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# THE HIBBERT JOURNAL

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THE  
HIBBERT JOURNAL

A QUARTERLY REVIEW OF  
RELIGION, THEOLOGY, AND  
PHILOSOPHY

EDITED BY

L. P. JACKS, M.A., D.D., LL.D.

AND

G. DAWES HICKS, M.A., Ph.D., Litt.D.

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THE

# HIBBERT JOURNAL

A QUARTERLY REVIEW OF  
RELIGIOUS THOUGHT AND

THE PROGRESS OF  
RELIGION

EDITED BY  
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## THE PROGRESSIVE PARTY :

A MOVEMENT TO RELATE DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT TO THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL NEEDS OF A DEMOCRACY.

THEODORE ROOSEVELT.

THE movement that resulted in the formation of the Progressive Party of the United States had in it many analogies to the movement that resulted in the formation of the Republican Party sixty years ago. But such movements are never mere repetitions of what has gone before, and this particular one had in it much to which there is no analogy in previous American history. The Republican Party was founded on one definite issue—the restriction of the area of slavery in the United States. By its mere entering into power it achieved this purpose, and the issue, in disappearing, created a new crisis. The party found itself faced by a totally distinct task, twofold, but equally definite—that is, the preservation of the Union, and, after a year or two, the abolition of slavery. There were thus in succession three sharply defined principles of overmastering importance as to which there was intense and open antagonism between the Republicans and their party opponents. As regards the Progressive Party the course of affairs has been different. The causes of revolt against the dominant political and industrial forces are as grave and the signs of revolt as widespread ;



but the evils are much more diffuse, much less susceptible of sharp distinction, and the remedies demanded are far more numerous and far less patent and striking in character.

The immediate cause of the break was the action of the machine bosses, and their masters, allies, and tools, at the Republican National Convention of June 1912, in depriving the rank and file of the Republican Party of their right to choose their own platform and nominate their own candidate. It was such barefaced and insolent wrong-doing, that in any event it would have forced a party bolt, and would not merely have justified but have rendered imperatively necessary the refusal of honourable men to take further part in or with the Republican Party until the dishonesty had been acknowledged and atoned for, and the dishonest agents expelled from the party leadership.

But the result in actual fact was more far-reaching. When once the swindle had been accomplished, the men who had been deprived of their just rights were forced to examine not only the action itself but the causes of the action; and no sooner had they done this than it became evident that the issues at stake were far greater than even the honest control of a party organisation, vitally important though this issue is. The men who stole the nomination at Chicago had no especial love for Mr Taft. Half of them scarcely took the trouble to conceal their contempt for him, and the great majority had been violently opposed to him four years previously. He was in their minds merely an instrument, or rather merely an excuse. Almost without exception the men of power who engineered the theft did so because they represented the forces of extreme reaction. They were for the most part professional politicians and big corporation lawyers, and they were carrying out the commands of the plutocracy, of the great financial forces whose social and political ideals are to be found in the ancient Phœnician trade oligarchies. I do not mean that these wealthy business men consciously take Sidon, Tyre, and Carthage as their models. Most of



them are not literary, and their knowledge of history is limited to what is recorded by the stock ticker. But they represent world-old forces. They insist, often with entire sincerity, that the only proper social system is one in which the business world is thrown open to a riot of unregulated capitalistic individualism. They demand that the successful moneymaker shall be in good faith accepted as the master, the ruler. They regard it as right and proper that all the rewards worth having in the profession of the bar shall be given to the clever corporation lawyer who makes himself most useful to the capitalist. They believe that all the rewards in politics should be given to the pushing, forceful, unscrupulous man, who is allowed and encouraged to make money in any way he wishes, and to talk in any way he wishes, provided that in times of crisis he can be relied upon to see that no laws are passed that will in any way interfere with the big capitalistic leaders, and that the police force is used to protect them from any outburst against their interests.

Unless the fact is thoroughly grasped that the nomination of Mr Taft represented the triumphant crookedness of the alliance between privilege in business and privilege in politics, the reason for the formation of the Progressive Party will not be understood. In the June Convention at Chicago, the leaders who usurped and retained the control of the machinery of the Republican Party were, for the most part, as I have said, big politicians and big lawyers who were doing the bidding of their capitalistic employers and favour-dispensers. The powers of privilege had made up their minds—unwisely, as I think, but definitely—that they would not permit the people, the rank and file of the party, to choose their platform and candidates for themselves; that at all costs the will of their political and financial masters should be imposed upon the people. The privileged class of politicians and capitalists came to this conclusion, which involved disastrous internal party warfare, precisely as in the cities of the ancient Mediterranean world the oligarchy so frequently came to the conclusion to face civil war rather than submit to loss of

power. In each case the motive was a resolute determination not to surrender privilege. The oligarchy which, by using the basest methods of machine politics, took possession of the Republican Party did so because it disbelieved in democracy, and had concrete material interests which could be served only by a continuance of the close alliance between business and politics. As regards matters of governmental machinery, these allied capitalists and politicians were peremptorily against every measure that gave the real control of affairs to the people as a whole. As regards the operations of government itself, they were against all action which either tended to take away privilege from the men of large means and great power, or which tended to secure against oppression the ordinary men and women who in an economic age need such protection by law—who need such protection precisely as in an age of militarism individuals of peaceful disposition need protection against bodily violence from individualists of another stamp.

When once the break had occurred, there followed the realisation that these were the underlying causes for the action of the numerous bosses, big and little, who had joined in the theft. Mixed with their indignation the men who had been deprived of their rights felt an unexpected sense of freedom. They were no longer hampered by the need of observing recent party traditions, and their own minds were freed as otherwise they never could have been freed. They grasped the fact that the wrong from which at the moment they were suffering had been committed at the demand of privilege. They made up their minds that they would strike at the real foe, that they would strike at privilege in business and politics alike, in the social and industrial no less than in the political world. This determination once reached, it was inevitable that they should see the next step, which was that the government must be actually related to the life of the ordinary man and the ordinary woman.

Therefore it was that the revolt against the evil machine practices of the bosses of the Republican Party widened into



the effort to put our politics on a cleaner and healthier basis, and above all to relate our governmental policies to the actual needs of our social and industrial life. This effort was formulated in the expression that we intended to strive for social and industrial justice. Such an expression is of course in one way a mere truism. But the effort practically to realise the expression is anything but truistic and commonplace. We gave in detail a number of laws for which we proposed to strive in order to realise this ideal, so that our platform was concrete and definite; and incidentally I may remark that there was not one promise that we made which it was not possible to carry out. Furthermore, we announced our purpose to establish the government within the party itself, no less than the government within the nation, on a genuine and thoroughgoing democratic basis. With this end in view the first step the party took, at its very inception, was one of good faith. We had issued our appeal not only to the men but to the women of the United States, for we felt that in our country things had moved forward so far that it was not only safe but desirable that the government should rest on a democratic base so genuine and so broad that it should include the women as well as the men of the country. Among the delegates to the First National Convention of the Progressive Party were women as well as men; one of them, Jane Addams, one of the leading personages in the Convention, seconded my nomination. It was a noteworthy gathering. Almost every class of the community was represented, always excepting the bread-and-butter machine politician, who is usually the dominant figure at such conventions. Catholic and Protestant, Jew and Gentile, white and black, native-born and foreign-born, man and woman, rich man and poor man, learned man and simple man—all alike were represented in the gathering at Chicago.

Indeed, the great lack was the lack of practical politicians, of men accustomed to the work of political organisation. There was also a very small representation of men of wealth. Moreover, ninety-six per cent. of the newspapers were against

us, so that the channels of communication to the public, if not choked, were at least used in such manner as to make it very difficult to get our position put fairly before our fellow-countrymen. About all we had was enthusiasm, disinterestedness, and, curiously enough, hard-headed common sense, so far as the policies we advocated were concerned.

The programme our party promulgated rang true. It was utterly unlike any platform ever put forth by any political party in America before; although the gathering itself was not unlike some of the gatherings of the Republican Party in the earlier days. The principles laid down were really merely the principles of Abraham Lincoln, applied to the present-day needs. Owing to the condition of things in the south we made but little progress there, and in the north we had to face the fact that the Democrats had made the strongest nomination they could have made, and went into the campaign with a nearly united party, confident of overwhelming victory, and of getting the spoils of victory. No man who expected any kind of material reward, or was susceptible to any material pressure, came with us. Under the circumstances our showing was remarkable. We beat the Republican Party by three-quarters of a million in the popular vote, and ten to one in the electoral vote; and in the majority of the northern states we ran a good second to the Democratic Party, and we carried some of them. Moreover, we forced both the Democratic and the Republican Parties, in spite of their bitter denunciation of us, to pay at least lip loyalty to certain of the principles we advocated.

These principles in their essence are simple. First and foremost, we believe in making the people really sovereign. There must be a sovereign somewhere. We know that there are countries in which that sovereign cannot be the people themselves. Sovereignty must always go with government, with control. Where people cannot themselves furnish that government and that control, where they have not the self-control upon which self-government rests, then the control



and the government must come from without. But we believe that in the United States it is the people themselves who can in the long run best govern themselves and their country. Down at the bottom the reactionaries who control both of the old parties disbelieve in this doctrine.

Such disbelief has existed among certain elements in our country from the beginning. As it cannot with safety be openly avowed, save under exceptional conditions, the usual policy of the disbelievers in democracy has been to make a show of giving the power to the people while actually depositing it somewhere else. Many worthy and respectable men, especially among big lawyers and big capitalists, sincerely believe in this policy; because at bottom they do not trust the people, they do not trust the democracy. The elaborate and complicated party machinery has lent itself to this policy, because under the American convention system sufficiently able and unscrupulous men, if they so wish, can always thwart the popular will—in the state conventions of both parties in New York State, for instance, the machine has never been overthrown in the last fifty years save in one case. Moreover, the legislative bodies can often be controlled in hidden ways. But although the powers of privilege often control both legislative bodies and party conventions, during the last thirty or forty years the chief reliance of the reactionary element, or, as it would call itself, the conservative element, has been the courts.

Under the Federal Constitution there has grown up the doctrine that the judges have the power to decide whether any law is constitutional, the law being null and void if the decision is adverse. In this respect American judges are law-givers, law-makers. In this respect their functions are legislative and political, not judicial. They stand alone among the judges of all the great industrial nations in the possession and exercise of these legislative and political functions; and the remedies I advocate affect the judges only in the exercise of these political and non-judicial functions. In the case of Federal laws and of many state laws, the ultimate decision as

to whether the people are to be permitted to have their will rests with the Federal judges, who are appointed for life, who are not elected by the people, who cannot be removed by the people, and who in practice cannot be controlled by the people. In theory, an improper decision of theirs can be overthrown by a Constitutional amendment. In practice, such an amendment can be passed only in wholly exceptional cases. The process of Constitutional amendment is very elaborate and complicated, and the remedy is extremely difficult to invoke. Except at the very outset of the formation of the government, and in the period immediately succeeding the Civil War, there have been less than half a dozen amendments to the Constitution adopted during the century and a quarter of its existence; whereas during that period the Federal courts have decided laws unconstitutional in hundreds of cases. In other words, the judge, who was not appointed to exercise legislative power, who was not elected by the people, who is not responsible to the people, and who is often wholly ignorant of the vital needs of the great majority of the people, is the final and irresponsible law-giver, the ultimate authority over the people. I believe the average Federal judge to be a man of high character and a good public servant. But I do not believe that any public servant should be permitted to exercise such a privilege as this. I do not believe that any public servant should, in the last resort, be permitted to impose his will upon the people. Such a doctrine comes perilously near being the doctrine of the divine right of judges, which is not one whit preferable to the doctrine of the divine right of kings.

The Progressive proposal is to restore the sovereign power to the people, where it rightfully belongs. We are not dealing with the ordinary functions of a judge; we are not dealing with any functions of a judge which in any way resemble the functions of an English judge, for instance: we are dealing only with the peculiar power of the American judge in reference to political issues. As regards this class of issues,



we propose that the people themselves shall have the power, after due deliberation, to say which of their two governmental agents represents their determination when in any given case the court declares that an Act passed by the Legislature is void, as being in contravention of the Constitution. We hold that the Constitution belongs to the people. They made it, and they fought for it. They paid for it with their blood in time of war; they support it by their money and their labour in time of peace. Theirs is the right, after due deliberation, ultimately to decide what it shall be held to mean in any given case where the Legislature and the court are in conflict as to what it does mean. Remember that we are not proposing to give to the American Legislature the power that the English Legislature has. We do not desire to go so far, for we think that the Legislature may misrepresent the people just as the court may misrepresent the people. We simply desire to restore or reassert the right of the people themselves ultimately to decide between the two governmental agencies, in the event that they differ as to their interpretation of what the people meant when they made the Constitution. Under our proposal there is no possibility of impulsive or hasty action. There is very much less danger of unwise action than if the power is left to be exercised absolutely by a little knot of well-meaning public servants who may be, and as a matter of fact often are, utterly ignorant of the ever-shifting, ever-changing desires and needs of the vast majority of their fellow-countrymen.

So much for making the sovereignty of the people real instead of nominal and fictitious. Now as to what shall be done with it. We believe that the objects we have in view can in part be obtained by legislation. We feel that the Government should be made the most efficient of all possible instruments for bettering the actual conditions of life and labour among the ordinary men and women who, in the bulk, make up the country. We do not intend to dogmatise too far in advance as to exactly what it will ultimately be necessary to do. The important thing is to take the three or four or eight

or ten steps which are immediately in front, and as to which we can be reasonably certain. What the hundredth step will be, or the two hundredth, we cannot say. The only way to find out is by actual trial and experiment, and by showing the old, old qualities, so commonplace in thought and so rare in action, of insistence upon moving in the right direction, together with refusal to move so far and so fast that we may suddenly find that we have gone in the wrong direction or else have damaged ourselves by mere speed and have to retrace our steps. Moreover, we will go with anyone who wishes to take the first steps with us, even although we may differ as to the likelihood of joint action with him concerning the hundredth step.

We Progressives are attempting a difficult task, for we are trying to get people to accept and act on truths instead of half-truths; and everyone knows that while a half-truth is usually very simple and very attractive, the whole truth is almost always complicated and rarely easy of apprehension. Moreover, the half-truth may, in its actual working, prove to be a particularly mischievous falsehood. In any given campaign, or any given emergency, the half-truth of the reactionary and the half-truth of the wrong-headed Radical may each command an ample following, so that there is little chance for the apostle of the whole truth to be heard; and yet it is this apostle whom alone it is safe to follow. Our task is to endeavour to make people understand that two half-truths, supposed to be fundamentally antagonistic, may really be complementary one to the other, so that each is useless, or even harmful, without the other. This is true of the fundamentals which lie at the bottom of our social system; such fundamentals, for instance, as practicality and idealism, or as individualism and collectivism—I use the word collectivism instead of socialism only because the word socialism frightens so many worthy people and is misused by so many wrong-headed people.

One man will advocate practical efficiency and another idealism, as if the two were in some way incompatible. Yet surely from the days of Alfred to those of Hampden, from the



days of Washington to those of Lincoln, the great movements for the advance of mankind have always been useful in much the proportion that those leading them and taking part in them combined a high idealism of purpose and spirit with a resolute common sense in translating this idealism into the terms of practical efficiency. There are plenty of men who admit this in theory—indeed, they must admit it if they will only think, for it is self-evident,—but it is rather disheartening to find how very large the number is of those who in practice disbelieve it.

There is much more reluctance to admit even in theory that collectivism and individualism are necessarily complementary to one another in social, industrial, and political life. Yet the only reason for not seeing this is that the problem is complicated. When the problem is as simple as that of a team in an athletic contest, or even as that of some special body of men doing a special work, such as an army, anyone will acquiesce in the truth of what I say. If in a football team or polo team any man asserted his fervent adherence to team-play as excluding all need of considering individual prowess, or *vice versa*, he would be regarded as of slightly unsound mind. No winning team can be developed on the theory that there is necessary antagonism between the two qualities. In an army the power to act collectively, which is what we mean when we make intelligent use of the word discipline, is essential. Yet there are races of such feeble fighting capacity that no amount of discipline will fit them to strive against those who possess a high average of individual fighting quality. There are other races whose refusal to submit to discipline or to recognise the need for coherent action has rendered the finest qualities of individualistic prowess useless from the military standpoint.

All this is so obvious that even to state it seems a banality. But, to judge by most of the socialist and anti-socialist literature of the day, it is very far from being a banality when the effort is made to apply it to our social system. Its acceptance is entirely incompatible with any belief in

thoroughgoing Marxian socialism—I use the word Marxian because socialism is a term so loose that accuracy of definition is necessary before praising or condemning any principle of action which is either praised or condemned as “socialistic.” There are men, claiming to be Simon-pure, scientific socialists, who demand equality of reward even where there is gross inequality of service ; than which there can be no graver social injustice. These men preach a drab monotony of condition and permitted achievement which would drive every soul worth saving into active revolt. They bend their thoughts to levelling, not up but down, in such fashion as would sweep away whatever of unselfishness and morality, and horror of greed and cruelty, humanity has already acquired in its stumbling and halting progress upward through the painful ages.

On the other hand, there are upholders of utter individualism and of merciless and unlimited competition who are blind to the fact that an absolutely uncontrolled individualism necessarily means such absorption of power—nowadays in the form of wealth—into the hands of a few very able and unscrupulous men as to mean that the mass of mankind would retain practically no power of individual initiative and expression whatever. An entirely unchecked individualism necessarily means, as regards the immense majority of people, the nearly complete elimination of all individualism. If anyone doubts this fact, I would refer him to the experience of many hundreds of thousands of men in the United States who have been employees or customers or business rivals of certain great trust magnates in the days of unlimited and uncontrolled competition.

Our proposal is to retain the maximum amount of individual initiative that does not itself mean more destruction than creation of individual initiative. Our proposal is to embody in government so much of socialism as will set the individual most free, as will serve as the foundation for an individualism both self-reliant and altruistic. If it is said that such ideals, though splendid, are vague, and that there are no practical steps to be taken toward their realisation, we answer



that the ideals have definite shape, and that we see not only the general direction to take in order to realise them, but many of the steps which should first be taken, and which being taken will enable us to take still others.

The useless injustices of the present system are readily illustrated by concrete examples. There are great masters of achievement in business in the United States, men who handle great insurance companies, great railroads, great department stores, great banking systems. But no one of these men has performed any such feat of business efficiency as that which is being performed at the present moment by the United States army engineer who is digging the Panama Canal, or which was performed by the United States officer of the line who so administered the island of Cuba as to fit it for independence. General Wood did his great work in Cuba, and Colonel Goethals is accomplishing his giant feat at Panama, on the modest salaries of American army officers. From Alexander Hamilton to Abraham Lincoln and Farragut and Sheridan, the same principle obtained. Farragut was a great admiral. He was entitled by the service he rendered to a much greater reward than the best of the skilled and formidable fighters among the enlisted men who served under him—and no man would have insisted so strongly upon this fact as these enlisted men themselves. He did receive a much greater reward. When he retired it was on a pension about ten times as great as the pension that any one of the many valuable enlisted men under him received. Such a difference was all right. But if the difference had been as great as that between the fortune of a great trust magnate and the fortune of some of the faithful and efficient men who work in the ranks under him, the disproportion would have been not ten to one but a thousand to one, and that disproportion would have been all wrong. Ten to one does represent in some sense a rough approximation of reward and service, and therefore it represents justice, and it would be utter injustice to have given the same reward to everybody aboard the *Hartford*. But the disproportion of

a thousand to one represents great injustice. There is no such difference in usefulness to the community between the trust magnate, even at his best, and the man who works for him far down in the ranks, as there is between the great admiral and the first-class gun-pointer or machinist; and where the proportion of reward is right in one set of cases, it is necessarily and obviously wrong in the other.

The President is one of the few American officials who are properly paid. If he is fit for his job he earns the big salary he gets. On the average, he ought to be one of the ablest men in the country, and two of our Presidents stand as the greatest men that the country has ever produced. There is and ought to be a very great difference in salary and in recognition between the President and any one of the men in the lower ranks of the Government service. But it is roughly proportionate to the difference of the service they render, and it is not one-hundredth part of the difference between the rewards of the great capitalistic employer and of the able man who works without capital.

We clearly recognise the injustices in the present social system. We do not for a moment believe that we have discovered any one panacea, or that we can discover any twenty panaceas, which will completely do away with them. But we have planned movements along very definite lines which will greatly reduce these injustices. We wish to strive for democracy in industry no less than in politics. This will leave room, and ought to leave room, for a wide inequality of reward, based on a wide inequality of service. But it will not leave room for a preposterously excessive and unjust inequality of reward, and it will attempt to do away with all privilege that comes without the corresponding rendering of service. We wish to give every man all that he earns, and we recognise that "earning" may take a myriad different shapes—Emerson, Hawthorne, Longfellow, and Poe "earned" a reward as emphatically as Fulton or Morse or Edison, and every healthy civilisation should give hearty recognition alike to the skilled



blacksmith and carpenter, the capable man of affairs, the big engineer, and the brilliant painter or writer or great man of science. All our contention is that no man should live on the earnings of anyone else without himself rendering service. We no more wish to deprive the Lincolns and Farraguts of industry of a proper leadership and reward than to deprive the Lincolns and Farraguts of civil and military life of such leadership and rewards. But we do wish in one place, as in the other, to secure a measurable equality of opportunity and a measurable proportion of reward to service.

It is not necessary in the HIBBERT JOURNAL to enumerate the steps that we propose taking. They range from heavily progressive inheritance taxes and a properly progressive income tax to workmen's compensation and old-age pensions; they include shifting the burden of taxation as far as possible to whatever yields an unearned increment, and insisting on a thoroughgoing governmental supervision and control over the business use of capital, especially in big combinations. The details are much less important than the spirit in which we are trying to work.

In the first place, we are utterly against anything that is vindictive. We no more countenance the idea that a man is necessarily wicked because he is rich than because he is poor. In the next place, we wish to see business prosperity, for the very reason that we wish to see that prosperity divided. We are against all limitation of efficiency; all we desire is to secure a proper division between capitalist and labourer of the joint rewards of efficiency. If the shareholder, who in modern times is so largely the unconscious employer, does not get proper dividends, he will not and cannot invest his money; and unless he invests his money, enormous important enterprises will not go on. We desire, as far as possible, to substitute co-operation for competition. Our purpose is open and declared to admit labour to its share of business management and business control, just so far and so fast as this proves practicable. We know that this means a long educational

drill, alike for employer and employed, for the wage-worker and the capitalist, no less than for the people as a whole ; and we are taking the first steps in that drill. Wherever, by co-operation developed into habits of thought and action, we can make the tool-user more the tool-owner, we desire to do so. Where this is impossible we wish the tool-owner to get a full reward, but we propose to establish over him such governmental regulation and control that a reasonable part of this reward shall go to the tool-user, and that the general public shall be fairly treated.

Finally and most important, we are not trying to destroy the old moral sanctions. We are trying to supplement them by the larger sanction of the new collective morality. We are trying to make them stronger and not weaker. We wish to establish the same moral law for the two sexes, but we wish to do it by raising the morality of the man, not by lowering the morality of the woman. We recognise fully that everything we do for the democracy will be futile unless the democracy acts for itself in a spirit of loyalty to itself and to the institutions it has created for the expression of its highest thought and purpose. We must have good laws, and, what is even more important, we must have popular fealty to the laws. We of the Progressive Party feel that much good will come from putting upon the statute-books the laws that we advocate. We believe that much good will follow if the Government enters on the path of policy which we have marked out. But we believe that most good will come from a changed body of public opinion, which will stand back of the laws and strengthen them and be strengthened by them. Assuredly a broader and deeper sense of brotherhood, combined with a higher and finer sense of individual responsibility, will grow in the souls of the men and women who in good faith, with cool sanity of judgment and burning fervour of soul, undertake the great task of bringing nearer the day of true democracy among the free peoples of the civilised world.

THEODORE ROOSEVELT.



## SOME LAYMEN'S NEEDS.

SIR FRANCIS YOUNGHUSBAND.

THIS article is intended to represent the point of view of those who from one cause and another have had to abandon most of the religious beliefs in which they were brought up, but who have afterwards discovered that underneath those discarded beliefs there lay revealed the deeper sources from which religion eternally springs, and from which they believe will now well freshly forth still truer, purer, sweeter, more invigorating religion than any that has gone before. It is also intended to show the pressing need of aid and guidance from every quarter which these men feel; for the deeper his religion, the more intimately in touch with his fellows does a man find himself, and the more urgently in need of that very best in others—here in this man and there in that—which he himself lacks in some particular.

On two fundamental questions they will especially value the advice of the deepest thinkers of the time—firstly, regarding the nature of that Power within us which makes for righteousness; and, secondly, regarding the nature of the goal or ideal towards which we should bend our efforts. What it is which so vitally affects our lives and impels us from within, and what it is we should make towards, are two questions in which practical men will always be crucially interested, and in the solution of which the greatest minds need to be continually exercised.

Most men who have had experience of life and have

thought at all over their experiences recognise that deep down at the back of things, working mysteriously through us, constraining us irresistibly at times, and impelling us we hardly know whither, is some great Animating Principle or Spiritual Power, upon which we all seem to depend as much as an electric light depends upon the generating force which gives it being.

The true and complete nature of this Motive Principle of the world from which each of us has sprung, and which, experience shows, binds us all by subtle and invisible strands in a common fellowship and a single unity, distinct and separate though each of us is from the other, must ever excite the interest of men. Is it all-powerful and bound of necessity in time to accomplish its end, or is it so limited by the conditions under which it has to work that the accomplishment of its end is uncertain? Has it any end? Is there any evidence of purpose in the Universe? And if the course of evolution and the exquisitely adapted means to ends in animals and plants do evidence the existence of some great purpose animating all living beings, is it necessary to assume that from the very first an ultimate end was definitely and consciously present in the mind of some Person; or may we suppose that things have proceeded in the mass as they proceed in our individual minds, a vague unrest giving rise to an impulse, and this again to a striving, the definite purpose of which is only at last discovered as, by a process of trial and error, first one end and then another fails to give complete satisfaction, and still the unrest? Again, is the Spirit to be regarded as possessing will and intelligence, and so as personal, acting indeed under conditions which he has imposed upon himself as men of honour would impose upon themselves limits of honour beyond which they would refuse to go, but with a moral end to which he is bound to lead us, his own manifestations and creations? Or is the Spirit an impersonal spirit such as we mean by the spirit of France, the conscience of Europe, the *esprit de corps* of a regiment—the spirit moulding and shaping the individual, but the individuals collectively forming the



spirit? Is it really a different and separate Person from ourselves, as a father is from his children; or when we speak of it as a Person, are we simply, for the sake of distinctness, personifying a spirit that is within us, as when we speak of Liberty or Justice or Britannia and make pictures and statues of them as persons we are only personifying for clearness the Spirit of Liberty or Justice or of Britain that is within us while we are well aware they do not actually exist as separate persons? And when we speak of the love of God, do we really mean loving a Person outside ourselves, or do we mean the love of Goodness as we love Liberty or Justice or England? And when we speak of God loving us, do we mean a distinct Person loving us, or do we mean the same as when we speak of England loving King Edward or Nelson?

Or does the analogy of the State give us any help in reaching a correct conception of the governing Principle of Things—as when we speak of the State ordering us in this way and that, confining our action here and encouraging it there, we know that it is really no separate person outside ourselves, but merely ourselves in our collective capacity? When we personify the Spirit of the Universe under the name of God, do we mean a really separate Person, or do we mean something indeed other and above us and ordering and directing our lives with certain limits, as the State is something other and above us but yet not really existing separate from and outside of ourselves?

Does the Spirit work from wholly outside ourselves as a builder works with his bricks, seeing that each is moulded to its appropriate shape and is fitted into its appointed place in the whole scheme of his designing? Or does the Spirit work entirely within men, creating men, and continuously creating by means of men, as Shakespeare created Hamlet from his own inner consciousness, and would, if he could, have given Hamlet the power of creating Othello, and of creating Othello with the power to create Macbeth, and so on?

It is to questions such as these that thinking men require an

answer. And the answers which the Bible gives to any such questions as to the nature of God differ as much as children do from grown men. At the commencement of the Old Testament the Power upon which man feels himself dependent is regarded as a God of strictly human aspect. He "walks in the garden in the cool of the day"; he curses the serpent "above all cattle and above every beast of the field"; he repents having created man, and says, "I will destroy man whom I have created, both man and beast and the creeping thing, and the fowls of the air; for it repenteth me that I have made them." But he changes his mind again and saves Noah, giving him minute directions as to the construction of the ark. He smells the sweet savour of Noah's burnt-offering. He is enraged at men building a city, and says, "Go to, let us go down and confound their language that they may not understand one another's speech"; and he then scatters them abroad from the city of Babel upon all the earth. He tempts Abraham. He talks with Moses. He hardens Pharaoh's heart. He advises the children of Israel to spoil the Egyptians, and he overthrows the Egyptians in the midst of the sea, so that there remained not so much as one of them. He is one among other gods, and jealous of these others. He waxes wroth and destroys those who worship other gods. But he likes being praised and flattered, coaxed and cajoled. He is, in fact, the very type of a capricious Oriental despot.

In the New Testament we have a far higher conception of God, and when we are told that God is Spirit and God is Love, and that the kingdom of God is within us, we have reached what many consider as nearly true a conception of the Spirit which is behind all as has yet been formed. But the conception of God as Father and in heaven is to some more difficult to accept. Most Christians, it may be admitted, find it intelligible and satisfying. But to others it conveys a sense of apartness. By heaven is generally understood some region in the skies. God is pictured as some person dwelling in the clouds and sitting on a throne. There



is a sense of distance and separateness. And the idea of a Father adds to this feeling. Fathers, though closely related to, are separate from, their children. They are distinct entities. Moreover, every father is also a son of some other father, and he of another, and so on, back and back to the ultimate source of things; and it is this very source that we are wanting to know about. To many it will seem that we are far more intimately and continuously connected with that source than any child is with his father. It will seem as if every moment of our lives energy was playing through us from that source—as if we were all as much connected with the original fount of things as the topmost sprays of a fountain are with the compelling energy which upraises them.

No one conception of the Motive Principle of the Universe has yet been found which will satisfy all people. Men and women of the highest intellectual ability and of the utmost rectitude have held many different views. They are all groping towards a more perfect conception—perhaps towards one which will give the idea of a Power working both in us and from above us—as love of country works both in patriots and from above them, creating patriots, while patriots in turn create it, the country loving the patriots, and the patriots loving the country, each, in a way, creating and inspiring the other. It cannot be supposed, therefore, that the question is yet finally settled. And plain men will distrust those who claim to know exactly what is the nature of the all-embracing energy at the back of things, and to have a complete knowledge of its actions and intentions. But they will attend to those clear and fearless reasoners who, with the most rigid intellectual honesty, will pursue the truth wherever it may lead; and they will listen also to those poetic souls who, from an unspotted purity of life, have the rare and treasured faculty of reaching truth by flashing deeply into the very core of things. And when these intuitions are tested by the criticism of reason, men will hope that more and more perfect truth will be reached.

But whatever the cause, and whatever may be the real nature of the Primal Energy in things, this one thing all religious men are agreed on, and it may be steadfastly laid hold of through the many perplexities of these great questions—this, that we are under an influence which makes for *good*. We may now and always have extreme difficulty in determining what is the nature of this influence and how it is that it acts upon us, but we have this to hold by steadily, that *something* does say to us quite decisively, “This is good and that is bad; and it is the good and not the bad that you must follow.” And this also is a fact we may cleave to, that the more deeply this influence is felt the more quickened is our sense of what is good and what is bad, and the more insistent is the impulse to reach not only the good but the very best. Whatever the source and whatever its nature, there is that within us which will not let us rest short of perfection. It may not give an assurance—though some think it does—that perfection will ever be achieved either by ourselves or by our successors. The weight of the Universe may be against us. But the point is that there is something compelling us to strive for perfection even if there is no positive certainty of reaching our goal, something which makes us rather chance the risk of failure than make no effort toward the best.

It may prove to be that neither we nor our successors will ever reach the glittering summits of the highest peaks. We know that the higher we ascend the more rarefied will be the atmosphere, the more difficult will it be to breathe, the more lonely and dangerous will be our position; and we know too that the unfeeling forces of Nature will be utterly regardless of our aspirations and may prevail against us, wither us as leaves, or mercilessly crush us in their giant grindings. Yet within us we have that which tells us it is better to have sought the highest, unattainable as it may prove to be, than never to have wrought at all; that it is better for mankind to strive after the best, even if Nature may eventually prevail and crush all consciousness out of them, than for



them to remain dull unheroic molluscs on the earth. We are quite sure that Captain Scott used his life as a man should use it, even though he did succumb before the relentless forces of Nature. And we may be likewise sure that we are right in aspiring after the highest even should it so happen that we are destined to be stamped out in the heartless operation of purely mechanical forces and that no future life lies before us. There is that stirring within men which, even with this drear possibility before them, drives them on to reach forward to the best; and that is a single and recognisable fact which a man can lay hold of, irrespective of the dogmas of any particular form of religion, and irrespective also of any lulling sense of comfort which may come from an assured conviction that all is bound of necessity to come well in the end.

Starting, then, from this plain and solid ground fact, which anyone may test by experience, that through mankind there is a drive impelling men to make the best and not the worst of themselves, which creates in them a dissatisfaction if they feel their lives have been wasted and have done no good in the world, and an intense joy when they know they have done some good, we have to determine the further point: what is the best—the very best of all?

And this is a difficult matter. What is the very highest peak, is not always easy to determine. We may set out with every intention of climbing the highest peak, but on reaching what we had thought to be the summit find that there are still higher heights beyond. Some will tell us that among these heights one peak is the highest; others will tell us a totally different peak is higher still. What is near seems higher than the more distant—though the more distant may in truth be incomparably the higher. To decide what is the best requires the greatest accuracy of observation, clear sight, and discriminating judgment. Before one who wishes to reach the highest sets out on his adventure, he goes to those who have surveyed all the peaks and with every precaution

possible determined the relative heights of all the so-far known peaks. And practical men who seek to reach, or even see, the very best likewise feel the necessity of going to those who, by clearness of vision and by fine reasoning, have settled with most accuracy which things among the many that are good are the truly best of all. They do not find it sufficient to be told that they must follow righteousness, obey their consciences, do their duty. For they know by experience that to determine what is best requires hard, clear, tense thinking and discriminating judgment as well as a conscientious desire to do what is right.

It is generally assumed that in the Sermon on the Mount and in the New Testament as a whole will be found what is the very best for us to follow. We are told that here is perfection and that herein is laid down the perfect ideal for all time, unsurpassed and unsurpassable. But not all assent to this view. To some it seems that more perfect ideals may well be formed—that the teaching of the Sermon on the Mount is *not* perfect. For through it all runs the idea of outside authority with its rewards and punishment—a thoroughly Oriental conception. We are to be good because we are told to be good, and because we will be rewarded if we are and punished if we are not. The incentive is to be the hope of reward and the fear of punishment. But there are those who consider that this is a flaw in any moral teaching—a basic defect—and that if the good is to be followed at all it should be followed for its own sake and not from any hope of reward, and that if evil is to be shunned it is to be avoided because it *is* evil and not from any fear of punishment. They would say further that we should bring about as much good as we can, even if we ourselves suffer for it, and even if we have no hope of compensation for our suffering by some reward in a life to come. And to pursue good for its own sake, without any idea of being rewarded in this life or in any other, seems a nobler conception than the idea of pursuing good with the hope of gaining a reward, if not now, at any rate



in another life. It also appears more reasonable and more acceptable to the ordinary man.

Nor would all men care for the reward which is offered—a place in heaven—if heaven is of the description given in the parable of the rich man and Lazarus. The rich man was sent to hell for no other reason that we are told than that he was rich. And the poor man went to heaven for no other reason than that he was poor. We are not told that one was wicked and the other good, but only that one was rich and the other poor. And heaven is described as such a place that, when the rich man was in hell and asked Abraham to send Lazarus that he might dip the tip of his finger in water and cool his tongue, Abraham simply told him that in his lifetime he had received good things and Lazarus evil things, and that now Lazarus was comforted and he was tormented. Here again there was no accusation against the rich man that he had done evil while Lazarus had done good. And then Abraham adds that, besides which, between heaven and hell there was a great gulf fixed, so that there could be no passing from one to another—even on errands of mercy. And when the rich man asked that at least Lazarus might be sent to the rich man's home to warn his brothers of this awful state of things, Abraham refused this request also, on the grounds that, as they had not listened to Moses and the prophets, neither would they be persuaded though one rose from the dead. And it may be noted that this Abraham was the man who in *his* lifetime had had a son by his wife's handmaid, and had then driven the handmaid and their son out into the wilderness.

Now, a state in which our fellow-beings must be left to suffer everlasting and excruciating torture throughout eternity for nothing worse than being rich and comfortable during their momentary life on earth, and in which we who are poor are left helpless to assuage our rich friends' sufferings by so much as a touch of a cooling finger-tip, or even to give effective warning to our rich friends' brothers of their nearly certain fate, is one to which surely not all Christians care to aspire.

Men often deplore the state of England to-day, but here we are at least *able* to help those who are suffering. We have no impassable gulf fixed between us and the sufferers. If we saw a rich man burning, we have at least the *power* to give him a cup of cold water. But in heaven, as illustrated by this parable, we would have no such power. Through all eternity we would have to look on helplessly at his sufferings. The pleasure of living in such a heaven is not a reward which all men would care to look forward to for their good deeds in this world. Even their present state seems better than that.

All this, however, concerns subsidiary points. What we are mainly concerned with at present is the question whether the New Testament, and especially the Sermon on the Mount, contains a perfect ideal, one which has no imperfection and to which nothing could be added to make it more perfect. Now, it is well known that authorities who have examined the New Testament candidly, and with this object in view, have discerned in it what they consider imperfections, and have suggested things which, *added* to the ideal therein contained, would make it more complete and hence more perfect.

To take no thought for the morrow, to judge not that we be not judged, to pluck out the eye or cut off the hand if they offend, to resist not evil—are all injunctions which have been adversely criticised by authorities worthy of attention. Throughout the Gospels the idea is conveyed that there is no need to be far-sighted as regards things of this world, to take long views, to exercise wise forethought, to work for centuries and generations to come. The whole impression given is that the kingdom of God is *at hand*, that the end of the world is on the point of coming—in the lifetime, indeed, of many of those whom Jesus was addressing,—and that therefore there was no necessity to look far into the distant future, or take thought for those who would follow us generations hence. But many consider this a defect and an error, and would criticise those who did not take most careful and anxious thought for the morrow. They would say that great harm is



done by fostering such a spirit of Oriental fatalism, and would argue that it is an urgent need that men individually and mankind as a whole should be persuaded to take far more careful thought than they do for the morrow. For the morrow does not take care of the things of itself, and men *have* to take thought what they shall eat, what they shall drink, and wherewithal they shall be clothed. The Gospel parable assumes that the birds of the air get their food and the lilies of the field grow without any effort; and no suggestion is made of the struggle for food and life they have to go through, and of the thousands which succumb in the struggle. Food does not drop into men's mouths without their making any effort. And if great minds were not now thinking out how the food-supply of the world could be augmented, future generations would starve. We who have had to fight famines in India know that because men of past generations did *not* take thought for the morrow millions of Indian peasants of the present day have starved.

The attitude of mind suggested by the Sermon on the Mount, of not being anxious about the future and of expecting the necessities of life to be provided for us without our designedly working for them, is by many engaged in the practical work of the world considered to be a decidedly wrong attitude to foster.

Another imperfection they believe they see is in the injunction to judge not that we be not judged, and in the grounds for that injunction, namely, that we ourselves shall be judged with the same judgment as we judge. The implication is that we have something to fear in being judged. And so most of us have. But we cannot deny that it is good for us to be judged and criticised by others, and good for others that we should criticise them. In public and in private life judgment and criticism are most valuable aids to good. All that can be said is that we should be just and fair in our judgments, and only make them with the direct and immediate object of furthering the good. But not to judge at all, and especially not to judge out of fear of being judged ourselves,

is by many considered a defective moral injunction, detrimental to high living.

What also is considered an imperfection is the tendency to depreciate the body and bodily passions. If the body offends, it is to be mutilated. "If thy right eye offend thee, pluck it out . . . and if thy right hand offend thee, cut it off." These injunctions are presumably not meant to be taken literally. But they do enforce a policy—the policy of suppression. If the bodily passions offend, they are to be suppressed, forced down, maybe eradicated. There is no recognition of their vital value, or of the fact that upon them all life is dependent. And there are those who consider this a grave deficiency in any moral teaching, and who hold that it is not the suppression of bodily passions that is desirable, but their transformation, transmutation, ennoblement, spiritualisation, and direction into good channels. If the eye offends, these would say, it should not be plucked out but turned away from what is bad and ugly, towards some object which is beautiful and good. And if the right hand offend, it should not be cut off but turned to some useful work.

The excessive disparagement of the rich for no other reason than that they are rich, and exaltation of the poor for no other reason than that they are poor, is also adjudged a defect. Experience among numerous races does not show that poor men as such are any better than rich men as such, or that riches in themselves are bad. There are as many bad poor men as bad rich men, and as many good rich men as good poor men. And riches as such are neither good nor bad. Riches may make men bad; but so, in actual experience, does lack of riches. And the urgency with which all Churches of every persuasion appeal for money, and the tenacity with which they defend what money they have when there is any question of disendowment, shows that they consider—and most men will say quite rightly—that riches are actually good—as means.

And here another defect in the Gospel teaching may be noted—the omission to mark the distinction between means



and ends. To pursue riches, or think about what we eat and what we drink and wherewithal we shall be clothed, as ends in themselves, is, we would admit, wrong; but to seek these things as means to some good end is wholly justifiable. The pure in heart are commended; and purity is of an importance which could never be overestimated—but only as a means, not as an end in itself. Only by those of the most spotless purity of heart and mind will the highest perfection be reached. But the most unsullied purity is of no value in itself. So the exaltation of such qualities as purity, humility, and meekness as if they were ends, and the excessive deprecation of riches and bodily requirements to which there is no objection as means, is an imperfection.

But the New Testament does tell us to love our neighbours as ourselves, and to do unto others as we would they should do unto us; and this, for the time and conditions in which it was said, was a very high standard to set up. As those who have lived among peoples in the stage of civilisation which the Jews in Palestine had reached two thousand years ago know, such men have little regard for their neighbours. When, therefore, men of such a stage of development were told to love their neighbours as themselves and to do unto others as they would themselves be done by, a great step forward had been made. Yet it cannot be said that the step represents perfection; for men have gone further still, and not in theory only but in actual practice. There have been many men, and probably still more women, who have loved their neighbours not merely *as* themselves, but far *more* than themselves; who have given up their lives, not only in death, but better still in life, for their neighbours—for loved individuals, for their country, for humanity. And they have not merely done unto others as they would that others should do unto them, but have done unto others a great deal more than they would ever expect others to do for them. Numbers and numbers of those who year by year, in church and chapel, read out this injunction do themselves go far beyond it in their own

devoted lives. And many have done this, not with a view to any subsequent reward in some future heaven, but simply and solely because they have loved their neighbours far more than they have loved themselves. Their noble actions have revealed to us a glimpse of a still higher state than that which the injunction aims at producing.

In many directions, then, we catch glimpses of what seems to be better still than the Gospel ideal. Inspired men of other lands and of other ages reveal to us vistas of heights beyond the height.

Our ideas of what is the very best thus grow and expand indefinitely, and yet as they grow we realise that any ideal must be of a most complicated character, and made up of many ingredients. We seem unable to fix on any one thing alone and say that that, and that only, will we follow; for even if we fix on Love we see that if we combined our enjoyment of Beauty with Love we should have found something better than Love alone. Here it is that the ordinary man requires so much more guidance than he receives at present. He wants those of the most sensitive and highly cultured natures to show him the nearest approach to perfection yet realised or conceived in each direction. He may be fortunate enough, by special aptitude or training, to have attained the furthest yet reached in some one line, but he will realise only the more clearly how much he depends on others for illumination on different lines. He may have the highest attainments in one branch of knowledge, but he will for this very reason realise how ignorant he is in other branches. And however much knowledge he may have, he will recognise how deficient he is in, say, the appreciation of Beauty. And if he has some capacity for enjoying the beauty of painting or sculpture, he may yet feel his lack of appreciation of the beauties of music, or of poetry, or of literature.

And then he wants the guidance of the best philosophers in forming his judgment on the relative values of all these things, and in settling their appropriate places in the complex



ideal. He sees, for instance, that Freedom is of no use unless he has some idea of the purpose for which he wishes to be free, whether to enjoy the beauties of nature and of art, or the pleasure of human intercourse, or with what other object; and unless he is also previously endowed with a stiff enough fibre of character to bear the strain of the tremendous responsibilities which freedom entails. He knows the value of a noble character, but he wants to know if character should be regarded as the ultimate end, or only as the approximate end and as a means to some further end. He experiences joy in the contemplation of some object of surpassing beauty, and he wants to know whether such enjoyment of beauty is a comparatively trivial thing in life, or whether it should be fostered, cherished, and enriched as a thing of permanent value.

Upon the answer to such questions as these depends the entire course of an individual's or a nation's life. Men have to act one way or another; and with more or less definiteness in their minds they have to act upon their estimate of the value of things. What they prize most they will most actively pursue. The English specially value Character, the French Beauty, the Americans Freedom, the Chinese Wisdom. Each man or nation will have a special bent in one direction, and upon the line of his own bent will probably act best. But proportion will be given to his ideas, and the harmony of the whole will be best promoted, if he can be wisely advised as to where in the true scale of things the objective of his particular line lies.

In the consideration of the two great problems which beset every man: what is the nature of that Principle or Person which governs the Universe, and what is the goal towards which the Universe tends—what is that which is impelling us, and towards what are we being impelled, or towards what should we direct our way,—most men seem to find a sufficient and conclusive answer in the Bible. But there are some, and probably an increasing number, who find there no such com-

plete answer as they require. The conception of God therein contained is not to them an adequate conception, and the ideal therein set up is not to them a perfect ideal. Each seems to require enlarging in width and in depth to meet the requirements of the fuller knowledge and experience of the present day. Conceptions formed by and adapted to a small people two thousand years ago could not be expected to suit the more widely experienced people of the present time. And on these two great questions of the Source from which arise all the mighty impulses of life and of the Goal towards which we should direct our efforts, many now look for a nearer solution to leading thinkers of the *present* day, believing that out of the experience of the past and the accumulated knowledge and wisdom of the ages they will be in a better position to arrive at the truth than any that have gone before.

It is beyond dispute that in the first century of our era the spiritual forces of mankind were quickened to an unprecedented degree. An immense impulse forward was given, and the moral sense was made more delicately sensitive than it had ever been before. All this is unquestionable; and that mankind will derive lasting benefit from the impulses thus given is certain. But what those who mix with men of other religions, who study their beliefs and the origin and history of these beliefs, cannot allow, is that the spiritual impulses of the first century in Palestine were different in kind from the experiences in other times and in other countries, or that what men then said and did was perfect and wholly incapable of improvement in any respect. They see what they consider to be similar movements occurring to-day under our own eyes. They see what seem to them higher ideals being set up, even in our own country. And they think it of overwhelming importance that nowadays, when we have so much more intimate contact with peoples of other religions than we have ever had before, they should have the benefit of the guidance, advice, and leadership of the ablest and most unbiassed thinkers of the time. The opinions of such men can, of course, be found in



books of varying degrees of intelligibility to the ordinary man. But what is so desirable is that they should be as easily and readily available as are the opinions of the official clergy.

Those men especially who have been out in the world and have lived their lives among men of other religions, feel the inadequacy of the guidance usually given by the Churches, and seek advice and help outside. They feel that most Christian priests, like the priests of all other religions, regard their particular sacred book as containing the fully matured, final, and perfect flower of religion, when in reality it only contains the germ, which still requires to be matured. They therefore look outside for guidance—to poets and philosophers, to public men and the public press, to literature and to art. And these men's need is urgent, for they have found by experience that even among men of other religions the higher European nations are looked to for a lead. More than is realised at home, we of Western Europe set the standard for far-distant peoples. And it is of vast importance for our influence that we should be recognised as a religious people, and that men who go out among peoples of other religions should themselves have a religion which can be to them a living faith.

We are a religious people—in the opinion of some, one of the most deeply religious peoples in the world. And we are, some also think, on the eve of a religious awakening in which we shall be incomparably more deeply stirred than we are by the passing political questions of the day. But it is to men who are not tied by already fixed formulæ that we shall have to look—to men who have imbibed the germ of religion that lies in the Bible and have let it germinate and fructify within them, and who now express their own religion in their *own* way. We do not care to hear only those who are bound to a fixed creed. We like also to have the continually advancing views of those who recognise that the most fundamental questions are still open, still need discussion, still require clearing up.

The crass, harsh, purely materialistic reasoner without a touch or tinge of emotion, human or divine, men of the wide

world will distrust as much as they do the mere sentimentalist who refuses to test and verify his intuitions beside the canons of pure reason or the actual realities of life. But what they hope is that in this great age, when life is wider, fuller, more varied than it has ever been before, men worthy of the times may arise who will also make it more intense. They pray that poets, preachers, philosophers, men of art may come forth who will infuse mankind with an ever-growing religion, redden the life-blood in our veins, clear our vision, and set our passionate impulses glowing with a new and sacred radiance. They trust that the most acute and earnest philosophers will rigorously chart out the course which we should navigate; that the most inspired poets will weave for us ideals by which to steer our way; and that preachers with burning spiritual fervour, hot from the central furnace of the world, will instil into us a forcefulness which will carry us unfalteringly to our goal. And they hope that these will bring religion not only for the poor and needy, but for the great world-workers as well; and not only comfort for the weary, but inspiration for the brave leaders of mankind, and encouragement and support in the full strain and altitude of their responsibilities.

Then, perhaps, we may look forward to a time when, on each day of the week and not on Sundays only, men will crowd into sanctuaries to hear the wisdom, not of one time and of one people, but of all time and of all peoples, expounded by the deepest thinkers of the day—women as well as men—and delivered, unfettered by any previous vows, as their own message to men of their own time in their own circumstances; to listen, also, to the words of the most inspired poets joined to the most heavenly music; to hear those still deeper things which no words can tell, but music alone can whisper to the soul; and to be sent back into the practical life of the world brightened by a fresh vision of what might be, braced as only contact with the great can brace us, and clothed with that serenity which those in touch with the Infinite alone can teach.

FRANCIS YOUNGHUSBAND.



## THE RELATION OF MYSTIC EXPERIENCE TO PHILOSOPHY.<sup>1</sup>

SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK.

So many varying conceptions and descriptions of mysticism are to be found in respectable authors that it seems needful to state what I mean by mystical experience for the purposes of this paper. A logical definition of that which, if it is anything at all, transcends dialectic, is obviously not to be expected. But the main point—at all events the point of metaphysical as distinct from physiological or moral interest—is the conviction of direct and immediate communication, independent of any sensuous perception, with intelligence not bound by the conditions of the sensible universe. By this we exclude abnormal communications, if we believe that there is adequate evidence of any such, between human minds or between a human mind and the consciousness of any other terrestrial or astral creature. Moreover, we imply that sundry characteristic phenomena in the experience of mystics, which are sometimes thought necessary or sufficient to determine its character, are only incidental, or even accidental. These incidents vary with the temperament, education, and dogmatic and other moral surroundings of the subject. It is common knowledge that the great mystics themselves have never regarded any particular signs as conclusive; on the contrary, they have warned novices, over and over again, of the need for scrutinising visions, auditions, and the like with cautious and even jealous criticism. I am not sure that it is wise even to assume that

<sup>1</sup> A paper read before the Oxford Philosophical Society.

any such epithet as "religious" is universally applicable to this kind of experience. It seems to me that, if we do so, we shall be in some danger of unduly narrowing the field of useful observation, unless we are prepared to expand our concept of religion to an extent that very few theologians and not many philosophers would allow. No doubt the original sense of the Latin word had much more to do with *tabu* than with doctrine, and in the Romance languages and in English it seems to have made a fresh start from a limited technical usage. We read of men being in or entering into religion as members of an order bound by vows before, though not much before, we get the wider sense of "*ensemble de doctrines et de pratiques qui constitue le rapport de l'homme avec la puissance divine*" (Littré, *s.v.*); and in the Oxford English Dictionary the significations are arranged accordingly. Littré's definition, again, is already not wide enough to take in Buddhism as we have learnt to know it, and the hands of posterity will not easily be tied by any definition we can make now. But, for the matter in hand, it is better to leave questions of this kind open. I will only add that competent students rank Joan of Arc high among the mystics, and yet her mission was neither religious nor philosophical, and I never read that she was exercised about her own soul at all.

It may be worth while, however, to note that the psychology of mystical experience has its analogies in the works of purely secular reason. Anyone who has tackled a stiff subject with the intention of getting as near the bottom as he could must be a lucky man indeed if he has never passed through stages of something resembling in quality, if not in intensity, the "dryness" or "dark night of the soul" so familiar in mystical writings, and unfortunate if he has not also known the relief and delight of a sudden clearing. William James quotes Philo as saying, "Sometimes, when I have come to my work empty, I have suddenly become full."<sup>1</sup> Surely most of us

<sup>1</sup> *Varieties of Religious Experience*, p. 481. The quotation is there at second hand; there is no reason for pursuing it to the original.



know what it is to come to one's work empty, whether the problem was in history, law, physics, or philosophy. There are days of incubation when the data seem formless and elusive, like a heap of dry sand; when the wheels of the brain seem to turn creaking slowly in a void, and bite on nothing; when reason maintains that something is bound to come out, but one cannot feel as if it would be anything but some dressing and patching up of old unsatisfying forms. Another day comes when, all at once, without any new effort, a ray of light falls on the scattered grains at an unexpected angle, and they are crystallised into stones, and take shape as a structure, and one feels, not that one has made it so, but that it was so all the time, and only waiting to be seen. Of course, it by no means follows that a result so presented is right, or even the best that could be had with the means then and there available. It is conditioned by the worker's capacity; but, if I mistake not, it is likely to be the best of which he is capable. This may very well mean that the work has got itself done in the back of one's head (a short English phrase which may go near to be literally correct for anything we know, and which at any rate is better English than talk of subliminal consciousness); and anyone who likes may use the fact as an argument that mystical experience is nothing but a heightened perception of some similar process. On the other hand, it is at least as good an argument that the process need not be illusory or in unreal matter because it cannot be exhibited in dialectic analysis. For it is certain that in many such cases the matter is of a perfectly verifiable kind, and the result can be appraised by the usual tests. If that result helps to make the facts more intelligible, whether they are decided cases, or the peculiarities of a group of charters, or the atomic weights of elements, it is at least good for something. If there is any burden of proof, I rather think it is on those who hold that mystical experience is nothing but an illusory imitation or morbid emotional development of genuine intellectual operations. Independent proof that the mystic's

experience has no real contents would drive us to some such explanation. To assume that no proof is required is to beg a very large question.

But I do not propose to argue the point that there is, at any rate, a question worth considering. All experience is, in the last resort, its own warrant. The trouble is to know where experience ends and disputable inferences begin. Here we have a unique kind of experience—not without analogies, as I have shown, but unique as a whole—vouched for by a good many persons widely separated by time and distance, who were in all ordinary affairs perfectly sane, often of marked ability, by no means always dwelling among credulous neighbours or under any external predisposing influence. As the Mauláná-i-Rúm said, the sun beareth witness of the sun. If, however, we grant that the mystics are all similarly and independently deluded, then their experience is reduced to a class of psycho-physiological facts which may be of considerable interest in human psychology, but have nothing to do with metaphysics, and are equally indifferent to all schools of philosophy : which is as much as to say that the title of this paper becomes unmeaning. Those who have made up their minds that we are talking of a chimæra cannot be expected to take any interest in discussing what kind of second intentions are that kind of chimæra's prey. Therefore I take leave to assume that the whole matter is not disposed of by using "mystic" and "visionary" as terms of disparagement, or by showing—what the mystics themselves have known as well as anyone—that visions and ecstasies are fallible in many cases. Beyond that, I demand no more than the virtue of an *if*, so much as will make it reasonable to ask : If the claim of mystical experience is to any extent accepted, what difference does it make to philosophy ?

We may premise, by way of abundant caution, that, whatever else the mystics give us, it will not be positive confirmation of any one dogmatic system. Romanists and Protestants, Hindus and Moslems are of the company, and within each



faith divers degrees of orthodoxy and manifest or suspected heterodoxy are represented. Plotinus at one end and William Blake at the other cannot be ruled out because one of them was a heathen Neo-Platonist and the other a Christian so eccentric as to refuse to be fitted into any system whatever. The only inference we can draw is that every one of the seers expressed his insight, naturally and inevitably, in a form conditioned by the terms and symbols which were familiar to him. To borrow an apt phrase from Professor Gilbert Murray, they are all trying to say the same ineffable thing. Whoever is convinced that any one form is better than the rest must base his conviction on some independent external ground. The mystics themselves are not in accord on the question whether any such grounds can be assigned. Jalálu'ddín Rûmî denied it. "The man of God is beyond infidelity and religion"; he will not take his rule from the church or the synagogue or the mosque. On the other hand, I cannot think that John of the Cross, if he had heard of Jalálu'ddín, would have admitted having anything in common with him; I am not sure that even the boundless charity of our own Julian of Norwich would have gone so far. Let us return to our proper field.

Is there any scheme of philosophy or habit of philosophical thought with which the truth of mystical experience is plainly incompatible? One is tempted to answer offhand: Yes, there is materialism. This, however, seems on reflection to involve a fallacy very common in popular discourse, but not fit to be allowed among historical students—namely, the supposition that materialism cannot be held along with belief in a rational order of the universe. It was so held by the Stoics, who were at the same time pantheists and materialists. Their world-soul was made of a finer kind of matter. Some of the early Christian fathers, too, thought the soul material; Macarius, a notable mystic, following the Stoic doctrine; others, if I mistake not, in the cruder fashion that passed into mediæval art. Then we have in our own household Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury, a

thorough-going materialist, a theist, and after his own fashion, though an odd fashion enough, an Anglican. He would admit nothing to be real that did not occupy space; "substance without dimension" was for him a contradiction in terms, and "whatsoever hath dimension is body, be it never so subtile."<sup>1</sup> This does not seem to require as a logical consequence that the subtle body called soul can receive no impressions except through the regular channels of sense. Ethereal vibrations might conceivably reach it in other ways, and there is no obvious reason against fitting telepathic intercourse into a Hobbist frame of the universe any more than against finding room for wireless telegraphy. Between human and super-human intercourse of that kind it is only a matter of degree. No doubt many modern physiologists would say that there is no corporeal soul, "be it never so subtile," other than the nervous system. But that is only a dogmatic assertion, which a modern physicist might well repudiate as a survival from the time when atoms were ultimate, ether a mere mathematical hypothesis, and electrons unthought of. Thomas Hobbes would have looked long before he found a mystic whose revelations were orthodox according to the orthodoxy of Leviathan. But if such an one could be found, I do not see what violence would be done to Hobbes's cosmos by accepting him. Not that, for my own part, I regard any such imaginary construction as probable or plausible. But that is because, for independent metaphysical reasons, I regard materialism as untenable—indeed, as being the one scheme of the universe admitting downright disproof. Berkeley is still good enough for me on that point. Materialism is tied to the ground of natural history, or rather is natural history pretending to be philosophy. As I said in an old university extension lecture on Hobbes,<sup>2</sup> "the most complete natural history leaves us as much outside the problems of metaphysics as we were before. . . . Thought and

<sup>1</sup> *Elements of Law*, part i. ch. ii. §§ 4, 5.

<sup>2</sup> *National Review*, September 1894.



feeling can be represented in terms of matter and motion only by forgetting for the time that matter and motion are themselves functions of consciousness." Holding this to be the sound view, I do not think mystical experience, however interpreted, can add anything to it, though certainly it does not take anything away.

Immaterialists will naturally expect to find that attempts to construct a coherent materialistic philosophy cannot escape assimilating something of what their authors profess to repudiate, and that those authors are driven by a λόγος stronger than themselves into some form of pantheistic indifferentism. One rather common sign of this process is when a professed despiser of metaphysic begins to quote Spinoza. But this again does not make for our immediate purpose.

If, then, mystics (including in that description all who take mysticism seriously whether from their own experience or from report) can be and have been materialists, much more can they hold any form of dualism or idealism. So far as our modern categories will fit mediæval philosophy, the official European doctrine of the Middle Ages was dualist, varied by occasional individual excursions towards pure idealism. In fact, plenty of good schoolmen were mystics or showed a mystical disposition, and it would be pedantic to offer demonstration of a fact so notorious. The name of Dante is enough. It is equally the fact, however, that the mystical temper often led to pretty hard straining on the scholastic leash. The sense of being made one with a transcendent object is its uniform note, and such an object is not easily conceived as other than universal. As Blake put it in the fewest words, "less than All cannot satisfy man." Thus we may expect, and in fact we find, a certain apparent drift towards some sort of monism running steadily through mystical speculation. This is most marked when we turn from Europe to Asia. The Súfis were thoroughgoing monists, and the only difficulty in finding a pointed illustration is to choose among hundreds or thousands

of equally emphatic passages accessible to Western readers. Hear this one verse of Jalálu'ddín Rúmí:

“I have put duality away, I have seen that the two worlds are one;  
One I seek, one I know, one I seek, one I call.”<sup>1</sup>

However the Súfís came by this attitude, they certainly did not get it from any official teaching in their own religion, or from the general atmosphere of orthodox Moslem piety. They were constantly on the verge of reputed heresy, sometimes beyond it. We find almost identical utterances in India: “Cast away utterly the knowledge of division” (Śankara Áchárya), and the like. In the atmosphere of Indian speculation this is quite natural; for in the early Middle Ages at latest the Vedánta school, which, though not claiming exclusive authority among professed Brahmanic scholars, has in the main prevailed, had worked out a strictly monistic doctrine. Indeed, it would appear, to the merely Western student at any rate, all but impossible to distinguish clearly between the mystic and the dialectic motives in Hindu philosophy. Mysticism being so intimately associated with Brahmanic systems, it was perhaps equally natural that the Buddhist teachers, while not actually condemning it, insisted on keeping it in a rather subordinate place. One might think at first sight that there is no room for it anyhow in a scheme of the universe which denies the existence of a soul, immaterial or material. But we must remember that the individual self which Brahmanism affirms, and calls the Buddhists heretical nihilists for denying, is quite different from the “empirical ego” with which Western popular philosophy tends to confuse it offhand. For Buddhist and Brahman alike the only real continuity between successive lives is in the balance of merit and demerit left over from each life and determining the conditions of the next. The Brahman holds that the customers of the eternal bank whose items of account are good and evil works persist when a life’s account is closed

<sup>1</sup> *Selected Poems from the Diváni Shamsi Tabriz*, edited and translated by Professor Nicholson, Cambridge, 1898, p. 127.



and a new one opened with the balance; the Buddhist says that an account which can automatically carry itself over from life to life is equally capable of creating the customer, and there is no need to postulate any soul at all. This makes no difference whatever to the possibilities of actual experience. In the farther East, in point of fact, popular or semi-popular Buddhism has developed its own mythology of extra-human beings in a hierarchy ranging from Bodhisattvas to devils—but devils not past conversion—and for all practical purposes as flamboyant and polytheistic as anything in Hinduism. It has even produced a Madonna-like goddess, or so it seems to us in the West; but I am told that the deity in question is really more like a sexless archangel. However that may be, she or it is one of the most charming figures in Chinese and Japanese religious art. But philosophy is choked in this jungle of wild though sometimes beautiful imaginations, mixed as it is with many foreign and archaic elements, and we must leave the miraculous transformation of Avalokiteśvara-Kwannon to the comparative mythologists if they can find anything to compare with it.

Further, we may note in the leading reports of mystical experience a fairly persistent undercurrent of scant respect for the category of Time. One cannot talk of any definite affirmance or denial of an ultimate metaphysical proposition, but a certain rebellious temper is evident. The mystic's ideal world looks like a world in which time no less than space is transcended. This appears, again, to entail a rather poor opinion of man's desire for immortality in the popular sense, meaning thereby continued existence of the conscious self in time, and for an indefinite time, after the death of the body. Such tendencies can hardly be explained as natural and probable incidents in superstitious delusion; for they are flatly contrary to the assumptions and contents of all vulgar eschatology. Life eternal is conceived, by a great majority of those who profess to believe in it, as a good time extended without limit under conditions analogous to those of terrestrial

life, but without the drawbacks, and they are neither able nor willing to conceive it otherwise. Again, the tendency now before us, like the tendency to universalism, has for the most part, in Western lands at any rate, been unofficial or even unorthodox. The movement is, so to speak, against the normally prevalent wind and current.

This, of course, proves nothing. It is possible that in some unknown way the disposition for mystical experience (of which, so far as I know, there is not any assignable mark other than the actual occurrence) may be connected with an intellectual disposition towards universalist and transcendental conceptions. But we are confronted here with a much more concrete and remarkable check to dogmatising. William James, a believer in mystical experience, was also a strong individualist and even a cosmical pluralist, and refused accordingly to give more weight to any mystic's disparagement of individual personality than to any other disputable matter involved in the form and expression of his testimony. Moreover, he thought it an open question, for aught I can see, whether the object of the experience might not be any one of several gods or dæmonic beings. It might be too curious to inquire whether, on James's principles, we should not contemplate the possibility of genuine, independent, and not necessarily concordant revelations from more than one quarter. William James, moreover, believed in the reality of time with an intensity as nearly fanatical as his genial nature would admit. Mr M'Taggart's pluralism would no doubt save his life in James's philosophic republic, despite his blasphemies against Time: it is far from clear to me that he would be allowed to live there as a free citizen.

On the whole, then, I think we reach no decided conclusion. Broadly speaking, a Platonist is more likely to become a mystic than an Aristotelian, and some forms of later metaphysical speculation appear to have special affinities for mysticism; but we have no warrant for saying that there is any such thing as an exclusive or definite mystical



philosophy. Thus the saying of the Mauláná-i-Rúm which I have already quoted is justified in yet another sense. *Mard-i-khudá zán suwi kufr ast u dín*: The man of God is beyond infidelity and religion.

Philosophy, to be sure, is concerned with mystical experience as it is concerned with all experience and all facts collected from experience—namely, as part of a universe assumed to be intelligible. It may be added that mystical experience is ultimately like all other experience in being incommunicable. I cannot be certain that my sensation, say, of a particular shade of green on looking at a certain stuff in a certain light, is in itself exactly similar to any other man's. We can only judge by communication and inference that we are more or less similarly affected. Neither is mystical experience unique in the fact that not all mankind are capable of it. For an approximately known proportion of persons generally sound in body are colour-blind, and many persons who are sensible to form and harmony in language have no ear for music. Some philosophers appear to think that mysticism is in itself and necessarily a species of false philosophy; but I do not see where the danger of false philosophy lies, unless a mystic chooses to construct a theory of his experience and constructs a wrong one. If all or nearly all mystics did construct the same kind of theory, and it could be proved erroneous, that might be a reason, whether strictly logical or not, for dismissing the whole matter as unprofitable. And if and so far as any mystic claims to set up his own interpretation of things not verifiable by reason (or, for that matter, a dogmatic interpretation of things admitted or verifiable) as a substitute for philosophy or a short cut to dispense with dialectic, philosophy may well censure him. But so may even a great musician enounce very disputable theories about his art, and this does not entitle a man who has no ear to deny that there is any such thing as music.

In this paper I have not sought to maintain any thesis;

but if I did offer one, it would be that the philosophical bearing of mysticism has been misunderstood by superficial modern criticism in much the same sort as the mediæval doctrine of the law of nature, and mystical thought, like that doctrine, has on the whole had a rational and anti-dogmatic operation.

FREDERICK POLLOCK.



## “THE FREE MAN’S WORSHIP.”

### A CONSIDERATION OF MR BERTRAND RUSSELL’S VIEWS ON RELIGION.

PROFESSOR PRINGLE-PATTISON.

THE peculiar note of despair and defiance evoked in a finely strung nature by a sheerly materialistic creed has been illustrated afresh in contemporary thought by Mr Bertrand Russell’s striking essay on “The Free Man’s Worship.”<sup>1</sup> Mr Russell has given us an instructive sequel to this paper, in a second essay on “The Essence of Religion,” which appeared in the *HIBBERT JOURNAL* of last October. As literature, these essays are among the most brilliant of recent contributions to philosophy, and the significant, though apparently unconscious, change of front executed by the author in the second essay makes the two papers, read in conjunction, a very interesting philosophical document. I propose in the following pages to examine Mr Russell’s argument and the logical coherence of his position.

The highly wrought rhetoric and the Promethean defiance of the first paper, as well as its title, might suggest a certain Byronic pose, as if the author were too consciously striking an attitude. But the lyrical intensity of many passages, and the nobility of the general outlook, stamp it unmistakably as an expression of intimate personal feeling. The poignancy of the situation arises from the writer’s acceptance of the unqualified materialism which he imagines to be forced upon us by the

<sup>1</sup> This paper appeared in the *Independent Review* for December 1903, and has since been republished in the author’s *Philosophical Essays*, 1910.

teachings of science. "That Man is the product of causes which had no prevision of the end they were achieving; that his origin, his growth, his hopes and fears, his loves and his beliefs, are but the outcome of accidental collocations of atoms; that no fire, no heroism, no intensity of thought and feeling, can preserve an individual life beyond the grave; that all the labours of the ages, all the devotion, all the inspiration, all the noonday brightness of human genius, are destined to extinction in the vast death of the solar system, and that the whole temple of Man's achievement must inevitably be buried beneath the débris of a universe in ruins—all these things, if not quite beyond dispute, are yet so nearly certain, that no philosophy which rejects them can hope to stand. Only within the scaffolding of these truths, only on the firm foundation of unyielding despair, can the soul's habitation henceforth be safely built." "A strange mystery it is," he adds, "that Nature, omnipotent but blind, in the revolutions of her secular hurryings through the abysses of space, has brought forth at last a child, subject still to her power, but gifted with sight, with knowledge of good and evil, with the capacity of judging all the works of his unthinking Mother." The severance of fact and ideal is here complete. Man is the outcome of "an alien and inhuman world," alone amid "hostile forces," powerless "before the blind hurry of the universe from vanity to vanity." And so Mr Russell proceeds to set over against one another the worship of Power and the worship of Goodness. The worship of the savage begins in servile homage to naked power; but with the growth of the moral ideal there awakens the feeling that to be worthy of worship the Power must be good. And as this feeling grows in strength, it produces the ordinary religious position which maintains "that in some hidden manner the world of fact is harmonious with the world of ideals. Thus Man creates God, all-powerful and all-good, the mystic unity of what is and what should be." "But the world of fact, after all, is not good"; and so we are confronted with the dilemma, "Shall we worship Force, or



shall we worship Goodness? Shall our God exist and be evil, or shall he be recognised as the creation of our own conscience?” In the latter alternative, Mr Russell urges, “lies Man’s true Freedom.”

At first the opposition of fact and ideal naturally engenders a spirit of revolt and hatred—a Promethean indignation against the tyranny of Fate, or, as we might say, the fundamental iniquity of the world. But indignation is still a bondage, and it may even be said to spring from the fierceness of personal desires to which the universe refuses satisfaction. A further step, therefore, must be taken, and that is the renunciation preached by the great religions, that complete surrender of all personal claims which can alone emancipate us from the tyranny of Fate. With the death of the finite self a new attitude towards the universe and the tragic facts which make up human life becomes possible—the impersonal attitude of the thinker and the artist. The liberating function of art has been celebrated by Schopenhauer, who held a similar view of the unreason and wrong of the actual world; but by no one has the world of the creative imagination been more nobly hymned as a refuge of the suffering soul than by Mr Russell in the short compass of this essay. And his view of tragedy as “the most triumphant” of the arts is truer both to art and to life than the facile optimism of “happy endings” and “virtue rewarded,” which would impoverish the universe by depriving it of some of its grandest features. So much one may say without subscribing to Mr Russell’s philosophic position in general. “To take into the inmost shrine of the soul the irresistible forces whose puppets we seem to be—Death and change, the irrevocableness of the past, and the powerlessness of man before the blind hurry of the universe from vanity to vanity—to feel these things and know them is to conquer them.” “The slave is doomed to worship Time and Fate and Death, because they are greater than anything he finds in himself, and because all his thoughts are of things which they devour. But, great as they are, to think of them greatly, to

feel their passionless splendour, is greater still. And such thought makes us free men ; we no longer bow before the inevitable in Oriental subjection, but we absorb it, and make it a part of ourselves. To abandon the struggle for private happiness, to expel all eagerness of temporary desire, to burn with passion for eternal things—this is emancipation, and this is the free man's worship. And this liberation is effected by a contemplation of Fate ; for Fate itself is subdued by the mind which leaves nothing to be purged by the purifying fire of Time."

But this imaginative transfiguration of the actual cannot blind us to the fact "that the non-human world is unworthy of our worship," and that the divine is to be found only in the world of our ideals. Hence Mr Russell's closing words are more in the key of passionate defiance than of the tragic conquest by acceptance which he has so finely painted. "Brief and powerless is Man's life ; on him and all his race the slow, sure doom falls pitiless and dark. Blind to good and evil, reckless of destruction, omnipotent matter rolls on its relentless way ; for Man, condemned to-day to lose his dearest, to-morrow himself to pass through the gate of darkness, it remains only to cherish, ere yet the blow falls, the lofty thoughts that ennoble his little day ; disdaining the coward terrors of the slave of Fate, to worship at the shrine that his own hands have built ; undismayed by the empire of chance, to preserve a mind free from the wanton tyranny that rules his outward life ; proudly defiant of the irresistible forces that tolerate, for a moment, his knowledge and his condemnation, to sustain alone, a weary but unyielding Atlas, the world that his own ideals have fashioned despite the trampling march of unconscious power."

This mood—of disdain and defiance—seems, it must be confessed, more appropriate than that of tragic acceptance, to the situation as he paints it. For, as he truly says, the child which blind Nature brings forth is born "with the capacity of judging all the works of his unthinking Mother."



And condemnation, swift and unflinching, is the judgment of man’s moral sense upon the world of materialistic theory. Man has no *right* to efface himself and his ideals before such a world, and, therefore, submission to the inevitable could have in it nothing of the calm of resignation. It would not even furnish a basis for the tragic emotion of which Mr Russell speaks ; for, as the masters have taught us, tragedy depends on the conflict of two forces or principles each of which may plead justification within its own limits—or it depends upon some flaw in the character of the hero which, in spite of his general nobility, leads in the end to his undoing. And, therefore, true tragedy leaves us with a sense of pity, doubtless, for the victim, but with a heightened sense of the great ethical forces that sway the world. But the unthinking world of materialism has no right on its side at all. The spectacle of the defeat of man by such a world is not a tragedy—it is a moral indignity, and the language in which Mr Russell characterises the indignity is no whit too strong. If we feel a certain incongruity in such a tirade directed by man against the cosmos as a whole, the incongruity is due to the false idea of the cosmos which underlies the whole situation.

The second article is written in a calmer spirit—shall I say with less bravado?—and seeks to develop the idea of acquiescence, on lines very often reminiscent of Spinoza, into a species of religious worship. This development seems to me inconsistent, and the second article, therefore, less logical than its predecessor ; but it is a most interesting sequel, and a striking testimony to the power of the religious sentiment—the apparent necessity of adopting a religious attitude towards the universe. The avowed object of the article is, indeed, in face of the admitted decay of traditional religious beliefs, to vindicate and preserve the religious attitude as a habitual direction of our thoughts. “It is the quality of infinity that makes religion, the selfless, untrammelled life in the whole which frees men from the prison-house of eager wishes and little thoughts.” The possibility of this attitude is based by

Mr Russell on the distinction, already drawn in the preceding article, but here still further emphasised, between the finite, particular, striving self with its private aims, viewing the world from the standpoint of the "here" and the "now" and the "me," and the "infinite nature," the "universal soul," also present in each of us, which has no private or exclusive purposes, which does not see the world from one point of view, but, as he finely says, "shines impartially like the diffused light on a cloudy sea." "The infinite nature," he proceeds, "is the principle of union in the world, as the finite nature is the principle of division. Between the infinite nature in one man and the infinite nature in another there can be no essential conflict: if its embodiments are incomplete, they supplement each other; its division among different men is accidental to its character, and the infinite in all constitutes one universal nature. There is thus a union of all the infinite natures of different men in a sense in which there is no union of all the finite natures." And the "contemplative vision" of the universal soul within us brings with it, Mr Russell concludes, "universal love" and "universal worship." This argument is obviously charged with metaphysics of a very different quality from the blank materialism of the starting-point—an "empire of chance," "omnipotent matter," throwing up self-conscious individuals as its casual products. But metaphysics is like the passion of love—a man may be deep in it, and others may have no difficulty in reading the symptoms, long before he is himself conscious of his predicament. Mr Russell does not seem to be aware how far a doctrine like the universal soul may carry him, and there is no indication that he has consciously abandoned his earlier position. But that only makes his case more instructive.

Let us consider, then, more carefully the process by which Mr Russell seeks to transform enforced acquiescence into "universal love" and "universal worship," and then ask ourselves whether the transformation is really compatible with his former scheme of the universe.



Worship, acquiescence, and love are named by Mr Russell as three elements in Christianity which it is desirable to preserve if possible. Worship, in any of its higher forms, involves, he says, contemplation with joy, and also reverence and a “sense of mystery not easy to define.” Accepting this definition, we may distinguish, he contends, between “a selective worship, which demands that its object shall be good,” and “an impartial worship, which can be given to whatever exists, regardless of its goodness or badness.” Moreover, worship may be given either “to an actually existing object” or “to what merely has its place in the world of ideals”—that is to say, worship may be either “worship of the actual” or “worship of the ideal.” For theism or an idealistic pantheism these distinctions do not exist, or, at least, they are inoperative, for the object of worship is supposed to be actual and to be at the same time the perfect embodiment of the ideal. The worship is thus selective, in Mr Russell’s sense, as being given to what is good in virtue of its goodness; and yet the religious attitude is extended to the arrangements of the cosmos as a whole, and may, therefore, be said to be, not indeed impartial in Mr Russell’s sense, but, at any rate, universal or all-embracing. But, according to the teaching of Mr Russell’s former article, the thinker who builds on the foundation of scientific fact is not at liberty to make this identification of the actual and the ideal; “the non-human world,” he told us plainly, “is unworthy of our worship.” Hence, our attitude to the world of the actual must be, if not one of hatred and contempt, at most a stoical and disdainful acquiescence; worship must be reserved for the ideal. “If Power is bad, as it seems to be, let us reject it from our hearts. In this lies Man’s true freedom: in determination to worship only the God created by our own love of the good.” Such was his former teaching. Now, however, he tells us that the worship of the ideal alone does not suffice. “When this worship stands alone, it produces a sense of exile in a world of shadows, of infinite solitude amid alien forces.” It must be

supplemented, therefore, by an emotion which will produce "a sense of union with the actual world"; and this emotion (to which he gives the name of worship) is the result of "the contemplative vision which finds mystery and joy in all that exists and brings with it love to all that has life." "This impartial worship has been thought, wrongly, to require belief in God, since it has been thought to involve the judgment that whatever exists is good. In fact, however, it involves no judgment whatever; . . . and, therefore, the combination of this worship with the ideal good gives a faith wholly independent of beliefs as to the nature of the actual world." "Religion, therefore, results from the combination of two different kinds of worship—the selective, which is given to the good on account of its goodness, and the impartial, which is given to everything that exists." The object of the former worship "need not exist, though it will be an essential part of the worship to wish it to exist as fully as possible. The object of the impartial worship, on the other hand, is whatever exists: in this case, though the object is known to exist, it is not known to be good, but it is an essential part of the worship to wish that it may be as good as possible." "Religious action is a continual endeavour to bridge the gulf between the objects of these two worships, by making more good exist and more of existence good. Only in the complete union of the two could the soul find permanent rest."

Mr Russell's treatment of the other two elements of the religious attitude—acquiescence and love—proceeds on similar lines. For the Christian or theist, acquiescence in evils which we cannot cure is made easier by the belief that whatever happens is the will of God, and that apparent evil must in the end eventuate in good. Without this belief the problem is more difficult. "We have to learn to acquiesce in the inevitable without judging that the inevitable must be good, to keep the feeling which prompts Christians to say, 'Thy will be done,' while yet admitting that what is done may be evil." Mr Russell says little that might help us to



appreciate the reasonableness of such a frame of mind, beyond pointing out the futility, and, in a sense, the absurdity, of cherishing indignation against the universe. His remarks are obviously a criticism and an implicit repudiation of the Promethean attitude which was, on the whole, dominant in the earlier essay. “Indignation,” he now says, “seems scarcely possible in regard to evils for which no one is responsible ; those who feel indignation in regard to the fundamental evils of the universe feel it against God or the Devil or an imaginatively personified Fate. When it is realised that the fundamental evils are due to the blind empire of matter, and are the wholly necessary effects of forces which have no consciousness and are therefore neither good nor bad in themselves, indignation becomes absurd, like Xerxes chastising the Hellespont. Thus the realisation of necessity is the liberation from indignation.” By discipline we can so “enlarge the bounds of self as to make it welcome with love whatever of good or evil may come before it.”

That leads us already to the third element—love. Here Mr Russell again distinguishes between “the *selective* earthly love, which is given to what is delightful, beautiful, or good, and the *impartial* heavenly love, which is given to all indifferently. The earthly love is balanced by an opposing hatred : to friends are opposed foes ; to saints, sinners ; to God, the Devil . . . But the heavenly love does not demand that its object shall be delightful, beautiful, or good ; it can be given to everything that has life, to the best and the worst, to the greatest and to the least. . . . To the divine love, the division of the world into good and bad, though it remains true, seems lacking in depth ; it seems finite and limited in comparison with the boundlessness of love. The division into two hostile camps seems unreal ; what is felt to be real is the oneness of the world in love.”

In this fashion, then, Mr Russell conceives that he has discovered, and shown the possibility of, “a form of union with the universe which is independent of all beliefs as to the

nature of the universe." Formerly the sense of union with the universe from which religion derives its power "was achieved by assimilating the universe to our own conception of the good." But "in order to free religion from all dependence upon dogma, it is necessary to abstain from any demand that the world shall conform to our standards. Every such demand is an endeavour to impose self upon the world. . . . The essence of religion lies," in short, he says, returning to the contrast between the particular and the universal self from which he started, "in subordination of the finite part of our life to the infinite part." And "the divine part of man does not demand that the world shall conform to a pattern: it accepts the world, and finds in wisdom a union which demands nothing of the world. . . . It is not the strength of our ideals, but their weakness, that makes us dread the admission that they are ours, not the world's. We with our ideals must stand alone, and conquer, inwardly, the world's indifference. . . . The insistent demand that our ideals shall be already realised in the world is the last prison from which wisdom must be freed. Every demand is a prison, and wisdom is only free when it asks nothing."

Such is the close of this remarkable argument. No one will deny—I certainly should not think of denying—that it contains much that is truly felt and nobly said: much, indeed, of the central truth of religion and philosophy. But the more willingly we recognise this, the more indubitable becomes the incompatibility of such truth with the general theory of the universe into which Mr Russell tries to fit it. It will be observed that the conclusion of the second article explicitly reasserts the complete indifference of the world to our ideals which was the starting-point and main theme of the first; so that this breach between the ideal and the actual is the point round which the whole argument turns. "A strange mystery it is," he said at the outset, "that Nature, omnipotent but blind, in the revolutions of her secular hurrying through the



abysses of space, has brought forth at last a child, subject still to her power, but gifted with sight, with knowledge of good and evil, with the capacity of judging all the works of his unthinking Mother.” A strange mystery indeed! The mystery rather is that Mr Russell should apparently never have brought his philosophical reflection to bear upon the sheer incredibility of the supposition! I do not wish to be taken as arguing for Descartes’ and Locke’s externally conceived Creator, but I commend to Mr Russell’s notice as an axiom Locke’s dictum: “It is as impossible that things wholly void of knowledge, and operating blindly and without any perception, should produce a knowing being, as it is impossible that a triangle should make itself three angles bigger than two right ones.”

Is not man, ideals and all, a part of the actual world and how can you determine the nature of a cause except by taking into account all its effects? Man *is* the child of Nature, and *therefore* Nature, taken here in the widest sense, as the ground of things, must possess at least as much intelligence and goodness and beauty as is exemplified in man, or as man at his utmost reach can conceive. Can anything, after all, for ultimate philosophical reflection, be more inept than this talk, which has grown so common, of man and his ideals, as if man were self-created and as if he developed his ideals in the internal vacancy of his own individual mind? <sup>1</sup> God, according to Mr Russell, is to be recognised as “the creation of our own conscience”; as “created by our own love of the good”; and man is to “worship at the shrine that his own hands have built,” although aware that the God he worships is no more than a private ideal which has no being in the actual world. The truth underlying

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Professor Jacks’ striking essay, “The Universe as Philosopher” (*Hibbert Journal*, October 1907, republished in *The Alchemy of Thought*). Professor Jacks bases his essay on the fact that philosophers so constantly forget to include themselves and their philosophies in the universe to be explained. “Every interpretation of the universe is itself an element in the universe to be interpreted; whence it follows that no interpretation is valid which fails to account for its own presence as an organic factor in the All-of-Things.”

Mr Russell's statements is something very different. To speak of God as the creation of our own conscience may be accepted as a vivid shorthand way of saying that the most important elements in our idea of God are not drawn from scientific observation of external Nature, but are the fruit of our moral experience. Mr Russell's statement, one might even put it, is a curious inversion of the old-fashioned saying that the voice of conscience is the voice of God—a saying, of course, no more to be taken in a literal sense than the more primitive belief that thunder is God speaking in the sky. The saying cannot even be interpreted as guaranteeing any special moral precept as a final expression of the divine; all that it legitimately means is that moral experience, like all other experience, claims objective significance. It is not merely a subjective process going on in the mind; it refers to an object, *i.e.* to something taken as independently real, recognised through the process, but not consisting in the process or created by it. Mr Russell, as an avowed Realist in epistemology, ought not to require to be reminded of this. He recognises it in the case of sense experience as against the subjective idealist. In an admirable passage in a paper on "The Study of Mathematics" he contends for a similar objectivity as belonging to the formulations of reason, exemplified in the laws of logic and of mathematics. Philosophers, he says, have commonly held that these laws are "laws of *thought*" in the sense of being laws regulating the operation of our minds. "By this opinion the true dignity of reason is very greatly lowered: it ceases to be an investigation into the very heart and immutable essence of all things actual and possible, becoming, instead, an inquiry into something more or less human and subject to our limitations. . . . Mathematics takes us into the region of absolute necessity, to which not only the actual world, but every possible world, must conform: and even here it builds a habitation, or rather finds a habitation eternally standing, where our ideals are fully satisfied and our best hopes are not thwarted. It is only when we thoroughly understand the entire independence of



ourselves, which belongs to this world that reason finds, that we can adequately realise the profound importance of its beauty.”

This is admirably said, but the same “entire independence of ourselves,” here recognised in the intellectual sphere, belongs also to the pronouncements of the moral and religious consciousness. We have no right to differentiate in this respect between different modes of experience; all alike claim objectivity for their judgments. Or if we *are* to compare one sphere with another, in none, it would have to be pointed out, is this claim more insistent, more overwhelming in force, than just in our moral and religious experience. The laws of goodness, for the good man, are no private or self-constructed ideals, but the foundation-verities on which the universe is built—in the often quoted words of Sophocles, “laws that in the highest empyrean had their birth, of which Heaven is the father alone, neither did the race of mortal men beget them, nor shall oblivion ever put them to sleep. The power of God is mighty in them and groweth not old.” Reverence for the moral law, which Kant makes the central ethical emotion, the overmastering claim of the law upon our obedience, the sense of abasement caused by failure to fulfil its demands—all these experiences are inexplicable on any other hypothesis than that the Good is as real as the True, and possesses the same “entire independence of ourselves.” And to the religious man God is not a mere aspiration, but the Power to whose indwelling influence he ascribes every such movement of his soul towards the good—the supreme Reality to which all his aspirations point.

On examination it will be found, therefore, that Mr Russell’s distinctions between the different kinds of worship are without basis, either in logic or experience. They collapse before the double criticism that, on the one hand, there can be no worship of the ideal conceived as a mere ideal, and, on the other hand, there is and can be no worship of the actual or the existent merely as such, apart from any consideration of its nature or quality. There remains, therefore, as the only valid form of worship, the worship of

the ideal conceived as the eternally real, or (to put the same thing from the other side) the worship of the Real conceived as good. And this will be found to be borne out by the test of experience. The first point, the impossibility of worshipping a mere ideal, has been already dealt with. In regard to the second, the worship of mere fact, Mr Russell refers to Pantheism as exemplifying such an attitude. But the parallel will not hold. Mr Russell himself observes that Pantheism infers that its impartial worship involves the belief that the universe is good and is one. The inference is, of course, in Mr Russell's view, mistaken; but the point is that, in Pantheism, this connection of ideas exists, and, if we are to speak of premises and conclusion, I should say that Mr Russell inverts their logical order. It is from the unity and perfection of the whole that, for the Pantheist, its worshipfulness follows, and not *vice versa*. How can we speak of worship of "whatever exists," if we identify the world of existence fundamentally with "the blind empire of matter"? Pantheism does not always invest its deity with moral attributes, but it is at least the unity of immeasurable power and of infinite variety that inspires the cosmic emotion. The idea of unity or system is dominant, and the meanest fact may become sacred when thought of as contributing in its measure to the life of the whole, or as an expression of the mystical unity of all that is. Its insignificance, or even its hatefulness, falls from it, when so viewed, for they are merged in "the glory of the sum of things." Logically or illogically, therefore, Pantheism ascribes a species of perfection to the object of its worship, and it is on this qualitative judgment, and not on the mere fact of existence, that its religious attitude towards the universe is based. Mr Russell conveys into the language of his second article a good deal of the mystical feeling which springs from a sense of the community of a single life.<sup>1</sup> His

<sup>1</sup> And indeed his repeated use of the word "life" in this connection is worthy of note: the object of impartial love is "everything that lives" (p. 53), "everything that has life" (p. 58).



language recalls at times the passages in which Wordsworth describes his early feelings—the bliss ineffable with which he

"felt the sentiment of Being spread  
O'er all that moves and all that seemeth still";

or tells us how

"To every natural form, rock, fruits, or flower,  
Even the loose stones that cover the highway,  
[He] gave a moral life: [he] saw them feel  
Or linked them to some feeling; the great mass  
Lay bedded in a quickening soul, and all  
That [he] beheld respired with inward meaning."

But it is a singular exercise in self-deception to attempt to transfer such emotion to a material aggregate, or, as Mr Russell describes it, "the blind hurry" of unconscious forces "from vanity to vanity."

What has been said about worship covers the closely allied case of love, and the same considerations apply to acquiescence, if we understand by the term not merely passive submission to the inevitable, but the glad or willing acceptance which betokens the religious temper. The religious man accepts even affliction in this spirit, as Mr Russell says, because he believes that it is the will of God. Or, if his belief is not so Christianly expressed, or so theoretically definite, he will say at least, like Marcus Aurelius in a touching passage on the apparent extinction of the best by death: "If this is so, be assured that, if it ought to have been otherwise, the gods would have done it. For if it were just, it would also be possible; and if it were according to nature, nature would have had it so. But because it is not so—if in fact it is not so—be thou convinced that it ought not to have been so." Or, as he puts it almost lyrically, in a passage that is oftener quoted: "Everything harmonises with me which is harmonious to thee, O Universe. Nothing for me is too early or too late which is in due time for thee. Everything is fruit to me which thy seasons bring, O Nature; from thee are all things, in thee are all things, and to thee all things return. The poet says, Dear city of Cecrops; and wilt not thou say,

Dear city of Zeus?" There is once more the idea of a whole and of an informing Spirit—a universe which, looked at as a whole, is something noble and worthy, to which its members may reasonably surrender their private claims. A cosmos or order, as Marcus Aurelius so often puts it—not a chaos. But the absolute gulf fixed by Mr Russell between the world of fact and everything that we pronounce to be of value precludes in his case the possibility of such an attitude.

"Union with the universe" he rightly signalises as the essential note of religion. But for union there must be some recognition of kinship with the Power to which we yield ourselves in love. It is using words without a meaning to speak of union with a world which outrages our moral sense by its absolute indifference to all our standards of value. And again he truly describes the universal element in religion as a "life in the infinite," involving the surrender of every private and selfish end. But our vision of the good and the struggle to realise it are just the emancipation from selfishness; they are the most universal things about us. And to surrender our ideals, to make no claims, no "demands," for them, is to play the traitor to what we *know* to be highest and best. Mr Russell does not really intend this, though his words might imply it. What he really means, I judge, is that we should cling to our ideals whether they are destined to realisation in the actual world or not. And such a sentiment has the true ethical ring about it. But do not let us at the same time palter with our convictions and affect a so-called impartial worship and love of whatever exists. Worship and love—religion, in short—imply of necessity a judgment of value, and Mr Russell himself, as we saw, concluded his account of the two varieties of worship with the significant admission that "only in the complete union of the two," *i.e.* only in a reality which was good or a good which was real, "could the soul find permanent rest." And when he says in the same connection that although the object of the impartial worship is not known to be good, "it is an essential part of the worship



to wish that its object may be as good as possible,” and that “religious action consists in a continual endeavour to bridge the gulf between the objects of the two worships, by making more good exist and more of existence good,” he virtually abandons the professed attitude of impartiality and adopts another theory of the universe, sometimes known as Meliorism, which has been current in various forms during the last fifty years. But the fundamentally non-ethical world of Mr Russell’s theory is not susceptible of better or worse. Man, its transitory denizen, may doubtless purify his ideals and improve his moral practice, but the cosmic power which has unwittingly produced him will, within a measurable future, remove again all traces of his existence as (in Mr Russell’s words) “it rolls on its relentless way.” Not unadvisedly does he speak of his philosophy as reared on the “foundation of unyielding despair.” But despair, though it may inspire a certain kind of courage, negates the very idea of religion.

We must conclude, therefore, that in his second article Mr Russell is either gravely illogical or is, half unconsciously, in process of changing his standpoint. The latter is the more generous and, perhaps one may add, the more probable hypothesis. For the difficulty of a critic is to understand how he could ever have regarded the crass Materialism which is the background of both papers as compatible with such a view, for example, as he holds of the nature of mathematical truth. And when one considers the theory of “the universal soul” or “the divine part of man” which he so inconsistently attempts to graft upon the materialistic dogma, it is easy to see how far the latter is from expressing his full mind as to the nature of reality.

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## IMMORTALITY AND COMPETITION.

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AT first sight these two ideas may seem to be far apart, and, as long as we only concern ourselves with immortality as an abstract idea, there is certainly no connection. The moment, however, that we turn an analytical eye upon the common demand for immortality, we have to face at every turn the intrusion of the problem of competition. It may be claimed that it is in any case unprofitable to go beyond the abstract idea, and that such an attempt can lead to nothing beyond picturesque speculation. This is obviously true with regard to details, but in the matter of broad principles it is not so true. Here we can very nearly dogmatise. We have, at all events as a starting-point, a knowledge of the workings of certain laws which come within the range of observation, and, if we assume (as we have a right to) that such laws are universal in their scope and are therefore applicable to the problems of futurity, we have at least a solid basis from which to prosecute our research.

In the old days there was no such basis. Heaven was then a sacred mystery outside of law, and enthusiasts were wholly unfettered and equally unguided in the imaginative pictures which they formed of its conditions. Such pictures no longer satisfy. People want something built up on argument rather than on rhapsody, and it is possible—within limits—to supply them with what they want; but the moment we replace rhapsody by argument, some of the most pro-



minent features in the old-time picture become so indistinct as almost to disappear. To many, whose minds are not adjusted to newer ideas, this loss—involving as it does to some extent the effacement of our egoistical outlines—appears at first sight to be irreparable. “Rob us of our cast-iron ego, and you rob us of everything,” is their complaint, but the legitimacy of this complaint fades under examination. We find that that which we relinquish so reluctantly has no real value in effect, and that the alternative which we can offer in its place, not only rests on a more solid basis, but is actually more desirable in itself.

Take, for instance, the basis of the old-time eschatology. Here we had pictured a fenced-off individuality carolling ecstatically through eternity. How impossible and how undesirable such a consummation would be is brought home to us when we substitute the word egoism for individuality. The two words in their true sense are in fact identical. The latter is sometimes used in a flattering sense to denote character, but this is an abuse of the term. Individuality is egoism, and egoism is individuality, and the active principle of both is competition. Here is where the idea of competition intrudes on that of immortality; and, having once intruded, it comes to stay.

The first thing which becomes apparent is that the word “heaven,” if intended to express a perfect state, is inapplicable to any state where competition is the rule of existence. Competition must be as out of place in heaven as a hyæna in a baby-crèche. It is true that a state in which competition rules may be so far ahead of our present experiences as, by comparison, to merit the name of heaven, but it must still be very far from the ideal state. The ideal state can only exist where there is no competition, and no competition means no individuality. This is where the old orthodox demands got out of joint. They clamoured for an undiminished individuality in conjunction with “heaven,” not recognising that the two ideas are not only incompatible but actually contradictory.

An individuality is a competing organism: this seems quite clear. It is in the competition which is inseparable from organic activity, and in the variations which arise from the ups and downs in the struggle for existence, that individuality earns its name. Once remove those qualitative contrasts, which can only arise from greater or less success in the competition of life, and what remains are not individuals but units, with no more individuality than have the pellets in a pound of shot. Individuality, then, is merely the product of a state where competition is the alpha and the omega of existence. From the ethical standpoint (as distinct, of course, from the commercial) competition is the root of all evil: *is*, in fact, Evil itself. In analysis its simple formula would be self-assertion at the expense of others.

The most interesting point in this connection is that organic needs are the sole incentive to competition. That ceaseless competition which, in the lower strata of life, results in the survival of the fittest, and in the higher strata in the supremacy of the strongest, springs solely from the hungry needs of predatory organisms. All organisms must, from their very nature, be predatory in greater or less degree; they must either prey or perish. The identity of organic activity with evil is, in fact, one of the commonplace truths of existence, so much so that evil is quite inconceivable outside of the catalogue of organic needs. In our own experience it is always the organic side of us which plays the villain, while the soul looks on in stern reproof. So that we are very nearly in a position to lay down the axiom that, if any community is to be completely happy and free from that internecine struggle for existence which we call competition, the individual units composing it must be non-organic.

But can a unit which is non-organic have any individuality? Let us even allow it a certain material background as a medium for consciousness, it would still appear as if this in itself is not enough to establish individuality; for individuality (or variation) can only arise when bodies are driven by the law



of natural selection to encroach on one another's nutriment, so that the gain of one is the loss of another. Non-organic units would have a consciousness of detachment from others, but no consciousness of qualitative variation from others; and, with no organic appetites to satisfy, there would be no incentive to competition, so that variations could never arise.

But a consciousness of detachment has clearly no value apart from an accompanying consciousness of qualitative distinction. When we have succeeded in realising this truth, which is really the crux of the whole question, it at once becomes apparent that the insularity of units between whom are no qualitative contrasts, and between whom—owing to the absence of organic appetites—no qualitative contrasts can ever arise, is meaningless, and that the divisional boundaries may therefore just as well come away. With the removal of the boundaries we arrive within measurable distance of understanding the essence, at any rate, of the idea of the merging of the individual in the Universal. To our outlook, which is obviously parochial and therefore faulty, there is little attraction in this idea, but with the Buddhist it is otherwise. To him it represents the great end to be desired and striven for, because in such an end only is there freedom from strife.

We may rest satisfied, however, that this consummation—whether desirable or otherwise—is not going to take us by surprise. Between our present aggressive organisms and the ultimate non-organic unity, is a gap which can only be bridged by a very gradual process of transition, and we may therefore rest assured that in any future life which is immediately before us we shall retain a certain proportion of organic individuality, but we shall retain it as a legacy of evil and not as the reward of virtue. It is after all the immediate hereafter which alone concerns us; the ultimate end may be a matter of speculative interest, but it is not that to which we look forward when we talk of the world to come. It will be time enough when we reach the next world to peer forward to that which is again beyond. It is, however, an allowable thought that our organic

individuality will become constantly less aggressive as we advance, and that the gradual dissolution of our egoistical outlines will be accompanied by an increased enlightenment which will qualify us to appreciate at its proper value the ultimate end. It is also quite clear that as the rapacity of our organisms declines, so will the outlines of our individuality correspondingly fade, so that the final disappearance of all divisional boundaries between units will exactly synchronise with the final disappearance from those units of all that is organic or predatory. The two processes, in fact, must march hand in hand throughout the evolutionary cycle.

Under close analysis this scheme presents a technical difficulty as follows:—

The name which we give to the metabolic processes which are inseparable from organic activity is “life.” Organic activity, in fact, may be said to constitute life, as we understand the term. Observation teaches us that organic activity is in the main predatory; an organism has to be constantly “stoked”; and in the case of animal life, *i.e.* where there is independent movement, it has to be stoked with other organisms.

It comes then to this: that life as we understand it is organic activity, and organic activity is robbery and murder, *alias* evil.

The problem of immortality, then, viewed from the critical standpoint, seems to present at first sight a very grave difficulty, for we find that while organic activity is evil, organic activity is also life, and that when we eliminate the one, we equally eliminate the other.

Here would seem to be an *impasse*, but it is only an apparent one. Life within our experience is, it is true, so invariably associated with organic activity that organic activity may actually be said to be the hall-mark of life; but it must be remembered that the real meaning and value of life to the living is consciousness. In our present state we have no experience of any consciousness, or of the possibility of any



consciousness, apart from organic activity. This, however, may be, and probably is, an accident of our present low state of development rather than the expression of a universal law, for it seems fairly obvious that there must be some form of consciousness apart from organic activity, unless consciousness is to be eternally associated with evil.

By far the most difficult point, however, in connection with the problem of immortality is that which concerns our rights of identification with beings not yet in existence, and yet it is a point which repays a little examination. The popular view is that there can be no identity without consciousness of identity, or, in other words, that it is the consciousness of identity which really constitutes the identity. When, therefore, we cut the chain of conscious connection between this existence and the next, there is an outcry. People complain that they are being robbed of their immortality, but this is clearly not the case, as a simple illustration must make tolerably plain.

If we allow unbroken consciousness between a living person A and a future being B, there is clearly no question as to the identity of the two. It stands out conspicuously. But if we break the chain of conscious connection, an immediate result follows. B loses his consciousness of identity with A. It matters nothing whether the break be for one second or for a million years, the result is exactly the same. Is B any the less happy because of this loss? Clearly not; he is still what he is, and his status is not in any way dependent on conscious connection with the past. Larks and butterflies forfeit none of the happiness of their existence because of ignorance that they were once eggs and caterpillars. B's consciousness of identity with A, in fact, resolves itself, on analysis, into simple memory of a past and inferior existence, which has clearly no value. When, therefore, we sever the chain of conscious connection, we are not in any way injuring B, but we are injuring A to the extent of destroying his anticipations of B's powers of retrospection in

the future. But as we have seen that B's retrospective powers are valueless, A's anticipations of these retrospective powers are therefore equally valueless, if A has the wit to realise that this is so. If he has not that wit, he is perhaps all the happier. We have, however, to face the very strong probability that there will be a break in the conscious connection between A and B, and, if we accept this strong probability as truth, the question arises as to whether we must rule out every conceivable claim that A can put forward to be identified with the as yet non-existent B? It would seem not. There remains the postulate which has been the groundwork of all the world's greatest religions and philosophies, that B's happiness (or unhappiness) is the direct resultant of A's conduct on earth; that B, in fact, is the actual projection of A's soul. B—unless his enlightenment is ahead of ours—will say: "God made me what I am"; but he will be wrong; it will have been A who will have made him what he is, and the right to speak of B in the first person singular and to apply the personal pronoun to B's state will be A's alone. Here we have food for anticipations which must shape themselves according to our consciences. For A, standing for the entire *genus homo*, the value of immortality lies solely in the nature of his anticipations, realities being clearly beyond his reach. He makes his own heaven by the nature of his anticipations, and if those anticipations are unshakable, that heaven is already his.

Many, however, will realise that the brightest anticipations of which we are capable—based as they are on the cravings and experiences of our present organisms—must always be not only wide of the truth, but also very wide of that which is desirable. Our entire outlook, in fact, is so saturated with organic egoism that it is more than probable that all which we reckon desirable is undesirable, and *vice versa*.

The only doctrine which can legitimately be insisted on is that there is a direct causative connection between present conduct and future destiny. Apart from the inherent proba-



bility of this doctrine and its consecration by the use of ages, it is clearly one on which the entire fabric of ethics and altruism must very largely rest; but God forbid that we should map out our own futurity, for we should make a most unhappy mess of it!

Before wholly dismissing from our minds the question of absorption and loss of individuality as being beyond the range of our conception, it is well to remember that we are not, as a matter of fact, entirely without experience of the process, subjective as well as objective. Swarms of bees, colonies of ants, and, in a lesser degree, shoals of fish, furnish us with striking examples of the voluntary subordination of the individual to the universal. We ourselves have, in the case of crowds, regiments of soldiers, etc., examples of how the unit-mind can be so dominated by, and lost in, the group-mind as to be all but unconscious for the time of its individuality. In combinations such as football and hockey teams, the chief joy of the player comes from the knowledge that he is part of a whole. For the sake of the regiment or for the sake of their country, men will always be found ready to do deeds of which in their individual capacity they are quite incapable. We use the term *esprit de corps* in this connection, and no better term is conceivable by which to express the subordination of the unit-mind and unit-interest to the group-mind and group-interest.

The interest and also the instruction lies in the fact that submission to the *esprit de corps* is not a painful or unpleasant experience, but, on the contrary, a source of singular joy and elation.

However, for gross organisms such as ours to pry into the æsthetics of the ultimate end is a palpable absurdity. All that we need concern ourselves with is that which immediately awaits us, and, unless the whole scheme is malignant (which is absurd), we may rest satisfied that that which awaits us is that which is desirable.

ERNEST HAMILTON.

## THE SIGNIFICANCE OF “NON-EVIDENTIAL” MATERIAL IN PSYCHICAL RESEARCH.

CHARLES E. OZANNE.

IN one of William Morris's charming tales of mediæval magic, the aged, white-haired knight travels in search of the lady he had loved, who had vanished from him many years before. He finds her at last clothed in such new youth and beauty by virtue of the enchanted water that he does not recognise her, but seeks advice from her for his quest as from a stranger.

The task before her is that of proving personal identity, and here as always, whether in imaginative literature or in serious scientific research, the mind naturally turns to the use of small intimate details of the past life known to the persons concerned, but not to the world at large.

“I said: ‘Geoffrey, what became of the white hind after the banners had left the wild wood?’ He stared wild at me, and I deemed that tears began to come into his eyes; but I said again: ‘What betide Dame Joyce's youngest born, the fair little maiden that we left sick of a fever when we rode to Upcastle?’ Still he said naught, but looked at me wondering: and again I said: ‘Hast thou ever again seen that great old oak by the clearing by the water, the half of which fell away in the summer storm of that last July?’” (*The Well at the World's End*, vol. i. pp. 213, 214).

Just how strong the evidence is for the reality of spirit return and for the genuineness of communications from those



we call the dead, only those who have some familiarity with the hundreds of pages of detailed records which have accumulated, giving identificatory data of the nature of those shown in William Morris's tale, are in a position to judge.

“Do you recollect coming to me once in the winter when snow was on the ground, and we talked over these things, and I gave you something to take away?”

“At that time we talked of the clergyman's wife who had the power of talking automatically.”

So, to give a single case in point, runs the record of one of the James communications received by Dr Hyslop. His record shows in this and a multitude of similar cases what the degree of accuracy was with which the reference was made.<sup>1</sup>

As I have studied the detailed reports of such investigations, however, and have reflected on the records of sittings I myself have had in the same form of inquiry, the conviction has become strong that not only the evidential matter dealing with data of personal reminiscence like those given above, but the so-called non-evidential matter also, has gone far to prove the reality of spirit communication. Indeed, the confidence that I personally have that communication with the life after death is now an assured fact rests fully as much on the nature of the so-called non-evidential as on that of the evidential material. The purpose of this article is to present some of the reasons for such a view.

One of the arguments most frequently heard against acceptance of spiritualistic communications is that they do not correspond with what our general experience of life leads us to think likely in regard to a future life, if this is assumed. We cannot reject the premises underlying this argument, but

<sup>1</sup> The quotation given is presented and discussed in the *Journal of the American Society for Psychical Research*, vol. vi. pp. 470-472. See for other similar instances the case of the spring of water, p. 555; of the saw-mill, p. 699; and indeed the entire discussion in the articles in that volume commencing on pp. 291, 345, 536, 609, 680, 717. This is, of course, but a small fraction of the vast mass of similar data now before the world.

those who advance them imply that if the communications correspond with what does seem to us on the basis of experience reasonable and likely, this then must be allowed as an argument in their favour. That is, while the correspondence between the statements given in spirit communications and the fact as established in this world gives obvious evidence when small details of trees and wells and snow-storms are dealt with, there is evidence perhaps of a really profounder kind when the representations, as a whole, harmonise with the sum-total of our experience of life here, and our deepest interpretations of its significance. Such evidence cannot be forced upon reluctant minds with the same insistence as can the other ; but to a mind delicately poised enough to weigh it, I question whether it is not even more conclusive.

But, one may say, such material can easily be fabricated. I regard it as extremely doubtful whether an able mind, artfully constructing a fraudulent picture of the future life presented through the fiction of communications from many different personalities, could construct a representation which would not afterwards reveal, on close scrutiny, evidence of its fraudulent character. But when such a presentation comes, as nearly all the data hereafter given do, through the hand of a woman in a trance, of the genuineness of which it seems there can be no doubt—a woman of fair general intelligence, but apparently giving, in her normal state, no evidence of the power needed for fabrication on such a scale, one whose mind is of a type radically different from the critical, philosophical character of the James and Hodgson and George Pelham communications ; when, moreover, those communications do correspond with the type of mind of the persons from whom they purport to come, and their representations are in harmony with our most highly developed conceptions of the world and of life,—then to ascribe those communications to subconscious personalities involves an extension of the conception of multiple personality to meet this form of argument similar to the extension of telepathy to explain the references to detailed events. One can



bolster up a falling Ptolemaic theory by cycloids and epicycloids and elaborate mathematical devices to account for the observed facts, or explain away the data used in the higher criticism of the Hexateuch by ingenious explanations of why this or that story or word was used, but there comes a time at last when such elaborate straining to avoid an undesired conclusion must give way.

I propose in the remainder of this article to give a few quotations from assumed spiritistic communications to indicate from various points of view the way in which, as it seems to me, the representations correspond with what should reasonably be expected, and with what we know of life here. The quotations which follow are all drawn from the *Proceedings of the American Society for Psychical Research* for May 1912, unless otherwise indicated. I have seen nothing yet that seems to me to throw so much light on the questions involved as does much of the material in this volume. I make minor occasional corrections of punctuation, spelling, omission of needless words, etc., in no case affecting the sense, in order that the article may run more smoothly for the general reader. As anyone who wishes to judge critically can look up the references to the detailed record which I give in every case, the procedure, I think, cannot be open to valid objection.

### 1. EFFORTS TO PROVE IDENTITY.

The group of spirit personalities operating from the other side of death in connection with Dr Hyslop's work, if the communications are genuine, is a group of men of highly trained intellect, familiar with critical doubt—men who know well the slowness with which the world comes to believe such phenomena, men like James and Hodgson and George Pelham, some of whom were active in the effort to come to an assured conclusion on these subjects while they were living. What should we expect from them if they exist with heightened powers in another life? Surely an intense determination to prove the reality of the communications to the

world, careful and intelligent effort directed to this end, strong assertion of their present vigour and denial of various other possibilities that might occur to the trained and sceptical mind, careful study of the difficulties in the way of successful communication and of the means by which good results might be attained. This is not the range of thought in which the mind of a medium like Mrs Chenoweth would naturally move.

Do the communications correspond with the expectation expressed above? I quote a few statements:

“He stands up and says, ‘I am a real person, with real faculties, and I desire to speak as a real man, and not as a fleck of consciousness floating in space’” (p. 182).

“Hodgson, I mean, and Jim, I want you both to feel I am no secondary personality of the medium’s” (*Proceedings of the Society for Psychical Research* for February 1898, p. 433).

“It is the spirit of a man which survives, all that makes up his day, his weeks, his years, tone, the quality, and I desire to prove and not to give you a sample of deteriorated or disintegrated capacity” (*Proceedings of the A.S.P.R.* for May 1912, p. 292).

The desire to send personal messages, or to use the power for various non-scientific purposes, and the need of repressing such inclination in the interests of the scientific work, are often dwelt on.

“I am divided between two desires: first, to assure my family that I am still a part of their human existence, to send greetings to my friends and speak of my surroundings; and second, to make the record of identity clear and correct” (p. 155). “Good times talking” must yield to “scientific” requirements (p. 107). Some “fool away” the energy (p. 112). “Friendly and family interests” must be set aside for a while (p. 140). “Small talk” must be eliminated (p. 148; see also p. 260).

Difficulties in the way of successful communication are carefully studied. “The trouble with this work is that so many get excited over the fact that they can communicate



that they want to tell all they know at once, instead of thinking one word at a time” (p. 112). The subconsciousness of the medium may be too prominent (p. 126). Recollection of identifying incidents to meet an arbitrary demand is difficult, unless the circumstances are such as naturally to revive the associations (p. 199 ; see also p. 293).

Caution is used in the work (p. 138), and new methods are experimented with in the effort to improve communications. “I thought to try one of my own ways . . . it is very difficult, but it can be done by this method. . . . One word at a time, and all other friends here on my side away in the distance, so that I will not get their ideas mixed with mine” (p. 114). “It takes experience. There is no royal road to spirit communication. I thought the difficulties were different, and more like limitations, but it is the experience and perfect connections, with no lost energy, which is the secret of communicating intelligently” (p. 188). To operate the body of the unconscious medium requires practice to gain facility, just as is the case when one operates a typewriter (p. 266). One could hardly find a better instance of scientific interest than the following: “I like to write for others. It is no hardship but a pleasure, and often when I hear the argument that we are kept from finer pleasures by the effort to express in this fashion, I wonder what finer pleasure there is than to be able to connect the two states of consciousness. To one who was interested in psychological problems the intensity of interest in these experiments is readily understood, aside from any value to the world. It is a puzzle that calls out all the energy one possesses to work it out” (p. 383 ; see also, as to hopes for the scientific work, p. 169).

The above quotations came mostly by automatic writing, through the hand of an unconscious woman (some few were oral communications through a medium). Which explanation is most reasonable: that the hand was guided by spirits, who were what they claimed to be—alert, intelligent, eager workers, seeking to solve a great problem ; or secondary personalities

masquerading in the subconscious attempt to impersonate men of a different type of mind and way of thinking from the medium's own?

## 2. HIGH PURPOSE OF THE PERSONALITIES OPERATING THROUGH THE MEDIUM.

Equally in harmony with the view that in these communications we are dealing with real, living, forceful personalities is the expression of lofty purpose directing the whole effort.

"It is not the purpose of any group of intelligent people on this side of life to spend energy and time in recalling small matters of identity, unless through that method the attention of the student body of the world be drawn to the truth of God's love made manifest among men. The whole purpose of the work is to save the world from its woe, by letting the light of truth shine on its face. It is so dreadful and uncertain a state in which men dwell, as if they built their cottages on the slopes of Vesuvius and saw death in every cloud of smoke. We desire to have them build intelligently, and live where no cloud of death obscures the clear view of heaven" (pp. 526, 527).

"The moral and ethical development of the world hangs on this spiritual knowledge. It becomes an incentive for righteousness in its best and truest sense, and makes the brotherhood of humanity a real and dominant note in the progress of civilisation. Heretofore the world has risen to new power on the neck of its fallen brothers, which at best is but volcanic progress. The emerging of one peak from the tumultuous sea of distress which sinks another portion of the fair land is not drawing the world to God. It can never come until men learn the truth of immortality; the struggle for present-day power is so tantalisingly universal" (pp. 294, 295).

"Any open door through which a soul may come and go is a challenge to us and an invitation to service, and it is of little consequence what is said or done by those who stand outside our receiving line if the one to whom our message is



given understands and is better equipped for the battle for the truth” (p. 507).

Shall we interpret these utterances as a piece of subconscious shamming? (See also for similar utterances, pp. 396, 177, and the remarkable passage on pp. 322, 323.)

### 3. THOUGHTFUL ATTITUDE SHOWN TOWARDS THE PHENOMENA OF THE NEW LIFE.

One of the most characteristic traits of men such as those from whom these communications claim to come, is that when put into a startlingly new environment they will not merely wonder, or let the thoughts vaguely drift till the blind working of custom and habit takes away the newness from things, but they will apply to the new phenomena an alert, inquiring intelligence and a keen and trained observation as they seek to interpret their new experiences. Do the communications purporting to come from James and Hodgson and the others represent their minds as working in the way trained minds would work when the greatest and most startling extension of the field of experience that they have ever known has come to them? A few quotations will show.

“It is not difficult to see and understand you, but the power to extract the meaning and composition of the present state and make it comprehensible to you is where the difficulty lies. . . . Much of the literal converse is as a mother talking baby-talk to her infant in arms. . . . We are men, not babes, and must speak as men to men” (p. 216).

“He is happy to find that the life is clear and livable, not a phantom existence as he sometimes thought” (p. 144).

“You may wish to know about my place of abode. It is more tangible and substantial than I thought, I assure you” (p. 161).

“I seem to be able to reason while at work, and that pleases me” (p. 171).

“It seems a little strange to return to the home”—(to the earthly home, he means)—“and have no working power; but

another power supplants the old, so I do not miss it as one might think" (p. 170; see also description of the impressions of a spirit on returning to the material world, pp. 280, 281).

Notable in a high degree are the keen psychological studies of the power of mind and traits of personality in the new life. Note the careful study of the power of memory and the working of the law of association of ideas.

"My recollections of the past depend on the situation and associations, as everybody's does. To sit down and recall events and affairs and people that are entirely dissociated with the present moment and companionship is too much like gathering pebbles on the shore you visited last year. Give me an hour with my dear old mother, and our common interests would, or might, loosen my memory" (p. 199; see also p. 188).

"My memory is clear on past events, but the recollection does not embrace each detail any more than yours does. In other words, my memory is not intensified or clarified by death. I speak only for myself. But neither is my memory dimmed. That is a point you and I discussed, I believe" (pp. 216, 217).

"We are a few degrees more sensitive than you in the world of physical expression, that is all" (p. 255).

"We have about the same capacity as when in the physical world; only, the psychic power is intensified" (p. 375).

Notice, also, for new light thrown on a mental problem by the experiences of the new life beyond death, the remarkable study of wandering thoughts interrupting the main current, and the way we in the body conceal them, while, if known, they would often destroy the continuity of conversation (pp. 255, 529, 682, and 683).

If the speakers are what they purport to be, men of trained minds communicating to us the results of their observations on the life after death, every word becomes natural and appropriate and forceful. If the dissociation of a personality in the trance state confers on a comparatively untrained woman such



power of psychological reflection, one can only conclude that “dissociation” has a high educational value.

#### 4. PROBLEM OF THE MECHANISM OF COMMUNICATION.

Few things are more characteristic of genuine contact with reality than the way in which the strangest new facts become embedded, as investigation proceeds, in a mass of concrete detail; the way in which what seems first a section from dreamland begins, on study, to yield a knowledge of law, of real and stubborn forces that must be patiently grappled with and mastered, till the vagueness of early imaginings is replaced by the realism of a solid world. It may seem like a bit of fairy lore to talk of discarnate spirits using the hand of an unconscious woman to write a message to earthly friends; but when one watches the actual phenomena day after day, or even reads the detailed records, it is the realism of the whole thing that impresses the mind of the observer.

The way the unseen spirit enters into the unconscious body which is like a dead body to it, the need of practice to learn to control it just as the young child must practise to gain dexterity in the use of its limbs (pp. 388, 306), the effect on ease of writing of even such a small thing as the shape and size of a pencil (p. 254), the way the hand of the medium feels to the controlling spirit (p. 281), the extent to which the spirit can see earthly objects when unattached or when working through the body of the medium (pp. 188, 433), the sense of push and energy in the task of communication (p. 274), the constant remarks about the energy that must be supplied at the start, the comments on the favourable and unfavourable character of the forces, the gradual waning of the energy towards the close of the interview till fairly clear writing at last approaches an illegible scrawl, the determined downward pressure of the hand as a communicator who is resolved to bring his message to a proper ending exerts all his force of will to utilise the vanishing energy to the last drop, the forced words of farewell frequent at the end, “I can

hold no longer," "I must go," or a sudden interruption of the communication and a more expert communicator resuming the writing with brief comments, "Lost his strength," "Could hold on no longer,"—only as one becomes familiar with these things by abundant reading of the records, or better still by daily work in the experiments themselves, can he realise how the method and mechanism of spirit communication through mortal bodies comes to seem as definite and concrete a problem to be worked out under natural law as was the problem of aviation or the perfecting of the telephone.

"I took hold of the pencil as if it were alive, but there seems to be a cold handle to it. That, I know, is a human hand by the shape, but in no other way" (p. 281).

"I am not able to see the articles on which I write while I am at work; but when in the room without the definite attachment to the body, which is a dead body for our use, I am able to see very well" (p. 188).

"The light presents me with a dead brain, or at least an inactive one. I cannot use the hand as if it were a hatchet, but must have it function as nearly normal as possible. The brain is as a dead planet reflecting only; but if I can infuse sufficient life into it, then I write normally" (p. 306).

"All in all I feel rather like the man at the ball in a football game. The interest is different, but the push and pull of mental energy is about the same" (p. 274).

##### 5. AFFECTION FOR FRIENDS LEFT ON EARTH.

If men who die pass out into a larger and higher life, we should certainly expect that the ties of friendship and affection connected here with all that is best in life should be stronger, not weaker there. Can the messages giving expression to such feeling have any evidential value? They might seem the easiest of all to fabricate. They are the stock-in-trade of vulgar mediumship. And yet is it so easy after all to fabricate such messages in an effective way? To write some message of affection is easy enough; but when a man of nobility of



character and feeling passes into a life where his finest emotions receive higher development, is it so easy after all to frame a message that shall be worthy of his personality, giving full strength to the emotions, yet avoiding weakness and sentimentality? I shall quote a few sentences from such a message and leave it to the reader to judge whether they are worthy of the person from whom they purport to come—whether they have the ring of genuine metal or not.

From one of the James communications I take the following: “To tell you that I am happy in renewing old acquaintances and expressing the love of family associations is simple, but important to me. It has no bearing on the evidential side of the work, I am aware; but those who knew me best know that the family ties meant much to me and that the joy of meeting my loved ones is great and sincere. The pang of separation is softened by the joy of reuniting oneself with the lost of long ago” (p. 170).

#### 6. THE CHARACTER OF THE FUTURE LIFE ITSELF.

Can we establish any standards of what the future life should be, reasoning from our experience of this life, and apply them in testing the assumed communications?

Those who have noticed how, in each case where exact scientific knowledge has entered fields previously left to religious faith, it has become necessary greatly to modify conceptions previously held, will naturally expect that the substitution of real knowledge for vague theological conceptions will bring great alterations of view here also, and that those entering the new life with only traditional expectations will be surprised by its difference from what they had expected. I quote again a few statements.

“We are far from the gloom of the grave, and I used to think sometimes that it was that human element in the communications which made the religious world balk at their acceptance. If the agonised cries of souls in Purgatory or triumphant strains of saints in Paradise had broken through

the blue, the Church would have found its verification and been with us. But the members of the Psychical Research were neither saintly enough to get the saints to descend nor devilish enough to communicate with the damned, and so there was nothing left but to talk with those whom they had known, just folks, plain folks."

Even the quiet humour here and the cleverness of expression are characteristic of the person from whom the words claim to come (p. 532 ; see also similarly pp. 267, 712).

"Have I told you how happy we are? It is a happiness that only comes when one is in the work which appeals to the best and strongest instincts of the soul. The companionships and sweet human loves are steps which help the soul upward, but the perfect peace and pure happiness come only when the soul serves in the work that satisfies and endures. We could not be content in the theological heaven. Work and not psalm-singing is more in our line" (p. 256).

Some passages, however, especially those in communications purporting to come from people who in this life were of a more strongly religious nature, show a closer approach to the conceptions of the Church.

"'Did she see Christ?'

"'Not yet, friend. There are few able to see him when they enter this world of light. They must be thoroughly cleansed and get away from earthly conditions in order to meet him. He did not the things of earth that mortal souls did, hence he went to the world of purer light than any of the rest of us could do upon coming over here'" (pp. 129, 130).

This, again, from one who, the editor says, had been a man of strong religious feeling, who fully expected to go into the immediate presence of Christ after death: "'Are you with Christ?' 'Jesus—his face is the light; and whereas his face is not discernible, yet we see his light and know that it is he'" (*Proceedings of the S.P.R.* for February 1898, p. 516 ; see also *Proceedings of American Society* for May 1912, p. 876). Against such communications, however, may be set



one like the following: “It is different from what we dreamed it would be, and God is just as far off and explicable to me to-day as when I tried to solve the problems of life and death in my own mind long ago” (p. 481).

If, however, the shrieks of the damned and the triumphant strains of souls in Paradise do not come to our ears, we do see pictured a life where there is loss or gain according as men have neglected or used the opportunities of the earthly life. We see some in the other life going forward with developing capacities to large and glad and ennobling service; and others, “earth-bound souls,” hovering around earth’s atmosphere, seeking to continue their life among the material interests which had engrossed them here” (pp. 130, 851, 120).

We find men on entering the other life regretting that they had not done more to prepare for it while in this.

“It is not strange that our instructors and professors do not take the matter seriously. They have no time, no money, no energy, and most of the time are immersed in material and physical science, which loses sight of the spiritual. Then, when we die we wish we had done more in the preparatory work. Fractions and decimals prepare the way for algebra and higher arithmetical work. All life is sequence, but we fail to begin with the essential—life itself. We busy ourselves with accessories and combinations of accessories” (p. 510).

It is, however, one of the tests that any conception of the future life must certainly meet that it must stand out in sharp contrast with the older traditional theological conceptions, however much of their essence it may preserve. One of the chief reasons why the idea of a future life was losing its hold on thinking men was that the only conception of such a life which they had before them was a traditional one, which was coming to seem more and more out of harmony with the growing knowledge of life which scientific investigation was giving us here. The future life may be far different from this earthly life; but since the universe is one, and united under one system of law, that life must in its underlying principles

be in harmony with what we know of this. It is just this feature that occurs again and again in the communications. One and another exclaim that the life is so far different from what they had expected, yet that it is so real and natural.

"I was greatly surprised when I came here to find the life so real and concrete. The abstract theorisings arising from incomplete data must pass" (from a sitting with Mrs Chenoweth—record not yet published).

"The natural after-life" (p. 699).

"It is better, but different, far different than what she thought. She had no idea of the reality of the spirit life, and it came as a joyous revelation to her" (p. 461).

"I sometimes forget that you are not perfectly conscious of all we are doing and saying. The whole thing is so natural that it is hard to believe that you are outside of the gates of Paradise and only getting glimpses now and again" (p. 615).

Very noteworthy as a statement of the nature of the future life is the following :

"I am not distant in thought or person, but all the many influences that crowd into my life to-day, this hour, this moment, keep me from the most perfect expression, which I strive earnestly to make. All the past is as a dream, from which I can pick but bits of expression and give to you as I am able. The real life here is so bright and full of all the wide experiences of the moment that they are the things I first long to talk about. Your mother is with me, boy, and lived so happy in the coming into this life of experiment. It is not all new, but it is all experiment.

"It is so different from what we dreamed it would be. It is not a life to fear, but one to wonder at and be constantly surprised and confounded" (p. 481).

Compare also the following: "It is all experience. The whole plan of living seems experience, experience. It is soul practice, and then the soul becomes strong and active in soul life" (p. 207).

A recent unpublished James communication by automatic



writing through Mrs Chenoweth speaks of the new life as “full to overflowing” with interest.

# 7. LIGHT THROWN ON THE GENERAL NATURE AND PROBLEMS OF LIFE.

All life, however, whether in another world or in this, constitutes one system. Each extension of experience gives new data for the interpretation of life and new means for its deeper understanding. From the time when the boy who has never left his home in a remote country village boards the railroad train to seek education or work in the city, each broadening of the field of one's experience brings deeper insight into life. When keen and thoughtful minds meet with that vast broadening of the field of experience which entry into another life must give, the messages coming back from that life, if genuine, ought to bear the impress of the larger knowledge and insight so gained. Do the communications meet this test without failure? The answer has been given to a large extent in the passages already quoted. I add a few that seem to me noteworthy for their insight into the deeper realities of life.

“If men and women survive death and enter a new realm of consciousness, the importance of life itself is the supreme interest and the accessories are less important and absorbing. . . . The life of spirit identity is real, conscious, and exacting in many particulars, and the spirit side of mortal life is most readily touched” (p. 323).

“Each soul has a right to freedom of choice, for souls are supreme in the order of the universe” (p. 346).

“I am constantly surprised and amazed at the evidence of close and constant intermingling of the different states of existence” (p. 375).

“Life is one great testing-room for souls, but no one seems to look at it in that way” (p. 436).

“One needs the personal touch to give and receive the best that can never be borrowed or lent. Some facts, like

figures, stand strong and uncontradicted, but the presence which creates a spiritual atmosphere is the helpful and revivifying influence. One is the intellectual, the other the spiritual evidence, and the matter resolves itself into: spiritual things are spiritually perceived" (p. 510).

When one realises how, both in the development of his own thought and in the successive systems of thought of mankind, each stage is imperfect and partially false—as Emerson in his "Sphinx" says of the human spirit, "Always it asketh, asketh; and each answer is a lie"; how yet in the imperfect solutions saving truth is found, so that the soul that seeks and uses all its powers is ever entering more and more into the light of the true knowledge,—when one once grasps these facts as furnishing the key to many of the difficulties in the history both of the race and the individual, he will be ready to appreciate the brief but striking statement which follows:

"I am so absorbed in the wonder of it all. We dream, and dream, and wake to find the tangle of dreams an orderly and plain matter of living progress. My dreams were toward the truth, but not the truth itself" (p. 335).

If, however, this is true, then we must also think that no one creed or belief has a monopoly of spiritual insight and power. This is a commonplace now, but the following expression of the truth is noteworthy:

"Life is a concerted number, not a solo. . . . The variety is the key, not the phase. The psychic power is not confined to time, or place, or person, or chance, or phase, but plays in and around and through all the experiences of human instinct as omnipresent as God" (p. 393).

I close this topic with a quotation which seems to me to show exceptionally deep insight, but which needs no further comment:

"I am here to give you peace, and the peace of the spirit passes the understanding of men. The day of materiality is doomed and will pass away, and the life and light of the spirit



will supersede the merely intellectual authority of the men who strive to lead the world to-day; but the expressions and exhibitions of spiritual power will be intellectually perceived and comprehended, and become the light of the world. The intellectual is but the channel which leads to the open sea of spiritual truth. How, then, is the mind of man the servant of God, and the more illumined the mind the brighter the glory which encircles the universe. So does intellect wait upon knowledge, and knowledge serve truth, and truth reveal God” (pp. 625, 626).

In the preceding discussion I have taken but a tiny portion from the vast mass of records which have accumulated through the patient toil of many investigators, during many years. I have drawn nearly all the quotations from a single volume, and have reproduced but a minute fraction of that. Yet what has just been given is enough to show the general nature of the problem.

What shall we do with these things? The records at least are a reality. There they stand in black and white, a challenge to the world to interpret and explain them. Shall we pass them by with a flippant word or a careless jest? Shall we treat them as a parlour entertainment? Shall we read and express interest or wonder as our temperament inclines us to do, and let the matter end there? We cannot do so. The issues are too vast in their significance for the race for us to treat the question in this way. Shall we call the whole thing a hoax, an artful fabrication of designing men? The character of the leading workers makes such a view impossible.

Our possible choice in interpreting the record is a narrowly limited one. Nearly all of the preceding communications came by automatic writing through the hand of a single unconscious woman, a woman of refinement and high character, yet not of a scientific method of thought, but simple and naïve in her mental processes. Did she, in a state of dissociation, when multiple personalities developed, subconsciously fabricate

the whole thing? Or was she merely an instrument; is there really a life after death; and did the personalities who are assumed to communicate—personalities strong and living, thoughtful, and filled with high resolve—use her hand to carry their messages to the world? For myself, I cannot but feel that it is those who can adopt the former hypothesis, not the latter, who are the uncritical and the credulous people.

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## “THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS AND THE EMPIRE.”<sup>1</sup>

CECIL REDDIE.

THIS book is by one of the most gifted, energetic, and far-sighted of English headmasters, who during thirty years ruled one of the Public Schools with extraordinary vigour and success. From about fifty he raised the number of its boys to over three hundred. This alone would, of course, be no proof of real excellence, though it is often deemed the most convincing proof by people incapable of seeing anything but mere numbers, and the money they suggest. The real proof was this. From obscurity Dr Gray lifted his school into the blaze of public recognition, and made it known to all the world. In particular, the Greek plays performed in his open-air theatre suggested a revolution in the teaching of Greek in schools. More of real Hellenic life and culture could be learnt there in one brief afternoon than in all the ten years of Greek grammar and “critical tips” usual in the stereotyped Public Schools which pretend to train the rulers of the Empire. Worn out by thirty years of uninterrupted effort, Dr Gray was carried away from that battlefield of patriotic devotion like a dying though victorious general. But no sooner was the strain removed than his remarkable vitality reasserted itself; and, after two years on his ranch in Canada, he returned to England, with his outlook still more expanded by contact with the future centre of the Empire.

<sup>1</sup> *The Public Schools and the Empire*, by Herbert Branston Gray, D.D., London: Williams & Norgate, 1913, pp. xx+374.

Such being the author, let us now turn to his message. The title of the work is the key to its contents. Briefly, it urges a revolution in the training of the wealthy and well-born, who monopolise the "Public" Schools. The boys in these places are at present being petted into imbecility. Instead, they ought to be forced to fit themselves to be rulers. The author is well aware that a really national system of education must ultimately be one and indivisible; that, therefore, no school and no University can be permitted to exist without proper relation to all the other educational institutions in the land. But he also knows that we have at present no *national* system at all, but only a miserable chaos; and that the education of the well-to-do, whether in school or in University, is the worst in the country, and consequently one main cause of the present national degeneration. He believes rightly that regeneration *might* most easily come from the top of the social pyramid from those who, under our present social conditions, are best able to pay heavily for exceptional opportunities, and who therefore would become, if properly trained for public service, our greatest national asset, instead of being, as now, a cause of demoralisation and decay. Disraeli, in *Coningsby* (1844), said: "The proper leaders of the people are the gentlemen of England; if they are not leaders of the people, I do not see why there should be any gentlemen." This seems to be Dr Gray's view also. Consequently he wishes to bring about a total transformation in our "upper class" schools and universities.

It is idle, therefore, for critics to complain: (1) that he says nothing about the notorious defects in schools designed for the masses; (2) that he says little about the new Secondary Day Schools and the new Universities; (3) that he does not single out for praise this or that Municipal School, or Grammar School, where possibly some fresh and vital experiments are being tried. The author very properly sticks to his thesis, *The Public Schools and the Empire*—those pet institutions which claim to produce most



of our rulers in Church and State. The book is concerned only with those schools and colleges which are (at present) monopolised by the rich. Dr Gray demands that all these wealthy corporations be reformed, so as to serve national needs, and not be allowed to go on ruining the valuable raw material entrusted to their charge.

The institutions he has in mind are of three kinds: (1) the Private Schools, in which the sons of the wealthy are educated from usually seven to fourteen; (2) the Public Schools, where they are educated from fourteen to nineteen; and (3) the ancient Universities, where they are educated from nineteen to, say, twenty-three. These three classes of institution are closely bound together, so as to form one system. The two Universities control the Public Schools, and the latter control the Private Schools. It should here be noted that *these* Private Schools are carefully to be distinguished from other Private Schools which do *not* restrict themselves to *preparing* boys for the Public Schools. Private Schools which prepare solely for Public Schools are decorated with a special title, conferred upon them by those Public Schools which they feed with boys. They are known as “Preparatory” Schools; and, as they *kowtow* with becoming obsequiousness before the majesty of the Public Schools, they are considered quite respectable. On the contrary, all other Private Schools which presume to compete against the Public Schools are regarded as disreputable, and are nicknamed “Private-Venture” Schools. These schools are supposed to think solely of the money they can make out of their pupils, whereas Preparatory Schools and Public Schools and the old Universities never think of “filthy lucre,” but agonise night and day solely over the great problem how to be thoroughly efficient and “up to date,” and how to make the utmost of every boy under their control. This system of nomenclature is one of the many devices adopted by the Public Schools to blind the public, and to prevent any form of competition which might expose

their own outrageous defects. For it is well known that almost all reforms in education have come from the much-despised Private Schools.

This is the best place in which to mention one serious defect in the book. Dr Gray does not, with sufficient emphasis, point out the entirely unscientific structure of this system of education, whereby boys are shifted, at the critical age of oncoming adolescence, at fourteen namely, from educators who know them to the care of strangers who know them not. There is overwhelming evidence that the proper age for transferring boys from the Junior School to the Senior School is not fourteen but the end of the eleventh year. At that age the typical boy passes into a new phase, and ought to be moved to a new sphere. Up to eleven he should, moreover, be educated mainly by women, who alone can deal with young boys with consummate insight and sympathy. At eleven boys pass beyond woman's control, and crave for masculine influence. They should go to the Senior School and remain there for the whole adolescent period up to eighteen, at which age they ought to proceed to the larger world of a University, whether "professional," "technical," or whatever be its label. Formerly this was recognised, and boys went to the Public or Senior School about the end of their eleventh year. Gradually, and largely by chance, this original custom has been altered. The usual reason given is that small boys will be corrupted if they go to the Senior Schools before fourteen. Preparatory schoolmasters, by harping on this theme, have terrified ignorant mothers, and feathered their own nests. In point of fact, small boys run greater risks at the hands of the boys of fourteen in the Preparatory Schools, who are often made "captains of dormitories" or even (toy) "prefects," at a peculiarly unstable age, uncontrolled by the presence of older boys who have passed right through adolescence and understand (as they alone can) their obligations to the "kids." Taking, however, the system as it is, we have to observe that already it is breaking down in some respects: only a small



percentage of Public-School boys proceed now to Oxford or Cambridge, while boys from other types of schools go now in greater numbers than formerly. There is, in short, plenty of chaos, through which we are, as usual, muddling along somehow.

Nevertheless, the weakest spot in our educational scheme of things lies in the institutions devoted to the directing classes. Hence the title of the book. But, from where is reform to come? Dr Gray knows well it will never come from these schools and these Universities themselves. People making a fat living out of a bad system are the least likely to see its badness, are the least capable of imagining or of carrying out reform. The old Universities possess ludicrously inadequate governments. Had they each a President with almost absolute power, as in the United States, they might move. But they are paralysed by obsolete machinery. The self-constituted Headmasters' Conference, which poses as a sort of scholastic House of Lords, is notoriously unable to move. Lastly, the heads of the ancillary Preparatory Schools are only permitted gently to coo. Dr Gray, we believe, resigned membership of the effete Headmasters' Conference in disgust at its inertia. The teaching staffs at Oxford and Cambridge, who are, in the main, keen for some reform, exhibit every year the pitiful spectacle of responsible officers of Universities being outvoted by a crowd of irresponsible fossils, largely country clergymen. Instead, however, of going on strike, these “Dons” think it becoming to submit to this idiotic interference.

Dr Gray must, therefore, appeal to some other tribunal. But who in England cares what the old-fashioned schools and Universities choose to do or not do? Certainly not the masses, who, for the most part, are too ignorant or too preoccupied to see the need of training leaders of the nation, or who fondly imagine national affairs can be carried on by Trade Unions or mass meetings—that is, by general ignorance. Dr Gray appeals, therefore, to the parents of the boys now being

stupefied in these costly palaces of false education. To this he devotes his first chapter. His next step is to expose and to demolish the carefully cultivated fiction that these *endowed*—that is, *charity*—schools are, in any sense at all, *public*. England has always been contemptibly mean with regard to education. Most of our schools and Universities, until recently, were founded by *private* citizens, just as the Empire itself has been won mainly by *private* adventurers. But the schools and colleges founded for the poor have been gradually appropriated by the rich, who thus get cheaper education. To disguise this fact the “swank” word “Public” School was invented, and the enthusiasm affected by the directing classes for these schools is, doubtless, due to the gratitude felt for the cheapened education they thus obtain. The next two chapters discuss the ever-increasing discontent, even among parents who patronise Public Schools, caused by their failure to provide effective education. Quoting Matthew Arnold, who, in 1871, urged public control of these institutions, Dr Gray insists that all these schools be set free from the warping influence of Oxford and Cambridge and be brought under the jurisdiction of the national Government. It is clear that this proposal is not quite consistent with the previous appeal to the parents. If the parents were determined to have reforms, they would simply give a term’s notice to withdraw their sons; and, if they all—or even many—did this, the schools would have to reform or perish. But the parents need reforming almost as much as the schools they grumble at, but support. It is because the parents, in the main, are not agreed as to the reforms necessary or possible that the schools have gone on, since Matthew Arnold’s attack, almost as inefficient as ever. The fact is, parents can see some defects and know how to grumble, but do not understand education sufficiently to propound remedies. Besides, parents suffer from the same limitations of mind and character which have caused both schools and schoolmasters to be what they are. No two parents, moreover, see as a rule alike. On the con-



trary, their well-meant suggestions are apt to be mutually destructive.

We are thus thrown back upon the alternative of governmental control. But, here again, we are pulled up by the fact that no actual Cabinet has shown, as yet, that it understands the gravity of the situation and the necessity of immediate reform—still less, that it knows what to demand or even to recommend. The masses—that is, electors—care nil, one way or the other, what goes on in the schools and Universities of the rich. They have not yet grasped the fact that all endowments, of schools and Universities alike, are really taxes on labour; that, consequently, these endowments ought to be used for national purposes. When the masses do grasp this fact, they will almost certainly say (exactly what the National Union of Teachers lately said): “No national funds shall be spent to make schools for the classes better than the schools for the masses.” They will go further. They will demand that the present misappropriation of endowments to cheapen education for the rich shall cease. What, then, will become of these palaces of education? They are often in the wrong place: some by rivers which flood them, others in stuffy health resorts frequented by invalids in bath-chairs. Some were formerly in the country, or at least well outside small towns, but are now engulfed by bricks and mortar and suffocated by modern civilisation, with all its mean squalor. Their buildings as a rule do not suit modern needs, whether domestic or scholastic, and their walls are saturated with the “effluvia” of obsolete ideas.

The next two chapters contrast the education given in the Public Schools with ideals of education as conceived by some of the great teachers of the world. The author points out that the present curriculum is still mainly devised to accentuate “caste,” and in no way adequately represents the course of studies needed by the directing classes of a great country.

Chapters vii., viii., and ix. follow, with a deeply interesting historical survey of the last fifty years of these schools.

The author quotes (p. 133) some admirable utterances of Mr A. J. Balfour and Herbert Spencer, which serve to convince the reader that even our most eminent statesmen and philosophers speak in vain. Nothing, it would seem, will compel reform—except, say, the seizure of London by the Germans; or, say, a revolt of the masses led by Mr Lloyd George. And yet, who will gain everything by reform if not the boys who use these schools? They would exchange their present ignoble life of bored self-indulgence for a strenuous life of useful work for the community.

Dr Gray next devotes three chapters to “Life in the Boarding School,” and here he is at pains once more (p. 165) to enunciate the aim of his book,<sup>1</sup> namely, “the investigation of one problem only”: “how far the curricula set, and the life led, at our great schools are fitting their *alumni* to become useful and profitable partners in maintaining the integrity of the Empire.” These three chapters show how the Public Schools fail to develop a proper Imperialism. But they do much more. They prove that the life, occupations, and studies fail to correct the faults of our national character—narrowness of mind and lack of sympathy,—and so fail to create *public spirit*. As public spirit is supposed to be the peculiar product of *Public Schools*, we must explain. Blind and fanatical idolatry, first of their own school, and next of Public Schools in general, is manufactured in excess of all need; but what is lacking is an enthusiastic determination to serve the nation as an indivisible whole. At this moment in our history this is our most urgent need.

Chapter xiii. discusses the Day School, and incidentally co-education and the influence of home. The unlucky number 13 seems to have infected the contents. Anyhow, the gifted author is less happy in this chapter than elsewhere. He points out that Day Schools are becoming numerous, popular, and

<sup>1</sup> I quote this, because some critics do not seem to have read the book or even the title, and lash the author for not advertising their particular scholastic shop “with the glad light of morning on their brow.”



important, that Boarding Schools are losing numbers as well as reputation. It is easy to see why. Englishmen despise education. They haggle over school fees, but must have a new motor-car every year and never grudge its annual upkeep. This, indeed, the author points out in a humorous footnote. But surely everybody expected that the multiplication of Day Schools, paid for out of the rates, would damage Boarding Schools. Is not competition the Englishman's panacea? Build new Day Schools to make old Boarding Schools reform! Ruin agriculture to pamper manufactures and commerce! Then, when ruined agriculture is tardily discovered to mean a degenerate population, the same clumsy statesmanship sets to work to ruin somebody or something to conjure agriculture back into life. Anything rather than grasp the whole problem! Dr Gray, perceiving the real ills of the usual type of Boarding School, but knowing much less about Day Schools, tells us (p. 235) that he also "has come to believe the Day School to be, on the whole, the more salutary system of education." True, he goes on to say: if certain drastic changes were made in the Boarding School, he "would be among the first to maintain that the Boarding School would form as ideal a part of a heavenly republic as ever the genius of Socrates portrayed."

The criticism suggested by this Chapter xiii. is: that Day Schools, whatever they *might* be, are at present in, or close to, towns, with all the ghastly drawbacks the word *town* suggests; that the English home is not organised for education, and also tends to narrow the mind and stifle the sympathies quite as much in one direction as the Boarding Schools in another; that, owing to the difficulties of co-operation between home and school, education "falls between two stools." There is, consequently, more immorality among day scholars, but it is less easily discovered, is not discussed so much, does not become so easily traditional, but, for the same reason, is not so amenable to wholesome public opinion; when discovered by the home it is hushed up; and

when discovered by the school it is also more or less hushed up for the sake of the parents who, of course, are living close by. Dr Gray omits to mention that in Germany, France, Switzerland, and other countries of Europe which possess excellent Day Schools, there is a strong movement in favour of Boarding Schools, and the Prussian Government has itself started one recently, although the Prussian Day Schools are the best in the world. As for co-education: in America, where the experience of it is longer and wider than in all the rest of the world taken together, there is a strong and steady movement against it, just when our Mayors and Town Councils are beginning to regard it as a moral panacea.

Chapter xiv., which concludes the criticism on the Public Schools, discusses their religious and moral teaching. Dr Gray points out what the boys of the United States lose by the almost complete separation between moral and religious teaching there. He does not, however, believe in religious instruction being in the hands of theological specialists. He maintains that the average lay schoolmaster is deeply impressed with the sacred nature of his calling, produced by his guardianship of the young. He ridicules examinations in "Divinity." He points out that no two men can think or feel alike on the subject of religious faith. He maintains that the reason why some people cannot find a religious atmosphere anywhere in the Boarding Schools is because it is, in fact, everywhere. He pleads for more elasticity in the Liturgy, argues that Carlyle, Ruskin, and other great prophets of our own country and epoch should be read in chapel. All this is excellent. Schools which inculcate sectarianism violate fundamental laws of psychology, and therefore fail to secure the results they hoped for. Founded to bolster up some variety of faith, they not uncommonly undermine the very faith they sought to strengthen. All religious bodies are finding at the present time that the young cry out for bread instead of stones. But space forbids our plunging deeper into this fascinating subject.



In the next two chapters Dr Gray discusses the relation between the schools and the old Universities. He would free the schools from all subordination to Universities. He says (p. 311): “There should be organic severance between the Public Schools and the Universities in all regards.” As to the courses of studies, he says (p. 308), “a definite date should be fixed at which a complete revolution in the general curriculum in English Public Schools and Universities should be effected. Let there be a breathing interval allowed for seven years . . . and let the old order yield place to the new, say, on 1st January 1920.” The seven years’ interval is to allow for the training of teachers, because at present so many can only teach “classics.” The majority of Public-School masters are not adequately educated, and so would be unfitted to take part in any up-to-date scheme.

Dr Gray is right to urge emancipation of schools from Universities. In no other important country of the world are schools controlled by Universities except in the United States, where this survival from English “colonial” days is being fast abolished. The work of schools is totally different from the work of Universities. The school has to develop the whole personality. The University has to train special aptitudes. Let each institution attend to its own job. The cause of our present absurd jumble of functions is the inertia of mindless tradition. Originally the “Colleges” at Oxford and Cambridge were what we now call Secondary Schools. Originally Winchester, Eton, and the rest were created to feed the said Colleges, and constituted what are now called “Preparatory” Schools. They were, in almost all respects, save that their pupils were younger, imitations of the Colleges. By degrees the boys went later and later from the schools to the Colleges, just as in our own time boys have tended to go later and later from the Preparatory Schools to the Public Schools. But the Colleges never broke loose from the habits and traditions derived from their infancy, so that they still muddle together the aims of a school with the totally different aims of a

University. Complete separation is essential. Chapter xvii. deals with the work which Universities *ought* to perform: namely, specialisation for definite expert duties as citizens of a great country.

Dr Gray concludes his book with three chapters on reconstruction from the bottom. These chapters deserve fuller consideration than space allows us. Suffice it to say that he discusses various theories of education, old and new, but finally takes his stand beside President G. Stanley Hall, the illustrious author of *Adolescence*—and (it should be added) of many other books and pamphlets of great value,—the editor of *The Pædagogical Seminary*, perhaps the richest mine of educational gold existing, the creator (more than anyone else) of the genetic philosophy of education, and the greatest figure in the educational world to-day. To reform our educational system, we must go back, as Dr Gray does, to first principles. If President Stanley Hall's ideas were carried out, there would be an amazing improvement all along the line.

Dr Gray has written a most important book in a most entertaining manner. It combines earnest purpose with sparkling good nature in a very unusual degree. Were it not packed so full of facts, criticisms, epigrams, and suggestions, one would be sore tempted to try to read it from cover to cover at one sitting. But it needs to be read again and again. All the way through it adumbrates reforms, so that one should not hunt for these in the last three chapters only, as some critics have done. But, how has this valuable book been received? To the honour of English education be it at once said the *educational* papers have received it with words of blessing. Other periodicals are less well informed and also less fair. Some of the reviews can only be called childish; others complain of exaggeration, although moderation is a distinguishing feature of the book, and although no one could exaggerate the inefficiency of these schools and Universities, judged by international standards. There is one fact which no critic so far, we believe, has mentioned, but which is of



profound significance. During the last few years has appeared one book after another criticising very adversely England's present condition. The Boer War seems to have set some people thinking. The revolt of the masses, followed by the practical abolition of the House of Lords, set others thinking. In 1909 appeared *The Condition of England*, by C. F. G. Masterman; *England and the English*, by Price Collier; *Das kranke England*, by Curt Abel Musgrave. This last was written and published in Germany, as if the author feared assassination if it appeared in English, although the book is almost entirely made up of extracts from staid and sober English newspapers, and so is a compendium of English admissions of our own English faults. In 1911 were published *An Imperial Democracy*, by F. Francis; and *The West in the East*, by Price Collier. In 1912 appeared *What is and What might be*, by E. Holmes, attacking our whole system of elementary education; *England's Weak Points*, by M. Herggelet; and *The Decline of Aristocracy*, by A. Ponsonby—which last Dr Gray does not appear to have seen, or he would doubtless have quoted from it extensively in support of his own arguments, for it is full of excellent wisdom and written in admirable spirit. In 1913 appeared *National Revival*, with a preface by Lord W. de Broke. Broadly speaking, these books all lead up to the conclusion that our directing classes need a totally different education, which is the main argument of Dr Gray's book.

In conclusion, we will mention what we believe are the indispensable steps to reform. We need at once to establish one great college of education, separate from all existing schools and Universities; staffed by the best men in the world that intelligence can find; furnished with everything the world possesses of books, instruments, charts, diagrams, apparatus, furniture, required to explain the processes of education and to make teaching effective; with workshops, class-rooms, laboratories, gardens, and lands where every variety of occupation and study could be tested; with art galleries,

music rooms, and, in short, the whole paraphernalia of up-to-date education; with schools attached in which the most intelligent boys in the kingdom would be taught by the best methods. Such a model college of education would supply the whole country with trained teachers, without whom nothing great will ever be done. It is useless building battleships without training officers to handle them. It is useless to train officers and consign them to obsolete wooden hulks. We need first of all teachers, for we have practically none. Then we need new schools all over the country built on up-to-date principles—large schools are an anachronism. No man can deal with more than about one hundred boys, especially if thoroughly up-to-date methods are employed and the whole life of the boy is considered. Schools of a thousand, of five hundred, or even of Thring's three hundred, are too large for successful work. Fix the number at (say) 112, eight classes of 14 each, with a small margin over, say 120 or 125 maximum. Let the aim be physical, mental, and moral culture of the boys, not numbers. Then, but not till then, our schools will cease to be shops. Give schools the power of granting diplomas, and the schoolmaster the status which rightly belongs to the highest of all professions. Mankind thrives in the country, but perishes in the town. Let all these schools be in the country, which alone can supply a fit environment. All this will cost money. Where is it to come from? First, we should nationalise all endowments; next, sell the obsolete schools and their sites; and then raise a loan of one hundred millions, secured on the credit of the country, to provide sites, buildings, salaries, pensions, and a complete outfit. This would be the most productive investment ever made by this country; for education spells Empire—and mis-education spells ruin.

CECIL REDDIE.

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## INTERNATIONAL MORALITY.

F. W. LEITH ROSS.

“THE history of nations,” wrote Mr Gladstone a generation ago, “is a melancholy chapter: that is, the history of governments is one of the most immoral parts of human history.” The sentiment thus expressed was not original then, nor is it now obsolete. Each year that passes affords fresh examples of the international opportunism to which Mr Gladstone was referring, and each example calls forth a renewed expression of ineffectual reprobation from the politicians, who are always ready on such occasions to give a discreet countenance to the well-intentioned but ill-defined aspirations of the philanthropists. It might indeed be plausibly argued that public morality has even lost ground in Europe during the last generation; and that the steady, iron-handed statecraft associated with the “Weltpolitik” of Bismarck has degenerated into a cynical utilitarianism, reckless alike of general juristic conventions and of private treaty engagements. But this is an exaggeration of the facts. Diplomats never had a good name: in recent years all they have acquired is a new weapon. Through a careful manipulation of the press, they can secure support to-day from an appeal to popular self-interest such as they never won from loyalty or patriotism. The growth of the democratic spirit, which makes itself felt even in the most autocratic states, has not proved itself altogether a power for peace in the international sphere. Its result has been stated epigrammatically in the

saying that thirty years ago Might was greater than Right: to-day Might is Right. But while there is a certain amount of justification for this accusation, side by side with this development there has been a parallel movement of a subtler kind in the opposite direction. The press has brought to bear on diplomatic intrigues the critical opinion of those not immediately interested; and this opinion tends in the end to impress itself even on those who for the moment were carried away by the exuberance of national enthusiasms. As long as the voice of criticism can be heard, the cause of justice can prevail: as long as any action is regarded as immoral, the evil is not irremediable. In fact, in the recognition of immorality itself is the seed of improvement. Thus the shocks to the public conscience of Europe during the last dozen years may be as well the sign of a growing tenderness on the part of the public as of a growing recklessness on the part of the powers that be. Acquiescence there no doubt is, but it is an acquiescence reluctant and indignant; so that the deepest outcry perhaps arises from the people whose conscience is by slow and painful processes groping towards the acceptance of a closer organisation and a more systematic vindication of public integrity.

These tendencies do not therefore argue an absolute or even a gradual divorce between the principles of conduct in public with those commonly used in private affairs: if anything, it is rather the reverse. Public opinion has gradually accustomed itself to apply to the intercourse of governments the standards it has in the past applied to the intercourse of individuals: unfortunately, during the process these standards have themselves been undermined. The indifference to morality of which our diplomatists are accused may after all be the fault rather of philosophy than of politics. For the ethical theories in vogue to-day are absurdly inadequate to the applications which are given to them by public sentiment. Morality, which is a force based on the living responsibility for action, becomes, according to the sin, a system based on the arbitrary limitation



of action ; the State, which is a combination of autonomous individuals, becomes an organism of parts efficient or inefficient in accordance with the measure of their obedience. Despite all verbal professions, this reasoning rests on the reduction of man to a mechanism. But man is not a mechanism : Morality is not a theory : the State is not an organism. Men are self-governing individuals, each of whom, for his own purposes and in pursuance of his own personality, acknowledges a rational control over his actions and accepts responsibility for their course. To him Morality is a force of his own nature, whose dictates are his dictates : the State, on the other hand, is the order which regulates his interaction with other individuals. It is an external order which he has his share in making and unmaking, and to which he owes much the same obligation as he owes to the material world in which he lives and moves. He resents its interference with his independence save in so far as he expects other people to accept it. So far, indeed, is he from accepting his position as a subsidiary part in a unitary organism, that he spends much of his time and thought in abusing and amending the system to which he contributes. He pays the piper, and he demands the right to call the tune.

Just as it is better to speak of "Men" than of "Man" (an abstraction of which anything may be argued), so it is preferable to speak of States rather than of "the State." In this way the academic superstition, which has become a part of the political faith of the average educated citizen, may be most readily tested. For as soon as we speak of the State we personify it, and in so doing we inevitably accept its organic character. But once this is accepted, it follows that the individual cannot set himself to judge the order of things any more than the hand can rebel against the head. Morality, therefore, instead of flowing from the individual, will be a function of the State. The duty of the citizen will be laid down for him, and he must do it. But whereas it is comparatively easy to control action by threat of punishment, it is impossible to initiate action by this means. The State can

only regulate action, and its codes are therefore necessarily negative. Morality, on the other hand, even the philosophers will admit, is essentially positive ; and this character it retains as long as it is formulated as a golden rule for the individual to apply. But when a detailed theory has to be evolved, the golden rule at once degenerates into a series of negative propositions. This fact would not matter much if these theories were not transferred from the study to the street ; but it has actually led to the unfortunate notion that Morality consists merely in obedience to a number of negative ordinances. As no one has yet had the temerity to determine the ideal of human nature in its finality, no code can possibly be complete ; but in so far as a code is even suggested, freedom of initiative, the very essence of moral action, has gone by the board. The philosophers may give us a very pretty thing, but it is not Morality, but Law.

So great, however, is their influence that it requires an effort to recall the original force which Morality represents. It is commonly regarded as a cut-and-dried system which such and such an action (described as "immoral") transgresses. The inference is that this system can be applied indifferently, to any sort of human interaction, as, for instance, international relations. Here the philosopher comes into touch, or rather into conflict, with facts ; for he knows that his theory will not work save in the abstract world he has evolved for it. So he says, "Between State and State there can be no consciousness of common good ; for the State has no determinate function in a larger community, but is itself the supreme community ; the guardian of a whole moral world, but not a factor within an organised world."<sup>1</sup> But here the man in the street takes him up. "This is all very well," he may say, "for the State you construct in your study, but it does not suit my requirements. My State is certainly a factor within an organised world ; it has a number of functions in that world, and it must exercise those functions in accordance with what I call Morality.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Professor Bosanquet, *Philosophic Theory of the State*, p. 325.



If your system of Morality will not work in that sphere, so much the worse for it." Or, to put the objection into philosophical jargon, the State is no more an isolated entity than is the individual. If the State has no moral function within a wider whole comprising other States, why should not the individual, who is a far more perfect organism than any State, quite conscientiously justify the extremest anarchism on the ground that he too is "the guardian of a whole moral world, but not a factor within an organised moral world"? Unless, indeed, the emphasis is to be laid on the word "organised"—in which case the conception of duty is admittedly a juridical and not a moral one—duty rests not on a common consciousness of reciprocity, but on a common subjection to force.

When philosophy thus repudiates the application of Morality to international relations it is small wonder that the diplomatist feels injured if it is expected of him.

But this is the actual situation. Morality has continually been treated as circumscribed by social organisation: its application to a wider sphere has scarcely been suggested. Indeed, as a contrast to the amenities of social morality, no illustration has been more commonly used than that afforded by a comparison with the interaction of communities in their corporate capacity. Hobbes uses this very illustration to justify his initial description of the "State of Nature." "Though there had never been any time," he wrote,<sup>1</sup> "wherein particular men were in a condition of war one against another, yet in all times kings and persons of sovereign authority, because of their independency, are in continual jealousies and in the state and posture of gladiators, having their weapons pointing and their eyes fixed on one another; that is, their forts, garrisons, and guns, upon the frontiers of their kingdoms, and continual spies upon their neighbours: which is a posture of war. But because they uphold thereby the industry of their subjects, there does not follow from it that misery which accompanies the liberty of particular men." Hobbes was writing within a

<sup>1</sup> *Leviathan*, chap. xiii.

few years of the close of the Thirty Years' War; and with all the progress of the two and a half centuries which have passed, it is melancholy to think how little the international situation has altered. Still do the "kings and persons of sovereign authority stand facing one another, with their forts, garrisons, and guns pointing"; still do their mutual jealousies enforce a posture of war. If in anything the situation is altered, it is in relation to the industry of their subjects, which no longer requires the "protection" of such a system, but would rather, if released from the burden thus imposed, shake itself free from a time-worn superstition and develop a new and unexpected wealth of prosperity.

But, after all, there is something rather superficial about such a comparison. It involves exactly the same abstraction as Hobbes makes to arrive at his non-social man. The abstraction is not so obvious; indeed it would apparently be denied by Professor Bosanquet. To him the State is "the guardian of a whole moral world, not a factor within an organised moral world." But this position can only be maintained by upholding the theoretic absolutism of sovereignty against the actual facts of the case. For the independence of nations has many limitations, financial, moral, even legal in character; and though the regard paid to such limitations depends largely on the forces at command, they cannot be ignored even by the strongest among the nations of the earth. The theory of independence, in its fulness, would postulate not merely plenipotentary rights of internal administration, but equally untrammelled rights of unrestricted and unprovoked aggression. It is simply disingenuous to maintain that the actual situation to-day, however much it calls for improvement, gives any practical justification to such a theory as this. If, as Voltaire suggested, a preacher of open immorality would be stoned by the people, a nation that practised such notions of independence would promptly be reduced to impotence. It is true that barbarities can be committed in Russia or Spain which would not be tolerated in Turkey or in Peru;



but the smaller States must be the index which gives the clue to the whole volume. If there are points in internal maladministration beyond which the smaller States cannot exercise independence without incurring alien intervention, there are equally points—more extreme no doubt—beyond which the largest State cannot proceed without incurring the risk of a similar penalty. The lever roused by public opinion rarely takes the form of intervention ; it may perhaps, in the case of powers of the first order, not even take so definite and committal a form as that of “friendly representations.” For, where active intervention is deprecated, a more perfect instrument may be found in the automatic upcrop of national mistrust, which, affecting as it does instantaneously the stability of the markets, brings to reason at the feet of the financier statesmen who can afford to ignore the arguments of diplomacy.

The dulness of our understanding in this matter is due to our uncritical acceptance of the theory of the State as an organic whole, and our forgetfulness of its limitations. Nations, if they have not common consciousness, have at least community of thought : what they lack is community of action. For whereas thought is necessarily universal, and cannot be made the sphere of any individual or any power, action, on the other hand, is essentially particular. It is set in motion by the will of the individual ; his action, irreparable and ineffaceable, carries away with it all possibility of amendment. This character of action makes the conception of a nation acting almost a contradiction in terms in an age such as ours, when a nation is an aggregate of social strata, varying widely in intellectual capacity and in material interests, and each more intimately connected with similar strata in other States than with those above or below it in its own. Nations can only act through representatives, whose title to speak for their community may be little or none. If we take the case of an autocratic State, which would seem most clearly to possess a cardinal unity of allegiance, binding together all classes, as the

steps of a pyramid, towards the summit of sovereignty, the unity for action is vested in the sovereign, who, as individual, may have interests discordant from those of his subjects.

But the problem is even more complex in the case of constitutional governments. Here the representative of the State is an accredited agent ; he is not an independent and authoritative spokesman of the case in hand. He is sent to the councils of Europe to vindicate the claims of his own nationality ; in so far as he forgets this, he is failing in his duty, and on his return he will be brought to the reckoning. He is the trustee of a nation's welfare ; and his power depends on the narrowness, not the breadth, of his outlook. In private life, no doubt, an estimable and law-abiding citizen, in his public capacity he is trained to develop that immunity from moral scruples that we associate with corporations. Overlooking the wide field of common interests, he must keep his eye on some particular national objective, to which everything is sacrificed, so that the varied claims of political rivalry may well raise such a clamour as to silence the thin pleading of the voice of reason. Thus, throughout history, the worst crimes have been committed not in the interests of the sovereign, but of the nation.

Difference of government is the prime cause of international dispute : it makes it easy to disguise fictitious opposition in terms of realities. Nations cannot communicate freely as long as the spokesman of the one is a dynastic autocrat, whose word is imposed by force upon his subjects, and the spokesman of the other is a demagogue, whose word is imposed upon him by the people he serves. The clash between Absolutism and Democracy, involving an antithesis of temperament in dealing with the practical problems of government, and arousing a hundred varied reactions of suspicion and irritation, is the great bulwark of the god of war. It is this temperamental difference which bars the application of Morality to the relations of States ; for Morality must define the temperament to be encouraged, and once this is done,



must organise itself for its maintenance. Whether this bar is a final one, we can only see if we consider the problem in the light in which it has been discussed in the past.

Men do not enter into the bloody struggles which have marked each stage of progress and retrogression in every epoch of history without some motive. It is not from an abstract admiration for martial virtue that war is declared. Yet it is extremely difficult to find motives which we can assert with any degree of verisimilitude to have been in the mind of the warrior. Religion is the nearest approach to such a motive; and religion, or the superstitious fervours which so often accompany it, has indeed been a fruitful source of strife. But the nation which embarked in a religious war in the twentieth century would stand convicted of incredible folly: the day has gone by for such ebullitions of theocratic sentiment, save in lands untouched by the sceptical and disintegrating spirit of European criticism. The wars of modern Europe are caused by the desire for territory, by the demands of commerce, or by the claims of honour. The most tangible of these motives—the desire for territory—is the one which is most commonly put forward. Yet territorial expansion cannot now be regarded as an unmixed blessing: it is no longer the profitable commodity that it once was; its responsibilities are as great as its privileges. The first duty of the conqueror is now to maintain order, not to extract profit. His first care will be to remedy the devastation he has caused, so that the war is often more advantageous to the conquered than to the conqueror. The greed for territorial sovereignty that persists is a rudimentary survival; the war of aggrandisement is a war in the interest of the ruler, not of the people.

But, it will be said, this is not the case in almost as common and even less defensible a type of war—that in support of mercantile and commercial interests. That is surely waged simply to promote the welfare of the wage-earners. This is, indeed, the pretext, but a most fallacious one. The so-called commercial wars of the ancient and middle

ages were attempts to break down monopolies, not of markets, but of goods. The opportunities of trade being restricted, and the use of the trade-routes jealously guarded, war was the only means by which many a commodity could find its way to the consumer. It was a question of spoils, not of trade. The situation has entirely changed in Europe to-day; only the most indirect advantage can be gained from even a successful war, while the disadvantages that are inevitable, whatever the issue of battle, are out of all proportion costly. Such wars serve not the interest of the wage-earner, but, at the best, only those of special cliques and corporations, to whose advantage are sacrificed the welfare and the lives of the people.

The last motive which need be dwelt upon is that conveyed by the vague term "honour." The connotation of such a term covers a variety of meanings, from matters too insignificant to arouse commercial or territorial ambitions, to questions, on the other hand, with which are bound up the existence of the State. In its lowest terms it reveals the childishness of much of our latter-day civilisation, its insistence on signs and symbols which have lost their meaning, its subservience to ignorant and indefensible prejudices. At its highest it represents the idealisation of the community at the expense of the individuals who compose it. For the "honour" thus vindicated is something far different from the honour of the individual: it more nearly approaches what we would call arrogance or incontinence. Further, by the appeal to war, the verdict is left to the arbitrament not of Right, but of Might; and this plea, therefore, is the one usually put forward by a strong power when, without provocation, it seeks self-aggrandisement at the expense of the weak.

Such being the chief pretexts—unsatisfactory enough—to which are ascribed the origin of wars, let us examine whether they could not be settled without recourse to arms. Here, as usual, the vaguer the solution suggested the wider its possible application. The growth of public opinion is the most important safeguard against rash and inexcusable breaches of the



peace. Its influence is, of course, chiefly sentimental : and its elasticity is often regarded as a compensation for its lack of intensity. But peace is too delicate a structure to rest surely on the shifting sand of sentiment. There is always a section of the populace which reaps a harvest out of the ruin of the remainder, and as long as the majority of the upper classes, with their military records and financial interests, constitute a vested interest in support of war, the sentiment of jingo patriotism will always have a more powerful appeal than that of pacificism.

But, it may be argued, the movement has gone beyond mere sentiment : it has expressed itself in the formation of the Court of Arbitration at the Hague. This is, we admit, a step in advance. It was justified by the successful issue of the various international difficulties previously submitted to arbitration. No one would wish to belittle such successes : the "Alabama" case, the Newfoundland fisheries, the "Dogger Bank" incident might easily in more troubled circumstances have been left to engender a posterity of rancour from which war might eventually have sprung. But, while acknowledging this to the full, we may take leave to doubt whether the advance is so great as is sometimes imagined. Each case submitted to arbitration may influence the submission of further cases ; but there is no logical necessity in this direction. Arbitration is purely voluntary, and, as such, cannot predetermine future action. It has, too, many flaws which must be corrected before it can become an efficient instrument for juristic purposes : we need only instance the difficulty of determining the constitution of the jury and the method of procedure, the tardiness of discussion and the inevitable postponement of the decision ; above all, the lack of moral courage in the arbiters, and the lack of sanction for the verdict. The first necessity for a Court of Arbitration is to secure a panel of judges who enjoy the confidence of all parties. Now, each nation individually gives its confidence only to those who express the national ambitions most con-

vincingly. The judges must therefore be found among private citizens rather than public officials. But no nation, accustomed to the principles of democratic government, will willingly entrust to the untrammelled and unchecked arbitrament of private individuals its most important interests. Thus the curious phenomenon arises that the main impetus to the promotion of arbitration has been given, not by popular assemblies, but by autocratic sovereigns. The Congresses of the Holy Alliance were summoned by Alexander I. in his pacifist period: the Conference of Geneva by Napoleon III.: the Hague Conference by the present Czar. The popular statesman knows the limitations of delegated power: he is jealous of the order thus built up, and he will not barter the right of private judgment for any security offered by an organisation of autocrats. The practical working of the "Holy Alliance"—which, it will be remembered, was formed to secure the peace of Europe by settling all disputes in friendly conference—only too well justifies such suspicions.

Yet that there is much to be said for such a confederacy cannot be denied. In the establishment, *ex nihilo*, of an international court to judge cases voluntarily submitted by disputants we have inverted the processes through which the development of private law has passed. Arbitration is the last, not the first method by which differences between individuals have been adjusted. We do not use arbitration with a burglar or an assassin; we appeal to the protection of the common law. And before arbitration can be effective we must give it a common sanction. Such a common power was to be found during the Middle Ages in the spiritual supremacy of Rome; but her supremacy disappeared in the upheaval which created the modern State system, and as yet no spiritual force has arisen in the new order which can be said to have taken her place as the authoritative exponent of the public conscience of Europe. The common power of the future must be sought in some other direction; but there are very grave objections to any concrete proposal which has been



suggested. It is, of course, possible to conceive a sanction based on the joint forces of some confederation of European States; but as long as these States retain anything of their present individuality, it is at least doubtful whether any effective combination could be made of such disparate elements. For any such combination could rely only on a limited support from its constituents, and would have to face unlimited resistance from its opponent; its forces would be subject to a divided, as against a unified, control; so that the probability is that coercion would not be successful save when demanded by and entrusted to the strongest of the powers. Further, there is no such ready criterion of the external rights of States as is afforded to their internal administration by the needs of individuals. The principles of private law are in the main established; the principles of national conduct are everywhere fluctuating. The doctrine of racial self-government, for instance, has weight to-day: it was not recognised a century and a half ago; and it may well be regarded as a mistake in a century and a half to come. As long as this is the case, therefore, with the strongest State will rest not only the enforcement of the sanction, but the interpretation and even the formulation of the law. But a power of coercion, uncontrolled by representative government and unguided by fixed principles of law, would be a power above law. It would be an instrument of universal peace only by means of universal conquest.

Arbitration, then, even if backed by the sanction of the common forces of Europe, does not promise well for the good government of the future. Such an expectation is, indeed, to mistake the scope of juristic conventions. The Hague Conferences have not been sterile; for the jurists understood what their aim was. It was to settle the first principles of a civil code between nations, not to determine the future government of the Universe. Arbitration cannot successfully be applied to the graver offences which require a criminal jurisdiction. It is a preventive against war: it is not a specific

for Morality. It is only because of the common misunderstanding on this point that it has required such lengthy consideration. But once the issue is put clearly, the misunderstanding—intelligible enough at first sight—clears away. War is not the antithesis of Morality : it may often be wrong, but it may equally well be right. Indeed, as there are always two parties to a war, it would be strange if innocent blood were shed on both sides for a wrong purpose. The fact is that war is a clumsy and barbarous procedure necessitated by the absence of any properly sanctioned system of criminal law between State and State. And as such a criminal law is, as we have seen, impracticable under the present system of autonomous States, the fault lies not with the individual but with the system.

The basis of this system is that the State is a rational organism, capable of action, like the individual, for a common purpose. This conception, which gives a species of moral personality to the State, is touchingly reiterated as a fundamental and necessary ingredient in all those philosophic theories which are to-day current ; yet, if we examine it, it is ludicrously inconsistent with the facts. These proclaim the modern State to be an aggregation of families and of classes, whose interests are wrapped up in those of similar families and of similar classes in alien aggregations : to be incapable of action save through a delegated government, effective enough as against a recalcitrant member within its jurisdiction, but hopelessly ineffective and indecisive in acting with similar governments ruling similar aggregations. These governments are all equally unconscious of any genuine aim or real desire held in common by the individuals whom they misrepresent, save a steady and ineffectual prayer for peace and tranquillity, the causes which, of all things, are the least likely to be promoted by the sagacious diplomacy which is intended to safeguard them. Recognising the absence of any spontaneous purpose linking together this aggregation which we call the community, they are compelled to invent one—that of mutual aggression ;



and beginning by deluding themselves, they end by deluding their subjects into the fixed idea that this is a rational, dignified, and, indeed, glorious object, which civilised and educated human beings should band themselves into opposing groups to maintain. They invent a fictitious self, and for the shade of its ambitions sacrifice the reality of good government. The fatality is the more irredeemable in that once this fetish of ignorance and misconception is exalted, it becomes a reality which cannot be disregarded. Aggression may be a foolish and a futile policy; but once it is mooted as possible, defence against aggression becomes necessary. Thus the avalanche starts, and gathers to it a weight of suspicion and a burden of debt which, even if we are spared the Armageddon of prophecy, may well tear from its roots the storm-shaken and ill-rooted fabric of our civilisation.

It is this false doctrine of the personality of the State which has both brought to being and made ineffectual treaty engagements. Commercial treaties are in the nature of bargains, and being mutually advantageous to both sides would readily be concluded and maintained without the intervention of diplomacy. It is the political treaties on which attention is chiefly concentrated; and of these the majority are probably of less utility to mankind than the paper on which they are written. The creations of force, they affect to limit the realm of force: an affectation which carries with it its own repudiation. As Alexander I. said to Talleyrand, "You are always talking to me of principles. As if your public law were anything to me: I do not know what it means. What do you suppose that all your parchments and your treaties signify to me?" Treaties hold good as long as they are enforceable: the only law of governments is the law of effectivity. The most solemn engagements are perennially being modified or repudiated, not from love of cynicism, but by the force of necessity. Treaty-making is part of the spectacular fame in which governments who have mistaken their function indulge: treaties are spurious coin from the beginning. The future progress of events cannot

be bound by a promise : for no man has the necessary authority to give such a promise. The validity of paper compacts rests not on the continuity of governments, but on the underlying unity which those governments would repudiate.

It is impossible to evoke order out of the present chaos by arbitration or by treaties, offensive and defensive : these are superficial palliatives which only disguise the essential irrationality of the system. We must go to the root of the evil and revise the traditional conception of the State as an aggressive personality, with a common purpose contrary to those of all the individuals that compose it. The State cannot—by a law of natural mortmain—hold land : it cannot trade : it cannot even fight, save through its citizens. It is time that these revised the interpretation of that cardinal doctrine of independence, in the name of which so much misery has been perpetrated. What they require of the State is security for person and property—neither of which will they enjoy as long as those in authority vie with one another in internecine disputes instead of performing the duties of civil government, and sacrifice thereby internal order for the sake of producing external disorder. The Republic of Plato is perhaps the most perfect example of this principle of national aggression carried to its logical conclusion : under it, the State would be constructed for a supreme end, the individual citizen be merely the means. But if this is the intellectual climax of a movement radically false, history is rich in less refined examples of the same fallacious principle. Such systems were good enough when the world was full of discrete and mutually unintelligible forces : but the spread of civilisation has been intensive as well as extensive, the different forces have come to recognise their underlying identity, and a more perfect instrument must be created for the better development of life. An aggressive independence ill reflects a harmonious interdependence.

It will be for the statesmen of the future to look these facts in the face. The common consciousness which the philosophers assumed has yet to be created. The forms of



government have not developed in proportion to the development of their constituents. No one of them is as yet a sufficiently delicate instrument to record the varying sentiments and yet maintain the standing principles which constitute the responsibility of national life: they must be brought into closer touch with the source of their power. The control of governments by the individuals must be perfected, and will be perfected: and the present framework of international hostility will then and there collapse of its own inherent inanity. The exact processes by which this real popular control will be effected—referendum, popular initiative, administrative decentralisation, freedom of trade—need not here be considered. All these in combination will probably be necessary. But the main question is not so much the instrument as the end. This is to clear away the mischievous misconception under which the function of the State has been narrowed down to the enforced organisation of its constituents for aggression; and to replace it by the true conception under which each State will contribute, by the development of its own constituents, to the common welfare of all. Thus only can Morality enter into the region of politics; for under our present system it is as harmful to a government as it is useful to the individuals who are governed: and Morality is never a vigorous growth when divorced from utility.

This is no empty aspiration impossible of attainment: it is, indeed, the consummation to which statesmanship is already tending. The developments of the last generation have been in nothing more original and more successful than in the organisation of international co-operative undertakings, such as the postal system. This internationalism (of which many instances might be cited) is not confined to the sphere of commerce: it has for many years been applied with signal success to the government of an important trade centre in the East, and it has recently been agreed to in the case of a city situated in a very hotbed of international rivalries.<sup>1</sup> The prosperity and

<sup>1</sup> Shanghai: Tangier.

efficiency of a municipality thus guaranteed by the goodwill of Europe in concert may well be matter for envy to the struggling millions who endure the burden of the great military and naval powers. Were it not for diplomatic rivalries the principle thus established might easily be extended to the less fully developed colonies, which require nothing more than security from European entanglements and a steady flow of investments for their development, until such time as they can attain to complete autonomy. And when this time has come, they would scarcely welcome it if it meant a renunciation of the benefits they had so long enjoyed, and a reversion to the tangled and unhappy disharmony of European diplomacy. That diplomacy is already appearing to the eyes of the new world as only the most grandiose product of Provincialism. Among the English-speaking races there has developed in amity a variety of self-governing communities which have raised themselves to perhaps the highest pitch of civilisation yet reached, and which are free, notwithstanding, from all desire or suspicion of mutual aggression. The achievement is no small one; and though in the course of history it may prove to have been but a passing phase, it may equally well point the road to the future development of civilisation. The new nations may come to the assistance of the old, not by joining their track, but by pulling them out of the quagmire to which that track has led them. When these great sister States have learnt to treat one another on mutual terms of trust and sympathy, without interference with their respective development, is it useless to hope that the States of Europe may also in time come to learn the same lesson, and in some form of federation leave one another free to work out the destinies of their civilisation without the instant fear of armed aggression, so that to the future historian the rivalries and antagonisms of England, France, and Germany may seem as full of fury and empty of significance as the old rivalries and antagonisms of Boeotia, Athens, and Sparta? The problems which each has to solve in its internal government



are difficult enough without the introduction of artificial and unnecessary complications.

This, it may be thought, has carried us rather far afield. Yet, if we gather together the threads of the argument, and look through the practical instances which have been developed to their theoretic significance, the story may, after all, be reaching its completion, and that which we are seeking may, in Platonic phrase, be rolling about at our feet. For the unsolved problem of international Morality is the identical problem which faces us in the sphere of human interaction: each difficulty throws a light on its counterpart. As we have seen, the human problem cannot be solved as long as Morality is confused with Legality; for Law is obsessed with prohibitions, Morality is a matter of worth. It is the positive effort springing from the initiative of the individual to make the most of life. Thus it is a mistake which cannot be compensated by any logical feats which lead us to regard it as a secondary radiation of a universal and self-regarding authority. Conduct is as much a matter of creative energy as art, and just as art cannot flourish in response to the dictates of authority, neither can life be galvanised by external codes. Only that is good which tends to further the development of individuality, not to hamper it: the greatest of crimes is the crime of interference.

This is exactly the keynote of modern national policy. The present system is based on the theoretically absolute right of the individual nation to work out its potentialities without interference: it scarcely repudiates open self-aggrandisement at the expense of others. But it has pursued its ideal too narrowly; with the result that neither development nor interference has become possible. In public affairs we have lost sight of that necessity of self-control which has alone been considered in the sphere of private conduct. Among men the tendency has been to curb initiative and to make it subserve an external authority: among nations all has been sacrificed for the sake of initiative, and initiative construed in the narrowest sense. These ideals are mutually required

to correct one another : in their synthesis is to be found the Morality of the future, both for men and for nations.

There are, of course, differences between the duties of States and of individuals : the analogy cannot be pressed in all details. The relationships between man and man are closer and more inherent than those between nation and nation. But, at the same time, it should be remembered that these relationships are largely contractual, and the force of law has tended perhaps to exaggerate the binding power of contracts. However that may be, the main interest alike of men and States is to make the most of their possibilities. The possibilities of the State lie not entirely or even chiefly in the sphere of conquest : its organisation, if directed to a moral end, would be self-centred, intensively rather than extensively. A good government, like a good man, would find its ideal in developing the capacities of its own subjects. Indeed, the question is perhaps simpler in the case of nations than of men ; for whereas among men self-development often accentuates the danger of infringing the rights of others, among nations the self-development of one is in the best interest of all. Patriotism is at present a doctrine of interference ; it must be elevated to be a doctrine of toleration. The deepest problem in all philosophy is to ascertain where the balance should be struck between the concentration and the diffusion of energy ; the practical duty of the State is to harmonise these principles, which are, after all, not so much contradictory as complementary.

F. W. LEITH ROSS.



## THE EVOLUTION OF THE SOCIAL CONSCIENCE TOWARDS CRIME AND INDUSTRIALISM : A PARALLEL.

E. H. JONES.

IN little more than the last decade political thinking has executed a *volte face* as regards industrial struggles. There is a demand to-day for something more than the negative legislation of the past. The conviction that the right in the economic struggle of Capital with Labour must be reached in the long run, provided only that the parties be allowed to fight it out, has been abandoned. It is no longer held that the business of the State is merely "to keep the ring" for the combatants, and there is prevalent a curious unanimity of opinion that the situation to-day cannot be met by the commandment "Thou shalt *not*." The necessity has arisen for the positive "Thou shalt," and there is a call for direct State intervention, for the urgent doing of something new and radical. Here are two witnesses from the opposite poles of the political world :

Professor Walker, in the January HIBBERT, says : " Here is one point in which the leaders of the labour revolt seem to have erred. They imagine that there is needed only some tinkering of the existing system."

" They are convinced that our social system must be profoundly changed. . . . They are quite right ; or rather they are wrong only in that they are not sufficiently radical in their views."

Mr H. G. Wells, in *The Labour Unrest*, makes the same point: "Hitherto the most that any State, overtaken by social and economic stresses, has ever achieved in the way of adapting itself to them has been no more than patching. . . . Yet some things there are that cannot be done by small adjustments. . . . And it seems to me that the establishment of the world's work upon a new basis—and that is what the Labour Unrest demands for its pacification—is just one of those large alterations which will never be made by the collectively unconscious activities of men, by competition and survival and the higgling of the market. . . . The change has to be made on a comprehensive scale or not at all."

Professor Walker and Mr Wells then proceed to outline what is to be done, each from his own point of view. That is to say, each has designs on the mote which he sees in the eye of his political adversary. Mr Wells says, in effect, to the Tory Idle Rich: "Do not fritter away your money! Produce!" and Professor Walker says to the starving Inefficient on the Socialist side: "Do not leave idle what little strength and skill you possess! Produce!" and they go on to show how the production is to be achieved.

Herein, it seems to me, they indulge in the "tinkering" which they themselves have condemned. Nor do they stand alone in this. Amongst those who dread the outcome of this war of classes it is a common error to focus attention, not on the conflict itself, but on the secondary evils which are the results rather than the causes of the antagonism, and whose removal will not bring peace. State-ownership, the elimination of the unfit, State employment for the unemployed and the inefficient, helps to self-help such as labour bureaux and unemployment insurance, improvement of the environment by means of garden cities, improvement of the individual by means of "continuation classes," education of the Idle Rich to a rational use of their money, education of the working man to a rational use of his spare time, the abolition of Capital, the subjugation of Labour to the needs of the community—all



have their several advocates, and all have this feature in common, that they deal with symptoms or consequences rather than with causes. For the achievement of proposals like the "radical change" of Professor Walker and the "large alteration" of Mr Wells would mean no more than that the State should succour the wounded and helpless in the ranks of the two armies. Society is to set up as an ambulance corps. The object is to make the weakling on either side—the Idle Rich and the Hungry Incapable—more efficient. And at the end of it all the fabric of society remains unchanged; the economic war goes on, and goes on all the more fiercely for the increased efficiency of the fighters.

The State has got to face the fact that the danger to society as a whole does not lie in the extremes, in the weaklings of either side. The destructive effects of the conflict are due to the opposition of capable men to capable men. For it is not our useless citizens who are mainly involved. The struggle is between the honest, hard-working, competent worker on the one side, and the equally honest, hard-working, and competent capitalist on the other; and it is the very competence of the workman as workman, and of the capitalist as capitalist, that makes the battle for supremacy so severe, and its danger to the State so great. Eliminate either the captains of industry or the workers and the organisation of society would be shaken to its foundations. A complete victory for either side would spell its own defeat as well as the paralysis of the whole State. But if every man who remains idle, whether because of his wealth or because of his own incompetence, departed this life to-morrow, and the newspapers neglected to make it public, the world would never know.

Class antagonisms will not be any the less strong, nor class hatreds any the less bitter, if the Hon. Algy sees the error of pearl dinners and goes on to the parish council, or if John Smith at last gets a shirt to his back. For the unrest is not based on the feelings of the scented Algernons nor of the

shirtless John Smiths. They are lookers-on at the great fight, and their only share in it is the passive one of being championed by one side or the other. Capital may assert the right of Algernon to spend his wealth in any way he pleases, good or bad, and Labour may assert the right of John Smith to be clad, to be provided with work whether he is fit for it or not; but these assertions are incidents in the conflict—not the cause of it. These weaklings have not even the status of Jenkins' ear. They did not form even the excuse for the war. The struggle began between the workers of the industrial world, and only in the fulness of time has the burden of the weak been taken over by the strong.

Most willingly do I admit that under existing conditions certain incompetents are unable to obtain employment, that this is lamentable, and that it calls for the sympathy of the State. Of our charity we ought to do what we can. But the life of society does not hang by this thread, any more than the livelihood of the family depends upon the helplessness of the youngest child. Something is here for tears, and that is all. If the State steps into the arena to guide and help, if the strong are called upon to make some sacrifice for the weak, the motive will be that which moves the father to cherish most tenderly the deformed and helpless child—it will be a pitying tenderness, not fear for our own existence.

In the not very distant past, the question "How can I get enough to keep body and soul together?" was too often the question of the capable worker in full employment. But the organisation of Labour has altered that, and the hard-fought economic battles of the nineteenth century have won for the labourer a comfort and a security of which his grandfather never dreamed. This question is no longer the point at issue. Wherever Labour is organised it has become the question of the inefficient, of the man outside the ranks, who cannot harm society even if he wishes to do so, who cannot kill industry by throwing down his tools for the adequate reason that he has no tools to throw. Strikes and lock-outs can alike paralyse



society, but these weapons are not in the hands of the idle rich and the unemployed to wield. They are the weapons of the workers of the economic world, and if State interference is to be "direct," it ought to deal directly with the men who are at the bottom of the trouble—the working capitalist on the one side and the working man on the other.

It must be observed in the next place that the fierceness of the quarrel is due to something more elemental than mere greed. There seems to be at the back of it all a firm belief in the morality of the demands made by either side. Pure greed will not explain the "sympathetic" strike, the "universal" strike, or the "universal" lock-out. Nor will ignorance. For working man and capitalist alike know from experience that it is indeed rare for the gains of victory at once to outbalance the losses of battle. The struggle is most often fought for the sake of class *rights*. The conquerors themselves can hope to enjoy only the moral fruits of their success.

Both sides are fighting for a principle, and, curiously enough, for the same principle. Each demands a just division of the spoils of industry. The question put is no longer, "Have I enough to keep body and soul together?" but rather, "Is the treatment meted out to me and my fellows just? Is our share in what we produce a fair share?" And the trouble is that each side claims that none but itself is competent to hold the scales of justice even, and that its own particular "inside knowledge" is necessary for the computation of what constitutes a fair share. There lies the basis of the unrest, and there it seems likely to remain so far as the suggested "radical reforms" go.

That the adoption of the schemes formulated might be most beneficial to the State in many ways I do not seek to deny. But I must venture to assert most strongly that they do not touch even the fringe of the problem they are intended to solve. They deal with production, but it is not in the course of production that the antagonism between Capital and Labour arises. It is true that production is necessary

for the existence of the State, and that Capital and Labour, in some form or another, are both essential to production. But the converse—that production is the life-blood of both Capital and Labour—is equally true. Neither can exist without it. The interest of each is to produce, and in this the interest of each is identical, not only with that of the other, but also with that of the State. Until the stage of distribution is reached they are allies, their interests are corporate and single, there is no conflict, and there is no danger to society.

But in regard to distribution an entirely new situation arises. The former corporate unity of purpose is broken, and here for the first time individual wants demand satisfaction and individual rights arise. Labour and Capital at once come into conflict. They must do so, however unselfish each may be. For the interests of the members of the economic world in the distribution of the goods they have produced, like the interests of the members of a family in the sharing of their common dinner, are and must be individualistic. Even under a régime of Spencerian altruism the two forces would continue straining in opposite directions, in antagonism one to the other. For it makes little difference whether I claim the lion's share for myself or for my neighbour, provided he objects equally strongly in either case. In the sphere of distribution the interests of Capital and Labour clash as naturally as they combine in the sphere of production. I do not believe that the problem of sharing, which is at the root of the present discontent, can be solved by excursions, however benevolent, into the alien sphere of production. You may utilise the powers of production to their utmost limits, as Professor Walker suggests; but, to use his own words, "industrialism would still remain essentially the same." You may increase the total amount produced as much as you please, but unless you alter the ratio between the wages of Capital and Labour, or prove conclusively that the present ratio is just, the discontent is bound to remain.



“But,” it may be argued, “there must be something behind the demand for immediate interference, for it comes, not from one school of economics nor from one political party, but from all sides. The fact that any one or all of the methods proposed may fail to achieve their end does not prove that there is no need for the State to make the radical change demanded. The point is that the State is face to face with a problem new to its experience, that Labour on the one side and Capital on the other have so highly organised their forces that further collisions between them threaten to imperil the safety of society, and that therefore it will not do to muddle along in the old way, tinkering and patching; a new remedy must be found and applied at once.”

That, I think, is the attitude of the gentlemen who call for a “radical change.” It has in it something of despair. It involves a Porsonian objection to the “nature of things.” It implies that the “collectively unconscious activities of men” have led to an internecine conflict to which there can be no other end than mutual extermination. It means either that society has outgrown evolution, or that evolution is leading to dissolution. For it regards the turmoil as a sign of old age and approaching death, and takes the position of affairs in the economic world to-day to be the mature result of all that has gone before rather than the youthful promise of what is still to come.

And, indeed, this is natural, for we are apt to look upon our own age as grown-up—such a view seems due to our own dignity. All development is unconscious—it has occurred before it is realised. Things would be much simpler if evolution, like Janus, could look before as well as behind; but it turns a blind face to the future. So political thinking tends to consider the present as static, and to apply the idea of the growth of the social organism only to the past. It has become almost a habit of mind to assert that we are what we are because of the laws of evolution, and to forget that as yet we “are” not, but are only becoming; that society is still in

the making, and that the laws of evolution did not perish yesterday.

But you cannot view a landscape through a microscope, nor can you grasp the full significance of motion from a single snapshot. The question "Whither are we going?" cannot be answered in the light of the present alone, and the prophet must be a student of history. He must know first whence we have come. And I think a glance into the past will show that this is no new problem which society is facing to-day, that it has been solved before, time and again, and that it is well on the way to being solved again. The "large alteration" is taking place. It is due not to a sudden interference from without, but to growth from within. For except society be born again, radical change is impossible, and you cannot at one stroke establish the world's work upon a new basis any more than you can present an invalid with a new constitution. You can tinker, you can patch, and in course of time you can fundamentally alter, for these are the methods of evolution, but you cannot substitute. Looking back, it may be possible to claim that a radical change has taken place, but it takes place through growth and not through substitution.

A clue to the nature of the radical change that is taking place is found in the history of the development of the attitude of society towards crime. In the "good old days" the State adopted, in criminal matters, a policy of *laissez faire*. There was no public check upon acts of violence. The "king's peace" was at first an exceptional privilege, reserved for high days and holy days, or for the locality actually favoured by the royal presence. War was the natural state of things, and the only limit to it was the limit imposed by the strength of the enemy or the fear of private vengeance. The beginnings of State interference, the first tentative steps in criminal administration, were directed not so much towards the punishment of crime as towards a reconciliation of the parties. The Anglo-Saxon "wer," or price fixed by custom on a man's life, was not a fine in the modern sense at all. It was primarily a



compensation paid to the relatives of the deceased ; and the idea that a crime was an offence against the whole of society, as well as a private wrong to an individual, did not arise till much later. This idea came with the gradual extension of the "king's peace" to cover the whole kingdom, and the theory of the right of the State to interfere arose from a recognition of the fact that a man killed was a man lost to the king's army. But even after this principle was recognised, the right of a private individual who had suffered wrong to avenge himself took precedence over the more shadowy right of the State. The State admitted the right of the private citizen to settle his own quarrel, and it demanded only that all peaceful methods should be exhausted before war was resorted to by the parties. Thus in the laws of Alfred the Great we find this : "That the man who knows his foe to be home-sitting, fight not before he demand justice of him."

The next step was the introduction by William the Conqueror of the trial by combat. Carter points out that the language used at its introduction "expressly treats it as a modified form of private war." It was an endeavour to minimise the numbers involved, to make the disturbance as small as possible. The State still admitted the fundamental right of the private citizen to wage war, but it literally "held the ring" and laid down the regulations for the fight.

About the same time the State evolved an alternative method for settling disputes. Beginning with the "inquest" for revenue purposes, trial by jury gradually developed into a system of weighing evidence. As such it was at first regarded with great distrust. Litigants had fears about the integrity of the judges, and doubts about the capabilities of their fellow-men on the jury to grasp the intricacies of the case. So they preferred to trust in the strength of their own right arms, and for a very long time the combat was the ordinary mode of trial. But in the course of centuries the doubts and fears were allayed, and the "trial by battel"

fell so far into desuetude as to be completely forgotten until an ingenious gentleman in a tight corner shocked public opinion by reviving it for his own benefit. As late as 1818, in the case of *Ashford v. Thornton*, the Court of the King's Bench was forced to acknowledge that "trial by battel" was still a valid and legal mode of trial. Its revival caused an immediate outcry for its final abolition, which was brought about by Act of Parliament in the following year (59 Geo. III. c. 46).

No clearer proof of the popular belief in the superior fairness of the jury system could be desired than the way in which the alternative method has been discarded by society—much as one throws away on the dust-heap an inconvenient and out-of-date tool. But it is none the less startling to think that it is less than a century since the idea of public punishment for crime, to the exclusion of the right of private punishment, was legally recognised.

The fact that this legal anachronism was startling shows how completely the national outlook, with regard to crime, has altered. It indicates the distance society has moved onwards in the past and how greatly national morality has progressed. It implies a fundamental change, a change from the purely negative attitude where the State says, "I have nothing to do with your quarrel; fight it out yourselves!" to the positive one where it says not merely, "The quarrel is mine too," but "The quarrel is entirely mine. You must not fight at all."<sup>1</sup> A charming instance of this modern view of the function of the State occurred recently in Burma, where a police officer, addressing a dangerous audience of rioters, found some difficulty in making an ordinary knowledge of the vernacular supply the phraseology necessary for a speech on political philosophy, and therefore wound up his order that the men should disperse with the simple explanation: "I am the Police Superintendent Sahib! If any fighting

<sup>1</sup> The most private of personal rights acquire the character of being *rights*, not from the affirmation of them by the individual, but from the recognition of them by the more or less organised community of which he is a member.



has to be done, I am the man who does the fighting. Nobody else is allowed to fight at all."

Now this, I think, is the position to which we are slowly coming in the sphere of economic disputes. The history of our criminal law is an exact parallel to the development that is going on in the industrial world to-day. Since the beginning of modern industrialism, little more than a century ago, the attitude of the State towards the problem has gone through nearly all the stages which we have noted in its attitude towards crime. There was at first no direct interference, for the State felt that the industrial quarrel was outside its province, and it contented itself with upholding the already established principle of protecting lives and property. Even the stock instance quoted in favour of the contrary view—the Act of 1799 prohibiting combination—was not a case of intentional direct interference with the economic struggle. "It seems reasonable to suppose," says Professor Cunningham, "that the motives which weighed with the Government of the day in 1799 were political and not merely economic. This Bill gave an additional weapon to deal with those who were concerned in any outbreaks which might arise in a period of scarcity, and it provided an engine for suppressing seditious societies, which might cloak themselves under a pretence of trade objects. . . . This view is confirmed by the fact that a very severe measure against debating societies was passed in the same year."<sup>1</sup>

But in any highly organised society a policy of *laissez faire* in economic matters is possible only in a very moderate degree. Individual instances of tyranny and oppression arise which, for the safety of the whole, necessitate interference. The growth of law is like the growth of our Empire, of which a Pathan proverb says: "First comes one Englishman for *shikar*, and to spy out the land. Then come two to make a map. Then comes an army to take the country. Let us therefore slay the first Englishman." In the realm of law, as

<sup>1</sup> Cunningham, *Growth of English Industry and Commerce*, p. 732.

in the realm of Empire, the struggle is always on the frontier. But the frontier is ever being pushed further on. The bullet-swept outposts of yesterday are the safe homesteads of to-day. There are no two opinions *now* about the morality of slavery. Step by step society has passed from problem to problem, solving each as she came to it, and embodying each solution in our social code. Mr Wells calls this "patching." It seems nearer akin to "weaving." It is the process by which our criminal law was built up in the past, *and it is the process by which we are building up our industrial law to-day.*

Beginning in 1802 with an Act restricting to twelve the hours of labour in mills where apprentices were employed, Parliament found itself dragged on to deal with mill after mill, factory after factory, and industry after industry. In 1816 the hours of labour in cotton mills generally were limited to twelve. In 1831 Sadler introduced a ten hours Bill applicable to children; in 1833 Ashley extended the principle to all "young persons" under eighteen years of age, and endeavours were made to prohibit absolutely the employment of young children in mines and factories; by 1840 the exclusion of women from mines was secured; and by 1850 a legal working day for women and young persons, and therefore indirectly for men, was finally established.

By this time the State was deeply committed. Once it had begun laying down regulations for the economic conflict it had to go on. With the formal recognition of the legality of trade unions by the Act of 1871, the "trial by battle" in the economic sphere may be said to have been officially sanctioned. The Factory Acts, the Employers' Liability Act of 1880, the Small Holdings Act of 1881, and the whole series of Coal Mine Regulation Acts are only so many additional rules to be observed by the combatants if they wish to avoid enlisting the State on the side of the enemy.

Once more the State was literally holding the ring. Interference was still negative. So long as the laws of the combat were adhered to, the State stood passive. But in 1893 the next



stage was reached—the State provided an alternative system to the trial by battle. Like the old “inquest,” its first application was very limited, very tentative. The formation of the Labour Department of the Board of Trade, and the introduction by Government of a Labour Disputes Bill, indicated the trend which public opinion was taking. In the same year Lord Rosebery, at Gladstone’s request, offered his services to settle the miners’ strike in the federated area — the first instance of direct Government intervention. Here was a fresh beginning—the first solitary Englishman “coming to *shikar*.” And the army seems to be on its way. In 1907 the Board of Trade formed a court of permanent panels for the purpose of arbitrating in labour disputes; there has been more than one instance of the holding of official inquiries into the causes of existing disputes although no invitation to adjudicate was received from either side;<sup>1</sup> and last year there came into an experimental being the “miners’ wage courts.”

It seems to me that once more the State has all but reached the stage where it says, “I am the one who does the fighting. Nobody else is allowed to fight at all.” And this stage has been reached not by the working out of any pre-arranged scheme, nor by the labours of any one political party. Lord Shaftesbury advocated, while John Bright opposed, the factory acts. Liberal Governments have passed laws against trade unions. It was the Conservative Government of 1875 that passed the “Employers and Workmen Act” that was hailed with such delight by the Trade Union Congress. There has been no steady adherence to a fixed policy by either of the great political parties. The Government of the day has always had to face and to solve the problem of the day. But looking back we find that there has been created, not a disconnected series of legal enactments, but a new code of industrial morality. The strike is beginning to be regarded as a barbarous method of settling disputes. Labour and Capital alike are being slowly forced

<sup>1</sup> E.g. in the recent dock strike in London.

to admit that circumstances exist under which private rights become public wrongs and must be surrendered. Reporting on the strike at Lethbridge, Canada, Mr Mackenzie King, the Deputy Minister of Labour, says: "In the settlement which was reached, both parties, I believe, made concessions in view of the great public emergency, which they would not have made had they not been moved by humanitarian considerations." Such instances as this seem to indicate that the adoption by the State of the judicial method of settling disputes would find support not only amongst the general public, but even from the parties most nearly concerned.

We have seen how the institution of the trial by jury was at first regarded with disfavour. So it is to-day, in the main, in the economic sphere. "On one point," says Mr Clayton in his book on Trade Unions, "the Trade Union Congress cleaves to its old traditions; it will have none of compulsory arbitration by the State for the prevention or settlement of strikes." There are the same complaints as in early times that the judges will be prejudiced, that the jury will not understand. "Whoever has studied the operation of this scheme in the various forms which it takes in New Zealand and Australia is aware that whatever the form may be, its acceptability depends upon the judge or the chairman. Where a judge . . . gives determinations in favour of the men, the employers say he is unfair; when he gives them in favour of the employers, the unions start an agitation for his removal."<sup>1</sup> The court, it is said, will find difficulty in collecting its fines, and we are told by Mr MacDonald that even if both sides are compelled to make deposits, "all sorts of temptations are placed in the way of each side to deplete the deposits of the other." Doubtless Robin Hood and his merry men used the same argument in their day. Doubtless they also thought it would be much more satisfactory to be allowed to settle their disputes in "the good old-fashioned way." But the onward march of public morality proved too strong for them. The criminal court had come to

<sup>1</sup> Mr Ramsay MacDonald in the *Socialist Review*.



stay; and if the lessons of history count for anything, the industrial court has also come to stay. We may yet see the establishment by the State of a force of industrial police whose mission will be as much to guide the streams of industrial traffic and help the timid on their way as to bring to justice the malefactors of the industrial world.

The greatest danger to the orderly development of this solution of the economic problem does not lie in the physical difficulties of coercing a large body of men, or of collecting fines imposed by the courts. Rather it lies in our holding too low a conception of the ideals of industry. "A matter of business" is apt to be regulated by a different, and lower, code of morals than that which we adopt in our ordinary daily relations with our fellows. Business "shrewdness" is very often private dishonesty. Mr Ramsay MacDonald would not dream of hinting that any business man would bring a *criminal* charge against a competitor in order to deplete his resources by fine, or to get rid of him by imprisonment. But he seems to have no hesitation in asserting that the *industrial* courts would be used for such purposes.

It may be true that the new industrialism lacks the finer qualities of the older institution whose place it has taken. The former unity of interest and personal sympathy between master and man seem to have disappeared and left no heritage. It is customary to contrast the old-time peace, when master and man fed at the same board, with the bitter conflict of to-day. And our young, vigorous industrialism is credited with being non-human, immoral, or, what is even lower, non-moral.

But this is simply because it is young, while the other was old, because the contrast is made between modern industrialism in its immature youth and the old industrialism in its mature prime. And the criticism is unfair, for the moral consciousness is the last thing to develop in an organism, and the bigger the organism the slower the development. Master and man were once tyrant and slave. I doubt if the morality of the relations between Cheops and the men who built the

Pyramids would bear the light of modern criticism. Slavery, serfdom, villeinage, long and toilsome apprenticeships, were the steps which led up to the slow realisation by the "old-fashioned" master of his own brotherhood with the man who served him. And at the best the worker was too often only a stepbrother.

In some respects, indeed, ours is already a morally healthier age, for much that was once granted of the master's charity is now claimed—and granted—as of right. Politicians have no right to impute to the armies of industry nothing but the meanest of motives. There are signs of the growth of a higher industrial morality than has ever existed in the past. The shrewdness of yesterday is the meanness of to-day, and the modern Laban is adjudged dishonest instead of clever. But even those Labour leaders who profess the deepest faith in the working man persist in treating him as a means to class supremacy instead of as an end in himself. The organised forces of Labour are being constantly flourished in the face of society until the ordinary citizen thinks of them as a purely fighting organisation. It requires a Board of Trade report to tell us that for every 2s. 2d. spent on "dispute benefits" during the years 1901–1910, there was spent on unemployed, sick, superannuation, and funeral benefits the sum of 13s. 8d. These are quiet virtues that have grown up unsuspected, and there is not a little of nobility in the silent way in which the strong worker stands shoulder to shoulder with his weaker fellow. Yet we are asked to believe that men who can do these things, men who will even sacrifice themselves in "sympathetic" striking, for the sake of others, would fall to the temptation of using the industrial courts in the way Mr MacDonald suggests. In spite of Labour leaders, I do not believe it of the working man, and I cannot but think that he shares with the capitalist and the suffering general public a keen desire to find the least costly and the most rational way out of the present troubles.

E. H. JONES.



## THE HISTORICAL TRUSTWORTHINESS OF THE BOOK OF ACTS.

PROFESSOR H. H. WENDT, JENA.

WHAT is the value of the historical report of Acts, if considered in the view of modern criticism?

We have a good criterion for the historical value of Acts in the Epistles of Paul. Mainly because these Epistles were not inspired by the interest of historiography, but as occasional writings, only by the practical desire to comfort and edify the original readers, we are sure that they furnish us with a genuine impression of the conditions, events, and personalities of the Apostolic Age. The principle which underlay the critical investigations of F. Chr. Baur and the Tübingen School still holds good to-day. The historical interpretation of the Pauline Epistles must be undertaken without relying on Acts, and the genuine Epistles of Paul must themselves be made the criterion of historicity of Acts.

It is precisely the application of this principle which seems to me to lead us to the recognition that the book of Acts is of great value for a knowledge of the Apostolic Age. Of course Acts contains some material which cannot be brought into harmony with clear statements of Paul (*e.g.* Acts ix. 23-30), and it gives some descriptions which must appear to us improbable and legendary, even if there be no direct contradiction to them in the Epistles of Paul. But the book also contains another class of material: a great number of historical reports which supplement very adequately those of

the Epistles and bear the stamp of historical probability. If we base our inquiry on a critical analysis of sources, and lay stress on those elements which we can believe, for literary reasons, to be due to an older tradition, if we base our judgment especially upon the principal source, we see that these older elements are of the greatest historical value. The historical information to be gathered from Paul's Epistles receives considerable additions from this material in the Acts. Without it, merely by the accounts and references in the Epistles of Paul, we should after all possess a very indistinct, incoherent, and uncertain picture of the Apostolic Age.

I will try to prove this statement by quoting a few examples. And that will give me an opportunity to add a few remarks concerning those older elements of tradition in Acts which are not part of the main source.

In the first five chapters of Acts the author has dealt very freely with the details of his narrative, including the speeches. But even here certain elements betray the use of reliable traditions.

To this class belongs, firstly, the tradition that the disciples of Jesus, after the death of their Master, established themselves in *Jerusalem*. Paul testifies to this fact by telling us that in his time, as early as his conversion, the primitive community, including the Twelve and James, the brother of the Lord, dwelt in Jerusalem (Gal. i. 13 f., ii. 1-10). From Acts we see that the disciples very shortly after the death of Jesus left their Galilean home (ii. 7) to live in Jerusalem. This very strange fact is not expressly explained. For the charge of the risen Lord to His disciples, to await in Jerusalem the promise of the Holy Spirit (i. 4, 8), does not explain the main point: why the disciples should have continued to reside in Jerusalem after the outpouring of the Spirit. The real reason for this, no doubt, is to be found in their intense eschatological expectation, which was connected with the idea that Jerusalem would be the place of the Parousia of Jesus and the very heart of the Kingdom to come. Not the



intensity with which they expected the *Parousia*, but this axiom concerning *Jerusalem as place of it* must seem strange to us. For the disciples had certainly not learnt that from Jesus. We do not possess any saying of Jesus, in which He attributes any special privilege in the completion of the Kingdom to that city that killed its prophets. The terrible fact that Jerusalem had rejected and even crucified the Messiah would rather, we should expect, induce the disciples to loath and avoid the city. Instead of this they did the very opposite. Their establishment in Jerusalem shows us how strongly they continued to be influenced by the old Jewish tradition. Jesus Himself had wandered from place to place with His disciples in order to spread the Gospel of the coming Kingdom (Mark i. 14, 38 f.). He had chosen especially the Twelve in order to be aided by them in this work of spreading the Gospel (Mark iii. 14, vi. 6-13; Luke x. 1-16). One would expect that the Twelve would have tried to continue their Master's work by again wandering through the country as soon as they had acquired the certainty of His Messiahship in spite of His death. But in reality they concentrated themselves on Jerusalem, and established there a local community of disciples such as had never existed during the lifetime of Jesus, and can hardly have been intended by Him for the future. Certainly the Twelve did effective propaganda-work for the cause of Jesus the Messiah. But they appear at first to have considered it their duty to limit their work to Jerusalem.

This concentration upon Jerusalem stands in connection with the *communism* of the first believers; and it is in this connection that we understand the difference of statements in Acts concerning that communism. On the one hand, we are told that all who believed sold their houses and lands and possessions and distributed the price of them by the Apostles (ii. 44 ff.; iv. 32-34 ff.). On the other hand, there is a special mention of Barnabas selling his field and laying the money at the Apostles' feet (iv. 36), as though this had been an exceptional occurrence. Furthermore, Peter expressly

remarks to Ananias and Sapphira that it "remained with them" to keep their possessions or the money resulting from the sale of them (v. 4). The neglect of the Hellenistic widows, which gave rise to the appointment of the Seven-men (vi. 1), is a further evidence of the fact that this communism did not exist in the general and thoroughgoing sense in which it is described in the preceding chapters. The declaration of the Twelve that others might serve tables (vi. 2-4), whereas they would continue in the ministry of the word, does not imply that they desired to give up an office they had hitherto held, that of distributing the common property. It merely implies that they did not wish to undertake, at the expense of their work of preaching, the recently instituted office of controlling the serving of the poor. The author of Acts would not have mentioned these things, which are out of harmony with his representation of the complete communism, unless they had been given to him by a fixed tradition. Nevertheless, his account that *all* disciples sold their houses and fields and distributed the money may also have been drawn from a good tradition. But in this tradition it must have had a time-relation and time-limitation, of which the author of Acts was not conscious. The original account may have referred to the time when the *Galilean* disciples of Jesus moved to Jerusalem. They all sold their *Galilean* possessions, and, in brotherly love, gave the proceeds to the community. We can then understand why the analogous action on the part of Barnabas, whose field was in the neighbourhood of Jerusalem and not in Galilee, should have been specially mentioned. In a similar way Ananias and Sapphira desired to gain a special reputation through the pretended surrender of their whole property to the community. With the followers of Jesus at *Jerusalem* it was a very exceptional thing, but with the *Galileans* it had been the common rule.

Part of the reliable tradition of Acts is certainly to be found in the fundamental conception of *Pentecost*; that in the first disciples the joyful consciousness of being the community



of the real heavenly Messiah was born in the form of ecstatic speaking, and that even the miracle of this ecstasy appeared to them to be a clear proof that they were filled with power from on high (ii. 1-21). We know from 1 Corinthians that the gift of tongues was an important feature of the spiritual life of Paul's Hellenistic churches. Without Acts we should have been inclined to take the view that this phenomenon, alien to the Jewish religion, and also to Jesus, was adopted by Christianity from the Hellenistic cults. But we learn from Acts that the gift of tongues was an element of primitive Christianity, on Jewish soil, and came from Palestine to the Hellenistic Christians.

In one respect the phenomenon is described differently in the Pentecostal account of Acts and by Paul in 1 Cor. i. 4. Paul makes a great deal of the unintelligibility of these utterances to the hearers. Acts is particularly emphatic in stating that hearers coming from all countries of the world immediately understood what was said (ii. 6-11). The usual interpretation appears to me untenable: that in Acts the event incorrectly is represented as a miraculous speaking in *many languages*, as though the ecstatic disciples had suddenly expressed themselves in *various really* existing languages, namely the mother-tongues of all foreigners present. If that were the meaning of Acts, we should be unable to account for the statements implying that the hearers not only recognised separately, the one in this disciple, the other in the words of another disciple, each man his own native tongue; but that all of them together understood *all* the speakers as though they were speaking to them in their native language (vv. 6, 8, 11). We should also fail to explain why the *Jews* who were present were as much taken by surprise at the immediate intelligibility of the utterances as the Gentiles (ver. 10). And, lastly, we should fail to explain why the mockers among the listeners should call this kind of utterance the effect of new wine (ver. 13). When we are told that the assembled disciples began to speak with other "glosses," as the Spirit gave them utterance (ver. 4), this

term does not mean "languages," but "tongues," *i.e. organs* of speech. They spoke with the new miraculous organs of speech which we are told (ver. 3) were given to them. Many tongues, because each has received his own. With these marvellous new tongues they do not speak in different *human* languages, but all of them in one totally *new* and marvellous language. This marvellous language has the peculiarity that it can be understood by all hearers equally, as easily as their mother-tongue. It is, of course, as great a surprise to the Jews as to the Gentiles. And malignant critics can interpret it as a sign of drunkenness, as at Corinth outsiders could believe it to be a sign of madness (1 Cor. xiv. 23). So, in spite of the difference between the description of Acts and that of Paul, so far as the intelligibility of the "tongues" is concerned, we cannot deny the essential agreement between the phenomenon in either case: it is a marvellous speech of quite another kind than the natural and historical languages of the day.

Let me remark in passing that the tradition of Acts enumerates amongst the first customs of the primitive community the *baptism* of new members in the name of Jesus Christ (ii. 38), and *the breaking of bread* in fellowship (ii. 42, 46). Here again we have an analogous case to that of the gift of tongues. From Paul's Epistles we know that baptism and the breaking of bread were firmly established among the Gentile Christians; and that the blessings of these rites as early as the days of Paul were considered as being analogous to the mysteries of the Hellenistic cults (cp. 1 Cor. x. 1-22, xv. 29). But it would be a great mistake to explain the existence of these rites in Christianity as being adopted from the mystery-cults of the Hellenistic world. To Acts we owe the undoubtedly correct tradition that these Christian rites go back to a date preceding the Hellenistic mission of Paul, and must be sought for in the very earliest practices of the Apostolic community. And in this original form, still connected with the baptism of Jesus by John, and the words of Jesus at the last common meal, they had a



meaning which differed widely from the later sacramental significance given to them under the influence of Hellenistic mystery-cult.

The strangest feature of the primitive Jerusalem community, in its beginning as well as in its later development, is the *interest in the precise fulfilment of the Jewish Ceremonial Law*. We have evidence of this from diverse sources. Paul speaks of it in Galatians ii. We learn of him that there were, indeed, variations in the legalistic zeal and strictness of the Christians at Jerusalem. There was a difference between the "Pillars" and the Christians he calls "false brethren"; between Peter and James, the brother of the Lord. Acts refers to the matter in xxi. 17—a portion belonging to the main source,—where James and the Presbyters at Jerusalem declare to Paul that the thousands of converts in Palestine are all zealous observers of the Law. And this is in accordance with what Acts tells us at the very beginning, namely that the disciples dwelt in the temple daily (ii. 46, iii. 1, v. 12-42). Naturally they did not choose the temple for external and practical reasons, but on the grounds of Jewish piety, which saw in the temple the very centre of all true worship of God. Their religious interest, strengthened by their consciousness of being the community of the Messiah, was satisfied—if not solely, at least partly—by a closer observance of the Old Testament Ceremonial Law. The ceremonial enactments formed a great and compact system: Temple-cultus, laws of the Sabbath and of other festivals, rites of purification and distinctions of clean and unclean food, were all intimately related to each other. Whoever felt himself bound to one of these laws was obliged to accept the system of laws in its totality.

Now, the interest of the Twelve and the early community at Jerusalem in the correct observance of the Jewish Ceremonial Law is, indeed, a very strange feature. We may, of course, understand it as the effect of having grown up and been educated in the legalistic Jewish mode of thinking and living. But we can certainly *not* understand it as the result of the influence

of *Jesus*. The legalism of Judaism, in which the worship of God and communion with Him was made to depend upon external objects and materials, conditions and circumstances, localities and times, was a narrowness of the Old Testament religion. It was an indication of barriers in the idea of God, in the conception of God's spiritual and moral nature. The Old Testament Prophets had already tried to break down these barriers. But in the age of Jesus these barriers had become more firmly established than ever. In Pharisaism just that side of the old religion, which was its limitation, was esteemed to be its special merit. Now, it was a very characteristic point in the Gospel of Jesus, that He overcame those inner barriers of the religion of His people. Although He did not desire to abolish the Ceremonial Law and the temple-cultus of Jerusalem, He certainly did not share the Pharisees' interest in the minute observation and the larger development of the Ceremonial Law; nor did He advise His disciples to take an interest in these things. The Gospels contain sublime sayings of Jesus in which He asserts His own and His disciples' inner independence of all ceremonial observances and duties (Mark ii. 23-28, vii. 1-23; Matt. xvii. 25; John iv. 21-24, vii. 19-24). His clear insight into the *ethical* nature and will of God was incompatible with the emphasis of external ceremonial observances. This was the chief cause of His constant conflicts with the scribes and Pharisees. For these reasons it is very strange that His most intimate disciples, who after His death declared themselves followers of His person and teaching, did not, in this very important point, draw the obvious inference from His teaching.

The after-effect of the influence of Jesus, however, in regard to this point was not completely lost in the early Jerusalem community. Only it does not appear in such form and force as we expect. We owe two narratives to it, which show this after-effect.

Firstly, the story of *Stephen's* martyrdom in chaps. vi. and vii., part of the main source. Stephen is accused of never



ceasing to speak against the holy temple and the law: "Jesus of Nazareth shall destroy the temple and change the customs which Moses delivered unto us" (vi. 13 f.). That is an accusation analogous to the one made against Jesus Himself in the Sanhedrin (Mark xiv. 58): "We heard him say, I will destroy this temple that is made with hands, and in three days I will build another made without hands." In the case of Stephen, as well as in that of Jesus, the accusation is said to have been a *false* witness, apparently not because Stephen never made utterances of this kind, but because his words were misrepresented so as to contain the blasphemous suggestion of a material destruction of the temple. His defence clearly shows that he indeed asserted the merely relative value and transitory character of the temple. This is the view which he tries to justify by history. The main idea of his apology is that God's presence had been revealed independently of the temple even in the past. For this reason he narrates the long wanderings of the patriarchs to whom God revealed Himself in many lands, long before He gave them a country of their own and a definite place of worship in Canaan. For this reason he gives the story of Moses, of his sojourn in Egypt and Midian, and of God's revelation through him in the wilderness of Sinai. For this reason also he points out that even when the people of Israel had entered the promised land, for a long time not the temple, but a movable tabernacle had been their place of worship. And for this reason his historical report ends with Solomon, whose temple is set in the light of the quotation: "The Most High dwelleth not in temples made with hands" (vii. 48-50). It is in these ideas, for which Stephen suffered martyrdom, that we feel the influence of the historical Jesus.

And through Stephen this after-effect of Jesus acted also on others. If not *solely*, at least in *part*, through Stephen the influence of Jesus reached and moved Paul even before his conversion, at first exciting only his fanatical opposition, but nevertheless being a "goad" against which he struggled

painfully. And, above all, this influence acted powerfully in those companions of Stephen who, in the persecution after his death, were scattered and began to preach the Gospel of the Messiah Jesus to Hellenistic people at Antioch (xi. 20). This universalistic expansion of Christianity, of which we hear in the main source of Acts, stands in relation to Stephen. Directly Stephen did not give rise to the Gentile mission, but the Gospel to the Gentiles was the logical result of his work.

Every monotheistic religion has a tendency towards universalism. If there be but one God, He ought to be universally acknowledged and worshipped. The religion of Israel did not lack this tendency towards universalism. All those Old Testament Prophets who lay stress on monotheism show also the tendency towards universalism, especially Deutero-Isaiah (chaps. xlii., xlv., xlix., lii., liii. 12). In the time of Jesus we see this tendency in the great propaganda undertaken by the Jews of the diaspora, and also by those of Palestine (Matt. xxiii. 15). But in Israel this universalistic tendency was fettered by the particularistic view that Israel alone was the chosen people of God, and had, according to the will of God, to separate itself carefully from the Gentiles. This strict particularism was to a certain degree toned down and brought into harmony with the note of universalism by the idea of an artificial incorporation of non-Israelites into the people of Israel by means of circumcision. But the acceptance of this national mark of the Jewish people involved the obligation of obeying the whole of the Mosaic Law (Gal. v. 3), including all the external demands of Jewish ceremonial. And just this Law could not appear to outsiders to be an everlasting and universal expression of the spiritual and ethical will of God. To them it was only a code of national rites and customs. The unlimited estimation in which this ceremonial law was held constituted the most important inner limits of the propaganda undertaken by the Jews. By the same limits was bound the missionary work of the primitive



Christians as long as they too insisted on the observation of the Jewish Ceremonial Law. The fact that the missionaries of the primitive community, whom Paul encountered later on in Galatia and Corinth, attempted to win Gentiles to Christianity did not make their missionary work a universalistic one in the real sense. Only where the observation of the Jewish Ceremonial Law was *not* required can we speak of real universalism. Stephen, by laying stress, under the influence of Jesus, on the relative value and transitoriness of the temple and Ceremonial Law, opened up the path for a truly universalistic mission work of Christianity.

Before we can consider what Acts tell us concerning the beginning of the Gentile mission, we must for a moment refer to the second story in Acts, which reveals to us the after-effect of the free position of Jesus towards the Law. It is the story of *Peter* and *Cornelius*. This episode we do not owe to the main source of Acts. But even there we may distinguish between primary and secondary elements. For it is given in two versions: first, in chap. x., where the meeting of Peter and Cornelius is described; then in the first part of chap. xi., where Peter gives at Jerusalem an account of the meeting. These two versions do not completely agree with each other. To me it appears that in Peter's narrative of chap. xi. we possess the more authentic version (cp. xi. 12 with x. 28; xi. 17 with x. 47). In this version it is noteworthy that Peter's neglect of the Jewish laws of food is expressly mentioned as having given offence to the brethren at Jerusalem. The reproach of the Christians at Jerusalem, after his return from Cæsarea, does not run: "Thou wentest in to men uncircumcised and didst *preach* to them the Gospel and *baptize* them," but is formulated in this way: "Thou wentest in to men uncircumcised, and didst *eat* with them" (xi. 3). Peter defends himself by referring to his vision. The meaning and purpose of this vision in x. 28 is given in the command that "he should not call any *men* common or unclean"; but surely the original teaching was

that Peter should not consider certain kinds of *food* as being unclean (xi. 12). His fear that he should have to eat unclean food is not to prevent him from accepting the invitation of Cornelius. Peter does not refer to words of Jesus. Nevertheless, we feel the influence of Jesus in this incident of Peter as well as in the story of Stephen. This influence not only *accompanied* the vision, but worked in the vision itself. Peter had heard the Master saying that "there is nothing from without the man that, going *into* him, can defile him; but the things which proceed *out* of the man are those that defile the man" (Mark vii. 14-23). The tradition of these words by Mark in all probability rest upon Peter's reminiscences. A man who had once heard such things was inwardly prepared for a vision such as came to Peter when he heard of the desire of Cornelius to see him. Paul also testifies in Gal. ii. that Peter, being an Apostle of circumcision (ii. 8) and demanding the observance of the Jewish law from those in the Christian community who had been born Jews, nevertheless did eat, at first, with the uncircumcised Gentile Christians at Antioch. The real inner conviction of Peter, which he afterwards denied, was that he was entitled to live as a Gentile without observing the Mosaic Law (ver. 14). This is quite in harmony with the character given to Peter in Acts in the story of Cornelius.

It is an exaggeration to say that in this Cornelius story Peter is represented as a real beginner of the *mission* work among the Gentiles. According to Acts, the conversion of Cornelius and Peter's relations to him were an isolated case, which is referred to later on as belonging to the distant past (xv. 7). Certainly, even an isolated case may be important as involving a principle and a precedent. Yet there is a great difference between justifying by a principle one single exception of a rule otherwise retained, or making a principle the basis of a consistent practice. The latter was certainly not the case with the Cornelius incident.

The term "mission" must be taken in a stricter sense than is usually done. Not every kind of propaganda by which



non-Christians are induced to become Christians deserves the name of "mission" work. There only is a real "mission" where a messenger sets out for distant lands with the express purpose of converting men to Christianity. Even if the primitive Christians held that the Gospel was intended for all the nations of the world, they may have still doubted whether the time had already arrived for sending out missionaries to distant lands as long as their immediate neighbours had not been won over to the salvation of the Messiah. And even if, in Judæa, some Gentiles were admitted to the Christian community without demanding of them the circumcision and the observance of the Jewish law, this *admission* of Gentiles was not a real *mission* to the Gentiles. *What was the beginning of the real mission work for the Gentiles?*

Paul does not give us any information on this point. Acts first tells us something about the earliest Gentile-Christian community at Antioch (xi. 19 ff.), and then, later on, relates the setting out of Barnabas and Paul from Antioch on their joint missionary journey to Cyprus and the inland districts of Asia Minor (chap. xiii.). In the main source of Acts these two narratives belonged to another. The episode that now separates them, describing the persecution of the Jerusalem Christians by Herod Agrippa (chap. xii.), is interpolated by the redactor. The source related, firstly, the appearance of some Christian prophets who had come from Jerusalem to Antioch (xi. 27 ff.), and then the proceedings of the prophets who belonged to the "existing" Church at Antioch (xiii. 1 ff.). Did these two events stand in some special inner relation to each other? Not if we take the representation in the Acts as we possess it now. One of those prophets who had come from Jerusalem, Agabus, has prophesied a famine. The prediction of this calamity in nature had no relation to the special situation in which Agabus was speaking. And even less had it relation to the subsequent missionary journey of Barnabas and Paul. The result of this prophecy was only their joint journey to Jerusalem in order to bring relief unto the brethren there

(xi. 29 f.). But this representation of Acts appears curiously inconsistent for two reasons.

1. It is very strange that Agabus prophesies a great famine *over all the inhabited earth*, whereas in the following verses, when the collection is determined upon, *Judæa* is made the particular country of the famine. The "great famine over all the inhabited earth" is simply identified with the "great famine in Judæa," of which Josephus speaks in his *Antiquities*—in the same passage which contains the reference to Theudas and the sons of Judas of Galilee (xx. 5, 2).

2. We can conclude from the clear statements of Paul in Gal. i. 17 ff., that he himself cannot have undertaken this journey to Jerusalem, of which we are told in Acts that he did undertake it in order to hand over the collection.

Under these circumstances we are justified in questioning whether the author of Acts has given the correct interpretation of this prophecy of Agabus, as he found it in his source. Prophets usually speak in metaphors, and metaphors may easily be misunderstood. When Agabus foresaw a "famine over all the inhabited earth," he probably meant that kind of famine of which the Prophet Amos speaks (viii. 11): "Behold, the days come, saith the Lord God, that I will send a famine in the land; not a famine of bread, nor a thirst for water, but of hearing the words of the Lord." The prophetic prevision of such a famine was caused by the surprising fact which the Jerusalem prophets saw at Antioch: a community of disciples of the Messiah Jesus, consisting not of Jews but of Hellenes. Deeply impressed by this fact, that even Gentiles should have longed for the Messianic salvation and found it, the Prophet Agabus anticipates the ardent longing of the Gentile world, inhabiting the whole earth, to receive the proclamation of the Messiah. The Western text has the words, "There was great rejoicing" when the prophets came from Jerusalem. Such a "rejoicing" seemed to be out of place if these prophets came only with the announcement of the horrors of an impending severe famine. Therefore the Alexandrian text has omitted



the "great rejoicing." But certainly the "rejoicing" was a very natural thing if the prophets on their arrival recognised the existence of the first Gentile-Christian community as a magnificent advance of the Christian cause, and if there was revealed to their vision a great hunger for the word of God in all the world. That would, indeed, be a joyful prospect for all the Christians. This prospect held out by the Jerusalem prophets was then taken up by the prophets of the Church of Antioch (xiii. 1 ff.). The command of the Holy Ghost, "Separate me Barnabas and Saul for the work whereunto I have called them" (xiii. 2), is the obvious inference to be drawn from the prophecy of Agabus. As such a great famine is to come over all the earth, messengers are to be sent out to satisfy the desire of the Gentile world. This was, according to the account of the main source of Acts, the beginning of the mission to the Gentiles, which started from Antioch.

The statements in Acts (chaps. xiii. and xiv.) implying that first of all Barnabas and Paul joined in the missionary work are indirectly confirmed by Paul in Gal. ii. For the reason of their journey to Jerusalem in order to plead before the primitive community and the Twelve for the cause of a Gentile mission, freed from the Law, can only be sought for in the fact that Paul and Barnabas had a common interest in the matter, not only with a view to the future, but also in looking back upon a missionary work already done, which was not to be endangered or annihilated (Gal. ii. 2, 5). But Paul himself gives us no direct information as to how and when this missionary work was done in partnership with Barnabas. Without Acts we should never have looked for his missionary work in Cyprus and in the Pisidian and Lycaonian cities of Asia Minor. The hypothesis that the Lycaonian churches, which were then founded, are identical with the churches of Galatia, to which the Epistle to the Galatians is addressed, appears to me untenable. For, firstly, it cannot be proved that the inhabitants of Lycaonia, who belonged officially to the Roman province of Galatia, but did not live in the district of Galatia

proper, could simply be addressed as "Galatians" (Gal. iii. 1). Secondly, it is improbable that Paul, if he really did missionary work among the Galatians prior to the Apostolic Council at Jerusalem, should, at the end of Gal. i., where he refers to his journeys in the time before the Apostolic Council, have omitted to mention just the journey to the recipients of this Epistle. Paul shows, it is true, great preference in his Epistles for the official Roman names of the provinces; but the inhabitants of the district of Galatia proper belonged to the Roman province of Galatia as much as the Lycaonians.

As to the further development of the missionary work of Paul, it is interesting to gather from the account which we possess in the main source of Acts in chaps. xiii. and xiv., and then in chaps. xvi. to xix., how Paul's consciousness of his missionary task gradually grew and expanded. He did not at the very beginning determine to carry the Gospel as far as Illyria (Rom. xv. 19) or Rome and Spain (Rom. xv. 23 f.). Originally his intentions were far less ambitious. But gradually he was driven beyond his original plans and purposes through Providence and impulses from above. From Cyprus he did not turn to the easily accessible cities on the western coast of Asia Minor. He penetrated through the very inaccessible mountains of the south of Asia Minor to Antioch in Pisidia, and to the cities of Lycaonia; that is, he avoided the cities of Hellenistic civilisation, and brought the Gospel to "barbarians" (Rom. i. 14). To this proceeding he must have been induced by the conviction that the human wisdom and civilisation of Hellenism did not imply a predisposition, but rather a hindrance for the Gospel (1 Cor. i. 18-29). When, therefore, after the Apostolic Council, he set out on another missionary journey, he was quite determined again to limit his activity to the inland provinces of Asia Minor. But now he felt himself propelled by impulses which he believed to come from the spirit of Jesus (Acts xvi. 6-8). At Troas he learnt, through a vision in the night, what God's purpose was: he was to go to



Macedonia (xvi. 9 f.). From the cities of Macedonia, again and again, after having preached there the Gospel for a short period, he was by persecution driven to advance further. Fleeing from Berea he reached Achaia (xvii. 15). The representation of Acts still implies his original intention of returning from Corinth to Antioch in Syria as soon as he had been joined again by his companions whom he had left behind in Berea. But when they joined him at Corinth, he had just found a good opportunity of preaching the Gospel in this very city. And again a nocturnal vision informed him that a great task awaited him at Corinth. Thus he remained there (xviii. 5-11). When he returned to Syria, eighteen months later, he could leave his Christian friends and fellow-workers, Aquila and Priscilla, at Ephesus (xviii. 19). They prepared and facilitated his subsequent work in that city, not only by being themselves Christian teachers, but furthermore by providing him with an opportunity of practising his trade. We know from his Epistles how much stress he laid upon the fact that, during his missionary work, he earned his living through the work of his own hands (1 Thess. ii. 9 ; 2 Thess. iii. 8 ; 1 Cor. ix. 15-18). Therefore the choice of the towns where he stayed in his missionary work, and the length of his stay, depended always on whether he found any opportunity of practising his trade. From Ephesus he turned his thoughts to Rome (Acts xix. 21). We know from the second Epistle to the Corinthians (x. 13-16) that previously he had considered it the will of God to carry the Gospel as far as Achaia. But when this task was accomplished (Rom. xv. 19) he aimed at higher and greater things: Rome—and Rome as an intermediate station on the way to Spain (Rom. xv. 23, 28).

Very interesting and instructive, then, is what Acts tells us concerning the so-called "*devout*" in the early days of Apostolic Christianity. They were Gentiles who sympathised with the religious conceptions, the spiritual monotheism, and the high standing of ethics upheld by the Judaism of their day. They even joined in the services of the synagogue, but did

not accept circumcision, and therefore remained "Gentiles" to the Jewish mind. Paul nowhere in his letters intimates that some of the members of his churches have previously stood in this peculiar relation to Judaism. But nevertheless it is extremely probable that the author of Acts is correct in repeatedly showing that these "devout" were particularly susceptible to the teaching of Paul, and everywhere formed the nucleus of his Gentile-Christian communities (xiii. 16, 42-48; xiv. 1, xvi. 14, xvii. 4, xviii. 4, 7). Whatever had appeared to them to be noble and attractive in Judaism, these men rediscovered in the Messianic faith proclaimed by Paul, in a higher degree, and free from the limitations of Jewish national laws and customs. For the sake of these "devout," Paul in all probability retained the practice of going to the Synagogue on the Sabbath day whenever he came to a new city. He sought to form a connection with these Gentile elements that were most predisposed to receive his gospel.

It is in Acts that we can still see that the laws by which the relation of these Gentile "devout" to the Jewish synagogue was regulated, became the model of a rule which was to regulate the relation between the non-Jewish and the Jewish members in the Christian communities. This was an extremely difficult matter if, on the one hand, it was admitted that Gentiles could become real members of the Christian community without circumcision; and, on the other hand, the Jewish Christians were bound to continue in their observance of the whole Mosaic Law. This was the real meaning of the agreement which, according to Gal. ii., Paul and Barnabas made with the "Pillars" of the primitive Church: the "Pillars" acknowledged the Gentile-mission of Paul as commanded by God, and Paul acknowledged that Peter also was called to his apostleship of circumcision by God (Gal. ii. 7, 9). This implied, of course, that men born as Jews were to continue, even as Christians, in the observance of the Mosaic Law. But if Christians of both kinds, having such a divergent attitude towards the Ceremonial Law, met at the same place



there were sure to be conflicts. Those born Jews, because they were pledged to continue their observance of the Law, would have to avoid contact with the uncircumcised. And still they had to acknowledge them as members of the same Lord and as sharing in the same Messianic salvation. To remove part at least of this difficulty, the Apostolic Council made the decision of which we are informed in Acts xv.

According to Acts, James proposed that the Gentile Christians should be free from the Law, excepting only those ceremonial restrictions which were laid down in Leviticus xvii. and xviii. for "strangers" dwelling among the children of Israel (Acts xv. 19 f.). And this proposal was accepted (xv. 22-29). As we saw previously, this account does not go back to the main source of Acts. But still the author did not freely invent it. That he made use of some fixed tradition we can see from the remarkable form in which the address of the Apostles' letter is given. It runs: "To the brethren which are of the Gentiles in *Antioch and Syria and Cilicia*" (Acts xv. 23). Now, as the author of Acts apparently presupposes, later on, that the decision of the Council was intended for *all* the Gentile Christians in general (xvi. 4, xxi. 25), he would certainly have prefixed a *universalistic* address to it, if he himself had formulated the wording. The fact that he limited the address to Syria and Cilicia proves that he was influenced by some fixed tradition. This older tradition concerning the Apostolic Council may be considered to have contained some truth. It did not stand in a flagrant contrast to the statements of Gal. ii.

The decision of the Council need not be interpreted as demanding that the Gentile Christians should observe at least a part of the Ceremonial Law in order to share the salvation offered by the Messiah. It may rather mean that the Gentile Christians, for the sake of the Jewish Christians who lived among them and were rigidly bound to observe the Mosaic Law, should observe the rules which the "devout" had to observe, according to Lev. xvii. and xviii., in order to

be admitted to the Synagogue. For if the Gentile Christians did so, the Jewish Christians could at least join the Gentile Christians in certain acts of worship without violating their own legal duties. If the apostolic decision had this meaning, it was not a rejection or limitation of Paul's Gospel that the grace of God is obtainable by all men through faith, for the sake of Christ, without the works of the law. It merely demanded regard for the conscience of the Jewish Christians which was still bound by the law. And that Paul himself practised and demanded of his converts such regard for the conscience of others, even if it were narrow and weak, we can show from many of his Epistles (1 Cor. viii. 7-13, ix. 19-22, x. 23-33; Rom. xiv. 13-23).

The decision was not a "new imposition" which was laid upon Paul and his Gentile-Christian converts (Gal. ii. 6); for the nucleus of these churches consisted of these very "devout" who, already before they knew of Paul, were accustomed to observe these restrictions out of regard for the Jews. It must have been a matter of frequent experience for Paul and his communities that the contact with these "devout" was for the law-abiding Jews and Jewish Christians a far easier matter than their relations with other uncircumcised people.

Of course, even the decision of the Apostles did not completely solve the difficult problem. We can gather from the story of Cornelius that the contact of law-abiding Jews with the so-called "devout" did not go so far as to allow the Jews to enter their houses and partake of the same food (xi. 3). That was, indeed, a great barrier for the Christians, whose common meals had a religious character, indicating their belonging to the one Master as well as their own community of love! In a predominantly Gentile-Christian community the individual Jewish Christians who felt themselves bound to observe the Mosaic Law, had at meals to sit apart from their brethren in Christ. This was intolerable in the long run. We can easily understand that Peter, coming to Antioch, at first set aside the legal restriction and ate with the Gentiles.



But we can also understand that other Christians, who had come from Jerusalem to Antioch, should, on legalistic grounds, have formed a separate table. And we can also understand from a psychological point of view that Peter should have begun to waver as to whether he should join the table of the brethren who were Judaists, or daily make himself unclean by eating with the Gentile Christians (Gal. ii. 11-14).

There was only one correct solution to such conflicts. It lay along the lines of the Gospel of Jesus, of Stephen, and of Paul. Those born Jews, who had become Christians, had to recognise that all the external observance of the Ceremonial Law, to which they clung piously, was not a real merit, but a limitation of the Jewish religion, and that the disciples of the Messiah had the liberty and the duty to overstep this limit.

For reasons such as the foregoing I am of opinion that Acts contains a great deal of valuable historical material supplementing the statements of Paul. Modern criticism is far from leading to a contempt of Acts. It aims only at a just appreciation and application of the various materials contained in this book. I hope I may have succeeded in giving the impression that the recent investigations in Acts are not without interest and profit.

H. H. WENDT.

JENA.

## MIRACLES AND CHRISTIANITY.

THE REV. G. W. WADE, D.D.

IT is often maintained by conservative theologians that those who question the accounts of the miracles in the New Testament, yet at the same time seek to defend faith in God as a moral and spiritual Power behind the universe, and in Christ as the highest revelation of God, occupy an untenable position. For it is contended that a non-miraculous Christianity is inconsistent with belief in a Personal Spirit as the maker and absolute controller of Nature, and is compatible only with a view of the world as a closed system of undeviating law, mechanically determined throughout. A belief in miracles (it is implied) is the only safeguard against materialism; apart from it there cannot logically be any faith in God as the master, and not merely the meaning, of Nature,<sup>1</sup> or in man as endowed with freewill and accountable for his actions. The dilemma is a serious one, if there is really no third alternative. For whilst the postulate of the natural sciences that the reign of physical law is universal makes belief in such miracles as are alleged to have been wrought on inanimate Nature very difficult, and whilst New Testament criticism is weakening the evidence for many of the miracles that are recorded, the loss of faith in God's supremacy and in man's responsibility would, if actually involved, produce moral bankruptcy. It may, however, be questioned whether the dilemma is a real one. And in this paper it is attempted to show that, even if it be held

<sup>1</sup> See J. N. Figgis, *Antichrist and Other Sermons* (1913), p. 226.



that of all the wonders reported to have been worked by Christ,<sup>1</sup> only the cures of diseased persons are sufficiently credible, and that these were not strictly miraculous, nevertheless supporters of such a position can yet avoid the consequences which are represented as inevitable.

But before it is essayed to establish such a thesis, it seems desirable to notice briefly how recent criticism has affected the evidence for the New Testament miracles. A change in the way of approaching the subject has resulted, in particular, from the discussion of the Synoptic problem. It was formerly usual to treat the New Testament records as being of more or less equal value as witnesses for the miracles; and if the reality of the miracles related was challenged, they were dealt with *en bloc*. But this procedure is no longer possible. It has come to be recognised that the gospels do not all stand on the same level in respect of historical worth. The writer of St John is admitted on all hands to have subordinated the recital of what the Founder of Christianity actually did and said to a particular view of the import of His deeds and words. St Luke and the writer of St Matthew can be shown to have used the gospel of St Mark (either in its present or in a more original form). Consequently an inquiry into the credibility of the Gospel miracles naturally has to start with those related by St Mark, who is our earliest and best authority.<sup>2</sup>

Now, if the miracles of the Gospel are considered in the light of the earliest evidence forthcoming for them, it must be allowed that by the evangelist whose priority is undisputed they are given great prominence. St Mark's gospel, unlike the others, is a record of action rather than of discourse; and the total impression which it conveys of our Lord's history is that of a series of wonders wrought not only upon human beings, but also upon inanimate Nature. Christ is there repre-

<sup>1</sup> Consideration of our Lord's Resurrection is here expressly excluded.

<sup>2</sup> The few miracles contained in the source (also employed by St Matthew and St Luke) usually denoted by the symbol Q are here disregarded for the sake of brevity.

sented as not merely curing diseases such as paralysis, hæmorrhage, deafness, dumbness, blindness, and "possession," but likewise as stilling a tempest, multiplying food, walking on water, and raising the dead to life. In fact, the gospel which criticism regards as being nearer to the actual events of our Lord's life than any other is, if anything, relatively fuller of miracle than the rest. And if it is sought to penetrate behind St Mark to the authority whom he followed, there is reason to believe that he derived much information from an eye-witness of Christ's ministry. St Mark himself was not an apostle, and probably never came in contact with our Lord. But according to a well-known statement quoted by Eusebius from Papias,<sup>1</sup> he acted as the interpreter of St Peter, and reproduced his reminiscences. This is confirmed by the fact that most of the incidents recorded in his gospel are such as St Peter could have witnessed. Accordingly, so far as one source upon which St Mark's gospel draws can be determined with probability, it may be maintained that, in respect of honesty of purpose and fulness of opportunity, that source is deserving of confidence.

But our trust in St Mark's reports of the miracles, which is created both by the relative earliness of his date and the excellence of the authority that he used, is bound to be qualified when account is taken of certain features observable in the transmission of the Gospel history, and the attitude towards the miraculous which both his authority and himself cannot but have entertained. For, firstly, a comparison between St Mark and the other synoptists who used his gospel shows that, even though the latter had a written document before them, they did not hesitate to diverge from it; so that it may be inferred that where a writer had no written source to draw upon, but merely oral narratives (as was almost certainly the case with St Mark), his divergences from the original tradition would be at least as great. And, secondly, inasmuch as both the apostles and the reporters of their testi-

<sup>1</sup> Eusebius, *H.E.*, iii. 39.



mony lived in an age and land which had a very different conception of natural law from that prevailing now, their explanation of a marvellous event could not fail to vary from any that would be given by scientific observers at the present time.<sup>1</sup>

The departures from St Mark which are discernible in the later evangelists are not confined to the report of our Lord's acts, but extend to the accounts of His discourses. An illustration of the latter kind is furnished by the narrative of the dialogue between our Lord and the rich young man. The account of St Mark (with whom St Luke agrees) is most materially altered in St Matthew; and it is impossible to suppose that the alteration is due to better information, but that it has been occasioned by the feeling that the language attributed to our Lord by the earliest evangelist was inappropriate to Him.<sup>2</sup> And it is doubtless to similar motives (such as the desire to make the acts described more congruous with an elevated view of our Lord's Person) that the variations in St Matthew's and St Luke's accounts of some of the miracles must be assigned. Thus, whilst St Mark states that Christ healed *many* that were sick at Capernaum, both St Matthew and St Luke relate that He healed *all*. St Matthew represents *two* demoniacs as cured at Gerasa (or Gadara), and *two* blind men at Jericho, instead of *one* sufferer at each place (as St Mark). St Luke introduces a remarkable addition into the story of the cutting off of the ear of Malchus; for whereas both the other synoptists, as well as St John, only mention that the ear was severed, the third evangelist states that our Lord healed it. These examples are enough to illustrate the freedom with which the narrative of St Mark has been treated by his successors.<sup>3</sup> From them it is apparent that the later writers have in certain respects heightened the miracles recorded in

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Sanday in Hastings, *D.B.*, li. 625.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Burkitt, *The Gospel History and its Transmission*, pp. 17, 18.

<sup>3</sup> The subject is dealt with in detail by J. M. Thompson, *Miracles in the New Testament*, pp. 59 f., 78 f.

the earliest gospel. But it is difficult to suppose that the tendency to enhance the miraculous began with St Matthew and St Luke. For St Mark himself, though prior to these, is yet separated by a considerable interval (thirty or forty years) from the termination of our Lord's life. Consequently, unless it can be assumed that St Mark was very differently constituted from his fellow-evangelists, it may reasonably be suspected that he was as little free as they from the tendency to magnify, in the direction of increased marvel, the information that reached him respecting our Lord's works, especially if, unlike them, he was dependent on stories transmitted orally and unchecked by any document.

And if we attempt to realise the conditions of mind under which the earliest narratives were framed, it is impossible to resist the conclusion that they favoured the production of miracle stories. It is clear from an examination of the Old Testament that the writers of it classed as miracles many events that we should consider due to the normal operation of natural forces; and there is no reason to doubt that the Jews of our Lord's day shared the same tendency. Regarding everything that happened as the work of God, and having an inadequate conception of the uniformities of Nature, they were little likely, in the presence of anything that seemed to them to exhibit more than ordinary indications of Divine agency, to distinguish between what was explicable by secondary causes and what was not. And in proportion as the disciples of our Lord became convinced that He was the expected Messiah, it is well-nigh inconceivable that even the earliest reports of His acts should have been devoid of an element of marvel. If modern scientific investigators have to exercise the greatest caution lest they should discover what they are looking for, it is certainly probable that in the first century enthusiastic followers of Christ, when attending their Lord in the course of His ministry, would see what they expected to see. In seeking, therefore, to estimate the value of the miracle stories in the gospels, we have to allow not



only for the difficulty which, in the first century A.D., pious minds would have in reporting accurately what they had been told, but also for the difficulty which the original witnesses would experience in observing accurately what really occurred.

And these antecedent doubts as to whether our Lord's works of wonder may not have been less miraculous than they are represented to have been, find corroboration in certain evidence furnished by the gospels themselves. In more than one passage it is made plain that the miracles described produced on those who had witnessed them a quite disproportionately small impression, if everything happened as related. Professor Burkitt has pointed out that after the two occasions when large bodies of people had been fed with a few loaves and fishes, and the food had proved enough and to spare, yet the disciples became filled with anxiety when they once more found themselves short of provisions. It is clear (as he says) that they had not been influenced by what had occurred at the two meals, a circumstance which would be incredible if the events had come to pass in the way generally supposed.<sup>1</sup> Almost equally surprising is the slight impression which these and other miracles seem to have made upon the Pharisees. The latter demanded of Christ a sign from heaven, such as would accredit Him as the authoritative herald of the kingdom of God which He proclaimed.<sup>2</sup> In view of the fact that previously to this the miracle of the revival from death of Jairus' daughter, as well as the miracles of the feeding of the five thousand and of the four thousand, had been wrought, the demand for a sign without any reference to what Christ had already done (for it is scarcely likely that such wonders had been kept secret) is not what might be expected. It looks as if His actual works had not been so very far removed from what others could effect. And this is what is implied in one incident. For when our Lord was charged with casting out devils by the help of Satan, He asked His accusers by whose

<sup>1</sup> Burkitt, *op. cit.*, p. 73.

<sup>2</sup> Mark viii. 11.

help their sons were wont to cast them out.<sup>1</sup> The exorcism of demons (to whose presence various maladies were then attributed) can be explained without assuming the exercise of powers really miraculous. Such cures were probably instances of faith-healing, to be accounted for by the influence of a sane and strong nature over a weak and disordered one. Such an influence would be at its height in a gracious yet authoritative personality like our Lord's. And that this, in any case, is the right explanation of a number of the miracles worked upon sick persons is rendered extremely probable by the stress laid upon faith as a condition of cure. It is expressly implied that our Saviour's power to heal was repeatedly limited by the spiritual state of the sufferers. When He encountered unbelief, as at Nazareth, He could do no mighty works save lay His hands upon, and recover, a few sick folk who (it may be assumed) manifested the faith which the rest lacked.<sup>2</sup>

Now, the considerations just reviewed raise the question not only whether there is not an unhistorical element in some of the narratives, but even whether Christ wrought any other miracles but cures in which the faith of the persons healed was an essential factor. It is sometimes sought to turn the edge of some of these considerations by reference to the testimony of St Paul, whose letters were composed several years before St Mark's gospel was written, and whose evidence is first-hand. It is urged, and no doubt with justice, that St Paul believed that he had the power of working miracles, and had often used it.<sup>3</sup> But he says nothing about the specific character of the signs and wonders and mighty works to which he refers as the proof of his apostleship; and in the light of what is related of the authority committed to the original apostles, which empowered them to cast out devils and to heal diseases,<sup>4</sup> it seems unnecessary to regard his words as implying more than

<sup>1</sup> Matt. xii. 27; Luke xi. 19.

<sup>2</sup> Mark vi. 5, 6.

<sup>3</sup> So Dr Sanday, in a paper read at the Church Congress, 1912, and reported in *The Guardian*, 4th October 1912, p. 1277.

<sup>4</sup> Mark iii. 15; cf. vi. 13, Matt. x. 1.



ability to work similar cures. Moreover, he appears to have attached comparatively little importance even to these. Both in his enumeration of the gifts of the Spirit and in his list of offices in the Church, miracles and gifts of healing occupy quite a secondary place by the side of intellectual and spiritual qualities ;<sup>1</sup> and, as is well known, to the miracles of the Gospel (apart from the Resurrection, which is not here under discussion), the apostle makes scarcely any allusion. Such silence is difficult to understand if he deemed them of as much moment as others have done since. Accordingly, little support can be extracted from the Pauline epistles in arrest of the conclusion that the wonders wrought by Christ did not go beyond the cure of mental diseases and such physical maladies as could be affected through the mind.

The plausibility of this conclusion will, of course, be variously estimated by different people ; and it is not proposed to discuss it further now. The object of the present paper is to dispute the contention that those to whom it commends itself are logically driven to take a materialist view of the world and of human history. It is here submitted that those who have come to think that the Nature miracles (as they have been termed) did not occur, are not precluded thereby from retaining a spiritual faith, or from believing that God really influences and controls His world.

The reason why a belief in miracles is so warmly cherished by many religious minds apparently is that the miraculous alone, or at least most satisfactorily, vindicates the character of the Power behind Nature. It can scarcely be that miracles are valued because they witness to the existence of a Divine will better than the uniformities of natural law ; it must be because they appear more plainly to attest in the Deity a *good* will. Caprice is not commonly regarded as an excellence in man ; and arbitrariness in the processes of Nature would of itself accord not better but worse with our highest idea of God than do the prevailing order and regularity. It is recognised that

<sup>1</sup> 1 Cor. xii. 8-11, 28.

for the scientific comprehension of the physical universe the regulation by law of its phenomena is essential. If our reason is to comprehend the world, and if we are to be able to turn it to practical account, we must be in a position to reckon upon what takes place in it occurring in an invariable order. Natural forces, to be understood and made use of, must consistently work on uniform lines. But whilst the unvarying uniformities of physical processes thus satisfy the requirements of the intelligence, they frequently distress the conscience. Conscience looks for a moral order in God's creation, and this it so often fails to detect. The mechanical operation of the laws governing the physical universe seems to bring about so many consequences which clash violently with our sense of what ought to be that the religious consciousness longs for the sacrifice of mechanical consistency to moral harmony. Evidence for miracles is accordingly welcomed because it helps to relieve the strain put upon faith by experience. Belief in their occurrence seems to make it easier to retain belief in the morality of God.

Now, with the feeling that produces this unwillingness to relinquish belief in the Gospel miracles it is impossible not to have intense sympathy. Yet it may be questioned whether the relief thence derived by a distressed faith is very substantial. The overruling of physical laws in the interest of moral considerations, such as is thought to be exemplified by the New Testament miracles, does not seriously reduce the problems raised by the existence in the world of so much evil. The miracles in question occurred within a very brief period of time; they were confined to a narrow space of the earth's surface; and they were wrought upon a relatively small number of sufferers within that limited period and region. The total sum of the instances is, in comparison with the aggregate of humanity, infinitesimally insignificant. Nor is it apparent that those whose ills were mitigated were conspicuously deserving. Even though many of the wonders recorded were worked in response to faith, this was not the case with



all. Thus the miracles themselves are not unattended by moral difficulties. And inasmuch as they are related to have happened at a particular date in the world's history, they depend upon historical evidence alone;<sup>1</sup> and are consequently at the mercy of historical criticism. They are thus bound to be a rather frail stay for religious faith. If that faith is to be secure, it ought to be independent of so precarious an element. If it must be in part conditioned by the experiences of the past, those experiences should be not fundamentally different from such as occur in the present, but capable of being confirmed and corroborated by them.

It remains, then, to consider whether faith in God can obtain support from human experience apart from belief in miracles. Does history afford evidence of the agency in the world of a Divine Power, free, intelligent, and moral, even though it be assumed that the laws regulating the inanimate world have never been interrupted? The answer here ventured is that in the triumphs of the human mind over matter, and in the triumphs of the human spirit over the animal passions, can be found the evidence desired. If there prevails in the physical universe the closed system of law which science postulates, yet the Author of Nature has left Himself scope for fresh activity in the intelligence and conscience of man. In the course of human history the face of the world has been marvellously changed. The secrets of Nature have been discovered, and its forces directed into new channels to lessen human hardships and to serve human needs. In this progress of research and invention there is evidence of a spontaneity which, as contrasted with the determinism visible in the material universe, is itself a miracle. And this aspect of man's power of initiative is the more impressive in the case of individuals of exceptional endowments, who throw out fruitful ideas which the less gifted majority take up. But though man's capacity to originate is super-

<sup>1</sup> The Roman Church, unlike the Protestant Churches, can cite as parallels modern ecclesiastical miracles.

natural in comparison with the mechanical processes of inanimate Nature, it has been a constant feature in human history; so that this miracle, unlike those that have been discussed, is attested by present experience as well as by past records. The evidence for it is as cogent for one age as for another; and the inference to which it points respecting the control of the world by its Creator is not dependent upon the verdict of historical inquiry. But proof of God's aliveness (to use an expression of Dr Figgis's) comes not only from human achievements in the fields of science and the arts, but from the influence of great personalities in the sphere of morality and religion. The ethical progress and elevation of humanity have been due to the inspiration caught by the mass of men from a few characters of rare spiritual insight and purity. And supreme among these has been Jesus of Nazareth. His Personality, as a source of illumination and inspiration, has been unique in human history. Though deep obscurity envelops a great part of His life, and even much of His public ministry, yet of His influence upon the world the Christian society which He founded is an abiding monument. What He has made of men, from the apostles onwards, is compelling evidence of His spiritual greatness. But the change He has wrought is testimony to more than His own impressive character. It witnesses to the intervention of a Spiritual Power which, through the entry into the world of so wonderful a moral force, has promoted in a surpassing degree the ethical development of our race. In comparison with the momentous factors which the example and teaching of our Lord have proved to be in history, the miracles attributed to Him, even if established, must appear of secondary importance. And whatever view criticism may finally take of these reported instances wherein God is thought to have revealed Himself by superseding in the physical sphere secondary causes by an immediate act of volition, there will always remain the Divine self-disclosure involved in the mere coming among men of such a one as Christ.



It has indeed been argued that the entrance into the world of such a Personality might be expected to be accompanied by occurrences demonstrating in a unique way the sovereignty of spirit over matter. Human expectations, however, concerning any Divine course of action have been too often falsified to make this plea convincing. The occasion was, it may be granted, a critical one in the spiritual history of mankind. But it is clear from our Lord's discourses, as preserved in the earliest records of them, that it was not by miracles that He chiefly sought to appeal to men. And, as has been shown, the actual impression made upon those who were present at some of the most remarkable wonders ascribed to Him is different from that which might have been anticipated. Though surprising cures of sick persons were unquestionably witnessed,<sup>1</sup> it was by His doctrine, and the influence exerted by His Personality, that His disciples were attracted and bound to Him. And at the present time, when the objections felt to miracles from the side of science are reinforced by the doubts arising from criticism, it seems unwise to lay stress upon the miraculous as the chief bulwark against materialism. Belief in the activity of a Divine Spirit in the world is most effectively defended by pointing to the spiritual activities mediated through men, the best of whom have ever ascribed all the good in them to a source other than themselves.

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<sup>1</sup> In this connection may be noted the distinction drawn between Christ and John the Baptist in John x. 41.

# THE MORAL OBLIGATION TO BE INTELLIGENT.<sup>1</sup>

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## I.

THE disposition to consider intelligence a peril is an old Anglo-Saxon inheritance. Our ancestors have celebrated this disposition in verse and prose. Splendid as our literature is, it has not voiced all the aspirations of humanity, nor could it be expected to voice an aspiration that has not characteristically belonged to the English race; the praise of intelligence is therefore not one of its characteristic glories.

“Be good, sweet maid, and let who will be clever.”

Here is the startling alternative which to the English, alone among great nations, has been not startling but a matter of course. Here is the casual assumption that a choice must be made between goodness and intelligence; that stupidity is first cousin to moral conduct, and cleverness the first step into mischief; that reason and God are not on good terms with each other; that the mind and the heart are rival buckets in the well of truth, inexorably balanced—full mind, starved heart—stout heart, weak head.

Kingsley's line is a convenient text, but to establish the point that English literature voices a traditional distrust of the

<sup>1</sup> Read before the Phi Beta Kappa Society of Amherst College, 17th April 1913.



mind we must go to the masters. In Shakespeare's plays there are some highly intelligent men, but they are either villains or tragic victims. To be as intelligent as Richard or Iago or Edmund seems to involve some break with goodness; to be as wise as Prospero seems to imply some Faust-like traffic with the forbidden world; to be as thoughtful as Hamlet seems to be too thoughtful to live. In Shakespeare the prizes of life go to such men as Bassanio, or Duke Orsino, or Florizel—men of good conduct and sound character, but of no particular intelligence. There might, indeed, appear to be one general exception to this sweeping statement: Shakespeare does concede intelligence as a fortunate possession to some of his heroines. But upon even a slight examination those ladies, like Portia, turn out to have been among Shakespeare's Italian importations—their wit was part and parcel of the story he borrowed; or, like Viola, they are English types of humility, patience, and loyalty, such as we find in the old ballads, with a bit of Euphuism added, a foreign cleverness of speech. After all, these are only a few of Shakespeare's heroines; over against them are Ophelia, Juliet, Desdemona, Hero, Cordelia, Miranda, Perdita—lovable for other qualities than intellect,—and in a sinister group, Lady Macbeth, Cleopatra, Goneril, intelligent and wicked.

In *Paradise Lost* Milton attributes intelligence of the highest order to the devil. That this is an Anglo-Saxon reading of the infernal character may be shown by a reference to the book of Job, where Satan is simply a troublesome body, and the great wisdom of the story is from the voice of God in the whirlwind. But Milton makes his Satan so thoughtful, so persistent and liberty-loving, so magnanimous, and God so illogical, so heartless and repressive, that many perfectly moral readers fear lest Milton, like the modern novelists, may have known good and evil, but could not tell them apart. It is disconcerting to intelligence that it should be God's angel who cautions Adam not to wander in the earth, nor inquire concerning heaven's causes and ends, and that it

should be Satan meanwhile who questions and explores. By Milton's reckoning of intelligence the theologian and the scientist to-day alike take after Satan.

If there were time, we might trace this valuation of intelligence through the English novel. We should see how often the writers have distinguished between intelligence and goodness, and have enlisted our affections for a kind of inexperienced virtue. In Fielding or Swift, Thackeray or Dickens, the hero of the English novel is a well-meaning blunderer who in the last chapter is temporarily rescued by the grace of God from the mess he has made of his life. Unless he also dies in the last chapter, he will probably need rescue again. The dear woman whom the hero marries is, with a few notable exceptions, rather less intelligent than himself. When David Copperfield marries Agnes, his prospects of happiness, to the eyes of intelligence, look not very exhilarating. Agnes has more sense than Dora, but it is not even for that slight distinction that we must admire her; her great qualities are of the heart—patience, humility, faithfulness. These are the qualities also of Thackeray's good heroines, like Laura or Lady Castlewood. Beatrice Esmond and Becky Sharp, both highly intelligent, are of course a bad lot.

No less significant is the kind of emotion the English novelist invites towards his secondary or lower-class heroes—towards Mr Boffin in *Our Mutual Friend*, for example, or Harry Foker in *Pendennis*. These characters amuse us, and we feel pleasantly superior to them, but we agree with the novelist that they are wholly admirable in their station. Yet if a Frenchman—let us say Balzac—were presenting such types, he would make us feel, as in *Père Goriot* or *Eugénie Grandet*, not only admiration for the stable, loyal nature, but also deep pity that such goodness should be so tragically bound in unintelligence or vulgarity. This comparison of racial temperaments helps us to understand ourselves. We may continue the method at our leisure. What would Socrates have thought of Mr Pickwick, or the Vicar of



Wakefield, or David Copperfield, or Arthur Pendennis? For that matter, would he have felt admiration or pity for Colonel Newcome?

## II.

I hardly need caution you that this is not an adequate account of English literature. Let me hasten to say that I know you are resenting this somewhat cavalier handling of the noble writers you love. You probably are wondering how I can expect to increase your love of literature by such unsympathetic remarks. But just now I am not concerned about your love of literature; I take it for granted, and use it as an instrument to prod you with. If we love Shakespeare and Milton and Scott and Dickens and Thackeray, and yet do not know what qualities their books hold out for our admiration, then—let me say it as delicately as possible—our admiration is not discriminating; and if we neither have discrimination nor are disturbed by our lack of it, then perhaps that wise man could not list intelligence among our virtues. Certainly it would be but a silly account of English literature to say only that it set little store by the things of the mind. I am aware that for the sake of my argument I have exaggerated, by insisting upon only one aspect of English literature. But our history betrays a peculiar warfare between character and intellect, such as to the Greek, for example, would have been incomprehensible. The great Englishman, like the most famous Greeks, had intelligence as well as character, and was at ease with them both. But whereas the notable Greek seems typical of his race, the notable Englishman usually seems an exception to his own people, and is often best appreciated in other lands. What is more singular—in spite of the happy combination in himself of character and intelligence, he often fails to recognise the value of that combination in his neighbours. When Shakespeare portrayed such amateurish statesmen as the Duke in *Measure for Measure*, Burleigh was guiding Elizabeth's empire, and Francis

Bacon was soon to be King James's counsellor. It was the young Milton who pictured the life of reason in *L'Allegro* and *Il Penseroso*, the most spiritual fruit of philosophy in *Comus*; and when he wrote his epic he was probably England's most notable example of that intellectual inquiry and independence which in his great poem he discouraged. There remain several well-known figures in our literary history who have both possessed and believed in intelligence—Byron and Shelley in what seems our own day, Edmund Spenser before Shakespeare's time. England has more or less neglected all three, but they must in fairness be counted to her credit. Some excuse might be offered for the neglect of Byron and Shelley by a nation that likes the proprieties; but the gentle Spenser, the noblest philosopher and most chivalrous gentleman in our literature, seems to be unread only because he demands a mind as well as a heart used to high things.

This will be sufficient qualification of any disparagement of English literature; no people and no literature can be great that are not intelligent, and England has produced not only statesmen and scientists of the first order, but also poets in whom the soul was fitly mated with a lofty intellect. But I am asking you to reconsider your reading in history and fiction, to reflect whether our race has usually thought highly of the intelligence by which it has been great; I suggest these non-intellectual aspects of our literature as commentary upon my question—and all this with the hope of pressing upon you the question as to what *you* think of intelligence.

Those of us who frankly prefer character to intelligence are therefore not without precedent. If we look beneath the history of the English people, beneath the ideas expressed in our literature, we find in the temper of our remotest ancestors a certain bias which still prescribes our ethics and still prejudices us against the mind. The beginnings of our conscience can be geographically located. It began in the German forests, and it gave its allegiance not to the intellect but to the will. Whether or not the severity of life in a hard climate



raised the value of that persistence by which alone life could be preserved, the Germans as Tacitus knew them, and the Saxons as they landed in England, held as their chief virtue that will-power which makes character. For craft or strategy they had no use; they were already a bull-dog race; they liked fighting, and they liked best to settle the matter hand to hand. The admiration for brute force, which naturally accompanied this ideal of self-reliance, drew with it as naturally a certain moral sanction. A man was as good as his word, and he was ready to back up his word with a blow. No German, Tacitus says, would enter into a treaty of public or private business without his sword in his hand. When this emphasis upon the will became a social emphasis, it gave the direction to ethical feeling. Honour lay in a man's integrity, in his willingness and ability to keep his word; therefore the man became more important than his word or deed. Words and deeds were then easily interpreted, not in terms of absolute good and evil, but in terms of the man behind them. The deeds of a bad man were bad; the deeds of a good man were good. Fielding wrote *Tom Jones* to show that a good man sometimes does a bad action, consciously or unconsciously, and a bad man sometimes does good, intentionally or unintentionally. From the fact that *Tom Jones* is still popularly supposed to be as wicked as it is coarse, we may judge that Fielding did not convert all his readers. Some progress certainly has been made: we do not insist that the more saintly of two surgeons shall operate on us for appendicitis. But as a race we seem as far as possible from realising that an action can intelligently be called good only if it contributes to a good end; that it is the moral obligation of an intelligent creature to find out as far as possible whether a given action leads to a good or bad end; and that any system of ethics that excuses him from that obligation is vicious. If I give you poison, meaning to give you wholesome food, I have—to say the least—not done a good act; and unless I intend to throw overboard all pretence to intelligence, I must feel some

responsibility for that trifling neglect to find out whether what I gave you was food or poison.

Obvious as the matter is in this academic illustration, it ought to have been still more obvious in Matthew Arnold's famous plea for culture. The purpose of culture, he said, is "to make reason and the will of God prevail." This formula he quoted from an Englishman. Differently stated, the purpose of culture, he said, is "to make an intelligent being yet more intelligent." This formula he borrowed from a Frenchman. The basis culture must have in character, the English resolution to make reason and the will of God prevail, Arnold took for granted; no man ever set a higher price on character—so far as character by itself will go. But he spent his life trying to sow a little suspicion that before we can make the will of God prevail we must find out what is the will of God.

I doubt if Arnold taught us much. He merely embarrassed us temporarily. Our race has often been so embarrassed when it has turned a sudden corner and come upon intelligence. Charles Kingsley himself, who would rather be good than clever,—and had his wish,—was temporarily embarrassed when in the consciousness of his own upright character he publicly called Newman a liar. Newman happened to be intelligent as well as good, and Kingsley's discomfiture is well known. But we discovered long ago how to evade the sudden embarrassments of intelligence. "Toll for the brave," sings the poet for those who went down in the *Royal George*. They were brave. But he might have sung, "Toll for the stupid." In order to clean the hull, brave Kempenfelt and his eight hundred heroes took the serious risk of laying the vessel well over on its side, while most of the crew were below. Having made the error, they all died bravely; and our memory passes easily over the lack of a virtue we never did think much of, and dwells on the English virtues of courage and discipline. So we forget the shocking blunder of the charge of the Light Brigade, and proudly sing the heroism of the victims. Lest



we flatter ourselves that this trick of defence has departed with our fathers—this reading of stupidity in terms of the tragic courage that endures its results—let us reflect that recently, after full warning, we drove a ship at top speed through a field of icebergs. When we were thrilled to read how superbly those hundreds died, in the great English way, a man pointed out that they did indeed die in the English way, and that our pride was therefore ill-timed ; that all that bravery was wasted ; that the tragedy was in the shipwreck of intelligence. That discouraging person was an Irishman.

### III.

I have spoken of our social inheritance as though it were entirely English. Once more let me qualify my terms. Even those ancestors of ours who never left Great Britain were heirs of many civilisations—Roman, French, Italian, Greek. With each world-tide some love of pure intelligence was washed up on English shores, and enriched the soil, and here and there the old stock marvelled at its own progeny. But to America, much as we may sentimentally deplore it, England seems destined to be less and less the source of culture, of religion and learning. Our land assimilates all races ; with every ship in the harbour our old English ways of thought must crowd a little closer to make room for a new tradition. If some of us do not greatly err, these newcomers are chiefly driving to the wall our inherited criticism of the intellect. As surely as the severe northern climate taught our forefathers the value of the will, the social conditions from which these new citizens have escaped have taught them the power of the mind. They differ from each other, but against the Anglo-Saxon they are confederated in a Greek love of knowledge, in a Greek assurance that sin and misery are the fruit of ignorance, and that to know is to achieve virtue. They join forces at once with that earlier arrival from Greece, the scientific spirit, which like all the emigrants has done our hard work and put up with our contempt. Between this rising host that follow intelligence,

and the old camp that put their trust in a stout heart, a firm will, and a strong hand, the fight is on. Our college men will be in the thick of it. If they do not take sides, they will at least be battered in the scuffle. At this moment they are readily divided into those who wish to be men—whatever that means—and those who wish to be intelligent men, and those who, unconscious of blasphemy or humour, prefer not to be intelligent but to do the will of God.

When we consider the nature of the problems to be solved in our day, it seems—to many of us, at least—that these un-English arrivals are correct, that intelligence is the virtue we particularly need. Courage and steadfastness we cannot do without, so long as two men dwell on the earth; but it is time to discriminate in our praise of these virtues. If you want to get out of prison, what you need is the key to the lock. If you cannot get that, have courage and steadfastness. Perhaps the modern world has got into a kind of prison, and what is needed is the key to the lock. If none of the old virtues exactly fits, why should it seem ignoble to admit it? England for centuries has got on better by sheer character than some other nations by sheer intelligence, but there is after all a relation between the kind of problem and the means we should select to solve it. Not all problems are solved by will-power. When England overthrew Bonaparte, it was not his intelligence she overthrew; the contest involved other things besides intelligence, and she wore him out in the matter of physical endurance. The enemy that comes to her as a visible host or armada she can still close with and throttle; but when the foe arrives as an arrow that flieth by night, what avail the old sinews, the old stoutness of heart! We Americans face the same problems, and are too much inclined to oppose to them similar obsolete armour. We make a moral issue of an economic or social question, because it seems ignoble to admit it is simply a question for intelligence. We use oratory, like the medicine-man, and invoke our hereditary divinities, when the patient needs only a little quiet, or permission to get out



of bed. We applaud those leaders who warm to their work—who, when they cannot open a door, threaten to kick it in. In the philosopher's words, we curse the obstacles of life as though they were devils. But they are not devils. They are obstacles.

#### IV.

Perhaps my question as to what you think of intelligence has been pushed far enough. But I cannot leave the subject without a confession of faith.

None of the reasons here suggested will quite explain the true worship of intelligence, whether we worship it as the scientific spirit, or as scholarship, or as any other reliance upon the mind. We really seek intelligence not for the answers it may suggest to the problems of life, but because we believe it is life,—not for aid in making the will of God prevail, but because we believe it is the will of God. We love it, as we love virtue, for its own sake, and we believe it is only virtue's other and more precise name. We believe that the virtues wait upon intelligence—literally wait, in the history of the race. Whatever is elemental in man—love, hunger, fear—has obeyed from the beginning the discipline of intelligence. We are told that to kill one's aging parents was once a demonstration of solicitude; about the same time, men hungered for raw meat and feared the sun's eclipse. Filial love, hunger, and fear are still motives to conduct, but intelligence has directed them to other ends. If we no longer hang the thief or flog the schoolboy, it is not that we think less harshly of theft or laziness, but that intelligence has found a better road to honesty and enterprise.

We believe that even in religion, in the most intimate room of the spirit, intelligence long ago proved itself the master-virtue. Its inward office from the beginning was to decrease fear and increase opportunity; its outward effect was to rob the altar of its sacrifice and the priest of his mysteries. Little wonder that from the beginning the disinterestedness of the accredited custodians of all temples has been tested by the

kind of welcome they gave to intelligence. How many hecatombs were offered on more shores than that of Aulis, by seamen waiting for a favourable wind, before intelligence found out a boat that could tack! The altar was deserted, the religion revised—fear of the uncontrollable changing into delight in the knowledge that is power. We contemplate with satisfaction the law by which in our long history one religion has driven out another, as one hypothesis supplants another in astronomy or mathematics. The faith that needs the fewest altars wins, the hypothesis that leaves least unexplained, the intelligence that changes the largest number of fears into opportunities.

We believe this beneficent operation of intelligence was swerving not one degree from its ancient course when under the name of the scientific spirit it once more laid its influence upon religion. If the shock here seemed too violent, if the purpose of intelligence here seemed to be not revision but contradiction, it was only because religion was invited to digest an unusually large amount of intelligence all at once. Moreover, it is not certain that devout people were more shocked by Darwinism than the pious mariners were by the first boat that could tack. Perhaps the sacrifices were not abandoned all at once.

But the lover of intelligence must be patient with those who cannot readily share his passion. Some pangs the mind will inflict upon the heart. It is a mistake to think that men are united by elemental affections. Our affections divide us. We strike roots in immediate time and space, and fall in love with our locality, the customs and the language in which we were brought up. Intelligence unites us with mankind, by leading us in sympathy to other times, other places, other customs; but first the prejudiced roots of affection must be pulled up. These are the old pangs of intelligence, which still comes to set a man at variance against his father, saying, "He that loveth father or mother more than me, is not worthy of me."



Yet, if intelligence begins in a pang, it proceeds to a vision. Through measureless time its office has been to make of life an opportunity, to make goodness articulate, to make virtue a fact. In history at least, if not yet in the individual, Plato's faith has come true, that sin is but ignorance, and knowledge and virtue are one. But all that intelligence has accomplished dwindles in comparison with the vision it suggests and warrants. Beholding this long liberation of the human spirit, we foresee, in every new light of the mind, one unifying mind, wherein the human race shall know its destiny and proceed to it with satisfaction, as an idea moves to its proper conclusion; we conceive of intelligence at last as the infinite order, wherein man, when he enters it, shall find himself.

Meanwhile he continues to find his virtues by successive insights into his needs. Let us cultivate insight.

"O Wisdom of the Most High,  
That reachest from the beginning to the end,  
And dost order all things in strength and grace,  
Teach us now the way of understanding."

JOHN ERSKINE.

NEW YORK.

## DISCUSSIONS

N.B.—The contributions under this heading refer to matters previously treated in the "Hibbert Journal." Reviews of books are not open to discussion. Criticism of any article will, as a rule, be limited to a single issue of the Journal. The discussion ends with a reply from the original writer.—*Ed.*

### DOES CONSCIOUSNESS "EVOLVE"? A REPLY TO PROFESSOR MUIRHEAD.

(*Hibbert Journal*, April 1913, p. 521, and July, p. 878.)

THE familiar difficulty which I find in the theory of an evolving consciousness, as expounded by the Cairds, Wallace, Green, Lord Haldane, Ritchie, and others of the same school, is that it seems to me to render *History* a priori impossible. Or, if History be accepted as a fact, it is left unintelligible, and experience, so far as its form is historical, is unexplained. To reveal this difficulty in its various forms was the object of my article in the April *Hibbert*.

I pointed out in general terms that an unsolved antinomy between timeless Logic and History in time runs through all these expositions, which burdens them with the difficulties of dualism, and is only suppressed by a number of verbal devices, such as bidding us "translate" time into eternity—which, of course, would be a *mis*-translation. Then I sought to emphasise the difficulty by bringing the theory face to face with facts. The principle of an evolving consciousness being *logical*, as alleged, I asked for an explanation of the admitted "slowness" of this principle in fulfilling its programme, not being able to understand why Logic, and that self-conscious Logic, should take *time* to do its work, so that we have to *wait* for its results. I also mentioned instances, as that of the Solomon Islanders, where the Logic of self-consciousness seemed to be arrested altogether. And finally I cited the instance of Mr Herbert Spencer, whose consciousness, though very wide awake about these matters, paid no heed to the programme of its evolution as laid down by the Hegelians, obstinately refusing to make that "return upon itself" required by the "immanent logic," from which we are assured there is no escape. In regard to this last instance, I suggested that it would be a good thing if



the Hegelians spent a little less time in *refuting* Mr Spencer, and a little more in *accounting for* him.

These difficulties are set aside by Professor Muirhead—than whom I could not wish for a more courteous critic—as no business of his. “These,” he says, “it is the work of the historian to explain,” thereby ignoring my central difficulty, which is that under the theory in question there would be no history, and no historians to explain why there was none.

But with all respect I venture to think that Dr Muirhead will have to shoulder these problems himself. Indeed, it is only when face to face with the actual facts of history to which I have referred that he calls upon the historian to relieve him of their explanation. When at a distance from the facts he makes a number of general statements which are evidently intended to throw light on the matter. “Just as in inference,” he says, “we have a principle of logical coherence, itself timeless, working in a psychical medium under the form of time, so in mental life in general we have always the *two* factors of the actual *thoughts, feelings, volitions* (*italics mine*) of the particular stage of development and *the pressure of the ideal*. . . . In knowledge, ethics, art, politics, religion it is all the same.”

This means, I suppose, that the actual history of the human mind, with such incidents as that of the Solomon Islanders and Herbert Spencer, is not a result of the “immanent logic” of consciousness acting alone, but is rather a joint product of the interaction of this principle with the psychical medium, the thoughts, feelings, volitions, current in the age. Any arrests, retardations, retrogressions, or recalcitrancies that may be observed in the fulfilment of the evolutionary programme, as it would be under the purely logical principle, are thus to be set down to the modifying action of this psychical medium, which consists of the thoughts, feelings, and volitions of the particular stage of development in question. Elsewhere Dr Muirhead extends the psychical medium by the inclusion of “ignorance or prejudice or want of proper stimulus from without”; and he goes so far as to increase the range of obstructing causes by adding “racial, geographical, and other conditions.” In some one or all of these ways we are to explain the arrest of evolution in the self-consciousness of the Solomon Islanders and the recalcitrancy in the self-consciousness of Spencer, and other such-like phenomena, including error in general.

But here I must ask Dr Muirhead a few questions. How has this psychical medium, which consists, observe, of *thoughts, feelings, and volitions*, managed (in a manner so convenient for his theory) to detach itself in the first instance from the sway of the “immanent logic,” and that so completely that it can *obstruct* the course of the immanent logic itself? Had the immanent logic no part in the origin of these obstructive “thoughts”? Does the history of the whole lot—thoughts, feelings, and volitions—lie outside the history of self-consciousness in general, and are they mere trespassers, or foreign invaders, whose disturbing presence “it is the business of the historian to explain”? No doubt, if we allow Dr Muirhead to postulate a “psychic medium” for his logical principle,

a medium consisting of what "thoughts, volitions, and feelings" he wants for his purpose, and containing the required amount of "ignorance and prejudice and want of proper stimulus from without"—no doubt, on these terms, all will be plain sailing. But Dr Muirhead's own theory will not grant him the terms. Under such a programme of evolution as that outlined by Dr Caird, a programme controlled by an immanent principle from which no self-conscious being can escape, the obstructing thoughts, the ignorance, the prejudice, and the rest would simply not be there. And what shall we say of the "racial, geographical, and other conditions" which further obstruct "the open road of the immanent logic"? Are we to suppose that the immanent logic of self-consciousness is sensitive to changes of climate? Does it manage to survive the east winds of Glasgow, but perish at Harvard under the severer rigours of a New England winter? Is it incompatible with a cannibal diet? Is the actual evolution of consciousness a joint product of logic, psychic influences, temperature, and local conditions? Something of this kind is the only construction I can place on Dr Muirhead's words. Whether it be "the business of the historian to explain" all this I must leave the historian to decide, but if I were an historian I would certainly decline the task of explaining how the working of an immanent logic is affected by geographical or other conditions. Were I a psychologist, too, I would certainly refuse to provide Dr Muirhead with a psychic medium consisting of thoughts, feelings, and volitions ready-made, which make war upon the principle said to control their development, and change eternity into time at the bidding of a theory.

Professor Muirhead takes me to task for not stating more explicitly my own theory of consciousness. And I confess that I am extremely loth to state any theory which professes to inform consciousness what it is conscious of. Suppose I say to consciousness, "You think you are conscious only of A; but I have now to inform you, in my capacity of philosopher, that you are really conscious of B as well as A." Consciousness will immediately reply, "If I were really conscious of B, I should not need you to inform me of the fact. By assuming that I need the information, you assume that I am *unconscious* of B, and thereby contradict yourself." It was this contradiction that I had in mind when, in my article, I ventured to implore philosophers like Professor Muirhead to remember that consciousness is at all events conscious and cannot be treated as waiting to become conscious of what the philosopher has to tell it about its own contents. The need of the reminder is emphasised by what Professor Muirhead says about "ignorance and prejudice" as delaying the immanent logic of *self-consciousness*. He must remember, if he will allow me to say so, that the ignorance and the prejudice belong to *one self-consciousness* with the immanent logic. No doubt the "slowness" of a boy to understand the "eternal truth" of the Fifth Proposition of Euclid may be set down to defects in the "psychic medium" of the boy, to his ignorance or prejudice, or even to geographical and other conditions.



But this presents no analogy to the slowness and obstructions which are admitted to exist in the evolution of *self-consciousness*. To make the analogy complete we must suppose that the Fifth Proposition is *self-conscious*; and, further, that this same self-conscious Fifth Proposition is sometimes slow and sometimes quick in becoming conscious of its conclusion, while sometimes, again, like Mr Spencer, it comes within a hair's-breadth of drawing the right conclusion, and then suddenly sheers off and draws a wrong one. This wholly unintelligible situation is what is presented to me by Dr Muirhead's account of the logic of *self-consciousness*. What he and his school invariably do, is to covertly introduce another mind behind self-consciousness, the mind, namely, of the student; and it is this second mind which they find "slow" or "quick," ignorant or prejudiced in its apprehensions of what their theory declares concerning self-consciousness. But there is no room for any such conception, and its "ignorance" or "prejudice" is a *Deus ex machinâ*, like the geographical and other conditions, which merely serves to illustrate that we have here once more the theory of a fact made to do duty for the fact itself.

Dr Muirhead tells us—and, alas! we know it too well—that the philosophers he is defending hold "the child is father of the man." For my part I humbly protest against their so doing. To tear this lovely metaphor out of its poetical context, where alone it is intelligible, and make use of it as a philosophic formula, is merely to provide a compendious illustration of all that is confusing in Finalist doctrine. So used, the expression is not only out of place, and therefore meaningless, but is a downright outrage on the intelligence. The child is not the man's father. He is the man's son. To the malign influence of this pseudo-formula—"the child is father of the man"—may be traced many of the troubles in which these thinkers become involved. In particular, it explains why Caird, after formally disavowing pre-formationism, elaborates a doctrine which turns out in the long-run to be pre-formationism, and no other; stating it thus: "the essential characteristic of development is that *nothing* arises in it *de novo* which was not in some way pre-formed and anticipated from the beginning."

In conclusion, I may point out that there are two statements, or rather two sets of statements, in Dr Muirhead's paper which I find difficulty in harmonising. In the one set he affirms that the essence of the soul is logical; that no principle save the logical principle is adequate to interpret the higher experience of man; and (in a passage already quoted) that the evolution of consciousness is subject, like inference, to a principle of logical coherence. From all this I can only conclude that in Dr Muirhead's view the process known as "proof" in logic and the process called "evolution" in consciousness are essentially identical in nature: the same logical principle is at work in both. So far all is plain. But in another passage he asserts "that all proof in the long run is *reductio ad absurdum*." And here my difficulty begins. If all proof is *reductio ad absurdum*, and if the evolution of consciousness is in principle identical with the process of proof,

does it not follow that the history of the human mind is also essentially *reductio ad absurdum*? Or must we here confess ourselves under a debt to that ignorance, prejudice, density of material, want of proper stimulus from without, and to those racial, geographical, and other conditions which have saved history from becoming the *reductio ad absurdum* which it would have become if left to the unchallenged control of its "immanent logic"?

L. P. JACKS.

OXFORD.

## A NEW LIGHT ON THE RELATIONS OF PETER AND PAUL.

(*Hibbert Journal*, July 1913, p. 733.)

### I.

PROFESSOR PRESERVED SMITH's article in the July number of the *Hibbert Journal* seems to me to take a very roundabout road to its result. With the ostensible point of the article I have no quarrel, though the Marcan stories of Peter's denial of Christ and his deprecation of the Passion are not so difficult to understand as Professor Smith makes out. It is captious criticism to find a contradiction between "all forsook him and fled" and the assertion that Peter followed, unless there are other very clear grounds for holding that there is a contradiction in the narratives; and as for "one who was brave enough to follow, not being cowardly enough to deny," it depends what is meant by "following," and I for one cannot see the slightest difficulty in Mark's story in that respect. Still, I am not concerned to defend the historicity of these stories, and the suggestion that they may have their ground in Paul's reminiscences of the differences between Peter and himself is worthy of consideration.

But if Professor Smith holds that that is their explanation, he surely does not find it necessary to defend the exact words in which the stories are related. That is very like swallowing a camel and straining at a gnat. Yet the greater part of the article seems to be devoted to expounding a theory which will account for the very words of the stories and for Peter saying in so many words, "I know not this man of whom ye speak." If the episodes themselves are unhistorical, I do not think the *ipsissima verba* are of so much importance.

Perhaps, however, the explanation of these stories is not so important as the theory on which the explanation rests. That theory, however, strikes me as very far-fetched and lacking in foundation. It amounts shortly to this: that Peter and the early Christian community knew nothing of the Passion and Resurrection; in Paul's conception of Christ these were the main elements; his Christology was entirely new, and was evolved quite independently of historical tradition. "The decisive element in Paul's consciousness at the time when he worked out his momentous dogmas was the primitive and widespread vegetation or initiation myth of



the dying and rising God." Now it may be admitted that Paul's Christology was new, and that to a large extent it was independent of historical tradition. The earthly life of Jesus is of little importance in it. But was it not just the tradition of the early Christian community as to the Passion and Resurrection that supplied the nucleus round which Paul's Christology took shape? If the early Christians knew nothing of the Passion and the Resurrection, while to Paul these were the main elements, and the decisive factor in his mind was a myth of the dying and rising God common to Oriental religions and to the Greeks, why did Paul become a Christian? And if these early Christians had no idea of the Passion and Resurrection, why were they persecuted? What we have to explain is how Paul, who persecuted the Church in excess of zeal for Judaism, suddenly went over to the Christians. There must surely have been some point of connection between his Christology as it ultimately took shape in his mind, and theirs.

It seems to me that their belief in the Resurrection of Jesus was the bridge to it. Two things are fairly evident to any reader of Paul's own Epistles. First, that Paul, Hebrew of the Hebrews as he declares himself to be, was thoroughly Jewish in his modes of thought. He may have been acquainted with Greek culture and Greek religious myths to some extent. But the problems which confront him in his thinking are at bottom Jewish problems. Second, that his great problem was a religious one; was, in fact, the same as Luther's, how to find a gracious God. The Law had failed him: "I through the Law have died unto the Law." Persecution of others is usually a sign that our own beliefs are shaky. The insistence of those whom he persecuted that the Messiah whom they followed had risen from the dead forced the idea upon his mind; and as he sought for a solution of his problem it dawned upon him that in this the solution lay. It is simply the central position and importance which he gives to the idea of the Risen Lord which is the "momentous new element" which he introduced into early Christian theology. That acquaintance with the myths and ideas of which Professor Smith makes so much may have contributed something to his conception, may be true, but it seems to me that the belief of the early Christians in the Resurrection of Jesus was the stepping-stone by which he reached it.

RICHARD BELL.

WAMPHRAY.

## II.

PROFESSOR PRESERVED SMITH's article will doubtless cause much discussion. There are many statements in it open to question. I will confine myself to one.

In an attempt to show that the Church of Jerusalem knew nothing of the Passion of Jesus, it is necessary to magnify the influence of Paulinism. The Passion, Crucifixion, and Resurrection are, according to Professor Smith, the product of Paulinism. Paul and his followers forced them upon the

Church. To Paul's predecessors they were "a blank." The Pauline views, we are told, "exterminated every other variety of opinion. . . . Q was suppressed for this reason; all other early non-Pauline literature was suppressed, with the exception of James, which does not broach the delicate question of Christology." Is there not another exception? What of the Apocalypse? Can it be asserted that this book—which, according to Renan, "breathes out a terrible hatred against Paul"—is a product of Paulinism? Yet, it cannot be denied that it contains unmistakable allusions to the crucifixion of Jesus Christ. It would be unnecessary to lengthen this note by quotations which must be familiar to every reader, but xi. 8, "where also their Lord" or, as in the Sinaitic MS., "the Lord was crucified" seems to be a plain statement of fact.

C. E. PIKE.

BRIDGEWATER.

### THE SOCIAL VALUE OF LOGIC TEACHING.<sup>1</sup>

(*Hibbert Journal*, July 1913, p. 912.)

PROFESSOR W. E. TANNER's review of my *Formal Logic* in the July number of the *Hibbert Journal* asks one question I can answer. He wants to know (p. 915) why I consider Formal Logic as a *social* problem. His whole review gives the reason, and after reading it I am more impressed than ever with the magnitude of the social problem presented by the organised teaching of logic.

It would, I think, he generally admitted that socially the function of professors of logic should be to regulate the spontaneous reasonings of men, to warn them against yielding to their natural and professional prejudices, to train them to be fair and reasonable in discussion, to consider both sides of a case, and to stick to the point. And yet when he, a professor of logic, meets with a systematic, closely-reasoned and strictly logical criticism on the way in which logic is commonly taught—does he exhibit any of the qualities which it is supposed to be the merit of logical training to inculcate? Does he give an account of the aim and arguments of the book he professes to review? Does he attempt to estimate them judicially? Does he quote them fairly? Does he reply to them relevantly? He does none of these things. Instead, he begins with a clear *petitio principii*, and attributes to the reformer of logic a "policy of *delenda est logica*," thus begging the question whether his own conception of logic is the right one. He then substitutes for his author's explicit and repeated statements of his aims two quite different "positions" which he himself thinks the author must "make good," subsequently declares them to be "untenable" (p. 916), and finally alleges them to be positions of his victim. After that the rest of

<sup>1</sup> Reviews of books are not, as a rule, open to discussion; but in view of the misunderstanding indicated by the writer in this paper, it has been judged reasonable to make an exception to the rule in the present instance.—EDITOR.



his review is a tissue of misrepresentations and irrelevancies. These he supports by quotations which are *in every case* so severed from their context as to have the effect of garbling.<sup>1</sup> He garnishes with dogmatic reassertions of the very doctrines which have been called in question, incidentally showing that he has not in the least understood the criticism he ignores,<sup>2</sup> and in the end concludes that he has vindicated "Logic" against unjust aspersions!

Now, I do not wish to complain merely of the futility of such criticism. It has at any rate convinced me of the importance of *one* "logical form." It is technically called *ignoratio elenchi*, and it is often used, though the best of logicians place it in the list of Fallacies: but Professor Tanner seems to entertain no doubt of its controversial all-sufficiency. And I recognise that when a book of the character of mine is met by a criticism of the character of Professor Tanner's it is in a sense a compliment. For nothing could reveal better than his irrelevance the desperate straits to which the defenders of the old abuses are reduced. The question I do wish to raise is the old one, *quis custodiet custodes?* If *this* is how logicians exemplify their notions of "logical" reasoning when their methods of performing their functions are questioned, how can they be trusted to guide aright the thought of youth? And this appears to me to be a very serious social problem, for which I can suggest no radical remedy.

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### THE FALL OF LUCIFER.

(*Hibbert Journal*, July 1913, p. 766.)

THE Rev. A. Smythe Palmer thinks Satan's existence "a reasonable postulate which best helps to explain the mysterious problem of evil and its origin."

It seems to me that it does not so much "explain" it as, so to say,

<sup>1</sup> It is unnecessary to give more than one example of this. Let us take the first, though it is by no means the worst. On p. 26 I was pointing out that all "forms," as considered by Formal Logic, are necessarily "ambiguous," because when the context in which they are used is abstracted from, they become capable of *all* the meanings the words can convey in *any* context. I inferred that it was therefore essentially futile to regard *some* terms only as "ambiguous," and to classify their (possible) "meanings." This argument Professor Tanner calls a suggestion "that Logic attempts to arrive at the real meaning of terms 'simply by staring at the verbal form.'" Whereas I had said that this was impossible and complained that *Formal* (not all) Logic made *no* attempt to arrive at the real meaning of terms, and I subsequently showed both that, and why, it systematically abstracted from the real meaning.

<sup>2</sup> *E.g.*, he thinks a logic is "on safe ground" (p. 915) which "merely says to the reasoner that if he has well and truly connected his terms by a middle, and has succeeded in making that middle unambiguous, then the form will, as form, inevitably connect his two terms." But this utterly misses the very points of the objection (which Mr Alfred Sidgwick has been arguing for years), that *no* reasoner can ever by mere reasoning succeed in making his middle unambiguous. The event alone can assure him, *ex post facto*, that his middle *was* unambiguous, and therefore *no* "form" of reasoning, as such, ever assures a conclusion *a priori*.

shift the difficulty one stage further—as more than once occurs in theology. When a boy, I remember being told by the priest who gave me religious lessons that man, having been created perfect by God, could not have sinned by himself. He could have sinned only at the instigation of some being external to himself—the Evil One.

Unfortunately, it did not occur to me at the time to ask Father X. how the Evil One, having also been created perfect by God, could have “fallen.” And if in the latter case no external prompting agent was necessary, why in man’s case?

Putting the responsibility for all that is evil in the world on Satan will exonerate God only if we suppose God and Satan to be equal in power. But this will be Zoroastrianism, not Christianity.

Apart from this, if such a scheme be adopted, one does not well see why principles, directions, etc., proceeding from one of these two supposedly equal Powers should prevail over those proceeding from the other. And, apart from reasons of mere sentiment, there is absolutely no foundation in the supposition that the good principle will conquer the evil one in the end.

But if there is no equality, if God *is* superior to Satan in power—in fact, so superior, according to the Christian theory, that He could, if He chose to, annihilate him in the twinkling of an eye—it is obvious that it is God who tolerates all the immense mass of evil which this world of ours contains at least as much as Satan directly produces it.

Therefore God is—*ex hypothesi*—perpetually acting in a way which, if imitated by man (wilful toleration of evil), our laws punish and our moral sense condemns.

In what way does the Satan hypothesis solve this difficulty?

PEROVSKY-PETROVO-SOLOVOVO.

### “THE EFFECT OF BIBLICAL CRITICISM IN THE WORK OF A CHRISTIAN PASTOR.”

(*Hibbert Journal*, April 1913, p. 623.)

THE Rev. Hubert Handley has made an admirable plea on behalf of the Christian pastor who accepts Biblical criticism at its true value, but he has been unnecessarily obscure in his presentation of the case. The article takes too much for granted. It assumes that all criticism is consistent with Christianity inasmuch as it seems to overlook the fact that there are “liberal Churchmen” who dispute some of the commonly accepted verities of the faith. I do not assume that the Virgin Birth is essential to Christianity, but what of the Resurrection? That is regarded as vital by most scholars; yet would Mr Handley have us believe that he is “bearing the critical cross ahead” for the school of scholars who dispute the Resurrection in common with most of the Gospel miracles? Ought not the distinction to have been made that there is criticism and criticism? To



bear the cross as men like George Adam Smith, Dr Briggs, Dr Driver, Dr Kirkpatrick, Bishop Ryle, etc., have borne it is surely a different thing from the following of Professor Kirsopp Lake and, say, Mr Thompson. Now, the reader of Mr Handley's essay is at a loss to know just what the writer is defending. He might well have the opposition of the ante-critical clerics, as Dr Driver has had it. He might have the opposition of critical scholars like Drs Sanday and Driver and Walter Lock, because he follows the extreme school in which we have classed Professor Lake and Mr Thompson. I am sure that the former scholars could not accept the position of the latter as strictly consistent with Apostolic Christianity! I do not think that Mr Thompson is, for example, "serving (Dr Sanday) in spite of himself." I cannot doubt the sincerity of Mr Handley, but he has made it a trifle hard for us to know his position with any degree of definiteness. His generalities are dangerous. For example, would not the layman (whose knowledge of criticism is limited to that which is given him by the backwoods anti-critic) believe that *inspiration is denied* by the words: "Verbal finality is gone, detailed and immaculate certitude is gone, the old inspiration—prodigious and singular—is gone, and with it the old authority." The laymen and, unfortunately, not a few clergymen do not know that the "old inspiration" is not all inspiration, and Mr Handley does not help them. Rather he puts the critic in a most obnoxious light, and many a parish priest and minister who numbers readers of the *Hibbert Journal* among his congregation will have to explain for Mr Handley what he should have made clear himself. The definition of Biblical Criticism given by Mr Handley is insufficient for any but a critic—and why should a critic need the definition? It is left for the layman to learn what criticism is from the article, and thus he can get little but vague generalities from Mr Handley. The layman has not the presuppositions that are essential to a clear understanding of the definition.

Mr Handley strikes a note of great importance in his remarks concerning the teaching of children. It is absurd and unfair to the child to drill into it the traditional view of the Old Testament. To do so is to risk the loss of its faith at a later age when it begins to read. The hope of the future undoubtedly lies in the teaching that we give our children to-day. I doubt the morality of deliberately lying to children under the plea of allegorical teaching which they cannot understand. If Moses did not write the Hexateuch, why not tell them so? It does not create honour or respect for the Bible any more than the attributing of Christmas gifts to a fictitious gnome deepens the love of a child for its parent. The spirit of criticism might well be applied to much of the legendary nonsense of the nursery.

Would it not have been well to have drawn the line clearly between strictly legitimate criticism and philosophic speculation? The latter is of course quite legitimate, but it hardly belongs to the field of Biblical criticism. It might have come within the limits of the article to have stated that speculation, *e.g.* as to the Person of Christ, is a distinct field, and

that, because a liberal theologian holds "heterodox" ideas thereon, the critics do not, of necessity, follow suit. It is too much the fashion for good men to ascribe every vagary of philosophic thought to that poor pastor whom they fearfully describe as "a Higher Critic"! But perhaps the "doctrinal colouring" which the critical pastor is said not to be able to supply is rather in the realm of the philosopher than the Biblical critic. Is not the man who remains in the ministry, as the accredited teacher of the Church, bound to teach her doctrines *in toto*? He is primarily bound to accept the creeds, and secondarily to accept the peculiar confession of his individual communion. If he cannot honestly do this, it devolves upon him to withdraw from his position as an accredited teacher until his church turns in his direction, or he back to his church. Surely Mr Handley agrees with this.

Though I think that the article should have been written with a greater attention to detail, with more care to avoid ambiguity, with a clearer statement of the writer's position, I am keenly grateful to him for the power with which he gives expression to many beautiful thoughts. The public, more than anything else, is in need of more clear, definite, and fearless teaching of the nature that Mr Handley has given us in this article.

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### "THE CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE OF LIFE."

(*Hibbert Journal*, April 1913, p. 473.)

THE pith of the Christian Ideal is given by Professor Royce in these words (pp. 473-4): "Christianity taught salvation through a transformation of the innermost being of the natural man";—an assertion directly contrary to the teaching of Christianity, which holds rather that the transformation of the natural man is only possible through, and following upon, salvation. If we simply *invert* the quotation, we obtain the central principle of Christianity.

"The salvation of man," he says (p. 479), "means the destruction of the natural self." Whether this be true or not depends on the sense in which the word "means" is used. Does the author imply that the whole content, or the main content, of salvation consists in this destruction of the natural self? If so, there would appear to be little hope for the crucified thief and his historical succession; but these, Christianity would say, are saved as effectively as the holiest saint in history. The assertion is true only in the sense that salvation *implies*, as a result and consequence of its own being, this destruction—not that they are identical or equivalent processes. Similarly, if we say that citizenship "means" a vote at an election, we



merely imply that voting is a consequence of citizenship, not that citizenship is exhausted by voting.

Professor Royce would centre salvation on the Kingdom of Heaven. The Kingdom is truly an important, if not the paramount, principle in Christianity; but its relation to salvation requires careful elucidation and expression. The author calls it (p. 487) a "saving community"; surely this is a function which the Kingdom, ideal or actual, has been careful never to claim;—it is content and thankful to be a *saved* community, whose duty it is to proclaim salvation to the world, but certainly never its own capacity to save. And it is to this community, continues Professor Royce (p. 496), that the Christian life looks "for the grace that saves and the atonement that . . . reconciles." Surely a poor hope is here for men, if they can turn only to a community formed of others equally fallible with themselves. "The grace of *God* that bringeth salvation" is Paul's expression of his belief—if Paul's beliefs still deserve consideration!

The author would accept the Church's belief in the communion of saints (p. 481); but—how are we to get the saints? Is the natural man bidden to destroy himself, and be so sanctified? Alas, the natural man must confess that he cannot even commit suicide; and how is any Kingdom of Heaven conceivably possible, except as the result of a prior salvation effected through grace!

With the Kingdom Professor Royce connects atonement, and here his views seem still more directly contrary to historic Christianity. He says variously (p. 492), "Your sin cannot be cancelled . . . never a destruction of guilt . . . their treason is irrevocable"; and his whole treatment of atonement seems to necessitate the affirmative answer to Paul's question, "Shall we continue in sin, that grace may abound?" But if we may again turn to the New Testament, we have "The blood of Jesus Christ cleanseth us from all sin."

Finally (p. 494), "our loss is due to the fact that we have not love. . . The Christian answer is: 'Love the community.'"

Undoubtedly, this is a Christian precept, but scarcely in the way Professor Royce conceives it—it is not the condition on which salvation depends, though it is a duty laid upon the saved. Here again Paul's answer was fundamentally different—"Believe on the Lord Jesus Christ and thou shalt be saved."

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# SURVEY OF RECENT PHILOSOPHICAL AND THEOLOGICAL LITERATURE.

## PHILOSOPHY.

PROFESSOR G. DAWES HICKS.

THE work that is of chief moment in philosophical research is rarely or never that which produces the greatest stir in the world or raises the most lively discussion. On the contrary, it is the quiet, plodding work of the investigator who is content to remain outside the noisy conflict of tongues that counts for so much in the estimation of the public and figures so largely in the popular periodicals. The instance which will at once occur to everyone is the case of Hume. Hume was probably the most profound and original speculative intellect that Scotland, the land of metaphysicians, ever produced. Yet his penetrative and epoch-making book fell still-born from the press. In our own day, the labours of Adamson and of Shadworth Hodgson illustrate the same thing. Both these men toiled on, patiently and conscientiously attempting to get to the root of fundamental problems, but their names were hardly known outside a narrow circle of readers and thinkers. To its lasting credit the University of Edinburgh publicly recognised the importance of their work, but no other university did. At the present time a similar situation is to be observed in German philosophical reflexion. Beyond question the most fruitful contributions to philosophical research of recent years have come from Alexius Meinong, in Graz, and Edmund Husserl, in Göttingen. Neither of these investigators has constructed a huge *Weltanschauung*—and, as the years go by, that will be considered less and less as a duty incumbent upon the philosophic inquirer—but both have been for long scientifically at work upon specific philosophical problems, and have thus added materially to the sum of human knowledge. Meinong's *Gesammelte Abhandlungen* are now in process of publication (by Barth of Leipzig), and I hope to have an opportunity of referring to them when the publication is complete. Here, however, I wish to call attention to the important *Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung*, the first volume of which, in two parts, consisting each of over four hundred pages, has just been issued under the editorship of



Professor Husserl (Halle: Niemeyer, 1913). The reasons for instituting the new *Zeitschrift*, as it is called, are simply and plainly stated in a short preface. Mention is there made of the rapid increase of workers in the field of what Husserl describes as phenomenology, of the growing conviction that philosophy ought to be pursued in a strictly scientific spirit, and of the need for an organ that shall represent those who are thus engaged in seeking for philosophic truth. The *Jahrbuch* opens with the first portion of an extremely elaborate and significant work by Professor Husserl himself, bearing the title "Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie." The author tried to indicate the method and the scope of phenomenological inquiry in his well-known book, *Logische Untersuchungen*, published twelve years ago, but the conception was then new, and, notwithstanding the care and exactitude with which it was formulated, grave misunderstanding has prevailed in regard to its meaning and import. Phenomenology has, for example, been taken to be a special branch of psychology. But, however essential it may be to psychology as supplying the latter with its fundamental notions, it is no more itself psychology than geometry is natural science. Psychology is an empirical science, and the term "empirical" implies, in this connexion, that, on the one hand, psychology is a science of what Hume called "matters of fact," and, on the other hand, a science of realities—that is to say, of real occurrences which are related to other real occurrences in time and space. In contradistinction therefrom, pure phenomenology is not a science of "facts" but a science of essence (Husserl coins from the Greek term *εἶδος* the barbarous phrase "eidetic" science), and the phenomena with which it deals are characterised as non-real (*irreal*). Phenomenology is a *Wesenslehre*, a theory not of real but of transcendently reduced phenomena—phenomena which, in other words, have been "purified" of just that which would confer reality upon them, and give them, at the same time, a specific position in the real world. The "plain man" is sure to flounder hopelessly when he is told that the fundamental science which lies at the basis of all the other philosophical sciences is a science concerned with entities that cannot be said to exist. But the slightest reflexion ought to be sufficient to remove such incredulity. A precisely similar statement holds good with respect to the physical sciences. They all rest upon the science of mathematics, and certainly mathematics has not for its subject-matter existing entities. Indeed, one may lay down quite generally the proposition that existing realities can only be known, in the strict sense, by means of entities which cannot themselves be said to exist. And what Professor Husserl's contention amounts to comes, I take it, to this, that the ultimate science in philosophy must be the science of those entities through and by means of which all other entities can be scientifically investigated at all. Whether this fundamental science is appropriately called phenomenology is another, and a relatively unimportant, matter. Husserl has selected that title apparently because he holds that the standpoint in question is reached by a process of "reduction" from phenomena—by purifying phenomena,

that is to say, of those elements that do not belong to the sphere of *Wesen* or essence. Professor Husserl's work is to be divided into three books, and Book I. only is contained in the present issue of the *Jahrbuch*. It is throughout a resolutely strenuous piece of argument. In this book, the general theory of phenomenological reductions, which reveal to us consciousness as transcendently purified and its correlative essences, is dealt with, and an attempt is made to obtain definite ideas of the general structure of this purified consciousness, and of the groups of problems, the lines of research, and the methods which belong to the new science. The author shows how the contingency of empirical fact is related to a necessity of essence the nature of which can be determined without implying the smallest assumption as to the existence of any one specific individual fact. Every judgment concerning essence can be converted into an equivalent and strictly universal judgment upon the particulars that fall under this essence as such. And this means, in other words, that the empirical sciences must rest in the long run upon an *a priori* theory of objects ("Ontology" Husserl now proposes to call it, in preference to Meinong's term, *Gegenstandstheorie*), and upon the logical principles which such a theory of objects involves. All the same, the principles of phenomenology are not for us *a priori* in the sense of being given prior in time to experience. They do but bring out the truths of distinctions which are directly given in sense-intuition itself. And in this connexion Husserl is enabled to make very clearly manifest the error committed by ordinary empiricism. Immediate apprehension (*Sehen*)—not sensuous apprehension merely, but immediate apprehension generally—is, no doubt, the ultimate source of all rational assertions. But to maintain straightway that all judgments can be shewn to be grounded on experience without having first of all examined the nature of judgments in their radically different forms, and without having then inquired whether such a contention does not turn out to be ridiculous, is a procedure of *a priori* speculative construction, and speculative construction of a kind by no means improved because this time it happens to emanate from an empiricist. Ask the empiricist to exhibit the source of the validity of the universal propositions he is constantly assuming, such, for example, as that "all valid thinking is grounded upon experience," and he will at once become entangled in obvious absurdity. With equal clearness can the error committed by idealism be exposed to view. Essences, or *εἶδη*, the idealist will argue, are notions, and notions are mental formations. Now, certainly essences are "notions," if by the term "notions" one understands, as that ambiguous word enables us to do, just essences. But *in that case* it is nonsense to speak of notions as mental formations. Numbers, for example, are said to be notions. But is not the number "two" what it is whether we "form" it or whether we do not? No doubt, I may carry out my act of counting; I may "form" my ideas of "one and one"; and, in this sense, I may have one idea, or several ideas, or no idea at all of one and the same number. Obviously, however, this very circumstance forces us to distinguish the idea of two from the number



two, which itself, like all the other members of the numerical series, is a timeless entity. Nay, even a chimera is not a mental existence. A centaur exists neither in the mind, nor in consciousness, nor anywhere else, and it is only because we are continually confusing the process of imagining with what is imagined that we blunder so egregiously in this reference. So in respect to essences. In a spontaneous act of abstraction, it is not the essence, but the consciousness of it that we "form"; and there is no more justification for identifying the consciousness of an essence with the essence itself, and for thus psychologising the latter, than for identifying our consciousness of a horse with the four-legged beast in the shafts. As against both these erroneous theories, Professor Husserl would defend what he calls *the* principle of all principles—the principle, namely, that whatsoever is given to us in direct immediate apprehension (as in its living reality, so to speak), is to be simply accepted for what it is given as, but at the same time only within the limits within which it is given. Furthermore, he would constitute a fundamental distinction between the way in which we are aware of being as itself living experience (*Erlebnis*), and of being as thing. The former is perceptible as immanent in the act of perception; the latter is always transcendent, and never itself forms part of the stream of living experience. Even for a divine consciousness, a thing would not itself be an *Erlebnis*; it would not, that is to say, be immanently known. And in the finite consciousness there is of the thing no picture or sign which *is* immanently apprehended in the place of the thing itself. On the contrary, and notwithstanding its transcendence, the spatial thing is, in its living reality, itself directly given to consciousness. It is given, however, subject to the conditions imposed by the circumstance that consciousness is in a state of perpetual change and flux; it is given, too, in various settings and in different perspectives. As given, it shadows off (*abschatten* is the suggestive verb used) in manifold directions. Hence arises the antithesis we draw between the thing itself and its appearances—an antithesis which is ultimately traceable to the fact that the thing is an element in a complex system of realities continuous with one another, and is by us, on that account, only partially known. But Professor Husserl insists—herein running counter to a well-known contention of Kant's—that the antithesis between appearance and reality has no relevancy with respect to consciousness itself. My own inner life, as I immanently perceive it, is given absolutely as it is—not only in its essence, but also in its existence; it has no aspects or sides which present themselves now in this way, now in that. Doubtless, I can *think* either truly or falsely about it. But that which is there in immanent inner perception is *absolutely* there, with all its qualities, its intensity, and so on. *Ein Erlebnis schattet sich nicht ab.* I must break off here, and have only so far touched the fringe of Professor Husserl's masterly piece of analysis. But I trust I have said enough to indicate its great value for all students of philosophy. To the other essays in the *Jahrbuch* I can only refer in the briefest way. Professor A. Pfänder makes a contribution, "Zur Psychologie der Gesinnungen." It is

a painstaking attempt to determine the nature and the kinds of mental dispositions. He finds them to be, in their general character, feelings, and to be built up of feeling, but, nevertheless, to be essentially different from feelings of pleasure and pain—a difference which he tries to emphasise by describing them as centrifugal streams of feeling. There follows the first part of an essay, entitled “Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik,” in which the author, Dr Max Scheler, criticises, with fairness and yet with acuteness, the central position of Kant’s practical philosophy, that the moral law is purely formal. Kant, it is urged, was right in rejecting any attempt to base the goodness or badness of an action upon its relation to an end, even a final end, but he was mistaken in supposing that all material values exist only in relation to a will directed to an end. Further, it was an error, on Kant’s part, to confine the *a priori* factors to the rational side of consciousness. The feelings and emotions, it is contended, have likewise their *a priori* aspects. Then, Dr Moritz Geiger offers some interesting “Beiträge zur Phänomenologie des ästhetischen Genusses.” Æsthetic enjoyment is regarded by him as the disinterested contemplation of the fulness or richness of the object. This does not mean that the contemplation is devoid of interest; on the contrary, a high degree of interest is a condition of intense enjoyment. Again, the contemplation must be disinterested, not the enjoyment. For enjoyment of all kind, in virtue of its being an affection of the self, is necessarily interested enjoyment. Finally, Dr Adolf Reinach writes on “Die apriorischen Grundlagen der bürgerlichen Rechts,” and maintains that in the science of law we have synthetic *a priori* judgments in Kant’s sense similar in nature to those of pure mathematics and pure physics. On the whole, this first volume of the *Jahrbuch* must be pronounced one of the most noteworthy productions of recent years that we owe to German philosophy.

An Italian thinker, Dr Bernardino Varisco, sketches in *Logos* (iv. 2) the “Grundlinien einer Theorie der Erscheinungen,” which seems in certain respects to have affinity with the monadism recently worked out in this country by Dr James Ward. Dr Varisco maintains that by reflexion upon experience we are led to conceive of reality as consisting of a multiplicity of conscious subjects, differing greatly in degree of development but not in essence from one another, and together forming an interconnected system. Unlike Dr Ward, however, he hesitates to extend this system downwards below the confines of animal life. The material world he regards as appearance merely, as having no existence apart from the thought of apprehending minds. We distinguish certainly in our thought the subjective process of thinking from that which is its content, but, contends the author, process and content are essentially inseparable. Appearances are *Vorstellungen* that arise through the mutual co-operation of the activity and will of the experiencing subject with the activity and wills of other experiencing subjects. A somewhat similar point of view appears to be reached by Professor Karl Skopek, of Vienna, in an article on “Die Begründung einer idealen Weltanschauung” (*Arch. f. system. Phil.*, xix. 3), who,



however, approaches it through means of a historical discussion of various philosophical systems. I cannot find that either writer really grapples with the serious difficulties confronting him. Dr Varisco offers no ground whatever for the assumption that the material world is a complex of *Vorstellungen*, and to the objection that because the material world is only knowable to us through means of thought we cannot conclude that its being is identical with the being of thought, his only reply is that the being thus ascribed to the material world cannot, at any rate, be separated from the thought of being, otherwise the contention that the material world (which includes its being) exists would not have the smallest significance. "For example," says Dr Varisco, "when it is said that a man has two hands, it is absolutely necessary that the notion two should be a characteristic of the whole formed of the hands of the man." Here we have an example of the fallacy which Professor Husserl, as I have said above, takes great pains to expose. The notion "two" is certainly an ingredient in the *knowledge* that a man has two hands, but it is a gratuitous assumption to assert that the *notion* "two" is a characteristic of that fact itself. In an article on "The Last Phase of Professor Ward's Philosophy" (*Mind*, July 1913), Professor J. H. Muirhead criticises Dr Ward's monadology from the point of view of absolute idealism. The author urges (a) that Dr Ward fails to render explicable how, from a world of self-determining monads, united merely by their coexistence, the start can be made towards that union and co-operation which has actually come about in the course of history. For, in order to account for the development of the devotion to common ends, the fact of the mutual implication of self and others in a *totum objectivum* from the first has to be assumed, and this involves the idea of an enclosing unity which cannot be harmonised with the assumption of the ultimateness of the plurality. The author urges (b) that, in order to show that we have a guarantee of the ultimate supremacy of the Good over evil, Dr Ward has virtually to admit a principle at work which requires the transformation of the apparently original plurality into an essential interdependence. There is, so Professor Muirhead argues, no possibility of explaining the real world that history reveals on the basis of a conception of the individual which rests on taking activity, conation, self-initiated process, for an ultimate. On the other hand, in an interesting article in the *Church Quarterly* (July 1913) on "Time and Eternity," Miss H. D. Oakeley comes to the conclusion that absolute idealism, as presented in Dr Bosanquet's Gifford Lectures, does not yield a satisfactory interpretation of the religious consciousness. No theory, she insists, which makes the transience of time unreal, whilst trying to save it for reality as an order, can avoid robbing the temporary experience of its peculiar meaning and value. The relentless logic which compels the whole (*i.e.* the best) to appear as the final stage of a logical process, rejecting all that does not fit in with its form of universality in difference, —time, separate personality, the contrasts of good and evil, teleology and mechanism—seems to her untrue to our deepest convictions. Mr

J. W. Scott, writing on "The Pessimism of Creative Evolution" (*Mind*, July 1913), has an indictment of like import to prefer against the philosophy of Bergson. The cross-sections which, according to Bergson, intellect makes in the stream of movement are literally "nothings" in that movement itself which is reality. The things which in this life of merely snapshot views we count as most precious are irrelevancies to the *élan vital*; they simply drop out; and there thus clings to Bergson's speculation all the pessimism of a theory which banishes a large portion of human values from the realm of being.

Professor Paul Natorp discusses a thorny question in his essay on "Philosophie und Psychologie" (*Logos*, iv. 2). He contends that in respect to its fundamental principles psychology belongs to philosophy, and that, since the process of objectifying necessarily presupposes as the ground of its possibility the conscious subject, psychology, when conceived in a broad and scientific way, would form, not indeed the basis of philosophy, but its culmination, and, in a certain sense, its last word. In an able treatment of the "Prinzipienfragen der Denkpsychologie" (*Kantstudien*, xviii. 3), Dr R. Hönigswald raises some weighty objections to the experimental investigations of Bühler and others upon the nature of thought-processes. His criticism centres upon the contention that in reporting their introspective observations the *Versuchspersonen* were constantly liable to the temptation of mistaking the contents of their thought-processes for the processes themselves, of supposing that they were recording actual *Erlebnisse* when, as a matter of fact, they were recording what they thought about those *Erlebnisse*. And he emphasises the vast amount of work there is yet to be done in determining exactly the relation between word and its meaning in the operation of thought.

The Marburg School has for a long time been insisting upon the close affinity between the Platonic and the Kantian methods of philosophising, and in a suggestive paper on "Platos Erkenntnislehre in ihren Beziehungen zur Kantischen" (*Kantstudien*, xviii. 3), Siegfried Marck summarises the points on which the thinkers referred to have laid stress. Plato, he reminds us, characterised sensation as the *ἄπειρον*, the perfectly indeterminate, which only obtained significance as an element in the unity of knowledge, and Kant's conception of a "manifold of sense" is a characterisation of like kind. For Plato as for Kant intuitions without notions are blind. And the epistemological function of the "ideas" is similar to that of the Kantian "categories of the understanding." Professor R. Falckenberg's *Vortrag* on "Hermann Lotze: sein Verhältnis zu Kant und Hegel und zu den Problemen der Gegenwart" (*Z. f. Phil. u. Phil. Krit.*, cl. 1) is interesting on account of the way in which it is shown how Lotze prepared the way for the work of Husserl and Meinong.

Professor G. Simmel's article on "Das individuelle Gesetz" (*Logos*, iv. 2) is a valuable contribution to ethical reflexion. He lays stress upon the consideration that the individual life is not merely subjective, but that, without in any way losing its individuality, is, as the embodiment of moral



obligation, essentially objective. The false *Verwachsung* between individuality and subjectivity must be given up, as also that between universality and conformity to law must be given up. And thus we shall be enabled to form a new synthesis between conformity to law and individuality. Mention of Professor Simmel leads me to record the appearance of a most delightful and stimulating little volume of his on *Goethe* (Leipzig: Klinkhardt und Biermann, 1913), in which he tries to indicate the philosophical significance of Goethe's life and activity.

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## THEOLOGY.

THE REV. PROFESSOR JAMES MOFFATT, D.LITT.

WRITING in *The North American Review* upon the threadbare theme of "English Literature's Debt to the Bible," Mr W. G. Perry finds three factors in the Bible itself, independent of translation, which make it a source of strong emotional impulse. "In the first place, its substance is essentially poetic. A considerable part of it is definitely lyrical, as in the Psalter and the numerous songs embedded in its narrative portions; an even larger part is filled with the ecstasy of vision, as in the prophetic books and the Apocalypse; . . . its wisdom books and philosophical essays are very distinctively logical and constantly flash into purple passages that make their appeal solely to the feelings. . . . In the second place, this emotional pulsing is made more noticeable by the form of the Hebrew sentence. Its sentences consist of single propositions that are short and vary little in length. This gives to its prose a rhythmic beat, not unlike the swing of the verse in our poetic composition. A third striking quality of the Hebrew is its total lack of abstract words; hence, abstract thought and emotion can find expression only through concrete terms, and constant recourse is had to figurative language to make such expression possible." This estimate is obviously based in the main upon the Old Testament. It raises problems of Hebrew style and metre which are being discussed on more technical lines both on the Continent and in Great Britain. Thus, the recent interest in Hebrew metre and poetry, among German scholars, coincides with the publication of several English studies in the same subject. Dr G. A. Smith's Schweich lectures, it is good to learn, are not his last word on Hebrew poetry; he half promises a larger work. Dr G. B. Gray has begun to publish in the pages of *The Expositor* his Oxford lectures, and Professor Gordon of Montreal has issued a volume on *The Poets of the Old Testament* (Hodder & Stoughton). The last-named book includes Ecclesiastes and Proverbs, but not the poetical passages of the prophets; it contains special studies of Job and the Psalter. Dr Gordon seems to favour Budde's development of the hypothesis thrown

out by Wetzstein that Canticles is to be read in the light of the *wasfs* or marriage-songs, in which the popular bridegroom was invested with the title of some famous sovereign, though, "while various parts of the book have a direct bearing on the marriage rite, the majority of the songs are better understood as the effusions of a young and ardent, fond, yet often heart-sick lover." Dr Gordon regards Ecclesiastes as an expression of faith touched with cynicism and pessimism. Professor A. B. Davidson's article in the *Encyclopædia Biblica* did a good deal to evaporate the ordinary exaggerations of this theory, but it is an exaggeration of this opposite position to claim, as some have done, that Ecclesiastes contains a gospel of work. Such a claim is criticised and discussed by Dr H. G. Mitchell in *The Journal of Biblical Literature*, pp. 123-138. He analyses the meanings of *ma'aseh*, the ordinary term for "work," and *'amal* or "labour." The analysis is complicated by the fact that it is difficult to distinguish between the original and the editorial comments or interpretations, also by the difficulty of the text at various points. Upon the whole, however, Dr Mitchell sums up against the estimate of Ecclesiastes as a Semitic Carlyle. Instead of finding any "gospel" in work, the Preacher "regarded it as a folly to be shunned when it was not a misfortune to be endured." All he attempted, or wished others to attempt, was the satisfaction of their normal physical appetites. Attainment, like wisdom and righteousness, seemed to him too costly to be worth while; they involved too much work (i. 18, vii. 16). And even the physical appetites were only worth satisfying when they were normal. "Any excess had to be paid for by increased labour" (ii. 11). Further, even this gratification of life's appetites was only feasible for a certain period in life (ix. 6, xi. 8). Incidentally, Dr Mitchell proposes a new reading and rendering of the famous passage in iii. 11, which the English Bible translates thus: "He hath made everything beautiful in his time: also he hath set the world in their heart, so that no man can find out the work that God maketh from the beginning to the end." The word for "world" is *'olam*. Read *'amal*, Dr Mitchell ingeniously suggests, and the sense is clear. God has made everything beautiful in its time, "moreover, labour (that is, a compulsion to activity, sometimes wearisome) hath he put into men's hearts, yet not so that they find out the work that God hath done from the beginning to the end." That is, Ecclesiastes declares that God implants in man's nature a craving which, "if not regulated and restrained, impels him (man) to undertake tasks that he has not the ability to accomplish."

Dr S. Székely, a Roman Catholic professor in Budapest, has issued the first of two volumes on the *Bibliotheca Apocrypha* (Freiburg: B. Herder). It contains extracts from the main apocryphal books, with introductions, and is designed for popular use. But the standard edition of the Old Testament Apocrypha is now that edited by Canon Charles: *The Apocrypha und Pseudepigrapha of the Old Testament in English* (Oxford University Press). For English students this supersedes Kautzsch's edition. It is more full, and it has the great advantage of containing,



among other novelties, the editor's work upon the Damascus documents. Now that Canon Charles has finished this long and arduous piece of editorial work, it is to be hoped that he will proceed to render a similar service to the study of the New Testament Apocrypha. In view of the important investigations and discoveries within the field of the uncanonical gospels and acts, even since Hennecke's serviceable German volumes appeared, it is high time that English scholarship addressed itself to the task of covering this province, and Dr Charles is the man to arrange such an enterprise.

The problem of the person of Christ is raised once more by Professor Loofs in *What is the Truth about Jesus Christ?* (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark), studies which were partly occasioned by the recent Dreiss controversy. Simultaneously, two writers in magazines reaffirm a similar position on the subject. In *The Expositor* for July, Rev. William Johnstone, discussing pragmatism in relation to theology, points out the importance of the pragmatic method in theology as distinguished from philosophy. "We have here the *given fact* of the *historical Christ*. He is a fact. He is *there*. The question for us is His work for *our* experience. In philosophy, pragmatism has no such given fact. It is the practical value of the great fact of Christ as Saviour for our experience that must be the centre of true Christian theology." He admits that Ritschl made the mistake of transforming a mere method into a theology as such, but this does not affect the fact that pragmatism is a final method, or the duty of theology to attempt a constructive view of the world based on the pragmatic facts of Christ and the Christian experience. Professor Denney, in *The Constructive Review*, also puts the restatement of the doctrine of Christ among the chief duties that await Protestant theology, and writes with great frankness upon the proper method: "It is of no use to revert to the decisions of Nicæa and Chalcedon in the present distress. No doubt they were meant to secure vital religious interests, and in a certain sense did secure them, but the ancient categories of *οὐσία*, *ὑπόστασις*, and *πρόσωπον* are categories with which the mind will not work any more. They do not enable us to exhibit the real Christ in whom we believe, either to ourselves or to others; they do not furnish us with the means of bearing a believer's testimony to Him, or of showing the way in which He determines the relation of God and man, or the relations of men to one another." The proper method is to fall back, in the first instance, upon the New Testament representations of Christ's person and work. This suggestion tallies with the impression made by most essays and volumes on Christology. They get over the New Testament problem as a rule too easily, and then either relapse into a modernised version of the older Creeds, or trim their sails to any passing breeze of philosophical speculation.<sup>1</sup>

JAMES MOFFATT.

<sup>1</sup> In *The Expository Times* (July, pp. 428-443) Canon Sanday replies with characteristic courtesy to Professor Garvie's recent strictures upon his application of the subconscious to Christology.

## A SOCIAL SURVEY.

### RECENT LITERATURE ON SOCIAL QUESTIONS.

*The Modern Social Religion*, by Horace Holley (Sidgwick & Jackson), tries to show that Baháism, inasmuch as it seeks not to destroy but to fulfil preceding faiths, and as it lays down a doctrine not merely for society but for the individual, satisfies the craving for a new and higher social synthesis, to which the churches on the one hand, having discovered that man has a body as well as a soul, and on the other the socialist parties, remembering again that man has a soul as well as a body, are finding their way. The kind of tendency to which the author refers is exemplified in the remarkable Interdenominational Conference of Social Service Unions held at Swanwick in the last days of June. The particular trend of opinion at the Conference, which had met to discuss the specific question of a minimum wage, is not of so much importance as the conditions under which a conference was held. Representatives of all the Anglican, Catholic, and Nonconformist bodies, who have social service unions, were present; lay experts of all shades of opinion contributed to the discussions. Such a meeting of disinterested thinkers and workers assembled to consider hotly controverted questions from the highest point of view cannot but be of the greatest profit to all who took part, and is bound to have far-reaching consequences by focussing the Christian conscience upon problems which are only too often left to be decided by the higgling and conflict of party politics.

As regards particular religious communities, the Catholic Social Guild continues its issue of an admirable series of publications (London: P. S. King), of which the most important up to the present is Monsignor Parkinson's *Primer of Social Science*, by far the best compendious manual on the subject that has yet appeared in English. It contains authoritative statements of Catholic teaching on social questions, which ought to be of great interest to thoughtful people who are outside the Roman communion. It is also thoroughly abreast of the recent literature of the subject, and intimately conversant with what social workers are attempting in the British Islands and on the Continent. *Social Service: Its Place in the Society of Friends* (Headley Bros.), while deeply interesting throughout, is remarkable as showing how far in advance of



their time certain prominent Friends have been on the practical side. George Fox advocated almshouses "for all poor Friends that are past work," recommended something not unlike the Nature schools of which we now hear so much, and, more remarkable still, suggested that there should be set up in each market town a register for employers requiring labour and labourers in search of work. John Bellers of London (1654-1725) appealed to the Archbishops, Bishops, and Clergy of the province of Canterbury for a friendly conference of all religious persuasions in the British dominions. He was in favour of a Supreme Court to settle international disputes, and of "Colleges of Industry" where education and industry for both age and youth could be combined in the same institution. He thought that medical aid should be placed within the reach of all, and that the latest medical and sanitary discoveries should be made available for general use. *The Life of Octavia Hill, as told in her Letters*, edited by C. E. Maurice (Macmillan), is a wonderful revelation of the motives which inspired a great social servant. *The Burden of Poverty*, by C. F. Dole (New York: B. W. Huebsch), admitting the more flagrant defects of our too industrialised civilisation, puts a series of searching questions to the merely materialist type of social reformer. How are we to evolve the genuinely "social" man and to train him when we have attained unto him?

### SOCIAL THEORY.

"*Economic Liberalism*," by Dr Hermann Levy (Macmillan), shows that the foundations of the modern industrial state were laid, so far as England is concerned, in the seventeenth century, but that a "social" state is arising in contradiction to the ideal of an individualist state so far obtaining. Nevertheless, Dr Levy is of opinion that whatever social changes are impending, Englishmen will not cease to practise the lessons they learnt from economic Liberalism, "to believe in the rights and greatest possible development of the individual; to regard each man as equal before the law, and to display toleration towards the opinions of others whether in politics or religion; to place the same social value on all professions, and to respect what other nations and races hold holy." *The Larger Aspects of Socialism*, by W. E. Walling (Macmillan), is a pendant to a former work, *Socialism as It Is*, and deals with the intellectual and spiritual side of the movement. Pragmatism, in the view of the writer, is "the method and the spirit of modern Socialist thought." Socialism, being the philosophy and policy of the Socialist movement, is constantly being modified, and modified to such an extent that whereas the early pioneers found themselves in contact with capitalism, "State Socialism" is now becoming the enemy, inasmuch as it seeks merely to arrange institutions, whereas Socialism seeks to bring new social forces into a position of power, and to supply the principles required to create a new type of man and society. Some of the writers quoted, Ellen Key, Mrs Gilman, and H. G. Wells, for instance, cannot be taken as typical or representative Socialists, and it is always well

to remember that, hotly as State Socialism is denounced by both the extreme right and the extreme left wings, the older political parties in all industrial countries have become permeated to an extraordinary extent with socialistic ideas, which, for good or for ill, will play a much more prominent part than hitherto in the evolution of civilised States.

The sub-title of *Syndicalism and the Co-operative Commonwealth: How we shall bring about the Revolution*," by Emile Patand and Emile Pouget, excites the hope that an answer will be forthcoming to the question which Syndicalists have been asked since the appearance of Sorel's *Réflexions sur la Violence*, and which they have usually disdained to answer, on the plea that their task was merely to set up an inspiring ideal—the "myth" of the general strike—not to suggest the means of realising it. The book, however, is as wildly impossibilist as anything that has ever proceeded from the pen of M. Sorel or any of the school which he created, and helps the disinterested student to understand why the Syndicalist movement is a rapidly diminishing quantity in France, is and always has been practically negligible in Germany, and has probably exhausted itself in the British Islands. Mr Philip Snowden's little volume, *Socialism and Syndicalism*, besides being a lucid statement of the case for reformist Socialism, has an acute criticism of Syndicalism, with which many non-Socialists will agree.

There has hitherto been in England a dearth of books on the Feminist Movement. Mrs Philip Snowden has written for the Nation's Library (Collins) a moderate and conciliatory statement of the case for it. Of a very different type is *The Truth about Woman*, by C. Gasquoine Hartley (London: Eveleigh Nash). A most able, penetrating, and downright book which burks no questions and states unflinchingly the advanced woman's point of view. It is well that this, whether right or wrong, should be openly stated, as the most radical change which has been going on in England in recent years is not the rise of Labour and Socialist parties, nor women's demand for the vote, but the altered view of thoughtful women, especially in the cultured classes, of their mission and function in the world and the circumstances under which they wish to perform it.

Mr Edgar Schuster's exposition of *Eugenics* (The Nation's Library: Collins) is the clearest and most persuasive statement in short compass of the case for a new way of approach to social questions, which is all the more significant as it cuts clean across the old sectarian and party divisions. In *The Case for the National Minimum*, Mrs Sidney Webb and her collaborators of the National Committee for the Prevention of Destitution reiterate "the necessity, in order to prevent injury to the community as a whole, of maintaining from one end of the kingdom to the other a definite standard minimum of the conditions of civilised life below which, in the interests of the whole, no individual shall be permitted to fall." The assumptions underlying this claim are—(1) that the social and economic wrongs of individuals are an injury, not only to themselves but



to the community; and (2) that the injury caused to the community by destitution and sweating are preventible, and therefore ought to be prevented. *How to Help: A Manual of Practical Charity*, by Mary Conyngton (Macmillan), though written for American readers, will be interesting to European students as well, for two reasons: it shows that, broadly speaking, the social problems and difficulties of the States are much the same as those of other industrial countries, and it assumes that social work must aim at prevention, not merely at punishment or palliation.

### SPECIFIC SOCIAL QUESTIONS.

Mr Thiselton Mark's *Modern Views on Education* (The Nation's Library: Collins) is extraordinarily successful in compressing into a short space for lay readers the gist of what educational experts are saying and doing. *The Idea of an Industrial School*, by Georg Kerschensteiner, translated by Rudolf Pintner (Macmillan), crystallises and restates the famous Munich Professor's views on the aim of education—a training for citizenship, “the realisation of the ethical idea of the highest outward good by means of service for the State, not blind service of a permanently rigid State organisation.” Education is to be a preparation of the individual for his future vocation in the community, to make this vocation ethical, and to make the individual join in the common work of raising the ethical standard of the community of which he is a member. An interesting variant and practical application of this kind of teaching, though not directly derived from it, is J. W. Petavel's *The Other Great Illusion* (London: Allen), which advocates doing for normal youth what the Swiss have done so successfully for “unemployables” at Witzwil, the educational colony where the occupants are taught to manufacture their own clothes and many other articles, and to cultivate the soil, with a view to increasing their general efficiency. *Educational and Industrial Training of Boys and Girls*, by Henry Dyer (Blackie), though based on the experience of Scotland, is of great general value. While insisting on technical and industrial training, the author lays more stress on the production of self-reliance and general intelligence than mere technical skill. Two interesting books on work among boys, both from the United States, are *Boy Life and Self-Government*, by G. W. Fiske (New York: Association Press), and *Training the Boy*, by W. A. M'Keever (Macmillan). The former, published by request of the International Committee of the Young Men's Christian Associations, advocates “complete training in self-control and initiative, and in the leadership of self-directed social groups.” The latter's motto is, “Train the whole boy and not a part of him,” an end which is to be achieved by co-operation between the influences of home on the one hand, and on the other of the Church, the school, and similar institutions. A book of quite outstanding merit and interest is *Physical Education*, by W. P. Welton (London: Clive University Tutorial Press), which maintains that the most urgent

need of English education is "adequate provision for physical training, and the full recognition of it as part of the teacher's work." Not the least interesting chapter in the book is one which give a most instructive history in brief of physical education from the earliest times to the nineteenth century. Finally, the growing demand among educationalists and social workers generally for pure and sane instruction for adolescents in matters of sex is persuasively stated in two brief but quite convincing books by Ira S. Wile, *Sex Education* (London: Andrew Melrose), and in a still smaller volume in the People's Book Series (T. C. & E. C. Jack), *Youth and Sex*, by Dr Mary Scharlieb and F. A. Sibley.

All parties in England being deeply committed to Land Reform, especially as affecting the labourer, it was time that reliable facts with regard to his condition should be put down. Dr Jocelyn Dunlop in *The Farm Labourer* (London: Fisher Unwin) shows how the modern problem has really been handed down from about the period of 1760, and reviews the situation up to the present day. *How the Labourer Lives*, by B. Seeböhm Rowntree and May Kendall (Nelson & Sons), does for the rural labourer what Mr Rowntree's earlier volume did for the slum-dweller of York, and the results of the investigation are, broadly speaking, similar. Seventy per cent. of the rural workers of England are paid labourers having no direct financial interest in the success or otherwise of the work in which they are engaged. The quality of the agricultural labourer is to-day worse than it was, and is steadily deteriorating, which is not to be wondered at if, as this book maintains, "the wage paid by farmers to agricultural labourers is, in the vast majority of cases, insufficient to maintain a family of average size in a state of merely physical efficiency."

*Co-operation in Agriculture*, by G. Harold Powell (Macmillan), which deals with American conditions only, advocates the view that the development of the agricultural co-operative movement needs to be preceded in most of the States by legislation that will permit the formation of non-profit co-operative associations or the formation of profit corporations that can be operated legally for the benefit of the members.

Lack of space prevents more than a brief reference to the results of a most remarkable investigation, the first of its kind yet undertaken anywhere, *The English Convict: A Statistical Study*, by Dr Charles Goring (London: Wyman & Sons). After five years of the most elaborate investigation (followed by three more of tabulation) into the life-histories of 3000 convicts, the conclusion is reached that there is no such thing as a type of human being "born to do evil" (as Lombroso asserted). "There is no definite line of demarcation, no absolute difference in nature, as opposed to degree, between the human beings who are, and those who are not, criminal." The extent and importance of these investigations, initiated by H.M. Prison Commissioners, can hardly be over-emphasised.



## SOCIAL EXPERIMENTS.

The chapter by Professor J. H. Muirhead in *Birmingham Institutions* (edited by J. H. Muirhead), besides being an interesting historical account of a beneficent social agency, the Birmingham City Aid Society, is a most valuable and suggestive statement of principles for the social worker. The whole volume will serve to make known to the citizens of the Midland town the various public activities, both municipal and voluntary, at work in their midst, a curious feature of British life being that much social work is carried on without reference to, or without the knowledge of, other people engaged in social work, and very often without the knowledge of the very people for whose benefit it is intended. That the average citizen should wash his face in municipal water or travel by a municipal tram-car or nationalised railway is a thing which in Western Europe no longer excites comment, but that, being of sound mind, he should invoke the State to administer his last will and testament was hardly to have been expected. Yet this is just what has happened in the British Islands in the case of the Public Trustee, an office created to allow of the State acting as executor and trustee under a will, or as trustee under a settlement. The office, which started operations in 1908, is now administering business of the value of £88,000,000. A branch office for the North of England has been opened at Manchester, and Scotland is also anxious to have a department of its own. The Home Office, or Sir Arthur Whitelegge, are about to form in London something corresponding to the American Museum of Safety at New York, which has formed a collection of various protective appliances, and instructs about 40,000 children, who each year leave the public schools, in the dangers they may meet in the occupations they are likely to take up. An unexpected development of private activity is the starting at Trinity College, Dublin, of a Co-operative Society, which is not the effervescence of some undergraduates, but is supported by the Provost and other mathematical Fellows of the University, and by Professor Bastable. A. E., in the *Irish Homestead*, warmly approves of the scheme, which he thinks, by cheapening the cost of living for the undergraduate, will have the effect of "a universal scholarship."

The Education Committee of the London County Council have made a new departure by attaching a psychologist to the elementary schools, whose business it will be to study the children with a view to arriving at an estimate of their capacity and temperament. As regards the bodies of the children, there is a growing belief in the virtue of fresh air as an environment for education. Sheffield will soon have three open-air schools, while Bradford, Leeds, Halifax, Lincoln, Westmorland, and other places have made or are about to make similar provision. A useful survey of what has been accomplished by "Schools for Mothers" and similar institutions is to be found in *Infant Welfare Centres*, by Dr J. G. Gibbon (National League for Physical Education and Improvement), while it is interesting to note

that a Nursery School on Montessori lines has been recently opened at 25 Cartwright Gardens, Euston Road, London.

Some other examples of useful public work must be mentioned. Since the control and management of the London casual wards was centralised under the Metropolitan Asylums Board, the London "casual" has decreased by 50 per cent., without, so far as can be ascertained, the burden of the community being added to in any other direction. The result of this experiment ought to induce the Local Government Board to unify the whole poor law administration of London, at present chaotically split up under more than twenty separate Boards of Guardians. The National Union for Christian Social Service, inspired by the success of its colonies at Lingfield and Marple Dale, has started a Farm Training Colony for "unemployables" at Turner's Court, Wallingford, where there will be accommodation for one hundred and twenty men and lads, with eighteen to twenty "brothers," who live with the men, work and study with them, and encourage them to develop the latent spirit of manhood within them. Examples of how to deal with the self-respecting worker, travelling from town to town in search of work, are to be found in the splendidly appointed and managed Ledigenheim (a municipal lodging-house for men) at Düsseldorf and in the new journeyman's home at Cologne, the latter of course entirely under Catholic auspices, and the latest and finest example of the network of homes for Catholic journeymen, which have spread over Germany, Austria, Holland, Belgium and Switzerland, as a result of the work initiated by the devoted Father Adolf Kolping.

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## REVIEWS

*The Problem of Christianity.* Lectures delivered at the Lowell Institute in Boston and at Manchester College, Oxford.—By Josiah Royce, D.Sc. (Oxon.), Professor of the History of Philosophy in Harvard University.—2 vols.—New York : The Macmillan Company, 1913.

THE title of this book—*The Problem of Christianity*—suggests its importance, but scarcely indicates its scope. The problem of Christianity is here so extended that it becomes co-terminous with the combined problems of logic, psychology, epistemology, ethic and metaphysic. It is in the form of a world-problem that the question is raised, and in the form of a world-view that the answer is offered. But if at times we lose sight of questions easily associated with the epithet “Christian,” we are always brought back to them by the returning sweep of the author’s thought. Every chapter is closely inter-related with its neighbours, and the whole book forms a compact and systematic presentation of a single thesis. I am inclined to think that the book might be summed up as a Christology, though I doubt if the author himself would fully approve of the description. For though he takes some pains to disavow Christology as the term is commonly understood, the very arguments which he uses for that purpose lead him to assert Christology of another type.

One of the most striking and challenging features of the book is the transference to the Holy Spirit in the Church of the functions usually assigned to Christ. We are accustomed to much confusion on this point in the writings of Christian theologians. But there is no doubt as to the meaning of Professor Royce. The active, guiding Power in the Christian Community is the Spirit; and it is only due to a historical accident that this Power has been otherwise distinguished as Christ. This central position, Professor Royce maintains, was assigned to the Spirit by St Paul. “I believe in the Holy Ghost; in the Holy Catholic Church.” These are the essential articles of the Christian faith, and, in their deeper meaning, here interpreted as the “Doctrine of Loyalty,” they are eternally true. Thus the famous proposal “to do something for the honour of the Holy Ghost” has been carried into effect by Professor Royce with a whole-hearted thoroughness which would have greatly disconcerted

the original proposer. In much of this, his work appears to me to fall into line with the thinking of the late Father Tyrrell, though there is no evidence that any of his works have been read by our author. The difference between Tyrrell and Royce involves little more than questions of nomenclature. To these, however, the latter thinker does not attach much importance. "Loyalty to the Spirit of the Beloved Community" is for him the path of salvation for all souls, and it matters little by what names the roads are called so long as they all converge to the one goal. "The Beloved Community" interpreted, be it observed, as a true *Individual*, and the guarantee (if not the substance) of all that is *real*, is the one object of worship, love, service; the fountain of grace and healing; the Atoner and Redeemer: in a word—God. So long as this is recognised in thought and in deed the ultimates are secure, and all differences of opinion within the one great agreement are without peril to the soul.

The word "peril" prompts me to state, at this point, what I have found most welcome and most impressive in this book. It contains a note of solemn warning, addressed primarily, unless I am much mistaken, to Liberal theologians. Thoroughly Catholic in outlook and temperament as the author undoubtedly is, nothing could be further from his way than the indiscriminating optimism into which Liberalism has so often degenerated. To him, as to St Paul, the natural state of man is one of uttermost peril. The isolated individual is "lost." His moral burden is such that in his isolation he is utterly incapable of bearing it. Startling indeed is the paradox that society is continually training its members, not to automatic obedience, but to rebellion; imposing an ever-increasing burden on the individual, and at the same time quickening the spirit of revolt by developing his individual self-consciousness; until at last the cry breaks forth from him, "O wretched man that I am, who shall deliver me from this body of death?" The will of the isolated individual is a traitor, and precisely this knowledge of his treachery, brought to self-consciousness by the education he receives from society, gives birth to the tragic conflict of his soul and awakens within him the felt need of grace, of atonement, salvation. How is salvation possible? He cannot undo his deeds; nor can they be undone by another. He is in the Hell of the Irrevocable. But, thanks be to God, there is a way of escape. For the world is organised as a "Community of Interpretation," and through loyalty to this, through throwing in his lot with the Holy Catholic Church of all loyal souls, a means may be contrived whereby the world shall be better off than if the treacherous deed had not been done. "Quite apart from the judgment of any of the gods, and wholly in accordance with the true rational will of the one who has done the deed of betrayal, the guilt of a free act of betrayal is as enduring as time. . . . No repentance, no pardoning power can deprive us of the duty and—I repeat—the precious privilege of saying that of our deed." But, on the other hand, "no baseness or cruelty of treason so deep or so tragic shall enter our human world, but that loyal love shall be able, in due time, to oppose to just



that deed of treason its fitting deed of atonement. The deed of atonement shall be so wise and so rich in its efficacy, that the spiritual world, after the atoning deed, shall be better, richer, more triumphant amid all its irrevocable tragedies, than it was before that traitor's deed was done."

Observe what is involved in these remarkable statements.

First, there is the implication that a merely individual salvation is impossible. Elsewhere, and continually, Professor Royce reiterates the principle that we are saved *together* if we are saved at all; our salvation being the joint work of a community, in which each of the members is active, in one spirit of loyalty (which is "Christ") to an end to be shared by all. There never was, and according to Royce never can be, a religion of salvation which expresses its aspiration in any other form than this, "*we shall be caught up together.*" On a recent occasion I heard a number of revivalists in a back settlement of America singing a hymn of which the refrain is

"When the roll is called up yonder  
I'll be there, I'll be there."

Such a hymn, sung by an isolated individual, would be impossible. Sung *together*, as they were singing it, its true meaning was "*we'll be there.*" So far these revivalists—I believe they are called "the Holy Rollers"—were illustrating the Roycean doctrine of Loyalty.

Secondly, the atoning process has its origin in the very constitution of the universe. "The history of the universe, the whole order of time, is the history, and the order, and the expression of the Universal Community." In the deepest sense the world is the Church, the members whereof are selves, engaged in an endless task of mutual interpretation. Such interpretations are not by word only, but by deed. Here, then, hidden within the very substance of reality, is an endless store of possibilities whereby guilt can be re-interpreted and a means found whereby the world will be made richer than it would have been had the guilty deed never been done. This is Atonement. Its significance is cosmic; its work is everlasting; its necessity is rooted in the laws of being. And its benefits are all for the loyal soul.

From all this the reader will be prepared to find in Professor Royce's work the fullest recognition given to the social aspect of religion. And not of religion alone. "The universe . . . is a realm which is through and through dominated by social categories. Time, for instance, expresses a system of essentially social relations. The present interprets the past to the future. At each moment of time the results of the whole world's history up to that moment are, so to speak, summed up and passed over to the future for its new deeds of creation and interpretation." The same holds of logic—its functions are determined by social categories; of the theory of knowledge—things are what we perceive them to be in virtue of social interpretation; of self-consciousness—I *am* the interpretation of my past to my future; my being as an individual is a triadic group of a being interpreted, a being interpreting, and a being to whom the interpretation

is addressed. Our inner life is "a conscious interior conversation wherein we interpret ourselves." All thinking is social—the work of a community. In thinking I *address* a thinker and I address him on the basis of thoughts which have been addressed to me. Philosophy, too, is thus a conversation of a community of minds. Wherever one turns, therefore, among the many realms that are put under contribution for Professor Royce's great thesis, we find, dimly or clearly outlined, the foundations of the Holy Catholic Church, the ground plan of the City of God. Even when a purely technical question of logic is under discussion, he remains true to the great articles of his faith, "I believe in the Holy Ghost; in the Holy Catholic Church."

Such a work cannot fail to touch the thought of the age at many vital points. It marks a great advance on traditional Hegelianism in that it gives a human or rather a social version of what has long been degenerating into a mere logical formula—"thesis, antithesis, higher synthesis." Those who have parted with Hegelianism will have to consider whether the objections they take to its dry verbalism hold good as against this living and human exposition of its principles. I do not suppose that Professor Royce will satisfy them. For, notwithstanding all the new life he has put into the old bones, he still bears many traces of the hole of the pit from which he was digged. Some of these remainders I have myself found difficult to harmonise with the new message.

Much will depend on our ability to fully understand and accept what Professor Royce advances as to the function he calls "interpretation," for this is the central term of his thesis. It is at this point that I feel least certain of having grasped the full meaning of Professor Royce's thought. If he means what I take him to mean, then it would seem to me that he has propounded one more theory of knowledge which is made to do duty for the knowing process itself, and he would lie open to the criticisms which Bergson and others have brought against this form of "intellectualist" fallacy. It is unlikely, on the face of it, that so cautious and fully equipped a thinker would lay himself open to this criticism. Subtle as this kind of fallacy is, Professor Royce is far too old a hand in these matters to fall readily into the trap. None the less, I will venture to state where the difficulty lies, for I have reason to know that others besides myself do not feel quite sure of their ground in following Professor Royce at this point.

It is easy to agree with Professor Royce that the cognitive process is not exhausted by the dual classification of perception and conception. Such a classification appears to be exhaustive only when mental facts are taken one by one. When they are viewed together, in their contrasts, conflicts, and contrary "leadings," its insufficiency is plain. It does not cover what takes place in a process of comparison; it has nothing to say which throws any light on the reconciliation of discrepant or antagonistic ideas. It does not explain a single scientific discovery. To cover this vacant ground Professor Royce introduces the term "interpretation." Interpretation takes place whenever two conflicting ideas are mediated by a third,



so that we "look down as from above" upon the two in unity, and behold their conflict at an end. This third idea is elsewhere described as interpreting one member of the conflicting or contrasted pair to the other; as happens when, by introducing the idea of the sonnet, we are able to express something of Shakespeare's genius in terms of Dante's, thereby comparing the two as poets. The form of interpretation is therefore triadic; there is (1) an idea to be interpreted, (2) another idea to which the interpretation is addressed, (3) and the mediating idea which effects the exchange of the one idea into terms of the other—the interpreter. Science is an endless series of such interpretations, and science, on that account, truly knows the real. The triadic form is not, however, peculiar to knowledge; it characterises the structure of reality. The world is real, and each object in the world is real just so far as, and just because, it manifests the triadic process of interpretation.

Now I can accept all this without serious demur when it is offered as an *ex post facto* description of what *has taken place* when, say, a given scientific discovery has been accomplished. Any attempt to describe that discovery in terms of perception and conception, or the "cashing" of the one into the other, leaves out of account what is most striking in the result of the process, and I can find no objection to the term "interpretation" as supplying what this defective analysis lacks. But if, on the other hand, I am asked to take this account as an adequate rendering from the inside, of what *is taking place* while the mind of the would-be discoverer is engaged in his search, then it seems to me that the essential thing is left out. Professor Royce, unless I misread him, does not observe the distinction between the *discovering* and the *discovery*; he does not discriminate between the mind as already possessed of the mediating idea, and the mind while still on the look-out for it. Here are two ideas, A and B, which have to be interpreted one to the other; and C is the mediating idea which will do what is required. I am already in possession of A and B and stand puzzled at their contrast or conflict. I am on the look-out for C. *How do I find it?* A crowd of ideas are offering themselves, in succession or together, as mediators. How from among this throng of candidates do I manage to pick out C as the one which will do the business? By what principle do I reject D, E, F? What are the marks of a genuine mediation? That it mediates? Professor Royce is surely anticipating when he puts "interpretation" into the cognitive *process* itself. Interpretation is what the process lacks, not what it possesses; and it is precisely as still lacking the interpretation sought, and as still *looking* for it, that knowing, as distinct from knowledge, is a cognitive *function* at all. The particular *functioning* in question is all over when the mediating idea appears. We are told that interpretation is the stimulus and inspiration of knowledge. So in a sense it undoubtedly is. But what is it that inspires the knower while the interpretation is still to seek? These questions may suggest why it seems to me that knowing, as a process in being, escapes the analysis of Professor Royce no

less completely than it escapes the analysis of those whom he justly criticises for reducing it to perception and conception. He has made a finer net than they; but no net however fine will catch the living waters.

But the task of criticism is repellent. For one statement that I feel tempted to criticise there are a hundred which I am compelled to admire. Seldom have I read a book of modern philosophy so profoundly suggestive, so stimulating, so kindled with fine ethical fire. What matters it that here and there one's private notions get a jostle, if all the time he walks in company with a thinker whose thoughts are stirring the solemn deeps of life? Professor Royce is such a thinker. Whatever he touches he illuminates; his finger-tips are organs of light. All things lovely and of good report are the stronger for his book. Its message of "Loyalty" is needed; it is the answering challenge of a noble mind to all that is most menacing in the disorders of the present age.

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*The Fitness of the Environment. An Inquiry into the Biological Significance of the Properties of Matter.*—By Lawrence J. Henderson, Assistant Professor of Biological Chemistry in Harvard University.—New York: The Macmillan Company, 1913.—Pp. xv+317.

THIS book develops an interesting thesis, that the physico-chemical constitution of the Earth (let us keep within its bounds) affords an eminently suitable environment for living organisms—for their coming to be and for their continuing to be. Organisms are adapted to their environmental haunts and the corners thereof, we all know *how well*; and the natural selection of innate variations—which are the Proteus's frolicking experiments—more or less adequately formulates *how*; but have we not rather lost sight of the previous fact of the fundamental fitness of the environment to be a cradle, a nursery, and a home of life? We have been preoccupied with the adaptability of the organism, victorious over its medium by insurgent genius, or by lying low and saying nothing, or by making many ventures in the course of which the unsuccessful mob is sacrificed, and a small successful élite saved; but have we not forgotten a little that the environment which is conquered has supplied the sinews of war since life began, and has been in striking ways accessory or contributory to the evolution of organisms? We have been accustomed to think of the environment as variously related to the organisms therein contained. It is a good soil; it is a necessary atmosphere; it is a series of provocative stimuli; it is a sharp-edged scythe, and so on: but Mr Henderson's circumstantial and unimpassioned presentation of the facts of the case compels us to go further and admit that the life we know upon the Earth is in its physico-chemical aspects singularly congruent with the organisation of the inanimate part of the cosmos.



The course of the argument is as follows. Fitness is a reciprocal relation: the organism is fitted to its environment and the environment to the organism. Living means trafficking with the environment, and to do this effectively organisms must have some degree of complexity and durability. An atmosphere containing water and carbonic acid appears to be a normal envelope of a new crust upon a cooling body like the Earth. These two primary constituents of the natural environment are necessarily and automatically formed in vast amounts by the cosmic process. But, as is shown in detail, water, carbonic acid, and their component elements manifest great fitness in relation to the upbuilding and sustenance of organisms. (Similarly, the oceans are formed automatically in the cosmic process, and the ocean has in certain respects a maximal fitness in relation to life.) There are no other compounds which share more than a small part of the qualities of fitness which water and carbonic acid possess; and no other elements which share those of carbon, hydrogen, and oxygen. Therefore the fitness of the environment is real and unique.

"The fitness of the environment results from characteristics which constitute a series of maxima—unique or nearly unique properties of water, carbonic acid, the compounds of carbon, hydrogen, and oxygen and the ocean—so numerous, so varied, so nearly complete among all things which are concerned in the problem, that together they form certainly the greatest possible fitness. No other environment consisting of primary constituents made up of other known elements, or lacking water and carbonic acid, could possess a like number of fit characteristics or such highly fit characteristics, or in any manner such great fitness to promote complexity, durability, and active metabolism in the organic mechanism which we call life."

It is certain that the Earth could not have become the home of the living creatures that we know unless it had gone through stages of chemical and physical preparation. It is certain that the physical basis of life as we know it could not have been formed unless there had been in matter a tendency to complexity—to form atoms, molecules, enormous molecules, and those unstable aggregates of molecules which we know in colloids. It is also certain that the compounds of carbon, with their large molecules and power of colloidal union, are such as to favour the increase of structural complexity, *e.g.* as we see it in the physical basis of life. And so on, for, as Mr Henderson has well shown, the evidence is cumulative that living creatures, as material systems, are in no wise foreign to the Earth, but are, in the deepest sense, congruent with it.

So far we are in entire agreement with the author, but we cannot follow him to his conclusion that "in fundamental characteristics the actual environment is the fittest possible abode of life." It may be so, but the assertion outstrips the evidence. That we cannot suggest another plan of evolution, another kind of make-up for the physical basis of life, does not by any means prove that there could be no other, no better.

And while it is a notable and valuable service to have shown so

definitely as the author has done what we may call the solidarity of organisms and their environment, is there not a risk of arguing in a circle and making a problem where none exists? If we grant, as Meldola says, that the elements have not been launched haphazard into existence as independent entities; if we admit a tendency in matter to complexify when it gets a chance (a tendency no more explicable than gravitation); if we suppose, as the author does, that "the whole evolutionary process, both cosmic and organic, is one," why should we be surprised at the "two complementary fitnesses"? The characteristic properties of water and carbonic acid, of carbon compounds and colloid states, are peculiarly fitted for the life of organisms, because organisms, as mechanisms (and the author does not consider them otherwise), are such as could arise and survive and evolve under the given environmental conditions. The Earth is friendly to living creatures because in their physical nature they are bone of her bone and flesh of her flesh—her very children.

While we cannot accept the particular form in which Mr Henderson states his conclusion, nor, on the other hand, can discover how he can be said "positively to assert a proposition which is in conflict with much of the scientific thought of the last half century," we think that he has done an important piece of work in showing that organisms cannot be thought of as episodically or contingently fitted to their environment. By a cumulative argument along many lines he shows that the "natural characteristics of the environment promote and favour complexity, regulation, and metabolism, the three fundamental characteristics of life." It is no small service to have so clearly and circumstantially suggested that (in Driesch's words) "Nature is Nature for a certain purpose."

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*Development and Purpose: An Essay towards a Philosophy of Evolution.*—

By L. T. Hobhouse, Martin White Professor of Sociology in the University of London, formerly Fellow and Assistant-Tutor of Corpus Christi College, Oxford.—London: Macmillan & Co., 1913.  
—Pp. xxix+383.

PROFESSOR HOBHOUSE is to be warmly congratulated on the appearance of his extremely interesting book on *Development and Purpose*, which marks the successful completion of an important philosophic enterprise undertaken rather more than a quarter of a century ago. In a valuable introduction the author takes the reader sufficiently into his confidence to narrate briefly the origin and course of the well-sustained inquiries that culminated in the present volume. This introduction thus not only possesses the intrinsic interest attaching to an account of the mental evolution of a distinguished thinker, but also serves as an indispensable clue to the proper understanding



both of the present book and of its predecessors, and is therefore deserving of special attention.

The group of problems which Professor Hobhouse has pursued with so much laudable perseverance was forced on him by the intellectual *milieu* in which he first took up the study of philosophy nearly thirty years ago. The biological theory of evolution was already generally accepted then, and Spencer's philosophical elaborations of the theory enjoyed considerable favour. Now, contrary to the intentions of Spencer and other evolutionists, the tendency of the theory of evolution was, in the main, towards materialism. The human mind was apt to be viewed after the analogy, say, of the liver or the lungs—that is to say, as an organ evolved in the struggle for existence, and having for its function the adaptation of the organism to its environment. The whole behaviour of a human being was liable to be looked upon as “a sort of glorified reflex action.” And the life of man was held to be of no special significance in the cosmic scheme, so as to be exempt from the inevitable dissolution that would follow the completion of the evolutionary process. Moreover, the extreme view of the function of natural selection tended to encourage an uncompromising individualism in the sphere of human conduct. All this was naturally disturbing to those who believed in man's special place in the universe, and who looked upon the course of civilisation as a process of checking the ruthless struggle for existence by means of humanitarian social co-operation. Thomas Hill Green and Edward Caird accordingly headed a revolt against these materialistic tendencies. They set up an idealist metaphysics against evolutionist science, and sought a way of escape from thoroughgoing materialism in an absolute idealism that tried to vindicate the spiritual nature of man and, indeed, of the whole cosmos. To the future author of *Development and Purpose*, as to many other students of philosophy, this kind of idealism seemed to attempt too much, and its efforts to explain away error and evil had the appearance of mere makeshifts. He was, moreover, sufficiently true to the empirical tradition of British philosophy not to look on complacently while the dialectical methods of German metaphysics threatened to displace the empirical methods of English philosophy and science. Perhaps a compromise could be made whereby the synthesis of experience as interpreted by science might be supplemented by careful philosophical analysis and construction. Accordingly, several years were devoted to inquiries into problems of scientific method and epistemology, the results of which were published, in 1896, in the work on *The Theory of Knowledge*—a book, by the way, that deserves to be better known than it appears to be. Next, feeling that the conception of evolution offered a key to the right interpretation of experience, and that if only the mental or spiritual side of evolution were treated with fairness a result would be reached that would be very different from the materialism of so many evolutionists, Professor Hobhouse carried out a series of investigations in animal psychology, the results of which he published, in 1901, in the treatise entitled *Mind in Evolution*, which may be regarded as one of

the important pioneer contributions to comparative psychology. Human evolution, which had received comparatively little attention in *Mind in Evolution*, was then made the subject of special inquiry, more especially on its ethical side, and the results appeared, in 1906, in the two volumes on *Morals in Evolution*, familiar to all students of sociology and comparative ethics. The volume now under review, *Development and Purpose*, completes Professor Hobhouse's scheme by bringing together the several lines of inquiry, summarising their several results, supplementing and correcting them in various ways, and evaluating their net outcome.

To give an adequate and easily intelligible summary of *Development and Purpose* is quite impracticable, since the book itself is necessarily rather summary in treatment. But the broad outlines may be briefly indicated. The purpose of the book is to determine the nature of mind and its place in the universe. The method adopted is partly empirical (or historical) and partly critical (or philosophical). The first of the two parts into which the book is divided is devoted to a comprehensive account of the historical evolution of mind from its earliest known conditions to its latest phase in modern civilisation. Life is conceived as the process of a psycho-physical structure which grows up in interaction with the environment, and which, through the medium of correlations (that is, joint operations of the parts tending to the maintenance of the whole), gradually acquires the power of directing its own fortunes. Rejecting the usual dualism of mind and body, Professor Hobhouse regards mind as an aspect of the psycho-physical whole, which is conceived as a continuous unity, the differences in which are only differences in degree. Mind, again, is not the same as consciousness. Consciousness is only the foreground of mind; organic processes that do not involve consciousness may yet include a psychical element. The generic function of mind is the same as that of the central nervous system, namely, to achieve the correlation or inter-connection of experiences. At the lower stages of life correlations are established without the aid of consciousness; in the higher stages, however, consciousness is the chief means by which the mind establishes new correlations—and the area which consciousness controls is the measure of organic development. In the lowest stages consciousness is undeveloped, and the response to the environment is at first sporadic and futile, but gradually modified by the action of heredity until it becomes normally suitable to vital needs. The next stage witnesses the first work of consciousness in the form of sensori-motor action, which involves a special correlation of co-present sense-data to meet the individual variations of sense-stimuli. Through the influence of heredity the feeling-tone determining this correlation from moment to moment may be so adjusted as to guide trains of action serving vital ends. This is the stage of instinct, which combines correlations based on heredity with correlations based on present conditions. The next higher stages show correlations based on individual and social experience. These include, first, the formation of habit and the acquisition of skill based on the correlation of sense-stimuli



with feeling under the influence of related consequences. Next, these consequences come into consciousness, and particular experiences are correlated, distinct elements being grasped in their relations, and anticipations formed on the basis of perception under the influence of underlying (but unrealised) affinities. Then these affinities come into consciousness, and there ensues a correlation of universals—experience is now organised into systems of thought and action serving comprehensive and permanent ends. Lastly, the defects of the thought-order lead to a process of critical reconstruction by which the factors of heredity, personal experience, and social life which go to the making of consciousness are themselves brought within consciousness, and a comprehensive survey is taken of human life, its meaning, and its ultimate goal. Each of these stages is shown to have its own methods, and to bring to light a new phase of reality. The last of the above-mentioned stages of mental development are separately treated with a wealth of detail. The movement is traced, not only on the side of cognition as such, but also on the side of will and social co-operation; art, too, receiving due attention as an influence in the process of reconstruction. The discussion on the spiritual order, with which humanity seeks to meet the deficiencies of the empirical order, contains some of the finest passages of the book, remarkable at once for their sympathy and their sanity. Basing himself on the historical survey, thus barely indicated, Professor Hobhouse submits it, “not in the least as a matter of faith, but as a sound working hypothesis, that the evolutionary process can be best understood as the effect of a purpose slowly working itself out under limiting conditions which it brings successively under control.” This implies that there is a spiritual element in the very constitution of reality, and that the evolutionary process is the process whereby the spiritual element or principle gradually gains the mastery over the non-spiritual elements. In other words, mind, or the spiritual principle in the structure of the universe, is neither the Lord of all, nor is it a mere epiphenomenon or casual by-product of mechanical forces. It is a real impulse towards organic harmony working under conditions that limit and hinder it, but which it gradually conquers and organises in its own service.

The historical or empirical account of the First Part is followed by a critical inquiry or philosophical estimate in the Second Part of the book. *Prima facie* evolution is not necessarily progress, and the latest phase in the evolutionary process, whether on the side of thought or on the side of action, is not necessarily of greater validity or value than the preceding stages. The earlier chapters of the Second Part are accordingly devoted to an examination of the validity of the experiential reconstruction which the historical account had presented as the latest phase in the development of mind. The outstanding feature of these chapters is the brilliant defence of rationalism—a timely defence in these days when irrationalism is quite the fashion, and “there are some who are at least successful in demonstrating their freedom from any bias in favour of rational methods.” The closing chapters deal with the causal efficacy of mind and its place in

the cosmos, and stress is laid on the consilience of the two lines (or methods) of inquiry followed in the two parts of the book. Both, it is maintained, lead one to conceive the world process as a growing harmony effected by the increasing influence of mind working under limiting, mechanical conditions which it gradually masters more and more. As to the ultimate significance of this view, this may be briefly indicated in a few sentences with which Professor Hobhouse concludes his book. "The conclusion," he says, "by no means answers all the questions that men ask of experience. But, if it is sound, it does settle the fundamental questions—whether the life of man is full of hopeful purpose or void of meaning, whether he can recognise in the constitution of things something that meets his hopes and answers his aspirations, whether he can make for himself a religion without self-deceit, whether he can finally improve the condition of his race by effort or is doomed always to fall back from every apparently forward step, whether he can trust to his reason or must admit the ultimate futility of his thought, whether the spirit of human love is justified of her children or blood and iron must continue to rule the world. To all these questions the conclusion here reached supplies a definite and a positive answer. It is, however, maintained here, not as something which is to satisfy all emotional cravings or end all intellectual doubts, not because it is artistically complete or even because it is proved with demonstrative certainty, but merely on the humble and prosaic ground that, on a complete and impartial review of a vast mass of evidence, it is shown to be probably true."

Considering the vast scope of Professor Hobhouse's book, it would be surprising indeed if there were not various points in it on which different thinkers might find themselves at friendly variance with him. To the present reviewer the chief difficulty of the book lies in the conception of the retrospective causal efficacy of unrealised purposes; some may object to the strain of Positivism that runs through the book; and other readers will no doubt find other difficulties. But there can be no doubt that *Development and Purpose* is a book of the greatest possible interest, worthy to rank with Professor Ward's and Professor Bosanquet's Gifford Lectures as one of the masterpieces of recent English philosophy. It is not a book that all who run may read. But it will repay abundantly whatever pains are taken with it. Moreover, some of its most interesting chapters are also the easiest—quite within the grasp of all who are interested in its great theme. And no serious thinker on life and conduct can afford to pass it by altogether.

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*A Psychological Study of Religion: Its Origin, Function, and Future.*  
— By Professor James H. Leuba. — New York: The Macmillan Company, 1912.

THE application of the scientific study of mental states and processes to the profoundest side of man is one of the symptomatic features of modern research, and the critical investigation of religion receives a valuable contribution in this volume, the work of a psychologist well known on both sides of the Atlantic. "The cry of the psychologist," writes Professor Leuba (p. viii), "is not for a return to the teachings of any man or group of men, but to human nature"; and since this is also the cry of others, and since this age feels itself able to shape its future, it is very desirable to inquire what is fundamental and essential in human nature. Professor Leuba, accordingly, has a wide appeal, and one eagerly awaits the psychologist's conclusions.

At the outset the author keenly realises the value of "religion" and the part it will play in the future; but, like all who feel deeply upon the profoundest matters, he is somewhat impatient of those whose equally sincere feeling happens to lead them in a direction opposed to his. His attitude, indeed, is a little remote from the absolutely impartial attitude of science, and hardly breathes that generous spirit of humanity which, we gather, is to be the religion of the future. The most notable feature of the whole book is the conception of "the source of psychic energy without belief in which no religion can exist." Since "belief in a personal God seems no longer possible, man seeks an impersonal, efficient substitute, belief in which will not mean disloyalty to science" (p. 125). Mystic and related experiences point to an origin beyond the person, but not outside of "sociological causality"; "the origin . . . is superindividual, but not superhuman" (p. 231). We approach Comtism, but we avoid its grave faults: for it is wedded to naturalism, and Professor Leuba would style himself an "empirical idealist" (pp. x, 309, 322 *seq.*). We have a Neo-Comtism. We may regard Humanity as "an expression of a transhuman Power realising itself in Humanity" (p. 328), and around this may be constructed a religion to take the place of Christianity (p. 336).

If, for the sake of brevity, we call this Power P, it is clear that P raises some very difficult questions. How are we to conceive its relation to the Universe, to man, and, say, to the existence of evil? "If it is thought of as Purposive Intelligence, we are back in theism. The hoary puzzles all rise up and clamour for solution" (p. 332). The psychologist wisely leaves these problems; it is left for the ordinary man to make the best of his contribution. P is effective, we can argue about it and discuss it. Did it come into existence with the first man? Did it ante-date man? Is the "corporate spirit" in groups or herds of animals related to P or not? If a man stands up against the world, is it due to P? If P thus works in the individual, what is the relation between the alleged "impersonal" P and the personality of that man? If one man believes in a personal God and

another in P, can the former use P to support his convictions? In fact, one might go on raising question after question, because "human nature" is so curiously synthetic, that P must be carefully formulated or else it will be interwoven with ideas which the psychologist might repudiate. Yet men would claim him as their authority even as they now claim William James. If psychology proposes to deal with human nature it must face the facts, and Professor Leuba's attitude, like that of the average rationalist, irresistibly reminds me of the inadequate position of the "conservative" scholar of the Old Testament, his failure to recognise the complexity of the situation, his concessions halting and entirely dangerous to his own standpoint.

Professor Leuba does not seem to me to emphasise clearly the origin of his conception of P. True, it may not be in opposition either to science or logic (p. 310); and if its basis is not in science, but in human nature, so much the more valuable this unconscious testimony to a craving or an intuitive feeling for what—among very many—has attributes of personal, immanent, and transcendent divinity. "Science" may have nothing to say against P, but it is astonishing to read that it cannot admit the belief in the immortality of the individual (p. 309, n. 1). Professor Leuba really means that many scientists do not admit it—others, of course, candidly recognise that it lies outside the province of specialistic scientific study. His style of argument is as unfortunate as his criticisms of William James (pp. 238, 274), because he makes it quite evident that the most expert psychologists, in turn, differ seriously over profound questions. The ordinary man who has certain convictions contrary to certain conclusions held by certain scientists and psychologists will ignore science and psychology as freely as he ignores the theology that is not in tune with *his* experience. *This* is human nature, and any observation of modern democratic tendencies is surely enough to convince us that the psychology or the science that is out of touch with ordinary human nature, and that answers the experience of merely an exceedingly limited number of specialists, will not have much success and may do much harm.

The book gives the impression of being written around P, to prove that P is in harmony with tested knowledge. If this be so, we have an analogy when the theologians seek proofs of ideas which they already possessed (*cf.* pp. 87, 254 *seq.*). The impression is heightened by the confused arguments touching "personal" and "impersonal" powers. In opposition to the generality of human nature, Professor Leuba thinks that an impersonal power is a simpler concept than a personal one. Hence "it may be expected to appear earlier" (p. 80). Although he asserts that "the relevant facts of child psychology all confirm this view," he freely admits that "the much more complex notion of personality does not lag far behind" (*ib.*). But why should the child personify what for the adult is "simply non-personal," and why is it for him "a natural form of explanation" (p. 94)? Is it not because "the moment soon comes when one's intimate experience of striving is projected into the world of external



causes" (p. 81)? If, then, our ideas thus spring from our mental life, whence comes the notion of an "impersonal power"? If it is an intuitive apprehension of the *reality* P, why cannot personification be equally an intuition of a *real* personal power? Professor Leuba tells of a child of two who asked her mother to lift her up that she might see the wind (p. 79): it is obvious that she was aware of the need of *personal* help, but to proceed to speculate upon the "something" passing by which the child expected to see, is surely outside sober research. If the young child asks "what" makes that (p. 96, *cf.* p. 78), "what" may be proof that he does not necessarily think of a personal cause, but it is extremely significant that the child will invariably and suddenly postulate a *personal* Creator (p. 97). The child is already aware of the limitations of ordinary persons; he has a notion of an impersonal "what" to apply to cases where a personal cause might seem impossible; yet when he is synthesising he does not cut the knots by demanding an impersonal power; he goes out of his way, as it were, and adds to the difficulties of our adult thought by this notion of a great Personal Being. So, too, the ordinary individual will take P, and in his synthesis he will associate it with his notions of personal power.

However, Professor Leuba's theory of an immanent impersonal power—which may suddenly become personal (*e.g.* p. 163)—so dominates, that a brave attempt is even made to work it into a theory of the origin of religion. The origin of religion is, of course, an event of prehistoric times, and although to-day there are areas relatively primitive, they obviously do not give us the actual primitive conditions (see p. 83, line 3, p. 180). We can only say that we *approach* "the original conditions of the race" (*e.g.* p. 76). His theory of the origin of religion is exceedingly hazardous, partly because the independent psychological arguments—in child-thought, for example—are inconclusive by themselves, partly because the relatively primitive conditions reveal some traces of the prior stages, and partly because in dealing with the evidence at second-hand he makes no serious effort to distinguish the relatively primary from the relatively secondary.

Psychology will undoubtedly illuminate the problems of religion, but it must be far more objective than it is in this volume. No adequate attempt is made to understand the point of view of the individual who practices irrational magic or who holds any superstitious and unscientific belief of the universe. Professor Leuba rightly observes that the "trial-and-error method" has a much wider range than we suppose (p. 60), and hence men must have found, and must still find, some satisfaction and advantage in their practices and beliefs, however strange this may seem to *us*. His remarks about "self-deception" (p. 64 *seq.*) or the "psychology of credulity" (p. 178 *seq.*) quite miss the mark; they apply equally to the specialist who marvels at the slowness of mankind to accept his own more scientific and more rational standpoint. From the truly consistent psychological point of view, the quasi-scientific or psychological document that culminates in a Neo-Comtism is on all-fours with an intelligent plea in favour of some particular theological position, and the impartial observer,

who finds a fundamental resemblance among all religions, cannot isolate from them the systems favoured by the ethical culture societies and others. Obscurantism is by no means to be found only on one side of the arena, and there is no doubt that the "comparative method," as it becomes more psychological, finds in modern life human documents quite as significant and as perplexing as the men of bygone ages or of distant climes.

It is therefore rather premature for the psychologist to claim to be the court of appeal (*cf.* pp. 270, 276). It is the average opinion that tells in the long-run, and psychology can guide it. There is much that it can do, and there is much in the mental world which it is "the task of science to bring to light" (p. 232 *seq.*). But mental science is still in the making, and it is not too much to expect those who would face the facts of human nature to give them that first-hand attention which they expect others to give to the data in their particular field. Professor Leuba succeeds in convincing the reader that religion is only part of the many interrelated aspects of life and thought; it does not stand upon a plane by itself; and, this being so, a psychological study of religion must be thoroughly comprehensive, and must not commit the fundamental error of having a conscious or sub-conscious estimate of what religion is or what it is to be. This is as though the historian, dealing with problematical situations, were at the outset to eliminate or condemn everything that offended his historical sense.

Professor Leuba's book is throughout a stimulating contribution to the subject. It presents a great deal of interesting material; and it proves that religion and religious experience can be submitted to ordinary rational investigation, and can be handled in accordance with the ordinary principles of objective research. No one who will be at the pains to read the book carefully will fail to profit from it, even though he be forced to dissent from some of its more fundamental positions.

STANLEY A. COOK.

CAMBRIDGE.

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*Choses Passées.*—Par Alfred Loisy.—Paris: Emile Nourry,  
62 rue des Écoles, 1913.

M. LOISY has here given to the public a short sketch of his life, and of certain stages of his thought, from his early years until his excommunication. At the same time this book is not, and is not intended to be, primarily an autobiography, or an exposition of his inner life. It deals with personal matters, for the most part, only so far as these illustrate his ecclesiastical career, or rather that portion of it and those opinions connected with it which brought him into collision with the authorities. It is thus not a bulky volume, but of much the same size as those other little red books with which his readers are familiar. But it is of very great interest to all who have followed the course of the Modernist controversy, especially as illustrated in the career of its most distinguished exponent.



The book is a kind of apologia, written, however, from M. Loisy's positive standpoint, not as a defence of opinions or their development, but as statements of fact, in which the writer seeks to place his own mental attitude and its resulting action in their true perspective in relation to those of the authorities.

With the principal stages in the course of the external events which he relates, many are already sufficiently familiar. What gives this account of those events its special value and interest are the comments of the writer himself, his explanations and self-revelations, which throw a new light on them at every turn. Though that self-revelation is only partial, and to a great extent subordinated to the special purpose of the volume, yet the confidences which Loisy vouchsafes are sufficient to make us feel how intensely interesting would be his complete psychological autobiography. For, when this writer chooses to tell us what his thought is, or has been, on the deeper and more intimate subjects, his sincerity is as great as Tyrrell's, while his clear-cut and delicate phraseology conveys, as far as it goes, the sense of positive reality. It would be a great advantage to descriptive psychology were he to bring to it the gifts he has known so well how to use in more objective spheres of research. On page 306 we read the following quotation from his journal, dated 10th May 1904, two years before his celebret expired, and four before his final expulsion from the Church: "This morning, while saying Mass, I could almost have wished that it were the last time. Do I still believe enough to call myself a Catholic? I remain in the Church for motives which have nothing to do with the Catholic faith, but rather with moral opportunism. A very little is required, very little, to make me realise that I can no longer honestly continue my priestly profession. If that little came to pass, I should not be astonished; I think, in fact, I should hardly be sorry. . . . I remain in the Church that I may not trouble certain souls, but I trouble my own enough! If I believe in anything, it is not in the teaching of the Church. . . . Can I honestly remain in it? . . . It would not help me at all to believe firmly that Jesus Christ had descended into hell, or that he had ascended into heaven. Nor could I derive any spiritual advantage from thinking that there are really three persons in God, or from treating him as a person. For a long time I have been unable to pray to God, as one would ask something of an individual of whom one expected a favour. My prayer consists in an interior act of self-recollection which enables me to decide what I consider good and lawful."

There is much more in this very valuable and interesting piece of self-revelation. It is unfortunate that space forbids us to examine his whole theory of the Divine, of which the above gives only a negative aspect. It is evident that Loisy remained in the Church long after its atmosphere had ceased to be congenial to him, for the sake of others rather than himself. His last years in it were a species of moral torture, and, when the blow fell at last, it came as a relief. In spite of the inevitable divergency between his official acts and his beliefs, it cannot be denied that his attitude was

consistent and sincere. He saw quite clearly that the matter at issue between the Church and Modernism was a radical difference of principle affecting the entire intellectual presentment of Christianity. That was why there could not be for him, any more than for Tyrrell, a half-way house of Protestantism. There is absolute dogma on the one hand, and free scientific criticism and thought on the other, and it is impossible to reconcile the two. The accommodations of Protestantism merely mask the main issue, which affects not only the dogmas rejected by Protestantism, but equally those which it regards as "fundamental," the conceptions of the Personality and other attributes of God. If the principle of absolutism in dogma be admitted, no portion of the dogmatic growth of Christendom can be logically excluded, and Rome is right in insisting that historical and metaphysical views must be twisted to its support. The Personality of God and Transubstantiation, in this respect, stand on exactly the same platform. If there are philosophical difficulties in the last, those in the former are greater. If, on the other hand, dogma be taken as relative, then all fixed metaphysical conceptions must be so taken, and the idea of God must occupy the position either of a symbol or a theory. If taken as a theory of the universe, it is under the disadvantage, as compared with a strictly scientific theory, that it cannot be put to the crucial test of phenomenal experience. It is impossible to get the Infinite out of the Finite: the former must always remain an idea, the logical complement and counterpart of the last. Yet, on the other hand, the symbolic theory of dogma is hardly more satisfactory (pp. 191-2). For if the "form of sound words" is a symbol, what does it symbolise? Relating, as it does, to a transcendental sphere, it can only symbolise the unknown, convey no knowledge of its actual nature, nor even assure us of its existence. At the same time, Loisy recognises clearly (p. 267) the superficiality of the notion that the "symbols" of the Church ought to be altered from time to time in accordance with scientific ideas. Those "symbols" must remain, and the change, if any, in their expression can only come by degrees.

"But," he adds, "what one has a right to ask of the Church, and what, at the same time, would be in her own interests, is that she should no longer place her theology as an obstacle in the way of the normal development of human knowledge."

These words sum up the life and spirit of Loisy's work, and, to a great extent, the reason of his remaining in the Church. He worked for others and for the future; not for himself or for the present. How far he succeeded in the object he set before himself remains yet to be seen. It is true that he did not succeed within the limits of the Church itself, and so far his self-imposed task was a failure. But he came to realise at last that (p. 190) "the evolution will take place, as it is already taking place, but outside the Church and at her expense, since she will not give her consent to it." Nevertheless, he is, like Tyrrell, disposed to regard his life as wasted (p. 305), and this shows that he, no less than Tyrrell, had set



his hopes too high. It was natural that Tyrrell, in his youthful enthusiasm and his ignorance of the actual conditions prevailing in the Catholic Church, should have imagined that the Church could be free, as well as believing, when it is neither. But the mistake is stranger in the case of Loisy, seeing that he was brought up in the Church. He really seems to have been under the impression for a great many years that the Church might accept his religious positivism, and it seems to have been a great disillusionment when hard facts at length convinced him that she could never do this, any more than she could accept what he calls "the illumination" of Tyrrell, of Blondell, or of Laberthonnière. It is only from this mistaken point of view that his life can be regarded as a failure. Apart from the permanent value of his scientific work, it is something to have placed the faith of the Church in its true perspective and relation to science: it is something to have sounded the depths of an illusion, and to have exposed it thoroughly from personal experience—so thoroughly that it will never need to be exposed again.

If Modernism is dead, Catholicism, as an intellectual system, is damned; for the final rejection of the former by the latter shows that the Church, as represented by the Pope and Curia (and these are more than ever the Church now), has resigned herself to be the Dead Sea of faith, the receptacle of past beliefs and theories, which no longer have any living connection with present thought, and, except for her continual attempts to galvanise them into a show of life, would long ago have found a place in a museum of intellectual curiosities. "Roman Catholicism," as the author says on p. 305, "is destined to perish, and it will deserve no regrets."

H. C. CORRANCE.

HOVE.

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*Within our Limits: Essays on Questions Moral, Religious, and Historical.*

—By Alice Gardner.—Pp. viii + 315.—London: Fisher Unwin, 1913.

MISS GARDNER has collected here a series of addresses mainly given to women. But the title of the series is not intended to suggest that the author is moving within limits narrower than those of the world at large. Miss Gardner lays down in her preface the general principle that for clear thinking and concentrated action, for the sympathetic and rational interpretation of the past, we must mark out the limits of the several fields which are before us. When the world is at large, "slovenly thinking" and "precipitate action" go together (Preface, p. vi). But it is a delusion of the world that it seeks freedom where it cannot be found: in action unhampered by reflection. Miss Gardner points out that in the age-long rhythm of reason and feeling, reason falls just now in the background (p. 26). Matthew Arnold ventured to suggest in his day that it was better to reflect before we made our blunders rather than after them. But even in

the 'seventies it was dangerous to suggest that the public needed such advice. And when it was found that culture lent itself to ridicule, there was an end of the matter. (The word "culture" nowadays brings up to most minds a preparation of bacilli for various practical purposes.) A saying of Matthew Arnold shows that he looked for intellectual salvation from a combination of the Anglican laity and the Nonconformist clergy. He used to walk occasionally with a Baptist minister, the late Rev. Mr Foston, who told me the story. They were in Windsor Park together, and Arnold turned on his companion with the inquiry: "How is it, Mr Foston, that among the Nonconformists the ministry is more intelligent than the laity, while in the Anglican Church the opposite is the case?" Of course, Matthew Arnold (and, indeed, Mr Foston himself) was fond of irony, and the question may have been proposed as a starting-point for a discussion. For the reasonable classes may yet be called in. The practical persons of to-day (like the Balkan States) are not happy although they are engaged in an internecine warfare, which rises in England from the various forms of passive resistance to the theatre-burning of a madwoman, and the outrages of rubber-planters and syndicalists. Even politicians, in their turn, may learn that the triumph of numbers may be too dearly bought. The herding of voters to the poll, under the influence of ill-informed and angry feelings, was indeed anticipated by the thoughtful advocates of an extended franchise fifty years ago. But there is no permanent satisfaction apart from the influence of high controlling motives. And it is disloyalty to reason if we fail to anticipate the ultimate triumph of reason.

Whatever grounds can be assigned, within a given community, for the universal right of adult men to the franchise—and in my opinion this right is bound up with all other rights—these grounds must, in like manner, be admitted for the universal right of adult women to the franchise. But the possession of a right does not determine the exercise of a right. Only the sovereign power—that is to say, force in some form or other—can make possible the exercise of a right. It is the function of the thinking classes in a community—the teacher in an elementary school even more than the public man—to direct by rational persuasion the persons who in the end determine the form of government. Miss Gardner's book gathers together wise instructions about many leading issues of life, along with the grounds upon which these instructions are based. Some things are said about the responsibility of women, which only a woman could have said so well. And I cannot imagine anyone who is interested in the various solutions of the puzzle of life who will not gain from so shrewd and kindly a counsellor.

Miss Gardner does not shrink from avowing herself a follower of Matthew Arnold in many respects. But while he was a little too much given to exaggerating the novelty of his ideas, Miss Gardner, as becomes a historian, dwells upon the common ground upon which many persons may meet. This does not prevent her from being as disturbing sometimes as any of our professional startlers. "A boy who had, under great



provocation, stolen some of his master's money, and undergone a term of imprisonment, was greatly surprised that his master refused to take him back into his service, now that the offence had been atoned for" (p. 146). If there is to be no atonement, why do you punish? Miss Gardner examines another of our dearest rights, that of posing as a martyr for freedom's sake (p. 3). "It may seem superfluous to say—what after all is worth noticing—that freedom of thought can only be used and enjoyed by those who care to think. . . . A Russian lady married an Englishman and came to live in an English village. Some friends called on her and asked her how she liked England. 'Not at all,' she replied, 'after such a free country as Russia! Here you cannot walk in the fields without being *persecuted*.' . . . If she had wanted to propagate revolutionary doctrine from a haycart, she would have been far freer in England than in Russia" (p. 3). For my own part, I hold that the liberty to walk about in the fields is more important than the liberty to propagate revolutionary doctrine from a haycart. But then a reviewer must quarrel at least once with his author, and this is almost the only matter on which I am not in agreement with Miss Gardner's fascinating book.

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*Pax Britannica*.—H. S. Perris, M.A.—London and Toronto :  
Sidgwick & Jackson, Ltd., 1913.—Pp. xvi + 319.

THE author of this book has, for a long while, been closely and honourably associated with the movement towards international peace, and the book itself is obviously intended to serve the cause of peace and drive home anew the lessons of peace. As a basis for his gospel of peace Mr Perris makes use of history, especially the history of our own country; indeed, if we are to take him at his word, he intends his book to be strictly historical and to be judged as such. The author wants "an intelligent reinterpretation of history," being apparently convinced that, hitherto, historians have been obsessed by imperialistic and militaristic ideas and ways of viewing their subject. This, of course, is only partially the case, there being in existence a mass of brilliant historical writing, open to any intelligent reader, which assuredly cannot be accused of over-emphasising the aspect of war as against the aspect of peace. On the other hand, it is somewhat difficult to follow Mr Perris in his desire to behold in *all history*, from the beginning even until now, simply the preparatory stages of the movement towards peace, nor would everyone be ready to accept his dictum that, "properly defined, the 'peace movement' is nothing but the civilisation movement—the law and order movement" (Preface, p. ix). This seems like reversing the truth in the interests of propaganda. The "civilisation movement" may be a development towards universal peace

and harmony, but the "peace movement" and the "civilisation movement" are not to be equated so easily as Mr Perris seems to think; nor, whatever we may wish, is it quite so simple a matter, as, again, Mr Perris seems to think, to regard the history of war as merely an accidental and evil commentary on the history of peace. The "reinterpretation" of history is a precarious business at best, and, even from the point of view of international peace, may seem also premature, unless we happen to share Mr Perris's optimistic faith that the days of war are over, and that present international rivalry must end in "stalemate."

However, granting Mr Perris his claim to what he calls "a point of view which is new in history books," we may safely admit that he has produced a readable and interesting volume, even though to some it may seem to have been conceived in leisure and carried out in haste. We are taken a rapid journey through the history of our country and bidden observe the points at which law and order triumph over disorder and anarchy, and we concentrate our attention, not on the accidental accompaniments of disturbances and conflicts, but on the permanent enrichments of national life and character; we are asked to see this England of ours learning, slowly and by hard ways, the lesson of peace, coming to understand, in arranging her domestic relations, that peace involves "the achievement of a certain balance of religious liberty, political powers, and social status" (p. 166), and that, as liberty in all directions becomes assured, so does peace become a secure possession. Within any nation the guarantees of internal peace are free institutions, equality before the law, and liberty of conscience: the history of England, as Mr Perris presents it, shows us a nation learning that lesson, and learning it in such a way as to be able to teach it to the rest of the world. Naturally, it is not a new story that Mr Perris tells, and in his hands much of it is simply the very briefest summary of facts. It looks almost as though the author had begun his work with a somewhat massive design in mind, and then had been hurried into neglect of that design. The most interesting section is that dealing with Anglo-American relations (chapter vii.); this is a valuable and interesting summary of the main facts, deserving of amplification, and much more suitable than anything else in the book to furthering Mr Perris's desire to show the Pax Britannica extending to international relationships. It is indeed a fact worthy of deep consideration that, for a century, two mighty nations have been able to settle, peacefully and amicably, disputes of a nature serious enough to suggest war, and it is still more noteworthy that these two nations should have practically agreed to let arbitration be the method of settling differences for the future. There is one aspect of the Pax Britannica which Mr Perris does not touch, except to say that he must leave it for consideration elsewhere (p. 225). This is the economic aspect, surely to-day the most enthrallingly interesting of all. Peace comes, says Mr Perris, with the growth of civil and religious liberty; but to any genuine and lasting peace, in Britain or elsewhere, economic liberty is equally essential, and it may well be that the Pax Britannica will



suffer many rude shocks before the economic ordering of our national life is such as to render internal peace truly and completely unassailable.

STANLEY A. MELLOR.

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*St Paul and Justification: being an Exposition of the Teaching in the Epistles to Rome and Galatia.*—By Frederick Brooke Westcott, of Trinity College, Cambridge.—Pp. viii + 397.—Macmillan & Co., 1913.

WITH the familiar black binding and gilt lettering of Messrs Macmillan's theological books, this volume makes a welcome addition to the shelf which contains the works of Lightfoot, Westcott, and other modern divines, and in it a distinguished son follows worthily in the footsteps of his famous father. Lacking table of contents, chapters, and index, the book certainly presents a novel aspect, but the author is undoubtedly at liberty to offer it in what form he chooses. The only question is, Does the reader find it adequate? And for my own part I confess that I should like some method of getting a summary idea of the contents. Nevertheless, the plan of the whole can be grasped without great difficulty. Falling into two parts, the shorter dealing with *Galatians*, the longer with *Romans*, the book is further divided into sections, of which the former part contains nine, the latter sixteen. The first section is headed, "A Word about Words"; the second, "The Idea of 'Justification' (that is, 'Being Set Right with God'): How It Arose"; but the majority of the sections are simply, "The First Paragraph from Galatians," "The Second Paragraph from Galatians," and so on. The teaching experience of the ex-Head Master of Sherborne has stood him in good stead, and without any parade of erudition he handles his materials well, and his argument is lucid. There is one small criticism which I cannot forbear making on the translations, which are often rather paraphrases, and that is, that it seems to me a pity to introduce into a classic the "you see" and "you know" which are the plague of our everyday life. No doubt it is done with the intention of rendering St Paul in modern language, but I do not think the worst offenders in this respect will be found to use the phrases in writing. Apart from this little blemish, the translation deserves nothing but praise; in particular, it wisely discards the fetters imposed upon themselves by the Revisers in their attempt, as a rule, to render one Greek word by one English. Take, for example, Rom. iii. 27-31, where νόμος is given two equivalents:

"Thanks to what principle? The principle of doing things? No! the principle of believing. Our view is that a man is set right before God by faith, apart from doing Law's biddings."

"Or, can it be that God is the God of the Jews alone? Is He not the Gentiles' too? Ay, surely, the Gentiles' also; if in very truth there is One God, who will accept the Circumcision, thanks to faith, and the Uncircumcision, because they have the Faith."

"Do we then by our faith annul the Law? Nay, nay! We establish it."

Of course, the renderings chosen are open to criticism by other scholars. Thus, our author is of opinion that in Gal. iii. St Paul avails himself of the double meaning of *διαθήκη* as "will" or "covenant," whereas Deissmann asserts positively that "there is ample material to back me in the statement that no one in the Mediterranean world in the first century A.D. would have thought of finding in the word *διαθήκη* the idea of 'covenant.' St Paul would not, and in fact did not." Incidentally it is worth noting that we have here the positive statement that Bishop Westcott accepted Professor Ramsay's South Galatian theory (p. 18).

As for the whole question raised in this work, undeniably it is foreign to most of the theological thought of the day. Debate no longer turns on justification by faith or by works; Luther and the Council of Trent seem alike to belong to another world. Yet if it be true, as our author asserts (and who can deny it?), that religion presents to man two great problems, viz., *How can I establish right relations for myself with God?* and, *Having once secured God's favour, how can I best retain it?* (pp. 11 and 12)—if this be true, it is well to have our minds recalled to the fundamentals, as they are here. The latter was the problem for the Jews, who held that right relations with God were secured for them in the first instance without thought on their part by virtue of their descent; and Saul, as a strict Pharisee, was of the same opinion. Upon his conversion the former problem presented itself, and this is the problem for the Gentiles, and also for those Jews who share the apostle's views. Consequently, this is the problem discussed in those parts of *Galatians* and *Romans* here commented on. The words discussed in the first section are *δική*, *justus*, *right*, and their derivatives.

To follow the discussion is not possible now; it must suffice to say that the conclusion is that with St Paul justification is "being set right with God." Almost at the end of the book we are told that "nothing could be done in the way of understanding the dogmatic ideas in St Paul till the reader had grasped two things: the Pauline outlook for one, the Pauline vocabulary for another" (p. 395). It is refreshing to be helped in our study of St Paul by a scholar courageous enough to tell us that the apostle's angelology "belongs to Jewish thought. It is no necessary part of a Christian man's belief" (p. 332). Hence it appears that our guide walks with untrammelled feet.

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*Ecclesiae Occidentalis Monumenta Iuris Antiquissima: Canonum et Conciliorum Graecorum Interpretationes Latinae . . .* edidit C. H. Turner, A.M. Tomi Prioris Fasciculus Alter, Nicaenum Concilium, Appendices et Supplementa. Pars Prima: Symbolum. Tomus II. Pars II.—Oxonii e Typographeo Clarendoniano, 1913.

THE aim of Mr Turner's great work is sufficiently set forth in its title. The first part appeared in 1899, and the second and third parts, which appeared some years later, were duly noticed in the pages of this Journal (vol. ii., p. 227). Now, for the first time in the history of the work, two parts have been published simultaneously, and it will be generally admitted that in interest they equal, if they do not even surpass, those that have gone before. The work is not one of those prepared to meet a passing need, but a solid monument of learning, in which each stone is well and truly laid—a work which is not for a day or a year, but for centuries. Of few writings of antiquity can it be said that they are preserved in so many really ancient copies, and the different families of manuscripts as well as the different recensions are set forth with that clearness of which Mr Turner is an acknowledged master. The work is incidentally a valuable means of instruction in palæography, textual criticism, and orthography. Much detail is provided in these departments that one can get nowhere else.

The preface to the first part gives eight pages of fresh information about the manuscripts, set forth in a felicitous Latinity which few nowadays could rival.<sup>1</sup> The volume itself consists almost entirely of documents that have never been printed before. The contents may be mentioned. The "Tome" of Damasus with the Greek translation, and the quotations made from it by Filaster and other authors, and some twenty-seven forms of the Nicene Creed occurring in authors as well as in canons of councils, etc., followed by an invaluable index, comprising all the differences of phraseology that occur in these forms. A study of this multifarious evidence follows, from which it appears that there were altogether four different forms of the Creed current in Latin in early times. The translations of *ἐκ θεοῦ, οὐσία*, and *ὑπόστασις* receive special treatment. Appendix X. contains a very interesting commentary on the Nicene Creed, written towards the end of the fourth century, and now for the first time published, from a Vatican manuscript. Mr Turner has equipped it with indexes of Scripture passages, proper names, and words and expressions, which may lead to the identification of the author. Interesting allusions to Urbanus, an Arian bishop of Parma, occur towards the end of the commentary. Another commentary is published in the next appendix. It has from the beginning been printed in the editions of Jerome, but old MSS. and a careful collation of old printed editions have enabled Mr Turner to present it in a form worthy of the present time, with all the necessary equipment of

<sup>1</sup> By an unfortunate misprint, "Byvanck" of the Museum Meermanno-Westreenianum at the Hague appears as "Bijranck." One regrets also the bad spellings "arcte" for "arte," "humore" for "umore" (pp. xi, xv).

critical notes and indexes. The volume ends with a fragment (from a Verona manuscript of the close of the sixth century) of an unknown Latin translation of chapters 41 to 46 of the eighth book of the Apostolic Constitutions, and of 73 of the Apostolic Canons, with a Græco-Latin index. This translation was made from a very good copy of the Greek, and is of paramount importance for the constitution of the Greek text, which is printed below for convenience of comparison. It brings to a fitting close one of the most important works connected with Church History and Latin scholarship published in our time.

The other part is more on the general lines of the work, but is no less distinguished for wide and accurate learning. Though it contains only the chapter-headings and canons of the councils of Gangra and Antioch, it is larger than the other. The size is explained by the fact that there are six or seven translations of the former and five or six of the latter, here exhibited with full critical apparatus. It is quite impossible to do justice either to the labour or to the skill and taste involved in the preparation and in the printing of such work. As has before been hinted, the serious student of the Latin language and literature will neglect Mr Turner's *Monumenta* at his peril, though it is primarily addressed to the student of Church History and Canon Law.

Some notes have occurred to me in the course of reading. Ambrosiaster could be added to the number of those who regard the Epistle to the Hebrews as canonical, and who use the form "Malachihele" (p. 329); the corrupt "causa" (p. 346, l. 39) should probably be "causam" in its sense of "disease" (here spiritual disease, as in Ambrosiaster); on p. 354, read "Pannartz" for "Pannart"; on p. 356, Pelagius, in Rom. v. 21, can now be added to the number of those who use *remissa* (plur.); on p. 361, a reference might have been made to the equivalent use of *novellus* (e.g. in Ambrosiaster); p. 367, second last line, a misprint. In vol. ii. p. 228, *pacissima* is surely a haplography for *pacatissima*; and on p. 312 the name is surely Tarcondimotus, a name special to a royal house resident at Pisidian Antioch in the first century A.D.

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# THE HIBBERT JOURNAL

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## EUGENICS AND POLITICS.

F. C. S. SCHILLER.

EUGENICS should, I suppose, be conceived as the application of biology to social life, as a sort of social hygiene on a large scale; and so it seems destined to make trouble in a world which has long grown used to unhygienic, dirty ways. Its habits and traditions are profoundly anti-eugenical, and it is besides highly resistant to new ideas. It will not be easy, therefore, to persuade the world how unhygienic its old ways are, nor how urgent it is to cleanse its Augean stables with scientific disinfectants, not only if it would progress and prosper, but even if it would survive.

Nevertheless, we must make the attempt; and, to begin with, let us radically disabuse our minds of the comfortable but enervating superstition that the human race is bound to progress, and that, however foolishly and criminally we may act, everything will in the end come right somehow, because evolution cannot go wrong. Science lends no support whatever to the easy-going optimism of this *a priori* fatalism. Progress is not a necessity either of thought or of nature. It is not a primary *law* of nature at all, but a complex result of a small episode in organic history, which happens to interest us greatly, and in which our ancestors took a prominent part. But there is nothing in the constitution of the universe, so far as we know, that guarantees the perpetual progress of human

societies. On the contrary, the primary law of physical nature seems to be a universal tendency to degradation; the ascent of organic life, or rather of a part of it, seems to have been achieved by struggling against a current of energy that is for ever flowing downwards. This struggle, therefore, has to be continued; intermit it, rest on your oars, fail to devise new methods of coping with new dangers, and you subject yourself to the law of decay and extinction which has peopled our museums with the gaunt skeletons of the failures of the past.

Progress, therefore, is a paradox, and its persistence an accident, or perhaps a miracle, which is not adequately explained by the agency of any known intelligence. For though intelligence *is* a force that makes for betterment, it does not guarantee it; moreover, the human and animal intelligence we know is very stupid and shortsighted, and often aims amiss and mistakes the means to its ends. It is therefore extremely easy to frustrate the progressive tendencies, and there always is, and always has been, imminent danger of degeneration. This danger is enhanced in ages which are rapidly progressive on the whole. For while big readjustments are being achieved, it is easier for minor mal-adaptations to pass unnoticed, which may become serious, or even fatal, under the new conditions.

The existing condition of society affords many illustrations of this. European civilisation has, in the last two hundred years, progressed with unexampled rapidity, and subjugated the forces of nature to human purposes in a marvellous degree. But the process has not been all clear profit. It has obviously and admittedly engendered an industrial system which exploits men as if they were machines, and greatly aggravates some of the old evils of the social order. We are none of us likely to forget nowadays that there is a social problem, which concerns the relations of capital and labour. But it looms so large, that we are tempted to overlook, deep down at the very springs of life, still more fundamental relations of a biological sort, in which also the progress of civilisation has produced mal-adjustments, fraught with tremendous possibilities.



A hundred years ago, when the thinkers of the human race were for the first time trying to assimilate in all its abstract clearness the fundamental law of organic fertility, and its bearings upon social progress, it is not too much to say that they were appalled by the prospect. The Malthusian law of population seemed to condemn the human race to a perpetual struggle with starvation, which could be mitigated only, and staved off for a time, by the systematic practice of murderous aggression. To the more advanced and humane of thinkers, the only policy that suggested itself was a voluntary and artificial restriction of the output of greedy mouths clamouring to be fed.

After a hundred years, what has experience taught us? Superficially, it may seem that Malthus was mistaken. Population has not outgrown the means of subsistence. At no period of its history has the human race been so numerous and has so small a percentage of it perished of starvation, war, and (probably) disease. But is all well in consequence in the best of all possible worlds, and was Malthusianism a false alarm? By no means. Its predictions have been falsified, but it is not therefore false. By foreseeing our danger it has enabled our forethought to avert it. Human nature is subject to other laws besides the Malthusian; but they do not simplify the problem of human progress. Nor has the prospect grown less alarming to the thoughtful. We may take it as proved, indeed, that human intelligence, at the level at which it now is, will not permit population to outgrow food-supply, but will endeavour either to increase food-supply or to restrict population. It is also true that population still continues to increase, and that while our stores of coal and oil and timber last, *i.e.* while we, as heirs of the ages, can prodigally waste the immense but not unlimited resources which defunct forms of life have accumulated, we shall probably contrive to live more amply and more easily.

But it is becoming clear to some of us that the value of life cannot be estimated by its quantity with an entire disregard of its quality. It is not true that one man's life is as

good as another's, and that all men are equal because they consume approximately the same quantities of the fruits of the earth. Science is quite clear that there is such a thing as natural nobility, and a biological content to the word "well-born." For some bodies are intrinsically better than others, stronger, fairer, healthier; and some minds are stronger, ampler, and happier than others. It is better to be born an Achilles than a Thersites, and a Plato than an idiot. Is it not worth while, therefore, to get for oneself one of these superior equipments for the purposes of living, or otherwise to learn how to make the best and the most out of the bodily and mental qualities one is endowed with? That is one of the fundamental axioms on which the appeal of eugenics to the individual securely rests. If moralists are accessible to new ideas, there is a new system of conduct to be built on this axiom.

It ought to appeal as much or more to the society in which the individual lives. For weaklings, wasters, fools, criminals, lunatics are not a blessing to any society. If their number increases to more than a small percentage of the whole, they not only impose an intolerable burden on the saner and sounder elements in the society, but endanger the survival of the whole. However powerful, therefore, a society may be, and however great its resources, it is doomed if it so organises itself as to breed the wrong sort of men and to favour the survival of the worthless at the expense of the more valuable. Any society which does these things is biologically a failure, a rebel against the laws of life, a foe to progress, a suicide that is contriving his own destruction; and even if its example should persuade and corrupt all other societies, it would not escape the penalty of its misdeeds. If the whole human race became involved in a revolt against the laws of life, the whole human race would simply become extinct. It would go to join the dinosaurs and pterodactyls, and form one more example of a biological experiment that had gone wrong. Until the sons of Adam have contrived to graft the fruits of the Tree of Knowledge on to the Tree of



Life, there is nothing in the course of nature that guarantees to them any permanence beyond that of the beasts that have perished.

Now what in point of fact have societies done in the past, and what are they doing in the present? Certainly not what is biologically right. They have not so organised themselves as to recruit themselves preferentially from the superior elements in their populations, or to augment the numbers and value of their natural nobilities. They have made no systematic and intelligent efforts at improving the human race or preventing its degeneration. They have, instead, persistently indulged in a number of anti-eugenical practices. It is anti-eugenical to indulge in more than a very limited amount of warfare. For though a successful inter-racial war may win for the victors room for expansion in cases where the vanquished are extirpated and not enslaved, it must be remembered that warfare produces an increased death-rate in the fittest and most vigorous portion of a race, viz. its fighting men, and that if it is persisted in it must, by eliminating this portion, end in racial degeneration. The current versions of history have, as a rule, ignored all this. The great ages of national adventure come, as a rule, after periods of recuperation that produce the heroes of the age that follows. It is an illusion that great men are the creatures of *their* times; they are born and bred in the undistinguished era that preceded. The Elizabethans were born under Henry VIII., Edward VI., and Mary. The great Athenians of the fifth century were born before Athens tried to dominate Greece, and while she was growing men under the pacific rule of the Pisistratids. Imperial Athens exhausted the Athenian stock by two generations of warfare, and fell, never to rise again. The heroes of the French Revolution are all to be credited, biologically, to the *ancien régime*. The decadence of Spain and Portugal is most probably to be traced to the constant drain of the most enterprising men the race produced to America, Africa, and India.

Slavery is even more anti-eugenical than war, for it enables the inferior race to survive under the rule of conquerors, who often proceed to eliminate themselves by internecine warfare. Egypt, India, China have been overrun by conquerors over and over again during the past three thousand years, but there has been hardly any change in the racial character of the bulk of the population. This is sufficiently explained by one of the great paradoxes of social history, viz. that it is usually the conquerors who die out, and the vanquished who take their place. For the conquerors naturally form the nobility, and though a nobility seems at first an institution in which society recognises eugenical principles, it is apparently a consequence of civilisation that a nobility never reproduces itself, and always tends to die out. The leading case here is that of the Roman patriciate. The decay of nobilities is doubtless due to a variety of causes—warfare, luxury, immorality, a higher standard of life and a lessened endurance of hardships; but it is impossible to blink the fact that it always attests a social failure. It means that though a society admires and delights to honour the qualities which it expects its nobility to exhibit, it yet has so ordered itself that it continuously eliminates the possessors of these very qualities. So soon, therefore, as it is realised how in fact the institution works, it becomes clear that our nobility is as grotesque as anything in Butler's *Erewhon*, and that true statesmanship would restrict titles to the worthless, in order to hasten their extinction.

It deserves, however, to be noted that this fatal ordering of society cannot always have existed. There must have been a time when the conditions of human life were such that the fitter survived and the unfitter did not, and when, in consequence, the human race was intrinsically and rapidly progressive; a time when personal superiority of brain and limb was essential to survival, and no social artifices availed to reverse the operation of natural selection. When that time was it is hard to tell. It probably preceded the attainment of any high degree of civilisation. For in any settled society



there is so much progress possible by the accumulation of tradition that native wits cease to be indispensable, and so much protection is extended to the feeble that they can propagate their kind. So biological progress has probably come to an end, except in so far as we may have grown more resistant to the microbes that swarm where men do congregate, and less susceptible to the charms of alcohol by the self-elimination of congenital drunkards.

In barbarism, on the other hand, the conditions are apparently sometimes so severe that to survive a man must have the support of an adequate band of his own kin, and descendants of the strong, chieftains, etc., survive better than the common herd; and in quite savage times, no doubt, the superior tribe that gobbled up its enemies (or their food-supply) would have a biological advantage over another that enslaved them. Cannibalism becomes a social danger only when the taste for human flesh it generates preys upon the tribe itself, and the warriors improvidently devour their own women and children. But however this may have been, it is certain that at *some* time personal and intrinsic superiority must have been decisive of survival. In no other way is it conceivable that the human race should have acquired those adjustments which render it superior to the apes, and more particularly its enormous superiority in massiveness of brain. There must have been a time when brain-power really was a vital necessity, when only the ablest could make a living, and when the feeble-minded were sternly weeded out. Probably this happened so long ago that hardly any record of an anterior state of things has come down to us. The fragments of *Pithecanthropus erectus* from Java, the jaw of *Homo heidelbergensis* from the Mauer sands, and (perhaps) the Piltdown skull recently recovered from the gravels of the Sussex Ouse, alone seem to antedate this decisive development, which generated modern man. Since these earliest palæolithic times there has been apparently no growth in human brain capacity. Even the Neanderthal race, though it has perhaps perished without

descendants, had quite as much brain as modern man, and contrived to live among hardships that would have daunted most of us.<sup>1</sup> In the main, then, sociological development has superseded physiological as the foundation of social progress, and this has doubtless, on the whole, been a gain, though it has brought into being the phenomenon of social *contra-selection* and the elimination of the fit.

Now upon this it may be remarked that the further back this phenomenon is traced, the less alarming it becomes. If, physiologically, man has been stationary or retrograde for so long, this only shows how unimportant physiological efficiency is to his social welfare. If, in spite of the elimination of the fit, the supply of proper leaders of the race has never failed, this shows that it does no mortal damage. If social selection proceeds upon different lines from natural selection, and mitigates and undoes its brutalities, this only shows that we have hit upon something higher than natural selection, or perhaps a higher form of it. Anyhow, it is all an old, old story, and there is nothing novel or alarming about it.

Unfortunately these retorts do not quite suffice. In the first place, there must come a point at which social progress can no longer compensate for physiological degeneration, but is arrested by it. If a race becomes progressively feebler in body and mind, it must sooner or later arrive at a condition in which the best doctors cannot save it from the microbes, and the best teachers cannot implant into the young duffers of the next generation the knowledge needed to save society, even if it could still produce good teachers and good doctors. And, moreover, there has appeared a new fact of serious import. So long as self-elimination was, like the *harakiri* of the Japanese nobles, a privilege of the few, and a mark of social superiority granted to a fraction of one per cent. of the community, the requisite supply of ability might be drawn from other classes. But what if all the classes that have hitherto produced ability should begin to die out under the conditions

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Sollas, *Ancient Hunters*.



of modern civilisation? There is much reason to suppose that this is what is happening, as many have doubtless learnt from the classical researches of Mr and Mrs Whetham in their remarkable book, *The Family and the Nation*.

The evidence goes to show that throughout the most valuable part of the nation, not only in the upper classes but also in the middle classes and in the best parts of the working classes, the birth-rate per marriage has in a generation sunk from four and a half to two, and is now only half the size required to keep up the numbers in those classes. In other words, society is now so ordered that in every generation it sheds one-half of the classes it itself values most highly, and supplies their places with the offspring of the feeble-minded and casual-labourer classes, whose families still average more than seven. What seriously aggravates the evil is the whole trend of social legislation. Social reform costs money, and the money is raised by taxation, which bears very hardly on the middle classes, who cannot curtail luxuries like the rich, and will not lower their standard of comfort. They meet the extra expense, therefore, by further postponing the age of marriage, and further reducing their output of children. One of the chief effects, therefore, of our present methods of improving social conditions is to deteriorate the race. And this in a twofold manner: they eliminate the middle class, and they promote the survival of the unfit and defective.

It is evident that both processes may easily assume the dimensions of a national calamity. If social arrangements are made whereby the unfit are liberated from the pressure of natural selection, and are permitted to multiply without restraint at the public expense, it is likely that their numbers will continuously increase. It is stated that the State of New York already spends one-seventh, and sometimes so much as one-fifth, of its revenues on the support of its defectives, and there is no reason why it should not have to spend the whole of it in this unedifying way, if the social policy which has led to this result is persisted in, or why the community should not

come to consist wholly of idiots, lunatics, and epileptics. For something analogous to Gresham's Law will operate, and the bad stocks will push out the good. The rapid fall of the birth-rate among the more provident classes of the community is but the beginning of a process which may lead to the practical elimination of the middle classes.

To whom, then, shall we look either to make good the gaps in the upper ranks of society in which the guiding minds must be found, or to man the professions which carry on the ordinary brain work which is needed, and provide the organisation and direction required for the efficiency of manual labour? To illustrate how directly this question bears on national welfare, we need merely inquire how the army is to get on without officers. The present shortage of officers has, no doubt, been aggravated by a variety of causes, but, at bottom, it is largely a biological phenomenon. The families with military traditions, in which the sons hereditarily went into the army and provided the best officers, are no longer large enough to yield an adequate supply of men. Nor will the State get them by offering more pay and less work. It cannot get them, because they exist no longer, and it is doubtful even if it will get inferior men from other families. For the same process is affecting the other professions also. Even the clergy can no longer be relied on to furnish a supply of capable and ambitious youth who will distinguish themselves in every walk of life.

It is perfectly possible, therefore, to tax the middle classes out of existence. Indeed, it has been done. History exhibits a great object-lesson in the decline of the Roman empire. This appears to have been mainly due to an unscientific system of taxation which crushed the middle class and left no breeding ground for ability and ambition between the millionaire nobles, who had nothing to rise to, and the pauperised masses, who had no chance of rising. Consequently, the empire had to take from without its borders the men it needed to conduct its military and civil administration. The barbarians alone could furnish the men to run the empire, and consequently



the barbarians inevitably came to overrun the empire. Modern civilisation seems inclined to repeat this blunder, and, if so, it is courting the same doom, if it can find barbarians virile and intelligent enough to overrun it. If not, the situation is by so much worse than formerly for the future of humanity.

It is worse also in this, that the elimination of the fit, owing to social mal-adjustment, is much more effective than formerly, and penetrates much deeper into the "lower" classes. In former times these contained and conserved considerable stocks of ability, which multiplied freely, but, owing to the rigid organisation of society, were not able to rise. Now it has been made so much easier for the able to ascend our educational and industrial ladders that rise they can, and do. But their ascent drains the lower classes of their congenitally able members, and so diminishes the prospect of further supplies from the same source. Secondly, the restriction of the birth-rate has already affected the superior artisan class quite as much as the classes above them. Hence, even if we grant that as good material can be produced in this class as in the professions, the quantity will not suffice. The damning fact remains that society recruits itself preferentially from among its worst constituents. And if it is remembered further that one-quarter of the existing population normally produces more than one-half of the next generation, it is evident that if this more prolific quarter be inferior in quality, great changes in the value and composition of a society may occur with startling rapidity.

The same phenomenon is observable all over the civilised world; it is not quite so bad in Germany as yet, but worse in France and in America. What does it mean? It means a rapid and progressive diminution in the output of ability. It means a necessary decline of all those pursuits that demand a supply of ability. It means a degeneration of the European race. It may mean the collapse of civilisation. It certainly means incomparably the gravest problem now confronting the

political wisdom of the civilised world. It means that however old-fashioned politicians may shrink from facing it, and however platitudinously they may continue to prate about their party nostrums, eugenics has become the most momentous issue in politics.

The problem is essentially a social one. It is not one to be solved by individual initiative or individual action, though, of course, it is equally clear that it cannot be solved without the co-operation of individuals. For the individual is helpless against social conventions; and, in effect, society already prescribes whom he shall (or shall not) marry, when and under what conditions and penalties in every class, and leaves him only limited and largely illusory freedom of choice.

Nor is it an easy problem for society to solve. For it has here to work upon and through the feelings of individuals, and in matters where its behests are hard to enforce and particularly easy to evade. If it succeeds in reorganising itself on eugenical lines, it will only be by making use of a multitude of expedients, and by dint of forethought and much diplomatic skill. Rough and ready legislation will be worse than useless. In short, our legislators and political thinkers will have to think more earnestly and seriously than they have done for the past two thousand years, with a greater disrespect of the traditions and conventions of political philosophy.

To begin with, they might fittingly be summoned to repent them of the evil they have wrought so long, and to remember that their blunders have often been more mischievous than crimes.

After a due humility had thus been fostered in them, they might be asked to contemplate a fundamental fact of social life, which Western civilisation has never properly appreciated, and is now in danger of forgetting altogether. It is simply this, that *the biological unit of human life is neither the individual nor the State, but the family.*

It follows that social organisation must be biologically sound in the first place, and that Individualism and Socialism are both



profoundly wrong, and dangerous to human survival. From a biological point of view, the individual is an indispensable but dangerous force, which is fortunately almost helpless by itself, and so becomes amenable to social control. He is not an end in himself; his happiness and perpetuation are secondary, and he should be taught to know his duty and his place. His proper place, whether for the male or the female, is that of a vehicle, a functionary entrusted with the transmission (or otherwise) of the hereditary qualities (good or bad) of his germ plasm. He is a creature to be tamed and used, but he should be coaxed and cajoled rather than coerced, lest he should revolt, or his spirit be broken. The essential flaw of Socialism, from this biological standpoint, lies in its handling of the individual, whom it cannot really catch and tame; he easily slips through the vast meshes of the social net.

The moral of history uniformly is that State control is never a success. It either fails, as in Greece, to be subtle and strong enough to meet the individual's evasions, or else, as in the Orient and Peru, it crushes him, and so deprives itself of the strong men that can control the social system, and steer the ship of State through the storms of circumstance. It is perfectly futile in practice to preach State Socialism in the hope of curbing individual selfishness. You may breed in this way astute exploiters of social machinery for their private ends, but never self-sacrificing citizens. Oxford has tried it for the past thirty to forty years, with indifferent success.

The truth is that our political philosophy is antiquated and unscientific. It has been too servile an imitation of Greek models. Now I would not hint any disparagement of Greek genius. But our admiration for it will do us more harm than good, unless it is critical. It should be remembered also by our political theorists that Plato and Aristotle were not the only Greeks. Both Plato and Aristotle adopted highly socialistic theories of the best social order. But they were not typical. Their theories represent an indignant protest against Greek practice. For the great bulk of the Greeks were by nature

individualists of a rather unbridled sort. The artistic temperament was probably commoner among them than it has ever been before or since. But the artistic temperament is a very doubtful blessing from the point of view of social organisation. It is antinomian, scornful of the humdrum, impatient of discipline, liable to emotionalism, full of vanity. It does not run well in any sort of harness, either in public or in private life. Nor is an æsthetic estimation of conduct, praise of the "beauty" of self-sacrifice, and disapproval of the "ugliness" of anti-social action an adequate substitute for the lack of a sense of duty.

And well the Greeks themselves knew their own weakness. That was why they cherished such an intense admiration for "moderation," and made the repression of emotional excess, the arduous recognition of self-imposed limits, the foundation of their art. It was the reason, too, why they adored the inhuman discipline of Sparta, even though it had succeeded only by eradicating from its citizens nearly all the qualities which were specifically Greek.

Nor was the artistic temperament the only reason why the city-state failed to control the individual Greek. It had tried to do too much, and in its jealousy had loosened the other bonds that hold society together. Especially it had weakened the family, and so increased the individual's natural licence. It will probably be conceded, even by the most uncritical advocates of Hellenism, that in matters that pertain to the sexual and family relations the Greeks do not yield models it is well for us to imitate. It should also be noted that Greek theory does not here supply a corrective to Greek practice. The Athenian family may have been as great a failure as Plato implies, but his methods of ending it seem distinctly crude, and his alternative scheme, despite its recognition of eugenics, is hardly calculated to achieve its end. The other philosophers, who nearly all abstained from marriage because it interfered with "contemplation," or, like Socrates, courted failure by marrying too late, were not indeed so



extreme in their hostility to the family as Plato, but they did as little to rehabilitate it in theory as in practice. In short, the Greeks have conspicuously failed to grasp the social function of the family,<sup>1</sup> and any political philosophy that relies exclusively on Hellenic inspiration fails in like fashion.

Yet the family is the only mechanism which human wit has ever contrived that has attractiveness enough to bind the individual's caprice to travel in regular orbits, and to build up an orderly society out of the gravitation of social units. It is a successful mechanism just because it is so much more than a mechanism. It is a biological necessity and a psychological craving, and a training ground for every development of ethical, spiritual and economic life. The family lies at the roots both of the school and of the factory and of the Church, though all these institutions have sometimes grown into unnatural forms which injure and repudiate their origin. I remember that when I was an undergraduate we were once set an essay by Jowett, the great Master of Balliol, on the Origin of our Moral Ideas, and embarked on a great variety of theories, without pleasing the Master, who at the end delivered himself of the dictum: "the fact is that our moral ideas originate in the nursery." We then thought it a terribly unphilosophic come-down from the altitudes of metaphysics, but most of us have probably realised by now how profoundly true it is. Moral education, the moulding of individuals into conformity with social requirements, must begin in the nursery, and it will make no slight difference whether this early training is conducted well or ill. And it is no less important to guide the child's first steps aright towards the secular and religious knowledge it will need to make its way through life. No State machinery will ever be as satisfactory in these respects as a good family; for no State machinery will be so potent.

<sup>1</sup> In the reflective stage of their development. Before that there was, of course, a period when a chieftain's rule rested, like Priam's, on the number and vigour of his sons, and until the fifth century B.C. the history of the Greek cities appears to have been essentially that of their leading families.

It will not touch the individual's life so closely and constantly, nor yet so lovingly; even quite an inferior family would be superior to the finest public institution. Consider, for example, what a nightmare life would be for the children subjected to the training of Plato's *Republic*, and how inevitably the polished hypocrites his education would turn out would be lacking in those very moral qualities he proposed to destroy the family to secure!

If, then, a State wants good citizens, the best thing it can do is keep the family in sound condition. At present this is not being done, and it is ominous that the family is being attacked and undermined from many sides. To the individualist it seems an unbearable restraint on the lawlessness of passion. He demands freedom to realise himself, *i.e.* to do as he pleases without regard for the consequences to anyone. To the Socialist the family is no less obnoxious; it seems such a sturdy centre of resistance to the pulverisation of the minor social structures for the greater glory of a State that dreams of composing a coherent order out of a dustheap of undistinguished and indistinguishable individuals, which the breath of a majority, or of a "machine," can blow whithersoever it listeth. He will always impugn it as a hotbed of individualistic selfishness, because it is an obstacle to the realisation of *his* ends. To the feminist it seems a symbol of the bondage of woman to the service of the race. It does not appear to have been considered that if the emancipation of women means (incidentally) a refusal to bear children, only those societies will survive which do *not* emancipate their women.

To an evolutionist, however, it will not seem credible that an institution will succumb to such puny attacks which has grown up under the hardships of primitive life and weathered the storms of man's lurid past, and is now so intimately intertwined with the chief biological, psychological, and social needs of humanity. Not that he will on this account either demand the suppression of blasphemers against the family or assume



the attitude of a *non possumus* conservatism. He will incline to the belief that the best cure for lawlessness is biological instruction, and that with a fair field and no favour natural selection will vindicate the family. Recalcitrants against it should not be forcibly prevented, therefore, from dying out. If left to themselves they will do so, perhaps with pleasure to themselves, certainly with profit to the community. He will even see some good in legislative interference which, though intended to break up the cohesion of families, like the death duties, operates to knit more closely together those families of which the members can trust each other's morals sufficiently to combine to frustrate the law.

As regards the future, it is always well to be chary of predictions. But just because the family is natural, and has evolved, it may be expected to evolve still further under eugenical auspices. For this very reason the scientifically-minded eugenicist will doubt whether the law does well to attribute an equal sanctity and value to all families, and to put the worst on a par with the best, to regard sterile unions as no less precious and indissoluble than fertile, and to bestow the right to found a family indiscriminately. He will protest, however, that the State has by no means done its duty by the family. It has put artificial and needless obstacles in the way of the survival of the best, and has done this under the influence of antiquated theories which are biologically false. It has been inspired in its action by individualistic, socialistic, or ecclesiastical influences. All these influences could not, of course, help evincing some perception of the fundamental principles of human welfare, but, as their knowledge was inadequate, their effect was largely anti-eugenical.

There is no saying, therefore, how powerful an instrument of good the family may not become, if the ultimate aim of statesmanship is conceived, not as the meaningless triumph of abstractions like "the State" and "the" individual, but as such an ordering of society as will tend to the survival of the better families, that is, *stocks*, rather than of the worse, and to

the elimination, as smoothly and painlessly as can be arranged, of those which are diseased or defective or tainted. For much may thus already be done to arrest the physiological decay of the human race, and (perhaps) to promote its development into a higher type, while the knowledge which is needed for attempting what is at present impracticable can only accrue from the experience of eugenical experiments.

It is not, however, to be expected that the warnings of eugenists will meet with universal assent. No moral reformation is ever popular, no far-sighted plan is ever widely understood. The inertia of habit and stupidity is always slow to move, and the opposition of those whose interests or prejudices are affected is always bitter. It is likely enough, therefore, that in many societies (democracies especially) nothing will be done. It may well be, even, that the European race as a whole will reject eugenics, and show itself incapable of the foresight, discipline, and self-control which the adoption of a eugenical policy will involve. That, however, will not settle the matter. The European race, in that case, will ruin itself, and its glory and pre-eminence will depart. But the appeal of science is universal, and will be transferred to those races which have, from time immemorial, builded their social structures on the family as their foundation, and remained relatively free from our follies.

There are at present in existence two great social schemes which have shown great vitality and power of endurance, and attained a high degree of civilisation. One of these is pacific and industrial, the other military; but both agree in regarding the family as the essential unit of social life. I refer, of course, to China and Japan. Both these states have in our day undergone enormous revolutions, and are still confronted with stupendous problems in adjusting their economic and moral order to the new situations created for them by the contact of an aggressive civilisation which was technically their superior. It seems probable that their intelligence and statesmanship will succeed in assimilating the technical methods and material



and military advantages of Western science, but no one as yet can hazard a guess as to what will be the spiritual effects of Europeanisation on the fabric of their beliefs and institutions. But if these can be adjusted to the new knowledge, if science can be absorbed without destroying the moral unity of the family, if the ancestor-worship of the animist can be developed into the descendant-worship of the eugenicist, I can see no reason why one should not prognosticate for both of them a rosier future and a more assured continuance than for our European societies, if these latter yield to the pressure of those, whether called individualists, socialists, or militarists, who tempt them to their destruction.

For Nature, after all, reckes little of the catchwords of our pride and politics. It acknowledges no "superiority" in the ways and ideas of those who are not willing or able to survive, and it is human ideals and ends which have to give way and to practise evasions to attain realisation, when they collide with the elemental necessities. "Democracy," "freedom," "self-realisation," "civilisation," nay "society" itself, are but snares for fools, if they beguile us into revolts against the primary laws which were established in the beginnings of life. A social order which endorses such revolts commits a crime against life which is certain to avenge itself. Moreover, the suicide of a society always destroys the innocent with the guilty, the sane and healthy with those of unsound mind and perverted feeling. *Quem deus perdere vult prius dementat*, and unfortunately our Hellenistic political philosophy exhibits all the marks of senile dementia and progressive paranoia.

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## SELF-SACRIFICE.

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THE conception of self-sacrifice is looked upon by some as belonging to those counsels of perfection which we gladly hold in all the greater respect, because their excellence generously relieves us from the duty of fulfilling them. Very few can be found honestly to reject the principle in theory and, least of all, in practice.

It is a conception so wrapped in perplexity and so remarkable in itself that it invites and deserves repeated consideration and analysis.

In all forms of genuine self-sacrifice, the individual deliberately sets aside some good of value to himself, and to that extent voluntarily curtails his range of legitimate personal satisfaction. We can only sacrifice what is of worth, and not what is worthless to ourselves; and a sacrifice which involves no real loss and impoverishment, or which ultimately leads to personal gain, is not true self-sacrifice.

On the other hand, the mere renouncement of a good is not enough to constitute the moral act of self-sacrifice; we renounce in order to accomplish some positive result. Self-sacrifice has both a negative and a positive aspect. Merely to give up a good is to waste goodness, not to make a sacrifice; and merely to achieve a positive end at the cost of effort, or it may be pain, is the normal condition of any form of self-assertion, not the peculiar note of self-renunciation. It is as mistaken to identify self-sacrifice with mere denial as it is to



identify all moral achievement with self-assertion. Real self-sacrifice involves self-assertion, if it is to be a moral act at all, for some end must be affirmed and attained by the act in order to give a meaning to the surrender of a good. The character of the sacrifice varies according to the end sought, as much as according to the good renounced, and the approval of the act is unreserved when there is a kind of moral balance between the good renounced and the end achieved, when the result attained is "worth the sacrifice."

The end achieved by the sacrifice must be good and not evil; otherwise, the good given up is thrown away and the sacrifice becomes itself an evil act. On the other hand, the surrender of evil for a good end cannot be a sacrifice, for the surrender of evil means no loss of what is valuable. Thus, a devil is incapable of self-sacrifice, and the rejection of evil, negative though it be, is not equivalent to the renunciation of good.

Again, the positive result aimed at in the sacrifice lies beyond the personal welfare of the agent making the sacrifice. The sacrifice must involve definite and, at least in appearance, permanent loss of an actual substantial good for the agent. An individual does not sacrifice himself for himself. This distinguishes self-sacrifice from mere self-denial, which is a normal condition of all moral self-realisation. Self-realisation always requires selection, and selective activity implies rejection of some things in order to obtain others. We cannot possess all the goods of life; we must make our choice and leave the remainder. A man may deny himself venison and old port to avoid an attack of gout, and may feel the restriction harsh and irritating; but his sense of humour should be enough to enable him to see that no one can be a martyr to his own self-interest. In all such cases, there is no diminution, and so no sacrifice, of individual welfare, but only a furtherance of it.

While the end realised by the sacrifice lies beyond the agent making the sacrifice, that end must further the welfare

of human personality, and must in some manner be higher in value than the good renounced in the sacrifice. The former condition is obviously necessary if the agent is to justify the act to himself and others as moral beings ; the latter condition is equally important if the renunciation of good is not to involve moral waste. The act of sacrifice rests on the assumption that, while the good is always valuable, all goods have not the same value, and that, therefore, one good may be subordinated to another consistently with the pursuit of the highest moral ends. Sacrifice of good can only involve moral waste if a higher good is given up for a lower ; if a lower is surrendered to realise a higher, there is doubtless still loss, but not moral waste, and so no immorality in the long run. The relation of lower to higher in which morality consists thus admits of a rejection of a good in the interests of a better, and justifies the rejection when made.

Further, it is of great significance that though the individual may conceivably give up most of his personal goods, he cannot sacrifice his highest good, or what he takes to be the essence of his moral personality. This, in practice, is for him the subject determining and possessing all particular goods, the standard of all moral worth, the core of his existence as a moral agent. He cannot renounce it, because, in any sacrifice, the good surrendered must be detachable from what he regards as the permanent and abiding self which makes the sacrifice. The agent's permanent self cannot be detached and so cannot be sacrificed ; or if it were attempted, there would be no self to make the sacrifice. Moreover, every sacrifice made must be justified, and every justification implies a standard of reference. If the supreme ground of all good, if the highest good of personality, is sacrificed, the sacrifice itself becomes meaningless or immoral. Every act of self-sacrifice is made in the interests of personality, and aims at its conservation, not at its destruction. Again, a man can only sacrifice what is of value to himself : if the source and fount of all that is valuable is given up, if personality in all its reality is abandoned, there



is nothing of value left and no sacrifice is possible. All sacrifice is thus in the long run subordinated to the fundamental condition of the moral life, the conservation of personality. Not for another can anyone renounce his whole personality; no man can give anything or do anything in exchange for his soul, and no one's personality can be worth the loss of another's.<sup>1</sup> The complete sacrifice of personality is self-degradation; and if degradation of others is immoral, self-degradation cannot be morally justified.

The utter sacrifice of self is a conception often praised and sometimes practised by certain ascetic types of individuals, and leads to extraordinary subtleties of self-sophistication. Such individuals think that because the sacrifice is made for the good of others it must be justified, since benefit to others is intended. They fail to see that the intention to destroy their own moral existence cannot possibly be a moral intention, and that the intention to foster goodness in others at the expense of morality

<sup>1</sup> It may be asked how this agrees with the familiar fact of a soldier dying for his country, or the less familiar but more extreme sacrifices of the great saviours of the world.

The case of the soldier is easily disposed of; he *risks* his physical life but does not voluntarily will his own death for his country: rather, he seeks to destroy his enemy, and his own death is incidental not essential to his purpose. His position only differs in degree of risk from that of every man who seeks to fulfil the most everyday duties of his life.

If we take the case of Christ's death as an illustration of extreme or highest sacrifice, it can be rightly held that the agent deliberately renounced his own life, for He claimed to have His own life in His power, "to lay it down and take it again." And life was here all the more precious, because so completely suffused with higher spiritual purposes; the deliberate surrender of it was thus in no sense suicide, since suicide results from despair or from contempt of personality. The sacrifice of His physical life was, however, really made in the interests of the conservation of personality. The process of physical death was never supposed to involve the whole of His personality. So confident was He of the supremacy of His spirit over all the powers of nature, that He knew it would survive organic nature's last disease and pass through death as triumphantly as any man may pass through and survive an illness. The negation of natural life was never confounded in His eyes with the surrender of entire personality. To annihilate personality completely is to commit spiritual suicide; but this is, in Christ's view, a contradiction in terms, since, like St Paul after Him, He held that spirit has eternal life, and cannot die at all.

cannot possibly further moral goodness at all. Moreover, while they may profess in their act to abandon their whole moral being for others, yet all the while they preserve for themselves what still is left and cannot really be eliminated,—the feeling of self-satisfaction with their own deed. This feeling is often cherished as an ample return for the loss, and is even regarded as the supremely precious thing. But it is obvious that if this feeling is so valuable, they have not given up *all* that they hold dear; and equally clear that if they have abandoned moral worth for the feeling of private self-satisfaction, their act is quite indistinguishable from pure selfishness. It is indeed a fine spiritual irony that converts the attempt at absolute self-abnegation and sacrifice of moral selfhood into a subtle but unmistakable form of selfishness and self-conceit. The humility which would strip itself of its garment of righteousness to clothe the moral nakedness of another becomes itself in turn a self-made moral outcast. The self-humiliation which would empty itself of all its goodness and worth to fill the lives of others sustains itself on the wine of pride which intoxicates the very devil. Thus it is that vaulting moral ambition overleaps itself and falls on the other side.

So far we have been concerned with the nature and implications of self-sacrifice. We have now to consider the grounds of self-sacrifice. What right has an individual to give up part of his good, and how can such an act further the moral end? That there must be some ground seems evident from the fact that we consider certain forms of self-sacrifice justifiable and others unjustifiable.

On the face of it, self-sacrifice seems to contain a moral paradox or a moral anomaly. It clearly means the real loss of a personal good, and in that sense involves a diminution of good somewhere. The moral end demands the attainment of good, and this is inconsistent with the surrender of good. Yet it is in the name of the moral end that the good is relinquished in self-sacrifice. The moral end is positive in substance, and is realised through affirmation of all the content of goodness.



To give up good seems to flout the very principle of moral value, or else to imply that the moral end can subsist both with and without its own content.

There is no illusion in this renunciation of goodness. What is abandoned is not evil; and the negation of evil would not be self-sacrifice in any sense. Nor is the giving up of a good a form of barter, like the "sacrifices" of a merchant to his customers, where, as we all know, the "sacrifices" are carefully planned to increase trade in the long run, and generally involve no loss at all in the meantime. In true self-sacrifice a real good is renounced, a real loss is sustained.

We cannot, again, resolve the act into deferred self-interest; for self-interest will not dictate the diminution of a real good for the individual, nor suggest the giving up of good for no definite personal return. Nor could such a course be morally defended on the grounds of self-interest, for the end which self-interest requires, and can alone justify, is the deliberate acquisition of all possible personal good, and the refusal to surrender any. If any were lost, it could only be by chance, and not deliberately. The self-interested moral agent has no concern with others except in so far as they minister to his good directly or indirectly. His self is not simply the centre but the circumference and end of his moral welfare. He could not even perform an act of self-sacrifice for the sake of the gratification of his self in doing so; for in his case, as in the case of every other type of moralist, form and content are inseparable and must be coherent, while self-sacrifice for self-gratification involves a sheer antagonism and incoherence between content and form; it would make self-sophistication into a conscious principle of conduct.

What is true of one self-interested individual in relation to others, whatever their moral principles, is likewise true of an association or a plurality of self-interested individuals acting together. They could not justify their conduct to themselves if in any way they gave up personal good for one

another. All such renunciation would be involuntary, not deliberate, and would be regarded with regret and disapproval, not with approval. Their existence together would have a value indirectly and contingently, and could only be approved if it enabled each to attain a maximum of good for himself. It could have no organic significance for their separate selves; it could at best be but an indispensable aid to the realisation of self-interest. Only in so far, therefore, as their insulated selves secured by co-existence complete fulfilment of self-love, would co-existence be better than dispersion. Self-sacrifice for the sake of co-existence would be morally a *hysteron proteron*.

What has been said of the incompatibility of self-sacrifice and selfishness holds true whatever be the content primarily emphasised by the self-seeking individual. Whether he regards self-development, or pleasure, or any other aspects of his "self" as his real object and aim, he is unable consistently to treat this as his true good, and at the same time to give it up for, or on behalf of, another or others. To diminish his good is immoral, and if his good is restricted within the walls of his insulated individuality, he is not justified in deliberately renouncing it under any circumstances.

If we start, then, from the conception of the insulated individual, and if such a being is the beginning and end of moral action, self-sacrifice is strictly immoral. Indeed, it is doubtful whether on this view the antithesis of selfishness and self-sacrifice, as an antithesis of bad and good, can have any meaning for morality. We cannot regard anyone as selfish in the bad sense if the assertion of his isolated self in every form is the essence of the moral life. What we have in such a case is a complete reversal of ordinary moral values. In ordinary judgments self-sacrifice is an unquestionable expression of the highest good, and selfishness the root of all evil. On this other view of the individual, selfishness is the source of all moral worth, and self-sacrifice the height of immorality. This, the logical outcome of the position, has



been frankly drawn by Nietzsche, who regards self-sacrifice as the baneful heritage of Christendom and the degradation of humanity, and who endeavours to recast all moral values in the mould of pure self-interest. It is worth considering how much of morality, as ordinarily understood, is left after such a process of transmutation.

I take it to be evident, however, from a candid analysis of actual moral experience, that self-sacrifice is approved, and is not an illusion nor a moral aberration. The question, then, is how is the renunciation of good, deliberately made, to be justified in the light of the absolute supremacy of the moral end? How can a partial loss of good further the realisation of the whole good?

If the conception of the individual as an isolated moral unit fails, as we have seen, to justify self-sacrifice and to give any moral meaning to such an act, there is only one other alternative left from which we can draw any assistance. This is to regard the individual as not morally isolated, but as a member in a moral whole of a higher order of individuation. Such a moral whole is that of the community considered as a collective unity of distinct self-conscious minds, possessing a distinct function and individuality of its own in reference to its component units. No doubt the attempt is sometimes made to justify self-sacrifice solely on religious grounds, and certainly we have in religion a whole higher than the individual unit, and embracing such a unit; and it is likewise true, as we shall see, that self-sacrifice has a significance in the sphere of religion. But a justification of self-sacrifice on religious grounds is not a moral justification of the act. It is either more or less than adequate. It is more than adequate in the sense that religion may be said to be required to give an ultimate ground for moral experience in its entirety, of which self-sacrifice is at most but a part. It is less than adequate in the sense that it cannot induce anyone to perform moral acts of self-sacrifice or to regard self-sacrifice as part of his moral life, who does not require and does not admit assistance from

religion in the fulfilment of his moral duties. There are such individuals, and in principle such an attitude is correct, for moral acts of whatever kind must find their moral justification and validity within the sphere of the moral life itself. This holds true, indeed, even in the case where indirect support may be drawn from religion for morality. If we say that no self-sacrifice is possible apart from religion, we either beg the question or convict of insincerity those who affirm that they do perform such acts without any help from religious ideas.

The moral justification of self-sacrifice must be found, then, in the conception of a collective life of individuals, and the possibility of self-sacrifice can only be explicable if such a collective unity is as real as the individuals who compose it. In point of fact, it will appear that the conception of self-sacrifice and the conception of a common life of individuals involve one another.

The reality of a common life can hardly be said to be any longer matter of dispute in social theory. It covers all that is embraced under such terms as a "common will," a "social mind." It is an operative spiritual unity pervading and animating individual centres of consciousness, organising their specific ends and actions into a definite order of human life. It is a result of combined wills only in the sense that it can be explicitly sought after by each; it is, however, the implicit ground and precondition of the will to combine. It is to the individuals as their real generic nature, which each unit specifically embodies. Relatively to this concrete social mind, each individual is, by himself, an abstraction. The distinction between the two may be best compared to that between a mental world and the focus of attention at any given moment in the life of a given mind. The social life is seen and felt most vividly by individuals in the various institutions which constitute its special expressions, more particularly such institutions as those of family, city life, and state. Here it is evident at every turn that the common life is realised through individuals as much as by them; in many ways, indeed, it is



realised in spite of individuals and their particular wishes, and operates always in forms of which the component units are more or less unconscious.

In such a whole it is evident that any given individual only partially embodies the common life which he shares with others. He cannot be in himself all that the common life is and contains; what each at most can do is to focus in a particular way a whole of human good which is more than any good he individually can realise. He must needs gather it into a special perspective, whose centre is his own individual interest, and whose field is the range of those particular purposes which the whole requires of him and the fulfilment of which is his contribution to the realisation of the whole. Such a perspective constitutes the limitation of his moral point of view. When we get beyond the sphere of social perspective, when we look at the whole of social life as such, we have passed beyond the plane of the individual moral life pure and simple; we then take up the attitude of the dramatist or the historian or the religious mind.

No individual moral agent, therefore, is called upon to bear the whole burden or fulfil the whole task of social well-being. No such burden can be laid on the individual, and no individual is equal to such a burden. A vast range of human social welfare must always remain beyond the reach, as it is beyond the ken, of even the most enlightened moral agent. We cannot do good to everyone in our own community; there are millions with whom we have no acquaintance and with whom we never come in touch at all. The centre of our moral interest is very limited, and the circumference in the case of most people has a very small radius indeed. What we have to fulfil is a restricted range of the common welfare in which all participate; in the successful fulfilment of our particular part consists our individuality as moral beings. We become significant for the whole, and have a worth to the community by doing our part only; and in the doing of this we realise the moral ideal for ourselves. To be com-

pletely united as parts to a complete social whole is the only moral completeness of which we are capable.

With such a conception of the individual's place in the larger whole of social well-being, an act of self-sacrifice acquires a definite meaning, a moral explanation.

In the first place, this view implies that the common welfare is a more enduring, a more universal, and a more complete realisation of human good than any act or good of which the individual is capable. In that sense the common welfare is prior in value to the good of the individual. Not that the welfare of the whole is prior in value to all the individuals taken together; this is impossible in practice and unnecessary in principle. In point of fact, all the individuals who compose a society do not and cannot together perform an act of self-sacrifice for their society. Such a situation would be a contradiction in terms. They together form the society, and the society cannot distributively sacrifice itself for itself collectively. That from which the sacrifice is demanded must be distinguishable from that for which the sacrifice is made. A good is given up for what lies beyond, and is in some sense independent of the agent making the sacrifice. The surrender of good by all for all would be either sheer moral waste or mere deferred self-interest on a great scale. If we eliminate the good of all the individuals, there is no whole of good which is to be furthered, and so no ground for demanding a sacrifice. But there is an enormous difference between saying that the welfare of the whole is prior in value to all the individuals taken together and simultaneously, and that the common welfare is prior in value to that of any particular individual, or a number of individuals taken in succession. The first is manifestly untrue and impossible; the latter is recognised as a fact of everyday social existence. Any given individual's value is derived from and dependent on the society which, by its traditions, customs, laws and institutions, gives substantial content to his particular existence, and which he does not create but finds when he becomes



morally awake and alive. In this sense, then, the individual is subordinate, not simply in strength, but in moral value to the life of the community.

It is this principle that lies at the root of self-sacrifice and furnishes the only moral justification of the act. The sacrifice of self is made for the larger welfare involved in a common life; it is but a specific acknowledgment and a concrete expression for the conscious subordination of an individual to the social whole. It is a particular instance of the general condition on which alone he can remain a member of his community. There are many ways of manifesting this general relationship; self-sacrifice is one way amongst others. In sacrificing himself, the individual proclaims his unity with the society on which his value depends, and proclaims also his willingness to live in and for his society. To attain such a complete unity is the supreme end of his social and therefore of his moral existence; it is the supreme source of all moral obligation whatsoever. Since the *giving* himself to the whole is the only way to achieve his supreme end, the *giving up* of his self for that whole, the surrender of a specific good for the common welfare, is but a case, though doubtless an extreme case, of the same principle, and is grounded in the same fundamental moral end. The surrender of a good doubtless makes it hard, and hence constitutes it an extreme form of expressing the oneness with the whole. For that reason, perhaps, it is generally held to be a high and a rare achievement. But the obligation to make the sacrifice is involved in membership in the community; and the readiness to make it is a test of the sincerity of the conscious connection with the common life. No one can or will perform such an act who does not admit the reality of his life in the community; and everyone who does accept this supreme condition of his moral life must be prepared to perform acts of self-sacrifice.

It may be remarked in passing that because the good surrendered is a real good for the individual, great perplexity is often incurred in determining whether the good should

be sacrificed, and what good should be given up. This is inevitable to the situation. The good of the individual has often to be "weighed" against that of the community, and weighed by the individual who makes the sacrifice, and who finds it peculiarly difficult to achieve the necessary self-detachment. The perplexity is, in consequence, readily accepted as a reason for condoning any mistake in coming to a decision, or for withholding judgment on the decision when made. Again, it is because the individual surrenders a good which he knows to be his own good, that self-sacrifice is often considered in a peculiar way to be meritorious.<sup>1</sup> For it is always in the power of the individual to maintain his own good, without incurring wholesale condemnation; and if, instead of this, he gives it up for the greater life of the community, he thereby proves himself possessed of greater devotion to moral ends, and hence of greater moral worth. For like reasons, an act of self-sacrifice involves, in a special degree, "willingness of mind"; it is voluntarily chosen by the individual rather than imposed on him by others. It is difficult both in principle and in practice to enforce an act of self-sacrifice; for, on the one hand, even if the individual clings to his own good, he is still doing what is good and not evil, and enforcement is concerned rather with an evil than with a good; and, on the other hand, the sacrifice of self rests on an estimate of the worth of the community to the individual, and no one can, as a rule, determine this so well as the individual who, in making the sacrifice, thereby shows what the common life means to himself.

Since the act of self-sacrifice is demanded in the interests of the community, it cannot consist merely in a surrender of individual good; it must likewise bring about a positive furtherance of the common welfare. The only moral justification for any act is that good, on the whole, is attained and advanced. The manner in which this is brought about varies according to circumstances. Sometimes the individual sets

<sup>1</sup> The best individuals no doubt do not concern themselves with the merit of the self-sacrifice.



aside his own good in order the more completely to concentrate his efforts on the common welfare; at other times his good is put in abeyance in order to give place the more readily to action for the common good on the part of others; or, again, what he gives up may itself be handed over as a positive contribution to the welfare of the whole. But in all cases the same principle is involved, the common good which requires the sacrifice must be promoted by the sacrifice if the act is to be justified.

What form of community it is for which the sacrifice is made will vary as much as the manner of the sacrifice. Sometimes it is no wider than the family group; and here, indeed, we often find the most frequent and perhaps the most typical manifestations of the spirit of self-sacrifice. In any case, as long as the family group exists, there will always be found opportunities sufficient for most people to realise their moral value through daily self-sacrifice, even in the minutest details of social experience. We may say, indeed, that it is in and through such acts in the family group that the deeper social consciousness of man has gradually been educated in the course of the moral history of the race. Sacrifices are also made for the clan, the village, and the city; for minor and quasi-artificial social groupings like that of the "club" or the "society," as also for the major and supreme groups of the nation and the state. Some have even regarded humanity as a single group and have made sacrifices for it accordingly. A sacrifice made for "humanity" is unintelligible except on the assumption, right or wrong, that humanity forms a whole or community of human beings. These are perhaps the most daring, as they have been regarded as the greatest, sacrifices of which men are capable.

No doubt, in many cases, the individual who makes the sacrifice has definite individuals in view. But it is always the common life of such individuals, common with one another and with his own, which is the real ground of the act. The act affirms this community of life, arises from it, seeks to

maintain it, and sometimes even to realise it in a deeper way than it seemed to exist before. The individual making the sacrifice may indeed have before his mind specific individuals, for whom, as he may say, he performs the act. But here, as so often in the moral life, we must distinguish the immediate object of attention from the ultimate ground of the act. And from this point of view, it is not the individuals as isolated, but the individuals as comprising a single whole of human life with himself, which forms the source and end and therefore the real motive of the sacrifice.

One individual (or for that matter, a number of separate individuals) cannot demand self-sacrifice as a duty from another. One individual may require another to realise his good; but no individual can require another to renounce his good. This is seen in the familiar fact that one who benefits by the renunciation of another invariably regards the benefit received as an act of grace on the part of the agent, an act which calls forth surprise and gratitude rather than mere approval. Similarly, again, we have the equally familiar fact that the agent often makes the sacrifice regardless of whether any particular individual, benefited thereby, expects it, is grateful for it, or approves of it; the act is done simply for the common life and not for any particular unit. The acts which individuals demand from one another as duties involve reciprocal duties on both sides. As individuals within a community, all seek self-fulfilment, and in that sense are on the same level of moral value. Duties owed are owed mutually; we do something for another and thereby bind him morally to ourselves. This comes out in the ordinary relations of life; for example, that of master and servant. The master claims to control the actions of his servant in certain circumstances; the servant submits and obeys. On what condition? On condition that he is requited for fulfilling the duties, he is "paid" for his obedience: that is to say, the master has bound himself to the servant by reciprocal obligations on his side, and has duties of a different kind to the servant. And so through-



out all the duties of individual to individual in the moral life. But in no case can an individual be required to admit a duty to give up his good for another; only the community as such can demand this. If an individual could demand self-sacrifice from another individual, individuals would have to carry on the moral life literally at each other's cost: boundless self-interest would be the moral basis for endless self-sacrifice: we should ceaselessly recreate by the act of self-sacrifice the same situation which called forth self-sacrifice:—a process which makes morality the pursuit not of a real end but of an *ignis fatuus*.

When self-sacrifice has its source and end in the community as above described, the paradox which it seemed to contain disappears. For the paradox consisted in treating an abandonment of an individual good as a possible contribution to human welfare. The solidarity of the life of the community both justifies the act and ensures that the loss of the individual good means no loss of good on the whole, that the paradox, in short, is merely an appearance, not a reality of the moral life. The loss which is a real loss to the individual is no loss at all to the community; and the gain to the community by the suppression of a particular good in the interests of the common welfare is a gain to a higher and more concrete moral reality than any individual attains.

This comes out in many ways. If a community can survive the complete disappearance of the successive generations of individuals in which it is incarnated, and not only not pass away itself, but by replacement of individuals be renewed and restored in the process, the loss of any individual's good may very readily be demanded as a condition of the positive maintenance of the common welfare, for such loss is certainly a matter of indifference in the long run. Even the services of the best can be dispensed with and leave the equilibrium of the whole undisturbed. A community is like an earthly embodiment of the Divine, and does not specially need any man's gifts: "Thousands, at its bidding, speed and post o'er

land and ocean without rest," and "They also serve who only stand and wait." A whole which is thus unaffected by the total loss of the individual from its midst, cannot be impoverished by the voluntary surrender by an individual of his own partial good. The time-span, the power of self-maintenance, and the self-compensating balance of a society, far transcend the limited range of time, activity, and efficiency of any individual. It is of the essence of the common life of a society to make individuals supplement and complement each other. Failure here is amply compensated in the whole by success elsewhere; weakness in one place is counter-balanced by strength called forth at another centre; diminution in one area is counteracted by an enrichment or increase in another. We have but to recall the familiar fact that the population of a country may be stable or on the increase in spite of the large percentage of individuals having no share in its continuance, to see this truth illustrated in one of its most remarkable forms.

Again, the community can even turn evil to good account, and in a manner, like Providence, return good for evil. This is seen in the process by which the community deals with the facts of wrong-doing and crime. The crime becomes an opportunity for the manifestation of the greater power and moral resources of a society. The wrong is not only righted, but the wrong-doer is forced to recognise the power of the common welfare in his own life, and, after punishment, is returned to a free participation once more in the good of the whole. The process of punishment is indirectly the way by which the common life of the whole is brought home to the consciousness of the wrong-doer. By so doing the community brings a vaster good out of a particular evil, and by restoring the wrong-doer to his place in the community, returns good for evil. A common welfare which can thus be maintained against and through an assault on its very existence, need find no difficulty in accepting a surrender of individual good as a service to its own larger ends.



The furtherance of the common good, then, is the ultimate ground, and final test of the value, of any self-sacrifice. Whether the individual making the sacrifice secures in the long run any personal reward or return, is not of the first importance. Sometimes the individual procures for himself indirectly great gain, sometimes merely renown, sometimes nothing at all by his act. The positive good attained by the act, however, in all cases falls to the larger life of the community, and that is the sole justification required by the sacrifice. And the more pure the act the more is this end really sought. An indirect advantage to himself the agent may promote; for his act affirms and emphasises his unity with his fellows, and this larger good when promoted often returns to the agent with all the added wealth of the community's completer resources. He loses his life to gain the vaster life of the whole. But that is not a necessary consequence, nor directly sought in the sacrifice.<sup>1</sup> And everything depends on the kind of sacrifice made whether such a result will come about. The only test he has to apply is whether in fact or in all probability the larger good of the whole will be promoted, such larger good consisting partly in completer union between the component members of the community whose life the act is intended to promote, partly in enrichment of the substance of human welfare in all its forms. And this test is adequate for all practical cases, though its successful application is largely a matter of experiment and experience. That the test is often mistakenly interpreted or wrongly applied, and that acts of self-sacrifice often lead to a sheer squandering of human goodness—these are familiar facts of the moral life, and are found on a large or a small scale throughout everyday experience. But such failure lies in the nature of the moral life, and does not affect the validity of the principle which the individual seeks to apply. Men and

<sup>1</sup> Hence the objection rightly urged against the egoism of much "self-sacrifice," and against such maxims as "Give and it shall be given unto you," "Seek first the kingdom of heaven and all things will be added unto you." No one who really seeks the kingdom of heaven cares whether he obtains anything in return.

women can only learn by trial and error that there are some things too precious to justify any sacrifice, and no community can rightly demand these from the individual; that sacrifices made at the wrong time and for the wrong people are futile waste of personality; and that sometimes an individual furthers the common welfare more by refusing to make a sacrifice on its behalf—often, indeed, this is the hardest choice to make.

The last question concerning the moral aspect of the subject deserves a brief consideration. What is the value of self-sacrifice in man's moral life? What is its significance and place in his experience? Some people speak of self-sacrifice as if it were the whole of man's morality. That it is not the whole is easily shown. For unless we have some good to give up we cannot sacrifice it for some further end; and if the only good realisable is that which comes by being given up, sacrifice itself would become impossible. There are no crumbs left over at the feast of self-sacrifice; and even gods and angels could not sustain their beneficence by exhausting the stores of their goodness in infinite self-renunciation. Self-sacrifice presupposes attainment and possession of good, and cannot, therefore, be the only source of it.

Others, again, speak of self-sacrifice as if it were the highest form of goodness. This view is also inaccurate. There can be no higher end for man than the realisation of human personality; this is a positive conception pure and simple, and admits of no loss or diminution in the content to be realised. Self-sacrifice does, however, mean a definite loss of good for the individual person making the sacrifice, and in that sense necessarily falls short of being an expression of the highest good. Self-sacrifice, in fact, implies that somewhere there is defect in human life or in human lives; a defect which calls for the sacrifice of good by some individual, and also a defect in the agent who thus diminishes his own total good in making the sacrifice. In a completely perfect state of things there would be no defective human life, and so no call for sacrifice to meet the deficiency. Were we all financially well off and



economically satisfied there would be no need for subscriptions, but only for rates and taxes: and were it not that the moral account of so many of us is so often on the wrong side, we should never require to live on the moral resources of our neighbours: we should then all have the godliness or goodness which is profitable unto all things.

It is just here that the inner significance of self-sacrifice appears in all its peculiar force. It is because there is failure of human good somewhere that self-sacrifice arises in answer to the insistent demand of an ideal that will not be gainsaid even in the face of momentary defeat. The extremity of man's struggle with the actual is the opportunity which calls out the reserve forces of man's faith in the purposes of human life. And why? Because the total failure of man's purposes on earth means the disappearance of the ideals which give worth to his personality and an intelligible claim for recognition in the plan of things; it means, in short, spiritual annihilation. Rather than admit this in all the horror of its consequences, man will throw over even a part of his own good if thereby the barque of spiritual life is saved from absolute shipwreck. The solidarity of men and the abiding value of man's personality are bound up together inseparably; and if in any way the latter is imperilled, the instinct of the higher self-preservation compels one individual to come to the rescue of his fellows with all the resources at his command, and these he gladly puts at their service even at the cost of himself. Self-sacrifice and the unity of man with man are to one another as effect and cause. It is because man is one with his fellows in all that makes manhood real and valuable, that, rather than see human worth defeated, one man will give himself for the good of others. And the more human worth is appreciated the more readily will the sacrifice be made, for the deeper appreciation of human worth necessarily carries with it a deeper sense of the unity of man with man. Self-sacrifice expresses man's deathless confidence in the sovereign worth of human personality, his last stand and supreme effort to save it from

impending disaster; it is the proof that the positive value of the good is so assured that the good can carry its own negation in its heart without fear of final overthrow.

We have dealt exclusively with the problem of self-sacrifice as a feature of moral experience. But no treatment of the subject is complete without some reference to its religious aspect. All moral ideas are recast and revalued in religion; and in none is the process of trans-valuation more remarkable than in the case of self-sacrifice. In religion the human relations of individuals to one another and to the community are looked upon and are realised as manifestations of the perfect life of God, in whose life all is blended and harmoniously united. The conscious sense of this presence of all men in God and of God in all men is one characteristic attitude of the religious life. The result is that a moral attitude when it enters the sphere of religion is taken in its most perfect form and operates at its highest level of significance; there are no qualifications and limitations; the purest expression of a moral principle is regarded in religion as the only expression, and all the limitations which characterise its application in the finite sphere of the moral life are either wiped out or regarded as of no vital importance.

Self-sacrifice lends itself in a peculiar way to this religious attitude. It emphasises, as has been said, the essential unity of man with man in the common life of a social whole. The individual gives up his good to secure the deeper unity. Now, surrender to the life of God and self-absorption in that life are of the essence of religion. The main trend of the principle of self-sacrifice is thus directly in line with the self-surrender found in religion. Hence, in practice, the close connection between a religious life and deeds of moral self-sacrifice; a life surrendered to God makes moral self-sacrifice comparatively easy.<sup>1</sup> Since by self-sacrifice the union between

<sup>1</sup> So close are they in appearance that many have taken them to be identical. But this is mistaken; surrender is passive and is not self-sacrifice. Man cannot sacrifice himself for God. God has no defects, and man cannot



the individual and his fellows is affirmed and deepened, and since in God the union of all men with each other is perfected, self-sacrifice becomes in religion a normal condition through which the perfect union of man with man is expressed. It is not even then the only condition; but it is a direct consequence of the perfect union in which human fellowship is realised in the religious life. Perfect union of man with man is the presupposition from which a religious relationship between men is maintained and carried on. The union is not deferred to the future: it is assumed to be a present actuality, for religion is the realisation in the present of a perfect life. But the consummate human form of intimate ever-present union of man with his fellows is the fellowship of love. From this, as a consciously present state of mind, self-sacrifice derives its place and significance in the religious life; and in this form religion takes up and adapts the principle of self-sacrifice.

Hence it has been rightly held that self-sacrifice in its highest, *i.e.* its religious form, is the outcome of love, and that love inevitably and gladly takes upon itself the burdens of sacrifice. Self-sacrifice is the price of love under the finite conditions of human fulfilment; love is the inspiration and reward of sacrifice. This view is true to experience, and is a logical development of the conception of moral self-sacrifice as we have analysed it. But this new form carries us beyond the sphere of morality proper into that of religion and the drama of humanity; and self-sacrifice becomes

enrich the life of God by any act of goodness even if it consist in the denial of his own goodness. Nor, on the other hand, does man, in sacrificing himself for his fellows, surrender himself to his fellows; for he is active on their behalf. The only sacrifice possible is that which seeks to remove defect of personal good: hence if there is to be self-sacrifice at all in the relation of man to God, it is God who must sacrifice Himself for man, not man who can sacrifice himself for God. And this is the form in which Christianity has interpreted the attitude of God's spirit to humanity. So far, therefore, from man's self-sacrifice for his fellows being equivalent to man's self-surrender to God, man's self-surrender to God calls forth an eternal act of self-sacrifice on God's part as the complement of man's self-surrender.

transformed, indeed, one might say, almost reversed, in the process. Self-sacrifice in this region no longer brings with it the sense of loss; for the love that works through sacrifice is realising itself thereby. Love seeks and expects no other good but love; all else is but dust in the balance; it is vanity and less than vanity. In the love that fulfils itself through sacrifice, sacrifice is welcomed for the love which it makes possible and wakens into being. Love thus turns self-sacrifice into self-completion. The sense of pain and regret, which moral self-sacrifice involves, becomes transmuted into the eagerness of desire for fulfilment. Love draws its life from defects even more than from perfections, for the love that expands to meet the defect expands to increase itself. The love that lives for love and nothing else has no good of its own to give up, and so has none to lose. Its good is the good that blends its being with others in a single whole of spiritual life; and hence the love that "loves itself" really loves this Larger Life in which the individual, with others, lives and moves and has his being. Its purest sacrifice is its highest self-love; its giving is receiving, its loss clear gain.

It is this religious love which has led and still leads to the greatest deeds of devoted abandonment of self in the interest of humanity. Doubtless the negative aspect of sacrifice is there; but it is only to the onlooker that this feature of sacrifice is a reality. To the agent it is mere appearance; there is nothing but self-fulfilment. He regards his act as part of the higher drama of human existence; it is governed by ends which scorn all temporal limitations; it is inspired by the love that, in Dante's noble phrase, "moves the sun in heaven and the other stars," the love that is stronger than death, and links man's life with things eternal, immortal, and invisible.

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# THE UNIVERSITIES AND THE TRAINING OF THE SOCIAL WORKER.

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SOCIAL work is so vague and elastic an expression that its use is only justified by its great convenience. As used in this paper it includes not only the many forms of philanthropy, but all kinds of State and municipal effort directed towards the improvement of social conditions. Every student of recent domestic politics knows that there has been, during the last few years, a succession of measures aimed not only at providing alleviations for the distress caused by poverty and disease, but at reaching at least part of the causes of these. This legislative activity has, to some extent, altered the channel of the stream of voluntary benevolence, but it has not, in spite of the prophecies of the pessimistic, so far stopped its flow. A close alliance between State effort and voluntary effort is recommended with regard to a large number of matters by both the majority and minority reports of the recent Poor Law Commission, and such an alliance is being realised in many of the latest forms of organisation, such as the Civic Guild of Help, the Advisory Committees of Labour Exchanges, and, latest of all, in the enforced co-operation between Insurance Committees and Friendly Societies under the Insurance Act.

All these various forms of activity, whether State or voluntary, or a combination of both, demand workers in large

numbers. The Poor Law, the Public Health Department, State Insurance, Labour Exchanges, Juvenile Employment Bureaux, Care Committees, Probation of Offenders—all these throw a wide field open to men and women as paid officials as well as honorary workers and members of committees.

Those controlling voluntary organisations, too, are waking up to the necessity for workers, both paid and voluntary, of a type competent to shape the activities of their societies into forms adapted to modern conditions and requirements. Such workers include secretaries of charity organisation societies, guilds of help, and philanthropic societies of all kinds, club managers, welfare managers for factories, and hospital almoners. Since the great majority of these openings are of recent growth, one may say that a new career or profession for men and women has been created—one which may perhaps best be compared to the practice of medicine. The analogy holds in several ways. The social worker tries to do for the disease of the body politic what the physician does for physical disease—to diagnose it, to cure it if possible, at least to alleviate the sufferings it causes. In both professions, the care of the individual case is the immediate object, but the reaction of the individual case on the public health or welfare has also to be considered. In both, there must be those who search for causes and try experiments as well as those general practitioners who are absorbed in case work upon prescribed lines.

But the physician has long years of training for his work, while the social worker, even now, too often approaches his without any special preparation. He picks up by experience a circumscribed knowledge of the particular problems with which his work is concerned, and acquires from his superiors certain rule of thumb methods. But he has no general knowledge of the complicated ills of society nor of the theories underlying the various efforts to cure these, nor any conception of the relation which his particular task bears to the whole.

The writer remembers the early attempts to introduce a



higher standard into social work. The London Charity Organisation Society and the Women's University Settlement started a scheme of training which afterwards developed into the School of Sociology. This has recently been amalgamated with the London School of Economics. The scheme at its earliest stage consisted chiefly of steady, practical work in connection with settlements or the Charity Organisation Society, supplemented by lectures by experts, such as Dr Loch, Mrs Bernard Bosanquet, and Miss Lonsdale. The lectures aimed at being little more than sign-posts, guiding the path of our approach to the new interests and problems around us. The real training was to be found outside the lecture-room, in the practical work, and still more in the privilege of living in an unexplored region, in a world of labour where the conventionalities of middle-class society were dispensed with, and where new points of view could be acquired.

It may be doubted whether most of the students of our schools of social science to-day come to their study with quite the thrill of excitement and joy of discovery felt by the students of this earlier stage. The edge of their appetite is too often dulled by the innumerable conferences and discussions, circles and handbooks, which have given them a premature and superficial familiarity with the more sensational aspects of social problems.

The earlier students, too, had the privilege of working under men and women who combined in a remarkable degree personal devotion and long experience with a clear perception of the aims of social progress. The names of Octavia Hill, H. V. Toynbee, and Margaret Sewell spring to one's mind.

Once the need of training had made itself felt, it was natural to look to the Universities for help in providing it. In some of the large provincial cities the local University already provides for the teaching of the doctor, lawyer, engineer, architect, even the dentist, farmer, and dyer: why not also of the social worker? Need was felt also for a centre

where members of the general public, interested in social questions, could study such questions under impartial, non-political, scientific auspices. The University, with its Chairs of Economics, History, and Philosophy as a background, could easily provide such a place of training and such a centre of study. In 1905 a school of social science was started in Liverpool, at the instance of a group of people connected with the University, the Victoria Settlement, the Central Relief and Charity Organisation Society. It was controlled by a representative committee, but had its headquarters at the University. Later the connection was made closer by the appointment of the lecturer in charge of the school on the staff of the University. A short time after, Birmingham established a course of social study, and similar courses have since been started in connection with the Universities of Bristol, Leeds, Glasgow, and other towns. The schools differ in name and, to some considerable extent, in their methods; but in the main their aims are the same.

First: they train workers for voluntary or salaried social work, and grant a diploma to those candidates who reach a certain degree of proficiency.

Secondly: they provide instruction in social questions for those who, in the course of their profession, or as voluntary workers for charities, or merely as interested citizens, come into contact with the problems of poverty.

Thirdly: they act as centres for investigation into social conditions in towns where this need is not otherwise provided for.

It is not the object of the present paper to discuss the relative importance of these different aims. It need only be said that, in the opinion of the writer, the training of the professional "social worker" is not necessarily the most important function of the school of social science, though there appears to be a tendency to consider it so. For one person able to take up some form of social work as a career and to prepare for it as such, there are hundreds who are brought into contact with the problems of poverty and have the



opportunity of influencing industrial conditions through the ordinary work of their professions, as employers of labour or as public-spirited citizens. In these days of facile sentiment and hastily-formed cocksure opinions, and of extensive experiments in social amelioration, it would be difficult to exaggerate the importance of spreading sound, reliable information and habits of careful thinking among such important sections of the general public.

Schools for social study being still in the experimental stage, it is probably fortunate that there is a good deal of variety in their methods. Before discussing the relative merits of the different plans that are being tried, it may make their scope clearer to the general reader if we describe one of them—the oldest outside London and that which is most familiar to the writer—in some detail.

At the Liverpool School of Social Science the course provided for diploma students is planned to occupy their full time for either one or two years. Graduate students, or those who are already experienced in some form of social work, can take it in one year; the former class giving the greater part of the time to practical experience, and the latter to study of theory. Those students who have had neither academic training nor practical experience are urged, if possible, to spread the course over two years, and to supplement the school's teaching by attending certain of the ordinary University courses in economics, industrial history, moral and political philosophy. By these alternatives an attempt is made to suit the needs of the very various types of students who present themselves.

Those who have already taken the ordinary diploma can proceed to a higher diploma at the end of a further year, spent in a special piece of investigation, or of responsible administrative work done under supervision and embodied in a thesis.

The ordinary diploma course consists of lectures, classes, essay-writing, tutorial teaching, visits to institutions, and practical work.

The lectures occupy two to four hours a week, and are arranged so as to interfere as little as possible with the fullest opportunities for wide and varied practical experience. They include courses in such subjects as social economics, industrial history, social psychology, ethics, treatment of poverty, local administration, problems of industry, etc. The lectures on administration are supplemented by classes taken by experts and by organised visits to institutions.

A great deal of importance is attached to practical administrative work, which is done under the direction of expert workers and discussed with the tutors of the school. This includes Charity Organisation, Juvenile Employment at the Labour Exchange, Women's Industrial Council, Factory Welfare Work, Clubs, School Management and Care Committees, and the Workers' Education Association. If possible, the student, unless already familiar with life in a poor district, should live at a settlement. The natural mixing of classes without effort or affectation of equality, which is the *raison d'être* of the settlement, is an invaluable part of the training.

In view of the wide scope of social service, and the varying ages and attainments of the students, individual tutorial teaching is specially necessary for them. Papers are required from them throughout the year, bearing both on the lectures and practical experience.

Those engaged in the various forms of social work in the city are admitted to single courses of lectures, and, from time to time, lectures on subjects of special current interest to the responsible worker are arranged.

In addition to the regular courses of the school, arrangements have been made to meet the needs of certain types of workers for whom separate provision has proved to be advisable. These include the students of a Theological College, Poor Law officials working for the examinations of the Poor Law Examinations Board, district nurses, domestic science teachers, sanitary inspectors, and health visitors. In these days of rapid development in social reform it is of the utmost



importance that such workers who have natural access to the home-life of the people in the course of their professions should know something of recent legislation affecting the welfare of the home and family life and the conditions of industry.

Arrangements are at present in progress to add to these an evening course, including economic theory and history of industry as well as problems of administration, suitable for men and women engaged in the work of the various Local Government departments and Labour Exchanges.

In organising a new department of teaching, problems of administration, method, and even of aim, naturally arise, which each school meets in its own way.

One of these problems is how best to adjust the teaching given to students who vary so greatly in age, education, and experience as do those who present themselves to schools of social science. It is hard to cater simultaneously for the Cambridge graduate of twenty-two, with a good knowledge of economics, but none of life, for the experienced Charity Organisation Society worker of forty, and for the ambitious young man or woman without special attainments either in theory or practice, and to supply their deficiencies in the course of the single year of study, which is all that most of them can afford to give. It is, of course, a great saving of expense and trouble if the ordinary undergraduate courses of the University in economics, ethics, etc., can be made to serve for the diploma course of the school, and it has the further advantage that it secures that the teaching shall be of University standard, and thus removes the doubt that has led some Universities to hang back from the task of providing for the training of the social worker. But, in the writer's opinion, this economy of machinery is in the long run a mistake. Lectures provided for undergraduates are, as a rule, too diffuse and ample in their treatment and not sufficiently brought into relation with practical problems for this purpose; also they are, or ought to be found, too elementary in some respects for the mature students of the school of social science. These students ought

to be, and in a rapidly increasing percentage of cases actually are, of post-graduate standing. The majority of them are either graduates or have supplemented a good secondary education by several years of such general reading on social problems and experience of social work as forms a not despicable mental substitute for academic study.

It is true that there are still a considerable number of students in our schools who are less intellectually developed. But it seems shortsighted to encourage this class of student to think that they can find, in a single year's course of social study, a substitute at once for the mental discipline of an ordinary University course, and a "bread study" leading on directly to a profession. Their needs can be met without thus sacrificing the better prepared and more desirable type of student, in one of two ways.

Either they can be required to spread the course over a longer period and to supplement it by attending certain of the ordinary undergraduate lectures; or they must forgo the hope of taking the full diploma of the school, and be dealt with by the provision of teaching arranged to meet their needs, such as have been already described.

The diploma course should, we believe, consist of specially provided lectures and teaching, more concentrated and more "applied" than that given to undergraduates; and the staff of lecturers and tutors should include both members of the University staff and persons with wide experience in social administration, and with a thorough knowledge of its requirements. Only thus can the practical work done by the students be brought into close relation with their theoretic training and the danger avoided that the student will acquire either too doctrinaire or too narrowly utilitarian a point of view.

The place which the practical work should fill in the scheme of training is another question upon which there is room for some difference of opinion.

There appears to be a tendency to regard practical work



as the technical side of the course, somewhat grudgingly permitted in an academic scheme, in order to give the trainee the necessary experience in office work, case papers, indexing, registration, etc. This view is, in the writer's opinion, an entirely wrong one, which at the present time needs to be combated. The shifting of the centre of training from the Settlement or Charity Organisation Society to the University, which has been described above, undoubtedly has its dangers. The situation to-day has been reversed. Whereas the student of ten or fifteen years ago was absorbed in the deep interests of personal experience, the student of to-day tends to rely on information gained from blue books or handbooks, and to neglect opportunities for first-hand knowledge and understanding.

It was said of Edward Denison's short and almost prophetic contribution to the thought of the 'seventies, that the "chief value of his letters lay in the fact that they were written not by a closet philanthropist or a dilettante doctrinaire, but by a man who had engaged in the most practical solutions by work." With wisdom drawn from actual experience, he gives expression to views far in advance of his time on such problems as the administration of the Poor Law, vagrancy, and—that which concerns some of us deeply to-day—the relation of the Church to poverty.

There can be no hard and fast line drawn between the theoretical and practical teaching of Social Science. Each is indispensable to the other. Those who have read or listened to those who have theories without a living background of experience will recall the words of St Paul: "Though I speak with the tongues of men and angels, and have not charity, I am become as sounding brass or a tinkling cymbal."

A man or woman learns the underlying principles on which his or her work must be built from experience in real life. He sees the unexpected as well as the expected results of legislation. Above all, he acquires a new insight and a right proportion and point of view. His practical work will illus-

trate and illumine his theoretical study. If anything must go, let it be lectures and books, not the opportunities of gaining experience and taking a personal share for a time in constructive schemes for social reform. While thus, almost unconsciously, absorbing social theory, the student has an opportunity of learning sound habits of work—method, composure, absence of fuss or effort, and skill and wisdom in handling difficulties.

The nature of the practical training given must, of course, depend partly on the local facilities possessed by each school. Those responsible for arranging the work of the students have to consider not only what experience they would wish to give them, but which of the institutions of the town are sufficiently sound in their methods to afford a good object lesson, and which are willing not merely to accept students for the sake of the work that can be got out of them, but to take some trouble in arranging to teach them as much as possible.

The needs of the individual student must also be considered, but not in the narrow sense of making his training too exclusively a preparation for his future profession.

Variety of experience is essential. One would not, for example, call a student properly trained if his practical work had been confined entirely to relief work and the problems of destitution, and he had seen nothing of such constructive modern movements as Friendly Societies, the Co-operative Stores, and the Workers' Educational Association.

The Universities are waking up, though slowly, to their responsibilities for the training of the social worker. But the future development and success of the movement does not lie wholly with them. There are certain needs upon which all concerned would agree, which can only be supplied from outside.

First: there is the need for a more general recognition of the necessity for training on the part of those who can influence potential students. For instance, more might surely be done by college tutors to impress upon future employers of labour,



ministers of religion, civil servants, etc., the desirability of using the new machinery as a means of acquiring some first-hand knowledge of the problems of labour and poverty before entering upon positions of influence and responsibility. Again, public departments, and those who are on the committees of societies and institutions for any branch of social welfare, should make it known that, in making appointments, they will give weight to the possession of a diploma of a University school of social science. If this were once understood, it would do much to raise the standard of social work in the country.

Secondly: scholarships are needed to enable men and women without private means to give the necessary time to such training. Many of the best type of University graduates, who keenly desire to do social work, now shrink from asking their parents to incur fresh expenses just when they are freed from their college course, and thus find themselves obliged to take the first post that offers. Public attention has been widely directed to the importance of constructive and carefully thought-out schemes of social reform, but little has as yet been done to enable the ablest of our men and women to devote themselves to the work of administration, and to undergo special preparation for it as they would do if they contemplated entering any of the older skilled professions.

Thirdly: funds are needed for endowments to establish schools for social science on a sound basis, and provide the special teaching and equipment required to make them fulfil their end, not only as a training ground for the professional worker, but as centres of social study for the general public.

There are other, perhaps shorter, ways of qualifying for different branches of social work than by obtaining a University diploma, but those who aspire to become something better than routine workers must have a grasp of the problem as a whole. The complaints of officialism, red tape, failure to realise and appreciate the efforts of others, and want of readiness to co-operate, are usually levelled against those who have

not had any opportunity of acquiring a wide and generous outlook. Speaking, too, from a purely utilitarian point of view, it is a great advantage to have training on broad lines, as the candidate who has had too specialised a training in any particular department has not nearly so wide a choice of appointments in the field of social effort.

Such schools of training are still in the experimental stages. It is not easy to know how we can best secure in our future responsible workers the well-balanced attitude of mind that will not be swayed by passing phases of thought, but will attack each fresh problem with intelligent and sympathetic criticism and an unprejudiced readiness to "prove all things and hold fast that which is good." The short and concentrated training should show the direction for future advance. It should suggest lines for further study and where to go for knowledge so that the worker will not be daunted by the problems of a different locality. During the brief period of training, the student should evolve principles of a sort which cannot be shaken by the changes of time and circumstance.

Above all, he should have cast off all prejudices and go forward to his future work interested in the whole science of social well-being and recognising its many sidedness. He should have formed some definite programme of social progress, so that he may not be driven hither and thither by passing impressions; but his programme will be on large lines, not cumbered by detail nor clinging blindly to any particular shibboleths.

The keynote of our training should be to inspire the desire to go on learning and the importance of an open mind and of ready adaptability to change. The rest will always lie in the personality of the worker.

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LIVERPOOL.



## THE ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF AUTHORITY IN RELIGION.<sup>1</sup>

MISS M. D. PETRE.

I SHOULD like to say, before entering on my subject, that I shall speak throughout from the point of view that is familiar to me; that is to say, I shall speak of authority as I know or have known it in the Catholic Church, and I shall consider its advantages and drawbacks in that Church, and not directly in any other. This is not for the sake of avoiding the general subject of authority, but because I believe that I shall examine it more, and not less, satisfactorily by examining it from a definite standpoint. Furthermore, it is, I think, in the Catholic Church that we have experienced, not only the worst, but also the best, of which authority is capable. We have suffered from its excesses, but we have also gained from its rightful exercise, and perhaps I may add that some of those who have been the greatest sufferers have also been the greatest gainers.

There has been much controversy and discussion as to the true definition of "modernism"; a discussion which has often seemed to me somewhat vain, and, indeed, in the nature of a concession which should not have been made to those whose aim it was to simplify what was complex, and to attach a single label to minds of the most varied character and tendency. The "modernism" that includes all those aimed

<sup>1</sup> This paper was delivered in French at the International Congress of Religious Progress, held in Paris, July 16th to July 22nd, 1913.

at in the *Pascendi* has no collective *Credo* and no collective *Programme*. There are, amongst its ranks, at one end devout and convinced Catholics, as there are, at the other end, free-thinkers with scarcely a belief in any God but Humanity; there are men to whom religion is all, and men to whom it is little else than a means to social welfare; and between these two extremes there are many intermediate shades.

If not a conscious strategy it was certainly, in its practical results, a successful manœuvre, which thus forced into one category the religious and the non-religious; it was a manœuvre likely, alas! to be as fatal to the general religious spirit of the Church as it was convenient to the official temper of those from whom it originated. For what, after all, can be worse for the cause of religion than to ignore or despise the distinction between the religious and the non-religious? and what can be, at last, more fatal to the Church, which properly exists in the interests of religion alone, than to thus underestimate her own true cause?

Yet the manœuvre did, as I say, succeed; and its result was a quantity of apologetic literature which, in spite of much that was deeply and permanently valuable, was often weakened by an attempt to give a definition of what was undefinable.

Then followed the various plans of action put forward by this heterogeneous company—the *programmi minimi*—the rough outlines of new churches or associations, all of which failed, more or less, in their aim because the least programme, emitted by one group, always contained something distasteful to another. There were men alive to social problems and dead to historical or scientific ones; there were philosophers with no sense for Biblical criticism, and critics uninterested in psychology or mysticism. Perhaps, in some ways, the least learned were, in this matter, the wisest, for, having no department of their own, they made place for the knowledge of others without preference or exclusiveness.

I speak as one unlearned, whose only science has con-



sisted in accepting the science of others, when I say that I think, in spite of our differences, we might have been of more help to one another had we sought a principle of union which did not consist in any collective statement of beliefs or needs, which rejected any attempt of authority to label us with such, and which found precisely in the problem of authority itself the point of common interest. That point of common interest need not necessarily have been a point of complete agreement—some would have conceded more and some less to the claims of authority,—but in this matter we had, at any rate, like sufferings and like needs; the same problem, if not in all respects the same solution.

We are sometimes told, as a warning against over-belief in any human effort or achievement, as an argument for submission to authority, as a warning against taking our own efforts too seriously, that philosophies come and philosophies go; others have sprung up and perished, and ours, too, will have its day and cease to be.

Now it is obviously the destiny of knowledge to be ever superseded, and the science of our age will be, in many respects, childishness to the science of some hundreds of years hence. Yet this most general and obvious admission should be accompanied by two further observations. First of all, if our philosophy is to be transcended, it will only be *after* it has been accepted—it will pass because it is *dépassée*—and it cannot be *dépassée* until it has its full say. Hence opposition only serves to lengthen its existence; everything must mature before it can perish. Secondly, and this is the chief point I would note, there is one leading principle of our modern philosophy which will not perish, simply because it is itself the discovery of the principle of imperishability—the discovery, that is to say, of the law of eternal movement. We shall live on just because we know we have in part to die; because our philosophy is the philosophy of life and action and movement, and not of a fixed and immovable truth; because we have found that the law of life is also the

law of death. This characteristic principle of modern religious philosophy may eventually become a truism, but it can never become a dead formula.

Some say that modernism is dead. I am quite willing to admit it if the term be used to denote that merely apparent cohesion of unlike aims and ideas of which I have spoken. I am willing also to admit that, for the moment, the counter-movement is triumphant in the Catholic Church; that many who hoped have ceased to hope; that many who adhered, through much tribulation, have ceased to adhere, and abandoned what seemed to them a false and futile position. And I have the deepest reverence and respect for many who have chosen this alternative.

But it is a far cry from this admission to the pessimistic conclusion that the movement is dead so far as the Catholic Church is concerned. Such a conclusion could only be logically acceptable to one who believed that this huge, wide-spreading institution was doomed, root, trunk, and branch, to complete and proximate extinction—and there are not many who would be prepared to maintain as much as this. If Catholicism continues at all, it can no more permanently exclude modern thought from its schools than it can exclude the surrounding air from its buildings. The Church has rejected a golden opportunity of saving humanity and fulfilling her task in its regard; but she cannot reject humanity itself—and *if she lives*, modern thought must finally get the best of all opposition. Hence it is, to my mind, a possible and logical question whether the Catholic Church itself will live (a question I myself answer with a positive affirmative); it is not, to my mind, a possible or logical question whether, if the Catholic Church continues to live, the modernist movement can wholly perish. It can no more perish than the air which we breathe.

I would say, then, that programmes of modernism, churches of modernism, catechisms of modernism, are always inadequate and frequently useless; we cannot enclose the surrounding



atmosphere in any kind of system, or form ourselves into associations to breathe it. But if we cannot form companies for the distribution of air, we can join together for the preservation of windows and doors and air-holes against those who would close them; and I venture humbly to say that union on these lines would have been, in the first place, *practicable*; in the second place, *useful*: we *all* wanted the right adjustment of the claims of liberty and authority, while on many other points some of us wanted one thing and some another.

This, then, appears to me the crucial question for those who love both religion and truth, and who also believe that religion must be incorporated in some institution. No institution can exist without a principle of authority; and though there are many, in our day, who think that the principles of democracy contain a satisfactory solution of the problem of authority, that the existing evils will disappear just in proportion as the will of the people takes the place of the will of king or class, there are others, of all shades of political opinion, who believe that authority contains its own problem, irrespective of the source whence it emanates, or the tribunal on which it is enthroned.

Nor will this problem ever be disposed of unless we consider authority not only in its ordinary or its most objectionable forms, but also in its highest manifestations; only by acknowledging the best can we hope to cure the worst.

Now it is a not uncommon illusion on the part of those who raise the flag of lawful liberty to fancy that it is the force of prescriptive authority which opposes them, and the holders of authority alone with whom they have to count. This is true, but only partly true. The path of freedom is blocked and impeded much more by those who wish to obey than by those who desire to command. There is no greater mistake than to suppose that the mass of mankind sincerely crave for liberty. They crave for comfort and convenience—they want to do as they please; but, *in the majority of cases*, they get more comfort and convenience and they do more readily what

they please when they live in subjection than when they have the disposal of their own lives.

But this is not the only form of obedience that resists the efforts of the apostles of liberty. Here, again, we must study our subject in its highest, as in its mediocre forms. There is an obedience inspired by genuine love of the ideal; by the desire for self-donation in a cause higher than that of individual self-interest. Nowhere has this ideal been more nobly presented than in the *Servitude et Grandeur Militaires* of Alfred de Vigny—where, in the life of the soldier, we see examples of the highest self-abandonment along with the resulting tragedies in cases wherein this generosity of obedience is abused.

Now I maintain that no criticism of authority will be solid and useful that fails to take count of this tendency to obey—this twofold tendency—one springing from the natural sloth and dependence of many characters; the other from an ideal of self-sacrifice and self-devotion. Authority, in its manifold forms, can correspond to both these needs, as it can also disregard every legitimate need in the unworthy search for its own aggrandisement.

Now we are most of us agreed as to the futility of the efforts that have been made to correct these excesses of authority by opposition to authority itself. Might it not be possible to set about our work in another way and to demonstrate the right limits of authority by teaching the right methods of obedience? If men could learn to obey, *and to obey whole-heartedly, thus far, but no farther*, would not authority be, *ipso facto*, forced into its proper dimensions?

Usually the remedy is sought simply by inciting the subject to rebellion—a rebellion which may, indeed, be quite legitimate. But though we can, on these lines, rectify certain individual injustices, we shall obtain no general reform without employing positive as well as negative methods. To tell men to rebel in certain cases, is to tell them not to obey; a profounder method of treatment is to teach them such a manner



of obedience as will, in its own nature, find its own limits. Thus we shall obey, or cease to obey, on the same principle of right conduct; while those whose temperament and conscience do not fit them to assume an independent course of action will not be cast adrift on seas which they cannot navigate.

In questions of authority, as, indeed, in most questions, we shall find minimising tactics of little real service. The problem is not whether we are to obey a little more or a little less; it regards the very nature of obedience itself. Since, then, it is authority in its relation to religion with which we are here occupied, I will take as a text and example one of the most complete and extreme presentments of the doctrine of religious obedience that has ever been put forward, namely the "Letter on Obedience," addressed by St Ignatius Loyola to the Society of Jesus in Portugal. In this document, just because it contains the doctrine of religious authority pure and undiluted, we shall be able to judge the question on its own true merits. It matters not, in this place, whether this document has been used more in the cause of absolutism or in that of liberty; what we want to extract from it is the highest interpretation of which it is capable, and, according to this interpretation, to judge where obedience should begin and where it should end; what we can gain by its noblest and most spiritual exercise, and what we can lose by a rigorous and mechanical application of its principles.

In this Letter there are three leading themes: first, that of the derivation of religious obedience; secondly, that of its degrees; thirdly, that of its end and object. As to the first, we are told how authority is derived, by a chain of delegates, from God to the superior; but the subject is exhorted to ignore the intervening links, and see only the first ring of the chain, namely, God Himself.

*I greatly desire, dear Brethren, that all those who serve God in this Society should be . . . distinguished by this mark, that they regard not the individual whom they obey, but in him Christ*

*our Lord, for Whose sake they obey. For the Superior is not to be obeyed because he is prudent, or virtuous, or adorned with any other divine gift whatsoever; but for this only that he is the vicegerent of God, etc.*

As to the second theme, there are, we are told, three degrees of obedience: that of merely external action, that of the will, and that of the intelligence; and no obedience is perfect which does not comprise the three grades. It belongs, in fact, to the dignity of man to perform no action save as a spiritual being; and external without internal submission is represented as an unworthy compromise, a disharmony and division of soul and body.

As to the third theme, we are shown that the object and end of religious authority, and, consequently, of religious obedience, is first of all the union of members one with another, and secondly the union of each one with God—brotherly love and divine love, consecration to humanity and consecration to God. The superior, individually, is nothing; be he wise or be he foolish, he can serve the end proposed. There is a certain proud independence in the very indifference that the subject is exhorted to manifest in regard to the personal attributes of his superior, whom he is to regard as a means and not an end.

Let us see what conclusions can be drawn from this three-fold exposition.

First of all, we see how emphatic is the distinction here suggested between religious and military obedience; the former being at once more complete and less rigorous; more exacting in its demands, and yet also more suggestive of its own limitations. The soldier is asked to pay outward respect, and may think what he chooses; religious obedience demands a tribute of the entire man, soul and body. But, if so, is it not equally evident that when the reason, a self-governing faculty, can go no further, the law must cease to bind (as, indeed, we find it said in the very document we are considering, when it speaks of the lawful resistance of conscience); and that when



the will ceases to find in the commands of a superior that alone which it has sought by the adoption of religious obedience, namely, the means of self-donation to greater than private ends, it also reaches the term of its obligation and must direct itself anew? So that it is precisely in the spirituality and entireness of obedience that we find the check of any possible extravagance.

Take, again, that point on which so much stress is laid of the personal unimportance of the superior, who may be recognised as a fool even while we obey him and inwardly justify his commands. Here, again, we have not only a suggestion of law but also a suggestion of liberty; the superior is a means, and not an end; let him serve that end, and we follow him, whatever his personal characteristics may be; let him attempt to divert us from that end, and we leave him for the same reason that we followed him. He stands in the place of God only in so far as he claims no place for himself; let him attempt to claim divine honours in his own right, and he is, *ipso facto*, a dethroned king.

Take, lastly, the end and object of religious obedience as set forth in that document, and we find again its profound difference from the military conception and also, more than ever, the true philosophy of its nature and limitations.

Its object is to unite us one with another, and to unite us all, individually and collectively, with the Divine Will. Hence its aim is the destruction of self-seeking and self-interest, and the absorption of our narrower life into a wider and more universal one. In so far, then, as we follow this aim purely and disinterestedly we shall know when authority is fulfilling its duty in our regard, and when, on the contrary, it is guiding us to a false issue. That it should demand the sacrifice of our private interest is of the very reason for its existence; that it should demand the sacrifice of our universal interests is to contradict every motive for obedience.

And how are we to be sure on this point? How are we to

know when it is not mere selfish instinct, but conscience, which bids us rebel?

Here we come to the point when the theory is clear and certain, while its application must depend on the lights of each one and the circumstances of each case. Every man must ask himself what aim he is seeking in his choice between the alternatives of rebellion or submission; and I will dare to say that he who, through the self-sacrifice of legitimate obedience, has most completely freed himself from the intrusion of petty and selfish motives, will be the best able to choose his path without fear of self-delusion. When we have lived for a common end, and have learned to forget ourselves in its prosecution, we shall not fear that we are following secret caprice in our departure from the beaten road.

Hence I will say a word in defence of some, though not all, of those who have appeared to render unworthy submission to unjust acts of authority. They may not be as cowardly as some have lightly judged them to be. It may be that they are still seeking the greater good, though at the expense of their private dignity; and, provided there be no sacrifice of principle, this may be, for them, the higher course. This is not said to justify those whose acts of submission have been inspired by motives of worldly advantage.

What, then, in a few words, are the advantages and disadvantages of authority in religion? and what is the best way to enable those, who consider some form of religious authority necessary, to avail themselves of its use, and check its abuse?

Its main advantages are that it guides those who cannot guide themselves; that it stands for the principle of mutual love and union; that it directs minds, hearts, and wills out of the domain of narrow selfish existence into the exercise of a wider and more spiritual life, by the subjection of the private to the Divine and universal will.

Its disadvantages are that, being centred in limited beings, it can wander from its true course; can sacrifice individuals, not to a greater end, but to its own selfish ends; and that it



can thus become a means of spiritual hindrance and oppression, and the seat of worldliness, falsehood, and expediency.

I have ventured to suggest that if, as I have supposed, some form of authority is necessary in every kind of institution, and if authority tends naturally to excess, and can never be expected to cure its own vices, while, on the other hand, the attempt to cure its sins by criticism of those who commit them is more or less doomed to failure, the more profitable course is to insist on the true nature and limits of obedience; to teach men in what genuine spiritual citizenship consists—its duties and its rights—its self-donation and its liberty. Remember that we can do nothing to check the superiors until we have the subjects on our side; and that we shall not have the best of these on our side unless we recognise the advantages as well as the disadvantages of the authority to which they submit themselves. Let them learn to obey for a noble end, and not for mere sloth and convenience, and they will learn also to resist when conscience demands it.

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## THE SCOTTISH CHURCH QUESTION.

SHERIFF R. L. ORR, K.C.

THE face of Scotland is changing. Unless the omens greatly err, posterity will put its finger on the present-day conferences of the two great Presbyterian Churches as the most important events now happening in Scotland in guiding and shaping the deepest of those changes. The conferences have, in fact, brought matters to a point of extraordinary interest. If it be true, as the ecclesiastical historian tells us, that at the Reformation the questions of the nature of the Christian Church as a spiritual society and of the relation which should subsist between Church and State were more carefully investigated and more successfully solved in Scotland than elsewhere, it cannot be without interest to know that we are apparently to witness in our day a further development there in the relations of Church and State—one which claims to make no break with the past, but so to readjust those relations as to approach more nearly the ideal which has never been absent from the minds of Scottish churchmen, and at the same time do something like justice to the broadly democratic views of the modern world.

That the present hopeful position has been reached is largely due to the new attitude taken by the Church of Scotland. How far she has travelled we have been reminded by the recently published *Life of Dr Charteris*. In the 'seventies and 'eighties of last century Dr Charteris was the warmest friend of Church union in the Church of Scotland. In 1874 he made an appeal for reunion in a lecture in



which he showed to his own satisfaction "that the relation of the government and the legislature of this country to the Established Church is singularly satisfactory," and pointed "to the obligation on all sound Scottish Presbyterians to view with a friendly eye the opportunity of reunion on the basis of the old National Church of Scotland." This ground has now been definitely abandoned. The proposals which the Church has now put forward form what Dr Charteris' biographer describes as "an entirely new departure." She accepted at the outset the suggestion of the United Free Church for "unrestricted conferences" on the causes which keep the Churches apart, and the Memorandum which she has subsequently tabled is marked by a statesmanlike breadth of view which has made it at least an acceptable and hopeful basis for discussion.

The times are propitious for such an attempt. There is a deep longing in the ranks of both Churches for action which will unite the divided stream of Scottish Presbyterianism. The Christian good of Scotland and the needs of the non-Christian world are felt to demand the most economical use of men and means. Lapse of time and the disappearance of bitterness bred by past controversies have made it easier for each Church to respect the convictions and traditions of the other. There has therefore been no attempt to rake up the ashes of the past and say who was right and who was wrong. Both are aware that mutual concessions must be made if common ground is to be reached, and each finds it easier to meet the other because mutual trust has grown since the conferences began, and each side believes that the supreme motive of the other is not party or sectarian advantage, but the advancement of the religious interests of their common country. The result is that the work has been carried on by the two committees in what may be described as a new atmosphere, and with a growing confidence that real progress is being made towards a reconstruction of the Presbyterian Church of Scotland.

The characteristic feature of that Church throughout her whole history has been the high claim she has made to autonomy in spiritual matters, or, as she is wont to express it, "freedom of the Church as subject in the exercise of her spiritual functions to the Lord Jesus Christ alone, and to His Word as the only rule of faith and practice." It is this claim which at different periods in her stormy history has brought about conflicts and collisions with the civil power, and which rent the Church herself asunder in the middle of last century. To this matter, therefore, as a main cause of separation between the negotiating Churches, the committees have devoted long and careful attention, and the results at which they have arrived are of an importance which it is impossible to overrate. The Memorandum of the Church of Scotland, prepared in April 1912, gathers up these results in a single sentence: "In the course of these negotiations both Churches have accepted the principle that in matters spiritual the Church shall be free from external authority, and shall be governed or limited only by her own constitution." In order to test the difficult and delicate ground on which they were here treading, the Committee of the United Free Church proceeded to set forth with much greater fulness in a Statement communicated to the other Church what they conceived to be the content and implications of this brief summary. Their language is so remarkable that it is given verbatim: "It is matter of agreement that the constitution must fully and explicitly set forth the liberty, rights, and powers of the Church of Christ as not given by the State, and not to be controlled or restrained by any relation to the State. The constitution would therefore make it clear that the Church, as a Church adhering to the substance of the faith of the Reformed Churches and to the Presbyterian form of Church government, claims the right to frame its own subordinate standards, to constitute its own courts, to legislate and judge in all matters of doctrine, government, worship and discipline, membership and office, to appoint its agents and their spheres of service: the decision of its courts being in all such matters



final. The constitution would also reserve the Church's right to alter the constitution itself within the limits and according to the procedure prescribed therein. The Church in asserting these claims in matters spiritual would recognise the authority and power of the courts of the realm in matters of property and civil rights." Again: "It has been clearly explained in conference that by statutory recognition of the freedom of the Church as embodied in her constitution, the Church of Scotland would in no sense be an institution constituted or controlled by the State, or deriving powers from the State, or in any way limited in its action by a special State relation. The terms of the recognition of the constitution in any Act of Parliament would not be such as to bind that constitution upon the Church, which would have power to alter the constitution within the limits and according to the procedure prescribed therein. Further, the Church would not be fettered in entering into union with other Churches, nor would any Church uniting with the Church of Scotland become subject to statutory obligation or control." To this exposition and development of the Memorandum the Church of Scotland's Committee has assented as a "fair and sympathetic interpretation." The language of the Statement is not chosen at random. It points to matters on which the State through the courts of law had negatived the Church's right of separate action, and so far as language can go, it is hardly possible to conceive a more ample and exhaustive statement of the Church's claim to spiritual freedom. Dr Henderson, joint-convenor of the United Free Church Committee, is warranted in saying, "I am not aware of any equally distinct, dominant, and effective summing up of the rights, claims, and liberties of the Church in any existing document." Now the Church of Scotland, recognising she does not possess such rights and liberties under her present constitution, has stated "that in the circumstances of the present day, and for the sake of reunion, she is prepared to seek, and recognises the expediency of procuring, the recognition of powers of separate action which would be a practical

satisfaction of the conception of spiritual freedom entertained by the United Free Church." In other words, she is prepared to frame and adopt a new constitution explicitly setting forth those rights and liberties, and then to go to Parliament and ask Parliament to recognise it as being the constitution of the Church of Scotland.

Here, undoubtedly, is a great new fact written on the page of Scottish history: one which reflects high credit on the statesmanship of the Church of Scotland, one which is also a striking historical tribute to the action of the men who in 1843 stood for spiritual freedom. The proposed new constitution modifies vitally the present one: it would be more correct to say it revolutionises it. Of this the most signal illustration is the right expressly set forth that the Church may, at her own hand, alter her own constitution within the limits and according to the procedure which the Church herself therein prescribes. Contrast with that the present arrangement between Church and State. In deciding the last of the Strathbogie cases in the Court of Session in 1843, Lord Medwyn, who took a larger view of the Church's powers than the majority of his brother judges, likens it to a treaty or compact under which nothing can be altered without the consent of both parties. "It was," he says, "thought expedient at the time [*i.e.* 1567–1592] to enter into this compact by which a certain form was given to the Church, having a certain profession of faith. Mutual advantages were stipulated on each side: it was, like all other contracts, one for mutual benefit: each was to fulfil some duty to the other in return for something done on its part. The State undertook to give protection, endowment, and extensive ecclesiastical jurisdiction to the Church, tolerating no other. As the counterpart of this important treaty the Church so constituted became bound to teach the people according to the Confession of Faith, to administer the ordinances of religion, and duly to exercise discipline, being exclusively empowered by the State to do so." That was the theory, and for long the fact squared



with the theory. Needless to say it no longer does so in its entirety. "Tolerating no other" has long disappeared. Since 1905 the Church has had power to prescribe the formula of subscription to the Confession of Faith required from her ministers and preachers. This she obtained by statute, or, in Lord Medwyn's language, by consent of the State the other party to the treaty. But subject to these qualifications the judge's language describes not inaccurately the somewhat rigid arrangement which still obtains between Church and State. To speak of such a Church as a State Church is natural and proper, but that term will be meaningless as applied to a Church with a constitution which proclaims in explicit terms that the Church's liberty, rights, and powers are "not given by the State," and are "not to be controlled or restrained by any relation to the State," and in regard to which it is expressly agreed that by statutory recognition of this constitution "the Church of Scotland would in no sense be an institution constituted or controlled by the State, or deriving powers from the State, or in any way limited in its action by a special State relation."

Few people nowadays will be disposed to deny that the conception of the relation between Church and State proposed to be embodied in the new constitution is far truer and worthier than the old one. But to embody that new conception to-day in a constitution recognised by statute involves a great deal. It means not merely the repealing of everything in the statutes inconsistent with the new freedom. It implies much more. If the Church in the past submitted to limitations and restrictions on her freedom in return for exclusive privileges, she must now be ready to part with her privileges when she claims her freedom. She cannot have both freedom and privilege. That the present position of the Church of Scotland imports exclusive privilege is too plain for doubt. The sixteenth-century statutes on which it rests are steeped in the spirit of exclusion and privilege. They could not well be otherwise. The King "grants jurisdiction" to "the true Kirk," and

“declares that there is no other face of kirk or other face of religion,” and “that there be no other jurisdiction ecclesiastical acknowledged within this realm other than that which is and shall be within the same kirk” (Acts 1567 and 1579). The early statutes are ratified by the important Act of 1592, and again in 1690 at the Revolution Settlement. The harsh intolerance which for long existed has of course disappeared, but the monopoly of legal recognition of the Church still survives in a modern world in which it is strangely incongruous. The terms of the Memorandum indicate that its authors have not been insensible to such considerations. And in the Report to the last General Assembly the Committee of the Church of Scotland recognise the force of the view that expressions in the statutes such as those above cited, “and the exclusive theory which they tended to stereotype, have infected the spirit of the law and established a legal and constitutional tradition which may tend unfairly to depress other Churches in relation to the State and the law, and to withhold from them due recognition as Christian Churches.” As matter of fact, other Churches are not known to the law *as Christian Churches*. They stand merely upon the ground of British toleration, but they are tolerated and protected by the law simply as voluntary associations of persons united for lawful purposes. They have no jurisdiction, because all jurisdiction, as the law understands that term, flows from the supreme power of the State. If, therefore, any case comes before the law courts raising questions between such a Church and any of its members, the case is decided solely by reference to the contract or constitution, just as it would be in a dispute relating to a mercantile partnership or a football club. It cannot be seriously disputed that the country has outgrown the state of opinion and point of view represented by the present legal position of the Church of Scotland, and that it is very undesirable that the law should continue to lag behind public opinion in a matter so closely affecting the highest interests of the land. It is round this important ques-



tion and the method of solving it that the interest in the present situation now mainly gathers. What does the Church propose? How will the State act? One could wish that the present opportunity were seized to readjust the relations of the State not to one Church but to all Churches in a worthy and adequate manner. The proposals of the Church of Scotland go some length — a considerable length — towards dealing with the question in a practical way. They insist on continued recognition of the Church as the national Church. But the recognition now claimed contains nothing of the old invidious quality of exclusiveness; it is no more than recognition of that Church as one of several Christian Churches in Scotland. The Memorandum, dealing with the view that exclusive recognition of a national Church infers positive injury to all other Churches, states, "it seems desirable to endeavour to meet it, if not by positive legislation for these Churches, at all events by a statutory disclaimer of any exclusive claim of the Church of Scotland to recognition by the State in Scotland as a Christian Church." Going further in this direction, the Memorandum contains the following suggestion: "It is matter for earnest consideration whether a provision might not be embodied to the effect that nothing which is contained in any Act of Parliament of Scotland, or of Great Britain, or of the United Kingdom, in relation to the Church of Scotland, should be construed to the prejudice of the recognition by lawful authority of any other Church in Scotland as a Christian Church protected by law in the exercise of her spiritual functions." Along with these statements in the Memorandum should be taken the explanations of them given in conference by the Committee of the Church of Scotland. "In conference they have been explained to mean that it is not contemplated that the recognition of the Church of Scotland as national should mean a monopoly of recognition which can in any way be interpreted as denying recognition to other Churches of Christ having their own place in, and making their own contribution to, the religious life of the nation."

What is the value of these statements, and how far do they carry us? Assuming them to be explicitly set forth in statutory form, they would undoubtedly possess high moral value as a declaration by the Church that the other Christian Churches in the land are entitled equally with herself to recognition by the State as Christian Churches, and as making their contribution, according to the measure of their service and influence, to the religious life of the nation. They would possess the further value that they would do much to break down the exclusive spirit and tradition which infect and disfigure the law. The recognition of the Church as national would then be seen to rest, not upon any ground of State-conferred privilege, but upon the fact that she was the most adequate representative of the Christianity of Scotland, or rather (for this is really what is meant), that the united Church about to be formed would be national in that sense, and as fulfilling that character. The State would then be free, as she is not free now, to recognise and avail herself of the co-operation of other Churches on occasions of national religious services. On the other hand, the proposals are open to the criticism that they are largely negative rather than positive. It is not contemplated as part of the scheme that there shall be positive legislation, by way of recognition of other Churches. It may be said that the matter cannot be carried further on the side of the Church than the Memorandum proposes. She claims recognition, but she claims no monopoly of recognition; she declares that the other Christian Churches in the land are entitled to recognition as well as herself: she can do no more. This may or may not be inevitable in any solution on the present lines, but undoubtedly it is a blot on the scheme as a scheme of settlement covering the whole ground. It becomes, therefore, the more important to inquire, when regard is had to substance rather than form, how the Church of Scotland would stand in future in respect of those benefits and privileges which she at present enjoys from her special State relationship. Take Lord Medwyn's description of them: "pro-



tection, endowment, and extensive ecclesiastical jurisdiction." Will any of these remain? She would receive under her new constitution the same kind and amount of protection from the State as any other Church which claims in her constitution spiritual freedom, and no more. In the event of a dispute being carried to the civil courts on a Church question, the appeal would be only to the general law of the land in the case of the Church of Scotland equally as in the case of any other Church. Her State-conferred ecclesiastical jurisdiction will disappear. She will retain only her inherent spiritual jurisdiction of the same nature and derived from the same Divine source as that of every other branch of the Christian Church. The question of endowment has not hitherto been fully discussed by the committees: both sides agree it is not a domestic question, but one appropriate to Parliament. The Church of Scotland stipulates that the endowments "are not to be secularised." The United Free Church "does not feel called upon to accept any position in relation to the settlement to be proposed to or carried out by Parliament."

There remains a form of recognition which the Church at present enjoys, but which does not rest on statute but on usage—the recognition of the Crown and its servants expressed in the appearance of the King's Commissioner at the opening and closing of the General Assembly. This is disliked by many. The dislike arises from the fact that the Church is in their eyes a State institution, objectionable to them as such, and identified with a system of State favour and ecclesiastical privilege. In themselves the visits of the Commissioner to the General Assembly are nothing more than acts of courtesy and expressions of good will towards the Church on the part of the Crown and its servants. When the Commissioner visits the Assembly of the United Free Church his visit means just so much, and no one dreams that it means anything more. If the relation of Church to State were so modified that its present objectionable features disappeared, such visits would be regarded simply as

becoming acts of courtesy from the head of a Christian State towards a Christian Church. How natural and how appropriate such acts of recognition are, even in lands where no State Church has ever existed, is well illustrated by the presence and speech of Lord Gladstone as representative of the King in South Africa at the opening of the recent General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church there.

It will be generally agreed that the men who can devise means by friendly negotiation to realise in a reconstructed and united Church the ideals of two great Churches having so much in common will deserve well of their country. Difficulties doubtless remain. The new features proposed to be embodied in the constitution of the Church of Scotland are only now being formulated, they have not therefore been discussed by that Church, nor have they been put before the sister Church. But a review of the task so far as it has been accomplished encourages the hope that with patience and good will the difficulties which remain may be surmounted and the goal reached.

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# THE VALUE OF CONFESSIONS OF FAITH:

A SCOTTISH PRESBYTERIAN ESTIMATE.

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IN Presbyterian Scotland the confessional problem is pressing and vital. Our two largest Churches, the Church of Scotland and the United Free Church of Scotland, whose hands have met in a first warm grasp of fellowship and whose eyes are fixed on a future union honourable and lasting, are already confronted with the delicate but inevitable difficulties of a union settlement, not the least of which concerns the basis of doctrine on which their future constitution is to rest. In matters of faith each Church has had its chastening experiences. The trials for heresy of Edward Irving, John McLeod Campbell, and William Robertson Smith, a trio of prophet, saint, and scholar, have taught us much—about ourselves as well as them. The controversies associated with our past divisions, the difficulties connected with our internal discipline and with our tenure of accumulated property, the limitations of freedom inhering in establishment, the perils of freedom inhering in voluntarism, have also been educating us. Is it too much to hope that out of the rich and varied experience of Churches so schooled and disciplined there will emerge a National Church worthy of the name, fitted in every way to resume the ancient position of the Church of Scotland among the forces of Catholic Presbyterianism? In our Constitution, how are we to state our doctrinal testimony? The Westminster

Confession, our common standard, is professed by neither Church *simpliciter et totaliter*, and it has been modified in various ways by other adhering Churches. What place are we to give it? Are we to formulate an attitude of measured loyalty to it, or are we to replace it for practical if not for ceremonial purposes by a new Confession? It is inconceivable that we should dispense altogether with an authoritative affirmation of our position; but unless we claim infallibility for our statement, we must provide in it for liberty of constitutional change. We have three centuries and more of confessional experience in the Churches of the Reformation to guide and admonish us. We can utilise the recent confessional work of sister Churches within the Presbyterian Alliance and outside. We can draw upon resources of Biblical scholarship and philosophical investigation which no previous age ever possessed. I only wish that it were possible for us in Scotland to take for the dogmatic symbol which shall seal our reunion a statement of the Reformed Faith, or a formula of adherence to the Westminster Confession, in whose composition the most gifted and the most trusted minds of the whole of English-speaking Presbyterianism had co-operated. We need, and we desire, a form which shall be truly comprehensive, simple, devout, and Scriptural in its terms, loyal to the principles of the Reformation, a bond of willing loyalty and communion which shall heal our past divisions, and hinder division in the future. If as yet we are not ready in the Presbyterian world at large for a truly ecumenical Confession, if we are not urgently eager for it, if we are not worthy of it, we can at least be thinking of it and looking forward to it with steadfast expectation. There are many indications in our day of happy changes impending. Social, missionary, devotional, and theological comradeship is rapidly transforming our relations to one another and to Churches beyond our pale. Doctrinal disputes which once seemed vital keep us no longer apart. The working differences which historically divided us on the one hand from Methodists, Congregationalists, and



Baptists, for example, and on the other hand from our Episcopalian brethren, have lost much of their seriousness. It is forms of worship, details of government, and differences of temperament that divide us far more than doctrine. With the menace of unreformed and credulous Romanism at our side, and the deadlier peril of indifference and unbelief all around us, the forces of Evangelical Christianity cannot but draw closer together, and enter into more intimate alliance. I am confident that in the near future there will be a remarkable increase of mutual understanding and warm fellowship among the Churches of the Reformed Faith throughout the Christian world.

To form a true estimate of the value of Confessions of Faith, we must acknowledge their service and their disservice impartially. It is only too easy to play the partisan and lose sight of the one in fixing our gaze upon the other. They are a complex problem, and we must not insist on having a very simple solution. Remembering how great a part they have played in history, what sweat of human brows they cost, what peril of human life they involved, we may well handle them with reverence. Remembering also what controversy they have stirred, what agony of conscience they have caused, what abuses they have incurred, we may well treat them with discrimination.

#### CONFESSIONS AND HISTORY.

Their value for religious and ecclesiastical history is obvious and will not be disputed. They are landmarks in the history of theological thought and learning. They remind us that there are mass-movements in doctrinal conviction not less than in spiritual experience, and they correct a tendency we moderns have to allow the fascination of single outstanding personalities to blind us to the slower evolutions of the rank and file. Sometimes, it is true, a great mind explains the age whose character its genius seems to sum up. As often the age explains the man when we have learned to know it. When we look back across the successive efforts of the Christian Church to formulate its faith in sentences which

all men may read and understand, it is of the very highest value that we can turn to the well-thumbed pages of the Creeds and Confessions of Christendom, and read in their faded lines the moving record of how in this or that age or land or Church, through fraternal conference or through heated debate, in the council-chamber or in the scholar's study, the considered faith and the passionate conviction of God's people have found impressive utterance. They epitomise for us the otherwise incomprehensible story of Christian doctrine, furnishing us with an invaluable conspectus of dogma, orderly and condensed.

It follows that as documents of history they must be historically studied and understood. They are full of technical terms, of clauses which to the scholar call up the memory of definite controversies, of phrases which betray their locality and school of opinion. Like the Apostles' Creed itself, they are monuments of well-weighed compromise and deliberate compilation. Like the Bible itself, they reflect the light of divine truth streaming from many minds. To accept them with unquestioning literalness is to accept them unintelligently and to do them dishonour. Place yourself at the standpoint of their framers and their age, allow for the fashion of their thought as you would allow for the idiom and vocabulary of their language, bear in mind the things they did not know, the history they had not read, the questions they had not raised and faced, the experience they had not enjoyed, the scholarship beyond their reach, and you will not do them the injustice of making them oracles for all time, or representing that their sceptre and their nod can arrest the tide of divine revelation and of human science. To know their origin and their historical setting is certainly to be in a position to judge them critically, and to have their oracular mysteriousness dispelled, but it is also to have one's imagination stirred and one's sympathy aroused. I can scarcely think of one of them which close historical acquaintance has not thus transformed for me, and I am free to acknowledge that some of them, famous in their day and but scantily appreciated



now, which I approached with disinclination and even repugnance when first commissioned to examine them, impressed me as noble monuments of Christian handiwork, a credit to their authors and their time, and an honour to the religion that begot them. Others may scoff at them as but cast-off garments of old-time thought, but when I think of them I apply to them not seldom the quaint words of Carlyle's Clothes-philosopher; "Often have I turned into their Old-Clothes Market to worship. With awe-struck heart I walk through that Monmouth Street, with its empty suits, as through a Sanhedrim of stainless ghosts. Silent are they, but expressive in their silence: the past witnesses and instruments of Woe and Joy, of Passions, Virtues, Crimes, and all the fathomless tumult of Good and Evil in 'the Prison men call Life.' Friends, trust not the heart of that man for whom Old Clothes are not venerable. . . . O, let him in whom the flame of devotion is ready to go out, who has never worshipped, and knows not what to worship, pace and repace, with austere thought, the pavement of Monmouth Street, and say whether his heart and his eyes still continue dry."

#### CONFESSIONS AND RELIGIOUS LIFE.

Articles of Faith have a value for religious life, and serve a directly spiritual purpose. In the form of Catechisms they have found entry into young and into unlearned minds, and rendered splendid service to religious education. But in every form confessional manuals have met a profound want and satisfied an elemental instinct of the human soul. Accepted as the sum of religion, I grant that they have tended to make men forget that religion means far more than faith, since hope and love are its anchor and its crown, and obedience is its girdle. The emphasis they lay upon doctrine, the savour of pedantry in their exact memorisation and legal use, the note of absoluteness and at times presumption in their unhesitating propositions, suggest a danger of pharisaism, and stand in need of counteraction. But the motive behind them is noble and

right. Faith *is* fundamental in religion. *What* we believe is vital, only less vital than *in whom* we believe. "I believe; help Thou my unbelief!" must always be the birth-cry of souls that make their way into the world of spiritual light and life. If only our Confessions had been more faithful to the Reformers' conception of faith as not a belief in doctrine, Scripture, or tradition, but above all a living trust of the whole soul in a loving God, if only their upholders had more consistently maintained their subordination to Holy Scripture and the subordination of the Written Word to the Word once made Flesh and to the ever-living Spirit of Truth, we would have been spared infinite division and dissension, and our standards would have escaped much serious disrepute. To know about Christ is not to know Him. Knowledge of doctrine is not experience of faith. But faith is notwithstanding inseparable from doctrine. We cannot trust Christ without believing that He was and is, and without knowing what He was and is. Accordingly, in every generation historic Confessions by their dogmatic thoroughness remind us that religious faith is not vague pious sentiment any more than blind obedience to authority, that it is something more than fugitive opinion, that it implies truth or conviction mature and tested, and that its principles, presuppositions, and facts must be consistent and ultimately form a harmonious system. Our age is not addicted to the same rigour and precision in religious as in scientific reflection. We are not, so far as I can see, in any imminent danger of excessive articulateness in our Christian thought. In our graver moments we envy the Schoolmen and the Reformers the confident comprehensiveness of their doctrinal systems. Our Confessions thus shame us, and spur us on to new constructive efforts, bidding us think long and deeply on our holy Faith, not as a luxury but as a high duty of religion. They assume that there is a profound unity in God's Word and in all revelation, capable of systematic presentation to the mind, and that it is a Christian's solemn obligation to find it.



Further, if Faith be fundamental, and intellectual apprehension be the appointed monitor of religious experience and activity, lending eyes and vision to blind feeling and devotion, it is imperative that it be shared with others, and therefore be confessed before men. Confession is an essentially evangelic act. It is the utterance of good news to the world. Like a flag, it is a symbol of the social, the unselfish, the unifying element in religion, rallying men when oppressed, at all times proclaiming the bond of their common allegiance. You do not understand it unless you reckon with two deep-seated experiences of the human heart: the power derived from self-committal which comes even to weak men who have mustered courage to confess conviction openly, and the kindred power derived from fellowship, which Novalis describes when he says: "My belief gains quite infinitely the moment I can convince another mind of it." If we know in whom we have believed, and in what we have believed, it is a Christian's duty to proclaim it, should be a Christian's pride, and will prove a marvellous reinforcement of a Christian's power. Faith that is genuine will out. Faith that is uttered will grow in the believer and will lay hold upon others. It is a law of spiritual nature. The men who toiled to compose Confessions knew it well and counted upon it. Above all the various particular objects that they had in view, the vindication of their teaching against misrepresentation and attack, the settlement of controversy, the ratification of ecclesiastical union or reunion, the determination of orthodoxy, and the provision of a dogmatic standard of discipline, they felt that it was the burden and glory of faith to find articulate expression, and that the communion of believers needed reliable guidance in believing. In the powerful chapter on Creeds and Confessions in his Cunningham Lecture on *The Delivery and Development of Christian Doctrine*, by far the ablest discussion of the subject known to me, Principal Rainy, than whom no ecclesiastical statesman of modern times has ever thought more searchingly or written with a wisdom more penetrating and mature on

the Confessional problem, has rightly emphasised that truth. He says: "A high Christian enthusiasm has usually been connected with strong and decided affirmation of doctrine, and with a disposition to speak it out ever more fully. That temper has been venturesome to speak even as it has been venturesome to do; as little fearing to declare God's Word in human speech, as to embody His will in human acts."

It is the elaborateness and minute detail of doctrinal standards that has made them peculiarly liable to disintegration by the corroding hand of time. To be dogmatic to-day about many particulars is to court correction and disrepute to-morrow. Confessions which were essentially summaries of Scripture drawn up by the highest scholarship of their time need not be expected to satisfy in all points the considered judgment of the Biblical theology of a later age. If God in His wisdom has compelled us to alter many of our opinions regarding the origin and meaning and purpose of His Holy Word, is it not strangely inconsistent of us to invest with immutability documents which from the first have been expressly designated as *subordinate standards*, that is, as standards subordinate to His Word? Accordingly, in every one of our confessional Churches, loyal though we have rightly been to our historic Confessions, we have experienced an undeniable unsettlement of attitude towards their dogmatic contents, adding to them even where we would not venture to subtract, reinterpreting where we would not venture to deny. There is nothing but harm to be done either by exaggerating or by minimising that experience. It is a trial, but it is not an evil. We must reckon with it frankly and calmly, and endeavour, like Christian men, to have faith, and to be true to our present and our future as well as to our past. Reverence to the hand that is dead and gone! Yes! for it fed us and clothed us, its outstretched finger pointed out to us our way, its clasp linked us to the infinite past, its fatherly touch upon our shoulder gave us encouragement and Godspeed. But honour also to the hand that now lives, for it has been given a work of its own



to do, a wealth to amass, a heritage to augment and to pass on. And honour not less to the hand that shall receive from us, and shall toil when we are laid to rest. If we have worked as freemen in the household of faith, if we have prized the liberty of interpreting the Word of God in the light of our best knowledge which our fathers won for us by sword or pen, we ought to be chivalrous towards our successors, laying upon them no yoke which we ourselves were either unwilling to bear, or not entitled to impose. It was profoundly natural that faithful Churchmen should view with dislike and trepidation the emergence of new formulæ of subscription, revisions of the old standards, and Confessions altogether new; but time and experience have eased our worst anxieties and disarmed our fiercest hostilities. The love of truth and the dread of error which have urged Christian thinkers, preachers, and scholars all the world over to recast time-honoured forms of faith are not motives to be disparaged. The impatience of disunion, the brotherly desire for reconciliation and fellowship with the estranged, the growing tolerance of intellectual differences that are honest and sincere, which have led, and still are leading, to Church unions and reunions, and in their interest to the preparation of new symbols of belief, are surely anything but motives of which we need be ashamed.

#### CONFESSIONS AND HOLY SCRIPTURE.

The relation of Confessions of Faith to Holy Scripture is anything but easy to define. They profess to be based on Scripture, and draw their authority and their proof-sentences primarily from it. Even when, as in the Decrees and Canons of Trent, they appeal to tradition as co-ordinate with Scripture, or, as in the Socinian Catechisms, to reason, they use passages from the Bible in the same way. The Evangelical Confessions all defer to Scripture, and are content to regard themselves as but summaries of it, ranking as strictly subordinate standards, God's Word being the only rule of faith and duty. And certainly the great Confessions

and Catechisms, whatever limitations they laboured under, have been remarkably effective manuals of Biblical doctrine. They have assisted countless learners to pick their way through the dark places of the Bible and reach the central truths and realise their harmony. They have promoted and directed study of the Scriptures, and lent coherence and proportion to their devotional and liturgical use. But, on the other hand, the very success with which they furnished Scriptural summaries led to their virtual supersession of the Bible, not, of course, for purposes of edification, but for purposes of discipline. Subordinate in name and secondary in origin, they insensibly but surely became the working standards of Church courts and theological instruction. The heretic on trial might appeal to the Bible as the avowedly supreme standard of orthodoxy, but he was promptly told that every heresy had quoted Scripture in its day, and the Father of all heresies, great and small, had done the same. The Bible was found too wide-meshed for discipline. Confessions were of closer texture, and could be trusted to sift a finer orthodoxy. Yet few will say that our Confessions can ever be too Scriptural. The closer they cling to Holy Writ in spirit, in tone, in language, in comprehensiveness, and in devout simplicity, the more we value and love them. But they must form no merely mechanical or legal epitome. The New Testament must dominate the Old, and the Gospels the New Testament, and Christ Himself and His Spirit the narrative of His earthly life and words. No summary, however ingenious, will ever replace for religious ends the venerable Book. To it the Christian intellect and conscience will never renounce their sacred right of appeal. No Protestant, no Presbyterian, can forgo that birthright.

#### CONFESSIONS AND ECCLESIASTICAL DISCIPLINE.

The relation of Confessions of Faith to Church discipline is the thorniest portion of my subject. I must devote to it a few frank words. Questions of conscience and questions of



law emerge at once in a bristling series, touching at once the individual and the Church, the preacher and the congregation, the past and the present and their claims.

Clearly it is a great advantage to a Church to have a common body of doctrine, greater even than a common mode of worship or organisation, and it is a sacred duty to profess as much of the truth as common conviction will allow. Church and congregation, moreover, are entitled to receive some guarantee that the pastor of souls will teach the truth accredited, adequately and loyally. Confessions accepted or subscribed are meant to serve both ends. Broadly speaking, they have done so reasonably well, and they deserve our deepest gratitude. But to use or enforce them legally in a hard and fast way is unchristian and unwise. The Church does not exist for the Confession, however venerable, but the Confession for the Church. The minister of Jesus Christ is not the special pleader of a particular theology, retained for a fee. The right to formulate the doctrinal content of faith is the prerogative and monopoly of no single age or generation, however confident of itself, and however competent. God is not the God of the dead, however great, but of the living; and His Truth, though it is eternal, is not stationary. If Faith has hands with which to cling, it has also feet with which to move forward. It would be well if we, who honour our ancient formularies, and resent the slightest invasion of their sacrosanctity, showed a little more confidence in their ability to bear handling and comparison. If better articles of faith were offered to us than we possess traditionally, would it not be our religious duty to accept them? Have we learned nothing and unlearned nothing worth recording since the Assemblies of Dordrecht and Westminster? It is natural for men who love the Ark of the Covenant to stretch out impulsive hands to steady it as the wheels of the waggon lurch in the ruts of the rough highway of experience, but there is a fear on its behalf that is ungodly as well as unmanly. The same solemn and indeed overwhelming responsibility which

rested on our fathers in the Reformation to purify their testimony to God's Truth rests also on their sons in every succeeding age. When men to-day rail at our standards, not always by any means without cause or in disloyalty, they may fairly be asked to show us a better for all purposes and for all orders of mind, and we may fairly be asked to preserve an open mind for its reception when it is produced. For my part, as an Assembly jurymen in any case of doctrinal discipline, I would refuse to take a merely legal view of any office-bearer's departure from our standards. I would feel bound to acknowledge that every minister has a constituent share of his own in the admitted right of that Court of which he is a member to move in doctrine at the bidding of science or of conscience or of the Divine Spirit. I think it is idle and sophistical to say that the General Assembly must enact permission before the individual may preach new ideas, for the Assembly is but a court of individuals, and its movement and initiative are necessarily slower and later than theirs. The universal Fatherhood of God and the sacred duty of missions to the heathen are *credenda* which many of our Churches have never yet authorised by statute or confession, yet, God be thanked, we have long since been guided and constrained by a higher voice than ecclesiastical enactment to proclaim them. It is thus, I submit, impossible and unchristian to interpret our standards in a narrow legal fashion. We would not do it with Scripture; we dare not do it with them. With the memory of what legalism did in the Gospel narrative, in the unreformed Church, and in the Protestant Churches during the seventeenth century, we have little excuse for relapsing into it again.

But, you say, may a minister of religion preach as he pleases with impunity? I answer only that disloyalty is not to be judged by narrow rules. We must be consistent and we must be fair. There is such a thing as disloyalty to the present and to the future to be kept in view. The letter of ancient standards even a lawyer will, if he can, interpret



historically, in the light of the conditions of their age and the intentions of their framers. Even a lawyer, too, will take into account the effect of divergent use and wont in subsequent generations as modifying their force when employed as documents forming the basis of a contract of professional service. To subscribe an ancient Confession, itself originally framed by majority findings and through innumerable compromises in debate, itself also interpreted in our own time by different schools of opinion and types of scholarship, is obviously anything but a simple act. It implies, of course, a solemn compact and pledge of loyalty to the past, and of loyalty to the living Church, but it involves no less an obligation to the Church's living Head and His indwelling Spirit. It seems to me—and I write under a profound sense of the gravity of the practical issue—that no branch of the Christian Church has any right to foreclose, irrevocably or irreformably, once for all, the form of its doctrinal testimony. Every Church, if it has eyes for the lessons of history since the dawn of the Reformation, ought to hold its property and administer its discipline on the explicit understanding that its hand is free from age to age to write afresh the sentences which utter its living belief in the living God. The Church needs freemen, not slaves, for its ministry. Even the world, though it delights in opinions that are dogmatic, and dearly loves "plain answers" to ugly questions, is not enamoured of men who proclaim the glorious liberty of the Gospel while themselves in confessional shackles. Of course, there is risk as well as dignity in freedom. Every employer and every offerer of free labour knows that. But is it for that reason better to go back to slavery? Select your men, train your men, trust your men, as your Master did. Run openly the risk of finding one man in twelve a traitor, as He did, and each of twelve slow of heart and mind. For after all no articles of indenture, however strict, can possibly guarantee the future fidelity and competence of the employed. He is a blind reader of Church history who does not know that Articles of Faith are powerless to preserve

intellectual uniformity. The Presbyterian Churches in the eighteenth century were anything but faithful to their standards; yet they did not make a single formal change in them, deeming it apparently not worth their while. There is a better way, a surer guarantee. In his *Arians of the Fourth Century*, John Henry Newman, who will not be credited with indifference to any lawful means of securing doctrinal conformity and identity, makes a memorable admission concerning what he calls "that novel though necessary measure of imposing an authoritative creed on those whom the Church invested with the office of teaching." He says: "If I avow my belief that freedom from symbols and articles is abstractedly the highest state of Christian communion, and the peculiar privilege of the primitive Church, it is not from any tenderness towards that proud impatience of control in which many exult as in a virtue, but first, because technicality and formalism are, in their degree, inevitable results of public confessions of faith; and next, because, where confessions do not exist, the mysteries of Divine truth, instead of being exposed to the gaze of the profane and uninstructed, are kept hidden in the bosom of the Church far more faithfully than is otherwise possible, and reserved, by a private teaching through the channel of her ministers, as rewards in due measure and season for those who are prepared to profit by them—for those, that is, who are diligently passing through the successive stages of faith and obedience."

We must beware lest in our zeal for uniformity and orthodoxy we make our doctrinal phylactery so broad and cumbrous upon our foreheads as to darken our eyes and obscure our vision. The Lord of the Church called Twelve to be Apostles, not Scribes, not Levites. Our ministry of the New Testament looks to the prophet, not the priest, for its ideals. If it is to be worthy of our Master's hire, it must be shepherds' not hirelings' work, leading the flock into fresh pastures in God's Word, not idly following at their heels. It is as vain to police



men into doctrinal conformity as it was to dragoon them. Rewards and punishments are out of place in matters of faith and truth. "Of all the various possible forms of superstition," says Kant, "ecclesiastical extortion of beliefs and confessions is by far the most vexatious; for by this oppression conscience is singularly violated." I believe that a great deal of our confessional unrest is due less to a considered dislike of our venerable standards than to a widespread feeling that unqualified subscription to them at the outset of our ministry, when our minds are theologically inexperienced, entails a yoke we ought not to undergo. It is all very well to say that if a man no longer holds the Confession in its entirety he can resign and go. Can he? Can we afford to let him? It may be his religious duty to shun schism and stay, even though he is deemed a troubler of Israel. We cannot muzzle our preachers and still call them prophetic men. We cannot put them in blinkers and still call them men of vision and guides to their fellows. Confessions are ill served by those who read them narrowly. View them historically, and you will honour them. Honour them, and without effort you will be loyal to them, neither fearing change nor morbidly yearning for it. I do not go so far as to say that at fixed intervals they should be revised, though Principal Rainy thought there was much to be said for that view, and I observe that it has been adopted by the most recent Union of English Methodist Churches in their Constitution. Seasons of revision, like seasons of revival, are not to be forecast. There are tides of ecclesiastical conviction as of spiritual life, and neither can be almanacked. The great thing, the essential thing, is that we cherish at all costs our dearly purchased liberty, and that cherishing it we use it with extreme reserve and with a Christian consideration both for the timorous and for the impulsive brother in the household of faith.

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## OUGHT THERE TO BE A BROAD CHURCH<sup>1</sup> DISRUPTION?

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“Man comes nearest to God when he is truthful.”—*A maxim attributed to Pythagoras.*

A LAYMAN lately spoke in hot tones to me of the Liberal clergy. He arraigned us wholesale. He discoursed in full charity of individuals; but of the Liberal clergy as a class he said in brief: “You ought all to go out. Chalmers and his hundreds of ministers broke away from the Church of Scotland, and Scotland to-day, in the prospect of righteous reunion, is reaping the moral benefit of their fidelity. You English Broad Church clergy hold untenable ground; you deceive yourselves, persuade yourselves, sophisticate; you settle awkward questions in an illicit, favourable sense—as we all, if we try, can do; you lead young ordinands to tamper with their consciences; you speak and write volumes of special pleading; if you would do the straight deed and go out, you would work more good than can all your books, articles, and sermons; you would begin to work good indeed, and you will not till then.”

Thus stated, with new point and actuality, this charge

<sup>1</sup> Broad Church principles are here taken to imply: (1) a mental welcome to all knowledge; (2) a conviction that dogma is ever provisional and from age to age demands reform; (3) a sense of native and profound inadequacy in human language as an instrument for the expression of spiritual realities. The description, in effect, is borrowed from a lecture by Canon Vernon Storr.



commands from me, at least, once more deliberation. It is an old indictment. Let us first recall some classic expressions of it.

Lord Morley's *On Compromise* springs at once to the memory. Long ago, during seven years or more of hesitation whether to be or not to be ordained, I spent weeks grappling with that book, settling my own account with the vehement sincerities of that attack.

"The first advance towards either the renovation of one faith or the growth of another, must be the abandonment of those habits of hypocritical conformity and compliance which have filled the air of the England of to-day with gross and obscuring mists."

So ends the searching chapter on "Religious Conformity." Again, Dr James Martineau, lofty, just, in whom was no guile, has left on record (*Life and Letters*) this grave judgment:

"I am persuaded that honourable laymen, themselves of Broad Church sympathies, are more awake than is commonly supposed to the essential immorality of the Liberal clerical position. An eminent man among them said to me to-day, with a shrug of his shoulders, 'I could not for a week do what they (the Broad clergy) do through life.' I never met with a layman who does not say the same";

though Martineau, with merciful inconsistency, on the death of Dean Stanley wrote thus:

"With him the greatest *personal* power I have ever known has passed from us. The loss to London in particular is something quite unique."

Again, probably the most weighty conservative utterance on the precise topic of clerical veracity is the essay of Professor Henry Sidgwick. There a master-hand marks out the moral boundaries: he fixes a clear dividing line between lay obligation to theological orthodoxy and clerical obligation; while Liberal laymen may walk in a wide circle of freedom, around the Liberal clergy confining ropes are drawn.

No attempt here is made to expound these authoritative writings. They ought, indeed, to be named; they ought to be respected, to be studied by every man confronted with the related problems. Let him weigh this impressive advice. Let him hear those trumpets of warning and integrity. Let him listen to philosopher and friend—listen and learn. "A wise

man feareth and departeth from evil; but the fool rageth and is confident." Yet after all a man is himself and not somebody else. At last he must retire into himself and choose: deep down there, where he meets in silence the Eternal Right, he must decide alone.

Am I honest? Can I remain a Broad Church clergyman without a moral twist? Have I thrown dust before my own moral vision—just enough to blind me to the quibble of my life, while leaving me otherwise a fairly useful person? Have I caught the taint of equivocation? lost the central virtue of simplicity and downrightness? Must I pose? Is the ground on which I stand not moral rock, but moral sand? and with its every subsidence must I shift? Dare I speak out what I believe? Am I holding something back? smothering something up? In my right hand is there *suppressio veri*, and *suggestio falsi* in my left?

Not only Broad Church clergymen will be the better for asking themselves on occasion these or kindred questions. They might brace and purify any man. I, at least, a Liberal in Anglican holy orders, welcome them; welcome their searchlight into the recesses of my conscience. And I come back from that self-scrutiny and tell whomsoever it may concern why I remain, and, God willing, intend to remain, at my clerical post. The grounds of my judgment are three.

(i) I am at home in this Church of England. I love it. The sacred influences of my life dawned within its fold. The memories of my childhood, of my first home, of my first attachments, are steeped in its benediction. Snatches from its liturgy, mottoes from its walls, legends from its windows, the awe of its music, the peace of its sanctuary—these woke the better man in me, gave me my first ideals, spelt out my first watchwords, introduced me to the things most high. If heaven lies about us in our infancy, heaven broke through the veil to me sacramentally in the worship of that wonderful Church. It spoke to me. The peal of its bells and the accents of its prayer and praise yet reverberate from those old days



in the corridors of my remembrance with a lifelong, incomparable charm. For me that Church has never failed. Early and late, from youth to middle age, the Church of my fathers has been to me the channel of wisdom and grace and has fed with divine nutrition my ultimate needs.

But, says an objector, do you believe the *doctrines* of the English Church? Your sentiment, he concedes, is evidently Anglican: you must, however, he insists, go further; you must assent to the Anglican formularies and accept the Anglican creed.

In a later passage I will make my own profession of belief; that act is, I reckon, demanded from me by candour. Meanwhile I declare my accord with the Church of England in a realm deeper than doctrine. My adhesion to this Church is ultra-rational. *Là, où finit le raisonnement, commence la véritable certitude.* I believe in the spirit of the Church of England—the spirit which through fifteen hundred years and more projected, adumbrated the doctrines. There is a soul in this august institution. That soul has stammered out its own unspeakable experience through the centuries in liturgies, hymnodies, theologies, confessions, homilies, debates. These lisping notes of the intelligence are the language of that soul—a language which in dim degree, tentatively, fallibly, variably intimates the experience within, the life hid with Christ in God of the society. The language intimates the experience, conserves it, transmits it; is a vessel in which the experience is held. The language must be there. But it is the soul which matters. The language changes, has changed, will change; is never more than suggestive; discloses at its first word and its last its own ingrained insufficiency; must be mended in its expression from one generation to another, that it may not fall too far short of its necessary, verbal endeavour. The language, though requisite, is light and secondary. It is the soul which matters. I believe in the soul of the Church of England; it is the Holy Ghost within those limits; I have been born again of it; all that is best in me is akin to it; my

real self belongs to it and it is intrinsically mine. At the root of things it is this, not dogmatic technique and propriety, which makes a Churchman.

(ii) I have clerical comrades. There is a group of Liberal clergy who are at home in this English Church. Each one of us is not alone; he stands in resolved ranks. *Multi societate tutiores*. We are a company which has an inveterate right and duty within the Anglican borders. Baron Fr. von Hügel, whose philosophic credit is European, has proved the necessity and laid bare the functions of High Churchmen, Low Churchmen, and Broad; of the institutional, mystical, rational elements respectively in religious totality. The Liberal school has played its effective part through English Church history in a long line of intellectual purgation. It is vigorous and alert to-day. Times of transition are its call and opportunity. Liberal laymen in the educated world are probably now the majority. Liberal clergy avowed are comparatively few, though clergy High and Low with dumb, sometimes unconscious, Liberal proclivities are almost certainly numerous. But the few open clerical Modernists count by the hundred; are a group as large as were the founders of other commencing reforms, Methodist or Tractarian; appear numerically to be growing, to be growing still more in confidence, prospect, enthusiasm; are, perhaps more than any other clergy, alive with a sense of mission; mentally are leavening the ecclesiastical mass with a quiet irresistibleness. Within the Anglican Church at this hour these Liberal clergy are a solid, contained fact. They are here; they have won recognition for themselves and for even their extreme teaching, have won something at least of that "common understanding" which, as Professor Henry Sidgwick admits, can cover doctrinal defect.

This recognition it is which pioneers of other important and contested change are seen to have gained for their cause. The originators of the Oxford Movement, with admirable persistency against popular misconception and dislike, evoked from the Anglican Church its potential Catholic characteristics,



until they succeeded in stamping on it an evident Catholic impress, until they conquered for themselves within the Anglican communion a position gradually unquestioned, at last, as we see, predominant.

And for us Liberal clergy, too, recognition will not suffice; our principles are not to be tolerated, they are to prevail. We invade the opponents' camp right and left. (a) Right: We claim not sufferance, but control; we will have from the conservatives no condescension; we are not permitted, we are essential; the need of us now, moreover, is surpassing, and the very age is ours; we stand at the springs of the Church which is to be, and its secret is in our keeping; inchoately, in hidden potentiality and slow genesis, we even *are* the future Church; and the other Anglican schools, High and Low, in the long run will only live, will only maintain their beneficent power, when they shall have learnt our lessons and have been reanimated with our vitality. (b) Left: The conservatives must look to their own honesty; ruridecanal chapters must repent of their sometimes obdurate ignorance, of their blind reluctance to study the alphabet of the modern religious revolution; if haste may be immoral, so may delay; at a difficult turn in the road, to see obscurely or to see askant is not so dangerous nor so craven as to shut your eyes; to strive amid the perplexities of Biblical criticism for a straight path, for the permanent clue, for assured, even if distressing, results, is more respectable than to shirk the critical issue and to run from the critical truth. All conservatives are not guilty of these sins—far from it; but some, perhaps many, are. And if questions are mooted of exclusion from the English Church, it may be asked whether it is not this evasive temper which first of all should be driven out.

(iii) I dare proclaim my belief—that is, my own interpretation of the common creed. Interpretations vary with interpreters; are necessarily and exactly as many as are these; to every man a fresh one and his own; *quot homines, tot credenda*. I do not hesitate to declare mine. At bottom

there is nothing to hide. We Liberal clergy are not furtive Churchmen. Doubtless in religious teaching, as in other regions of didactic statement, the differing qualifications of the listeners, their graded intelligence and culture, call for respect and accommodation; child and adult, simple and thoughtful, illiterate and erudite neither invite nor allow to a preceptor the same educational approach; they live one set in one intellectual world and another set in another, and only the language of their own world can each set understand. You must not obtrude points of destructive criticism and doubts which are shaking Churches upon the untroubled piety of the village. But on due occasion, in the proper court of obligation, we Liberal clergy can speak out utterly the belief that is in us. When we have spoken it, Professor Henry Sidgwick, though he holds that other immoral effects may ensue where the Liberalism is extreme, grants that in us there is "no substantial unverity." I will so speak out here and now.

But first we must keep off the field a few popular and vagabond errors.

(a) What is a creed? Words are feeble indicators of spiritual things, as we saw in detail above. Yet words for ever bubble up as signs of movement in the deep waters. Some of these words are caught and become fixed as *standards of suggestion*; they are adopted as the verbal representations of the Faith; they become to the Christian society media of preservation and growth, tokens of fellowship, incentives to combat; they sound in the councils, echo in the services, glitter on the banners of the Church. A creed is such a fixed array of words, authoritative and compact; it is, indeed, the art of religious formulation at its highest, the climax of dogmatic activity. But a creed is not perfect, not magical, not final.<sup>1</sup> It is an effort of the human tongue, fallible, amendable.

<sup>1</sup> Liberalism discredits dogmatic finality. "The man who has arrived at the goal," says the proverb, "is but at the beginning." Liberalism urges its view against conventional opinion. "Of course the Creed, as a compendium of theology, does belong to the static ante-development stage of thought. All



It is terminology in all its transiency. It is the ecclesiastical language of one age passed on to the lips of the next—and again passed on. In each succeeding period, no doubt, it takes to itself new meanings, and it rises time after time to new intellectual occasions. But a day may come when it will need literal revision; the substance of it, what it ever essentially aimed at, being retained; the nomenclature, the turn of the phrases, the subordinate affirmations being, for the wants of that day, improved. *Idem aliter*. Thus may Christendom, with awful reverence and hope, by and by review the muniments of its belief.<sup>1</sup>

(β) The Nicene Creed is among creeds the chief. It is the uppermost bough of the confessional tree, whose luxuriance may be traced back to the green shoots of primitive baptismal formulæ. It protects something which the heart of the Christian world in spiritual experience had found to be precious and felt to be central. "First the thing," insisted Pestalozzi, "then the word." The Athanasians only stammered out what the heart of Christendom had the instinct for and wanted to say. In the wide hall of the Christian consciousness and during the debate of a hundred years the Athanasians

the 'lettings out' of theology by gussets and patches have been made under protest; and profess to be mere logical explicitations. We now, looking back, see that the Creed ought to have been imposed merely as provisional—as registering the state of theological development of that day; as destined to be transformed into a better symbol; but in fact it was imposed, and is still imposed, by 'officialdom' as final at least so far as it goes. Hence the 'Lex Orandi' treatment of the difficulty is to some extent an 'economy' (to use a polite term), an attempt to stretch the old bottles in default of new. . . . During the period of transition I suppose we must suffer these wretched 'economies.' . . . We cling consciously to the earthen vessel lest through our imperfect discrimination we should part with any life-giving remnant of the heavenly treasure that may cleave to it."—*Autobiography and Life of George Tyrrell*, vol. ii. pp. 184, 185.

<sup>1</sup> "When men are sufficiently prepared by an understanding of the principles of religious growth, we shall have to recognise the right of each age to adjust the historico-philosophical expression of Christianity to contemporary certainties, and thus put an end to this utterly needless conflict between faith and science, which is a mere theological bogey."—*Autobiography and Life of George Tyrrell*, vol. ii. p. 185.

doggedly moved their resolution, the Arians doggedly moved their amendment. The amendment was lost in the end; the resolution was carried; and the heart of Christendom approved. Yes! in effect it cried, we want that word spoken, that word of hard theology; we want that inner experience of ours made articulate; we have been dumbly aware of it for generations in our souls, aware of it wonderingly within; it is a secret which we knew in the hidden depths, which we lisped in supplication; now you have spelt it out on the legible tables of the mind; it is put into intellectual preserve; it will shine over our heads, a watchword; what we revered as a mystery we realise as a doctrine—the Divinity of Christ.

(γ) Clergy do not recite the Creed as individual schoolboys to a schoolmaster, performing a set task, under fear of inspection and the rod. Rather, if the comparison be not too trivial, do they recite it *con amore* as Etonians old and new might sing together the Eton Boating Song. It evokes the spirit of the institution and gives to it broken, yet inspiring, collective utterance. The Creed is the verbal badge of a great society; it is a venerable, hereditary statement, scientific in mould, but mystic in essence, conceived in symbolism, imbued with poetry; it is “practically or equivalently rather than mathematically adequate”; it is the succinct, official, best attainable, dogmatic averment of the brotherhood; a Catholic sign, not a theological trap. You are not to pick out with the pincers of inquisition a clause here or a clause there; to hold it up before some thoughtful, anxious priest; to exact from him some strait, convential assent; or, if he fail in your ordeal, to pin him to the wall and cry, Now we have you! Professor Sidgwick, it must be owned, saw in the minister’s “I believe” that rigorous personal obligation. I venture wholly and fervently to differ. The “I believe” is representative. If the clergyman is in general mental agreement with the words of the Belief, and is in entire spiritual concurrence with its underlying purport and endeavour, he is herein a fit organ of congregational speech. Dr Sanday, Lady Margaret



Professor, is reported (THE HIBBERT JOURNAL, October 1912) to have declared that he repeats a creed

“not as an individual, but as a member of the Church.”

Canon J. M. Wilson (*The Use of the Apostles' Creed in Worship*) lately preached in Worcester Cathedral thus :

“We may in perfect intellectual sincerity repeat the Creed with its implications of mystery and miracle, as the essence of our Christian belief as a body, rather than as the scientific expression of our individual present opinions ; and thus we possess continuity with the Church of every age, continuity with our own childhood, and continuity with our fellow-Christians in every stage of thought, however different from our own, and in so doing we worship in truth.”

Father Tyrrell, a knight of truth, gave (*Lex Credendi*) to our claim commanding assertion :

“It is not then directly as an expression of my own private judgment and spiritual orientation that I say the *Credo*, but as an expression of the Church's collective Faith, which I desire to share and appropriate, and which I acknowledge as a rule or norm. I say it as a quasi-sacramental act of association with the corporate life of the Christian people, past, present, and future. It is the ‘I’ of the whole Church which finds voice in me and in each of her members. ‘Credimus,’ Πιστεύομεν, ‘We believe,’ was the older formula, as it is that of the *Te Deum*, and it gives us the true sense of the newer.

“But since this is so, it is plain that in reciting the Creed I do not address myself to, or profess to be in inward agreement with, any other individual or school or passing phase of theological thought ; that none of these have any more right to rule my spirit than I have to rule theirs ; that the only norm I acknowledge is that to which they must defer as well as I—that of the slowly forming but divinely guided mind of the living Church of all times and all places, of which mind the Creed in its present form is the only authorised expression.”

(δ) The argument of this paper justifies a place among the clergy for extreme Broad Churchmen. A member myself of the Liberal right wing I desire to approve and exonerate the left. You cannot draw odd chalk lines across the path of clerical Liberalism and say at will, “No farther.” Especially are Liberal *clergy* of slower pace morally prohibited from thwarting and upbraiding their swift, it may be precipitate, brethren. Yet those cautious Liberals are for ever making that attempt. It is an unreasonable tale. The Apostles' and Nicene Creeds (to speak for a moment of both) have in interpretation expanded by degrees. 1. “Right hand” has been stretched to

cover immaterial precedence; 2. "Maker of heaven and earth," to cover the cosmic processes of evolution; 3. "Resurrection of the body," to cover *post-mortem* idealism; 4. "To judge both the quick and the dead," to cover vast, gradual discrimination; 5. "Who spake by the prophets," to cover all the valid inspirations of humanity; 6. "Descended into hell," to cover entire de-localisation; 7. "Ascended into heaven," to cover a non-spatial exaltation; 8. "The third day he rose again," to cover objective revival and Christophanies apart from corporal resuscitation; 9. "Born of the Virgin Mary," to cover a non-miraculous but sacrosanct birth.<sup>1</sup> Strange that, speaking loosely and approximately, each group of liberating expositors has assailed its more advanced companions; that each group has been, in some measure, persecuted, and in its turn has inclined to persecute, has been defendant in one age and prosecutor in the next. Group 2 has cast at group 3 the reproaches aimed at itself by group 1; group 3 against group 4 its own picked-up and similarly spent missiles. And now the first seven groups appear to unite in action for the censure and arrest of groups 8 and 9.<sup>2</sup> It is arbitrary, and it may not be. You cannot carve Liberalism into two clean and separate halves, marking one "allowed" and the other "forbidden." Liberalism is a

<sup>1</sup> Well might T. H. Green declare (*Two Lay Sermons*): "It is only in word, or to the intellectually dead, that the creed of the present is the same as the creed of the past."

<sup>2</sup> Professor Sidgwick himself draws an iron line against group 9; he affirms that if the miraculous birth of Christ be withdrawn there falls "the vast weight of Nicene Theology." The teaching of such a man compels me, a plain working clergyman, to a respectful attention. But Dr Sidgwick was eminent as a moral philosopher, not as a doctor of the Church, and he is no expert in appraising the securities and props of theology. In this sphere we may set over him at hazard, say, Dr Armitage Robinson, Dean of Wells, who in his noted open Letter to the Archbishop of Canterbury writes: "The Incarnation is a cardinal doctrine of the faith. . . . But to say that the historical fact of the Virgin-birth is a cardinal doctrine of the faith is to use language which no Synod of Bishops, so far as I am aware, has ever ventured to use. It is to confuse the Incarnation with the special mode of the Incarnation in a way for which Christian theology offers no precedent."



body of principles which embrace restrained practitioners and violent. In no case, however elementary, is clerical Liberalism free, or ever has been, from difficulty of conduct. To use words in an unusual sense is never sweet to the honest man; it is not simple enough; and, as the *Imitation* says, *Beati simplices*. But in a period of stress it may be a duty thus, sometimes painfully, to serve the fundamental realities of the Church, which are the fundamental interests of mankind.<sup>1</sup>

My own belief is this:

(1) I accept the Nicene Creed. (2) At once I distinguish. I mentally shift the emphasis more and more on to the great spiritual affirmations of that reverend symbol, away from the detailed historical affirmations; (3) because the spiritual affirmations (*e.g.* "I believe in one God . . . and in one Lord Jesus Christ . . . being of one substance with the Father. . . . And I believe in the Holy Ghost . . . and I believe one Catholick and Apostolick Church") appear to me to be the proper and sure exercises, and to be based on the inward experience, of the common Christian consciousness; whereas the detailed historical affirmations (*e.g.* "He suffered and was buried, and the *third day* He rose again according to the Scriptures, and *ascended* into Heaven"), literally interpreted, stand on the authority, and, so to speak, at the mercy, of a small band of trained historical scholars. (4) This distinction obtains, in my judgment, even in the case of the central doctrine, viz. between (*a*) the spiritual affirmation of the Incarnation, on the one hand, and (*b*), on the other hand, the historical affirmation of the physical miracle—which is of the Incarnation the traditional mode and concomitant. (5) I accept the record of this physical miracle of the Nativity with far less assurance than the record of that spiritual fact of the Incarnation; because I believe that of that spiritual fact the Christian consciousness, exerting its just functions, has been an abiding and age-long witness, whereas from the

<sup>1</sup> According to that fine definition of religion as "the adjustment of our conduct to a transcendent world."

physical miracle historical science (here the appropriate and final decider) appears, in the voices of its chief European authorities, to be more and more averse—the critical chemistry seeming more and more to put the supernatural, containing narrative into natural solution. That miracle, however, has been ingrained in the Christian consciousness for eighteen hundred years; it has been ingrained in my consciousness (with one obscuring interval) from childhood; therefore I hold on to it with struggling hope against, as I think, the present verdict of the best historical research and erudition, expecting that this verdict (retracting, devious, zig-zag as it has been in its progress from generation to generation—now destructive, now restoring, now discordant, now unanimous) may yet, before it reaches its goal, take another conservative turn.

(6) But madness it were not to look ahead; to shut one's eyes and ears to the immense critical disturbance; not to prepare, especially in view of critical exploits in the Old Testament, for a possibly adverse critical issue in the New Testament; to rear the Christian edifice on territory which we rent from the historians, and from which they may oust us, rather than on the native spiritual ground and indefeasible freehold of the Church. This would be again to play the obscurant and disastrous part of the Roman Church in Spain, of the Eastern Church in Russia. Even so staid a journal as *The Guardian* was alive, and radically alive, fourteen years ago to these possibilities. In a long review, 31st January 1900, of Professor Percy Gardner's *Exploratio Evangelica*, it writes:

“Now if it should prove on a fair and thorough criticism (and this is the work, not of one man, but of a generation) that on historical grounds the conclusions summarised in this book, or others like them, are true, then Professor Gardner has done a work of simply inestimable value in sketching the lines of reconstruction. And it will be found that he retains a large proportion of what ordinary Christians most value, though under forms which at first sight seem strange and even repellent.”

These anticipations are akin to the forecast of the present writer. (7) Religion in accord with Science; ecclesiastics



docile, repenting of our immemorial error; the host of Christian pilgrims chanting their processional hymn in tune with knowledge; *mentally* God and sinners reconciled—an article of my creed is that this coming of the Lord is at hand.

Adeste, fideles,  
 Laeti triumphantes,  
 Venite, venite in Bethlehem;  
 Natum videte  
 Regem Angelorum:  
 Venite adoremus Dominum.

HUBERT HANDLEY.

LONDON.

## THE FAILURE OF THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND.

THE REV. A. W. F. BLUNT, M.A.,

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IT is a healthy symptom in the condition of the Church of England that it is beginning to admit its own failure. That failure is indeed patent, whether we consider the statistics of church attendance, or more significant facts, such as the slightness of the Church's hold on the modern democratic movements, its proved incapacity to revise its own Prayer Book, or its obvious inability to instil a sense of discipline into its members or a sense of mutual charity and trust into its several sections. We have had various speculations of late as to the causes of this failure. Most of them, written from the academic standpoint, find the explanation in the intellectual unrest of the time. Typical of this class of speculation is the essay by Mr Talbot in *Foundations*, or an article by "Academicus" in the *Church Quarterly Review* for January 1913. But, so far as I know, we have not yet heard any explanation from the standpoint of the parochial clergy. And it is as an attempt at some such statement that this article is offered. After all, we must recognise that University society and the rare circles of the educated do not mould English opinion. Their influence is but small in those large or small centres of commerce in which the parochial clergy are mostly busy ; and what is here written is merely an effort to summarise



the experience gained in a typical parish of a large provincial city, a parish wherein every class of commercial society is represented.

Mr Talbot has written a most interesting essay on "the modern situation." It is just the kind of generalisation which was to be expected from a University *milieu*, and it is done as well as it could be done. But I am bound to confess that those elements which he cites as constituting the modern situation are simply negligible, in any description of the situation such as it is found in a place like this, compared with elements which he does not notice. Let me put the position quite personally. Of hostility to the Church I find but rare examples, of hostility to parsons not many, of hostility to religion very few. The vast majority of people are friendly. They approve of religion, they approve of the Church—many even subscribe to it. It helps, they feel, to keep the poor quiet and the young respectable. At the same time, a clear majority of grown people in all classes, rich, middle, and poor, neither attend the church nor take any active interest in religion. Intellectual reasons may account, perhaps, for five per cent. of the cases, but not for more. For the rest, their attitude is not one of positive opposition or disbelief or doubt, not even of avowed indifference, but of sheer negative neglect. The causes of this neglect are partly the accidents of household occupation ; most households include no domestic servants, and where there are no servants the care of babies and small children becomes a tie which makes church attendance very difficult, and the father will very seldom enter a church if his wife and child are at home or are waiting to be taken for a walk. But, beyond this, the neglect is due to simple unadulterated slackness. It seems a contemptibly commonplace and homely explanation in comparison with speculations as to intellectual tendencies. But I appeal to any parish priest whether it is not his experience that scientific or intellectual movements are far less formidable enemies of religious observance than the bed, the arm-chair, the pipe, the motor car, the

bicycle, or the golf club. It is not mental alertness but physical relaxation which is the Church's worst opponent.

This cult of physical relaxation is in its turn due to various causes. The bodily strain, the pressure, and the monotony of modern industrial and commercial occupations is one cause. But it is not the only cause, for the tendency is found, not only in the "working classes," but in the leisured classes to at least as great a degree, perhaps even to a greater degree in proportion to their opportunities of recreation. There is a real slackening of moral fibre among all classes; and the butterfly existence of so-called "Society" has its parallels among those whom convention does not admit to that charmed level. And with this moral slackness goes a spiritual laziness. A large proportion of the people do not come to church simply because they cannot pray. Worship is too severe a tax on their spiritual capacity. The Holy Communion commits them, as they recognise, to a degree for which they feel themselves unequal. This laziness is not observable only in matters of religion: it prevails with regard to all educational opportunities. Very few boys and girls continue any form of study after they leave school; and crowds will attend a football match, whilst a mere handful can be attracted to an organ recital or a lecture.

A great deal of this slackness is purely temperamental, even though it is general. There is no conscious theory at its back. But, so far as any dim nebula of a theory can be discerned, it may be described somewhat as follows: "Church attendance is not a necessity but a tax; and the tax is superfluous. Religion is a private affair; I can worship just as well at home. And indeed worship itself is somewhat of a luxury. A religion of mere morality is quite enough, and morality can be practised independently of worship, whether public or private."

The failure of the Church is not so entire as it seems. There is no doubt that its influence extends very widely to produce a respect for moral laws and sanctions. The witness of the Church on moral questions, weakly and inadequately as



it has been given and understood, is yet much stronger and more generally accepted, even among those who are unaffected by its witness to spiritual truth, than is always realised. And, moreover, even its spiritual teaching is more powerful than any statistics would suggest. The stream of grace which flows from the Church touches many beyond its active or even its professing members; and the average non-churchgoer is much nearer to the kingdom of heaven than he is himself aware. But it must nevertheless be admitted that, so far as any public recognition of religious obligation or any private sense of personal religious conviction is concerned, his life discloses a blank void. I repeat that this is scarcely ever due to theoretic reasons. The problems of pain and sin and death trouble some, but the experience of pain and sin and death brings more to church and to a real sense of religious duty than the problem of these evils keeps away. The real trouble is not intellectual. It arises far more from absorption in temporal pursuits and enjoyments. The cares and riches and pleasures of the world are the real agencies that choke the Word. The majority do not hold off from religion because they think on the subject. They do not think. They neither believe nor disbelieve. Their only philosophy is that this world is quite enough to bother about. And this is true, with due allowances, whether they are top or bottom dogs. There is very little opposition to the Church's dogmas and sacraments, because there is very little understanding of them. They are neglected not because they are regarded as untrue or superstitious, but because they seem immaterial and superfluous. There is an almost total indifference to the Church's discipline, not because it is the discipline of the Church, but because it is discipline.

The Church, in fact, has failed to produce a conviction of its own necessity, except as an ethical agency; a conviction of its own value, except as an emotional dispensary. In the former capacity it appears to the average respectable and moral man as something which may do good, but not a good

of which he himself stands in need. In the latter capacity it commends itself to women; but the average man, however sentimental he is at bottom, is profoundly shy of confessing or seeming to recognise the characteristic. And so on both counts he holds himself aloof. The Church has not succeeded in winning general recognition as the indispensable home of indispensable grace for the human will, as the indispensable giver of a corporate witness to God, enunciating dogmas as the necessary formulas of corporate assent, and imposing discipline as the necessary rules for corporate obedience. And this failure, though not entirely, is largely our own fault. In our effort to justify our own existence, we have allowed religion to be misrepresented as a mere moralising agency, as a kind of special constable sworn in to assist the secular law, and public worship to be misrepresented as a mere sedative or soporific to human emotions. Even our churchgoers are very often in a state of gelatinous amiability on the subject. Many come to church because it helps to keep them respectable or because they find "spiritual comfort" in the services; and we meet their wishes by making them spiritually comfortable. We decoct soothing syrup for the soul, when what it often needs is a really bracing tonic or a discomforting purgative. In other words, we have compromised too much. We may have Christianised the world a little, but we have permitted the world to secularise the Church a great deal more. We have tried the easier part of our task, to infuse a flavour of goodness into the wicked world, or a flavour of sentiment into the hard world; we have shied back from the more difficult part, to infuse a flavour of eternity into temporal life. It is true that there has been a big revival of the emphasis on grace and witness and self-dedication; but this revival has not always been well directed, and certainly its success is not proportionate to the effort put forward. If there has been a growth of Church feeling, there has also been a growth of worldly neglect.

To some extent the Church's failure was inevitable. It is involved in the very nature of the problem, in the very fact



that the Church of Christ is not the Kingdom of God. Christ's laws give the ideal for the Kingdom's life. But the Church has had to be opportunist, has had to compromise those laws, by the mere stress of its relation to the world in which it exists. It began by compromising the moral ideal for the sake of discipline and dogma. It adopted an attitude of exclusiveness and opposition to the world; it made dogma and discipline its test of membership, and it excommunicated more often for heresy than for immorality, for ecclesiastical than for ethical irregularity. It went perhaps too far in this direction; but its attitude, apart from the extravagances of ecclesiasticism, was fundamentally right. It was right, because corporate unity is more valuable than individual morality. Morality is derivative, dogma is primary. To make morality the test of membership is, moreover, to attempt the hopeless task of establishing a Church of none but saints. In practice the task is hopeless, for morality is often only surface-deep, and moral goodness is too elusive to be standardised. The result of the attempt, whenever it has been made, has been to attach predominant importance to the obvious and grosser sins, at the risk of condoning the subtler but perhaps more fundamental sins. And in theory also the attempt is a complete mistake, for the Church is not the Kingdom, and in the Church tares and wheat are to grow together till the harvest. We are often invited to condemn a Church which could burn John Huss and leave Cæsar Borgia scatheless. And no doubt Church unity has sometimes acted as a Juggernaut. But that is also sometimes the behaviour of Truth itself. And though nobody will condone either moral laxity or dogmatic bigotry, nevertheless the right order for the Church to preserve is dogma, discipline, morals, as may be realised when we note what has resulted from inverting the order. For the characteristic of the Church of England in modern times has been a reaction to dogmatic and disciplinary laxity; an armistice has been declared between the Church and the world; the Church no longer opposes the world, but has experimented with the

policy of permeation and peaceful penetration. And the result is patent. The Church's moral influence is nearly as strong as its influence in dogma and discipline is weak; and yet the Church as a whole is weak, and religion as a whole is weak also. Many men are respectful towards the moral laws which the Church declares, who pass idly by the spiritual facts on which it bases these laws. And the result is not only that the Church suffers under the huge burden of its nominal adherents, but that the cause of religion in general suffers also; for such people may be moral, or they may be sentimental, but they are carnally and not spiritually minded.

The policy, therefore, which seems indicated is that of a counter-reaction, a reaction by which the line of demarcation between Church and world shall no longer be blurred, but shall be drawn clear and precise, that all men may know definitely what membership of the Church is and means and involves, alike in regard to dogma, to discipline, and to morals. (1) Under the first head, we need to revert to an emphasis on the necessity of a visible Church, and to assert that religious individualism or non-religious socialism are both but mutilations of Christianity. We need to enhance the importance of Church membership by reviving the thought of the Church as the priestly body. And as a corollary we need to proclaim the value of Church dogma as a necessary expression of that body's corporate mind. Of course, the relation of dogma to truth is a question that needs constant discussion. We must allow that dogma is but an imperfect formulation of truth, and we must not present a hard front to all possibilities of restating dogmas. But there is a world of difference between being ready to give ear to restatements of dogma, and dogmatically denying that dogmas are necessary at all. We must insist that dogma has a positive value, a primary necessity, as the only true basis of all Christian morals, and as the agreed formulation of what the Church holds to be true; and that all the doctrinal disputes which have seemed to be concerned with mere words, or even mere letters, did, as a matter of fact,



result in a more synthetic formula, *i.e.* one that is nearer the truth, and therefore a stronger foundation for morality.

(2) Under the head of discipline, we had better begin by giving up the pretence to be a National Church in any sense which hinders us from being a Catholic Church. In particular, we had better renounce the ambition to be a Church which every Englishman has, by virtue of his nationality, a right to belong to but no duty to obey. We shall be more wisely advised to equate our work in England with our work in the mission-field. Then we shall be able to realise that the discipline of the mission-field is as necessary here in England as it is in countries for which we do not make the equivocal claim that they are nominally Christian. To take but one example, we shall perhaps begin to recognise the futility and folly of our present system or want of system in the administration of Holy Baptism, whereby we baptize indiscriminately all who are presented, without observing any one of the safeguards which the Church has ordained as conditions of that administration—safeguards which, in the mission-field, nobody would dream of neglecting, but which we have allowed in England to become practically obsolete, with the result that baptism has sunk to the level of a social ceremony of registration or of a magical charm, working *ex opere operato*.

(3) Under the head of morals there is, of course, no doubt that we need to give, with much less vacillation and ambiguity, a social message to the world of our time. But it is even as necessary that we should, in dealing with our own members, insist that the groundwork of their moral obligation is their corporate duty, and that sin is not merely sin against the body of society, but against the Body of Christ. In short, we need to teach that their moral duty is based upon their position as members of Christ, and that membership of Christ is based upon a given grace. The Church is a teacher of morals, because it is a steward of grace; and the indispensable relation of ethics to sacraments is a point upon which our own members should be no longer left in uncertainty. Humanitarian ethics

are one thing; Christian morals are another; the Church's concern is with the latter, not with the former.

The laity, then, need to be far more definitely and thoroughly educated in Churchmanship. It follows, therefore, that the clergy must be better equipped to instruct them. It is often supposed that a more learned clergy will be better able to attract outsiders and convince gainsayers. But this is only true in regard to a very small section of English society; for the rest, it is a delusion. The great majority of outsiders are not gainsayers; they are not imbued with intellectual objections, and will not therefore be impressed by an intellectual ability to answer them. But a learned clergy will be better able to instruct their own people thoroughly. And the necessity of a better-educated clergy is thus a corollary from the necessity of a better-educated laity.

Nothing so far has been said on the subject of Christian reunion. But the omission is deliberate. Reunion must indeed be a primary charge on the Church's prayers. But at present it is quite clear that overt attempts at reunion are premature. They are premature because we are still obsessed by the idea that the way to attain reunion is that each side should give up something. And that is but the vainest of fancies. Reunion can only be attained (as the Bishop of Chicago has told us) when every side comes prepared to say, not what it will give up, but what it will give. And we at any rate are not ready to do this until we are clearer in our own minds where we stand and what exactly we have to give.

We must not, however, expect that such a policy as is here recommended will transmute our failure into a vulgar success. If statistics be our criterion, our failure will in all probability be more apparent; we shall probably lose numbers of adherents, at any rate at first. This need not trouble us unduly. Language is often used which would imply that, if the Church only did its duty properly, it would be bound to be a success. But this is a complete illusion. The example of Christ's own ministry is enough to prove that a statistical



success cannot be commanded so easily ; and all Church history testifies that a Nemesis waits on such success. We shall be well advised to abjure thoughts of success and to devote our attention to loyalty. If we do our duty, we shall not be popular. But at least we shall be a Church of Christ, failing, if we fail, because we are a Church of Christ. At present our success, so far as we succeed, is that of a compromise with the world ; our failure, so far as we fail, is the punishment that waits on such a compromise ; and the punishment is not likely to become less.

Is this the policy of despair ? It may seem so. And yet we shall only be tempted to despair if we forget that the purpose for which the Church exists is not to save souls—that is Christ's work—but to bring Christ to souls, and souls to Christ ; not to win members—that is the Holy Spirit's work—but to bear witness to the truth, whether men will hear or whether they will forbear.

Finally, if we are not to concern ourselves with calculations of numbers, shall we be tempted to be tactless, harsh in our judgments, roughly uncompromising and rudely dictatorial ? That indeed is a possible danger. But it is a less danger than that of unworthy or over-eager compromise. Men are as a rule prone to be enamoured of popularity, and we shall not be likely to err by excess of zeal for the unpopular alternative. For many a day to come the motto, "If I yet pleased men, I should not be the servant of Christ," will be a wiser one for us to digest than the motto, "I am become all things to all men." And if we carry on Christ's work with a great sincerity and loyalty to the truth, and above all in the spirit of true prayer, we may in time be guided into that finest wisdom which is able to combine both mottoes in thorough and perfect concord.

A. W. F. BLUNT.

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# CHANGING RELIGION.

J. ARTHUR HILL.

## I.

To those of us who live in the swirl and rush of commercial life—as, for instance, in a West Riding city where as a topic of conversation even the weather gives place to wool—the most striking feature of modern life is its intense practicality. Anything that has no apparent bearing on actual life is regarded as of no importance. The word “theoretical” is used as a term of opprobrium, suggesting imaginative flights uselessness, and moonshine. Inventor and discoverer command no respect, unless a company can be floated, and dividends earned. We are a mercenary and utilitarian generation.

For this temper of mind the great triumphs of applied science are no doubt largely responsible. We have seen such miracles performed in facilitating locomotion and communication, from railways to aeroplanes and radio-telegraphy, and are so much interested in the multitude of comforts and pleasures which a high civilisation affords, that our whole attention is focussed on the external parts of life, on the things which affect material well-being. And, side by side with this development, and indeed incorporated with it, is the growth of industrial conditions, and consequent commercialisation of values. Money is the most powerful means to the attainment of comfort and pleasure. Therefore, business success is, naturally, our ideal.

This development has had its effect on religion. Here also we are become practical. To some extent religion seems to be dwindling and dying, crowded out of existence by the mere stress of making a living, or, in the case of the idle rich, by eating,



drinking, and being merry. And it is not solely the rich that are guilty of this latter indictment. The crowds on football-field, cricket-field, racecourse, and in public-houses are made up mostly of working men. Work and low forms of pleasure divide between them almost all the waking hours of a terribly large proportion of our people. Religion is being squeezed out. Where it does continue to exist and to show any vitality, it is being compelled to be practical, in order to survive. And the practical form of religion is morality, social service, and the like.

There is no need to deprecate this practical religion. The world has much need of it, and the various social reformers are doing good work on its behalf. Fired by the injustice of present conditions, they set out with eager zeal to succour the not-guilty "bottom dog." They are right in so doing, even though it may justly be urged against them that their aims are low—a mere affair of more cakes and ale, to be paid for by lessening the grouse and champagne of the plutocrats. The aims are low, but commendable nevertheless. If we can raise the average of well-being, if we can diminish suffering, by all means let us do so.

Other forces are impelling thoughtful religious men in the same direction. These, perceiving that, whatever our supposed differences on matters of belief, we are all agreed on the importance of good character, are inclining more and more to a religion which shall at least be undogmatic. Doctrine divides; righteousness unites. On practical moral issues the believers in all kinds of 'daxies are at one, and can work together in efficient harmony. This fact, so striking a contrast to the facts of disunion and discord which are still occasionally thrust on our notice by what Emerson calls "the fury of sect," is leading peaceable souls away from doctrine, and towards life. They say, with Mr Birrell :

"Whatever mysteries might appertain to mind and matter, and notwithstanding grave doubts as to the authenticity of the Fourth Gospel, it is bravery, truth and honour, loyalty and hard work, each man at his post, that make this planet inhabitable" (*Obiter Dicta*).

Boileau, speaking of the Jesuits, said that they were a people who "lengthen the creed and shorten the Decalogue." The modern tendency is exactly the reverse. Less creed, more righteousness. In our libraries the dust lies thick on volumes of controversial divinity, and even the famous *Provincial Letters* are read—as by Gibbon—only for their style. The points which were vital then are now remote and uninteresting. Not even the wit of Pascal can make the dry bones live, even though the quarrel between Jesuit and Jansenist was partly on moral grounds. How much more defunct, then—if more were possible—must the purely doctrinal controversies be! Who cares now about *homoousion* and *homoiousion*? The diphthong which once split the Christian world in two, now stirs no pulse—no, not even a theologian's!

The tendency, then, is to elevate morality (including social service) into a religion. This is in the right direction, but it overshoots the mark by being *too* practical. Morality cannot take the place of religion so long as the human constitution remains what it is.

In the first place, it ignores the speculative, cause-seeking, metaphysical instinct. Probably all men, even in our busy and practical times, are in various hours of stress or exalted perception (someone's death, a "sunset-touch, a chorus-ending from Euripides") impelled to address to the universe, however inarticulately, a series of questions which morality cannot answer. What am I? And Whence? And Whither? And what does Existence mean? The positivist tells us that we ought not to ask these questions, because there is no answer to them; though how he knows that is not quite clear. If he is relying on his intuitions, he is no more likely to be right than the metaphysician, whose intuitions point the other way. And, anyhow, we cannot get away from the fact that the human mind *does* ask these questions, and cannot help asking them. And (*pace* Mr Frederic Harrison and other exceptions who serve to prove the rule) the vehemence



of the asking is in direct ratio with the general mental power and spiritual elevation of the asker. The yokel wonders least, and questions least; a Carlyle—yes, even an optimist Browning—withers and agonises in strenuous demand. The questioning is there, right or wrong. Religion answers the questions. The Ethical Society and the positivist do not. Therefore, morality cannot replace religion.

Nevertheless, it seems probable that this metaphysical questioning is, as just indicated, very much on the wane. The modern mind, so full of practical affairs, is becoming less and less concerned about a final solution of the riddle of the universe. Also, the scientific man—and we are all more or less scientific now—sees the universe as such a stupendous affair that any attempt at totality-explanation seems more than a little absurd. It may therefore be admitted that, though the failure of morality to supply a metaphysic is fatal to its present attempt to become a religion, this may nevertheless be no permanent block. Humanity may become less speculative; metaphysics may sink into limbo; and morality may become sufficient unto itself and may then call itself a religion—though it will not be what we mean by religion now.<sup>1</sup>

But this affair of metaphysics is only one objection. It is possible enough that future generations may lose interest in complete solutions of the *Welt-Räthsel*, as we in our time have lost interest in the quibbles of the schoolmen; but there is another question which will gain correspondingly in importance. Withdrawal from metaphysical speculation, *plus* the extremely practical temper already alluded to, will lead to a vigorous inquiry into the bases of morality. The man in the street, unregenerate, practical, will ask why he should act morally when his inclinations draw him in other directions. The moralist and the positivist have no convincing answer.

<sup>1</sup> "It seems that in course of time we shall reach a stage in which, recognising the mystery of things as insoluble, religious organisations will be devoted to ethical culture" (Herbert Spencer's *Autobiography*, vol. ii. p. 468).

Abstract Moral Ideals, abstract *Grands Êtres*, salvation through August Comte our Lord,—these do not appeal to our unregenerate friend. Try another tack, ask him if he does not feel an inner impulse to “realise his highest self,” and he will smile vaguely, or shrug definitely. These phrases do not touch him. They are blank cartridges. You must put forth your hand—taking a hint from the wily Adversary’s counsel—and touch his bone and his flesh. If, for example, you tell him, in answer to his question as to why he should do right, that in proportion as he fails to do it in this world he will suffer pain in the next, that for each attempt at doing right here, he will be rewarded there—if you can seriously tell him this, you will reach him. You have given him what he calls a “reason.” The question of course remains as to whether your alleged facts are true, and the man may not accept them as being so; but he will admit that if they *are* true, they are of vital importance to him. His own well-being is concerned, and he is thus touched in his tenderest spot. If the alleged facts are true, he recognises that they provide a sufficient “reason” for effort of a kind which may not be pleasure-yielding here, but which will be worth while, in view of the ultimate outcome. Religion says that the facts are true: morality and positivism say nothing: therefore religion has the pull.

This demand for rewards and punishments before we will consent to “be good” may seem a childish or even a mean thing. But, after all, what are we but grown-up children? Why should we pretend, and put on spiritual airs? Why fear to admit that we do not like pain, that we want to be happy? Constituted as we are, we cannot help it. Let us then at least be honest! Let us admit that religion’s assurance of pains and rewards in a future state is sufficient inducement, if believed, to make us conform more nearly than we otherwise might to the ideal conduct. The trouble is that it is no longer believed. Heaven and hell have vanished in their turn, as the Valhalla of our Norse forebears vanished



when Christianity arose on the twilight of the ancient gods; and we are left, as Mr Kidd among others has lengthily informed us, without rational sanction for morality. We are in need of something that shall be to theological Christianity what that Christianity was to the followers of Odin. We await a new Paulinus to tell us—as in Bede's pathetic little story he told Eadwine and his court—whither flies the soul when it passes out into the dark. And it is not altogether mere selfishness. It is often on behalf of others that we most strongly feel that justice is not done here, and that another stage of existence is needed to square things up. Also, we have a kind of instinctive conviction that, quite apart from moral desert and payment, there is a bigger meaning in our existence than this life manifests to us, and greater powers in our own selves than we are at present able to make use of:—

“ . . . if the wages of Virtue be dust,  
Would she have heart to endure for the life of the worm and the fly?  
She desires no isles of the blest, no quiet seats of the just,  
To rest in a golden grove, or to bask in a summer sky:  
Give her the wages of going on, and not to die.”

But *does* she go on? That is the question.

## II.

The appeal to revelation and metaphysic is now obsolete. The case must be tried at the bar of science. The science of the nineteenth century disclaimed the power to deal with the question directly, but thought that the notion of survival of death was indirectly rendered absurd by the establishment of regular concomitance between mental and cerebral changes. However, we have now changed all that. We know now that science *can* deal directly with the problem of death, while, as to psycho-physical parallelism, it is now recognised that this parallelism—even if it were much more complete than is yet proved—is no argument for materialism.<sup>1</sup>

There seems to be a strong probability that this branch of

<sup>1</sup> Cf. F. C. S. Schiller's *Riddles of the Sphinx*, p. 295; Professor James's *Human Immortality*; and Bergson's *Matière et Mémoire* for anti-parallelism.

scientific investigation will play a very important part in the religious and philosophical life of the twentieth century. For the last thirty-one years the Society for Psychical Research has plodded along, sadly hampered and abused by the over-credulous for being too sceptical, and by the ignorant over-incredulous for being too believing; and the results of its quiet labours are already rather astonishing, particularly the latest developments, which seem to indicate that some of the Society's recently deceased members are carrying on a vigorous campaign of communication from "the other side."<sup>1</sup> There is no need to repeat here any summary of the evidence, which is extremely complex, and very difficult to estimate; but it is noteworthy that some of the more sceptical among the investigators—old hands who are keenly alive to the various alternatives of fraud, telepathy, etc.—have been greatly impressed, and almost convinced, by the recent phenomena. It may also be said, without fear of contradiction, that no serious inquirer has ever yet been known to investigate with any thoroughness in these regions, without coming to the conclusion that things do happen which orthodox science cannot explain. The investigators may differ among themselves as to whether the true explanation is "spirits," telepathy from living minds, clairvoyance, or something as yet unnamed (or a mixture of some or all of these), but they are agreed that *some* supernormal explanation is required. And it seems extremely likely that any such explanation will involve, even if it does not directly affirm, the supposition of man's survival of bodily death. If so, science will have made religion rational once more. The man in the street will listen, for the religious teacher will give him solid, scientific reasons for devoting some attention to soul-culture. He will prove to him that dollars are not everything, and that the man who builds for this life only, is taking a short-sighted view of existence. The far-

<sup>1</sup> *Proceedings S.P.R.*, vols. xx. to xxvi. inclusive, *Hibbert Journal*, Jan. 1909 (summary of vol. xxii., and comments, by Mr G. W. Balfour and Principal Graham). Also *New Quarterly*, Jan. 1909, article by Mrs Verrall.



seeing, practical man, once he is convinced that, ultimately, the race is not to the swift nor the battle to the strong, but that virtue, character, are the things which lead to the ultimate prizes—once having seen this, he will shape his course, at least to some extent, accordingly. The horizons have receded; the former limits are limits no longer; there is further territory to take into account; and from being entirely this-worldly he will become, at least partially, *other-worldly*.

And this, “enlightened selfishness” though it be, is at least an improvement. It is a selfishness of a better kind. It aims at a spiritual instead of a material welfare. It brings with it philanthropic endeavour, conducing to mitigation of others’ sufferings, to charitable judgments, to righteousness and sweetness. It is therefore not to be undervalued, imperfect though it is.<sup>1</sup>

### III.

Thus far we have tacitly assumed that religion, in order to recapture the modern man, must be rational, must be able to give scientific evidence for the things not seen, must offer some kind of proof of the continuance of man’s spirit into a *post-mortem* state the conditions of which will depend on our use of the life that we now have. Two questions here arise.

(a) Granted survival, is there moral continuity, as religions assert? Is sin punished, and virtue rewarded? We need proof of this, as well as of mere survival, before the psychical-research evidence can have any compelling moral influence. In answer to this, we may frankly admit that the evidence for moral continuity is at present much smaller than that for survival. We have had enough to do to prove survival, and our efforts have been almost entirely directed to the securing

<sup>1</sup> If, as offset to our request for rewards, we are willing to suffer the consequences of our sins, there seems much less “meanness” in the attitude than in that of an Evangelical who accepts the old theory of the Atonement. As Sir Oliver Lodge remarks, none but a cur “will ask for the punishment to fall on someone else, nor rejoice if told that it had already so fallen” (*Man and the Universe*, p. 220).

of evidence of identity, or, as in the "cross-correspondences," to the proof that *some* mind external to the automatists is concerned. Moral continuity, then, is presumed rather than proved; though it may be proved later on.

(b) Is religion necessarily bound up with belief in survival of bodily death, or indeed with any particular intellectual opinion or opinions? Is not the religious state of consciousness essentially different from intellectual processes and conclusions? Are we not committing an *ignoratio elenchi*—hitting the wrong target—by labouring at our psychical-research proofs of survival, in the interests of religion? These proofs may affect conduct, through self-interest (though, as a matter of fact, creed affects conduct much less than is commonly supposed), but they do not change the man himself. He is not necessarily any better, inwardly, for the mere knowledge that *post-mortem* reward and punishment is a fact. No amount of intellectual knowledge can take the place of, or will necessarily bring with it, spiritual elevation of character—*i.e.* real goodness. The two things are distinct.

Here it becomes apparent that it is desirable to have a definition of "religion," and this is a difficult matter. The usual etymologies (of Cicero and Lactantius) are of little assistance. Kant's "morality considered as a divine command" is too theistic, and moreover seems—in Arnold's phrase—insufficiently "touched with emotion." Max Müller's "perception of the infinite," etc., is suggestive but unsatisfactory, the "infinite" being a purely negative term, and thus a true Unknowable and Unperceivable. Myers's "response of the soul to all that it knows of cosmic law" is good, but perhaps lays too much emphasis on knowledge; for the religious man, *quâ* religious, is not thinking of law or knowledge. For present purposes, let us take Professor James's definition of religion as an affair of "inner unhappiness and need of deliverance on the one hand, and mystical emotion on the other" (*Varieties of Religious Experience*, p. 431). According to this, it is a feeling of unrest, of being somehow



wrong and out of tune; merging into a more or less ecstatic feeling of rest, of attainment, as of one who is put right and is *in* tune.

It is interesting to note the ubiquity of these psychological facts. They are not by any means confined to Christianity, nor even to organised religions of any kind. John Stuart Mill attained a mild sort of regeneration, after a period of typical uneasiness and melancholy, by reading Wordsworth. Some may even reach it through mathematics.<sup>1</sup> The best examples are, however, to be found in Christian literature; and of these Professor James gave in the *Varieties* an excellent selection. As further illustration, let me here quote a rather good case which I happened to read about just recently:

"Suddenly something happened to me. What it was or how it came I had no idea, but somehow an inner eye seemed to be opened in my soul, and I seemed to see that after all God was a fact—the bottom fact of all facts—and that the only thing to do was to find out all about Him. It was not a pious feeling such as I had been looking for, but it was a conviction—just such a conviction as comes to one when a mathematical problem is suddenly solved. One does not feel that it is solved, but one knows it, and there can be no further question."<sup>2</sup>

Hannah Smith was brought up in a Quaker atmosphere, but was unable to get up the proper religious feeling. From sixteen to twenty-six her religion was "nothing but a religion of trying to feel." Then came the illumination or conversion just described. Continued study of the Bible resulted in a further flash of revelation that God was somehow or other in Christ, reconciling the world unto Himself, "There need be no searchings within or raking up of one's inward feelings to make things right with God. Christ had made them right,

<sup>1</sup> "This condition of Inspiration, direct Intuition, or Enthusiasm—some approach to what is meant by 'seeing God'—is but transitory, and may be rare, but it can be induced by a great variety of instrument. A few attain it during the contemplation of law and order enshrined in a mathematical expression, or in some comprehensive philosophic formula; but to many the transfiguring and revealing experience is heralded by the song of birds, by sunshine upon grass, by the wind in tree-tops, or by the wild solitude of mountains" (Sir Oliver Lodge, *Man and the Universe*, p. 123).

<sup>2</sup> *My Spiritual Autobiography*. By Hannah Whitall Smith. New York: Fleming H. Revell & Co., 1908.

and we had nothing to do but accept it all as a free gift from Him."

As already indicated, it is noteworthy that the mystic uprush follows the line of least resistance. The revelation clothes itself in the familiar symbols. To Quaker Hannah Smith it is God and God-in-Christ; to Unitarian Emerson it is God only, or an impersonal Something which fills him with peace and joy,<sup>1</sup> like the Presence which Wordsworth felt (*Tintern Abbey*, etc.); to Plotinus it is the unnameable One, and communion is the "flight of the Alone to the Alone." Theistic belief is not an essential, as Buddhist mysticism shows. After Gotama's struggle towards attainment comes the familiar ecstasy:

"This is uniformly described as a mental state of exaltation, bliss, insight, altruism. The different Suttas emphasise different phases, different facets, as it were, of this condition. But they regard it as one and the same upheaval of the whole mental and moral nature—will, emotion, and intellect being equally concerned. Thus one Sutta (the *Mahāsaccaka*) lays stress on the four raptures, and the three forms of knowledge; another (the *Dvedha-vitakka*), on the certainty, the absence of doubt; another (the *Bhayabherava*), on the conquest over fear and agitation; another (the *Ariya-pariyesanā*), on the bliss and security of the Nirvana to which he then attained."<sup>2</sup>

Further:—

"And no one of all the experiences described in these accounts is, in the canonical books, confined to the Buddha. Each of them is related, in other passages, of one or other of the men and women who afterwards adopted the new teaching, and fell under its influence. These conditions are constituent parts of the state of mind called Arahatsip. They all recur in the standard description, repeated in so many of the Dialogues, of the manner in which Arahatsip is reached. And the sum of them is, in this connection, called Nirvana, one of the many epithets of Arahatsip."<sup>3</sup>

#### IV.

Religion, then—at least in its most general aspect, as described by Professor James—is not necessarily associated with any particular intellectual conceptions. It is a state of

<sup>1</sup> "Crossing a bare common, in snow puddles, at twilight, under a clouded sky, without having in my thoughts any occurrence of special good fortune, I have enjoyed a perfect exhilaration. I am glad to the brink of fear . . . I become a transparent eyeball; I am nothing; I see all; the currents of the Universal Being circulate through me; I am part or particle of God" (*Nature*).

<sup>2</sup> T. W. Rhys Davids, *Early Buddhism*, pp. 35, 36.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 37.



consciousness, produced in a totally inexplicable manner. It appears or does not appear, and all is said. It is allied to inspiration rather than to reasoning. *Alles ist als wie geschenkt*, as Goethe says; and we have little or no control over the business.

But, though we cannot control these states of mind in any direct or certain way, we can perhaps make some attempt at *judging* them. And, though judgment will not affect mysticism in any direct manner, it will influence the phenomena indirectly; for all minds are more or less susceptible to the general atmosphere. Moreover, there is a tendency here and there, on the part of some who have rebounded from excessive rationalism, to encourage the mystic vision by various methods which are said to be efficacious. This tendency is largely the outcome of our increased knowledge of Buddhism, Yoga, and Oriental mysticism generally. It is particularly manifest in America, where the publications of the New Thought school—led by Horatio Dresser and R. W. Trine—have met with an astonishingly favourable response. It seems therefore very desirable that some evaluation of mystical states should be made, in order that we may discover, if possible, whether they ought to be cultivated or discouraged.

To this end, two things require to be done. (1) Other psychological states, analogous to mystical ones, should be examined, and their value estimated; this should help us in classifying mysticism, in somewhat the same way as a known substance may help us to guess the constitution of an unknown one, if the form of crystallisation is the same. (2) The mystical experience must be submitted to the pragmatic test.

(1) The one feature common to these experiences is, as we have seen, a feeling of peace, attainment, vision, conviction that "it is all right." This kind of state can be produced to some extent in most people by artificial means which the modern conscience does not commend. Thus produced, we call the state—in advanced stages—*drunkenness*. Other drugs besides alcohol are capable of bringing about a similar

result, *e.g.* Indian hemp, laudanum, and other stimulant-narcotics. The same revelation, often in such vividness as to affect the whole after life, may be obtained in states of partial anæsthesia by chloroform, ether, or nitrous oxide, as Professor James points out, quoting the experience of Mr B. P. Blood.<sup>1</sup> Further, the mere fact of ecstatic exaltation may be produced not only by physiological means, but also by hypnotic suggestion, and even by psychological stimuli of low order, without definite suggestion from without. Harriet Martineau tells us in her Autobiography that when a little child she had played cards and had won twopence. "The pavement hardly seemed solid when we walked home—so elated was I," she remarks; "the very sight of silver and copper was transporting to me without any thought of its use" (vol. i. p. 25). A typically mystical state, though of low intensity; yet produced by no specially worthy object. In such cases we assume no influx of the divine. We record the fact, but we draw no inference. Why then should we draw inferences from, or attach special importance to, similar states when they are associated with what are considered venerable objects—God, Jesus, Virgin, τὸ εἶν ἀπλοῦν, and what not? The psychological state proves nothing. Ecstasy, a supreme happiness and consciousness of at-one-ment, does not prove that all is *really* well with the experient, any more than melancholia proves that all is really ill. The mystic of course cannot help his subjective certainty, any more than the sufferer from religious mania can help having the conviction that he is eternally lost; but we must accept neither as proving anything about the real state of affairs.

(2) The mystic consciousness must be pragmatically tested. What are its fruits? Are people better (as it is usual to suppose) after these illuminating experiences? We accept their statement that they *feel* better, but is the feeling enough?

<sup>1</sup> *Varieties*, p. 384. Sir William Ramsay, in partial anæsthesia, "saw" the truth of Berkeleyanism (*Proceedings S.P.R.*, ix. p. 236). Cf. Tennyson's trances, *The Ancient Sage*, and *Memoirs of Alfred Tennyson*, ii. p. 473.



Has their character benefited? Do their interrelations with their fellow-beings show greater approximation to what the general consensus of opinion calls the ideal conduct (roughly, high altruism) than before?

These questions are not easy to answer satisfactorily. The revivalist and the convert will give an unhesitating "Yes" to all of them, but revivalists and converts are not usually philosophers, and we cannot accept their opinions without confirmation. On the whole, it does not seem that we can come to any conclusion on the matter, without carefully collected data which are not yet available. Dr Starbuck's *Psychology of Religion* indicates the kind of statistics required. We want biographies of converted or illuminated individuals—full biographies, from birth to death—in order that we may judge the sum total of the effect of the experience. Failing this, it would be interesting and instructive to have the opinions of careful and unprejudiced observers (if such there be) as to the cases known to them. Let them observe their friends and acquaintances; comparing, in the twice-born cases, "before" and "after," and also comparing the once-born with the twice-born. And, demanding this, I am perhaps called on to practise what I preach, and to give the results of my own observation.

I must premise that my circle of acquaintance is not large enough to supply data for any generalisation, and that I entirely refrain from drawing conclusions. I merely state the results of limited observation, and am prepared to see those results overbalanced by the observations of others whose surroundings are different. This said, I go on to affirm, without hesitation or doubt, that the definitely twice-born people known to me are not specially admirable characters, as compared with the once-born. The obvious retort is that this opinion is due to my own unregenerateness; sinner does not appreciate saint; a hero is not heroic to his valet, not because the hero is not a hero, but because the valet is a valet. And so on. But it is not a matter of mere subjective likes

and dislikes. It is a matter of objective fact. I find that the twice-born—the converted ones, the saints, the “professors”—are less trustworthy in carrying out promises, in telling the scrupulous truth, in punctilious justice and honesty in the minor affairs of life, than the once-born. It so happens that I count among my friends several very vigorous anti-religionists. One is a Haeckelian; another is more of a Huxleyan. I dissent from their philosophy in many points, and I am not prepared to maintain that they are the sweetest-natured among my acquaintances. They are a trifle too assertive and combative; readier to smell religion—in order to jump on it—than ever was inquisitor to smell heresy. But, while admitting their lack of mellowness and depth, I affirm their exceptional trustworthiness. To either of them a promise is a sacred thing. Make an appointment with one of them, and you know that he will punctually be there, though the heavens fall and he has to scramble over the *débris*. They are as reliable as the force of gravity, both in their fulfilling of promises, the justice of their actions, and the veracity of their statements. In these aspects (and surely they are very important ones) they are the most admirable of men.

Turn now to the other side of the shield: consider the converted. Among these brethren I find great (yea, even smug) respectability, great regard for externals, regular attendance at public worship, much emotion at revivals and prayer-meetings, much quoting of Scripture, and much spiritual pride. But exceptional honesty and veracity I do not find. Still, I do not charge them with deliberate lapses, though it needs a robust charity to give them such large benefit of the doubt, in many cases known to me. It seems to me rather that their deviations, their little meannesses and unveracities and dishonesties, are the result of their general mental build. Their religious temperament carries with it moral instability. Having their heads in the cloud, they are unable to see the gross earth. Rapt in their mystic contemplation, they sometimes neglect to pay their bills or keep their promises. “It’s so easy to forget



a little thing like that," as the comic song has it, when the mind is occupied with higher things.

It follows as a natural consequence that in business dealings the unregenerate are preferable to the "professors." A wool-buyer friend of mine who lives in Turkey has a similarly strong preference for Turks as against Armenians. The former (Moslems) are found to be passably honest. The Christian Armenians would manage to steal butter out of a dog's throat.

But, even if my data were sufficient to generalise from—which they are not—the case would not be settled. For my friends the "professors" might have been worse still if they had not been converted; and, on the other hand, my Haeckelian friends might become much better than they already are if they could be regenerated. It is therefore impossible to judge from these people whether or not a conversion or second birth is morally beneficial.

It may be claimed, however, that many converts at revival services do exhibit a change of character which is an improvement. Drinking habits may be abandoned, and chapel-going adopted. Whether the man is really improved, is less certain. Sometimes he becomes a canting rogue, very vocal and plausible. Sometimes he seems to have merely changed his method of intoxication; for, in Wales particularly, religious services seem to have an emotional character which becomes almost frenzied. Still, the new method is cheaper, and the convert's wife and family will probably benefit, whether *he* does or not. But, in short, we cannot tell, with any certainty, whether the "religious consciousness" is pragmatically good and desirable or not—whether it is evolutive or degenerative.

## V.

Thus, at the end, reason abdicates. I, personally, being a once-born subject, may incline to suspect that mystical emotion is morbid and pernicious, like hashish-ecstasy, opium-dream, or "anæsthetic revelation." But I cannot prove it,

any more than the mystic can prove *his* point. In other words, if you like, the conviction on both sides is intuitive. Each has as much right to his opinion as the other. I confess, with regret, that the mystic is much more confident than I am, and therefore happier. But, as already remarked in a different connection, that is no proof of his *real* rightness. In fact, it is rather the other way. Most of us know a few people who are exceptionally sure that they have the whole truth on this or that matter, and it is a continual source of astonishment to them that other people fail to see it. They are generally very happy people—naturally enough—and I confess to an occasional spasm of envy in talking to one of the fraternity. To an irreverent and unfeeling world they are popularly known as *cranks*.

As to the future of religion, then, reason can tell us nothing. For, in great measure, religion is a matter of subliminal uprush, and we do not know the laws of its manifestation. The spirit bloweth and is still; and in each case we know not why. May it not be, however, to hazard a speculation, that the inspiration which formerly manifested itself in the mystic emotion of religion may be in course of changing its mode of manifestation? Instead of appearing as emotion, it may appear as *intellectual* energy. Is not such a guess to some extent supported by the trend of history? There is probably less religious emotion in Christendom per head at the present day than ever before. And there is certainly an increase in average *intellectual* acquirements and powers. Does it not seem—here I admit to airing my *Aberglaube*—that a Suso, a St John of the Cross, a Boehme, a Marguerite Marie Alacoque—who was so ecstatic that she “wasn’t any good in the kitchen” and who supplied an insoluble problem to the good nuns as to what on earth was to be done with her—does it not seem that these emotional folk are much less admirable characters than the once-born Darwins, Huxleys, and Sidgwickes, who, though having no “religion,” yet held sternly on in the way of rectitude, conforming to a standard



higher than many of the twice-born ever reach? As Myers says, the intellectual virtues are now become necessary to salvation. The maxims of the *savant* are as morally binding as the maxims of the saint. The exercise of intellect is a higher duty than any cultivation of "union with the Divine." The *savant's* sincerity, his unremitting, uncompromising, toilsome search for truth, is a grander thing than the passive, drunken raptures of Marguerite Marie Alacoque. Moreover, his *results* are greater. Copernicus and Darwin are better religious teachers (in the best sense of the word) than Plotinus and St Teresa; for they enlarged and systematised our conception of God's universe, and thus glorified Him. It is of course true enough that there is much intuition in science itself; discoveries are made by happy flashes of genius. The "scientific uses of the imagination"—in Tyndall's phrase—are great. But the *orientation* is different. Also the *savant* has more *faith* than the mystic,—more faith in the possibility and power of knowledge. And this is contributing to the linking up of peoples and the beginning of a Brotherhood of Man, such as individual mystic emotion would never bring about. Does not then the *savant* represent a higher stage of evolution than the ecstasies who have reached a "cosmic consciousness" which may be no more than an auto-hypnotic hallucination of feeling, devoid alike of beneficence or truth? If so, religion (as the word is defined by Professor James) will cease to exist, and we shall be better off without it. Something called religion will continue in being, though what it will be no man can say. It seems to me, however, that it will be somehow specially concerned with the new realms which our psychical science is now discovering. Science is far from "bankrupt." It has a new earth to its credit, and it is now adding a new heaven. It is *religion* (in the mystical sense) that is bankrupt; for in the twenty-six centuries between Gotama and Hannah Smith it has no progress to show.

J. ARTHUR HILL.

## BERGSON'S PHILOSOPHY AND THE IDEA OF GOD.

HENRY C. CORRANCE.

ALL systems of thought must pass through the fire of criticism, in order that the dross may be destroyed and whatever living principles they possess strengthened and purified. It is safe to prophesy that the work of our greatest living philosopher will not escape this common fate, nor is such immunity desirable. But the criticism must be of the right kind. Bergson's philosophy is so complete in itself, its various strands so interconnected, and so fruitful in its results, that any partial and one-sided objections which do not take account of the system as a whole, will not only fail to touch his main positions, but will be quite ineffective in their more immediate and restricted reference. In fact, as the work of this great thinker is distinctly a constructive, rather than negative, criticism of previous theories, it can only be met by a counter-theory occupying the same ground and attempting to solve the same problems.

His conclusions are so radical, and so destructive of what may be called the vested interests of past philosophy, that it was certain they would not remain long unchallenged. Some very ancient weapons have already been furbished for the attack. Among others, of course, the familiar and facile charge of "abstraction" has been made against him. It is always easy to bring this charge against any philosophy; since all are necessarily abstract in their degree, owing to the



fundamental nature of words and thought. But it is a weapon without point, except the character and results of the abstraction are explicitly recognised and exhibited. Even in the case of Kant, against whom such a charge has most frequently and effectively been made, there is this justification for abstraction as a method, that he thus enables his readers to see the different parts (or rather "principles") of the mental apparatus, even though the separation between them can only be purely arbitrary. It is the method of the surgeon who isolates portions of the human anatomy which are never separate in life. But the error of Kant consisted in taking these abstractions as definitive, and as ending, therefore, in insoluble antinomies. Bergson's use of abstraction, on the contrary, is the exact opposite of this. It is that of the clockmaker who instructs his apprentice by taking a machine to pieces, and then putting it together in such a way that it goes better than before. If the inadequacy of this illustration were not recognised, it would be misleading, for no philosopher has been so steeped in the wholeness of mind and matter, in the sense of that unity of life and consciousness which includes mechanism but is superior to it. He sets out with the plain and oft-repeated warning that such abstractions are not to be taken definitively, but only provisionally, in order to make us recognise the distinctions which lie in the bosom of that unity, but have been obscured by the point of view of previous philosophy.

He makes, for instance, no such absolute distinction, as he has recently been accused of making, between the time and space categories and duration. Only, according to him, this distinction represents a deep difference in the nature of things, the non-recognition of which has led to many of the troubles of philosophy in the past. The spiritual element, as the origin of all things, partakes of both these principles in their degree and order. Mind does not, as it were, impinge upon matter and become flattened out in a broad surface, but already contains within itself the tendency to spatial perception.

Similarly, though extension is the distinguishing property of matter, yet the more its inner constitution is penetrated, the more it becomes resolved into pure motion, and, ultimately, into the spiritual principle of duration. It is at the meeting-point of these two opposite movements that perception arises. Quality, like quantity, is due to the interaction of mind and matter ; but, in this case, the second is the more passive factor. Perception, by means of the afferent nerves, gathers vibratory motion, the universal basis of active matter, into varying rhythms of consciousness. Quality is thus much nearer to the intimate nature of mind than is quantity. Men have sought to measure the strength of their sensations and feelings by external standards, but there is really no such common measure between minds. The mind can only be conscious of certain qualities in its own states, and the strength and peculiar character of its feelings can only be known to itself.

It is impossible, within the limits of an article, even to summarise Bergson's theory of the connection of the various mental powers with the brain, on the one hand ; and that between these powers and the conscious self on the other, as elaborated in *Matière et Mémoire*. But this very slight sketch may, perhaps, be enough to indicate the line of thought by which Bergson seeks to explain the general relations between mind and matter, that stumbling-block of philosophy, and to illustrate the bearing of his main principle upon the question.

He brings the same principle to the solution of that old-standing puzzle, the relation between motion and space, the most popular form of which is that of the race between Achilles and the tortoise. Space is divisible, but motion indivisible. Movement is a rhythm, the rhythm of duration. We measure movement as we measure time, by applying to it the category of space ; the only means by which any measure, in the quantitative sense, is possible. The moving object passes through so many points in space, and we say it has covered so much ground, so many inches, so many miles. But the movement, as such, is quite distinct from the space that has



been traversed. In fact, it is not only distinct, but the exact opposite, since extended space is a series of stationary points. The fallacy of the ancient puzzle consists in treating the movement as if it were itself divisible and therefore motionless.

Again, he applies the same principle to the solution of the age-long problem of determinism and freedom. The determining element of consciousness consists in the spatial categories. In the earlier stages of conscious life such determination is absolute: mental activity is limited to reflex action. But, as life rises in the scale of existence, until it reaches self-consciousness, liberty of action becomes wider owing to the greater variety of choice offered to reflection, and the greater variety of means of accomplishing its ends, which it has gradually developed. And, among self-conscious beings themselves, the more they live on the surface, the more will they be the slaves of circumstances. But it is not only sensation and perception: it is also spatial ideas which determine the mind. And, as every thought, in order to be distinct, must tend towards spatialisation, abstract notions remaining empty formulas until they are supplied with some content, it is difficult to see how the mind can free itself from the tyranny of mechanical and spatial notions.

Once more the same principle intervenes. The mind, owing to the necessities of action, cannot avoid the use of spatial concepts. In fact, as we have seen, these concepts, or rather the tendency to spatialisation, is an element of the mind itself and not imposed upon it from without. At the same time, the durational element in mind is distinct even from the spatialised time category, and certainly from all other spatial concepts.

Here, then, we have the essential nature of mind; and the more the mind is able to do violence to its racial habit, necessary as this is to its ordinary life, the more it is able to withdraw into itself and realise this essential character of its own nature, the greater will be the degree of freedom to which it will attain when it goes out once more from itself in action.

According to Bergson, it is only at certain supreme moments that approximations are made to full liberty. In the ordinary way, actions, and even thoughts, are largely determined; though, the greater the degree of self-realisation and self-recollection, the more are the spatial categories subject to the ego and used in the cause of freedom.

Here, again, must be noted an unfair criticism to which Bergson has been subjected. It has been said that his scheme leaves no room for determination by the higher motives and emotions, more especially religious and moral. This is a misrepresentation. He would not deny for a moment, because it would be strictly in accordance with his philosophy, that such ideas as, *e.g.*, love, justice, truth, when imposed externally on the mind, influence conduct by the force of authority. It is by fear, or, at least, by external impressions of goodness forcibly suggested to the mind, that a child is first taught, and the action becomes free only in proportion as such ideas are assimilated and appropriated. The mind becomes free in proportion as the choice becomes deliberate, and the strain between the rival sentiments and passions ceases. Dogmatically taught morality is a form of tyranny, even though necessary. The individual who gives rein to all his bad passions is, so far, more free, even though such action will not ultimately issue in freedom. Yet an Anglican bishop has said, apropos of liquor prohibition, that he would rather see Englishmen drunk and free than slaves and sober.

Freedom consists in the spirit making the sentiment its own and becoming identified with it. Thus Bergson writes on page 126 of the *Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience* (the quotation is from the original, the important words being in italics): "It is, then, a rude psychology, the dupe of words, which describes the mind as determined by sympathy, aversion, or hatred, as if these were so many forces pressing upon it (he does, however, allow elsewhere that we are obliged provisionally to apply spatial images to mental facts). These sentiments, *provided that they have attained a*



*sufficient depth*, represent, each one of them, the entire mind, in the sense that all the content of the mind is reflected in each one. To say, then, that the mind determines itself under the influence of one of these sentiments, is to recognise that it determines itself entirely."

Then it has been said that Bergson's view of freedom destroys the belief in all finalism whatever. This is not so. It is true that his view does preclude any finalist scheme which is an absolute forecast of results. But those who object to this view must show, what no maintainer of absolute finalism has yet been able to show, that liberty, in any real sense of the word, can be consistent with their theory. If they cannot show this, there seems no alternative to determinism but the solution proposed by Bergson, founded on one and the same principle of the distinction between duration and space.

It will at least be clear, from these examples of his doctrine, that, whether Bergson's theory be true or false, it is certainly not "abstract" in the wrong sense of the word. In fact, it is the most concrete of any of the philosophies. For it combines together idealism and realism, subjectivism and externality, intuition and intellect, motion and rest, determinism and free-will, reflection and action in a way that has never been previously effected; and that without making any forced or unnatural concretion of irreconcilables, but on a single, transparent principle which, whether disputed or not, is at least clear and consistent throughout. His philosophy, though concrete, forbids the glozing over and confusing of real distinctions, such as that between duration and eternity. These two ideas cannot be compared from his standpoint, the one being founded on a real inner experience, in which all preceding moments are gathered into the present, and the present is always pressing on to the future; the other being a mere abstraction, detached from, and inconsistent with, life. In eternity there is neither past nor future. In duration the future is yet unborn and the past exists only as

it lives in the present. The idea, then, of God as a Being Who gathers up all succession, past, present, and future, in one simultaneity of consciousness, amounts to nothing more than the complete and absolute spatialising of duration. No jugglery of logic can ever unite such totally and essentially opposed ideas as those of succession and simultaneity.

And although, of course, Bergson's philosophy, as does even natural science, and as any universal theory must inevitably do, transcends experience—yet it is founded on it, and never contradicts it, as many of the older philosophies have done. Far from his philosophy is any word-juggling with supposed essences and existences, which are beyond the ken of the mind which imagines them. His very idea of God itself is not explicitly stated or argued, but disengages itself necessarily from his theory as a whole. And it is in this ultimate question that his main principle is most fruitful.

Plato's theory of the mystical sanctity of universals has ruled all subsequent idealist thought down to Neo-Hegelianism. It makes a double appeal to man's nature, to his instinctive desire for rest and stability in a world of change, and to his logical sense of complementary contrast. This attitude of idealism, therefore, has met a deep need of man's nature. It offers a "here and now," a "being" in contrast to the stream of "becoming." In various shapes and categories, such as form and substance, it has presented man with that standing-point of unchangeableness and eternity which he desires. Bergson's philosophy turns this assumption inside out and upside down. His theory, which is at least self-consistent, and explains, as we have seen, by a single principle, several radical antinomies inherent in the older view, argues that universals, so far from being a declension from some perfect archetype of thought, are really no more than abstractions from spatial categories. He thus connects them, no longer with the highest, but with the lower, categories, with those which limit the freedom of the spirit by imposing on it the external conditions through which it must act. Therefore, as we have



already seen, it is necessary that the spirit, in order to realise its freedom, should withdraw itself as far as possible from all spatial determinations: it must even make the supreme and heroic effort of attempting to realise that its time-category is, by a transference of the outer to the inner, also spatial, and that, however inevitable this may be, owing to the necessities of action, the real life of the spirit is already outside time as well as space. That life is perpetual movement, a duration, a movement entirely *sui generis*, measured not by time but by the living experience, a sense of timeless flux, a rhythm of thought and action, in which the whole past and present interpenetrate, though only certain memories rise to the surface of consciousness. The inner life of the spirit is thus brought into the strongest contrast with those static categories which represent the spirit's descent into matter; a descent which meets a similar movement coming in the opposite direction to, but of the same nature as, its own. No philosophy could thus be more radically and diametrically opposed, than Bergson's, to the whole course of past idealism. His boldness in thus attempting to reverse the process and development of ages can be justified only by results.

It is the main object of the present paper to point out and emphasise the revolutionary effects of such a doctrine upon that metaphysical conception of the Deity which has been built up, out of the spatial categories, in the course of Christian centuries. It will probably be a long time before the far-reaching and radical nature of that doctrine is fully appreciated even by those who admire M. Bergson's philosophy. For his negative criticism is not so conspicuous as that of Kant, inasmuch as it does not attack any specific and traditional arguments for theism. And yet he is really far more radical than Kant. But, while Kant's strength and value lay chiefly in his negative criticism, it is the positive and constructive side of Bergson's scheme which stands out most prominently. To this his most radical criticisms are subordinated, and, therefore, his system as a whole is far more a vivid and original apologetic

for theism than a criticism of the grounds on which it has previously been maintained.

Yet is his weapon none the less, but the more, keen and searching because at the first it is not felt. It will be like the sword in the fable of the Eastern magician, which was so keen that it passed through the body of his opponent without the latter being aware of it. But the moment he shook himself, he fell to pieces.

But, even if the old idealist philosophy is overthrown, popular conceptions will survive it long, since the principle has sunk deeply into the general consciousness. Nor is this surprising when it is considered that all practical life and action must be dominated by, and adjusted to, spatial categories. Hence a popular tendency to fossilisation of thought corresponds to the philosophic elevation of symbols into permanent and abiding realities. It is from this deeply rooted and inevitable principle that has sprung the use of idols to represent God. It is from this that have arisen all anthropomorphic notions. Hence, too, even more than from narrowness of outlook, comes the popular worship of fixity of ideas. Many years ago the present writer remembers being told of a certain Anglican clergyman, known to himself and the narrator, who had been living so long in the same parish that his flock had come to respect his views, although they did not believe in them. If anyone holds an even obviously false view long enough, this is called consistency; whereas, from the same popular standpoint, a mind which moves with the times, and adjusts itself to the changing conditions of environing thought, is dubbed "changeable." This idolising of immobility of thought is a perversion of the true ideal—consistency of character. It is that element in the human mind which, though essential to its nature, and necessary when properly directed and subordinated, affords a point of support to all infallibilities and dogmatisms.

The popular mind contains all the elements of philosophy *in confuso*, as is necessarily the case considering that the great



realities of experience, which is the only sure ground of philosophy, are the same for all. Therefore it contains and recognises the element of change as well as abidingness. There can be little doubt, however, that the latter tendency has been exaggerated through Platonic and Christian idealism sinking down, in the course of many generations, into the general consciousness by means of popular teaching and hymns. The contrast is drawn most clearly in such lines as:—

“Change and decay in all around I see :

Oh ! Thou, Who changest not, abide with me !”

If anyone will throw his mind back beyond the time when he received definite and dogmatic Christian teaching, and can remember the way in which the idea of eternity then presented itself to him, he will find, perhaps, that he had a vivid conception of it under the form of everlastingness, that is, eternal duration. It was the “for ever and ever” of the Lord’s Prayer, the “while endless ages run” of the hymn, not “the eternal moment,” a metaphysical conception which he would not have then been able to appreciate.

But the popular mind is uncritical in its conservatism, as in its radicalism, and consequently it identifies these two very disparate ideas. It takes many generations to make deep impressions upon that mind, and when once they have been made, it is still more difficult to change them. It is easier to cause their total rejection than to modify them. The metaphysical idol, built up out of logical abstractions, has sunk deeply into that general consciousness, and is far more difficult to break than one of wood or stone. Besides, it has been identified with the moral ideals of Christianity, with all that is implied by religious and moral sentiment, which gives it great strength and prestige. And it thus comes about that both the moral and metaphysical aggregates are either accepted or rejected as a whole. The charge is not untrue of the general public that the rejection of dogma, and especially of this metaphysical notion of God, involves also the rejection of

Christian morality, though there are many instances on either side which show that this connection is not necessary or absolute.

And, indeed, it is recognised, even by those who think but little, that the centring of these moral ideals in a Perfect and Personal Being is the very crux of Christian theism, especially with the now enlarged knowledge of natural history and archæology. Bergson's theory of God concerns only metaphysics. It does not touch the moral question at all, and so avoids the difficulty. And in this respect the absolutist philosophy is on the same footing. It is theologians who, for the practical needs of faith and worship, have, in the course of ages, succeeded in welding together in the mind of the populace the moral and metaphysical aggregates. But, in one sense, Bergson carries the war further, into the very heart of the intellectualist conception of Deity, into such current formulas as "The Unchangeable" and "The Eternal," the strictly metaphysical character and non-religious origin of which is little suspected by the large majority of those who make them a matter of faith.

Bergson's Creator is immanent in nature, but not, like the God of Pantheism, identical with it. He is continually trying to express himself under conditions which are more or less opposed to his freedom, and which he is only partially successful in overcoming. Yet he is ever "making all things new" in a sense which is in direct contrast and contradiction to the static philosophy. He lives in duration, not in "eternity," and, therefore, at least his liberty is not self-limited by any absolute finalist scheme. There is finalism in the universe, but it is in no sense rigid or determinate. It consists of the forward spring (*élan*) of the spiritual and life principle, by which it seeks, apparently, to realise itself; though, like a winding river, it cannot go direct, but encounters many obstacles which divert it from its course. Thus life is full of surprises, and can never be anticipated, because no two moments are ever the same, but every new moment is coloured



and qualified by the whole past which lives in it, and itself enters into and qualifies the past. The work of creation is ever proceeding, and Bergson's God is truly a living God.

So far, then, from the static categories of "here and now" expressing reality, they are merely abstractions from it. The idea of eternity, in the sense of unchangeableness, is opposed to life. The "being" of the metaphysician is no more than an abstraction of that "becoming" which is reality itself, just as the photograph of motion can give no more than fixed positions.

It is true that Hegelians and Neo-Hegelians endeavour to include life in the static categories, but this is mere logical jugglery, and bears no relation to life as we experience it.

At the same time, Hegel is, in some respects, the best of the whole line of absolutist philosophers, because he recognised the limitations of the mere universal. Nothing can be finer than the starting-point of his philosophy, where he places the category of "being" at zero and makes positive reality commence with "becoming." But, thereafter, he attempts to make empty categories do a work they were never intended to do—yield the movement, concreteness, and experience of life, and, by this extreme, exposes the weakness of the whole position. His absolute represents either mere logical finality or a gigantic abstraction of human self-consciousness.

This radical contrast, then, between duration and space must, when once the prepossessions that obscure it have been dissipated, remain as a permanent possession of thought.

Yet, the strong, instinctive desire in mankind for stability and permanence must have some cause and seek some satisfaction. Surely this will be found, if Bergson's contentions are right, no longer in static concepts, but in the deep and abiding sense of the identity and permanence of personality.

Yet it has been charged against Bergson's theory by a recent writer in the HIBBERT that self-conscious personality is precisely what it abolishes. The more, according to this

philosophy, he argues, the mind realises its own essential nature, the more must it be plunged into an abyss of nothingness. It looks very much as if the critic had read *Time and Freewill*, but not *Matière et Mémoire* or *L'Évolution Créatrice*. For this is simply a travesty; depending, as it does, on the assumption that Bergson denies the essentially spiritual origin and character of the spatial categories. It has already been pointed out that he does nothing of the kind. What he actually does is to place those categories in a subordinate position to duration, thus reversing the respective places they occupied in the old philosophy. The two are, indeed, the very warp and woof of consciousness, as we know it. Our memories, by which alone the sense of identity and individuality are preserved, are, so far as they are distinct, necessarily spatial. We cannot imagine consciousness without this element, and if Bergson denied these facts, which he does not, this accusation would be just.

It is true that he draws a clear distinction between duration and space, and between the corresponding mental faculties, intuition and intellect; making some form of intuition the most original and intimate principle of mind. And intuition, though an ever-present factor, is most active and fruitful on those rare occasions when the mind is best able to withdraw into itself and realise its own nature and freedom. Hence all ebullitions of genius, the thoughts and ideas which have moved the world. But, at the same time, he insists no less strongly upon the necessity that intuition, in order to be fruitful, must interact with intellect. Otherwise it sinks into mere blind instinct, mere mental habit, such as is found in the lower grades of life, performing a very limited number of habitual acts, in which the means have become perfectly adjusted to the end. It cannot get outside this narrow circle.

Intuition, on the other hand, has the direct insight of instinct, with its range widened in proportion as it is united with intellect. In the procession and development of the life-principle, its original unity has suffered division into different



orders of existence, owing to the necessities of that struggle towards self-realisation to which reference has already been made. The most conspicuous of these divisions has been the specialisation of instinct in certain species of animals, while, in the main line, man's intellect has been developed at the expense of instinct. His instinctive intuitions are rare and infrequent compared with the ordinary and roundabout process of inference. According to Bergson's theory these are differing forms of the primitive and original world-consciousness, which was neither the discursive intellect nor intuition as we know them, but something which contained the two, and possessed their dual characteristics *in posse*. That original form was, however, much nearer to intuition than intelligence. But the latter is the most in evidence and the most constant, because it has developed by the necessities imposed by the interaction between the inner and the outer, the self and its object. To this origin are due both its strength and its weakness: its strength, when applied to mechanical and practical purposes; its great limitations when turned to reflection and speculation. Here it is that intuition goes clearer and truer to the goal, though it needs the balance, range, and expression which the intellect can alone supply. But man has found intellect so much the most valuable faculty he possesses for practical purposes, that he has used it for the solution of questions it was never intended to solve, by reason of its nature and origin, and he has ended by hypostatizing his own abstractions.

Here, then, Bergson leaves the question of God, since he does not seem, so far, to have any wish to go beyond, in his speculations, what the facts of experience warrant. His idea of the task of philosophy appears to be that it should keep strictly on "scientific" lines. Its scope is at once wider, deeper, and more general than that of any science, since it aims at organising the whole of experience and thought. But that is no reason for its attempting to fly above the atmosphere of experience and fruitlessly beat its wings in the vacancy of space. Let it rather descend to life, thought,

matter, action, and renew its vigour by seeking to overcome the old difficulties, which the past thinkers have found insoluble only because they went to work on the wrong lines from the first.

If reason can tell us anything about the Ultimate, it can only be on the lines of experience. Bergson's idea of God is not reached by seeking to establish what is, after all, however subtle and even self-deceiving the sophistry, nothing more than a preconceived idea. He abhors all such finalism as this, which he shows to be the very opposite of liberty.

But, when he has reached a certain point, his idea of God, as already noted, disengages itself naturally from his thesis, and "drops like an overripe fruit." It distinguishes automatically between what we can know about the absolute through experience of the self and the world, and what is due to mere speculative imagination. At the same time, though he recognises that he cannot, on philosophical grounds, make an affirmation of Christian theism, yet neither, on the other hand, does he make any denial. The facts certainly do not warrant the affirmation of a self-conscious and personal individual in the only sense of which we have any experience. The nature of the Ultimate must ever transcend our categories.

Yet, though his philosophy thus escapes that acuter form of antagonism between the ideal and the actual, which is inherent in traditional theism; it will not be able ultimately to evade the task of attempting to reconcile the moral ideals with their brutal antecedents and environment, to which they are, to a great extent, so diametrically opposed, and offer, on the whole, so ineffectual a resistance.

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## SYNDICALISM IN FRANCE AND ITS RELATION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF BERGSON.

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IN England we should probably have heard little of Syndicalism if the Government had not prosecuted the printers and editor of the *Syndicalist* newspaper. The *Syndicalist* was but an obscure sheet whose existence was known to very few. The result of the prosecution was that the movement obtained a tremendous advertisement out of all proportion to its size. I believe the number of syndicalists in England is very small. And their Syndicalism is but a diluted form of the French movement.

It is in France that the real nature of the movement has to be studied. Nor is it by accident that Syndicalism was born in France, as Lagardelle points out. It is there the proletariat have seen most plainly the failure of democracy to alter the relation of classes, and it is there also that revolutionary and heroic traditions make the atmosphere in which Syndicalism could be born and bred. Italy comes next. In the view of syndicalists, German democracy is reactionary. It has no revolutionary tradition to give it a masterful inspiration towards independence. We will then turn to France to study the real nature of Syndicalism. Even there we find that, like every other "ism," it is compounded of different elements, and advocated by men whose opinions differ on some important points. Its great organisation is

the "General Confederation of Labour," which was formed in 1895, and aimed at getting rid of politicians, and securing what is called "direct action" and "direct control." It is independent of all parties, and free from all tutelage of State or municipality. It is based on an intense class-consciousness, and is organised definitely for a class-war. The very breath of life to it is that capital and labour are deadly enemies, and are incapable of reconciliation. The organisation proceeds from simple to complex. First you have the syndicate, which is an aggregate of workers; then comes a union of syndicates; and then a general federation of unions. Each part is autonomous. In the syndicate are those of the same or similar trades or industries. The grouping is spontaneous, not following a prearranged plan. Any workers whose interests are identical with those of a group can join the group, without considering any conception or theory, philosophical, political, or religious. We are told that one characteristic of the syndicate is that it does not limit its action to claim only for its members; it claims for all workers. Pouget calls this "profoundly social." We must remember, however, that it does not take in society, but only the working class. The General Assembly is supreme. Its council of about ten, with secretary and treasurer, have only power to execute its decisions. A union of syndicates or of labour exchanges (labour exchanges in France are entirely controlled by the working people) is a union of groups in the same town or region. The great business of the organisation is the class-war. It must so act as to intensify working-class feeling against the employing class and the wage system, against all the forces of exploitation manifested in capitalism, and against all forces of oppression held by the State, such as the army; it must eliminate the modern State, because the modern State is the upholder of the present system. Syndicalism at its height proclaims war on the Parliamentary system, and "Down with democracy!" is one of its rallying-words. No hope of deliverance lies in electing labour representatives to



Parliament. They soon lose their fighting nerve and become conciliators; they soon surrender to the influences that play upon them from the upper and the middle classes, and forget their old enthusiasm. A Labour Party in Parliament, therefore, becomes a hindrance to what the syndicalist regards as the only possible emancipation for the workers. The one thing to do for this emancipation is to enter upon a deadly war for the elimination of the employing class, and of all the forces that tend to support it. The syndicate must keep the employer in dread, restrain his insatiable desires of exploitation, secure from him every possible improvement of condition while he remains, and dispatch him at the earliest possible moment.

The daily work of the syndicate is of two kinds—mutual protection and resistance. The French syndicates have passed the stage of living for mutual help in the way of money benefits. What they do in that way, Pouget tells us, is only a cloak to hide illegal resistance to employers. This attitude differentiates the French syndicalists from those of England, where a great deal is made of “benefits.” In France they relegate such work to a very insignificant place, because they look upon it as likely to dilute the fighting force. Rich labour unions are shy of strikes; their officials are cautious about spending money. Something of the sacredness of property attaches to the funds of a union, and the organisation is weakened by it for the class-war. Of anything that does this the syndicalists fight shy.

The one qualification to enter the syndicate is to be a wage-earner, one of the exploited class. There is no other condition of membership. According to Pouget, even the ideal which gives to the confederation its power is not to be made an indispensable act of faith, or a creed-condition of membership. The confederal ideal is not a theoretic doctrinal formulation; it is the declaration of a social necessity, fatally opposed to capitalistic society; it is the logical resultant of the cohesion of the proletariat on the ground of economic interests.

The main weapons with which this class-war is to be fought are the strike and sabotage. Sabotage, however, is condemned by Sorel, who may be called the philosopher of Syndicalism. It is undisguisedly and boldly advocated by Pouget and others in the C.G.T. Pouget says that the maxim of Syndicalism is: "For bad pay, bad work." It makes itself effective now by a slackening of production, now by bad work, and again by attacking the instrument of production, such as damaging a machine. In commerce it will often spoil the thing sold in order that the seller may lose his custom. The object of sabotage is to hit the master, not the consumer. Pouget defends it and says: "Sabotage is in the social war what guerilla fighting is in national wars." There is no sanctity in laws. It is held that the laws have been made in order to defend what is, and it is therefore necessary to go outside them to obtain anything. They give us what they take to be examples of the efficacy of sabotage; *e.g.* the hairdressers' assistants in Paris put a caustic ingredient in paint that was to be used for shop fronts which caused it to deteriorate quickly. In three years nearly two thousand shops were treated in this way, with the result that the masters granted shorter hours of labour and a weekly day of rest. The method is recommended all round. If it were adopted all round, society would collapse. That is what the syndicalists want. The main weapon of this class-war, however, is the strike, sectional strikes being preliminary to the great general strike which is to overturn society and make possible a new economic world. Great emphasis is laid upon the moral value of strikes, quite apart from any material benefit gained by them. They are splendid drills for the feeling of solidarity and common interest, and they thus prepare the proletariat through the discipline of common action, and through the intensification of their hatred of the employing class, for the one great strike which is to end the present order. Now, if you ask for details as to how this general strike is to be carried out, and how the world is to be



reorganised after it, the syndicalist maintains that you are asking unnecessary and unreasonable questions. The questions themselves are due to a false culture whose prestige must be ruined. It is the culture of intellectualist philosophy and science, a culture which believes in the possibility of deducing practical programmes from scientific propositions, which believes that things will work out according to systems and theories, made beforehand, and that nothing can be done without them. The syndicalist, however, maintains that historic movements do not corroborate this opinion. Says Sorel: "There is an indefinite number of systems of social economy or of sociology; the projects of the reform of society have been innumerable; the enunciation of great laws of history will fill several rubbish-carts; and the ill-success of their predecessors does not discourage the makers of theories." He wonders whether it is not a sign of mental alienation among our contemporaries that they insist on pursuing the phantom of a science which always forsakes them and always deceives them. The excuse that sociology is a young science he regards as too poor. There is no way of foreseeing the future in a scientific manner, nor is it possible to prove that certain hypotheses are superior to others. We must act against those things which we feel to be wrong with all our power, and let the future grow out of our acting. Intellectualist philosophy is radically incompetent to explain great historic movements. Not dogmas and formulas, not vain discussions on the future society and endeavours to map it out beforehand, not a compendious plan of social organisation, not these are wanted. What is wanted is a sense of the necessary war, and the fire of it, a philosophy of action which gives the first place to intuition, and which claims that the simplest worker engaged in the battle knows more than the doctrinaires of all the schools. Syndicalists know by instinct that the spontaneous creations of life will always be more rich than the most marvellous inventions of the makers of systems; and an ardent proletariat must claim the right to creative action, and must not be

hindered by intellectual theories or sociological inferences. No one must inquire how men will arrange their future good fortune; all that is necessary is the revolutionary apprenticeship of the proletariat.

Sorel will not discuss the details of any plans for the general strike. He says: "Strikes have engendered in the proletariat the most noble, the most profound, the most moving sentiments they possess; the general strike groups these in a composite picture, and, by bringing these together, gives to each its maximum intensity; appealing to the most acute memories of particular conflicts, it colours with an intense life all the details of the composition present to conscience. We obtain thus an intuition of socialism which language cannot clearly express, and we obtain it in a symbol instantly perceived" (quoted by Bouglé, *Revue du Mois*, April 1909). Indeed, Sorel's favourite word for the general strike is "myth." He maintains that it does not matter whether the details of the myth will come true or not, and it is not useful to reason on possible incidents that may occur in the social war. What is wanted in the myth is a sort of concentrated whole, a unity embodying the social aspiration in a fiery centre, and giving precision to revolutionary thoughts. It does not matter that the general strike may be only a partial reality or only a product of the popular imagination. The whole question is whether the general strike embodies all the socialist ideals of the revolutionary proletariat. It is necessary to think of the passage from capitalism to socialism as a catastrophe, the process of which escapes description. The value of the general strike idea is in supplying motive power for the revolution. Myth has always been indispensable to revolution, Sorel argues. The myth is different from Utopia. It is not a description of things, but an expression of will, whereas Utopia is an intellectual product. The myth incites men to a fight for the destruction of what exists; Utopia leads to piecemeal reform. The myth is the expression of the convictions of a group in the language of movement. The belief in the



Second Advent did its work for the early Christians though it never came off. The general strike idea will do the same thing, though it may never come off. In this opposition to theorising the syndicalist claims to be applying the Bergsonian philosophy. Sorel refers to Bergson as one of the masters of contemporary thought who has many times put us on our guard against the errors which spring from traditional philosophy, and asks if the time has not come to abandon the old Greek methods of seeking reality, which must be found in the mobile and the continuous. Sorel maintains that the criticisms of Bergson have their application above all in sociology. In the eyes of syndicalists, the College of France may co-operate with the labour exchanges. An unexpected harmony reveals itself, to use Bouglé's phrase, "between the flute of personal meditation and the trumpet of social revolution." Thus they invoke Bergson's philosophy to cry, "Down with intellectualism!" As Bergson maintains that movement is an indivisible whole, so Sorel claims that the general strike should be considered as an indivisible whole; no detail of execution is of any interest, and one is in danger of losing something of understanding this whole when an attempt is made to analyse its parts.

In this way we are warned off questions as to any details of how the general strike is to come off, or is to be conducted. Indeed, one of the syndicalist's objections to democracy is that democracy favours general culture, and makes reform dependent upon an intelligent appreciation of what is wanted, and how it is to be got, by the workers in general. The syndicalist looks upon this as a snare and a delusion. All that is necessary is to infuriate the workers against the masters and against the State, so as to make the present system unworkable and bring about the final catastrophe. It is impossible to say in detail what will happen afterwards, just as it is impossible for nations who embark on a war to say what sort of government is going to be set up after the war. The aim of the syndicalist is to put all industries in the power and

under the control of those who work in them ; to destroy the modern State and municipality, and to let the syndicates be the nuclei of the new governing bodies. From the ruins of the middle-class world will spring up an economic federalism, which will give full liberty of development and of satisfaction, and the syndicates will be the constituent cells ; there will be groups for production, groups for distribution, and groups for exchange. Syndicalists oppose the conception of State socialism, which, they say, by its centralisation will mean tyranny, and leave the wage-system untouched. Their idea is the workshop without the master, and the government very much localised, carried on directly by the people concerned, and not by representatives ; the only function for representatives would be that of an executive.

It will be seen that all this is described in merely vague and general terms, and they refuse to go into further particulars, or to discuss how their scheme would be likely to work, or whether, indeed, it is possible or not. If we ask how these groups are to be related, how markets are to be secured, how foreign affairs are to be conducted, what is to happen to what are now called the middle and the upper classes, they put us off, and tell us to beware of the snare of intellectualism. The Balkan war would serve the syndicalist as an illustration of what he means. It was not necessary to inform all the people of future plans, but only to infuriate them against Turkey. Nor could anyone say what sort of society would be reconstructed after the war.

One more point before we proceed to criticism. We would like to know in what way the syndicalists are preparing men for the change they contemplate. And here they speak of a new morality. The workers must be guarded from the ideas and the morals of the enemy-class. Ordinary education gives men middle-class prejudices. Therefore they should not receive ordinary education. Moralists do not usually reason on what there is of fundamental truth in the individual ; they judge according to judgments which society has drawn up in



advance from different types of society. A commercial type of society will have one set of judgments, and its laws will be framed accordingly. The syndicalists argue that when that type of society is destroyed by catastrophe, and a new type emerges from its ashes, the new type will bring with it a new morality. Sorel does not think that the history of moral ideas yields any kind of unity when their contradictions are fairly faced. He would justify violence towards the present order because there is nothing eternal about this order, or about the morality it enjoins. He quotes Bureau to the effect that the soft and effeminate character of men is more dreadful than their sentiment of independence, even when the latter is exaggerated and brutal. A stab given by a man who is morally honest but violent is a social evil less grave, and more easily curable, than the excesses of luxury of young people reputed more civilised. Sorel thinks that it is not necessary that there should be a great development of brutality and bloodshedding, and the propagandists of the general strike should work to make the maintenance of socialism compatible with the least brutality possible; though he seems to think that ancient society, with its ferocity, compares favourably with modern society, which has replaced ferocity by cunning. There was a sincerity, a living sentiment of justice, a pious respect for the sanctity of morals, among ancient peoples which are now replaced by falsehood, chicanery, and hypocrisy. This justifies some measure of violence to overthrow them. The syndicalists claim that they are creating a higher ethic than that of the modern State. Those who advocate sabotage would seem careless about the character of their men, but Sorel emphasises the moral worth necessary to perfect production, and the need, therefore, of caring for ethics. The new school, according to him, thinks the moral progress of the proletariat as necessary as its material progress, but it descends to the depth of the problem; it is not content with vague recommendations on religious duty; in its insatiable desire for reality, it seeks to get at the roots of moral perfection,

and would know how now to create the morality of future producers. He would therefore have the man produce well now. Another element in their ethic is this. Syndicalists are not servile like democrats; they do not aspire to high social places; they know that they should always remain in a way of life extremely modest. Putting their confidence in the movements of masses, they do not reckon on Napoleonic glory, and they leave to the middle classes the superstition of great men. What the character of the new morality is to be does not seem to me quite clear, except that in the meantime they do call for this subjection of the individual to the interests of the mass. When they speak of the moral results of strikes they mean their effect in waking up and intensifying class-feeling, and making people believe that better conditions are possible. That, I think, must suffice as a description of Syndicalism. I must confess to be rather in a fog regarding Sorel's conception of the general strike. He does not seem to mind whether it will ever come off or not; it is a myth, and its function is to intensify class-feeling. But I cannot see how the intensification of class-feeling, if it does not result in revolutionary action, such as a general strike, can secure the transference of the machinery of production from the present owners to the workers. Sorel quotes the myth of the Second Advent among the early Christians. They believed that their Messiah was coming back at the end of the age to make a new world. He did not come, but the myth had made their Christianity very intense, and it would not have done it if they had preached the doctrine of a gradual evolution into goodness. It was the myth of a catastrophe that made the Church. So it may be with the general strike, Sorel seems to think. But the reply is obvious. The myth of the Second Advent did make Christianity very intense, but it did not recreate the world by catastrophe, there was no universal upheaval, no sudden change in the type of society. Likewise, the myth of the general strike may make those who believe in it intensely class-conscious, but unless it comes off it cannot



transfer the workshops to the workers. I do not say this result would follow, even if the strike did come off, but at anyrate the transference could not be effected without its occurrence. This is a somewhat ironic situation, viz. that the very apostle of action is trusting in the efficacy of a myth that may never become action, and therein the denouncer of theory is certainly theorising.

Further, are not the syndicalists making an unfair use of Bergson? They are putting the efficacy of action against the use of intellect; they seem to say: "Never mind what you think; make your feeling tremendously intense, and act according to feeling, then see what you think." This does not seem to me to be the position of Bergson at all. It is in regard to the discovery of the nature of reality that Bergson insists on the inadequacy of the intellect, and even there it is only inadequate, not false. Even the intellect discovers true aspects of reality, though, owing to its limitation, we must fall back upon the immediacy of spiritual intuition if we are to seize the reality itself. The intellect was not given for constructions of the absolute, for formulating theories of the ultimate reality. But Bergson maintains that the function of intellect is to guide action. The intellect is to consider the relations of things, and to represent in ideas beforehand things to be done, and glean wisdom for the doing of them. Bergson never meant to give intellectual work no place in the practical life; on the contrary, he meant that the practical life was the sphere for intellectual work. Action takes place, according to Bergson, on the surface of reality; vague intuition is not the best guiding power there, its function is to reach beneath the surface;—on the surface the intellect is to be the general. The syndicalists seem to me to have mistaken the meaning of Bergson.

We must, therefore, in spite of their warning us off, dare to use our intelligence in judging of their proposed action. When we do, I think we shall find that they are aiming at an impossible thing. They aim at cutting a class clean out from

the heart of the nation, and making it an independent entity and unity. But is this possible? Is it a possible accomplishment in feeling to begin with? Is not every class bound to the nation by strings that cannot be cut? No doubt identity of economic interest can create a considerable class-feeling, but to isolate this interest as if it were the one reality in the life of the class, and to make it the propeller of the whole activity of the class, is, as Bouglé rightly thinks, a feat that cannot be accomplished. Wide as the gap may seem between the lowest class and the highest, one must remember that there are intervening classes, and there are undefined borderlands with all sorts of relations and interests, and at the bottom of all common human feelings and sympathies, and an identity of response to the great joys and the great sorrows of life. With the same heavens above them, and the same earth beneath them, and the same essential heart in their breasts, there are unities that lie beneath difference of circumstances which would prevent the class-feeling based on economic interest from becoming the sole and deciding factor of life.

Again. Suppose the class could be isolated and unified, it still could not continue to exist except in constant interaction and daily transactions with other classes. In other words, society would have to be reorganised. "Society," as Bouglé says, "is not a workshop, and, in reorganising, Syndicalism will have to make concessions to Parliamentarism, to humanism, to the idea of general solidarity, to everything, indeed, which it denounces and detests. Political machinery would be found absolutely necessary, and the workshop without a master, *i.e.* without authority somewhere concentrated and symbolised, would not be practicable. It would be found that positive action was dependent as before upon perpetual compromise."

On the evils of sabotage we need not dwell. That seems like making for an ideal society, and ruining on the way the men who are to constitute it. To me the end and the method of Syndicalism seem impossible and undesirable.



But the movement must not therefore be cheaply dismissed. Much of its criticism of the present conditions of the labour world is true, and very scathing. And in connection with this the demand that we shall study economics in the concrete, *i.e.* that we shall look into actual present conditions in the light of what man thinks and feels and needs, and not in the light of mere economic theory, is a just demand. It is something like the demand of Ruskin that political economy should not be merely the science of wealth but the science of man. We have worshipped far too long at the shrine of supply and demand in economics. We must learn to alter the demand when it is not a good one, and refuse to supply it when it is a bad one; we must cease to deify economic law, which is very largely a deduction from common practice.

Even the syndicalist criticism of morality is worth considering, for it is true that some of our morality is very superficial, and belongs much more to passing phases of thought than to any eternal truth. The way in which the doctrine of contentment with one's station in life is sometimes preached, the duty of deference to superiors, are examples of this.

Nor is the syndicalist protest against patriotism utterly unreasonable. When we see patriotism exploited for the purpose of anti-internationalism, at the expense of throttling social reforms at home, there is room for protest. At the International Peace Congress recently, an Italian lady of the Peace party could not bear to have Italy blamed for its descent upon Tripoli; she flung her peace principles to the wind, and defended the war, though she admitted that she and her party had done all they could to prevent it. Why did they try to prevent it? Because they thought it was wrong. Yet the moment it begins they think it is right. Patriotism swamped internationalism. The same thing happened in our own country during the war in South Africa. This is juggling with morality, and rather than join in the cry, "My country

right or wrong," I would sympathise with the anti-patriotic attitude of the syndicalist party. I would, however, call it "the higher patriotism," for I do not believe that any man can love his country worthily who does not love truth and righteousness more. Working men in all nations are going to respond less and less to the old cry of patriotism, because they see that it generates a passion that tells against the unity of mankind.

Once more, the syndicalist's criticism of democracy cannot be lightly dismissed in these days when democracy is becoming a sham in our own country. With the extension of the franchise it does not follow that the people will have any more real power. The executive is counting for more and more, and unless a change takes place the main affairs of State will be managed almost without any reference to the people's will.

Another fact about Syndicalism is worth notice. It is part of a significant reaction against a listlessness of life that followed upon the advent of Darwinian science. In a vague sort of way the doctrine of the survival of the fittest weakened many wills. If the fittest would always survive, then what was, *i.e.* what had survived, was evidently the fittest: let it be. The inference was a doctrine of *laissez-faire*. There is a reaction against that theory in the world of thought. Syndicalism is part of the reaction on the field of practical life. It is good in so far as it means that men believe in their power to create what they want. If a new social order is needed, the human will is capable of creating it. That is a glorious and a true belief. It is pusillanimous merely to accept a social order which one feels to be unjust, with the idea that because we have evolved into it we cannot work ourselves out of it. Bergson's emphasis on the will to create finds its echo on the industrial field in Syndicalism.

But this entails the responsibility of choosing *what* to create, and there, I think, syndicalists have gone wrong. We have a tremendous power of creation; in fact, we can create



what we wish. But that makes it supremely important that we should wish the right thing.

Again, and lastly, Syndicalism is worthy of consideration as a reaction from past efforts at social reform whose results have been very disappointing. It is quite true that, in spite of all trades unionism, and labour representation, and ameliorative legislation by middle-class government, poverty is the tragic fact over a large area of human life. Real wages in many industries are even less than they were, and the possessing classes have a wonderful way of diverting the good that was intended to relieve the lower classes, as well as of shifting their own burdens to their shoulders. We should not fail to learn, from the fact that Syndicalism has come into existence, that the one outstanding demand is that the conditions of human life must be improved. It is easy enough to show certain wrongs in Syndicalism, but it is infinitely more important to remove the greater wrongs which brought it to birth.

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## CERTAINTY IN MATHEMATICS AND IN THEOLOGY.

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IT is a common error to suppose that mathematics differs from all other subjects in the possession of a peculiar certainty. On this account the layman regards mathematics with profound respect, though he feels that its ways are not his ways and that its devotees have little to share with the rest of mankind.

Among others who hold this error are certain of the clergy. On a single Sunday, not long ago, I heard two sermons from different pulpits bearing on mathematics. The first was concerned with matters such as truth and love that could not be *defined*, and so the preacher held that his method of treatment was bound to be opposed to the method of mathematics. The second sermon was concerned with statements about God and eternal life that could not be *proved*, and here, too, the methods of mathematics, and rational processes generally, were declared worthless.

Now, it is my purpose first to explain mathematical method, and then to show that this method is in place in the study of theology and ethics. And if the thesis seems unusual to the point of being picturesque, one may notice that it is the *method* of mathematics to which reference is made and not the *content*. We shall hardly put geometry in place of the Gospels, nor substitute for the litany the theory of errors.



But the fact that he is dealing with the undefined and unproved is no reason why a student must abandon mathematics, for without these "primitive" elements mathematics cannot make a beginning. If we define a thing we define it in terms of something else, this in terms of something else, and so on. Then evidently some term or terms must be left *undefined*. So, in a rigorous treatise on geometry (Hilbert's) we find the terms *point*, *straight line*, and *between* undefined—the very terms which a layman would think easiest to define. We say that the points A, B, and C, are in a straight line, and that B is between A and C. We may even go so far as to represent all this by a figure,

$$\begin{array}{c} \dot{A} \quad \quad \dot{B} \quad \quad \dot{C} \\ \hline \end{array}$$

though we know that the points as represented are not points at all, and that the line is far from straight. And with this strange beginning we go on to study geometry with renewed satisfaction, and are grateful to Hilbert and the rest who have shown us these undefined things.

Again, if we prove a proposition in mathematics we prove it by virtue of some other proposition, so that at least one proposition must be left unproved. And from what has been said about the undefined and the unproved, we may interpret that charming statement of Bertrand Russell's, "Mathematics is the science in which we never know what we are talking about, nor whether what we say is true."

As an example of the unproved proposition in geometry, take Euclid's axiom that in a plane, through a given point A, there is only one straight line that will never meet a given straight line B C.

$$\begin{array}{c} \dot{A} \quad \quad \dot{B} \\ \hline \dot{B} \quad \quad \dot{C} \\ \hline \end{array}$$

A moment's study of the figure will convince one of the truth of the axiom. An hour's study leaves one in some doubt about it. To a mathematician the statement is not *evident* at

all but is simply an unproved proposition with certain logical consequences, and there is good evidence that Euclid so regarded it.

The popular mistake about the axioms of mathematics is to conceive of them as self-evident, and herein mathematics is supposed to have its main advantage. But what is self-evident at one time is not self-evident at another. Mistakes in this respect are shared by mathematicians and non-mathematicians alike, for it is self-evident at one time that the earth is flat and at another that every continuous function has a derivative. The essential concerning the axioms is not that they are self-evident but that they are unproved.

It might seem, then, that we had opened the door to wild speculation and inaccuracy. But such is not the case. It is against this sort of thing that the door has been closed. For the "primitives" must be few in number and their logical consequences must explain the phenomena with which we are dealing. Then, in spite of the fact that, as the Frenchman says, "There is nothing there that you have not put there," it may be difficult by means of a few primitives to put enough there. If anyone thinks it an easy task to pick out a few primitives which will explain the phenomena of mathematics, let him try it. Mathematicians will testify that the problem is one of extreme difficulty. For the few things are left undefined in order that the many may be defined, and the few unproved that the many may be proved. *After a certain point* in the discussion, everything must be defined, everything proved, and the demand for precision is inexorable. Along with freedom at the outset goes rigour in the execution, and a premiss carelessly adopted will surely be revealed in the light of its consequences.

But someone will say, "If the many are defined in terms of the few undefined, what is the *meaning* of the whole?" Here we are confronting a paradox. There is no doubt that the meaning of the few is derived from the many. So Veblen says, leaving *point* undefined, "This implies that the reader is



free to carry in his mind any image of a point which he can reconcile with what is said about it." Or, in the words of Whitehead and Russell, "The primitive ideas are explained by means of descriptions intended to point out to the reader what is meant; but the explanations do not constitute definitions because they really involve the ideas they explain."

And now some Philistine asks, "What is the use of the whole process? How are mathematicians better off than anyone else?" Perhaps they are no better off. They like to know what terms are left undefined and what assumptions are made in a discussion, and they take all possible care to avoid contradictions, on the ground that it is not dangerous to hold any *one* notion but only to hold *two* contradictory notions. Whether anyone agrees with them or not is, in the last analysis, a matter of taste.

But if anyone does agree with them, a clergyman for example, he is a mathematician at heart, no matter if the content of his thought is far removed from the content of mathematics. To illustrate, let us make a beginning first in mathematics and then in theology, using the same method in both. In geometry we proceed in an orthodox fashion if we leave undefined the terms *point*, *line*, and the relation *on*, and announce as unproved the proposition "If A and B are distinct points, there is not more than one line on both A and B." The reader may find the proposition self-evident, but that is not the important thing about it, as we have shown.

Now, suppose that we concern ourselves with the idea of God. Is it necessary that God should be defined? Not at all. God may be the very term which we prefer to leave undefined. Let us leave *human being* and *love* also undefined, and choose as unproved the proposition "There exists a God who loves every human being." The proposition may be more or less evident. Some would consider it trivial, some would give their lives to maintain it, but that does not concern us. For us the proposition is unproved and is so stated. It

is a starting-point. Whether it is well chosen or not depends on its consequences.

To illustrate further, we may extend our field in geometry by the following definition, "Two lines intersecting at a point form an angle," thus defining a new term by means of our primitives. And, passing from theology to ethics, and remembering that the choice of primitives is to a degree arbitrary, we may define *right conduct* by the undefined terms *love* and *clear thinking*, and say, "An act is right in so far as we love and think clearly." If the definition does not help us to explain the phenomena of conduct, we adopt another definition or leave right conduct undefined. The same primitives are not always chosen by different writers on mathematics; for example, Hilbert leaves straight line undefined, while Veblen defines it in terms of point and order, Pieri in terms of point and motion, Peano in terms of point and distance.

If the foregoing analysis is sound, it may aid in correcting the error mentioned at the outset of this paper. The mathematical content that has been used is commonplace. It is the sort of thing which we call well-known and which is too little taught.

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# THE JOHANNINE APOCALYPSE.

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THE theory suggested in this article may be thus summed up:—

1. The Apocalypse contains records of actual visions of the Apostle John, spread over the years 68 A.D. to 97 A.D.

2. These visions were coloured by familiarity with apocalyptic literature.

3. Some of the records were circulated during the author's lifetime, but they were incorporated with others about the year 100 A.D. by an editor who added a preface and a post-script, and turned the records of the separate visions into a single work of literary art.

This theory meets the chief difficulties connected with the date, the authorship, the spirit, and the history of the book. Let us look first at the problem of the date, a point concerning which critics are much divided. Some parts of the book seem clearly to have been written in 68 A.D.; other parts at least as late as 93 A.D. This is not surprising if the actual visions were separated from one another by decades and recorded immediately after their occurrence, but not put together until about the year 98 A.D.

The question of the authorship is similarly disputed. On the one hand, it is shown that all direct early evidence attributes the book to the Apostle. On the other hand, it is pointed out that the whole spirit of the Apocalypse is so alien to that of the Fourth Gospel, that it is hardly conceivable

that the same man should have written both books. This argument appears to me unanswerable. I cannot conceive of the author of the Fourth Gospel setting to work to write an Apocalypse at all; still less such an Apocalypse as this one. But if he simply recorded his visions, it would naturally be done in a very different style and spirit from his proclamation of the *Logos* doctrine and his recollections of the life and teaching of his Master. A similar conclusion is reached if we study another branch of the controversy that rages round the question of the authorship of the Apocalypse. The attribution of the book to a second "John" was probably made to escape from the difficulty of regarding it as the work of the Apostle. This attribution of the Apocalypse to "John the Elder" is first found well on in the third century, and comes from a very untrustworthy source. We ask in vain for any explanation of how it came to pass that this "John the Elder" is never heard of in this connection till A.D. 255, especially if he had a right to speak with the sort of authority which the writer of the Apocalypse assumes. If we regard the preface and the postscript as his, he claims something like infallibility. In any case, he speaks to the Church in general, and to the Asiatic Churches in particular, in language which no one but an apostle, and no apostle but one of the greatest, could be expected to use. If our theory be accepted, this difficulty disappears. The author of the main body of the work is that disciple whom Jesus loved; one of the Pillar Apostles, and ultimately the sole survivor of the Twelve. Of the work of such a man, recently deceased, we can well imagine an ardent and devout disciple-editor saying: "Blessed is he that readeth, and they that hear the words of this prophecy" (Rev. i. 3); and it is at least conceivable that he should say: "I testify unto every man that heareth the words of the prophecy of this book, *If any man shall add unto them, God shall add unto him the plagues which are written in this book*" (Rev. xxii. 18). We should search in vain through the other works of the inspired writers for anything in the least like this. The words



would indeed seem unbecoming if a man, however inspired, applied them to his own writings, and we feel that the Beloved Disciple would be especially unlikely to utter such curses; but both preface and postscript are natural enough as an editor's additions to the highly valued work of such a master as St John.

The theory of an editorial preface is confirmed by a change of person. The opening verses say that this revelation was sent by God "unto his servant John, who bare record of the Word of God." This is a natural description of the writer of the Fourth Gospel, and of the Epistle in which the *Logos* idea is so prominent. It would be a far less natural description for a man to give of himself. Compare it with the ninth verse, where we have, not "John," but "I, John"; or even with the fourth verse: "John to the seven churches." The latter would be a natural opening. It is the form used over and over again by St Paul. But I think that anyone who carefully reads the first three verses of *Revelation* will see strong internal evidence that they are editorial additions, and that the author's own work does not begin till verse four, even if it begins then.

Let us next apply our theory to one of the problems connected with the letters to the seven Churches (Rev. ii., iii., and iv.). These letters are addressed to the "angels" of the Churches. Once more the critics are puzzled and divided. Who were the angels? Were they officials of the Churches, or were they guardian angels, or was the word "angel" used metaphorically for the spirit, the prevailing spirit, of each Church? All these suggestions are quite unsatisfactory. We have no evidence that any Church officials ever bore such a title. It would be more inappropriate to permanent local officials than to apostles or missionaries, who as messengers might conceivably be called angels. Moreover, the letters are clearly not intended for the officials, but for each Church as a whole. The chief local minister might be more or less responsible for the faults and virtues of his congrega-

tion; but there is no hint here of such transferred responsibility. What, again, are we to make of such a message as, "Behold, the devil is about to cast *some of you* into prison" (Rev. ii. 10)? As a message to the Church of Smyrna this is simple enough, but it is only by straining the words that they can be appropriately addressed to an official. The difficulty of supposing the "angels" to be guardian angels is even greater. Why should the writer rebuke guardian angels for the defects of those they guard? Ramsay has shown us that if the letters were addressed to the Churches, a messenger would naturally have carried them round in the very order which the writer adopts: Ephesus, Smyrna, Pergamos, etc.; but if they were addressed to guardian angels, there would be some difficulty in delivering them to the addressees! As for the third suggestion, that "angel" is a metaphor for "prevailing spirit," I will only say that it is a very far-fetched way of reconciling facts with words. But on my theory all the difficulty vanishes. Nothing would be more likely than that, *in a vision*, the Churches should appear personified as angels, and that the vision-seer should address them as such. On awakening from his ecstatic trance, the Apostle would naturally write down what he remembered of the vision and send it in the form of a circular letter to be read in all the seven Churches. The record would naturally include the personification of the Churches as angels. Coming as part of the record of a vision, this would not present any difficulty; and in the record of the vision afterwards used by the editor the personifications would naturally be retained.

It is of course an essential part of my theory that the author should have been familiar with apocalyptic literature; but this would naturally have been the case with St John. In his enforced exile and solitude on Patmos he may well have re-read many apocalypses. What could be more natural than that his visions should be coloured with apocalyptic references? Again, the banished Apostle, from his little island, would anxiously watch the critical events



from which his beloved Churches had suffered, were suffering, and would soon suffer still more. The lonely exile was not to be intimidated by the whole power of Rome. The Son of Thunder met the persecutors of Christians and the deifiers of emperors with a blast that has reverberated through the ages. His pictures of Babylon, of the Beast, of the Dragon and the rest, stamped the reign of brute force with an indelible stigma. Sometimes his fulminations are directed against Nero, sometimes against later emperors, down to Domitian. The ingenuity and diligence of commentators have identified many of the political references, but my present point is simply that his embodiment and personification of the principalities and powers with which he had to contend are more likely to have arisen before his imagination in actual visions than to have been the product of a deliberate artistic adoption of a prevalent literary form.

That this form, as we have it, was due to an editor rather than to the author, is confirmed by a detailed study of the book. There are breaks in the arrangement that would hardly have occurred if the work had been a deliberate work of art. This is evidenced by the fact that so many competent critics have regarded the book as composite. Weizsäcker, Sabatier, Schoen, Volter, Vischer, Harnack, and Weyland, widely as they differ from one another, all hold in effect that the author of *Revelation* incorporated therein the work of other men, and introduced these in such a way as often to interrupt his plan. This is certainly a plausible view, but it seems to me less plausible than the theory that an editor, having to deal with a number of records, arranged them, so far as he could, so as to produce a single book, with a certain unity of structure, but could not satisfactorily work in all his materials, and so was obliged either to omit much or to break the symmetry of the work. In dealing with the visions of his master, St John, a pious editor would naturally prefer the latter alternative.

Certain curious repetitions and apparent inconsistencies

point in the same direction. The final judgment of the hostile powers is described in Rev. vi. 12–17. In Rev. xiv. 8 it is spoken of as over, but in xiv. 14–20 and in xvii. 16 it is again described. In xviii. 2 it is again spoken of as past, but in xviii. 4–24 it is again predicted. This presents no difficulty if we regard the book as a series of separate visions, arranged and connected by an editor; but it is most unlikely that an author, writing consecutively, would thus pass backwards and forwards between the prediction of an event and its accomplishment.

In the descriptions of heaven we find other inconsistencies, natural enough in a combination of separate visions, but hardly possible in a continuous production. Heaven is sometimes like the court of a great king. God is seated on a throne surrounded by loyal subjects and worshippers (Rev. iv.). Among these, the martyrs are expressly included, but presently we are told (vi. 9) that these martyrs are “under the altar.” Further on God appears to be hidden in the Holy Place of a temple, where no man can enter because of the smoke (Rev. xv. 5–8). In the New Jerusalem, on the contrary, there is no temple. It would be easy to multiply such cases of inconsistency; but enough have been given to illustrate the view that we have here a series of separate visions, woven into one consecutive revelation. It would be absurd to suppose that the author could not have given a consistent account of his conception of heaven; but no such consistency was to be expected in separate visions, coloured by separate apocalypses, myths, and Old Testament passages. Respect for the apostolic author would probably prevent the pious editor from attempting to harmonise them.

The mysterious episode in chapter xii. is an obvious interpolation, and its introduction can hardly be explained except on the assumption that the editor had here a separate vision, which he wanted to introduce somewhere, and yet could find no suitable place for it without a serious interruption of the general development of the work. This strange episode



seems to be suggested by a solar myth — Babylonian or Egyptian or Greek,—and it is likely enough that St John was acquainted with some Hebrew version of such a myth, and associated it, in vision, with the troubles of the Church. Thus the flight of the mother of the sun-god is made an allegory of the flight of the Mother Church of Jerusalem from the doomed city before its fall (Rev. xii. 6). This may be compared with the Greek myth of the flight of the pregnant mother of the sun-god Apollo, and her persecution by the python. So, too, her adventures and persecutions after her child's birth (Rev. xii. 13–17) may be compared with the Egyptian myth about the birth of Horus. This apocalyptic vision is of “a woman with the sun and moon under her feet, and upon her head a crown of twelve stars.” A dragon stands by her side, to devour the child as soon as it is born. It proved to be a man child, who was to rule all nations. Immediately after his birth “the child was caught up unto God,” and the woman fled. War follows in heaven, and the dragon, cast down to earth, persecutes the woman. She receives eagle wings, that she may fly into the wilderness. Thither the serpent follows and tries to drown her, but the earth saves the woman by swallowing the river which the dragon had spewed out of his mouth. The dragon then goes away to make war against those of her seed “which keep the commandments and hold the testimony of Jesus.” Obviously this vision does not agree in detail with our records concerning the birth of Jesus Christ. Whether the mother be the Virgin or the Church, the allegory is at least vague. Why should the Child be represented as caught up to God immediately after his birth? My answer is, of course, that the vision was suggested by a myth, but was coloured by the dreamer's preoccupation with the persecutions of the Church that were going on, and especially by the flight of Christians from the doomed Jerusalem, and the ill-treatment of the Gentile Christians. There is no reference to the Crucifixion or to the Resurrection; but the Child has

ascended to his Father, and the dragon that persecuted him is now persecuting his followers. There is evidently no attempt to invent a consistent allegory of the Gospel story or of Christian theology.

In contrast with the inconsistencies of imagery and allegory, we may note the underlying consistency of idea; for this strengthens our belief that the materials of the book, as distinguished from its form, came from one and the same man, even though the arrangement of it came from another. Throughout, the revelation is of Jesus Christ, with his two-fold purpose of overthrowing the powers of evil and establishing a perfect society upon earth. Evil is primarily associated with Rome, both as the persecuting tyrant and the worshipper of emperors. It would of course have been idle for the Christians to have rebelled against the Empire, even if behind it there had not been the powers of Satan. Backed by the dragon, the beast is for the present irresistible. Christians must bravely endure martyrdom and firmly resist all temptation to apostasy; but above all they must have faith, and look forward confidently to the victory of Christ and the overthrow not only of Rome but also of Satan. Meanwhile the Churches must look to themselves (Rev. ii., iii., and iv.), making themselves as far as possible images of the New Jerusalem, for they too are subject to the just judgment of Christ. Let the Churches purify their morals and their worship, and so await the coming of their Lord. He is arrayed in a garment sprinkled with blood, and his Name is called the "Word (*logos*) of God" (Rev. xiv. 13); "the first and the last" (Rev. i. 17; ii. 8; xxii. 13); "which is, and which was, and *ὁ ἐρχόμενος*" (i. 8). What could be more in the spirit of the Fourth Gospel?

We must next allude to the prominence throughout the Book of Revelation of the number seven. There are seven spirits, seven Churches, seven trumpets, seven plagues, seven bowls, and so on. This fact has been used as an argument for the unity of the book, and might therefore be used against



the theory of separate visions. But it is only necessary to suppose that the symbolic significance of the number was strongly felt by St John, to understand its recurrence in vision after vision.

The following list of separate visions may be tentatively suggested, though some of these are perhaps compounded by the editor out of several of the seer's dreams:—

*Vision I.* The seven Churches.

*Vision II.* Heaven as the court of God.

*Vision III.* The seven seals. In the course of this we have incorporated—

*Vision IV.*, the sealing of the saints (Rev. vii. 1–17), and the editorial (viii. 1–5), to connect Vision V. with Visions III. and IV. The subject of Vision IV. naturally suggests its interpolation in the midst of Vision III.

*Vision V.* The seven trumpets, in the midst of which are interpolated—

*Visions VI. and VII.*, the crowned and persecuted mother, and the two beasts.

*Vision VIII.* The lamb surrounded by saints.

*Vision IX.* In chapters xiv. 6 and xvi. 1 we have probably one or more visions, modified by the editor so as to form a transition to—

*Vision X.* The seven bowls.

*Vision XI.* The curse on Babylon.

*Vision XII.* The destruction of the beast.

*Vision XIII.* The destruction of the dragon.

*Vision XIV.* The day of judgment.

*Vision XV.* The New Jerusalem.

It is likely enough that some of the visions were circulated immediately after their occurrence. Thus the letters to the seven Churches were no doubt sent round to the said Churches in the form of a circular letter. The more political visions, being intended to sustain the Church under persecution, would

also have been circulated at once—passed from hand to hand, and perhaps from Church to Church. As an illustration of this, take the references to Roman Imperialism, and Nero in particular, under the image of the beast. Look first at the thirteenth chapter. The object of the writer is to sustain his fellow-Christians under persecution and temptation, and at the same time he knows that his own life is too valuable to be sacrificed. So his message must be clear to his hearers and yet not clear to Imperial officials. The beast comes up from the sea, because to a Jew of Palestine the sea was the west. St John in his youth may well have “stood upon the sand” and seen Roman ships appearing on the horizon, apparently “coming up out of the sea.” The phrase would suggest nothing to a Roman, but everything to a Jew. The beast has ten horns, all crowned with diadems, a reference to the ten great provinces of the Roman Empire, each of which seemed to a Jew a sort of kingdom. On each of his heads are names of blasphemy, for Nero and later emperors claimed to be divine. It was the dragon who gave him his power and his throne. Every Jew knew that the dragon symbolised the devil. “The whole earth wondered at the beast,” and indeed Nero’s great ambition seemed to be that he should be wondered at, as fiddler and actor-manager no less than as emperor; and men “worshipped the beast . . . and there was given to him a mouth speaking great things.” Nero was perhaps the greatest braggart that ever sat upon a throne. “And there was given to him authority to continue forty-two months”—the exact period between the beginning of Nero’s persecutions and his death. “And it was given unto him to make war with the saints and to overcome them. . . . And all that dwell on the earth shall worship him, everyone whose name hath not been written in the book of life of the Lamb that hath been slain from the foundation of the world.” To a Roman this would be senseless jargon. To a Christian the meaning was clear. The test of Christianity was to be a refusal to worship the new-fangled god whom the Roman



Senate had set up. But to remove all possible doubt, we have the famous statement that the number of the beast was six hundred and sixty-six. A Jewish Kabbalist would naturally transliterate the Greek form for "the Emperor Nero" into Hebrew; and, applying his Kabbalistic system, this would give him the six hundred and sixty-six.

Let us pass on to chapter xvii. Here we have plain references to the widespread belief that Nero was not really dead, but would return in triumph. "The beast that thou sawest, was and is not, and is about to come out of the abyss and to go to perdition." Further on, the seven heads of the beast are interpreted. We are told that they represent seven kings, of whom "five are fallen, and one is, and the other is not yet come." The beast is no longer Nero, but the Roman despotism. Nero is simply one of the heads. The writer of the Book of Revelation regarded him as the fifth emperor. This vision was during the reign of the sixth. The seventh, though "not yet come," was at hand. This enables us to date positively one at least of the visions, as Galba, the sixth emperor, only reigned for a few months—June A.D. 68 to January A.D. 69. On the other hand, the vision in chapter vi. seems to contain a clear reference to an edict of Domitian (A.D. 92), or rather to the revocation of his edict, which can hardly have been earlier than A.D. 93. The object of this edict was to limit the production of wine. Its revocation would naturally lead to the conversion of arable land into vineyards, to a raising of the price of necessities and a lowering of that of luxuries. This is expressed in Rev. vi. 6: "A chœnix of wheat for a denarius, and three chœnikes of barley for a denarius, and the oil and the wine hurt thou not." No doubt the high price of wheat and barley was due to other causes than the revoking of the edict of Domitian, but the seer, as champion of the poor, points correctly enough to one tendency of the new Imperial policy.

It will not, I think, be necessary to give further illustrations of the fact that parts of the book are as early as A.D. 68, and

other parts as late as A.D. 93. The book can hardly have taken its present form before A.D. 95, and most of the visions probably came between A.D. 90 and A.D. 96.

The chief objection to the whole theory grows out of the linguistic differences between the Fourth Gospel and the Apocalypse. The former, in the words of Dr R. H. Charles, is "written in correct and flowing Greek, and there is not a barbarism, a solecism, or a provincialism in the Gospel; whereas the Greek of the Apocalypse is inaccurate, disfigured by unusual and foreign words, and even at times by solecisms." I submit, however, that these differences of diction may be explained by the different circumstances in which the books were written. That a Jewish peasant should have attained to such a mastery of Hellenistic Greek as we find in the Fourth Gospel is no doubt wonderful. Such a man, however, in recording his visions, might well relapse into inaccuracies and barbarisms of diction which he avoided in the more studied, leisured, and careful work involved in the writing of the Fourth Gospel. The difference is not greater than the difference between the polished English in which Robert Burns learned to write, and the peasant dialect in which some of his more spontaneous lyrics continued to be written. If we rejected the Johannine authorship of the Fourth Gospel we should of course escape the difficulties connected with the differences of diction, style, and spirit; but I do not consider such rejection necessary. We know how the Coleridge who saw the Vision recorded in *Kubla Khan* wrote philosophically on philosophy; and how the Carlyle whose English was pure and limpid in *John Sterling* also achieved the amazing diction of *Sartor Resartus*. We know how Dante hated, with a hatred like the Apocalypt's, and yet loved with a love like the Evangelist's. We hesitate therefore to deny the possibility that one man wrote both the Apocalypse and the Fourth Gospel.

J. E. SYMES.



## DISCUSSIONS

N.B.—The contributions under this heading refer to matters previously treated in the "Hibbert Journal." Reviews of books are not open to discussion. Criticism of any article will, as a rule, be limited to a single issue of the Journal. The discussion ends with a reply from the original writer.—*Ed.*

### "A NEW LIGHT ON THE RELATIONS OF PETER AND PAUL."

(*Hibbert Journal*, October 1913, pp. 190, 191.)

IN an understanding criticism of my essay on this subject, Mr Richard Bell puts his finger on the crux of the argument. Seeing that there must have been some point of contact between the Christology of the Jerusalem Christians and that of Paul, he reasons that this must have been the (assumed) belief of the former in the Resurrection of Jesus. If so, one must further assume—as Mr Bell probably does—that the appearances of the Risen Lord were historical. As it is both unscientific and disingenuous merely to evade this issue, I will state frankly that, regarding the Resurrection as an impossibility, I cannot treat it as an actual occurrence. From this standpoint it is an *a priori* improbability that the Easter faith should have originated among the companions of Jesus (supposing the Jerusalem Church to have contained such), and this hypothesis was supported by an examination of the documents, for my study showed that the said faith was actually lacking among the writings of the Jewish Church and was first introduced by Paul. The point of contact between the dogma of the two was their common belief in Jesus as the Messiah.

Mr Bell further argues that as Paul was a Jew he could not have been so very much under the sway of Greek ideas. Spinoza, too, was a Jew, but his philosophy is not the child of rabbinical speculation. Paul lived in a Greek city and habitually spoke and wrote Greek, so that he could hardly have escaped a deep tincture of popular Hellenic culture and religion. The researches of Wrede, Brückner, Reitzenstein, Norden, Murray, Carl Clemen, and others, have constantly added to our knowledge of Paul's debt to Greece; the only question, as Mr Bell himself

admits, is how far this influence extended. In taking stock of Paul's thought, it must also be remembered that by his time Judaism itself had borrowed much from the children of Javan. The New Testament assertion that Christ died and rose "according to the Scriptures," indicates that the idea of a suffering and rising Messiah was current in certain Jewish quarters. Indeed, it may be found, more or less distinctly, in Psalm xxii. (*cf.* Briggs, *Psalms*, i. 191; Reinach, *Orpheus*, p. 232, English); Testament of Levi xvi. 3; Testament of Benjamin iii. 8; Wisdom ii. 18 ff.; 4 Ezra vii. 30. Perhaps it is also in point to quote James v. 6, which is not, as practically all scholars from Luther to Bacon have recognised, a reference to the Passion, but is a proof of the currency of the general idea of the sufferings and death of the ideal Just Man.

Mr C. E. Pike attacks my thesis by adducing the testimony of Revelation xi. 8 to the crucifixion of the Lord, and by quoting Renan to prove that the Apocalypse, far from being Pauline, "breathes out a terrible hatred against Paul." But is Renan's word final on this point? He is supported by Köstlin, Baur, Schwegler, Volkmar, Holtzmann, Hilgenfeld and Hausrath, but he is contradicted by Neander, Ritschl, B. Weiss, Gebhard, Weizsäcker, J. Weiss, and Ramsay. Fortunately, our estimate of the testimony of the verse in question is not dependent on the decision of so doubtful a point as the attitude of the book as a whole to Paul. Many scholars now see in the Apocalypse a compilation from diverse sources. Two of the very greatest contemporary authorities, Canon R. H. Charles (*Encyclopædia Britannica*) and Professor J. Weiss, find in the passage containing this verse a fragment from an alien source incorporated in the whole by the final redactor. It is perfectly possible that opposite views of Paul's gospel may have been taken by the author of this pericope and by the author or authors of other portions of Revelation as we now have it. And it is perfectly plain that the man who calls Jerusalem "Sodom and Egypt" breathes out a terrible hatred not of Paul, but of his adversaries the Jews. It is true that other verses (i. 18 and v. 9) speak of the death of "the Son of man" and of "the Lamb," but the wording is vague, and, as evidence of an historic fact, worthless. Can anyone see in the terrifying vision of i. 13 ff. a picture of the "historic Jesus"?

In weighing my argument the reader should remember that it is but one of many which can be and have been adduced to disprove the historicity of the Passion. For the others I again refer to the works of W. B. Smith and Reinach, to which must now be added the translation which M. Reinach is doing me the honour to make of my article. It will appear, with additions of his own, supporting my thesis, in the Brussels *Bibliothèque de Propagande*.

PRESERVED SMITH.



“DOES CONSCIOUSNESS ‘EVOLVE’?” A RESTATEMENT  
AND AN INVITATION.

*(Hibbert Journal, April 1913, p. 521.)*

PROFESSOR JACKS'S "reply" is partly a restatement of the argument which my discussion attempted to meet, partly a summons to consider a further difficulty rising out of the position I took up. I appealed to the justification that any intelligible view of History furnished of my contention in favour of the evolution of consciousness. On the contrary, Professor Jacks replies, "The theory of an evolving consciousness renders History *a priori* impossible." This is the old point, and if the theory of an evolving consciousness is literally a theory of *pre-formation*, it is, I agree, unanswerable: History appears as merely a senseless expansion, in the form of time, of a reality lying previously compact in the brain or whatever corresponds to the brain of the absolute. It is not likely, however, that a theory which rests on the necessity of conceiving of a reality beyond time should have adopted so naïve a conception of eternity as a mere antedating of time. The idea one may suspect to have come rather from critics who have recognised neither the real meaning of the distinction of time and eternity nor the grounds on which it has been maintained by idealists from Plato to the present time. Be that as it may, my discussion was intended to make these grounds clear by the aid of Professor Jacks's own illustration, and I must merely repeat that, apart from some increase of purpose, some increasing organisation of the elements of life strictly analogous to the logical organisation of the elements of thought and knowledge, and resting like it on the assumption that particular events in consciousness have their value in their relation to a whole which is neither a particular nor an event, progress and achievement are unintelligible and History becomes a mere record of unmeaning change. Professor Jacks again supports his criticism by asking how the immanent logic that on this theory is supposed to govern men's thoughts and actions succeeds in one place, fails in another: how it comes to a halt in Spencer while it has free course and abounds in Hegel, and why idealists do not spend less time in refuting Spencer and more in accounting for him. I do not know that idealism more than any other philosophy is called on to account for Mr Herbert Spencer, but I should not consider it a superhuman task to show what the influences were which enabled that philosopher to take one step, *e.g.*, in the logic of freedom, but left him stubbornly blind to the next.

Professor Jacks's second point is far more difficult. Admitting the logical principle—the "spirit of the whole"—working in the parts or psychical centres, hampered by their limitations, and having to wait their time, how are we to conceive of its relation to them? "How has this psychical medium managed to detach itself, in the first instance, from the sway of the immanent logic, and that so completely that it can obstruct the course of the immanent logic itself? Has the immanent logic no part in the origin of this obstruction?" Though this is a new point, I have

no desire to shirk it. I would rather broaden it. It is only a particular form of the wider question of the relation of the Universe as a whole to time and change. May I, without embarking on the discussion of so large a problem, here take space for an explanation and an invitation? Intelligible and answerable as I believe the question in one sense to be, it may easily be formulated in such a way as to make it unintelligible and unanswerable. This is done when we hypostatise one of the aspects of reality, and conceive of it as detached from and obstructing another from without. To take the present antithesis: there are no "thoughts, feelings, volitions" into which "logic" does not enter and which have not some traces of internal organisation. There is no bare psychical to be set in opposition to a bare logical, or standing to it as created to creator. What we have is always one form of organisation opposing another, a less developed (I am sorry I must insist on the term) a more developed form. It is this that makes at once the joy and the tragedy of the world. If it be answered that we are only increasing the paradox by trying to conceive of the Universe as self-differentiating and self-obstructive, I might reply that it is a paradox involved in all the great Western systems of philosophy from Plato to Lotze, and that Bergson, in his treatment of the relation between the vital impulse and the material conditions in which it manifests itself, does not escape it, but only emphasises it. I prefer to note that we seem to me to be at the present moment in a more favourable position to resolve it than ever before. We must, I believe, insist on the idea of the whole, under whatever name, as the constructive principle of our world. But we must equally insist that the value of the construction is not to be measured statically in terms of an already existing perfection in the whole, but by the energy and solidity of the individual contribution to it. If we reject mere change in time as of no value except as a condition of something lying beyond it, we must insist on individual development as the unconditioned, or the highest form in which the unconditioned reveals itself to us. To establish this position, and with it to provide the justification and the clue to the direction of human progress, seems to me the chief need of the present day, and is an enterprise in which I venture to suggest, on the basis of some such understanding as I have sketched, idealists and their critics might profitably unite.

J. H. MUIRHEAD.

BIRMINGHAM.

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### SOME LAYMEN'S NEEDS.

(*Hibbert Journal*, October 1913, p. 17.)

#### I.

THE search for a right conception of the Source and Goal of our being which Sir Francis Younghusband advocates is certainly most needful, and is to be pursued on all sides and independently of all preconceptions.



But real progress can only be made by conserving such truth as we have already gained, and I think there is much more in the Christian conception of God than he finds in it. The great word in the Sermon on the Mount is this: "Ye therefore shall be perfect as your heavenly Father is perfect"; living in love to *all*, "be the sons of your Father who is in Heaven." Can we get anything higher than this? It is the thought of God as the all-perfect ethical Being, and the ideal for man is to be a true son of that heavenly Father by being like Him in character. The ideal is infinite and cannot be transcended. The term "Father" is to be interpreted by the best that is in ourselves: "What man is there of you who, being a father," etc. Nor is God thought of as a "distant" Being. He is the "heavenly" Father as distinguished from our "earthly" fathers. The "Father" with whom Jesus lived in constant communion was always near to Him and to His disciples: "Pray to thy Father who is in secret," He said, that is, "always nigh to thee, and never more so than when thou art alone with Him." The term "Father" is the most appropriate that we can apply to the *Source* of our being, using human language as we must. We do not require to go "back and back" in its application; we are using it directly of "the ultimate Source of things." He is "separate" from us, of course, for we are certainly not He; but, according to Jesus, He is at the same time within us, an "energy that is playing through us." We have thus already in Christ's thought of God and His relation to us that "more perfect conception" of which Sir Francis speaks, "of a Power working both in us and from above us," in our conception whereof those other elements which he mentions may well be embraced in harmony with the central truth.

It would occupy too much space to refer to other elements in Sir Francis' criticism of the Gospels, but to one more I may be allowed to advert, because of its importance. Jesus, it is said, bids us love our neighbour as ourselves and do unto others as we would have others do to us, which was good for the time, but not high enough. Many men and women have "loved their neighbours, not merely as themselves, but far more than themselves," and have given up their lives for them. But Jesus taught expressly that we are not to love our "neighbour" only, but our "enemies"; and is it not in Him who devoted Himself to doing good to others, and ultimately sacrificed His life for their sakes, that we have the supreme inspiring example of such higher love, so that He could say, "that ye love one another even as I have loved you"? Whether He said this in so many words or not, it is strange that His own example of self-sacrifice should be forgotten.

W. L. WALKER.

SHETTLESTON, GLASGOW.

## II.

THOSE who had read and profited by Sir Francis Younghusband's *Within* would instinctively turn to "Some Laymen's Needs" for further consolation and inspiration.

Incisive as is the article, was there any need to weaken it somewhat by such questionable opinion as "for no other reason" in the sentences, "The rich man was sent to hell *for no other reason* that we are told than that he was rich. And the poor man went to heaven *for no other reason* than that he was poor"? Whoever imagined that this was the underlying idea of the Abraham-Lazarus illustration?

I submit that it is these very statements which give the "static" party an opportunity for discounting the "dynamic" party. It is a pity, as it impedes evolution in ecclesiastical dove-cotes.

THEODORE P. BROCKLEHURST.

GIGGLESWICK-IN-CRAVEN.

### "THE SOCIAL VALUE OF LOGIC TEACHING."

(*Hibbert Journal*, July 1913, p. 912, and October, p. 192.)

DR SCHILLER'S rejoinder to my review of his *Formal Logic* is the genial suggestion that I show myself therein so incompetent and dishonest a reasoner that my employment as a Professor (which, by the way, I am not) of Logic constitutes a public scandal—part of the "social problem" which gives the sub-title to his book.

I did not, in the first place, ask him what he meant by a social problem. To have done so would argue me incapable of understanding plain (exceedingly plain) English. The words "Why social?" simply introduce, as anyone can see, an explanation of what he does mean, illustrated by quotations.

I do not "begin with a clear *petitio principii*" by using the phrase *delenda est logica*. Whatever Dr Schiller's definition of Formal Logic may be, it is quite clear—and, if that had been possible, his rejoinder would make it clearer still—that he is speaking throughout of Formal Logic as at present taught. The phrase used above does absolutely describe Dr Schiller's attitude to this; it contains no assumption whatever that my "own conception of Logic is the right one." A small point, but one which characteristically illustrates Dr Schiller's methods.

Another logical crime charged against me by Dr Schiller, iterated and reiterated (without proof) throughout his rejoinder, is that of irrelevance or *ignoratio elenchi*. And he asserts that I do not "give an account of the aims and arguments of the book," nor "attempt to estimate them judiciously." It would be hard to formulate a statement more flagrantly at variance with the facts. Having studied with great care the line of argument by which Dr Schiller justified his remarkable views, I was forced to the conclusion that their cogency depended *in every case* on the same initial fallacy—an unwarranted exaggeration of the formality of the Logic he was assailing. Believing this, it was the plain duty of an honest critic



to make it clear. To this—the pith of the matter, as it seems to me—I addressed myself, and most of the review is directed to this point. If this is “irrelevance,” the word (assuming, of course, that it is not being used merely as a verbal missile) must be given a quite new meaning.

How Dr Schiller can assert that his positions are “quite different” from those I controvert passes my comprehension. His whole book is a sustained and a closely reasoned attempt to prove that the doctrines of Formal Logic are so completely formal as to be untrue, and even meaningless. But if his premisses are false (as I have attempted, by taking instances, to show), the very closeness of the reasoning will only lend him more surety in his false conclusion.

The charge of “garbling,” when space does not admit of giving the full content, is one very easy to make, and not so easy to refute. To take the case alleged by Dr Schiller: his whole line of argument is based on the assertion that Formal Logic cuts itself off from a consideration of *real* meaning. Phrases such as: “once . . . the inquiry has been safely restricted to a simple form of words” (p. 103): “he [the Formal logician] condemned himself to consider *forms of words*” (p. 5—italics Dr Schiller’s)—are met with everywhere. The sentence, “It is vain, therefore, to prophesy what the real meaning will be simply by staring at the verbal form” (p. 26), does not *assert* that Formal Logic is reduced to attempt this: and if Dr Schiller denies that the passage is intended to *suggest* this, I of course accept his statement. All I asserted was that it did actually suggest this. And under the circumstances, and considering that the whole book teems with similar “dyslogistic” phrases, describing the acts of the Formal logician, I think the error was natural.

Mr Alfred Sidgwick’s argument about ambiguous middle is of course entirely valid as against a Logic which is absolutely formal. My whole contention is that Logic as actually taught is not so formal as to expose itself to this very searching and valuable criticism.

Finally, though I consider that Dr Schiller’s case against Formal Logic does rest throughout on an exaggeration of its formal character which really misrepresents it, I have avoided the use of such phrases as “a tissue of misrepresentations”: because such phrases suggest, and are usually meant to suggest, deliberate falsification. I have made no such charge against Dr Schiller, and I must protest warmly against the very strong suggestion that my review is open to that charge.

W. E. TANNER.

UNIVERSITY OF BRISTOL.

# SURVEY OF RECENT PHILOSOPHICAL AND THEOLOGICAL LITERATURE.

## PHILOSOPHY.

PROFESSOR G. DAWES HICKS.

HEGEL's *Encyclopædia of the Philosophical Sciences* was designed to work out the conception of philosophy as a systematic and unified whole. Whilst each of the parts of philosophy was a real totality, rounded and complete in itself, yet it inevitably burst through the limits imposed by its special medium and gave rise to a wider circle. The title of Hegel's book is adopted for the series of volumes that are appearing under the general editorship of Professor Windelband and Dr Arnold Ruge, because, notwithstanding the tendency of the present age to extreme specialisation, the object of these volumes will be to show that the idea of unity and timelessness is involved in the very notion of philosophy, and that its various paths lead one and all of them towards this idea. Each volume of the *Encyclopædia* will deal with one of the main departments of philosophy, and will consist of exhaustive articles on fundamental aspects of that subject by well-known European and American thinkers. The English edition of the work is edited by Sir Henry Jones, and the first volume, on *Logic*, has just been issued (London: Macmillan, 1913). It includes three articles on "The Principles of Logic," by Professors Windelband, Royce, and Couturat, and single articles on "The Task of Logic," by Professor Croce, "The Problems of Logic," by Professor Enriques, and "The Transformation of the Concept of Consciousness in Modern Epistemology and its Bearing on Logic," by Professor Losskij of St Petersburg. Miss B. Ethel Meyer is responsible for the translation of five of these into English. The volume as a whole shows in a singularly conclusive manner the vast range of material that falls within the province of modern Logic, and the relatively subordinate position therein occupied by the traditional Formal Logic. Professor Croce maintains that Logic "concentrates within itself, in a more or less developed form, the whole of philosophy, and coincides with it." Professor Windelband, who follows in the main the leading of the Critical Philosophy, regards Logic as the



philosophical doctrine of knowledge, or the theory of theoretical reason. He reiterates the view he has defended at length in other writings that there are but three fundamental philosophical sciences—namely, Logic, Ethics, and *Æsthetics*,—corresponding to the fundamental psychical activities of knowing, willing, and feeling, and to the forms which human culture has taken—namely, science, morality, and art. In an interesting way the author sketches, under four heads, the various aspects of knowledge with which Logic, as thus conceived, would be called upon to deal. By (a) phenomenology of knowledge he understands the sum-total of the empirical phenomena which constitute the given presuppositions of Logic. Here the relation of psychology to Logic is discussed, and the distinction between the two points of view is clearly and lucidly stated. Whilst Logic cannot be indifferent to inquiries as to the way in which judging and knowing as psychical activities have been developed, yet it is primarily concerned not with the origin but with the truth or validity of ideas, and in respect to the latter question any answer that may be given to the former is quite irrelevant. “There are logical principles of Psychology (as of every science), but there are no psychological principles of Logic.” A doctrine of judgments is what is meant by (b) Pure or Formal Logic, and judgment as the fundamental function of perception is the evaluation of a relation between ideas, an act of the synthetic consciousness which is judged according to its truth-value. Pure Logic culminates in the treatment of the relation between judgments, *i.e.* in a theory of Categories. Windelband distinguishes between reflective and constitutive categories, the latter being those which, like causality, are thought really to subsist between objects; the former those which, like equality, although determined by the special qualities of objects, subsist at first as relations in consciousness and only for consciousness. As a kind of comparative morphology of science, (c) Methodology has to deal with the application of the principles of Pure Logic to the different aims of the special sciences. A fundamental line of demarcation is here to be drawn between those sciences in which the aim is the discovery of laws and those which are primarily concerned with particular events, between the natural and the historical sciences. The critical method of (d) the Theory of Knowledge is directed to answering, in the light thrown by the theories and results of the sciences, the question as to the relation of knowing to reality. Windelband contends that after avoiding all metaphysical and psychological misinterpretations of such terms as “the valid” and “consciousness-in-general,” what remains for us is nothing else than the sum-total of the interconnexions and relations between existents. These are not themselves existents, either as things, or as states, or as activities; they are only actualised as contents of the process of knowing. The valid is the form and order under which that which exists is determined. The form and order are not brought about by the existent, nor does knowing produce them, but as there are no existents which do not exhibit this form and order, so there is no process of knowing which does not make use of them. The analysis of knowledge

comes to a stand before the problem of the relation between validity and existence. If metalogical speculation proceeds further, it can take no other path than that of a spiritualistic metaphysic and conceive of the formal structure of the valid as a spiritual order. But between such a world-ordering spirituality and our human spirit there would be about as much similarity as obtains between *canis signum coeleste* and *canis animal latrans*. The valuable and important articles by Professor Royce and Professor Couturat deal with the developments of modern Logic which we owe largely to Peano, Frege, and Russell. Professor Royce predicts that the Theory of Order will be a fundamental science in the philosophy of the coming time, and discerns in its problem an inexhaustible topic for future research. Professor Losskij first explains the view of consciousness which he has developed in detail in previous works. Consciousness is the sum-total of everything which stands in a certain unique relation to the Ego; a relation which may be indicated by saying that everything which the Ego "has" falls within the sphere of consciousness. Calling what the Ego "has" the content of consciousness, the assertion may be made that every fact of consciousness depends for its existence upon at least three factors—the presence, namely, of an Ego, of a content of consciousness, and of a relation between the two. The content may be either an expression or modification of the Ego (as, for example, joy, wish, etc.), or it may confront the Ego as something alien to itself, as something "given" to it (as "red," "hard," etc.). For the theory of knowledge the second kind of content is the more important, and it may be either psychical or physical in character. The fact that the content is "given" does not imply any causal interaction between subject and object; the relation that subsists is that between knowing and the known. Knowledge of the object is gained by a process of comparing and distinguishing and not by means of an impression or affection of the mind. Judgment is a singling out of subject and predicate and their interrelation from the totality of the contents of consciousness; or, in other words, the act of judging is an act of analysis, which seeks to lay bare the synthetic necessity of connexion between the "given" contents of consciousness. If the individual knowing, instead of following out the objective synthesis, himself effects a synthesis, thinking gives place to fancy or other subjective activities, and the assertion has no longer any logical ground. The author admits that much work still remains to be done before Logic can become completely transformed in accordance with the view he has here presented. But those of us in England who have been arriving at results very similar to his will welcome this independent piece of work on the part of the Russian thinker.

In the *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* (New Series, vol. xiii., London: Williams & Norgate, 1913), subjects of very varied character are discussed. Mr Bertrand Russell's Presidential Address, "On the Notion of Cause," begins with a very drastic criticism of the law of causality as usually stated by philosophers, which he maintains is false and is not



employed in science. Instead of stating that one event A is always followed by another event B, scientific laws assert functional relations between certain events at certain times, which Mr Russell calls determinants, and other events at earlier or later times or at the same time. No *a priori* category is involved; scientific laws make their appearance as purely empirical facts and are not necessarily universal, except in a trivial and scientifically useless form. A system with one set of determinants may very likely have also other sets of a quite different nature; a mechanically determined system may, for example, be also teleologically determined. The reasons for supposing volitions to be determined are strong but not conclusive. Even if volitions are mechanically determined, freedom in the sense revealed by introspection may still be a fact. To a symposium upon the question "Can there be anything obscure or implicit in a mental state?" three interesting papers are contributed. Mr Henry Barker maintains (a) that psychological implicitness is a sheer fiction, and that the distinction between the explicit and the implicit has no psychological application whatever; (b) that, while the distinction of the clear and the obscure, on the contrary, is actually based on psychological facts, it nevertheless expresses those facts in an unpsychological way. Obscurity in a mental state as such must be an obscurity which comes somehow between the subject and the object (that which is actually experienced), and not between the object and the thing. An object cannot be half in consciousness and half not, or there only to half the degree it might otherwise be. When it is said to be there in a dim way, the real fact is that something else is there which, under the altered conditions, corresponds to the same thing or is produced by the same stimulus. Professor G. F. Stout, on the other hand, contends that within the field of consciousness there are contents which are not separately discerned, that there may be experience of difference without judgment of difference, and that in this sense it is legitimate to speak of implicit consciousness. Professor R. F. A. Hoernlé is, on the whole, in agreement with Dr Stout, and urges that on Mr Barker's view a psychologist would seem to be precluded from dealing with the development of experiences at all. There are two papers on Voluntary Activity—one by Professor Hoernlé entitled "The Analysis of Volition," and the other entitled "The Nature of Willing," by the writer of this Survey. Both agree that the experience of willing is highly complex in character, and is analysable into simpler constituents, but that in its character *as a whole* it has a uniqueness. Three of the papers deal with different aspects of the philosophy of Bergson. Miss Karin Costelloe discusses the question "What Bergson means by 'Interpenetration.'" She interprets Bergson as meaning that the more what changes has *durée* (that is, the tendency towards interpenetration, in which the nature of what comes after only finds its explanation by reference to what came before), the less the change admits of being divided up into a succession of *similar* events, or "parts" which can be classified. Miss L. S. Stebbing writes on "The Notion of Truth in Bergson's Theory of Knowledge." Intuition,

according to Bergson, is the sole philosophic faculty, because by means of it the knower can plunge into the flux of reality, and know that reality from within by being one with it. Thus, truth is identified with reality; and such identification, it is argued, is fatal to any theory of truth. Only by admitting the non-existential character of truth and its dependence upon the distinction of knower and known can it be maintained that truth is complete, even though it be *about another*. It may then be complete just because the knower in knowing is no longer the part that he is as an *existing* knower. Professor Arthur Robinson deals with "Memory and Consciousness." He contends that Bergson's treatment of memory fails to do justice to the function of meaning in remembering, and encounters serious difficulties through an analysis which rests on the presupposition that everything which can be called structure falls to the side of matter. Moreover, unconscious memory, in which our past exists just as it happened, is not necessary to explain the fact that we can think of the past. And can the past exist just as it happened in a universe which is essentially continuous change?

The philosophy of Bergson still continues to be widely discussed in the periodicals. In an article on "Some Antecedents of the Philosophy of Bergson" (*Mind*, Oct. 1913), Professor A. O. Lovejoy traces anticipations of Bergson's conception of "real duration" in the writings of Ravaisson, Dauriac, and Noel. Under the title of "Life and Logic," Dr H. Wildon Carr (*ibid.*) replies to the criticism of Bergson to be found in Dr Bosanquet's *Gifford Lectures*. In the first place, Dr Carr repudiates the description of Bergson's theory of indeterminism as a "guidance theory" in Bosanquet's sense of the term. It is one and the same reality which, according to the theory, lived and known from within is freedom, and viewed from without is necessity. Freedom means simply that the universe is open to the movement, change, becoming which is ultimate reality as we know it immediately and intuitively. That same reality, when we intellectualise it, is complete determination. In the second place, Dr Carr insists that Bergson's account of logical process follows from his theory of the intellect, and that therefore the opposition between his account and Dr Bosanquet's is not a disagreement of fact but of interpretation. In the third place, Dr Carr argues that the real issue between Bergson's view and Dr Bosanquet's as to the nature of the Absolute centres upon the question whether the Absolute is timeless or is in time. If Dr Bosanquet is to rebut the charge that the Absolute as he and Mr Bradley conceive it involves the notion of a reality of which it may be said that for it *tout est donné*, he must show that in logic we have not only speculative but real activity, an activity that creates. But, on the assumption that Absolute is Experience, yet not experience as it develops in time, but self-subsistent and eternal, all is given in the Absolute, and freedom is appearance only. Professor C. E. Cory criticises Bergson's "Theory of Intellect and Matter" in the *Philosophical Review* (Sept. 1913). He tries to show that the hard and sharp distinction between mechanism and life is not consistently



adhered to by Bergson, but is repeatedly relinquished in favour of the view that there is continuity between them. Mr N. Clark Barr objects to "The Dualism of Bergson" (*Phil. R.*, Nov. 1913). Life and matter, he thinks, if they are not after all to be separate entities whose dualism is final, must be processes constitutive of a Self, though that Self may not be personality completely fulfilled, because its plans and purposes themselves grow. Bergson is in danger of hypostatizing activity itself.

In an able paper on "Idealism and the Reality of Time" (*Mind*, Oct. 1913), Mr Hugh A. Reyburn argues, in reference to Dr Bosanquet's *Gifford Lectures*, that idealism cannot afford to adopt the view of time as for us breaking the continuity of the whole, but as appearance only. A static whole, a conception which excludes succession, cannot be the Absolute. For the aspect of succession is not merely a hindrance to totality, it may be a means to it. Hegel recognised the necessity of including the lower in the higher, and he tried to make the externality of nature contributory to the concreteness of spirit. And Dr Bosanquet's view would be more convincing if he had regarded the individual as real not merely in spite of finite teleology, but also partly because of it. To do this, however, he would need to be in earnest with the reality of time. Mr J. W. Scott, writing on "Idealism as Tautology or Paradox" (*Phil. R.*, Sept. 1913), tries to show that the line of argument which realists are at present most tempted to pursue, is an attack not on idealism but on Berkeley; and that however successfully it may reduce this Berkeleian idealism to tautology or paradox, it thereby only reaches the point from which idealism—the idealism which it thinks it has been attacking—takes its start. The concern of the idealist is to show not that the universe is psychic but that it is complete, that it has an articulate structure, such that the more a man's mind becomes adequate to it, the better that mind becomes. I confess, however, I do not see on what ground Mr Scott claims the principle he thus enunciates as specially distinctive of idealism. An acute criticism of the doctrine of "Degrees of Reality" (*Phil. R.*, Nov. 1913) appears from the pen of Mr Bernard Muscio. The metaphysical argument which employs this notion is, he contends, based on an assumption concerning the nature of the universe, which assumption philosophy is by no means compelled to make. If we have any reason to believe that the universe is, for example, spiritual, we must find this reason in some analogy from parts to whole. We could not first discover the universe as a whole to possess a certain quality, such as "spirituality," and then proceed to investigate in what degree certain of its parts possess this quality. That would be to reverse the process of knowledge. If it be urged that the fact that certain finite experiences are "higher" than others implies that the Universe is the "highest experience," the question how this is known must be pressed. Such an implication could only rest on some ultimate judgment of faith, and cannot be supported by rational argument. M. Radulescu-Motru examines the Kantian idealism in an elaborate article on "La Conscience transcendente" (*Rev. de Métaphys.*

*et de Morale*, Nov. 1913). Kant, he maintains, in the construction of his philosophical edifice gave too much attention to the cement, or the relations between the elements of experience, and too little to the material elements. The author's main criticism is that in the conception of the transcendental unity of apperception two unities are included: on the one hand, a unity of the individual consciousness which is based upon the supposed identity of the psychological ego; and, on the other hand, a logical unity which is based upon the numerical identity of a super-individual consciousness (*Bewusstsein überhaupt*), and that he provides no means of transition from the latter to the former.

The first volume has appeared of an important book which is to consist of four volumes by Professor Oswald Külpe, entitled *Die Realisierung: Ein Beitrag zur Grundlegung der Realwissenschaften* (Leipzig: Hirzel, 1912). It is an attempt to justify and to establish a realistic philosophy, such as is taken for granted by the natural sciences and by psychology, through means of a carefully worked-out theory of knowledge. By realisation, the author understands a mode of knowledge or investigation in which the real thing to be apprehended is presupposed as there, and not as having first to be made or created. Only the thoughts by which we seek to represent and understand the thing are formed and produced. This first volume prepares the way for the constructive work which is to follow by a critical survey of the arguments by which the opposed theory of idealism has been supported. Külpe distinguishes between two kinds of idealism—on the one hand, the idealism of consciousness (*Konszientialismus*, as he calls it); and, on the other hand, objective or transcendental idealism. The former is idealism of the type of Berkeley's, and the greater part of the volume is devoted to its examination. It is contended that in the process by which knowledge of reality is built up we are continually transcending the immediate content of consciousness, and that all the arguments which have been advanced against the validity of such transcendence are invalid. As against objective idealism of the Neo-Kantian type, it is urged that we do not transcend the immediacy of experience merely in order to postulate ideal norms or values, but rather in order to constitute a world of metaphysical reality. In the concrete natural sciences thought is concerned with objects which, in virtue of their own nature, determine the way in which thought operates. Thought, it is true, is never a process of mirroring or copying; it is essentially a process of defining and constructing. But the process of defining and constructing is not carried on by chance or at haphazard; it is controlled by the actual character of the material offered to it. Knowledge is in Külpe's view a comprehension of realities not immediately given, but which are apprehended in and through what is immediately given. And he discerns in a critical realism of this kind a *via media* between naïve realism on the one hand and objective idealism on the other. The subsequent volumes of this book will be awaited with lively interest.

G. DAWES HICKS.



## THEOLOGY.

THE REV. PROFESSOR JAMES MOFFATT, D.LITT.

IN *The Samson-Saga* (Pitman), Dr A. Smythe Palmer gives a popular and fascinating study of the folk-tale of this Hebrew champion, from the standpoint of comparative religion. He adopts the mythological theory. "An historical personage, bearing this name, actually lived and fought and rioted in the fields of Palestine at an early period, and enjoyed a widespread reputation as a popular hero among the Israelites." But the stories, as we have them, reflect solar myths, ultimately of Babylonian origin. Dr Palmer has collected a large amount of illustrative material from all quarters, but it is only fair to remember that the hypothesis which he presents is by no means accepted unanimously by scholars. Gunkel has just written vigorously against the solar theory; and M. Halévy, in the *Revue Sémitique*, xx. pp. 273-313, handles with characteristic severity Reinach's recent presentation of the same hypothesis.

On the less speculative ground of texts, Mr S. Friedeberg has published a clear and convenient annotated Hebrew text of *Joshua* (Heinemann), and Messrs A. B. Macaulay and J. Brebner have edited *The Vulgate Psalter* (Dent). Both volumes are for the use of students in the first instance. The latter is designed, however, for those who know no Hebrew, while the former concentrates upon grammatical and idiomatic difficulties. It is much to be desired that the *Vulgate Psalter* should be read in schools, and this edition is admirably fitted to meet the want of such classes. In *The Book of Wisdom* (Rivingtons), Mr A. T. S. Goodrick publishes a vigorous and full commentary on the English text, with notes and discussions which form a valuable supplement to the editions in the Cambridge Bible by Mr Gregg and in Dr Charles's Pseudepigrapha by Mr S. Holmes. Mr Goodrick takes the view that Wisdom is deliberately antagonistic to the teaching of Ecclesiastes, and, like Heinisch, refuses to favour any of the partition theories. On the vexed problem of the book's attitude to Greek philosophy, he judges that the author drew mainly upon popular Stoicism. "We have no difficulty in discovering in Pseudo-Solomon a Hebrew Seneca—to a certain extent even a Cicero,—with all their hesitations, their picking and choosing of doctrines, but, above all, with their real faith in the government of the world by God's providence, call it *σοφία* or what you will." In this connection we have to note Professor H. Wheeler Robinson's *Religious Ideas of the Old Testament* (Duckworth). It is a small volume, but it would not be easy to find in so brief a compass a more thoughtful and adequate treatment of the fundamental religious ideas which underlie the Old Testament literature. Dr M. Hyamson's *Mosaicarum et Romanarum Legum Collatio* (Oxford University Press) is a much larger volume, and it deals with a much later and more legal aspect of Judaism. The *Collatio*, in Dr Hyamson's opinion, was written in order to instruct Christian clergy in Roman Law, perhaps about the beginning of the fifth century. It quotes the

Pentateuch, but its aim is not simply to show that the Mosaic Law forestalled subsequent religious knowledge and jurisprudence; its main purpose is to teach Roman Law, which is compared and contrasted with the Law of God. Dr Hyamson has edited, translated, and annotated the *Collatio* with singular care; and as this is the only edition since Mommsen's in 1890, it is a valuable contribution to our knowledge of early Roman jurisprudence as well as of early Christian clerical training, even although the *Collatio* cannot be assigned, as it once was, to Rufinus of Aquileia or Ambrose of Milan.

The relation of Hellenism, in some form or other, to the early Church has been raised by two recent writers in a way that challenges ordinary opinion on the subject. In the first of his posthumous *Zwei Kirchengeschichtliche Entwürfe* (Tübingen), Gerhard Loeschke argues that during the first two centuries the dominating influence upon faith and morals as well as upon Church organisation was that of Jewish Hellenism in the Roman Empire. In *Hellenism and Christianity*, Mr Gerald Friedländer tries to show, upon the other hand, that Christianity owed its ethical virtue to Judaism, while it popularised itself among the lower classes by borrowing rites and beliefs from the Mystery-religions of pagan Hellenism. "It is not suggested that there was a conscious adaptation of Hellenistic legends to the person of Jesus. It was a natural process which was quite unintentional. Jesus was Hellenised, and in consequence he was deified." Mr Friedländer's argument is subjected to close criticism by Mr G. H. Box in *The Jewish Review* (pp. 368-376). The larger question involved in his thesis, viz. the dependence of Paul's theology upon the central ideas of the Mystery-cults, is discussed with care in two excellent monographs which criticise more or less adversely this tendency to explain Paul's conceptions of the sacraments and of faith from the current ideas of the Mystery-cults. In *Der Einfluss der Mysterienreligionen auf das älteste Christentum* (Giessen), Dr Clemen covers the ground with characteristic attention to details, and concludes that these cults had no influence upon primitive Christianity; even Paul was unaffected by them. Professor H. A. A. Kennedy reaches practically the same conclusion in *St Paul and the Mystery Religions* (London), although his special subject is Paulinism. "In St Paul we are confronted, not with one of those natures which is content to be the medium of the spiritual forces of its environment, but with a personality which has been shaped once for all in the throes of a tremendous crisis, and thenceforward transforms every influence to which it is sensitive with the freedom born of a triumphant faith." Whether or not this is the last word to be said on the problem, these two cautious, scholarly estimates form a timely counterbalance to the opposite view which writers in this country as well as on the Continent<sup>1</sup> have often

<sup>1</sup> The assertion of Drews and others, e.g. that Adonis is an early instance of the dying and rising god, is disproved by Stocks in the *Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte*, vol. xxxiv. pp. 221 f.; and there are some sound paragraphs on the unhistorical exaggerations of the Mystery-hypothesis in J. Weiss's paper on "Das Problem der Entstehung der Christentums" in the *Archiv für Religionswissenschaft* (1913), pp. 432 f.



popularised from Reitzenstein. Both volumes amplify the sharp criticisms passed by Schweitzer on the theory, and supply the reader with materials for forming his own judgment.

When pushed to extremes, the theory that early Christianity succeeded as a Mystery-religion either tends to resolve the historical Jesus into a mythical notion or to separate his gospel from the religion of the early Church. The latter tendency is shown in Loisy's position, as reflected in a recent paper on *Les Données de l'Histoire des Religions*. "Ce n'est pas à l'évangile de Jésus, c'est au mystère chrétien que le monde gréco-romaine s'est converti. Mais Jésus fournissait au mystère chrétien un fondement historique et un idéal moral qui manquaient aux mystères païens." A similar point of view underlies Professor Söderblom's recent edition of Tiele's *Kompendium der Religionsgeschichte*. This admirable manual places Jesus Christ at the end of the section on Judaism, and then discusses Christianity in a later section after the religions of Greece and Rome as part of the religious syncretism of the age (pp. 505 f.).

The general question which emerges from such discussions, with regard to the position of the historical Jesus in Christianity, is raised by Dr K. G. Goetz in the *Zeitschrift für wissenschaftliche Theologie* (1913, pp. 193-229). He asks, "Genügt der geschichtliche Jesus für die praktische Theologie und Frömmigkeit oder nicht?" Here Troeltsch's views are prominent, as in Professor S. J. Case's study on "The Problem of Christianity's Essence" in *The American Journal of Theology* (1913, pp. 541-562). The latter scholar doubts if Troeltsch's view of the absolute being attained gradually in the course of an historical realisation of the ideal is tenable. Ultimately and ideally, he argues, this means that Christianity is conceived "as a quantity standing outside the range of the historic process. Moreover, it is a question whether the assumption that development issues in an absolute, itself determined solely by the process of development, is not fundamentally a contradiction in terms, or, at least, an undemonstrable hypothesis." Some of the philosophical data which underlie any discussion of this problem are stated in three useful papers on the Philosophy of Religion which Dr F. R. Tennant has contributed to the pages of the *Expositor* (August, September, October).

The problem of the relation between primitive Christianity and the Mystery-cults has not, however, drawn all interest entirely from the problem of eschatology in the gospels. In the *Expositor* (October, November 1913), Dr Albert Schweitzer has begun a study of the sanity of Jesus<sup>1</sup> with reference to the assertion that the adoption of Apocalyptic views indicated a certain mental disorder. Dr Schweitzer's medical knowledge equips him for the task of examining the pathological theories of writers like Rasmussen and De Loosten. He indicates that the result of his studies has been the conviction that such writers hastily identify the unfamiliar and strange with the morbid. In the second edition of his *Geschichte der Leben-Jesu-Forschung*, Dr Schweitzer does not retract any

<sup>1</sup> The German title is *Die psychiatrische Beurteilung Jesu; Darstellung und Kritik*.

of his former positions; the main feature of interest is the new discussion of the controversy upon the existence of Jesus. But the significance of the eschatological teaching continues to be discussed. Thus, in the *Harvard Review* (v. 385 f.) Mr W. L. Sperry writes thoughtfully upon its fidelity to religious experience in the light of Bergson's philosophy, and a large work has recently appeared which deals with the whole question from the standpoint of practical Christianity. The sub-title of Dr E. W. Winstanley's *Jesus and the Future* (T. & T. Clark), is "an investigation into the eschatological teaching attributed to our Lord in the gospels, together with an estimate of the significance and practical value thereof for our own time." The investigation is on familiar lines; it is the estimate which is most characteristic. Dr Winstanley feels that the Johannine reinterpretation of the primitive Messianic eschatology is most suitable to modern times, understanding by "reinterpretation" a deeper "appreciation of the inwardness of the teaching" of Jesus as preserved in the synoptic record. He admits that the modern idea of the Church cannot be attributed to Jesus. "We have not sufficient warrant for stating that our Lord planned, or even within the limitation of His human experience foresaw, the Catholic Church of the Christian centuries." The rock-saying of Matthew xvi. 18 is not "part of an authentic record" (p. 277). The language about judgment and the return is realistic but only symbolical for us; "the realistic machinery of the Return has passed away once for all with the outworn cosmology; we can but use the old symbolism, remembering that it is only imagery, and regard the truth of the eternal and therefore present Judge which is the moral fact behind it." This spiritualising of the eschatology is already found in the implicates of the synoptic teaching of Jesus, though he used eschatological, realistic forms. The Johannine interpretation carries on the process of transmuting or dropping the latter until the ethical and spiritual principles of Jesus stand out clear. Such is the thesis of Dr Winstanley's attempt to retain the eschatology as part of the historical teaching of Jesus, and at the same time to prove its inadequacy to the real burden of the Christian gospel for later ages. It implies that Jesus used the term "kingdom of God" in a larger sense than the usual eschatological connotation—an hypothesis which is also assumed by Mr G. C. Bosanquet in "Christianity as a Gospel" (*Church Quarterly Review*, 1913, pp. 150-176).

From a different point of view Mr G. C. Binyon, in *The Kingdom of Righteousness* (Evesham), finds the solution of the apparent antithesis between an eschatological and an immanent kingdom in the conception of the kingdom as God's ever-present sovereignty. "In proportion as men's personal lives and their civilisation come to be dominated by the reign of God, the kingdom may be said to come. In so far as the Divine Ideal is capable of being realised on this planet, the kingdom would refer, not to a future world, but to the future of this world." Such a conception of the kingdom Mr Binyon discovers in the main propaganda of Socialism, and his book is an ardent religious plea for Christian sympathy with that



propaganda. The exact bearing of the teaching of Jesus upon Socialism is more cautiously defined, however, by Mr C. C. Arbuthnot in the *Biblical World* (xli. pp. 146 f., "Did Jesus teach Christian Socialism?").

Professor G. B. Smith's *Social Idealism and the Changing Order* (Macmillan) starts from the ethical change involved in the substitution of democratic for aristocratic ideals in society, and the consequent break away from the older ideal of authority in religion. It emphasises the need of ethical reconstruction on the part of theological progress, as opposed to a vague supernaturalism and an implicit intellectualism. "Of course, there are certain abiding traits and needs, as there are certain abiding conditions of human life; and these will continue to require certain fundamental moral principles. But the validity of such principles is referred to the needs of humanity in its present relations to the world and to society, rather than to superhuman sanctions." The book is constructive as well as critical. Its pragmatic basis for ethics and its distinctively American outlook, however, differentiate it from Mr Binyon's, as the latter is differentiated from another Anglican's treatise, entitled *The Future of the Evangelical Party* (Elliot Stock). Mr Herklots believes this party has a future in the Church of England, and therefore criticises its intellectual narrowness and other defects. He welcomes traces of a new spirit among the Evangelicals, hopes that they mean "the death-blow to our ecclesiastical contempt of Non-conformity" and to heresy-hunting ("the worst feature of the Evangelicals"), anticipates an appeal by Evangelicals to the element of culture, artistic feeling, and intellect in the Church, and hotly repudiates the term "Low Churchmen" as historically wrong. "With the word Evangelical we have no quarrel, except for its awkward polysyllabic form." Mr Herklots is optimistic about the Church of England if it will come round to the position of the Evangelical party and shake off mediæval rubbish. Whether it will or not is open to dispute. There is a Colonial saying about the Church of England that "the old Mother Church always comes lumbering up in the end compartment of the last slow train, next to the refrigerator." Mr G. C. Bouquet quotes this in *A Point of View* (Longmans), a series of twenty-five addresses which are frankly dedicated "To all non-churchgoers, from whom, if they will, the clergy can learn so much." Mr Bouquet's point of view is not theological, though it implies a theology, and a theology which is hardly that of Mr Herklots. He insists on reality and efficiency as notes of the Christian religion, and drives home this point with picturesque insistence. Both of these writers belong to the English Church, and this determines their attitude to theology. From a non-ecclesiastical point of view, the moral interests of life are stated as an adequate religion in *The Faith of all Sensible People* (Methuen). The author, Mr D. A. Wilson, has little faith in any metaphysical knowledge, and he does not see any reason why sensible people should vex themselves with such speculation. "Necessity is justice—the two words are merely different aspects of the one reality. When we see this . . . then willingly we spring to do what is assigned to us by Fate, not only saying but feeling

to our finger-tips, 'God's will be my will—it shall be done!' . . . such is the faith of all sensible people."

To recur, however, to the eschatological aspect of the gospels, we may note Mr B. H. Streeter's defence (*Journal of Theological Studies*, 1913, pp. 549 f.) of his view that John the Baptist's preaching was apocalyptic as well as prophetic. The eschatological element in John's baptism is emphasised, in connection with the Messianic hope, as a sealing or symbolic act which entitled recipients to admission into the coming kingdom. It was in the light of this, Mr Streeter argues, that Jesus was baptized. "The essential meaning of the rite would be rather aspiration for the future than regret for the past. In that case one who needed no repentance would be more, and not less, inclined than others to identify Himself with the outburst of religious aspiration of which it was the characteristic symbol." A contrary view of Old Testament prophecy is outlined by Professor R. H. Kennett in *The Interpreter* (October 1913, pp. 13-42). He ingeniously attempts to show that eschatological interpretation was post-canonical, that there was really no eschatology in the Old Testament, and that therefore, on the same exegetical principles, many words of Jesus which are usually regarded as eschatological are not such.

In *The Jewish Quarterly Review* (September 1913, pp. 199-207) Dr S. Krauss of Vienna discusses an article on Judas Iscariot, contributed by Mr W. B. Smith to the *Hibbert Journal* a couple of years ago (vol. ix. pp. 529 f.). Dr Krauss shows, in opposition to Mr Smith, and also to Wellhausen, that there is no philological reason against the natural explanation of Iscariot as "man (or citizen) of Karioth," and he protests vigorously against the inference, which he calls a methodological error, that Judas was meant to typify the Jewish people. From a different point of view the question of Judas has simultaneously been raised. Of the three essays in Dr E. A. Abbott's *Miscellanea Evangelica* (Cambridge), the second discusses sympathetically the old hypothesis that it was Judas who took Peter and brought him inside the palace of the high priest (John xviii. 16), thus leading him into temptation. "The motives of Judas in leading Peter into a position of sore temptation may not have been malignant. They may even have been friendly. But, friendly or not, they turned out badly for Peter."

On the broader field of New Testament theology, we have to chronicle a new edition of Weinel's *Biblische Theologie der Neuen Testaments* (Tübingen), in which some sections have been revised and others amplified. The main positions of the book remain unchanged, however. Weinel defends his use of the term "æsthetic" in a new preface, but reserves criticism of his critics to another place and time. Apart from Professor Kennedy's work, nothing of importance has been published in English upon St Paul, with the partial exception of a commentary on *The Epistle to the Ephesians* (Burns & Oates), by Dr G. S. Hitchcock, to which may be added the edition of the Pastoral Epistles in Lietzmann's *Handbuch* by Dr M. Dibelius. Two short introductions to the literature of the New



Testament have appeared—Dr Paul Feine's *Einleitung* (Leipzig), and an *Introduction to the Books of the New Testament* (Edinburgh) by Archdeacon Allen and Mr L. W. Grenstedt. The former is on more usual lines than the latter. Dr Feine, for example, dates the synoptic gospels after 70 A.D., and even admits the probability of an Ur-Markus, whereas Mr Allen seems to find little trouble in dating the gospels prior to 70 A.D. Both volumes uphold the apostolic authorship of the Fourth Gospel, but Dr Feine is much more alive to the difficulties of the problem than Mr Grenstedt. The early dates of the gospels are presupposed in the recent findings of the Papal Commission, which assert that Luke wrote Acts towards the end of the first Roman captivity, and also repudiate all objections to the authenticity of the Pastoral Epistles, which are dated between that captivity and the apostle's death. According to the *Irish Theological Quarterly* (October 1913, p. 489), these findings or decisions "are neither infallible nor put forward as such."

JAMES MOFFATT.

## A SOCIAL SURVEY.

### SOCIAL THEORY AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS.

THE most striking utterance during the past quarter on social problems from the religious standpoint has been the manifesto of the "Council for Christian Witness on Social Questions." The Council, which consists of representatives of the Social Service Unions of the Anglican, Catholic, Congregational, Baptist, Presbyterian, Primitive Methodist, United Methodist, Wesleyan Methodist, Friends' and Unitarian bodies, and from the Presbyterian Church of Scotland, the Student Christian, and Brotherhood Movements, was formally constituted in June of the present year for the purpose of focussing and expressing Christian opinion on the broad principles of social progress. This remarkable document, issued on 24th November and signed by a large number of the best-known names in all the Christian Churches, urges on "Christian people the duty of furthering with strenuous and persistent pressure the application to our industry of the principle of the living wage." Another proof of the change of public opinion in these matters have been the papers on social topics at the Church Congress at Southampton, when the arguments of speakers who but a few years ago would have been considered guilty of flat blasphemy against the established order were heard not only with respect and toleration but with lively sympathy. No less striking, to those who can discern the signs of the times, were the proceedings of the economic section of the British Association. The opening address of the President of the section, Mr Philip Wicksteed, was a plea, after Jevons, for the re-establishment of economics "on a sensible basis." The closing paper, by Professor J. H. Muirhead, asserted that economics alone among the sciences had not only its particular conclusions, but the whole field and method of its work, questioned at the present time. The new philosophy came not to destroy, but to fulfil. Its test was, not the rights of the individual, but social well-being, which required (1) that everyone should make himself of economic value, (2) that needs should be supplied in the most economical way, and (3) that the right man should have the right place. Another example of the increasing belief in the duty of social and public service has been the campaign opened throughout England on 5th November by the Cavendish Association, which appeals to public school and university



men to devote themselves assiduously to national, public, and social service under the inspiration of Christianity. One specific aim, by no means the least important, of the Association is to encourage its members to take a much larger share in municipal work. This changed attitude of mind is no less conspicuous in other parts of the English-speaking world. *Social Programmes in the West*, by C. R. Henderson (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, and Cambridge University Press, London), is a reprint of lectures delivered by the Professor of Sociology of Chicago University at the most important centres of India, China, and Japan during 1912 and 1913. It is written from a definitely Christian standpoint in the belief that efforts for the infant, the sick, the insane, the destitute, the criminal, the ill-paid wage-earner are but the concrete expression of the Christian spirit. The same writer, in an article in the October number of the *International Review of Missions*, pleads that a Christianised sociology may be one way of building a bridge between the Eastern and the Western mind. *Social Welfare in New Zealand*, by Hugh H. Lusk (London: Heinemann), is the work of one of the early settlers of New Zealand, an active member of its Parliament, who maintains that the land and social legislation of "the little heaven down under" is an attempt to realise the kingdom of God, and that twenty years' experience of the experiment has been followed by an economic success far greater, in proportion to the numbers of its people, than that of any other community in the world.

*The Life of Florence Nightingale*, by Sir Edward Cook (Macmillan), reveals many hitherto little-known activities of a great woman, who has been associated in the popular mind chiefly with her work in the Crimea, and her later efforts on behalf of the profession of nursing. A great organiser, with superb practical gifts, she was also endowed with extraordinary foresight, and more than a generation ago anticipated some of the most remarkable conclusions of the Poor Law Commission of 1909. *The Life of Benjamin Waugh*, by Rosa Waugh (Fisher Unwin), shows what can be accomplished by the indomitable courage, energy, and persistence of a single individual, to whom, perhaps more than any other, is due the awakening of the national conscience of England on the subject of ill-treated children.

The quarter has been fertile in attacks, frontal and otherwise, on the god of things as they are. A notable challenge to current assumptions comes from Oxford. *Property: its Duties and Rights*, by Professors Bartlet, Scott Holland, Hobhouse, Rashdall, Mr A. D. Lindsay and others, with an introduction by the Bishop of Oxford (Macmillan), discusses the subject mainly from the standpoint of religion and philosophy. The view of the authors is that, in order to secure a juster distribution of wealth, the State is free to alter the laws controlling property, which must be brought into ethical subordination to the needs of social justice. *The World of Labour: a Discussion of the Present and Future of Trade Unionism*, by G. D. H. Cole of Magdalen College, Oxford (Bell & Sons), is an extraordinarily brilliant, original, and well-informed survey, by an

exponent of the "new" or "greater" Trade Unionism, of the present position. As regards the organisation of labour, many will look forward to seeing in book form the series of articles which have been appearing in *The New Age* on guild socialism and the revival of the guild system, by far the most original and stimulating criticism of society from the non-individualist side which has appeared in English in recent years. An unfamiliar point of view is advocated in *The Theory of Social Revolutions*, by Brooks Adams (New York: The Macmillan Co.), which maintains that progress comes by social convulsions occurring at periodic intervals of about three generations: that one of these is due now, inasmuch as capitalistic government, which has been in power for nearly a hundred years past, has collapsed, and something more flexible and human must take its place.

The rationale of various sectional reform efforts has been well stated in several publications of the quarter. *The Future of the Women's Movement*, by Mrs H. M. Swanwick, with introduction by Mrs H. Fawcett (G. Bell & Sons), is a sane, well-balanced, and cogent discussion of the subject from the constitutional standpoint. Five chapters dealing with the economic problem are admirable in their penetration, restraint, and foresight. The constitutional advocates of woman's claims will no doubt have noticed with satisfaction that a woman was chosen to preside over one of the sections of the British Association meetings, a circumstance which can hardly be regarded as a concession to militancy. *The Story of the C.W.S.: the Jubilee History of the Co-operative Wholesale Society, Limited*, by Percy Redfern (published by the Society at 1 Balloon Street, Manchester), is an astonishingly interesting record of the patience, faith, energy, and integrity needed to build up a great working-class movement, which with all its faults and failures has been a potent factor in the social and political education of the democracy of Great Britain. *War and Peace, A Norman Angell Monthly*, and other publications of the Garton Foundation will provide the public with serious discussions of the war question from the new point of view which Mr Norman Angell has so successfully advocated. In this connection attention must be called to the proceedings of the recent Co-operative and Trades Union Congresses, which afford additional proof of the fact that, whoever believes in war nowadays, it is certainly not the organised working classes, for in every industrial country in the world for the last half century the working classes, as soon as they have become organised and articulate, have been staunchly opposed to war as a method of settling international disputes. One other pronouncement of the last quarter from the Labour side is significant, and may have far-reaching consequences—the resolution adopted by the Miners' Federation at Scarborough in favour of co-operative action between the large trade unions.

From the non-party standpoint the politics "of all sensible men" have been crystallised in two volumes which are worthy of mention. *The Elements of Political Science*, by Stephen Leacock, Head of the Department



of Economics and Political Science, M'Gill University, Montreal (Constable), gives a succinct and impartial treatment of the nature of the State and the structure and province of government. *A Primer of English Citizenship*, by F. Swann (Longmans), is the clearest, most comprehensive, and most compendious manual of its kind which has yet appeared in English. *University Tutorial Classes*, by Albert Mansbridge (Longmans), narrates the rise and progress of the Workers' Educational Association, the most important development in the history of British education since the Act of 1870.

### SPECIFIC SOCIAL PROBLEMS.

Many lurid pictures of the white slave traffic, which, from the point of view of candid persons anxious to secure reliable facts, are useless, have been written by sensational impressionists. In England there is a surprisingly small amount of anything that can be called evidence on the question, though in the United States there has been a great deal of really serious and valuable investigation. The most recent example is a useful volume issued by the Bureau of Social Hygiene, *Commercialised Prostitution in New York City*, by George J. Kneeland, with introduction by J. D. Rockefeller, jun. (London: Grant Richards), which gives detailed results of prolonged inquiries by a corps of skilled investigators. The British Local Government Board has also issued a valuable *Report on Venereal Diseases*, by Dr R. W. Johnstone (Cd. 7029), the gist of which is that, owing to the remedial discoveries of Ehrlich, Hata, Wasserman, and Noguchi, the foulest and most deadly, because most insidious of all our social plagues, may be annihilated. The appointment of a Royal Commission of Inquiry into the problems presented by the prevalence of sexual diseases has followed as a natural consequence of the emphatic and unanimous statements at the International Congress of Medicine, which represented twenty-eight different countries. Two features of the general social situation in England are, so far as they go, satisfactory. The last annual report of the Prison Commissioners announces that, during the year reviewed, fewer people were received into prison than in any year since the Home Office statistical records began. Pauperism in England and Wales, according to a recent statement of the Parliamentary Secretary to the Local Government Board, is now at the lowest point on record. Nevertheless, recent investigation has shown that an enormous proportion of the population in every industrial country, and especially in the United Kingdom and the United States, are not in receipt of a living wage. A most striking statement of this fact is to be found in *The Cost of Living*, by various writers (American Academy of Political and Social Science, Philadelphia), which maintains that the earnings of the American worker, rural and urban, in an enormously large number of cases are insufficient to maintain physical efficiency, and advocates, among other remedies, the establishment of a minimum wage. In the United Kingdom there has been much discussion of land problems. An instructive exercise would be

to collate carefully the proposals of *A Unionist Agricultural Policy* (Murray), the *Liberal Land Inquiry* (Hodder & Stoughton), the *Fabian Society Rural Reform Supplement*, and the interim *Report on Land of the Parliamentary Labour Party*. All of these agree on the evil to be remedied, which chiefly concerns the position of the rural labourer, and all agree in recommending an extension of wages boards to cover the case of the labourer, the direct building of cottages by the State, the establishment of credit banks, and an increase of co-operation generally on the lines which have been so successful in Ireland and Denmark. *Men and Rails*, by Rowland Kenney (Fisher Unwin), is an able plea by one who, for part of his industrial career, has been a railway worker, for a more rational treatment of railway problems in the hope that it will lead to a more humane treatment of railwaymen.

### SOCIAL WORK AND SOCIAL EXPERIMENTS.

Not the least valuable of social servants is the social investigator who provides us with the facts from a study of which must proceed all wise experiments and legislation. *Round about a Pound a Week*, by Mrs Pember Reeves (Bell & Sons), gives the results of five years' investigation into the condition of that stratum, by no means the lowest, of the population of South London, who earn from eighteen to thirty shillings per week. The poor pay more for housing, food, fire and light than the well-to-do—such are the conclusions of this and similar investigations. "Working-Class Households in Reading," a report of an inquiry initiated by Professor A. L. Bowley (reprinted from the *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society*), declares that 25 to 30 per cent. of the working-class population of Reading in 1912 fell below the standard of life set by Mr Rowntree in his investigations at York, whereas in York in 1900 only 15½ per cent. of the working-class population fell below this standard: more than half of the working-class children of Reading, during some part of their first fourteen years, live in households where a reasonable minimum standard of life is not attained. Mr Larkin may be a stormy petrel and lacking in constructive capacity, but it is due to him more than to any other that the British public now knows that about 25,000 families in Dublin are living in single-roomed tenements.

The best manual of general information for the social worker is *L'Année Sociale Internationale* (Action Populaire: Reims), while the *Year-Book of Social Progress* (Edinburgh: Nelson & Sons), now in its second year of issue, is an immense improvement on the first year, and is a serviceable book of reference for English social workers. A good example of what can be done to provide information for use in a given district is the *Liverpool Social Workers' Handbook*, prepared for the Liverpool Council of Voluntary Aid (Liverpool: Marples).

From Germany (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr) comes a very interesting and up-to-date account of the British Settlement movement, all the more useful as it is by an outside observer, *Toynbee Hall und die englische*



*Settlement-bewegung*, which gives a more complete account of settlement work than any that has appeared in English. Ancoats, Manchester, would be one of the most dismal districts in industrial England were it not for the efforts of that most original of social servants, Mr Charles Rowley, who after fifty strenuous years "of work without wages," inspired by the belief that "the common man is eligible for the best," is still showing that the Ancoats Brotherhood can appreciate the finest products of music, literature, art, science, and philosophy.

Those who believe in State action on the large scale will find confirmation for their views in two recent events. In America the construction of the Panama canal has been carried to a successful conclusion by the direct effort of the State after the conspicuous failure of private enterprise. In England the Trade Boards Act has recently been extended to four more trades, an extension which will include 150,000 workers, mostly women. About one-fifth of the female workers in factories and workshops in the United Kingdom are within the scope of the Act, the working of which, so far as it has gone, has not only been of immense benefit to the employees concerned, but has increased the general prosperity of the trades to which they belong. Another successful development of communal activity is the school medical service, which, according to *The Health and Physique of School Children*, by Arthur Greenwood (P. S. King & Son), issued by the Ratan Tata foundation of the London School of Economics, is one of the most valuable agencies for the prevention of destitution and poverty. The work and results of school clinics are described in *School Clinics at Home and Abroad*, by L. D. Cruickshank, and of schools for mothers and similar institutions in *Infant Welfare Centres*, by Dr J. G. Gibbon (both issued by the National League for Physical Education and Improvement, London). What is being done for children of a larger growth, whose occupations or bad home conditions cause them to spend most of their time on the streets, is shown in the work of the Birmingham Street Children's Union in its fifty-four clubs for children from ten to fourteen years of age, and its fourteen senior clubs, where boys and girls are trained to help in the junior clubs. That the influence of the streets may be very potent for ill has perhaps been more recognised in the United States than in Great Britain. An interesting pamphlet recently issued by the Board of Education, *The Playground Movement in America and its Relation to Public Education* (London: Wyman & Sons), points out the American view of the play movement—that in general it is a social rather than a merely educational work; that it has lessened tuberculosis, truancy, and juvenile delinquency, and strengthened school discipline and efficiency. Most important for British citizens is the news that the Home Office has formed a new department, which will deal with all questions relating to children, including children's courts, industrial schools, street trading, and charges of cruelty to children. This Sir John Kirk thinks may be the first step towards the appointment of a Minister for children. An admirable account by a competent French observer of all the most recent schemes

for the decasualisation of the English dock-labourer is to be found in *Le travail casuel dans les ports Anglais*, by Dr J. Malegue (Paris: Rosseau). With admirable point, the author says that the term "casual worker" denotes the position of the man who comes "*always and regularly* to look for work in places where it is *sometimes* given him." Largely through the efforts of the National Association for Women's Lodging Houses, the movement for establishing hostels for poor women and girls is growing in all directions. Hostels have been established at Aberdeen, Manchester, Newcastle, York, Bradford, Leeds, Huddersfield, Stockport, Salford, Bolton, Leicester, Nottingham, Derby, Birmingham, Wallasey, Liverpool, Worcester, and Eastbourne, while London has the magnificent Ada Lewis Hostel and the still more recent Mary Curzon Hostel at King's Cross, where a bed can be had for 5d., breakfast for 3d., and dinner for 4d. The workers at the Browning Settlement, Walworth, London, claim to have proved by the homes for aged people which they have established at Whyteleafe, Croydon, that the State could provide both Old Age Homes and Old Age Pensions at a cost of 5s. per head per week less than what is now spent in the London workhouses. But for the best example of what can be done for aged people we must turn to Bruges, where there are hostels for the old, quaintly called God's Houses, established in some cases as long ago as the fourteenth century, some in the fifteenth, some in the sixteenth, others in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and maintained partly by old foundations and partly by a municipal subsidy. Social students at least, when in Bruges, should visit these as well as the belfry and the Memlings.

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## REVIEWS

*The Psychology of Revolution.*—By Gustave Le Bon.—Pp. 336.—London : T. Fisher Unwin, 1913.

M. GUSTAVE LE BON has added yet another chapter to his long account of the psychology of popular movements. His latest work, an analysis of the French Revolution, does not add anything to the conclusions—or should we call them assumptions?—stated in his previous books; but it illustrates them very vividly and very ingeniously. The book begins with an excellent summary of his principles. All human actions are determined by one or more of three elements, to which are assigned the names rational logic, affective logic, and mystic logic. Of these, rational logic is always critical and negative; the other two elements are positive and active, and alone furnish the motive force of action. We use our rational logic to judge actions; and, since we cling to the belief that we are rational beings, we like to think that our actions, and those of other equally sensible people, are rationally determined. But this is a delusion: the motives of action are feeling and faith, and both of these are equally blind and irrational. In other words, the real mainsprings of conduct are affective logic and mystic logic.

This crude statement of M. Le Bon's position perhaps gives to his principles too general an application. He does not profess to treat of all human actions, but only of the actions of human beings in groups or masses; and the actions are then subject to a fourth element, apparently a kind of "collective logic," which renders the affective and mystic elements even more irrational than they naturally are. But the statement appears to represent his position in reference to the motives of individual members of groups, and also of their leaders, and may probably be taken as a fair exposition of his principles. If so, the principles are sound enough. Putting aside the misleading use of the word "logic," we are forced to admit that, in most of the great issues of life, individual and social alike, the determining forces are feeling and faith, and that both act as unseeing or blind impulses, in the sense, at least, that they bring with them no reasoned explanation or justification of the direction in which they impel us. True, we *express* the impulse in terms of rational logic; but the

impulse itself is irrational, and our arguments are seldom more than the dress in which we deck it in order to make it plausible. Further, it is not our actions only, but also our interpretations of others' actions which are determined by these same elements. The historian, therefore, can never be the impartial interpreter of events; he sees or feels their significance through the medium of his own affective or mystic elements, and expresses his feeling in the form of an apparently judicial estimate of the wisdom or folly of the agents, and a cold analysis of the results of their actions.

Now it is clear that M. Le Bon, in so far as he admits all this, must be judged in the light of his own categories—even as he ruthlessly judges all other interpreters. And it may safely be asserted that it would be hard to find any writer whose views are more obviously determined by his own "affective" bias. In the first place, he is really a rationalist at heart, in spite of his contempt for rational explanations. Worse still, he is a cynic and a pessimist. The "affective" elements of mankind are, for him, chiefly made up of lust for blood, greed, ferocity, and all sorts of barbarity; the "mystic" elements are always idiotic, and usually insane, delusions, such as Calvinism, Islamism, Jacobinism, or Socialism. To be possessed by strong feeling is to be possessed by a demon of cruelty; to be "saturated with mysticism" is to be filled with a dangerous madness. And religion is the most dangerous thing of all, for its usual result is to generate murderous hatred.

Further, from his concentration upon the psychology of mobs (or, rather, from his original prejudices against mobs and their doings), M. Le Bon has acquired a fierce contempt for everything resembling a mob. And, as "the people" only means for him an enlarged form of mob, anything in the nature of a democracy or democratic action falls under his contempt. It follows that his interpretation of history is more than gloomy: it is abysmal in its darkness. Every nation appears to be rushing headlong to the hell from which its original equipment of feeling and faith was derived; (we never learn how it emerged in order to be able to fall back); and there are only two kinds of check, which may or may not be operative, as accident determines. One check is "the soul of the people"; this is the one substratum of something better than lust and ferocity which can keep insanity at bay. But, though all peoples have souls, only some have souls which can protect them: the English are among the lucky ones, the Latin peoples are not. Nor is it clear how this prophylactic soul is built up on the foundation of innate barbarity intensified by the acquired insanities of religious faith. The second possible protection is a Napoleon or other strong man who is also shrewd enough to understand mob psychology. For it is to be noted that M. Le Bon adopts the "great man theory" of history, side by side with his theory of inevitable mob impulse. The people, in spite of its very sufficient affective and mystic elements, always requires *some* intelligent individuals to give it a lead. These latter supply the ferment, being themselves hypnotised by their own ideas; then the masses are infected, and go mad too. But other intelligent



individuals may save, instead of corrupting, the mass. They too are possessed by an idea; but it may happen that the idea is thoroughly undemocratic, in line with M. Le Bon's prejudice; and in that case the nation will be saved.

It would be unfair to leave this criticism of M. Le Bon's position without one important qualification. His pessimism, and even his cynicism, are partly justified by the character of the material upon which he loves to concentrate his attention. Thus, in the present work, the first theme used to illustrate his principles is the appallingly dark story of religious persecutions. In face of the facts, it is impossible to say to M. Le Bon that he ought not to be cynical about the "religious" or "mystic" impulses, except on the single ground that these facts have nothing whatever to do with religion. The tragic thing is that the persecutors were allowed to masquerade under the name of religion, and that we have so little knowledge of what religion is that we allow the name to be polluted without any protest. But religious persecution is a contradiction in terms—as flagrant a contradiction as mystic hatred or saintly wickedness. M. Le Bon, as a purely rationalist observer, takes as "religious" the phenomena which we allow to be called by the name, and then draws conclusions which are perfectly just and not cynical at all. His cynicism only begins when he refuses to admit any real distinction between the "religion" of a Torquemada or a Montluc and that of a St Francis.

There is some justification, again, for the pessimism engendered by a close study of revolution among the Latin peoples, and of the French Revolution most of all. M. Le Bon has some reason for regarding part of this as an orgy of drunken insanity. But in this case neither our slipshod misuse of terms nor our ignorance of realities justifies his assumption that the people, in the sense of the great mass of a modern nation, is always as mad and as cruel as the French mobs of 1789.

Space does not allow a detailed criticism of his treatment of the Revolution. But one or two points call for comment. On the one hand, the treatment does not inspire confidence in his method. Apart altogether from the obvious bias or "affective logic" by which the author is swayed, there is something very unsatisfying about a psychological explanation of great movements which refuses to allow any real causal influence to circumstances and events outside the psychologist's province. The French people were roused in a way almost unheard of in history; that is to say, according to M. Le Bon, their primitive feelings of savage cruelty were brought into sudden and effective operation. But by what were they roused? Just by sundry "mystic" ideas and hypnotic words, such as freedom and equality, supplied by a few middle-class dreamers. That is practically all the explanation. The arrogance of the nobility and the sufferings of the masses are mentioned, it is true, as interesting concomitant circumstances, while the famine and the hard winter and the ruinous floods which immediately preceded the Revolution are only once referred to—in an aside!

Again, the psychological analysis of the motives of individuals is hardly more satisfactory. The three men who stand out as calling for the psychologist's explanation are Danton, Robespierre, and Buonaparte. Of these, only one—Robespierre—is analysed at all, and the many pages devoted to him leave his influence as inexplicable as ever. It is significant that no attempt is made to analyse Buonaparte's mentality. Is there a reason for this? Is it just possible that, since he alone is regarded by M. Le Bon as sane, the Le Bon method cannot very well be applied to him—lest it should reveal him as mad as everyone else?

On the whole, the book must be called a most disappointing one. It is suggestive and stimulating, simply because it is thoroughly provoking; but we feel, even more than we felt in the case of the author's earlier works, that he is simply twisting history into distorted forms in order to fit it into the mould demanded by his special theories—or prejudices.

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*Eternal Life: a Study of its Implications and Applications.*—Baron F. von Hügel.—Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1912.—Pp. xviii + 443.

BARON VON HÜGEL's profoundly inspiring study in religious experience and its philosophical formulation arose originally, as he tells us in his Preface, from an invitation to contribute an article on Eternal Life to the *Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics*. Much to the gain of both practitioners of the "way" and philosophical students of human life, the article overflowed its bounds, and hence the present volume—a work remarkable alike for its generous catholicity, its sane and always wholesome devoutness, its keenness of psychological insight, and its telling criticism of the forms in which the conception of the "eternal" life of the spirit has figured in the great philosophers' interpretations of human experience. The plan of the work is very simple. The main problem is clearly stated for us with sufficient clarity in the author's Preface. Through all the vital religions and all the great philosophies there can be traced the conviction that human life stands midway between the kind of existence which belongs to the abiding and permanent source of all life—the *totum simul* of pure and simple Eternity, and the mere disconnected succession of the "flux" of phenomena. Man's life is never itself "out of time" in the sense of being an actual *totum simul*; it is essentially durational. Yet human life as we know it is never mere succession, like the succession of moments of "clock-time." In two ways "participation" in Eternity is an actual feature of our human life. We can rise to the contemplation of the underived and pure eternity of the supreme life, and, in practice, under the stress of this conception we can mould our own life in time in such a fashion that, as the reshaping of our activities advances, durational life itself loses more and more of the character of mere succession and takes on



the character of life in an abiding order. Precisely because Baron von Hügel is so alive to the interpenetration in man of the divine and the creaturely, he thus avoids the pitfalls which beset imperfect and one-sided enthusiasts for the "mystic way." The very difficulty of life, especially of the life of the Christian, arises from the impossibility of sacrificing either element in the whole. Human life must never aim at the impossible suppression of the durational, or place its felicity in attaining a condition empty of knowledge, creation, and good "works"; nor yet must it, as the secularist would bid it, approximate to the merely temporal and successive by seeking absorption in many passing ends and purely phenomenal goods. Mere absorption in "ecstasy" and mere dissociation in the pursuit of the transitory are alike perversions and mutilations of our nature. The true life of the "spirit" is only to be found in the active direction of a life which, because human, necessarily has the durational form, by an ideal derived from our apprehension of the Eternal. The main interest of Baron von Hügel's work lies in the skill and insight with which he follows "the interaction, the tension between these two elements or movements," through its varied manifestations in the life of philosophers and men of science no less than of saints. Primarily, to be sure, the book is concerned with religion and the philosophy of religion, and it is natural, therefore, that it should have more to say of the life of the saint and the thought of the metaphysician than of the "scientific temper"; but the deeply sympathetic treatment of Darwin in the chapter on "Biology and Epigenesis" affords admirable exemplification of the truth that all characteristically human life is one in its main characteristics, and that, to the eye of true catholicity, the single-minded pursuit of scientific research must always be, as it was for Aristotle, one of the modes in which the presence of the "divine part" in man reveals itself. I cannot forbear quoting, for the benefit of devout but ill-instructed minds which may be misled by the foolish tirades of "apologists" of the type of Mr Gilbert Chesterton, an exquisite saying of our author (p. 281): "Religion, above all Christianity, awakens and develops its strength in contact with the visible, especially the organic. . . . Here, Darwin's rapt interest in the interrelated lives of plants and insects, in a bird's colouring and a worm's instincts, are, in their grandly self-oblivious outgoing to the humble and the little, most genuine flowerings of the delicate Christian spirit in this fierce, rough world of ours. Without such love, bridging over such differences . . . such studies instantly become impossible, or dry and merely ingenious, or weakly sentimental."

Such warnings are indeed salutary at the present moment, when there is an unmistakable tendency on the part of widely-read popular defenders of "faith" either to cry down the achievements of disinterested science by sheer clamour, or at least to banish "secular studies" to a sort of "court of the Gentiles" reserved for things common and profane. Justice will never be done to Christianity, neither by its official friends nor by its opponents, so long as both parties agree to forget the principle involved in the doctrine of the sanctification of the body and the resurrection of

the flesh, that God is the God of a whole Universe, not of a select spiritual part of the Universe.

It is as much in order from such a point of view as it was to be expected from the personality of the author that much of Baron von Hügel's book is taken up with reiterated insistence upon the part played by the ceremonial cultus of institutional religion in fostering the sense for eternal values in a world so full as ours is of incentives to "distraction." It is not merely that he dwells, as other thinkers before him have done, upon the essentially social character of the religious life, and the impossibility of maintaining it at a permanent high level except in participation in the wider religious life of the "community" or "church" (the truth which lies at the bottom of the maxim, "*Extra ecclesiam nulla salus*"), but that, in virtue of his sound opposition to dualism, he is able to do greater justice than is always done to the value of the "externals" of cultus, its use of sense-symbolism in its various forms as a means of evoking and sustaining transcendental emotion. Thinkers in our own country have probably been more influenced in their attitude towards this employment of the external than they themselves are conscious of by a Puritanism which is fundamentally dualistic in its contempt for the "material," and its failure to understand that "matter" itself, if a really "spiritual" view of the world is to be tenable, must be capable of impregnation with spiritual significance. They would, no doubt, admit this as a general principle, but they mostly seem to forget the principle when they are confronted with the actual use which the historical religions have made of the "material." Too many, I fear, would even endorse the singular assertion of Kant that a rational man must naturally feel ashamed of being detected in the irrational act of saying his prayers. As a member of the Roman Church, in which the employment of the "material" and its associations as aids to the evocation of transcendental emotion has received fuller development than in any other form of Christianity, Baron von Hügel naturally deals with this aspect of his subject with peculiar authority. That his main position is a sound one seems, to the present writer at least, quite clear. If we give the name "religion" to every keenly realised participation in the life of "the divine," an individual thinker may, no doubt, have a genuine "religion" all to himself; Aristotle and Spinoza and Kant are all historical instances to prove the point. But it is equally clear that for the permanent living of the "divine" life the environment of a community in which the common "religion" is the bond of fellowship is indispensable. The "religious" side of Peripateticism hardly lasted longer than a generation after Aristotle's death; the mysticism of Spinoza has been a source of spiritual regeneration to solitary students here and there, but in its influence on the general trend of philosophic thinking Spinozism has degenerated into little more than a commonplace naturalism, while *Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft* was never anything better than a still-born religion. And it ought hardly to be necessary to add that it has always been the common cultus, much



more than agreement on matters of speculation, which has served to keep the sense of being many members in one body alive in Churches. The Mass counts for more than the definition of transubstantiation in keeping up the consciousness of brotherhood throughout the Roman communion, just as the common flag and the common National Anthem do more than anything else to make the sense of unity alive in the "British Empire." And I should be inclined to agree with the view which our author expresses with deep regret, that the Protestant Nonconformity of Great Britain is rapidly, from its very lack of the "institutional" element, becoming little more than a political combine. I hasten to add that I also share his regret.

In structure the work falls into three main parts. The first is a comparatively brief historical summary dealing with the anticipations of the conception of an eternal life in the historic religions and philosophies of the past, and more particularly with the contributions of the Hebrew Scriptures on the one hand, and the Greek mystery-religions and philosophies on the other, to the synthesis which Christianity set itself to effect as soon as it felt the necessity of a philosophical interpretation of itself. The contribution of Israel and Judah is found to consist primarily in the conviction of the transcendental value of "the other life of God, present somehow within the soul, here and now, and the unique joy and self-realisation to be found by man's soul in belonging to Him alone in all its acts and states."

What is contributed by Greek philosophy (especially by Plato and Plotinus), and indirectly by the mystery-religions which Socrates and Plato spiritualised, is the conviction that this life of the "divine part" carries within itself the implication of a persistence beyond the dissolution of the body, and, in fact, abiding under all the changes of the mutable phenomenal world. Thus "immortality" is rightly seen by the author to be only desirable and only justifiable by philosophy as a derivative consequence of the soul's inherent capacity for participation in the "divine." As against all attempts to "prove" the "immortality of the soul" by necromancy and the performances of "mediums," Baron von Hügel's observation with regard to the special services of the Hebrew Scriptures to Christianity is timely and important: "It is these spiritual-ethical 'this life' experiences and teachings, and not those naturalistic-magical guesses and practices as to a subsequent life, which heralded, prepared, and entered into the substance of whatever was fully abiding and fruitful in the further . . . teachings concerning eternal life. . . . It is not this faith in survival after death that is the basis of these great convictions, but it is . . . these great convictions that support and postulate that faith."

In the main Baron von Hügel's historical sketch appears to me just and duly proportioned. I may mention a few matters of minor detail where I find it difficult to go along with him. I could wish that he had not lent his authority to the ugly word "Orphism," a formation to which it would be hard to produce a parallel. "Orphicism" would be a correctly formed name for the doctrine of the Ὀρφικοί or "Orphic men," and "Orpheism"

(as a trisyllable) seems unobjectionable as a formation from the name Orpheus itself; but "Orphism" is, surely, an etymological monstrosity. (Incidentally, also, p. 25, Sabasios should not have been written for Sabazios.) Page 26: the Getæ οἱ ἀθανατίζοντες surely means not so much "the Getæ whose faith made men immortal" as simply "the Getæ who take the side of, or go in for, immortality." The word ἀθανατίζειν is—like Aristotle's ἐνίζειν—formed on the analogy of μηδίζειν, λακωνίζειν, "to be a pro-Mede, to be a pro-Spartan," and the like. As to the actual account of Orphic beliefs, can we be sure, as Baron von Hügel assumes, that the particular myth of "Zagreus" is really as old as the sixth century B.C.? If so, why do we not find any explicit early allusions to it, e.g. in Euripides or Plato? Even in the Petelia and Thurii tablets there seems to be no definite allusion to this particular story. Page 28: the regular classical word for the "wheel" of birth is not τροχός but κύκλος, as in the Orphic verses which Baron von Hügel translates on the opposite page (κύκλου δ' ἐξέπτην κτλ.). Was the author thinking of the curious, and, so far as I know, as yet unexplained, appearance of the "wheel" in the Epistle of James (iii. 6, καὶ ἡ γλῶσσα πῦρ, ὁ κόσμος τῆς ἀδικίας ἡ γλῶσσα καθίσταται ἐν τοῖς μέλεσιν ἡμῶν, ἡ σπιλοῦσα ὅλον τὸ σῶμα καὶ φλογίζουσα τὸν τροχὸν τῆς γενέσεως)? P. 29: though Plato represents the σῶμα-σῆμα theory as familiar to the Pythagorean Philolaus and his circle, the actual derivation which he calls "Orphic" in the *Cratylus*, and has in mind in the well-known allusions of the *Phaedo*, is rather different. According to him, the "Orphics" derived σῶμα from σῶιζειν, the body being regarded as a place of safekeeping in which the soul is reserved against the Day of Judgment. Who the persons who derived σῶμα from σῆμα were he does not say, though allusions in other writers make it likely enough that they too were Orphics. (Same page.) The tablets from Petelia and Thurii should hardly have been called "contemporary" without anything to indicate with what or whom they are contemporary. As the text stands it hardly comes out that they belong to the later part of the fourth century. Also, I doubt about Baron von Hügel's rendering of ἐκ καθαρῶν ἦκω καθαρὰ χθονίων βασιλεια. I think, and Diels appears to be of this view, that we should interpunctuate after καθαρά, not after ἦκω, so that the sense will be "A saint I come from the saints." It is the purity of the soul which is pleading its cause, not the purity of the goddess, which is the point to be insisted on. The thought is, "my purification is finished." P. 30: it is not quite correct to say that "in Plato the river Ameles or Lethe brings pollution to those who do not succeed in crossing it." Lethe, in the *Republic* myth from which the reference is taken, is a *plain* which all the souls on their way to rebirth have to cross; Ameles is a river of which *all* have to drink—nothing is said of crossing this river. (Since we know that one of the things which the soul, in the Orphic doctrine, has to do in its wanderings after death is to drink of the fountain of Memory, it was presumably also a part of the theory that before rebirth a soul has to drink of the water of Forgetting. This would explain why we do not remember our ante-natal adventures.)



P. 31: I would suggest that in all probability the "memories" which the soul of the initiate was held to obtain are recollections of the proper ritual words in which it will have to address the Chthonian gods when it discloses the great secret of Orphicism, its own kinship with the children of "Earth and Heaven." When one bears in mind the importance for primitive and savage beliefs of the exact utterance of ritual formulæ, one can hardly doubt, I think, that the thing remembered by the initiated soul and by no other is the formula, Γῆς παῖς εἰμὶ κτλ. itself.

I think also that Pythagoras and his followers deserve explicit mention in any study of the history of the notion of eternal life. As far as one can conjecture, it seems to have been they who took the first great step in the spiritualising of an exceedingly ancient type of "other-world" religion by substituting the μαθήματα, the knowledge of the laws on which the Universe is ordered, for a knowledge of the imaginary dangers of the journey to the land of spirits and the rules for their avoidance, as the true "saving knowledge."

It should hardly have been stated as a known fact that Parmenides (p. 31) was born "about 544 B.C." This is the Alexandrian account, but Plato, who is our earliest authority on the matter, implies that Parmenides belongs to a time thirty years later, since he describes a meeting between the Eleatic, at about the age of sixty-five, and the young Socrates. (Similarly in the *Sophistes* he represents Socrates as conversing just before his death with an Eleatic who had personal recollections of what he had heard from Parmenides in his boyhood.)

In the account of Plato and Aristotle, I would only note that some of the writer's points turn upon views as to the chronological order of Plato's works which are in some respects singular, and, as I think, definitely mistaken. Thus I cannot, any more than most students of Plato, assent to inferences drawn from the assumption that the *Phaedrus* is an earlier work than the *Symposium*, and I am sure that it is a grave mistake to put the latter into Plato's "third period." It is a much more serious matter that Baron von Hügel should charge the greatest of Greek moralists with "distressing insensibility to the odiousness" of pæderasty. The accusation would hardly have been made if the writer had recollected the language of the *Phaedrus* on this vice, or had read the pages of the *Laws* in which absolute purity is demanded for both sexes. I am sure Baron von Hügel will see, if he will reconsider the point, that he has been betrayed into a judgment on the level of those which find nothing but perverted eroticism in the language of Christian mystics about the *ludus amoris* and the spousal of the soul with her Bridegroom.

I may note a point or two in Chapter IV., which deals with Stoicism and its influence on Philo and other Jewish writers, such as the authors of *Wisdom* and 4 *Maccabees*. As before, it is precisely my appreciation of Baron von Hügel's general account which leads me only to mention one or two minor points where I cannot follow him. P. 43: the theory of a Semitic element in early Stoicism, though often confidently given out as

fact, seems to rest on no real evidence. There is nothing in the Stoic doctrines which suggests any but Hellenic antecedents, and there is no real evidence for the Semitic origin of any of the early chiefs of the school beyond the not very important fact that Cittium, the birthplace of Zeno, is said to have contained some "Phœnician colonists." That Zeno was descended from these colonists we have no reason to suppose: his own and his father's names indicate rather Hellenic origin. (Unless anyone likes to hazard the wild suggestion that the name of his father, Mnaseas, is a Greek perversion of Manasseh!) It is a pity also that the Stoic λόγος should be, in accord with a bad old custom, rendered by "Reason." What it means is rather the "constitutive formula"—in scholastic phrase the *forma*—the "law" of structure and growth in things. This is why we can speak in the plural of the σπερματικοὶ λόγοι or "generative formulæ" or "ratios" proper to the various real kinds of things; "seminal reasons" would be an unmeaning combination of words. The note to p. 48 should not have been worded so as to suggest that von Arnim's *Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta* has advanced no further than its first volume. It has been complete for some years, apart from the promised index.

For most of Baron von Hügel's readers the main interest of this first section of the book will probably lie in his account (Chapter V.) of Primitive Christianity, and, more particularly, in his analysis of the presentment of the Kingdom of God in the actual teaching of our Lord. The subject is treated with an admirable sanity and from a point of view which accepts the main assured results of Biblical criticism without any tendency to hasty exaggerations. Stress is rightly laid on the point that the utterances of Jesus are neither systematic nor philosophical; in form they are almost always answers to questions suggested by special circumstances, and they are "utterly exoteric"—homely, practical words to homely and humble folk. They are specially religious: not philosophical, nor even moral. Again, it is not the practice of eternal life with which most of these utterances, though there are some notable exceptions, deal so much as the advent of a future "Kingdom," and this advent is most commonly envisaged in the apocalyptic fashion as sudden, imminent, and "given by God" rather than "achieved by man." Yet Baron von Hügel properly refuses to accept the doctrine of an *Interimsethik*, or to make Jesus into a pure apocalyptic dreamer. He points, naturally enough, to the presence in the Synoptic tradition of the sayings and apologues of the earlier period of our Lord's ministry in which the coming of the "Kingdom" is represented as gradual, and as something for which man has to prepare himself; or again, as something which in some way is already present in the life of the little band of disciples. Thus we have in the apparently conflicting strains of thought in the Synoptic tradition the inner tension between the two sides of the antithesis which is fundamental in vital religion, the antithesis between the free gift and the necessity of working out our own salvation and doing "works meet for" repentance, or, to speak in the favourite phrases of current controversy, between the "immanence" and the



"transcendence" of God. And it is rightly insisted that the two are inseparable. Divine immanence is only possible in its utter fullness *because* God is absolutely transcendent, *excelsus super omnia*, a supreme personal spirit, not a mere form like Kant's *Bewusstsein überhaupt*. In practice the fullest use of the physical and external as means to the spiritualisation of life is only possible where it goes hand in hand with the temper of a "noble asceticism," with "detachment" from all that is "creaturely." You cannot really sever the first commandment from the second. Hence it is the supreme triumph of the life of Jesus that, while it presupposes an interior detachment as complete as that of Plotinus, it never aims at a life *solus cum solo* as its goal. "Nowhere in our Lord's conception of this ultimate life is there a trace of the *solus cum solo*, or of the survival of the abstract-intellect alone. . . . Everywhere these popular sayings . . . insist on the great fact that the inner spiritual life, to be deep and genuine, permanently requires a rich variety and organisation within a strongly social life." Hence the utter personal indifference of Jesus to "social reform" goes along with the deepest sympathy with the lives of the simple folk.

It is suggested that the predominance of the apocalyptic mode of utterance in the later pages of the Gospel is psychologically explained by the fact that Jesus himself was living "under the stress of resistance to his teaching, and of the approach of a violent death and apparently utter defeat." This, I should say, is a true observation—in fact, the truth which is caricatured by Renan and other sentimentalists in their picture of a *schöne Seele* driven into bitterness and injustice by experience of misunderstanding and opposition. But I am not sure that it is the whole of the explanation. When the "Kingdom" would come was, according to the Gospels, a question to which Jesus expressly said he had no answer. I would suggest that it is probably true of all apocalyptic vision that it appears without any note of time, and that the language of the seers which seems to suggest *propinquity* is probably an imperfect translation of their experience. The sense of the certainty of fulfilment expresses itself in language which seems to convey the implication of *nearness*. Because the seer is assured that the vision "will come" without fail, language forces him to speak as if he were equally sure that the coming is momentarily at hand. There is also the critical question, which the author does not raise, how far the apocalyptic utterances of the Passion week may have suffered in our Gospel tradition by contamination with current contemporary apocalypses produced by the imminence of the ruin of Jerusalem.

I cannot speak here of the brief but most suggestive treatment of the remaining two sources of early Christian doctrine—the work of St Paul, the first great organiser of the Church, in supplementing the apocalyptic preaching of the coming Kingdom by complementary insistence on the present indwelling of the Spirit in the Church, and the Johannine writings—this "mystical life of Christ"—with their combination of Pauline religion and Philonian philosophical categories; nor of the further apprecia-

tion, always sympathetic even when most critical, of Plotinus, St Augustine, "Dionysius," St Thomas, and Eckhart as illustrative of the double movement towards social activity and towards "interior detachment," and the loss which the service of man no less than that of God suffers from the attempt to suppress either direction. But I should like to say a word in special commendation of the study of two great philosophers, Spinoza and Kant, with which this first division of the book ends. I heartily concur at once in the delicate appreciation of the deep religious insight shown by Spinoza, especially in the last two parts of the *Ethics*, and in the severe judgment passed on the hopeless inadequacy of the metaphysics, and the endless breaches of logic which vitiate his philosophy as a whole. Spinoza's intellectual prejudices in favour of a mechanical monism are utterly at variance with the richness and depth of his experience and appreciation of life. He is constantly trying to pour the new wine of a singularly rich, delicate, and intense inner life into the rotten old bottles of a scheme of categories which are only adequate to the exhibition of the merest physical becoming. And the pity of it is that his modern admirers usually admire him for the wrong thing. His ethical and spiritual insight is too often beyond their range, but they share his love for a neatly ordered schematisation. Hence they readily swallow the fiction that the "logic" of his doctrine is irrefutable, abandon everything in his philosophy which they see to be incompatible with his monistic premisses, and so sink into an empty Naturalism. They forget that Spinoza's own object was avowedly not the satisfaction of mere intellectual curiosity, but the deliverance of man from the "passions." Their Spinozism would not—to parody Charles Lamb—deliver a herring. Hence Baron von Hügel's searching criticism strikes me as specially opportune. I would equally commend his careful study of the sources of Kant's failure in the department of *Religionsphilosophie*. I think he is probably right in holding that Kant's failure to leave any place in the "religion within the limits of mere reason" for most of the deepest content of the historical faiths is a consequence of the one-sidedness with which Kant insists on basing religion on mere ethics to the neglect of ontology and cosmology. It is just the complexity of such a conception as the Christian notion of a God who is at once the *ens realissimum*, the "first mover," and the lover of souls, which makes genuine belief in such a God so potent in determining the whole of a man's thought and action. For one can love the Christian God: one cannot love Kant's personified categorical imperative. At best, as Kant said, we can respect Him; but it is not by respecting that men can be "born again." Baron von Hügel, however, is careful to insist on the real depth of Kant's insight in one matter of first-rate importance: at least Kant understood that Evil is no mere "privation," but the revolt of a personal will against Good. "Here he rises head and shoulders above all the previous or subsequent Enlightenment—indeed, above the entire Neo-Platonist strain present, in strange contrast with their deep Christian experience and directly personal teaching, even in St Augustine's and Aquinas's pages. . . .



This nobly truthful insight was unfortunately lost again by such post-Kantians as Hegel and Schleiermacher, who . . . revert to Spinoza. Yet, without such an insight, there is wanting a sufficiently imperative motive for the soul to gain the greatest livingness in its turning utterly away from self to God, its strength and purifier."

The second part of the book bears the title "Contemporary Survey." Special study is given in its chapters to Fichte, Schleiermacher (as a typical specimen of the theologians who reduce religion to feeling devoid of intellectual content), Hegel and his British disciples (among whom Dr McTaggart in particular receives some effective criticism), Feuerbach, Schopenhauer, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche. It is a signal proof of the author's delicate sense for the psychology of religion that he is much more alive than most either of Nietzsche's co-called disciples or of his foes to the ever-present craving for a "faith" in "this clean liver and devoted brother." The next chapter, on "Biology and Epigenesis," deals not only with Darwin but with the general trend and influence of biological development-theories on religious thought. As the title of the chapter indicates, Baron von Hügel makes effective use against irreligious Agnosticism of the conception of organic development as epigenesis, so far agreeing with the main critical results of Ward and Bergson, the latter of whom receives, in his turn, some well-deserved admonitions on his failure to make the proper use of his own great conception of *durée réelle*. "Bergson," writes the author, "has removed the mechanical obstacles to liberty, but he has not discovered the spiritual conditions and requisites for the same liberty. Indeed, by his strenuous exclusion of all permanence and of every aim and ideal . . . he has, most unintentionally, brought us back to that Naturalism which he had so successfully resisted when it masqueraded as a sheer Mechanism. . . . We get a spiritualistic beginning crowned by a naturalistic conclusion, a certain warmth with coldness and depth with shallowness."

Chapter XI. is given to a careful and deeply sympathetic, as well as searching, examination of the claims of Socialism to be able to provide a religious ideal and a Gospel entirely "immanent" and "of this world." It is particularly interesting to note the extent to which, as Baron von Hügel's quotations show, the rising leaders of Continental Socialism and Syndicalism, such as Bernstein, Van der Velde, and Sorel, are beginning to exhibit dissatisfaction with the original endeavour of Marx to make a "this-world" economical ideal replace God and the eternal life of the spirit as an adequate object for whole-hearted devotion. Probably the most interesting chapter of the whole "Contemporary Survey" to the average reader will be that on "Institutional Religion" as seen from within the most "institutional" of the great Churches. Baron von Hügel's fine spirit of charity does not desert him here. On the one hand, he insists strongly on the positive value of the rich culture of the Roman Church as evidenced by her singular success, even in our own adverse age, in producing rare types of saintliness, such as the Curé d'Ars, Mère Marie de la Providence,

and the Abbé Huvelin, of the last of whom he writes gratefully and lovingly from personal knowledge. On the other, as he says, the widespread tendency of our age away from organised "Church" religion cannot be simply explained by the supposition that men neglect the Churches out of sheer perversity. The modern revolt indicates real dangers inherent in religious institutions. The problem is precisely that Institutionalism, while indispensable, if the life of the soul is to flourish, does easily tend to give off unwholesome by-products. Yet we cannot afford to banish a valuable spiritual medicine because it is, like most bodily medicines, dangerous. Baron von Hügel's position as a faithful member of the Church in which the tension between ancient Institutionalism and modern life is at its acutest enables him to make a clear diagnosis of the defects which beset Institutionalism in religion generally. The tension characteristic of our age, he finds, exhibits itself in five chief antagonisms: (1) the antithesis between the reasonable claim of the Church to pass judgment upon the tendencies of philosophies and doctrines to further or hinder the soul's growth in grace, and the equally reasonable demand of Science and Philosophy as such to develop in their own way without outside interference; (2) the conflict between the need, on the part of the Church, for reasonable certitude as to the historical facts essential to her faith, and the right of historical criticism to treat all alleged historical facts by one and the same method; (3) the difficult problem of reconciling deep conviction of the importance of spiritual truth with avoidance of the methods of the persecutor; (4) the problem created by the conflict between "Church's law" and civil law, and the impossibility that a Church convinced of her mission should ever consent to solve the problem by abdicating her functions as an ethical teacher; (5) the *impasse* which arises from the claims of a hierarchy to dominate secular politics. Here, again, the real difficulty is that one cannot accept either the extravagant claims of an ultramontane priesthood to dictate the world's politics, nor the absurd demand of the "anti-clerical" that the Church shall be systematically silent about questions of national right or wrong doing. In the case of each of the five antitheses a thoughtful man sees that both parties have a strong case: the claims of Institutional religion cannot be gainsaid, but the historical mischief which has often followed their assertion is equally clear. Baron von Hügel is inclined to believe that the difficulties may resolve themselves if faced in a spirit of truth-loving charity. The time may come, he hopes, when the opposition of Rome to freedom in philosophising and to the "higher criticism" will disappear as the old opposition to heliocentric astronomy and to physiological science has already done. The difficulty connected with "religious toleration," he suggests, may disappear as the Roman Church becomes more generally penetrated with the sense of the presence of truth and value in varying degrees throughout all human faiths which is common in her trained theologians. He is evidently, and naturally, much less at ease with regard to the present tendency to seek, rather than avoid, occasions of conflict



between canon law and the civil law of European states, and to insist on claiming the absolute plenitude of spiritual and temporal power for a monarchical Pope. To a not unsympathetic outsider like myself the Pontificate of Pius X. certainly appears as an untoward epoch in which the great Roman Church has made grave jeopardy of much that she seemed to have gained under the direction of Leo XIII. Baron von Hügel seeks comfort in the three thoughts that (a) the reaction towards a theory of the Papacy much like that of Boniface VIII. was originally forced on the Vatican by the violence of lay zealots like Le Maistre, Görres, and W. G. Ward, and what lay zeal has done may yet be undone by the zeal of a more enlightened laity; (b) the subjects of the Papacy cannot be for ever "terrified" into choosing autocracy as the only alternative to absolutism: they will feel, with Rosmini and Newman, that even the officially infallible Pope cannot be beyond "learning and receiving from men and through men—those very men to whom he has so much to teach and so much to give." (But is not the question whether the Popes will henceforth be as ready to feel this as their subjects, no doubt, are?) Finally, (c) the situation is not yet desperate. Amidst many abuses of autocratic power and much anarchical revolt, there is still in the Church a sound core of sincere and dignified loyalty and genuine freedom. The worst feature of all in the outlook for Institutional religion, in the author's view, is Rome's unhealthy and passionate craving after the temporal power, a craving of which the author appears to think, as Dante did, that it makes it all but impossible to be a good patriot without being treated by the Church at least with very cold and unfeeling suspicion. This, Baron von Hügel suggests, is a malady for which we cannot expect a cure in the ordinary course of things. Providence may allow the Curia to be converted by bitter experience of the ruinous consequences which will certainly attend on any adventure for the making real of the temporal power. Or the *Papa Angelicus* of legend may yet take flesh and blood, and may conceivably use the very plenitude of power placed in his hands by the success of the Curialists to undo their evil work. But it seems clear that the author almost despairs of any but a miraculous cure for the evil. Meanwhile he contents himself with the conviction that so long as the Church is rich in the production of saintly lives she will not be abandoned to shipwreck.

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*The Meaning of God in Human Experience: a Philosophic Study of Religion.*—By William Ernest Hocking, Ph.D., Assistant Professor of Philosophy in Yale University.—New Haven: Yale University Press; London: Henry Frowde, Oxford University Press, 1912.

THIS is a work of striking originality and unusual compass, in which, so far as one may judge from its contents, a profound grasp of some of the

greatest post-Reformation philosophy has been deliberately combined with the best results of modern psychological and anthropological research and recent metaphysical speculation, and the whole turned in an artless and great way upon what the author believes the subject of ultimate importance to the present generation.

The author's thought launches itself on the crest of our most recent wave of general philosophical tendency, and in a manner of speaking, cuts it through. Without asking whether the "mere intellect," upon which the last phase of American philosophy has spent its critical force, was or was not verily that to which the masters of idealism traced the birth of reality, he makes clear at least that the religious soul would look in vain for its God in any reality which satisfied such "intellect" alone. The central demand of religion, he goes so far as to say, is for the satisfaction of a certain "practical and responsible *feeling*." But immediately, in a massive argument, full of quiet insight and rich human truth, he exhibits the inevitable "destiny," first, of all feeling, and then particularly of religious feeling, to seek articulate utterance for itself in a theory; which means, in the case of religion, a search for some "unshrinking objectivity" in the universe, something just *not* one's "own unconquerable soul," something against whose infinitude that soul may feel itself, and in which it may root itself and be sure. Such, allowing for all the deep injustice which a short account perpetrates upon a great book, is the general tenor of this work in the first three of its six "parts." By showing thus what the religious spirit expects to find in God, it clears the ground for submitting its main thesis, in Part IV., its statement of "How Men know God."

It does not require a great deal of recklessness on a reader's part, or of self-sophistication, to please himself by finding in the author's treatment of this last-mentioned subject a rediscovery—in the manner in which really living minds do continually rediscover the deepest truths—of the essential process whereby idealistic philosophy has always sought to prove the necessity for an Absolute. What is distinctive of the author's treatment is the power with which that inevitable logical movement towards the Absolute becomes in his hands veritably a movement towards the God of religion. This is due, we believe, to the primitive and naïve character of that which he uses throughout his argument as the *touchstone of reality*, namely, experience, in the frank sense of the word. The question how we know another mind, when all we "experience" are the physical signs thereof, becomes the pressing problem to which "knowledge of God" is the only possible solution. We know other men, the author holds—in a doctrine which he thinks distinguishes him deeply from Royce—because, and only because, we first know the God who is speaking to us through Nature. Religion from the first is an affair between the solitary soul and the universe, arising with the earliest dawn of the conscious difference between what that soul sees in the universe and what is really in it—the difference between the thing there before him plainly in the light, and the Being behind that, in the dark. In the most primitive consciousness man, in



knowing, is *seeing another Being's object*, seeing an object through his own eyes and through another's at once. In knowing Nature, therefore, I am already transplanting myself into another's centre. The "other" in question is God. Now this is what my fellow-beings for ever challenge me to do. This is what "knowing" them means. Altruism is not the fundamental note in this *Weltanschauung*. We experience other men (which experiencing is the essence of altruism, as Royce surely has shown) only because we first experience God; and they are needed, in the last resort, in order that we may be brought nearer God.

It is evident how much turns upon the truth that man, in seeing, sees simultaneously from out Another's point of view, that "it is impossible for him to be alone in this cosmos." Which, of course, leaves the religious spirit inquiring still, Who is this companion?—"would that I knew where to find Him!" But by the time we have traversed the author's closing sections, developing the logic of mysticism and the meaning of worship, and have gained a glimpse of the crowning fruit of religion in the prophetic consciousness that "I have overcome the world," it is easier to assent to what one might call the message of the whole work—viz. that that inevitable companion can be met face to face; and that he is the object of our "whole-idea," veritably He "in whom" we, with all our failure and fragmentariness, are eternally "complete." For all down the thorn-strewn path of the world's religious history there are those to be found who *knew* that Nature was God's speech to them; and of those, some few could make themselves articulate and tell us what He was saying. Those were they who could stand far enough back from the world to meet the world-whole with their "whole-idea," and feel the thrill of the meeting. They were the pure in heart. And much and tyrannically as the world is "with" the modern spirit, such experience is not at all impossible to us; indeed, in the author's view, is not very far from us. There has been, he holds, "a genuine deepening of spiritual consciousness in our western world; a new appreciation of faith, a new love of life and its variety, a new ability to be both bond and free," which manifests itself, he believes, in the fact "that cleverness and erudition poured out in abundance do nowadays visibly pall and fail of their usual effect." And all of it has left us just on the edge, so to speak, of a deep religious life. "The thing now required," he says, "is a simple thing, a common word, a slight increment of ultimate sincerity somewhere that can reunite our roots with mother earth. We are as well off above ground as we can be until we are better off below ground. What boots it though a man can produce out of his inner consciousness a veritable banyan forest if there is, in all, no growth *downward*? There is, I say, a quiet and canny maturity of conscience abroad, which knows surely what it does not want, a new-born thing in the world, the source of our new philosophies—in particular of our pragmatisms, our realisms, our mysticisms—the doom of the old, the doom also of the new that fail to arrive at reality; the lash at the back of the thinker, and the hope in his

soul." These words from the preface indicate the breadth of aim behind the whole; and they will perhaps also convey something of the sustained and convincing eloquence of thought—not enthusiastic, but simply vast and strong and careless, because sure—with which the author of this work seeks to impart to us his sense of the obvious value of worship, and the certainty and nearness of God.

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*Euripides and his Age.*—By Gilbert Murray. (Home University Library of Modern Knowledge).—London: Williams & Norgate, 1913.

It is most appropriate that Professor Gilbert Murray should contribute a volume on Euripides to the Home University Library, for he has by his other work, and particularly by his translations of Euripides, won the admiration of a large public to which this series must especially appeal: to those, that is, who, without possessing necessarily a first-hand knowledge of the subject, are anxious to make themselves acquainted with it by the light that can be thrown by those who have such knowledge.

For these, and indeed for all who are interested in the Greek drama and Euripides, Professor Murray has written a highly stimulative study of the poet and his period. He always writes freshly and with enthusiasm, and in going over ground which has often been trodden before he is never trite, but always suggestive and original. He reconstructs with much ingenuity the life of Euripides from the scanty materials that are at hand. Hamlet thought it was to the credit of Polonius that he should be mistaken for a fishmonger, but many admirers of Euripides may be relieved to learn from Professor Murray that there is probably no basis in fact for the favourite taunt of Aristophanes that the mother of Euripides was a greengrocer.

Professor Murray takes a wide survey both of the drama and the period. He shows how the great age of Athens, that came of the success in Greece born of the success in the fight against the Persians, ended in disillusionment and the disaster of the Sicilian expedition. Much in point on this subject are the many references to Thucydides. It may be said that Thucydides wrote the great Attic tragedy, the *History of the Peloponnesian War*. Professor Murray notes the influence on Euripides and his work of the exhilaration of the earlier and the disappointment of the later times. He writes with a most intimate appreciation of the plays and fragments and the many-sided genius of the poet that is revealed therein. His conclusion on the place of Euripides is given in this passage, with regard to what he calls "the great revelation, or the great illusion of tragedy":

"It is achieved, apparently, by a combination of two extremes; in matter a full facing of tragic facts, and in form a resolute transfiguration



of them by poetry. The weak artist shirks the truth by a feeble idealism ; the prosaic artist fails to transfigure it. Euripides seems to me to have gone further than any other writer in the attempt to combine in one unit these separate poles."

Yet this estimate, which Professor Murray expresses in a somewhat different form elsewhere, where he says, in commenting upon the *Bacchæ*, that Euripides was both a reasoner and a poet and that the two sides of his nature sometimes clashed and sometimes blended, raises the question what the achievement of Euripides really was. In fact, it raises the host of questions that come up for debate when we consider the place of Euripides among the great dramatists. In writing of a poet who has been the subject of so much controversy, Professor Murray is singularly uncontroversial, and the value of his book is much enhanced thereby. But probably a great many readers of Euripides, when they compare the views expressed in this book with the impressions they have received from the plays themselves, will feel that they dissent from Professor Murray—that, at any rate, they would emphasise things differently. Professor Murray applauds the change that has come over our study of Greek civilisation in the last two generations. "We now try to approach it," he says, "historically as a thing that moves and grows—to see the Greek poet or philosopher in his real surroundings and against his proper background. Seen thus, he will appear not as a stationary 'ancient' contrasted with a 'modern,' but as a moving and striving figure, a daring pioneer in the advance of the human spirit."

Now, all this is very flattering to the self-esteem of the present age. But may not the praise be undeserved, or at least premature? The labours of distinguished scholars in many fields have indeed thrown much light on many departments of learning. But have we, in essentials, got a truer view of the ancients? It is difficult to take the measure of our own enlightenment. An uncomfortable suspicion arises that posterity may find as much to correct in current views as we find in the classicist view. At a time when so much of our literature and drama is so eminently self-conscious and controversial, we are naturally inclined to turn to the Greek poet who most obviously echoes and anticipates the problems with which we are occupied—the poet who has felt, as Professor Murray observes, "the same desires and indignations as a great number of people at the present day, especially young people." It is really a question of emphasis, or values ; and we can have no quarrel with Professor Murray's statements, though we may feel that he is perhaps too greatly impressed with what might not be unjustly termed the doctrinaire side of the poet's genius. He discriminates indeed with great justice, as may be gathered from the observations here quoted, between Euripides the reasoner and Euripides the poet. But, after all, with the greatest poets one does not feel the need of such discrimination. Aristophanes is more often amusing for his jokes than convincing by his criticism. But there is a fundamental truth underlying the absurdities of his attacks upon Euripides. There is

much in Euripides that is beneath the substance of great poetry. Take, for instance, the famous "Woman's Right" speech of Medea. It is indeed remarkable, and may fairly be quoted in support of the claim that Euripides was a pioneer in the advance of human thought. But compare it with the soliloquies of Macbeth or the great speeches in the *Ajax*, and it appears weak and sentimental. Euripides, running along his double line, misses the greatness of the greatest, the power of appealing to us as at once particular and universal. Yet of course he is a very great poet, and if he misses the sustained inspiration of the greatest poets, he appeals to us at times in a more intimate way than any other ancient writer. "Euripides the Human" really expresses as well as anything that has been said of him the nature of his appeal. We may read a great deal which many at any rate will find baffling or irritating; but when he comes to the tragic moments, Euripides gathers up our interest and moves us profoundly. And this is, in effect, what Aristotle says of him, with whose criticism Professor Murray concludes his book: "*Even if faulty in various ways, at any rate clearly the most tragic of the poets.*" This is Professor Murray's translation, and it rather flatters Euripides, for Aristotle calls him the most tragic, with a somewhat special application, in allusion to his unhappy endings. And we hope we may not appear ungrateful for Professor Murray's excellent study by suggesting that the "faulty in various ways" feebly represents that part of Aristotle's criticism which is censure, and that the reading of Euripides confirms the justice of Aristotle's divided view.

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*A History of Freedom of Thought.*—By J. B. Bury, M.A., F.B.A.  
(Home University Library).—Williams & Norgate, 1913.

IN this small volume of some 250 pages Professor Bury has set out to tell us the story and the vicissitudes of freedom of thought, which "in any valuable sense includes freedom of speech." After delimiting his problem to the conflict between authority and reason—we hear nothing whatever of the existence or value of the rational motives which induce us to believe a given authority in matters which are not against, but beyond, our capacity of reasoning—the author takes us quickly through the history of Greece and Rome. In antiquity "reason" was "free," and Professor Bury sums up his chapter in the following words:—"If we review the history of classical antiquity as a whole, we may almost say that freedom of thought was like the air men breathed. It was taken for granted, and nobody thought about it. If seven or eight thinkers at Athens were penalised for heterodoxy, in some and perhaps in most of these cases heterodoxy was only a pretext. They do not invalidate the general facts that the advance of knowledge was not impeded by prejudice, or science retarded by the weight of unscientific authority. . . . Opinions were not imposed except by argument ;



you were not expected to receive some 'Kingdom of Heaven' like a little child, or to prostrate your intellect before an authority claiming to be infallible." This summary strikes us as a little rapid, and a little enthusiastic. Other eminent historians, while yielding to none in their admiration for his ideals of Greece, have given us a more sombre picture, or better, one in which the light was occasionally obscured by a cloud. Having dealt with antiquity, we pass on to consider the Middle Ages, which are classed and dismissed under the general rubric "reason in prison"; the Renaissance and Reformation, in which we find a prospect of deliverance; the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, in which the "emancipation" of reason was effected by the growth of rationalism; and so on to the present day. In an epilogue, Professor Bury gives his "justification of liberty of thought." The closing words run as follows:—"Meanwhile, nothing should be left undone to impress upon the young that freedom of thought is an axiom of human progress. . . . It is true that children are sometimes exhorted to think for themselves. . . . It is assumed that he (the child) will reason from principles which have already been instilled into him by authority. But if his thinking for himself takes the form of questioning these principles, whether moral or religious, his parents and teachers, unless they are very exceptional persons, will be extremely displeased and will certainly discourage him. It is, of course, only singularly promising children whose freedom of thought will go so far. In this sense it might be said that 'distrust thy father and mother' is the first commandment with promise. . . ."

Now, it is obviously quite impossible to follow the author through the whole tangled story of the history of Europe. Moreover, in such a work the facts are on the whole less important than the general principles of the writer who groups the facts to defend his theses. After all, the emphasis and importance of facts must naturally depend upon the principles and general outlook, on the *Weltanschauung und Gedankenwelt* of the historian. And Professor Bury's main ideas stand out with unmistakable clearness. To begin with, Christianity is "mythology." "During the last three hundred years," we read at the beginning of the sixth chapter, "reason has been slowly but steadily destroying Christian mythology and exposing the pretensions of supernatural religion." In fact, Professor Bury makes it clear that he deems Christianity the enemy. He goes out of his way, for instance, to show that "the researches of students of anthropology and comparative religions—such as Tylor, Robertson Smith, and Frazer—have gone to show that mysterious ideas and dogma and rites which were held to be peculiar to the Christian revelation are derived from the crude ideas of primitive religions. That the mystery of the Eucharist comes from the savage rite of eating a dead god. . . ." In making such statements, Professor Bury has clearly accepted the authority of the anthropologists, and forgotten to look into the evidence. Professor Frazer, for instance, does indeed state a number of ideas of this kind, which always appear very damaging to Christianity until we suddenly realise that he

misunderstands the Christian doctrines. In his *Totemism and Exogamy* he confuses "virgin birth" and "immaculate conception," ideas which have no more connection than Shintoism and gravitation, and which, we are unwillingly forced to conclude, he has never properly grasped. And instances might be multiplied. Professor Bury himself says nothing of Andrew Lang's criticism of anthropological speculation, nor of a study like "*Der Ursprung der Gottesidee*," in which Schmidt, the editor of *Anthropos*, indicates, by a patient appeal to fact, the unfounded nature of nearly all recent English theory-making in the domain of anthropology. We might all do well at times to remember Darwin's canon, of collecting and noting all facts that tell against our own preconceived or scientific theories: if not noted, they tend to pass over the threshold into the subconscious.

Professor Bury, however, goes farther. Not only does he trustingly follow those who condemn Christianity, but he himself misunderstands what he condemns and dismisses as "mythology." On page 53 we read:—"We must remember that, according to the humane doctrine of the Christians, pagan, that is, merely human virtues, were vices, and infants who died unbaptized passed the rest of time in creeping on the floor of hell." This is at least surprising, as Christians have always regarded, let us say, prudence, justice, fortitude and temperance—the old pagan virtues—as real, human, and natural virtues, which find the warmest possible commendation in Christian ethics. And in the second place, Christians as a body have never condemned unbaptized infants to hell. Certain more vigorous and less ballasted persons may have spoken in this way, but the body of Christians have never adopted any such tradition. On the contrary, they have thought that unbaptized infants pass eternity in a state of natural happiness. Professor Bury's conclusion, as to "the intolerance arising from such views," may, therefore, as we do not wish to be aggressive, pass unnoticed.

On the same page 53—this page is not very different from others, as far as we can gather—we read:—"Besides the logic of its doctrines, the character of its Sacred Book must also be held partly accountable for the intolerant principles of the Christian Church. It was unfortunate that the early Christians had included in their Scripture the Jewish writings, which reflect the ideas of a low stage of civilisation and are full of savagery. It would be difficult to say how much harm has been done, in corrupting the morals of men, by the precepts and examples of inhumanity, violence, and bigotry which the reverent reader of the Old Testament, implicitly believing in its inspiration, is bound to approve." No doubt much might be said about Professor Bury's conception of the Old Testament, which would appear a little one-sided and warped, but we pass at once to the supposed Christian theory of inspiration. Surely no Christian can ever have been quite so muddled and unbalanced as to think that one must approve of all the conduct recorded in the historical books of the Old Testament! It would obviously bring him into immediate collision with the decalogue, not to speak of the principles of natural law and the precepts of Christ, if he



were, for instance, to approve of the adultery of David or the idolatry of Solomon. And so, once again, the intolerance ascribed to the reading of the Old Testament must be dismissed in silence. It would almost seem that Professor Bury had constructed a real "mythology." Only let us ask him, in all candour, to guard against ascribing its mysteries, dogmas, and rites to Christianity.

We pass to say a word about Professor Bury's second leading conception. Just as Christianity, or, we should say, the "mythology" is the real enemy, so rationalism is the heart and life of freedom of thought. Now, obviously, rationalism can be taken either in a negative or in a positive sense. Let it be observed at once that we all use our reasons: that is to say, we all collect and sift facts, and examine our principles critically before combining both fact and principle to form scientific or philosophic theories. Newton, the greatest of the physical scientists, used his reason to some purpose, as did also, let us say, Bacon and Descartes, the leaders of modern philosophy, and all three remained devout Christians.

The positive, energetic use of thought and reason cannot, therefore, be the "differentia" of the rationalist. We are thus driven to consider the negative aspect of the rationalist creed, according to which all doctrines which have not been or cannot be ascertained by reason are necessarily untrue, if not nonsense or mythology. Frankly, the axiom is one which baffles us. It is not obvious: it cannot possibly be proved: it cannot be deduced from any coherent theory of truth. It stands as a kind of challenging statement, founded apparently on some authority. In his little history Professor Bury has almost limited his conception of rationalism to this negative aspect which disallows all revelation. His history of the freedom of thought is, strictly speaking, a history of rationalism, and by rationalism he means something "which has been slowly but steadily destroying Christian mythology and exposing the pretensions of supernatural religion." We submit that this is a curious, not to say limited, view of the grandest chapters in human history, the growth of freedom of thought properly understood as the patient and careful use of reason. To think what one pleases, just as one pleases, is not freedom—it has never been spoken of as such in any philosophy—but obedience to impulse.

We might indeed add many reflections. Professor Bury's facts and dates are often enough incorrect, and his reading of the Middle Ages contains some very inaccurate and sweeping statements, which would need to be changed beyond recognition before they could be made to fit the facts. In a longer review we might perhaps indicate these "strains of the stuff" and "warpings past the aim." As it is, we close, feeling that the author has given us at least a one-sided view of the whole matter. The fact that it will be read by many thousands of people who will put implicit trust in all its statements only makes this one-sidedness still more to be regretted.

JOHN G. VANCE.

*Some Loose Stones: being a Consideration of certain Tendencies in Modern Theology, illustrated by reference to the Book called "Foundations."*—By R. A. Knox, Fellow and Chaplain of Trinity College, Oxford, 1913.

WHEN, a short time after the publication of *Foundations*, there appeared in the *Oxford Magazine* a poem about its authors, under the title of "Absolute and Abitofhell," it was freely said that the book would have been worth writing in order to produce so brilliant a piece of satire. It was not, perhaps, then anticipated what a success the book would achieve. And it is doubtless this success which has encouraged the ingenious author of the satire to publish his more serious thoughts about *Foundations* in the present volume.

We say "serious" advisedly. For it must not be inferred, either from the title of this book, or from the headings of some of its chapters, or from the misplaced frivolity which occasionally disfigures its pages, that the writer is not in earnest. On the contrary, he really believes that Christianity is a revealed religion in the old mediæval sense of the phrase; that one must argue *a priori* to the truth of everything which is contained in the creeds, and even to the reality of religious experience; and that to concede anything at all to the *a posteriori* methods of modern criticism and theology is to give up Christianity altogether. Youth and irresponsibility apart, he is as much in earnest as was the Pope, when he penned his encyclical against Modernism. His fears are the Pope's fears. His attitude is the Pope's attitude.

To many liberal theologians *Foundations* was a disappointing work. The differences and the timidities of its writers, their silence upon several crucial points, and their air of writing for the public as well as for the truth, detracted from the positive gains of their performance. But the public was at once interested and flattered—interested by the serious discussion of important things; flattered by being told that the modern mind is not far from the kingdom of Heaven.

It is just this equanimity of the modern man that Mr Knox sets himself to attack. And it is obvious that, in doing so, he forms an unwilling alliance with the extreme Liberals for a joint assault upon the position of the moderate critics, who are represented for the occasion by the authors of *Foundations*. The extremists say that these writers do not go so far as their premisses demand. Mr Knox says that they have already gone so far that nothing can save them. The conclusion suggested is that there is no permanent footing to be found between simple Traditionalism and a quite unlimited Liberalism.

It may be said at once that there is much in Mr Knox's criticism which is distinctly damaging to that cautious Liberalism which is so much in vogue at the present time, and of which *Foundations* may not unfairly be taken as an example. Thus it is a real weakness of this Liberalism that it sometimes seems to be less interested in truth than in edification. "We ask



of a doctrine, not 'Is it sound?' but, 'Couldn't we possibly manage to do without it?' not, 'Is it true?' but, 'Can I induce Jones to see it in that light?' (p. 9); and the sketch of Jones, "the hero of *Foundations*," is clever as well as amusing. Nor is it unfair to say that the Jones whom the writers have in view really belonged to the last generation, and that his difficulties were not quite those of the modern man (p. 11). Again the complaint that the religious point of view and needs of women have been ignored is a timely one, applying as it does to more books than *Foundations*: the point is one of the most valuable that Mr Knox makes (p. 16). The chapter on Miracles insists on a proper definition of the point at issue (p. 54), and quite fairly urges that Liberalism does not escape from all the difficulties of the situation by substituting the belief in "special providences" for the belief in miracles.

But it is in his criticism of the Christology of *Foundations* that Mr Knox's argument comes to a head. "My difficulty," he writes, "has been to discover precisely what it is that the authors of *Foundations* mean when they refer to Jesus of Nazareth as 'Divine.' And so far as I am able to interpret their meaning, the suggestion has been that the Jesus of modern criticism, with his limited knowledge, his gradually developing personality, his partial and changing apprehension of the purpose for which he has been sent into the world, his liability to the ordinary temptations of mankind, is somehow God. And, frankly, the more I look at it, the less sense does it seem to present" (p. 144). Mr Knox will here carry the ordinary man with him. The whole tendency of the critical and historical study of Christianity is towards a humanitarian view of its Founder. History cannot discover anything in him which is certainly supernatural. It cannot even be conscious of any inadequacy in its natural account of him. And against this tendency, which the critical side of *Foundations* strongly exemplifies, that book has nothing constructive to offer, except Mr Temple's restatement of the Nicene Christology in terms of will instead of substance—a weakness which almost deserves Mr Knox's retort—"If nothing further is necessary to justify us in calling a person divine, then I can no longer be content to withhold the title of 'divine' from the Virgin Mary" (p. 153). In other words, the attempts which some Liberals are making to restate the divinity of Christ simply as a historical fact, provable by historical evidence, cannot but fail. Yet their error is not, as Mr Knox thinks, in going too far, but in not going far enough. The solution of the problem is to be sought in the recognition that "divinity" is a belief about Christ only partly based on historical evidence, and deriving its main force and justification from religious experience.

But Mr Knox is relentless. He pursues the Liberal to the ground of religious experience, and attacks him there too. He thinks that religious experience is the effect, not the cause, of theological belief, and that the mystical experience in particular affords no sound basis for dogmatic construction. "There is not a wisp of evidence," he says, "as to any process by which people argued inductively, as from effect to cause, from their own feelings

at the reception of the Sacrament to a Presence in the Sacrament itself. I would go further, and say that if the faithful had not from the first gone to the Sacrament already expecting, in virtue of a Divine promise, that Jesus was there to meet them, they would never have had any Eucharistic experience at all" (p. 180).

Here Mr Knox obviously overreaches himself. Everyone who has thought about his religious experience is conscious of elements in it which are due to training or to suggestion. But he also knows that there is more in it than that. And in any case he will not be so simple as to suppose that, because his experience has come to him at second hand, or has grown up from obscure and perhaps undignified beginnings, it is invalid or untrue. Mr Knox has tumbled head-first into a very old fallacy. Nevertheless it is far from clear how much of what is lost by the surrender of the old dogmatic basis of Christianity is regained by the appeal to religious experience. And those Liberals who are disposed to carry their argument to its conclusion will be the first to admit that Mr Knox's criticisms raise problems of vital importance.

We regard this book, then, as a rather damaging attack upon some of the tendencies of theological Liberalism, as exhibited in *Foundations*. But, lest we should seem to look at it only from this point of view, we must end by saying that it is also the most damaging exposure of orthodoxy that has been written since Dr Figgis's *Civilisation at the Cross-roads*. Mr Knox has set himself to examine the psychology of Liberalism: he has in fact written a most illuminating document on the psychology of Traditionalism. He has done much to show that there is no permanent footing to be found on the slippery slope of Liberalism: but most people will think that to remain where he stands is infinitely more precarious. He is for ever attacking the *a posteriori* method of the Liberals, and the uncertain hypotheses upon which they proceed. But his own *a priori* method is only certain because it is based upon a hypothesis to which theirs are as nothing—the hypothesis of an infallible body of revelation, given at a point in past history, from which all truth can be deduced. It is just this assumption that the modern mind cannot make. Mr Knox, treating the modern mind as an isolated freak, a pathological specimen, can say, "So much the worse for the modern mind." But the educated world in general knows that this is nonsense. The modern mind is not a freak: it is on the whole true to type. It has taken centuries to become what it is. During its growth it has moved further and further away from Mr Knox's standpoint. It can never move back again. To take up the attitude suggested by this book would mean definitely to turn one's back on modern society. It would mean to set up, once again, revelation against reason, the Church against the world. It would mean to deny that the progress of the human mind is, as a whole, towards knowledge rather than ignorance, towards truth rather than towards illusion. It would mean to identify, for all time, religion with Mediævalism, and Christianity with Rome. There is much that is pious and attractive in Mr Knox's way



of presenting this alternative to Liberalism. But that ought not to blind anyone to its inherent absurdity. It is pathetic that men like Mr Knox, whose ability might make them pioneers of Christian thought, should be found defending a position in which "the ring-wall of authoritative dogma lessens the fierceness of the attacks of doubt, but also adds a fearful responsibility. The whole position stands or falls by the weakest parts in the defence: give up one article of the Nicene Creed, and the whole situation is lost" (p. xi).

Mr Knox complains that recent writers have treated the "cross-roads" at which they conceive Christianity to stand as giving a choice between two routes, and no more. He asks, pertinently enough, why not go straight on? (p. 216). But which *is* straight on? We may be pardoned for thinking that Mr Knox has played a trick upon the traveller, and turned the signpost round.

J. M. THOMPSON.

OXFORD.

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*The New Testament Documents: their Origin and Early History.*

By George Milligan, D.D.—London: Macmillan, 1913.

By publishing his Croall Lectures of two years ago, Dr Milligan has made a useful and timely addition to the growing library of Introductions to the study of the New Testament. The book might almost be called a companion volume to Sir Frederic Kenyon's well-known *Introduction to the Textual Criticism of the New Testament*. It covers a wider ground, since it deals not only with the MSS., but also with the linguistic problems, the literary character, and the formation of the canon of the New Testament; and it is therefore less detailed and less original than the earlier volume. But it gives a valuable conspectus of the problems of criticism, and it is written and illustrated in a way which will make it at once useful to the expert and attractive to the amateur.

As might be expected, Dr Milligan's special interest in papyrology makes his treatment of the evidence drawn from the papyri as to the affinities and interpretation of New Testament Greek the most valuable part of the book. It is not yet generally realised that the language of the Evangelists and of St Paul was in the main not a literary mannerism, but the language of the professional and business men of their time. Indeed, this will not be understood until the New Testament is retranslated into real modern English. Dr Milligan might have mentioned Dr Rutherford's translations of some of St Paul's Epistles as perhaps the best attempt that has yet been made to do this. Meanwhile, commentators might well make more use of such papyrus-texts as have already been published: and it is to be hoped that before long they will be able to consult the promised edition of Dr Milligan's and Professor Moulton's *Lexical Notes for the Papyri*, and the *Lexicon of the Greek New Testament* upon which Professor Deissmann is understood to be engaged.

If attention may be called to one of the many interesting points which Dr Milligan raises, it may be suggested that, the more one studies the way in which the New Testament autographs were written and copied, the less certain one can be that our present text is free from early misrepresentations and corruptions. The later corruptions can be traced with comparative ease. But when we get back behind the evidence of the archetypal MSS. and the earliest versions, what do we find? Travelling preachers, dictating letters to scribes, who, even if they did not misunderstand what was said, might yet modify, or clothe in their own language, the author's ideas. (It is suggested, for instance, that the Greek of the Fourth Gospel, and the differences in style between some of the Pauline Epistles, may be explained in this way.) Collectors of stories or sayings, who had little power of discrimination between good and bad evidence, and who were almost bound to give a personal or congregational turn to what they reproduced. Copyists, who were at best fallible, and who, in any case, had not yet such a reverence for the written word of the new Scriptures as would prevent their introducing improvements of their own. And it must be added that no authors' rights whatever seem to have existed under Greek law.

In view of such facts, the confidence which it is customary to express, and which is expressed both by Dr Milligan and by Sir Frederic Kenyon, as to the substantial identity of our text of the New Testament with the original autographs, is perhaps a little overstated.

In this, and in many other interesting points which it raises, Dr Milligan's book will be found a valuable addition to the critic's library. We hope that it will encourage scholars to contribute some other volumes that are sorely needed. There has been no proper rationale of Biblical criticism—no adequate statement of its presuppositions and principles. There is room for a history of New Testament criticism which will trace the development of critical method in connection with particular problems or passages. And we need a clearer statement of the principles and practice of literary and historical criticism to put beside the several excellent monographs which deal only with textual criticism.

Meanwhile, Dr Milligan's book can be confidently recommended.

J. M. THOMPSON.

OXFORD.

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*The Open Secret: A Study of Life's Deeper Forces.*—By James Thompson Bixby, Ph.D., Author of "The New World and the New Thought," etc.—Boston: American Unitarian Association, 1912.

DR BIXBY's book is very readable, but the suspicion grows in the reader's mind that he has taken up a very well-disguised book of sermons. We would not suggest either that he would necessarily have avoided it had the disguise been less effective or that he will lay it down when the



suspicion becomes a conviction. But the homiletic aim and the moral fervour of a preacher partly account for the choice of subjects and for the method of approach. Wide and thorough as has been the scientific reading and observation of the author, constant though his appeal is to scientific data, hypotheses, and conclusions, his attitude is not that of the disinterested investigator. Edification is the motive of the book, so that, although there are chapters on Vitality and Mechanism, Atom and Spirit, and Purpose in Nature, we are not surprised to find the "dear reader" apostrophised (p. 161). Fearlessly and with the most skilful use of his weapons Dr Bixby attacks materialism in natural science and in morals, and incidentally he manages to have something to say on every subject of current interest. The first part of his argument is practically an expansion of a saying of Lotze: "The true source of the life of science lies in showing how absolutely universal, in the structure of the world, is the mission of mechanism, yet how completely subordinate is its significance." The "cosmic motor power" cannot be found in the existing matter of the world, for the first steps of the evolutionary process (involving "differentiation") presuppose a cause external to the nebulous matter and giving to it its rotary impulse. Dr Bixby is fond of calling this cause a Cosmic Dynamo (why Kosmic on p. 47?) and of using figures of speech suggested by such a name (*e.g.* p. 154). His analysis of the problem of mechanism *versus* vitalism reaches the conclusion "that the grand cosmic Force . . . must be connected with will and intelligence, of which it is a function and expression. Inasmuch as this energy and outflow is infinite, the fountain-head of power must be equally infinite. It must be no less than an all-powerful Spirit and eternal Mind, of which the diversified phenomena of Nature are simply the manifold phases" (p. 39). Theism and the problems of Providence are discussed, and the view of "law" taken by Naturalism is shown to be unreasonable; but the errors of the theory of Divine intervention at special times for special objects are also renounced, and the author finds the key in larger and profounder views of Nature and of God. "A Divine Will as the causative power of the world's phenomena is the fundamental demand of theology. But when the nature of such a Divine Will is thoroughly considered, it is seen that any high idea of God requires the events of Nature to be orderly, and excludes all arbitrariness as much as science itself does" (p. 97). For example, a volcanic eruption is but the effect of certain forces acting according to invariable laws, but the very forces which combine to bring about the eruption are those which cook our food, work our steam engines, and prevent us spinning off into the outer planetary spaces (p. 105). It is the inflexibility of the laws of fire that enables us to use it daily with such general safety. Problems of human destiny and freedom, and the great theme of man's sacred partnership with God in the making of the world, are sympathetically treated, and finally Dr Bixby arraigns the present age as an age of superficiality, pleading for profounder thought assisted by more strenuous application (not to the "popularising"

of science but) to research, and for profounder feeling arising out of an awakened human sympathy. He is insistent in his demand that a greater place should be given to discipline in education and home life, and believes that no reorganisation of society can avail which is not first a remoulding of individual character.

Dr Bixby's fertility in illustration is great, so great that he is rather too often betrayed into a confusion of metaphors. It is possible so early as page 8 to pass rapidly in thought from *foundations of a Cosmic Temple* to *fragrant blossoms unfolding petal by petal*, but we tire of this gymnastic when such mixture of metaphors occurs within the limits of two or three sentences as we find on p. 150 (*weathercocks, dynamite, robes, and fertilisers*); p. 156 (*cords uncoiled by the Fates and the voyage of life*); p. 235 (*sealed fountains, distorted images, and melting cruelty*). There are many awkward and some ungrammatical sentences (e.g. "*Science, no more than religion, can look . . .*" for "*Science cannot any more than religion look . . .*" p. 120); while the fourth sentence on p. 220 and the last on p. 238 are exhaustingly long. "Wilt" is a misprint for "will" on p. 195.

H. E. B. SPEIGHT.

KENSINGTON, W.

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*Youth and Life*.—By Randolph S. Bourne.—London: Constable, 1913.

IN a remarkable essay entitled "The Life of Irony," which contains the essence of the argument of this book, the author tells us of one of those awakenings of the mind that give one a wide view, as from a mountain top, of an unexplored country of extraordinary beauty and vast extent. He is reading Plato's *Dialogues* and imagining that he is among a group of eager youths who are being cross-examined by Socrates, when it occurs to him that "this pleasant challenging of the world, this insistent judging of experience, this sense of vivid contrasts and incongruities, of comic juxtapositions, of flaring brilliances, and no less heart-breaking impossibilities, of all the little parts of one's world being constantly set off against each other, and made intelligible only by being translated into and defined in each other's terms—that this is a life, and a life of beauty, that one might suddenly discover oneself living all unawares."

Comparing the religious man with the ironist, he finds that the latter is less acquiescent and introspective, and more courageous and sympathetic. The ironist has no sense of superiority which makes him shrink from contact with the world, no nice partiality for "the fine-nerved humanities" of the sanctuary which makes traffic with the multitude and the contemplation of the ugly and vicious elements of the community life a grim and painful duty. Not so solemn as the religionist, not so self-important as the conservative, he realises that "nothing is really so serious as we think it is, and nothing is quite so petty. The ironist will descend in a moment from a discussion of religion to a squabble over a card-game, and



he will defend himself with the reflection that religion is after all a human thing and must be discussed in the light of everyday living, and that the card-game is an integral part of life, reveals the personalities of the players—and his own to himself—and being worthy of his interest is worthy of his enthusiasm.”

The Socratic dialectician, indeed, is the only true democrat, who has no respect of persons, not even of himself. “With his constant outdoor look he sees his own foibles and humiliations in the light of those of other people. He acquires a more tolerant, half-amused, half-earnest attitude toward himself. His self-respect is nourished by the knowledge that whatever things discreditable and foolish and worthless he has done, he has seen them approximated by others, and yet his esteem is kept safely pruned down by the recurring evidence that nothing he has is unique.”

The writer goes on to express “Some Thoughts on Religion,” and to discourse on “The Adventure of Life,” “The Mystic turned Radical,” “The Dodging of Pressures,” and other topics. But although the titles are various the subject is the same throughout—that of the herd environment that standardises conduct and restricts free will within narrow bounds. In dealing with the social compulsions Mr Bourne manifests an intimate knowledge of the psychology of Dr Freud. He points out that people do not do what they want and will, but what their instincts drive them to do in response to group stimuli; that everyone finds life at the outset “a crude mass of puzzling possibilities”; and that no man’s career is the direct and purposive fulfilment of a well-laid, rational plan. Prosperous and successful men, contemplating their achievements, imagine that these constitute a triumphant progress to a foreseen and desired goal, but psychoanalysis would show that to begin with they blundered about for opportunities and adequate media of self-expression quite as irrationally as humbler folk do. Mr Bourne maintains that if men’s actions are to have any moral value they must be the outcome, in each individual case, of experiment, discovery, and creation. He therefore regards high spirits and radical views as a better equipment for the adventure of living than settled beliefs and a conservative temperament; and counsels old and young alike to make their life a process of what Lowell would have called “lying open to one’s genius.”

But Mr Bourne’s psychology is at once more ancient and more modern than Professor Freud’s, and it probes deeper into the arcana of the mind, for it shows how religion arises from the working of the sense of relationship to the cosmos that is no less instinctive than are the sex and the self-preservative impulses. Very vividly does he describe the terrors with which present-day knowledge of world-wide and apparently irreparable evils has overwhelmed thoughtful men, while at the same time it has established the conviction that to man and his aspirations the universe is utterly indifferent. But the very gloom of these reflections brings the essayist’s humour the more prominently into play.

“It is necessary to be somewhat self-centred in considering the problem.

We must trust our own feelings rather than any rational proof. In spite of everything, the world seems to us so unconquerably good, it affords so many satisfactions, and is so rich in beauty and kindness, that we have a right to assume that there is a side of things that we miss in our pessimistic contemplation of misfortune and disaster. We see only the outer rind of it. People usually seem to be so much happier than we can find any very rational excuse for their being, and that old world that confronted and scared us may look very much worse than it really is."

Mr Bourne goes on to proclaim a very practical gospel as to the utilisation of science for the prevention of misery, while he demonstrates how we could "reinststate ideals and personality at the heart of the world," and eschew "that curious love for futile suffering that form [*sic*] some of the darker qualities of the Puritan soul." From pessimistic speculation he finds refuge in a Bergsonian theory of a world-memory which reminds one of Emerson's "over-soul" and Fechner's "earth-soul."

But the author has put so much of his personality into it that no one will be able to appreciate the book through the medium of a review. The style has a charm and a distinction which lure the reader on from page to page, as if he were listening to a friend expressing brilliant ideas in rhythmical prose with the greatest ease. The very faults of the style deepen this impression that one is talking, as one reads, with a conversationalist who is both critical and sympathetic. Careless expressions—"a drastic attitude," for instance, and "no guarantee against it can be inculcated"—mar the beauty of a sentence or two here and there, but they are not flagrant enough to disturb the deep attention with which the reader follows the current of the writer's thought. At once devotional and provocative, the book sets forth a bracing religion that is well suited to the needs of twentieth-century industrial civilisation; and yet it has a meditative quality that recalls the works of earlier thinkers, such as Mark Guy Pearse and John Richard Vernon, who wrote in times of ampler leisure and larger opportunity than our own.

M. E. ROBINSON.

LONDON.



# THE HIBBERT JOURNAL

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KIKUYU.

THE VERY REVEREND H. HENSLEY HENSON,  
Dean of Durham.

THE Kikuyu controversy has come upon the Church very suddenly, but (though the place and occasion were surprising) the controversy itself could not have been postponed much longer. For the Church of England seems to be in danger of becoming "an organised hypocrisy," pretending to be something that it is not, speaking like Pascal's Jesuits with two voices according to the suggestion of its immediate interest, destitute therefore of any valid claim either on the loyalty of individual Christians, or on the continued support of the nation.

Three factors may be distinguished in the volume of discontent which has found violent expression in the Bishop of Zanzibar's "Open Letter"—conservative opposition to doctrinal "restatement," sacerdotalist resentment against the attempt to restore order in the Church, and revolt against the conditions of national Establishment. To these must be added, as the Bishop's personal contribution, the discovery, for one can hardly suppose that it was anything else, of the dramatic discrepancy between the actual procedure of the English Church in the mission field and the theory of English Churchmanship which passes for axiomatic in the assemblies

of "High Anglicans," and in the columns of the *Church Times*. The Bishop of Zanzibar exhibits the acute distress of the disillusioned neophyte, as well as the cold severity of the ecclesiastical theorist. He is indeed disturbing the familiar habit of Anglican missionaries when he protests against the proceedings at Kikuyu. The application of his doctrine of Anglicanism to the missionary action of the English Church would involve the resignation of most of the missionaries, and the closing of many missions. It may be safely asserted that such a notion of Anglican obligations as he outlines receives no acceptance outside a few semi-private missions like that which he himself directs in East Africa, and perhaps in that Paradise of Tractarianism—the South African Church.

Theories must needs yield to the grim realities of life in the mission field, and, in face of pagans and the prairie, the most reluctant of Churchmen has perforce to distinguish between the things which matter and the things which are of little worth. Perhaps the best answer to the Bishop of Zanzibar's indictment of the Bishops of Mombasa and Uganda would be a statement of the actual happenings throughout the Anglican Diaspora. As the facts are reported it is becoming evident that the assumptions of the "Open Letter" were hardly less grotesque than intolerant.

"The questions at issue," writes Bishop Stileman, "profoundly affect the position of Church of England missions in a Moslem country like Persia, where most of our fellow-workers for the extension of the Kingdom of Christ are American Presbyterian missionaries who have always worked with their brethren of the Church Missionary Society and the London Society for Promoting Christianity among the Jews in the closest and most brotherly fellowship."

The Bishop proceeds to describe his ordinary method, which appears to include everything which has outraged Bishop Weston in the incidents at Kikuyu (v. *Record*, 6th February 1914). Bishop Stileman speaks for the work in Persia; another bishop, the Bishop of Caledonia, bears similar testimony from British Columbia. He describes an Easter Communion at which the representatives of many denomina-



tions united in receiving the Sacrament of Unity. "Together we knelt side by side and partook of those sacred elements which, variously interpreted, meant for each and all the Holy Communion, the Fellowship Divine" (v. *Ibid.*). Such evidence could be easily multiplied. In China, India, Polynesia, and elsewhere, the application of the rigorous exclusiveness, which the Bishop of Zanzibar identifies with Anglicanism, would revolutionise the conditions under which the foreign mission work of the Church of England has hitherto proceeded, and would create a situation in which much missionary work could not proceed at all. For it is common knowledge that the main burden of foreign missions is sustained by non-Anglicans, since Anglicans, in face of the heathen and Mohammedans, are a "feeble folk" when compared, not merely with the disciplined legions of Rome, but with the enthusiastic forces of non-episcopal Protestantism.

It is precisely because co-operation has been common in the mission field that the notion has arisen, and obtained wide extension in ecclesiastical circles, that the problem of "Reunion" will find solution first in that sphere, and that the home Church will then be drawn into an endorsement of *un fait accompli*. The proofs of Divine acceptance of non-episcopal ministries being too plain for the most rigorous logic to dismiss, and too emphatic for the least fraternal to ignore, it will follow everywhere that the insistence on a monopoly of Divine favour for specific systems must fall out of Christian acceptance. Recognition of non-episcopal Churches will be seen to be required by the same reasoning as that which led the Apostle of the circumcision to admit Gentiles to baptism: "*Can any man forbid the water, that these should not be baptized, which have received the Holy Ghost as well as we?*"

The gravity of the Bishop of Zanzibar's "Open Letter," therefore, is little connected with its indictment of the proceedings at Kikuyu, which may fairly be regarded as illustrative of well-understood Anglican principles, and which

certainly stand in line with similar action in many parts of the mission field. The real importance of the "Open Letter" will be determined by its reception at home. If the authorities of the Church of England were to give formal countenance to the conception of Anglicanism which that document expounds, and if the general sentiment of English Churchmen were to endorse the Bishop of Zanzibar's denunciation of the Bishops of Mombasa and Uganda, a situation of the utmost gravity will undoubtedly have been created. For the whole future of the Church of England will necessarily be compromised by the deliberate adoption of a policy which not only implies the categorical repudiation of its character as a Reformed Church, but also can by no means be reconciled with its history and constitution as an Established Church. Yet it must be admitted that the adoption of such a policy is no remote or improbable danger, for, though it is evident that the general sentiment of religious Englishmen remains still essentially Protestant, and though it cannot be denied that the "Open Letter" has shocked deeply the general body of English Churchmen, yet it is the case that the clergy and bishops have within recent years accepted so generally a view of Anglicanism indistinguishable from that which the "Open Letter" expresses, that it is not difficult to imagine formal decisions being taken of a very deplorable character. The "Open Letter," therefore, has become a test of current Anglicanism. It must be placed alongside many happenings in England which clothe it with a representative character, and give it something of the importance of a formal challenge to the Church itself. The leaven of Tractarianism has been working within the Established Church for two generations, and it has not merely brought about an almost complete paralysis of law, but has so effectually destroyed the older conception of the English Church as embodying a moderate form of Protestantism, conservative in system, liberal in temper, that the most reluctant understanding has now to admit that under the name of the Established Church, and



with its authority, two mutually contradictory versions of Christianity are being offered to the nation. Perplexity and weakness at home must needs appear in confusion and conflict abroad. The natural evolution out of insularity into a larger view is in danger of being arrested by the triumph of a specific conception of Anglicanism, which is not only unhistorical and illogical, but also totally inconsistent either with the maintenance of the Establishment at home, or with the "comity of missions" abroad.

The *Church Times* has been at the pains recently to state this conception in the clearest terms, so that "he who runs may read." It begins by setting forth the unbridgable chasm which parts Catholicism and Protestantism :

"The entire outlook on religion is different. If one is right the other is absolutely wrong, and where these essential differences are present there can be no question of union, or even of united action, whether in the face of aggressive heathenism abroad or religious differences at home."

It proceeds to state the "Catholic theory" of the ministry :

"It is said that for valid Sacraments a valid ministry is needed, and that no ministry is valid unless there is a regular ordination by a Bishop who has himself received his Orders through an unbroken chain from the Apostles, and so from Jesus Christ Himself."

It sweeps away the notion that such a succession could be secured through presbyters, and insists that the Church of England absolutely denies the validity of all non-episcopal ministries. But it is careful to insist that the bishop is only entitled to obedience when he rules "in accordance with the law and tradition of the Church. When he does not do so he ought to be disobeyed" (v. *Church Times*, 13th February 1914, "The Position of the Church of England").

The theory, it will be perceived, is not only prohibitive of any reconciliation with non-episcopal Churches, which must be regarded (to use Bishop Weston's language) as "bodies whose very existence is hostile to Christ's Holy Church," but also absolutely paralysing so far as any doctrinal restatement is concerned. Episcopal Orders, in fact, commit the man who receives them to a purely obstructive attitude towards every

proposal, however reasonable in itself, or imperatively demanded by the needs of the Church, which involves a departure from "the law and tradition of the Church."

When we inquire where precisely this immutable law and binding tradition of the Church are to be found, we are referred, partly, to the "undivided Church" of the early centuries and, partly, to the agreement of the modern Episcopate. The one justifies the Bishop of Zanzibar in repudiating the jurisdiction of the Archbishop of Canterbury, and the other permits him to claim authority for all the latest Roman devotions, which, simply by the fact that they are Roman, are sufficiently certified to have the approval of the existing Episcopate! Nothing is judged on its merits. Everything is brought to the test, not of the New Testament, or of English law, or of reason, or of expediency, but of the "Catholic tradition," disclosed in patristic literature where that serves, and in current Roman practice where it fails to serve the requirements of the moment. Of this "Catholic tradition" the Bishop is the exponent and guardian.

The *Church Times* expounds Bishop Weston's position thus:

"It comes to this: he called upon the Church of a certain province (*i.e.* Canterbury) to intervene in a grave matter concerning Churches which belong to no province. *We have said that in the present conditions of the mission field, precedents of the fourth century, or earlier, are more applicable than those of a later period.* We are now reminded of the frequent references to the special authority of Apostolic Sees which were made in circumstances of difficulty before the development of the metropolitical and patriarchal system. But as in those days, with all his reverence for the Apostolic See of Rome, St Cyprian could stoutly maintain the independent and equal authority of bishops in Africa, rejecting the judgment of the Apostolic See when need arose, *so now the Bishop of Zanzibar hints plainly that he is prepared to fall back upon the inalienable powers of the Episcopate, vested in him, should the occupant of the chair of St Augustine take action that is to be blamed.* 'Unless the two bishops are found to be faultless,' he says, 'by an authority that is beyond question, it is clear that *I shall still be in the position of having to determine for myself whether I can remain in communion with them or not.*' We were inclined to blame him for not taking independent action in the first instance; we are glad to find him ready for it in the last resort. It is evident that he will recognise no papacy at Lambeth. We will only add that as the Archbishop of Canterbury evidently



has no thought of any aggrandisement of his See, and intends to refer the matter to a fairly general Council, the Bishop of Zanzibar might have spoken his mind, we will not say with less firmness, but with less asperity" (v. *Church Times*, 20th February 1914).

I have italicised the salient passages. When it is remembered that six-sevenths of the mission work now proceeding in the world is carried on by non-Anglicans (apart altogether from the Roman Catholic missions), and that "the precedents of the fourth century or earlier" assume the existence of an undivided Church, it will need no argument to show the practical fatuity of seeking in that remote period the precedents which should govern ecclesiastical action at the present time. Besides, it is evident that the Bishop of Zanzibar is not really submitting a case for decision, but only demanding the confirmation of action which he has himself taken on grounds which do not in his mind admit of discussion. All this parade of an appeal to his metropolitan is delusive, for he is not prepared to accept his metropolitan's decision. What he wants is not an authoritative verdict on a disputed question, but a formal confirmation of the views which he proclaims to be "Catholic." Bishops, he holds, *must* agree with him, for, if they disagree, they transgress the very assumption of the Episcopate, and forfeit all title to the regard of the faithful! Canterbury may fail, but Zanzibar can suffice. There are always "the inalienable powers of the Episcopate vested in him" to fall back upon. We incline to agree with the *Church Times* that it might perhaps have been preferable if he had taken "independent action" at first. We should have been spared reams of controversy, and the true character of his conduct would have been more easily perceived.

In passing, it may be well to remind our modern Cyprian that the famous Bishop of Carthage was wrong on the main question, however admirably independent in maintaining his error. He will be ill-advised if he finds in the history of the controversy between Rome and Africa in the third century nothing but a precedent for kicking against superior authority in the twentieth.

This conception of the bishop, not merely as essential to the very being of a Church in the true sense of the word, but also as in the Church serving the purpose of a barrier against all departures from precedent, is infinitely suggestive.

Two consequences follow at once. On the one hand, no man of competent knowledge and independent character can accept the episcopal office on that view of it. On the other hand, an episcopal college composed of men who so interpret their office must be totally destitute of judicial competence, as well as of governing initiative. On the last point, the *Church Times* is quite explicit:

"It is not required in a judge of heresy to be free from prejudice in favour of the Catholic faith. Reference is not made to impartial unbelievers. There was never a Council of the Church, the assembled Fathers of which had not for the most part made up their minds on the matters to be discussed. *The ideal austerity and aloofness of a civil tribunal is not here to be imitated*; both accusers and defenders of the accused are commonly included among the judges" (v. *ibid.*).

It may be observed, however, that the "defenders" can only declare themselves to be such under the heavy risk of being immediately translated from the bench to the dock! This notion of the Episcopate, and, we must add, this view of judicial procedure, are purely mediæval. It explains the resolute "Erastianism" of our Reformers, and the extreme reluctance of liberal-minded Anglicans to accept an episcopal tribunal as a substitute for the Privy Council for the final court in matters doctrinal. It explains also the hesitation which is moved in some Anglicans by the present agitation for more "liberty" to the Church of England.

"To allow religious liberty to a community," wrote Archbishop (then plain Mr) Temple, "is very often only another phrase for allowing the oppression of the members by the leaders, of the quiet by the busy. The concession of religious liberty to a religious body means the permission to exercise their own laws and their own discipline over their own members; it means the permission to inflict any penalty not exceeding excommunication. Now of what do these communities consist, and how are they governed? They generally consist, first, of a considerable body of steady, but not very eager, adherents, who either belong to the sect by birth, or have found in its worship,



for one reason or another, a sort of religious resting-place for their lives; and, secondly, of a much smaller body of warm partisans, who are what they are by conviction, and who take the lead by virtue of their greater zeal and activity. The former are very often earnest but quiet Christians. The smaller and busier section, however, look on themselves, and are looked on by a sort of tacit consent of the rest, as the truly religious" (v. *Frederick Temple*, ed. Sandford, i. 124).

The tyranny of the zealous minority is not unknown in any Church, but in Protestant Churches there is at least no organic incapacity to admit new truth. On the episcopal theory exemplified by the Bishop of Zanzibar, and expounded by the *Church Times*, the Church is absolutely bound by the precedents of the "Catholic" past. This circumstance vitiates the parallel often drawn between the Established Church of England and that of Scotland. Why should not the autonomy of the latter be conceded to the former? The answer must be that spiritual autonomy in a National Church implies the acceptance of the principles of Protestantism, and the Church of England appears to be disposed towards a formal repudiation of those principles. In a Catholic Church *sensu Zanzibarbarico* the tyranny of the zealous minority means the despotism of the Dead Hand.

If the view of the Episcopate now being pressed is to be generally accepted, it must affect importantly the action of those who are responsible for advising the sovereign in the appointment of bishops. For the humble purpose of religious obstruction (which is *ex hypothesi* the whole duty of a "Catholic" bishop in matters doctrinal), there is little need of ability, and none of knowledge. A modern education, indeed, is likely to have a disturbing effect on the simple positiveness of personal conviction which befits a "Father in God" when he has to speak with authority on the difficult and debated questions of modern criticism! The faithful are to expect from the successors of the Apostles, not the deliberate wisdom of the scholar, or the large prudence of the statesman, but the reassuring echo of their own prejudices, and the dogmatic reaffirmation of their own beliefs!

It may be conceded that the English bench tends to match the requirements of the theory.

In the course of the controversy which has filled the newspapers during the last two months, it has become clear that the general sentiment of English Churchmen repudiates heartily the exclusive attitude disclosed in the "Open Letter," and resents as altogether unworthy of the English Church the gratuitously offensive terms in which that attitude is set forth. But it has also become no less clear that the Bishop of Zanzibar can count upon the support of large numbers of clergymen, and that his action, though crude and unexpected, accords too closely with the main lines of Anglican policy in recent years to be easily rejected and rebuked. With some adroitness he has succeeded in mixing up two sets of issues, not properly connected, and thus drawn to his side, or, at the least, partly incapacitated for acting against him, considerable numbers of religious men, who, while heartily opposed to him in some things, are no less heartily agreed with him in others. On the old issues of the Reformation, Englishmen are for the most part still agreed. They are in principle and feeling as decisively Protestant as their fathers. But on the new issues, which the advance of science and the advent of Biblical criticism have created, and which confront all the Churches of Christendom, as well reformed as unreformed, they are much divided in opinion and exercised in mind. Probably the rank and file in all Christian Churches are hostile to theological change, swayed by emotion rather than by intelligence, easily captured by appeals to that conservative feeling which is the raw material of fanaticism. Accordingly, it is an obvious device of ecclesiastics, threatened with defeat in one direction, to seek escape by a diversion in the other, securing as champions of orthodox belief what they could not hope to win as reasonable men or charitable Christians.

We notice, not without some surprise, that this very obvious and often-used device is commanding a large measure of success. Nearly seven hundred clergymen of the London



diocese, including perhaps half the incumbents, have signed an address to the Upper House of the Convocation of Canterbury, expressing their "grave anxiety," not only at the doctrinal developments of the time, but at "the widespread tendency to approach the problem of reunion among Christians in a way that is clearly inconsistent with the belief that Episcopal Ordination is essential to a valid Ministry of the Word and Sacraments." They ask, therefore, "for the help of themselves and their people," that their "Spiritual Fathers" should give them assurances in both respects. The clergy are very explicit in their demand. The bishops are asked—

First, to repudiate the claim of some clergy to reject the Miracles of our Lord's Birth of a Virgin and the actual Resurrection of His Body from the tomb, *because we believe* that these truths lie at the very centre of the Faith and that *the statements of the Bible and the Creeds with regard to them are perfectly plain and unambiguous.*

Second, to make it plain that, in accordance with the teaching of the Church in all ages, *the Church of England has always taught, and must continue to teach, the necessity of Episcopal Ordination* as a condition of exercising the Ministry of the Word and Sacraments.

The clergy add a paragraph illustrative of their position, and, we may say, also indicative of its fatal defect :

"We desire to express our unwavering belief that the Church of England is a true part of Christ's Holy Catholic Church, and, *whilst recognising the fact that freedom must be allowed within well-defined limits*, we humbly ask to be reassured as to the two principles to which we have referred, being convinced that on this basis alone the Church of England can make the most of its opportunity and best fulfil its mission."

It must be admitted that this is a very surprising, and a very disheartening document. It is the one, because at this late stage of religious development, one had assumed that educated Christians in the centre of the world's culture had moved beyond the point of offering their own personal opinion

as a final argument for the truth of anything ; and that fair-minded men, even although they were clergymen, had realised that the inevitable doubts of thoughtful students were not rightly met by mere assertions. It is the other, because it had not seemed possible that gross and patent untruth should so easily receive the signatures of responsible and presumably informed men. To say in the teeth of the notorious facts of Anglican history, that the Church of England "has always taught the necessity of Episcopal Ordination" is a false statement, whether you test it by the Prayer-book, or by Anglican literature, or by the history of the Church as expressed in law and practice.

Moreover, the clergy are curiously inconsistent. While they profess their own confident belief as the justification for their attitude, they seek some "reassurance" from the bishops. While they concede that "freedom must be allowed within well-defined limits," they refrain from indicating what those limits may be, apart, of course, from their own profound conviction at the moment ; and actually ask the bishops to affirm that, with respect to the points on which liberty is in some quarters being sought, no liberty shall be given ! What is it they look to receive from the bishops ? A vote in convocation, hardly unanimous, probably nearly so, to the effect that the bishops agree with the signatories, will change nothing in the situation which so distresses the London clergy. The difficulties raised by textual criticism will remain precisely what they were. The arguments of scholars will lose nothing of their weight, and gain nothing. No doubter will have been assisted ; no enemy defeated. That the Church of England "is a true part of Christ's Holy Catholic Church" is an evident truth, but therein the Church of England does not stand alone. So far as I know there is no Church anywhere which does not make the same claim, and support it by the same assurance of "unwavering belief."

In recent years the London diocese has not been associated conspicuously with the intellectual efforts of the Church of



England. The signatories of the petition to the bishops are more suggestive of parochial activity and party zeal than of scholarship, research, or large statesmanship. St Paul's is represented by Canon Newbolt and two minor canons: Westminster Abbey by four minor canons. For the rest, the published names appear to include no recognised authority on the questions with respect to which the document dogmatises. Still, I do not wish to be supposed to underrate the melancholy suggestiveness of the petition, whether the type of Churchmanship it discloses be considered, or the number of names attached to it.

More significant, and certainly not less melancholy, is the declaration by the Bishop of Oxford in a letter to the *Times*:

"I feel quite sure that to the great mass of High Churchmen such an open Communion (as at Kikuyu) seems to involve principles so totally subversive of Catholic order and doctrine as to be strictly intolerable, in the sense that they could not continue in a fellowship which required of them to tolerate the recurrence of such incidents" (v. *Times*, 29th December 1913).

If words mean anything, these words mean that unless the Church of England cuts the last links of its ancient fellowship with "the other Protestant Churches," Bishop Gore and his followers will secede. I think there are some reasons for thinking that this kind of threat has lost its terrors for Evangelicals. They have learned something, and unlearned something in recent years. Never again will they be the party of prosecutions. They have no use for "No Popery" fanatics. They are realising that they have no need to apologise for their position in the National Church, but are standing for its true tradition, when they insist on seeking a *modus vivendi* with their fellow-Evangelicals in other Reformed Churches. They are no longer content to stand outside the intellectual movement of the age, but perceive that they, just because they glory in the large liberty of Protestantism, and stand in the true succession of those courageous innovators to whom the world owes the Reformation, are called to take their part in the indispensable process of assimilating knowledge, and giving it just expression

in theology. They claim special authority in determining the missionary policy of the English Church by the best of titles—their own prominence in the work of foreign missions. Their acceptance of the new episcopalian organisation of the Anglican Communion is conditioned by their loyalty to evangelical principles, and these disallow such rigidity as that which perpetuates and even emphasises denominational divisions in the face of the unconverted world. Accordingly, if the Bishop of Oxford and his friends secede, it will be solely by the exercise of their own free choice. Only they must face the fact that Evangelicals will in the future use, responsibly but freely, their lawful liberty as members of a Protestant Church, which interprets the tradition of ancient faith and practice by the light of the Reformation. If “Catholicism” be unable to endure such liberty in fellow-Anglicans, then it must once more inspire a secession. The Church of England has sustained more formidable secessions in the past than any which the Bishop of Zanzibar is likely to effect in the present, even with the potent aid of the Bishop of Oxford.

While Evangelicals are learning the lesson of tolerance, liberal Anglicans have been learning the not less important lesson of reverence. Both are beginning to perceive that they have the same objective—the assertion of the essential ideas of the original Gospel; and that both have the same opponent—the legalism of Christianity conceived of in terms of system. In the mutual understanding and frank co-operation of Evangelicals and liberal Anglicans lies the best hope, not only for religion in this country, but also for unity throughout the Protestant world. And that unity, once achieved, must lead on to a still larger reconciliation. This is the natural order of Christian effort: first, union with the nearer, then with the remoter. To reverse that order by turning our backs on our fellow-Protestants, and seeking an union (really impossible save by mere incorporation) with the unreformed Churches of Rome and the East, is to defeat everything.

Kikuyu has revealed a startling dualism within the



National Church, a dualism indeed which was not unsuspected but was not adequately realised. Comfortable platitudes about the Anglican *Via Media* will hardly pass so easily in the future, for the co-existence of two mutually irreconcilable types of Churchmanship is not equivalent to any moderate blend which can be described as a *Via Media*. We have Romanism without the Pope, and we have Protestantism with the Bishop: and there is only this to distinguish the two in their ecclesiastical title, that while the one is habitually and avowedly contemptuous of the law under which the Establishment is secured, the other is frankly loyal to it. That is a significant difference, and ought not to be ignored in a just estimate of claims.

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## SACRAMENTS AND UNITY.

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WHAT is the present position of Christian thought and feeling on the subject of the sacraments? Do the old lines of demarcation still persist, or have these been modified in any way during recent years? What has been the influence of Biblical criticism and modern speculation on our theory of the sacraments, and what part may we expect the sacraments to play in the movement towards reunion?

At first sight it may seem that nothing but confusion reigns over the whole subject, and that, so far from drawing together on sacramental questions, we are rather drifting farther and farther apart. Is not the Christian Church hopelessly divided to-day on the very things that should most unite it, the one baptism, the one bread, and the one cup? Some insist on seven sacraments, some will have only two, others are of opinion that we need none at all. Grave differences of belief exist as to the fundamental nature of a sacrament, the relation to be discerned therein between outward material form and inward spiritual substance, and the place to be assigned to personal faith as a condition contributory to its efficacy and power. Who are the persons rightly qualified to administer the sacraments? Who are the persons proper to receive them? Do the sacraments merely symbolise, or do they convey, grace? Does grace, sacramentally conveyed, differ in quality and power from grace not sacramentally conveyed? What was the exact meaning of



Christ's words in instituting the sacraments? Did He conceive them as mysteries in the Greek sense or simply as memorials or covenant seals of His approaching Kingdom? Did He intend them to be permanent and of universal obligation? Did He even institute them at all? These are questions that give rise to the acutest controversy among us. On the one hand, large and influential communities, such as the Society of Friends, the Salvation Army, and members of the Brotherhood and Adult School movements feel that they can dispense with sacraments altogether, without sacrificing anything essential to the Christian life. On the other hand, among those who retain them may be found every possible variety of belief, from the view that the Eucharist is a propitiatory rite requiring a sacrificing priesthood, to the view that it is no more than a simple memorial observance, quickening our recollection of a bygone Christ. How, then, can anything even remotely resembling Godly union and concord be attained on sacramental lines?

It is impossible to ignore the force of these considerations, yet signs are not lacking that modifications are taking place and concessions are being made which, though no more than tentative at present, may nevertheless prepare the way for a better understanding in the future. Before dealing with these movements, however, it may be well very briefly to review once more the chief theories of the sacraments as they have emerged in history, and as they prevail to-day. These may be roughly divided into three outstanding types, the Catholic view, the Rationalist view, and the Evangelical view.

### I.

We begin with the Catholic view, which is operative and influential, not in the Roman Church only, but in other communions outside it, and which claims to be a simple and legitimate explication of the original deposit of faith, as once for all given to the apostles and their successors. According to this conception, the sanctifying grace of God is "the Divinely

infused supernatural quality which permanently divinises the human nature to make it proportionate to its Divine end.”<sup>1</sup> It is a spiritual substance or transcendental presence committed by the heavenly Lord to the keeping of His earthly Church, which is the storehouse or treasury of His grace. From Christ’s broken body and shed blood this grace is diffused like a sweet fragrance among mankind, by means of the Spirit, through the sacraments, within the Church, which is the historical extension of His incarnate life, and the perpetual creation of His transcendent power. These sacraments convey renewing, enlightening, and sanctifying grace, not as mere symbols, but as authentic channels. They are the rivulets to the Church’s reservoir. The grace they impart is, as it were, a supernatural deterrent, antidote, or antiseptic against sin, the medicine or elixir of immortality, and the stimulant or cordial of every virtue. Their action is essentially objective and divine, since they rest on the sure promise and covenant word of the Redeemer who instituted them and gave Himself in them. Christ, that is to say, is a Real Presence in the sacraments. He is there to quicken and to sustain that supernatural life which it was the purpose of the Incarnation first of all to bestow. The Lord’s presence in the sacrament is not conditional upon our faith, or merely concurrent with it; still less is it occasioned by it. Rather is it independent of our faith and its predisposing cause, conferring new life upon the mind or soul before faith can be. The efficacy of the sacraments is intrinsic, if administered according to the intention of the Church, and to such as do not interpose the obstacle of unbelief or mortal sin. Why not? Is anything impossible with God? Who so bold as to assert that the Divine Spirit may not operate freely upon the nether springs of our being, through materialistic media, in ways that the understanding may not grasp, and to which the will itself gives no consent? May not a seed be planted even if it does not fructify? God’s gift of Himself in grace, it is maintained, and man’s recognition

<sup>1</sup> *Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics*, s.v. “Grace (Roman Catholic).”



and appropriation of that gift in faith, are ever to be treated as separate and distinct things. And the former is prior to the latter. Christ in the sacrament comes to His own, even if they receive Him not. If they receive Him, He empowers them to become sons. But ere they can receive Him, or even reject Him, in some real manner He must be *there*.

From this governing conception every part of Catholic belief and practice may be logically deduced. It is clear that so precious a gift as Christ's sacramental presence must be reverently conserved in a pure channel and authoritatively bestowed only by appointed hands. It is clear, also, that where such consecration is validly secured, in the name and by the authority of the whole Church, this grace of sacraments must inevitably flow, apart from the personal character and worth either of the celebrant or of the participant. There need be, of course, and there ought to be no kind of impediment in this respect. But if such should arise, and a strain be put upon faith because of the evil lives either of the priests or of the laity concerned, it must be firmly and emphatically maintained that sacramental grace accompanies valid orders *rather* than the pure faith by which it is either mediated or received. It is Christ and not the priest who gives the sacrament, and the priest acts, not in his personal, but in his official capacity, as a representative of Christ and of the whole Church. Similarly, it becomes a matter of urgent practical importance that this sanctifying virtue of Divine life should be received as soon as possible after birth in Holy Baptism, as frequently as possible during life in the Holy Eucharist, and as late as possible before death in Holy Unction. One cannot go too far in showing respect and veneration for so heavenly a gift. It must be diligently prepared for, splendidly accompanied, jealously guarded, and meekly and lovingly adored. It should be received fasting, and reverently reserved for the sick and the infirm. For is it not Bethlehem, Nazareth, and Calvary here in England? Does it not do for us now precisely what Christ Himself did for His first disciples in the flesh? Finally,

although grosser magical ideas are not necessarily present in this conception of the sacraments, it is easy to see how readily it lends itself to superstition and abuse. The presence of Christ in the elements comes to be materialistically conceived, and even a St Teresa can write, "We know that our good Jesus remains with us until the accidents of bread have been consumed by our natural heat."<sup>1</sup>

## II.

In sharp contrast to this entire system stands that of Rationalism. According to its view of the sacraments, the whole idea of a supernatural revelation or transcendent life objectively mediated to us through incarnation and sacraments must be given up, and all the phenomena under examination be interpreted in terms of the purely natural subjective experience of spiritual humanity. Sacraments, it is pointed out, are by no means peculiar to Christianity. Parallels to them may be found abundantly in the Greek mysteries and other pagan cults. Nor does this in the least detract from their validity and value. Religious sacraments arise out of the needs of humanity itself, and register in symbolic form the old ingrained instincts and aspirations of the heart. No kind of objective efficacy resides in them. It is absurd to claim that they distil or materialise the Infinite for us, or are endowed with any thaumaturgic power. They fulfil a purely social and psychological function in life, and all the significance and efficacy they possess is conferred on them by auto-suggestion from ourselves. This is not to say that their value is imaginary or unreal. Sacraments are most necessary to us and they are rooted in reality. They focus, externalise, and make vivid to us, in symbolical language far more eloquent than speech, those thoughts, needs, and feelings which we share in common, and which are among the most precious constituents of our higher psychic life. In their origin the sacraments are associated with magic. They are erratic boulders, so to speak, stray

<sup>1</sup> *The Way of Perfection*, ed. B. Zimmerman, London, 1911, p. 231.



surviving relics of the animistic age of thought and feeling, when the boundary lines between the inner and the outer world were more blurred than they are now. And still they are of value to us, inasmuch as even yet not all truth can be said to lie above the threshold of lucid self-consciousness. Sacraments render us the service of providing a means of needful emotional discharge in the region of dim mystery and subconscious automatism in which self and not-self, subject and object, blend. Even as such, however, the sacraments *are* sacramental. They are sacramental to minds so mystically attuned as to receive them, in the sense that an ivy leaf taken from the grave of Keats may be sacramental, and mediate some of those spiritual realities for which Keats stands. The sacraments enhance our sense of living, and enable us to feel that we are merged into a larger whole. The life they convey is a real life, even though it defy all ordinary modes of definition. As such they may be acceptable to minds which regard the credal statements of the Church as either unintelligible or absurd. So long, then, as the sacraments legitimately satisfy, as they arise from, the emotional needs of man, so long as they yield him that peace, security, consolation which his religious consciousness requires, it is superfluous to ask whether they be true or false or have any counterpart in an objective realm of reality at all. He that is wise will accept the evolved system of the Church, receive her sacraments, and abandon himself gladly to the vague sweet comfort they afford, without troubling to inquire whether they be pagan or Christian in their origin, subjective or objective in their operation, so long as they satisfy the cravings of the soul and soothe the dull achings of the troubled heart.

### III.

The Evangelical view of the sacraments, to which we now turn, occupies a position midway between the two that have just been discussed and adopts a critical attitude to them both. On the one hand, it rejects what it considers the too objective

realism and externality of the Catholic view, in the interests of a more spiritual and subjective faith. On the other hand, it rejects the too subjective impressionism of the Rationalistic view, in the interests of a more definite and objective truth. The one system, it contends, impoverishes the sacraments by reducing them too readily to a lower, and earlier, magical and materialistic level. The other falsifies the sacraments by substituting a system of ideas for the supernatural energy and power of Christ in the Holy Ghost.

To the Evangelical, the one supreme sacrament is the sacrament of the Divine Word, by which God gave Himself in holy and loving judgment for the salvation of the world. Baptism and the Lord's Supper placard this redemption before mankind. They derive their validity, not from their formal correctness of institution, nor yet from the official authority of the priest who administers them, but solely from the Gospel which they were created to express. As Luther so earnestly insisted, they are subordinate to the Gospel and an appanage of the Word. Did not St Paul himself loudly proclaim that he was sent, not to baptize, but to preach the Gospel? In the Evangelical view the sacraments are the public, corporate, and dramatic acts of the confessing and experiencing Church, as it symbolically commemorates, corroborates, and represents the timeless, saving, historic, and objective facts by which it lives. Such declaratory acts are sacramental because, as effectual signs and seals of God's grace, they exhibit and apply the blessings of His Gospel, and truly interpret and convey Him who once made a sacrament of Himself. And the grace they bestow is no *donum superadditum*, no spiritual substance or divine essence, drawn from the storehouse of the Church, that can be infused into the soul through valid sacramental and external channels, in however rarefied and refined a manner. That is considered a Greek conception of salvation, too long dominating Christian theology, and leaning to metaphysics rather than to ethics. Grace, rather, is to be conceived strictly in terms of personality. It is a moral relationship between



two wills, something that knows only spiritual channels of communication, and must be always dynamically and never mechanically conveyed. For clearly the mode of its communication to the soul must be in keeping with the moral character of grace itself, and the nature of that great redeeming act of holy love from which it derives its authority and power.

As in the case of Catholicism, so here also the governing conception moulds and determines the details of belief and conduct. In the Evangelical Churches the institutional or mechanical element in the sacraments is reduced to a minimum, and the utmost importance is attached to their religious elements, the meeting of free grace and believing faith. The centre of gravity is shifted from the material elements to the Church's communal act, and even from both Church and sacraments to the Gospel they proclaim, and the faith which Christ demands. The position is reached, not that faith is the determining feature in a sacrament, a kind of meritorious state of feeling or belief within ourselves which attracts Divine Grace and guarantees its efficacy, but rather that faith is a conditioning and essential part of a true sacrament, and that it is through the purity of faith, rather than through the due authorisation and validity of the act, that the divine grace of sacraments normally operates. The Evangelical takes his stand upon the conviction that the Divine life within the soul never is, and never can be, begun by an ordinance, however it may be ratified or sustained by one, and a large section of the Free Churches powerfully insists that an antecedent hearing of the Word, and an act of intelligent and personal faith in the offer of the Gospel, is as truly an integral part of the sacrament of Baptism as it may be and ought to be an integral part of the sacrament of the Lord's Supper.

#### IV.

It is impossible to believe that the types of theory here outlined are sacrosanct and final. Each has passed through many phases in its long history, and there is nothing now to

indicate that the process of development is closed. Each has been able to persist because of some vital truth it holds in trust, and each must be made willing to recognise the claims of the other two. But if this is ever to be brought about, certain concessions and modifications would seem to be necessary.

In the first place,<sup>1</sup> Catholics, whether Roman or Anglican, may surely go some way towards meeting Evangelicals by granting a fuller recognition of non-sacerdotal ministries of grace, without any waiving of their own distinctive claims. There are already some indications that this is taking place. Many of the most responsible leaders of Anglicanism hold a view of the priesthood that is official and representative rather than substitutionary or sacrificial. Even in his most holy eucharistic functions the priest, it is maintained, acts solely in the name of God and of the universal Church, doing, on their behalf, what both God and man desire should be authoritatively done. At the kernel, that is to say, of the whole subject of the sacraments, lies the question of Holy Orders. Granted that historical criticism no longer permits an appeal to strict apostolical succession, it is nevertheless needful that the entire body of the Church be organised, and articulated, and knit together by a duly commissioned priesthood, whose acts shall be official and valid and representative.

Now this point of view does not necessarily involve a theory of *exclusive* sacramental grace. Anglicans are increasingly willing to concede that a valid gift of prophecy is granted to Nonconformists, and indeed the wide distribution of free Evangelical Churches throughout the world, and the manifest fruits of the Spirit which they bring forth, make it hardly possible that they should do otherwise. It is also frequently admitted that non-sacerdotal sacraments may be spiritually valid, and that the Real Presence may be bestowed where two or three are gathered together in Christ's name, if

<sup>1</sup> I am here much indebted to a paper on "The Sacraments" by Canon Adderley.



the words of institution be in order and the intention of the worshippers be sincere. Even an assembly of working men, reverently adoring Christ in a P.S.A. or Brotherhood meeting, at which neither bread nor wine is so much as thought of, may be more truly sacramental than the solitary communion of a highly respectable Anglican according to the official rites of his parish Church. This view implies no real surrender of sacramental claims. These are still affirmed while the efficacy of something else is not presumed to be denied. The unbroken testimony of history, it is contended, and the profoundest spiritual experience of Christian believers, still make the Church's official sacraments unapproached and unapproachable as the pledges of Christ's presence and as a means of grace. Yet, inasmuch as they are to be regarded as a means and not as themselves the end, the claim which others make that they can attain to the same end by other means ought not to be denied. Further than this Catholics can scarcely be expected to go, without directly repudiating the grace of orders.

On the other hand, if Catholics show themselves thus willing to take their stand upon a purely representative official priesthood of the ministry of the Church, may not the Evangelicals be prepared to meet them on the same ground? Theoretically, it is already occupied by them in advance, since they claim to make a distinctive principle of an elected or delegated ministry within the Church. But, as a matter of fact, the ministerial office in the Evangelical Free Churches is only partially or sectionally representative. Whom does a Wesleyan or Baptist or Congregational minister represent? Apart from the question of his faithfully representing Christ, he represents either a single Church or a group of Churches, or else, alas! no one but himself. He cannot be said to be there as the officially commissioned delegate of the whole Church, even of so much of it as is outside Romanism and Anglicanism. This is what makes it so difficult for these two great historic communions to come to terms with Nonconformity. There is no uniform, recog-

nised, official ministry. Here again there are indications that a better state of things is in store for us. In all the Free Churches greater care is being taken in the selection of their ministers, more attention is being devoted to their education both spiritual and intellectual, endowments are being raised and larger responsibilities assumed for their maintenance and support. All these are steps in the right direction. Could but Free Churchmen agree on some uniform scheme of ministerial commission and ordination, which would give to ministers of all the Evangelical Churches an equal official and representative standing within the Church, and to the sacraments administered by them some kind of accredited communal validity, would not the ground be prepared for a much closer rapprochement with Anglican and Roman Catholicism than is possible at present? The real crux, with us as with them, is the question of valid orders. Were that settled, differences of theory as to the Real Presence in the sacraments and other things would not long divide us, any more than they divide widely divergent schools within Anglicanism and Romanism at the present time. These would be held in solution within the common life, if only some outward order and unity were recognised.

The Rationalist Sacramentalists above referred to need give but little trouble in this connection, partly because they are few in number and partly because they are willing to come into any sacramental system of the Church, if only their dogmatic reservations are respected. A greater difficulty might arise in the case of the Society of Friends and other bodies at present choosing to dispense with sacraments altogether. But would not their need be met, not by the abolition, but rather by the multiplication of symbols as a means of grace and by their fuller spiritualisation? Non-conformity has surely gone far enough in the direction of laying stress on freedom, prophecy, subjectivism, and ideas. Has not the time come for restoring the balance a little and recovering the lost emphasis on the more outward



symbolical and institutional aspects of Christianity? What is to prevent the Church from hallowing several different sacraments or symbolic acts, provided it differentiates their significance and value? This is no new proposal. St Bernard advocated a sacramental ordinance of Foot-washing. The Apology for the Augsburg Confession was willing to allow Penance as a sacrament instituted by Christ, and Melancthon approved the inclusion of Ordination. All the sacraments of Roman Catholicism might be admitted in this way, and even some others suggestive of child training or civic patriotism or social service. It is true that not all these could plead our Lord's own institution or the consent of antiquity and the universal Church. But may not some notice be taken of differing degrees of symbolical suggestiveness in matters of this kind? David had a group of mighty men that "were more honourable than the thirty, but attained not to the first three." Might not the Church, acting in Christ's name, institute certain acts or ceremonies which are more honourable spiritually than the multitude of things that are in a sense sacramental, yet attain not to the first two which come to us from Christ and directly show forth the passion and resurrection of our Lord?

In any case surely it may be said that it must be by means of sacraments, more than anything else, that the essential unity of the Church will ultimately be realised. The glory of sacraments is that they are symbolical dramatic acts, performed in common and so shared by all, yet patient of many interpretations according to the worshippers' varying points of view. Sacraments visibly set forth what they do not too narrowly define. They embody spiritual truths in outward concrete forms that can be appreciated by both the learned and the ignorant, the child and the grown man. Hence their infinite superiority to any spoken word and even to the ministry of art. Was not the Redemption itself a dramatic act, something not said merely, and hardly as yet explained, but mightily and effectively and finally done by

God the Father and placarded in Christ before all the world. And it is by the rehearsing of this great deed together in fitting symbolic action, rather than by the reciting of any creed, that the differing minds of Christendom must be gathered into one. Symbols and ceremonies and sympathies may unite men where creeds and theologies do nothing but divide them. Ours is an age which believes in unity and passionately desires it. But it must be a unity large and comprehensive enough to include all distinctive elements in the truth, and to exclude none. Also ours is an age which is quick to discern the importance and significance of symbols. We do many things daily that are almost sacramental. Our instinctive reverence for the national flag, the widespread popularity of freemasonry among us, our love for the insignia of public office and of royal state, all show that a fertile soil for the sacramental idea is already prepared in our hearts and minds. We need but to give this instinct its widest and noblest application, and to utilise it in setting forth worthily the central and universal things of the Christian faith. Already the Church of England and the Church of Rome can hold together in one sacramental communion the most widely differing sympathies and opposing creeds. May not the time come when a wider Christendom will find a uniting bond, not in social service merely, or acts of practical utility, but in forms of common worship and true communion, when one sacramental act shall unite all, yet the widest latitude of interpretation be allowed to each, and when no man shall need any more to say to his brother, "Know the Lord, for all shall know Him, from the least even unto the greatest."

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## INSPIRATION.

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THE term *inspiration* is a difficult one to handle. More especially is it difficult for a layman who is aware of its almost overwhelming theological associations. Still, its associations are not exclusively theological, since the poets with a praiseworthy unanimity advanced an early claim to inspiration—a claim which can hardly be judged less venerable than that urged in the interest of the earliest religions. The idea of inspiration appears in the most primitive period of human thought, the belief that chosen spirits among men became at times the channels of divine wisdom or warning, and were thus enabled to speak with an authority and power far beyond their own—an authority and power of which they were never the assured possessors, but only the occasional and honoured recipients. In some cases the god was supposed to possess and control the body of the prophet and to speak directly through his lips; in others he was thought to communicate his message in dream or vision, or through voices which by the gifted ear were heard amid the sounds of nature, the murmur of the forest or the monotonous music of the stream. So literal an interpretation of the word is somewhat out of fashion. It is still, however, employed by writers on religion and on art; but though the term *inspiration* preserves in theology something of its ancient sense of actual divine control, it has ceased in art to be more than a mere suggestive or

illuminating phrase. An inspired painter or poet—what do we take him to be? We take him to be a highly gifted person, so eminently superior in talents to his fellow-men that his work is most easily described in language properly appropriated to messages or mandates once believed to display supernatural sanction and sanctity. Or if we are of that opinion which prefers to eliminate the distinction between inspiration in art and inspiration in religion, we do so, not by ascribing poetry to any supernatural source, or regarding the poet as in any sense the mouthpiece of divine wisdom, but by classing religious utterances, formerly placed apart as more than human, among the examples of that kind of insight which appears in the work of men of genius. Something is doubtless gained by reducing the matter to a single issue; but it is, of course, apparent, however we shift our ground, that the nature of this peculiar type of insight remains in obscurity. Goethe, like most other philosophic minds, pronounced it inexplicable and beyond analysis. "In poetry," said Goethe, "especially in that which is unconscious, before which reason and understanding fall short, and which therefore produces effects so far surpassing all conceptions, there is always something dæmonic." Yet, though ultimately no doubt inexplicable, the attempt to state and to understand such a problem as that involved in the phrase *Inspiration in poetry* may perhaps be admitted as legitimate and interesting.

All great men have not been thought of as inspired, nor all great achievements. Inspiration has commonly been supposed to operate in two regions: the region of religion and the region of art—the regions where the spirit of man is brought more directly into contact with the mystery, the pathos, and the beauty of human life. "Verse," says Hobbes, "among the Greeks was appropriated anciently to the service of their Gods, and was the Holy stile, the stile of the Oracles, the stile of the Laws." If we confine ourselves to the sphere of art, the point of interest lies here, that the priceless things, the moving things, that have given and continue to give the



highest pleasure, that best illuminate human experience, that produce emotional exaltation, appear in all cases to be beyond the reach of the strongest ambition and the most untiring industry, joined with the most searching intelligence. That is the first point of interest. We might be willing to ascribe these priceless and moving things simply to unusual talent, as indeed we are accustomed to ascribe them; but in these cases where we have any account of their genesis it seems that they belong to a category of their own, that they are not produced under the direct and conscious guidance of the artist. They are, as Goethe said, "dæmonic,"—due, that is, to some impulse from beyond the artist, and usually described by him as "given" or "found," as having their source in a power of which his nature was the servant rather than the master. They appear, also—and this is the second point of interest—to have their birth in an exalted and ecstatic condition of the mind, of which psychology has so far rendered a very meagre account, and often appears able to help us only by insisting that this exalted or ecstatic condition is pathological, and bears a close similarity to hysteria or dementia. There is, indeed, nothing novel here. For, as Plato pleasantly remarked, "he, who having no touch of the Muse's madness in his soul, comes to the door and thinks that he will get into the temple by the help of art—he, I say, and his poetry are not admitted; the sane man is nowhere at all when he enters into rivalry with the madman." But the description of the great artist as a sort of madman does not take us far. Sophocles satisfied his judges that he was not beside himself by the quotation of a passage from the play he had just written, the *Œdipus Coloneus*, and, however numerous the eccentricities of mind and character to be found among poets, it is not the eccentricities, but the remarkable breadth, insight, and distinction of their work—in a word, its high sanity—which captivates and commands attention. They appear in the main to be singularly successful in preserving their productions from any taint of the disease from which they are popularly supposed

to suffer. "I hold," said Emerson, with fine discrimination, "that ecstasy will be found normal, or only an example on a higher plane of the same gentle gravitation by which stones fall and waters run."

There exist—and in some ways it is an unfortunate circumstance—few and slender records by poets of their methods while composing, or of the mental state in which composition was most successfully accomplished. When they do exist, however, they dwell with almost unanimous emphasis upon the unsummoned, the involuntary, and spontaneous nature of the best work. "Just as the man of destiny does not execute what he wills or intends," said Schelling, "but what he is obliged to execute through an incomprehensible fate under whose influence he stands, so the artist, however full of design he is, yet . . . seems to stand under the influence of a power which separates him from all other men, and compels him to declare or represent things which he himself does not clearly see through, and whose import is infinite." But it is best to take the evidence of the artists themselves. Here is the testimony of Scott, simple and direct: "I don't wonder that, in dismissing all the other deities of Paganism, the Muse should have been retained by common consent, for in sober reality writing good verses seems to depend upon something separate from the volition of the author. I sometimes think my fingers set up for themselves, independent of my head; for twenty times I have begun a thing on a certain plan, and never in my life adhered to it (in a work of imagination, that is) for half an hour together." Scott was not a mystic nor an introspective poet, and one is here perhaps less prepared for transcendental experiences than in the presence of such artists as Goethe or Shelley, who express themselves as similarly affected. Of some of his poems Goethe speaks as having come suddenly upon him: "They insisted on being composed immediately, so that I have felt an instinctive and dreamy impulse to write them down on the spot. In such a somnambulistic state, it has frequently



happened that I have had a piece of paper lying askew before me, and I have not discovered it until all has been written, or I have found no more room to write." "I appeal," wrote Shelley, "to the greatest poets of the present day whether it is not an error to assert that the finest passages of poetry are produced by labour and study. The toil and the delay recommended by critics can be justly interpreted to mean no more than a careful observation of the inspired moments, and an artificial connexion of the spaces between their suggestions by the intermixture of conventional expressions." Clearly, as Balzac said, "the artist is not in the secret of his intelligence." Such sentences of deliberate prose are, perhaps, more convincing than similar assertions conveyed in verse, which may be passed over as fanciful, as when Milton speaks of—

"my celestial patroness, who deigns  
Her nightly visitation unimplor'd,  
And dictates to me, slumb'ring, or inspires  
Easy my unpremeditated verse";

or as when Herrick ascribed his productiveness to a "brave spirit," in whose absence he could not write—

"'Tis not every day that I  
Fitted am to prophecy;  
No, but when the spirit fills  
The fantastic panicles  
Full of fire, then I write  
As the Goddess doth indite."

The peculiar impulse here described is not, indeed, confined to poetry, but appears as the agent in all forms of high imaginative creation. "I wonder," says Thackeray, "do other novel-writers experience this fatalism? They *must* go a certain way in spite of themselves. I have been surprised at the observations made by some of my characters. It seems as if an occult Power was moving the pen. . . . What if there is an *afflated* style—when a writer is like a Pythoness on her oracle tripod, and mighty words, words which he cannot help, come blowing, and bellowing, and whistling, and moaning through the speaking pipes of his bodily organ?" Or take the case of George

Eliot, of whose literary method we have an account given by her husband. "She told me," he wrote, "that in all her best writing there was a 'not-herself' which took possession of her, and that she felt her own personality to be merely the instrument through which this spirit, as it were, were acting." Recall also the humorous account given by Stevenson of the secret operations of his inspiring Brownies. "The more I think of it, the more I am inclined to press upon the world my question: 'Who are the Little People?' They are near relations of the dreamer's beyond doubt . . . they have plainly learned, like him, to build the scheme of a considerate story, and to arrange emotion in progressive order; only, I think, they have more talent; and one thing is beyond doubt—they can tell him a story piece by piece, like a serial, and keep him all the time in ignorance of where they aim."

With such writers the pieces seem to move themselves upon the board, and they as spectators appear merely to note the progressive stages of the game. With them Schopenhauer's "dreaming omniscience" comes to the assistance of their "waking ignorance."

"Yea, when it sleeps the mind is bright with eyes:  
But in the day it is man's lot to lack  
All true discernment."<sup>1</sup>

If such experiences are not unknown among writers of imaginative prose, it may well be that to the more fervid mind of the poet his imagination must at times appear, as it did to Wordsworth, a mighty and compelling fate.

"That awful Power rose from the mind's abyss,  
Like an unfathomed vapour that enwraps,  
At once, some lonely traveller."

Turn to another art, and there is the often-quoted account given by Mozart, in one of his letters, of the involuntary character of his musical conceptions. "Whence and how I know not—I cannot make out. . . . All the invention and construction go on in me as in a fine strong dream." And again,

<sup>1</sup> *Æschylus, Eumenides*, 104-106.



elsewhere: "You will never do anything if you have to think how you are to do it." In these cases of unusual intuition the work seems to be performed by some prior agency and to reach completion without effort on the part of the artist, who is a passive rather than an active instrument in its production. "Considered in its positive aspect, inspiration has two essential marks," says Ribot,—“suddenness and impersonality.” The marks of such inspiration are well illustrated in the spiritual experiences of such mystics as John of the Cross: "He who is in this state cannot believe that the words do not proceed from some third person;" or Boehme; "I, in my human self, do not know what I shall have to write; but whatever I am writing the spirit dictates to me what to write, and shows me all in such a wonderful clearness that I do not know whether or not I am with my consciousness in this world." Of Henry More, the Cambridge Platonist, we read, "From the beginning all things in a manner came flowing to him." Like Socrates, he had his monitory impulses also, borne in upon his spirit in an irresistible fashion, and experienced "very great rapture when he was thus affected." His thoughts "went faster than he always desired," swept by "a divine gale," and "all the while he seemed, as it were, to be in the air."

Some at least of the poets appear to belong to the family of the mystics, and poetry might almost be regarded as a species of divination. If we accept the idea for a moment, an interesting parallel becomes possible between the processes by which some of the ancient oracles were obtained and those employed by the poets. The favourite seat of an oracle was in a grove of trees, or in the hearing of a mountain stream, and it is remarkable in how many cases the responses seem to have been associated with rhythmical sounds—a murmuring of waters or a whispering of leaves, or, as in the case of the oracle of Zeus at Dodona, a chiming of metal caldrons. In the *Odyssey* this oracle is described as situated in "the high leafy oak tree of Zeus," and at this famous shrine there appear also to have been sacred doves, from whose crooning music

the answers of the god may have been gathered. The oracles of Apollo were probably in some cases similarly obtained. It is related by Virgil that when Æneas landed at Delos to consult the god, at the approach of Apollo the sacred laurels trembled, as the laurel grove by the Parnassian shrine of the same god was wont to stir and rustle at his entry. There are, too, in Old Testament history references such as that to "a going in the tops of the mulberry trees," which incited Israel to war; or that to the vision of the angel, which, we are told, was beheld by the prophet Elijah under a juniper tree; or that, again, to the oak, which, according to the Scripture narrative, was by the Sanctuary of the Lord, under which Joshua set up a great stone as a witness against the people—all of which suggest that in the early history of mankind the rhythmical sounds of Nature might be pressed into the service of religion, and might aid the priest or worshipper to attain that emotional exaltation and aloofness from the things of common consciousness which in modern days we seek in music or the melodies of verse. At least it is curious to observe how many are the references to the stimulating influence of rhythms, real or fancied, which meet us in history. Leaving music aside and confining ourselves to literary history, we may pass by that long tradition of the spiritual effects of melody of so profound a psychological interest; we may pass by such cases as that of Joan of Arc, to whom the heavenly voices which directed her career were only audible in the forest—"If she were in a wood, she could well hear the voices coming to her"—and note, for example, the statement that Elisha required music before he began to prophesy, and the sound, as of whirring wings which Heine heard about his head when in the mood for composition. We may recall the case of Wordsworth, who composed much of his poetry to the murmur of a running brook; or that of Coleridge, who declared that he could write as good verses as ever he did if he were perfectly free from vexation and in the *ad libitum* hearing of good music; or that of Schiller, whose poetical



ideas germinated in what he himself described as "a certain musical mood"—"The music of a poem floats before my soul when I sit down to write it, far more often than the clear concept of its content, concerning which I have often scarcely made up my mind"; or, again, the case of Burns, whose verses rose into his mind to the accompaniment of old and remembered airs, and took their perfect shape, as when Ilion to Apollo's lyre, "like a mist rose into towers."

Such cases illustrate the compelling power of rhythm, which, disengaging the mind from its imprisonment in the web of customary associations, enables it to draw upon resources beyond its normal reach, the resources of depths not often and not strongly stirred. For there appears little room to doubt that the full powers of the mind are but rarely exerted. It appears certain that by exclusive attention to the immediate environment, essential to the preservation and well-being of the organism through which it manifests itself, the mind is continually distracted to external issues, and becomes, so to say, a stranger to its own profounder and less familiar powers. Too little is asked of it, and the response is only equal to the habitual demand. Rendering us forgetful of the world of outer interests, rhythm, whether in music or poetry, gives the soul freedom to enter its own natural home, and draws around it a protecting screen. It sinks within itself to commune with itself and with the spirit of unseen reality,

"and to know  
Rather consists in opening out a way  
Whence the imprison'd splendour may escape,  
Than in effecting entry for a light  
Suppos'd to be without."

Rhythm is thus not only the natural expression of emotional experiences of more than ordinary intensity, but in some sense the password which opens to us the gates of the unconscious mind. It assists us to strike

"the hollow caves of thought, and wake  
The infinite echoes hid in each."

In music and poetry we continually experience its power of liberating and supporting the imagination; but what is imagination? We may take it to be the power possessed by the mind of operating as a whole and operating without restraint; mental activity, that is, conducted in freedom and with no practical end to serve, as contrasted with the activities linked to ordinary life and action, and carried on in a restricted sphere of determined interests, cribbed and confined to single issues by social, logical, or physical requirements. The appeal made by music or poetry is an appeal to the mind as a whole, undistracted by immediate and mundane considerations, freed from the preoccupations of its daily business, and thus capable when deeply stirred, and acting at the higher or extreme limits of its power, of an insight and sagacity at least analogous to inspiration or spiritual vision. Imagination in this sense would be, as described by Wordsworth—

“Reason in its most exalted mood.”

The place of imagination in the history of the human race is a yet unwritten chapter in psychology. Nor will it be an easy chapter to write, since, like the pervading air we breathe, it supports the whole structure of our mental being. “Every man,” as John Stuart Mill said, “imagines, nay, is constantly and unavoidably imagining. He cannot help imagining”; or, as it has been otherwise expressed, “The habitual occupation of the mind is not thinking, as we fancy, but dreaming.” To imagination belong the empires and civilisations, the theologies and philosophies, and all the wonder of man’s ways. By its aid he places the actual beneath his feet, for he can dream a better than the world he inhabits.

And it may be claimed that in this faculty we have the veritable source of inspiration. Doubtless the word *imagination* will serve as well as another—it has often so served—to name the source of poetic power. Yet it is but a word and carries with it no revelation. In certain of its aspects, however,—that, say, in which it may be looked upon as a decorative art, or as, with some of our poets, an art barely to be dis-



tinguished from music,—the inspiration of poetry need raise no further problem of difficulty or moment. We recognise it as a legitimate function of art to adorn and gladden existence. And a great body of verse aims at no more than this, to steep the spirit in a bath of delightful sensation, to chant some thought-dispersing lay. “The only way not to be unhappy is to shut yourself up in art” is the argument, “and to count everything else as nothing.” Out of his emotional experiences and their associations, the dim and flitting shapes of memory, is drawn the material upon which the artist imposes an exquisite order, and shapes to music the substance of his dream. We read, and, as with the opening bars of some persuasive melody, like a cloud the present hour recedes, new hues and images invade the conquered mind. Take these verses translated<sup>1</sup> from an Irish poem, entitled *The Dead at Clonmacnois* :—

“In a quiet watered land, a land of roses,  
 Stands St Kieran’s city fair;  
 And the warriors of Erin in their famous generations  
 Slumber there.

There beneath the dewy hillside sleep the noblest  
 Of the clan of Conn,  
 Each below his stone with name in branching Ogham,  
 And the sacred knot thereon.

There they laid to rest the seven kings of Tara,  
 There the sons of Cairbré sleep—  
 Battle banners of the Gael, that in Kieran’s plain of crosses  
 Now their final hosting keep.

And in Clonmacnois they laid the men of Teffia,  
 And right many a lord of Breagh;  
 Deep the sod above Clan Creidé and Clan Conaill,  
 Kind in hall and fierce in fray.

Many and many a son of Conn, the Hundred-Fighter,  
 In the red earth lies at rest;  
 Many a blue eye of Clan Colman the turf covers,  
 Many a swan-white breast.”

It matters little if these are unfamiliar names or if the poem tells us nothing new. It evokes a mood, it recites an

<sup>1</sup> By Mr T. W. Rolleston.

incantation, and from the many-peopled underworld there troop the forgotten shades. It weaves a music from the glories of old days and vanished youth and beauty. The pleasure hid in such a poem depends upon the skill of the artist and the depth of the reader's responsive emotion, upon the number of the reverberating echoes, since it is true, as Whitman tells us, that "all music is what awakes in you when you are reminded by the instruments."

In poetry, as in music, we may thus be for the moment entranced by the strangeness and beauty of our new surroundings, or, again—and this is peculiar to poetry—we may be spell-bound by an illuminating image. Entrancement of this kind may be brought to many readers, for example, by such an image as this of Browning's:—

"I will keep your honour safe.  
With mine I trust you, as the sculptor trusts  
Yon marble woman with the marble rose  
Safe on her hand, she never will let fall."

Here the illumination of a poetic moment may be admitted, or in such a famous passage as that in which Homer describes Achilles, when by divine mandate, though still abstaining from the war, he appears upon the trench to hearten the Greeks by his mere presence and voice—a passage of which the fire cannot be extinguished even in the inadequate medium of translation. Again, poetry may be rich in interests other than emotional. It may charm us by its wit and surprise us into intellectual pleasure by the skill with which a body of evasive thought or delicate fancy is reduced to simple and lucid expression. Who could have believed that our vague and wandering ideas, the twilight weavings of the brain, could be caught and rendered into words, and words, too, which seem to have floated of their own impulse into the pattern of the rhythm? Exquisite adjustments of language to thought, such as meet one in Horace or in Pope, a happy coincidence of mood and modulated speech—these are properly reckoned among the attractions of the art. And this may be met with



in poems charged with no loftier inspiration than a light heart and an amiable good-will, such as, for example, we find in Cotton's *Ode to Winter* :—

“ We'll think of all the friends we know,  
And drink to all worth drinking to . . .  
We'll drink the wanting into wealth,  
And those that languish into health.  
The afflicted into joy, the opprest  
Into security and rest. . . .  
The brave shall triumph in distress,  
The lovers shall have mistresses,  
Poor, unregarded Virtue, praise,  
And the neglected poet, bays.”

But as Leigh Hunt expressed it, “ There is one genius of the South, another of the North, and others uniting both.” And probably the word *poetry* connotes for its more diligent readers a place of higher enchantments than these. They ask from it more than that it should treat “ human life,” as Sir William Temple said, “ like a froward child that must be played with and humoured a little till it falls asleep, and then the care is over.” For these readers it is more than decoration and more than music ; it is their philosophy. And in the higher strain appears a certain authority : it offers a criticism or an interpretation of life. So that if we could admit, as Bergson says, that “ Poetic imagination is but a fuller view of reality,” admit it in the fullest sense, admit that in the case of the best poetry its authors were, as Blake asserted of himself, “ under the direction of messengers from heaven, daily and nightly ” ; if we could allow that their work was produced, as he tells us his *Jerusalem* was produced, “ written from immediate dictation, twelve or sometimes twenty or thirty lines at a time, without premeditation, and even against my will,” we might well have no further diffidence, but place ourselves under the immediate guidance of the seer in the revelation of his impassioned yet strangely impersonal song. Blake's creed is, however, scarcely one for general acceptance, since he was minded to look upon art as the chief end of man. For him the world of spiritual vision provided the only cer-

tainties, and he conceived of the great masters of reason, Bacon and Locke and Newton, as no better than the misguided ministers of Satan. Fallen from the state of grace, as allegorised in the Scripture narrative of the Garden of Eden, shut up in the prison of the senses, we are subject, in Blake's phrase, to the deadly dreams of "single vision and Newton's sleep"—that is, the poisoned sleep of a blind and insolent rationalism. Through art lay the pathway to freedom, through poetry and painting and music, "three powers in man," as he finely phrased it, "of conversing with Paradise." But, as Swinburne has said, "Blake was possessed of a fervour and fury of belief. He had a devil, and its name was Faith." Only those can climb to these rare elevations of thought who have shared Blake's transcendent experiences—

"He had seen the moon's eclipse  
By the fire from Ætna's lips;  
With Orion had he spoken,  
His fast with honey-dew had broken."

These things are too high for the majority of us. Let us allow great privileges to the poet as "a holy and wonderful being," as Plato called him, but it is inevitable that we should ask ourselves how far he is to be trusted. Grant the beauty and the power of his utterances, grant that they are of the nature of oracles and that he himself is a diviner, it is still not easy to determine the precise weight to be attached to his doctrine, the inspired messages. For, not content with discoursing music to us, the poets constantly pronounce, as Sophocles, Dante, and Wordsworth pronounced, opinions and convictions upon the nature, meaning, and destiny of human life. They set up a cosmic philosophy. How far may this philosophy and these pronouncements be trusted? Are their rhythmical utterances in any measure more authoritative than prose? Poetic ideas, based upon no assigned or assignable premises, apparently derive their authority, and induce assenting emotion because they are accompanied by a seductive music which disarms the critical faculties and insidiously overpowers the



soul. The melody induces sympathy for the chosen ideal, "as if it would bribe the ear to corrupt the judgment." Thus it would seem that the artist employs hypnotic arts, lulling to slumber the wary and protecting intelligence, casting his rhythmical sop to Cerberus, that he may win for his doctrine unchallenged passage into the depths of the mind. Instinctively he makes his appeal to instinct, for his art is the art of evading that watchman of the intellect, that sentry who challenges all comers and demands from them the utilitarian password. In the struggle for material existence his challenge is a necessity. Evolution favours those powers of the mind which keep the organism in close touch with its immediate environment. Powers not in the present hour required, forces to meet situations still to arise must wait their time. The army is in motion, but the van only has taken the field. Thus it is that we are left with the ancient problem which clothes itself in so many disguises, of the conflict between the conscious and the unconscious reason, between intellect and imagination, between logic and instinct, the apparent conflict between the mental forces already and those not yet fully engaged. Or we may speak of it as the conflict between things achieved and things looked for, things won and those seen yet a great way off. For while science and the practical intellect move by the law of their being within the circumference of matters partially understood and for certain ends mastered, the imagination constructs its own world in the light of superb possibilities. And the poets, it may be allowed, possess at least one advantage over the men of science and reason—they have no rivals as interpreters of the world's desire. If not of what life is, they give the best account of what it should be—

"Eternity is in their looks and eyes."

If now we are told that there is no correspondence between the cosmos as it is and as we would have it to be, we touch upon the nerve of the matter at issue. Among the postulates required by science, the most fundamental and significant is that of the intelligibility of Nature. We look out upon the

world and find that in part we can understand it, for answers are in a measure yielded to our inquiries. Nature is not a blank wall scrawled over with meaningless hieroglyphics, to which we have no clue. Patient study elicits principles and discovers adjustments and meanings. The history of science is itself, indeed, a triumphant exhibition of the thesis that Nature is intelligible, that mind meets mind. Her movements, her laws, her methods gradually reveal themselves to persistent and detailed examination. And in its mechanical and organic aspects, in its physics and chemistry, the world is daily better understood. The moral and spiritual order, with which art is concerned, has not, however, clearly emerged, and we are forbidden in this region to require any correspondence between man and his environment. The harmony here is more difficult to establish, and we are often asked to believe in a universe rational and intelligible in part, but in part also perverse and disappointing, a universe responsive to our intellectual but without response to our emotional and spiritual requirements. Such a breach in the continuity of Nature was discovered by Professor Huxley—a breach which, in his view, compelled man, the last and most splendid product of the cosmic process, to turn upon it in anger, and bid defiance to that very evolution which had blindly carried him into existence. At the bar of human justice the morality of the world system was pronounced inferior to the morality of the being it had produced. The same strain of mingled thought and emotion led to the remark by another writer: "Man has this cause of pride; that he has bethought himself of justice in a universe without justice, and has put justice there." Science may, indeed, accept so singular a conclusion, but it would be fatal to poetry. The imagination admits no such lack of correspondence between ourselves and the world to which we belong. The universe cannot be at variance with itself. "We have bethought ourselves of justice in a universe without justice." It is impossible, for if we have bethought ourselves of it, there surely it is, and that we should find it



there a part of the high design. And as for justice till it appear, so for a moral and spiritual order as lucid and convincing and complete as the mechanical and organic, the poetic creed asks and will continue to ask. It requires a cosmos not in part but throughout intelligible, the beatific vision of perfect beauty and absolute rationality. "It aims," in the language of Hegel, "to present in forms for the imagination features of the ultimate ideal of the harmonised universe." And therefore poesy "was ever thought," as Bacon said, "to have some participation of divineness, because it raises and erects the mind by submitting the shows of things to the desires of the mind, whereas reason doth buckle and bow the mind into the nature of things." No arguments will reconcile the poet to an imperfectly responsive world. For if irresponsible, there can be no alternative but to regard art as a manufactory of delusions, and poetry in particular as elaborate "nonsense-verse." In the sphere of mere mechanical evolution there is no room for ideals. Ideals are for it the disastrous consequence of a mental and emotional development far beyond the needs of man's material and temporary needs, since, to employ again the language of Hegel, "he has transcended in his thought the possibilities of existence, and elicited from and for his supposed structure an emotion which has no justification." Take it as you will, poetry appears meaningless except as a revelation of the possibilities of the soul. Narrow life to its more obvious appearances, decline its larger suggestions, and we must count ourselves betrayed by a vast conspiracy of the poets, who, in their fancied inspiration, have followed not a *vera lux* but the marsh fires of a night of storm. And Nature is herself in the conspiracy, the prime author of their delusions, since they have found in themselves no other instincts than those she has implanted, and nursed only the fires she has kindled. At least the poets, even if deceived, have honourably fulfilled their obligations; they have been the just and unswerving interpreters of the heart's desire.

Poetry, like all art, is then best understood as an expression

of the inner necessities of human nature, a gradual unfolding to itself of the unconscious mind of humanity. And poetic inspiration I take to be an unusual exhibition of the power to discover and make known, as far as the imperfections of human speech permit, the true nature of the objects from which the spirit of man derives the fullest and most enduring satisfaction. "Of genius in the fine arts," said Wordsworth, "the only infallible sign is the widening of the sphere of human sensibility." It is indisputable. Inspiration, that is, discloses the things which once seen are appreciated; it opens to us, step by step, the world with which we are in secret but unconscious sympathy. Thus, in the phrase of Keats, "the imagination may be compared to Adam's dream; he awoke and found it truth." In the final computation of values we accept the disclosures, the predictions of the diviners. And if this be so, the best poems are simply those which are truest to human nature, to the latent, however, no less than to the developed powers, affections, aspirations. The best poets are those who know the minds of men better than they themselves.

There resides, indeed, in oracular utterances, as there resides in miracles, no power to coerce the unwilling mind. And if one be asked, therefore, to supply a test, to enumerate the convincing signs of genuine inspiration, one is compelled to decline such a responsibility. Time was when men in doubt about the inspiration of a book consulted other books on the matter, to read and perhaps to be persuaded by the rigour of the argument. They have ceased to do so. And it would certainly be unwise to offer any criterion by which the message of the true prophet may be distinguished from that of the false. "Therein the patient must minister to himself." There is no other criterion than the answering impulse, and who will analyse for us the emotion of conviction, the mystic union of the mind with itself?

But the existing order? How if the inspired doctrines clash with this? On one side we may have the oracular delightful poet, enamoured of liberty, capable of charming our souls



with his honey-sweet minstrelsy. How if on the other we have the established social system, a network of conventions and restrictions? The poet representing the desires and ideals of the soul, the divine passion of the soul to be itself and to be happy, encounters, it may be, the laws and prescriptions of society. At every point he is met with "Thou shalt not" and becomes resentful and indignant and claims a perfect freedom. What is to be done with him? Well, said Plato, when he comes to our city "we will fall down and worship him as a sweet and holy and wonderful being, but we must also inform him that there is no place for such as he in our state—the law will not allow them. And so when we have anointed him with myrrh, and set a garland on his head, we shall send him away to another city." But let us remonstrate with the philosopher. Clearly in the best appointed states things are not altogether as they should be, and the good citizen is continually employed upon the effort to improve them. Can we then accept the dream world of the poet as the pattern to be followed? There would seem, indeed, to be no alternative. Plato's method of dismissing him with formal honours would serve admirably if we were assured that he represented no opinions but his own, if we were assured that he was not the mouthpiece of some divine and universal requirement. But in that case what hinders to keep him with us as a harmless social entertainer? The difficulty lies here, that the poet is no source of danger unless he happen to give expression more boldly, more lucidly, more convincingly than others, to the still unconscious mind of humanity. An ideal community would have nothing to fear from him. It is the imperfect society which is alarmed, and has reason to be alarmed, lest his restless probing of the mind may raise the unconscious spirit to a knowledge of its true necessities, and fill it with resistless passion for a fuller self-realisation.

The more excellent world of the poet, in so far as it is a more excellent world, can hardly be denied inspiration, but it is a perpetual menace to the inferior and existing order.

Amid things incomprehensible it provides things lucid and satisfying, amid things painful and disordered things joyous and shapely. And it would therefore appear to be best for reason to make her peace with the poet, and, with what haste she may, construct an objective world after the pattern he so persistently supplies, in such measure as within the conditions of time and space and the weakness of human nature the pattern may be realised. For until some means be found to drug or destroy the imagination it will continue to drag the reason at the wheels of its victorious car, to proclaim unceasingly the "ultimate angel's law," and announce with inexpugnable conviction the approaching ruin of "tyrannies, moulting sick, in the dreadful wind of change."

W. MACNEILE DIXON.

GLASGOW.



## WHERE FAITH AND MORALITY MEET.<sup>1</sup>

JOHN JAY CHAPMAN.

AMONG all the changes of creeds and of customs, there are in any society always two types of men. There is the man of good conduct, whose life illustrates moral truth, and there is the religious person who consciously experiences moral truth. Even in ancient Egypt or in ancient Rome these types must have existed—the ethical person and the religious person. And if we were forced to choose between them we should prefer the man of conduct to the man of feeling. We reverence the good man who is not interested in religion more than the religious person who is not good; and in so doing we cast a doubt upon all dogmatic formulations of truth. There is something in religion which can only be expressed through conduct. This is the reason for parables, which are mere pictures of conduct, and leave the mysteries of faith unsolved. We may consider ethics as life in the round, or as religion in practice. The distinction is convenient, but not ultimate. It is easy to see that ethical conduct must somehow be a form of religion. Any statement of ethical truth comes into competition with religion. Your Ethical Society, for instance, treads on the toes of the churches. The teaching that goes on in this building is, in a sense, religious teaching. By calling it ethical you do not prevent it from being a branch and form of religion.

<sup>1</sup> This was delivered in a course (before the Ethical Culture Society in New York) where each lecturer assigned some book to be read in connection with the lecture. The New Testament was the book recommended.

Ethics is separated from religion very much as the churches are separated from one another—by wavy lines of prejudice and education. It is with these lines that we have to do. It is they that rule our philosophy; I do not say that they rule our lives so much as they rule our statements. There is a realm of discussion, and it is in this realm of dissension that words become important. Words are powers—like water power and electricity; and we find them running and circulating about the world with natures and meanings of their own which we cannot control. History has determined the matter and has bound us up as with chains in the meanings of these creatures, words. For instance, anyone to-day who uses the word *God* is talking Hebrew, not the Hebrew of Palestine, but that Hebrew of modern accent, with two thousand years of Western Christianity in its voice. You cannot wash the significance out of the word nor cast another meaning upon it, though you speak with the tongue of genius. The quandary of the scholar becomes very apparent when he translates the Greek and Roman classics. In this case the modern writer has difficulty in attributing to the pagan gods the right kind of divinity. When he uses the God with a capital G in depicting classic mythology, he not only gives us a qualm on behalf of Jehovah, but he does a refined kind of violence to the pagan myth. He owes two apologies.

Symbols mean so much, and become so identified with particular causes that we fear to use them. The thing we are afraid of is lest *they* shall use *us*. Every man I meet is afraid of a different kind of a surplice. Some dread gestures, as implying they know not what of dogma or claim. To bow at the creed or not to bow gives equally sincere shivers to opposing classes of persons, who in dress, food, and moral code are indistinguishable. How explain these labyrinthine antipathies, this deadly war of masonic signs and murderous shibboleths? Each one of them must for explanation be looked up historically. Each one of them has a most simple



explanation—an explanation *in fact*. Some disagreeable episode is at the back of each and every ebullition of sentiment. These rancours are the fumes of old controversy. We are still carrying on the animosities of the wars of religion. The Reformation is still in progress. The smell of incense continues for generation after generation to arouse the strongest animosities known to human nature. The Gothic Church may crumble, but the sentiment of hostility to all it once typified endures. So also the counter sentiment of attachment to it and hatred of the Reformer endure. If I am a Roman Catholic I may not sing “Lead, kindly Light” till *after* Newman’s conversion. To do so might imply something that I do not mean. Thus are we all slaves to formula, and slaves to the fear of formula—slaves as it were to history.

Thoughts like these passed through my mind as I left this building the last time I was in it. The occasion was about a year ago. I had come here to attend a lecture of one of your foremost teachers—one of the pillars of the Ethical Society, and one of the most notable saints in the city. This man was lecturing to young men on Epictetus. It was a strange academy—a kind of mad tea-party. The students were most of them muscular young Hebrews, with an immense reverence for their instructor’s character and a marked scepticism as to his modes of reasoning. Not one in the room—myself least of all—knew anything about Epictetus. The system of instruction was as follows:—The master read a few sentences out of Epictetus, and then asked a question of the nearest Hebrew. If the teacher did not like the answer he received—and he never did like it—he flung the young Hercules to the ground and pounded his head with the volume till the boy cried for mercy. Then he patted the boy’s shoulder, gave him an affectionate hug, the protagonists took their places again, and the séance was resumed. At times the contagion of argument spread, and the whole class fell upon the floor in *mêlée*, while Epictetus scored a touch-down. At the end of the lesson we were not fatigued, but exhilarated. It was good

to have been there. These boys went home stirred and filled with vitality. I understood why it was that the Ethical Society was one of the religious bodies which constantly sends forth young men into practical reform work.

During the *conférence* I kept muttering to myself from time to time, "Why Epictetus?" You see I was trying to fix my mind on Epictetus and to remember who he was. Of course some word was mentioned now and then about morality and religion, duty, service, and so forth; but I could not seize or identify these flying thoughts. I knew that I had read about all these things somewhere before, but I could not remember where it was. At last my eye caught sight of a small grey volume, which did not look like a book, but like—like an object, a clothes-brush perhaps. It was a little hotel Bible, which was part of the furniture of the room, but which had not been noticed or mentioned during the proceedings. It seemed to be shrinking and fading away. I picked it up. It was quite illegible and had never been legible. No wonder the volume had never been opened. Yet it was there—a Bible. There in that little wizened package lay the great Hebrew mind, the only mind that is worthy to be called mind at all, so far as Ethics goes, the fountain of all enduring ethical thought, the source of all enduring ethical power. There lay the A B C of Western religion, if one desired the historic view; there the symbols of living ethical faith—that faith which is the nearest one we could reach if we threw a stone out of the window. I am speaking of the whole Bible, the Hebrew contribution to the world, the Old and New Testaments as a single body of thought. For the philosophic content and the mode of looking at life is the same in all parts of Jewish literature. It is impossible to understand the New Testament except through the Old, and *vice versa*.

In the class-rooms of the Ethical Society the Bible seemed to be a thing aloof—perhaps a delicate subject. Why was this? Because Christ was rejected by the Jews two thousand years ago, and because Christ said many things that people



have since disagreed about. The prejudices of the Ethical Society are easily explained. It was founded in the nineteenth century, chiefly by Hebrews, and in order to rescue ethical truth from the clutches of dogma—the dogmas of Western Christianity and Western Judaism. The clouds that hung about its birth trouble the manhood of the Society. The same thing is true of the Protestant Episcopal Church. The same thing is true of all churches and of all institutions: their origins limit their influence. Their origins live along with them and cramp their mind.

The Ethical Society was to have been pure intellect, and lo, it is almost as full of prejudices as the next religious body. This is no one's fault; it is a process in human affairs.

I will tell you another anecdote which illustrates the reverse action of Ethical force, that is to say, it illustrates how benevolence is able to make use of all sorts of creeds, races, and dogmas without causing any trouble. The story is also about Jews. A very important Hebrew in Chicago, a man of great benevolence and vast wealth, wanted to help the Southern negroes. He got the negro question on the brain. He found by consulting with the best authorities that the most valuable thing he could do for the negroes was to raise the character of the white men at the South. One way of doing this was through the Y.M.C.A. So then this Hebrew of the Hebrews subscribes enormous sums to found white Christian Associations (from which negroes are excluded) as his best way of reaching negro conditions. It required the discovery of America to provide a field which should show up phenomena of this kind. The real forces of goodness and badness run right through every person and every institution, and the notion of segregating truth into churches, schools, and theories is becoming visibly more absurd as the years go by.

There is no doubt that humanity is held apart by dogmas and statements of truth, by attempts to define truth. Humanity is drawn together by warm-hearted conduct. And yet the conduct we approve often rests upon dogmas which

we do not approve. The dogmas then are as important as the conduct. While reasoned and sensible statements of Ethical truth seem well enough for a certain class of minds, there are great realms of power where Ethics does not run. Nay, if you examine closely you will find that these sensible statements are always criticisms and qualified acceptances of religious truth. They are finger-posts pointing to religion.

Moral truth is born in the form of religion. Afterwards comes ethical theory and rakes in the ashes for precepts. You cannot run the Salvation Army upon Ethical statements, nor abolish Slavery through Ethical Culture. The movement would have to be heated and vaporised into steam power before its blows would tell. In the process God would be discovered. Pure Ethics has a weak voice. She has no poets of high rank, no prophets with heart-cleaving words. She is a handmaid, a note at the bottom of another's text. Ethics has a weak voice, it is true, and has said little of importance to humanity or about humanity; but she has a strong hand and has done much for humanity. She sometimes saves the fragments where theologies clash and hope to destroy one another. But let me tell you my belief. Without Theology she would perish, for Ethics is a feeble plant, hardly self-perpetuating. Ethics must draw constant life from religion—and ever new life from new religion, or it becomes a husk, and humanity discards it.

If these things are true, then your Ethical Society must live by becoming to some extent a Theological Institute. Nay, it is one already. Your programme this Winter shows eighteen meetings of which the subjects have been announced. Ten concern Robert Browning; one is on Dante. Now Browning and Dante are pure Theology. Thus Ethical theory camps out on the abandoned farms of Theology.

The thing I would say to you young people is this: Pursue the road you are in. Follow the stream to its source. Read Browning and Dante and Milton and then go to the source of them, which is the New Testament, and read that. Read it



not merely for Ethics, but unreservedly for all that comes out of it. If Theology comes to you out of it—and it will—accept it, and have no fear of it. The fear men have of Theology is due to the political abuses of the past. We go on trembling at the robe, after the tyrant is dead. Some people fear candles on an altar. There is no harm in candles. If you light candles each one of you on the altar of his own heart, there will be more light in the world.

Those dim poets, Dante and Browning, shed a light and show a sort of beam out of the infinite; but you must be a beam in yourself, and not fear the glow and heat that may come from a deeper understanding of life—when it begins to reach you from behind the poets.

There has recently been an age of agnosticism: it is closing. An age of faith is in progress. The Desert of Agnosticism has been crossed; and some of those leaders who helped multitudes to pass across it, were destined not to enter the promised land themselves. Such men are ever among the greatest of their generation. I am thinking of William James, who was in himself more than he either saw or thought. At the time he was writing I saw in him only the ineffectual thinker, but later I came to see in him the saint. The vice with which his mind was tinctured was the very vice of which I should accuse the Ethical Society—a fear of the symbols of religion. His heart had been a little seared by early terror. The intellectual part of him was enfeebled by the agnosticism of 1870. And yet what difference did it make? Some sort of light shone out of his cloud as he took his way across the sands, and men followed him. I speak of him here, because his life is a type of mystery. He is there before us, but he can no more be grasped than a phantom.

We also, in like manner, are mysteries, and our words, deeds, and notions are merely phantoms. Behind each one there is something which others see better than the man himself sees. The controlling element in our lives is unknown to us. All our language is personal; we cannot hand our faith

to another. This has always been true. Even in the Middle Ages when faith was theoretically uniform it was always practically individual. Every mind has a law of its own. The idiom of it is formed slowly in each one of us and must be waited for patiently. You must not accept another man's terms of thought or sacrifice the integrity of your mind at any time. It may be that you are not destined to experience religion. Very well, accept this destiny; acceptance is the beginning as it is the end of religion. We must each walk our own path and move in that direction where glimmers the dawn—or what looks like the dawn leaving the rationale of our conduct to the outcome. By following our inner feeling, no matter how quaintly it may express itself, or how remote it may seem from the usual modes of expression, we shall set ourselves on the road towards the great discoveries. I say, accept your powerlessness and accept your peculiarities. There was no one ever exactly like you. No wonder, then, that other people's statements means little to you. Those statements may hereafter come to mean something, by looming up behind the things that have been revealed to you through your own conduct. All the great temples have been dedicated to this same inner God, and have been builded in this silence. The secret of the heart—a thing personal and intimate—being expressed, stated perhaps with diffidence, turns out to be the great lamp of truth, an axis on which human life turns, and has ever turned.

The New Testament is the Thesaurus of sacred wisdom compared to which there is no book or monument that deserves to be named. It is a personal record and contains things—one might say—almost too personal to be published. Of this nature is its importance, and from this source—neither from Church nor from commentator—flows its power.

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NEW YORK,



# THE MIDDLE AGES, THE RENAISSANCE, AND THE MODERN MIND.

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THE coloured windows of the Gothic cathedrals and the dazzling lights of Dante's *Paradiso* are no mere accidental expressions of the medieval spirit. It demanded bright and gorgeous colouring for the expression of its intense emotional life. The *Romance of the Rose*, the story of *Abelard and Heloise*, the ideals of chivalry and the love poetry of Provence are as truly medieval as are the lives of the saints, so full of fervour and poetry, or the magnificent Latin hymns. Dante fainting at sight of Beatrice is medieval in the intensity, the almost morbid intensity of the medieval spirit. The fine-spun, over-subtle distinctions of scholastic philosophy are indeed frequently pedantic, but it was a pedantry largely due to love of traditional forms which were closely knit into the general mind and sanctioned by the emotional life which they expressed and nourished. Frequently, too, it was due to a love of symbolism, of the word as more than the thought, of language as an instrument of power and not merely of expression, as valuable for its emotional suggestiveness as well as for its intellectual content. The Holy Mass of the Roman Church, symbolic in its every word and action, is a no less typical creation than is Gothic architecture. All the best medieval thinking is impassioned thought, emotionally charged with love and fear. It was spiritually intense, with all the high

lights and deep shadows of a vivid inner life. To realise how greatly the modern mind has been enriched by its medieval inheritance we have only to compare the work of Michael Angelo with that of Phidias and Praxiteles. We speak of the emotional atmosphere of Michael Angelo as being not Greek but modern—yes, modern, but only if that term is taken in its widest sense as including the medieval, and as opposed only to the ancient or classical.

Owing to the present-day predominance of science over art, we are apt carelessly to assume that ignorance of mind and poverty of soul must go hand in hand. No conclusion is more false. Anthropologists would seem to be working round to the view that imagination is the faculty which more truly than reason distinguishes man from the animals. The power to form free images has chiefly enabled man to emancipate himself from a given environment and to subordinate it to his needs. It is to imagination also that religion and the arts are in large part due; and when inspired by fitting standards of value, it will interpret the universe and human life more adequately than a more enlightened generation that has no recognised controlling values through which to master humanely and appropriate its accumulated body of knowledge. The periods of enlightenment and the periods of spiritual greatness, as manifested in the arts, in religion, and in social life, by no means coincide. And, as a rule, standards of value make their appearance in the general life long prior to any possibility of their theoretical establishment. And so it would seem to be in the development of the European mind. Modern values that have called for a reconstruction of life not yet completed, were, it would seem, first brought into existence under the stimulus and discipline of medieval conditions.

An alteration of emotional values is the most infallible sign, both in the development of the individual and in the history of humanity, of radical transformation in the structure of life, and is laden with consequences as far-reaching as any that can be caused by additions to our knowledge. Now, in



the Middle Ages the European scale of emotional and spiritual values was not only extended and enriched, but was profoundly altered in its standards. And I shall strive to maintain that the chief contribution of medieval life to modern civilisation exactly consists in this deepening and transvaluation of the standards of judgment. But, as I have said, I shall indicate only indirectly, through criticism of the defects of the classical tradition, in what this contribution consists.

In the transition to modern standpoints two very distinct sets of causes were contributory: on the one hand, the new discoveries geographical and scientific, and, on the other hand, the revival of Greek and Hebrew studies. Of the first set of causes much might be said. I shall single out for consideration only the new astronomy. The entire scheme of medieval theology rests upon the assumption that the earth is the sole planet inhabited by a race of beings similar to man. The discovery, therefore, that the stars are suns identical in nature with our own, and therefore presumably surrounded by planets similar to the earth, was most disconcerting. It is not surprising that Giordano Bruno, the philosopher of the Copernican system, should have been condemned by the Church. If it was to burn any heretic, it could not have chosen a more fitting victim. His philosophy demonstrated very clearly the necessity for a radical reconstruction of Church dogma.

But we must distinguish between the religious attitude and its theological interpretation. And in terms of this distinction we may say that though the Copernican astronomy dealt the deathblow to the traditional theology, it has strengthened the higher and deeper elements in the religious consciousness, and has favoured the elimination of its more compromising features. The religious consciousness and the Ptolemaic cosmology hardly seem to harmonise. Who has not felt in reading Dante the almost grotesque character of the cosmical setting which the current astronomy compelled him to give to the sublime mysteries of his Christian Faith?

It was excellently suited to his realistic imagination, but it was incongruous with the conceptions which he was seeking to body forth.

Calvin was no scientist, and held to the traditional cosmology, but in cutting away from the medieval theology those doctrines which seemed to him inconsistent with the teaching of the Old and New Testaments, he developed a religion which at its best breathes the very spirit of the new astronomy. The Calvinist teaching almost demands a Copernican astronomy as the only appropriate setting for human life, the fitting manifestation of a Divine Being before whose perfection, as Calvin delights to insist, even the Cherubim faint with fear and shade their eyes. What I mean will become clear if we take a passage from the opening chapter of Calvin's *Institutes* :

"Very remote from the divine purity is what seems in us the highest perfection. Hence that horror and amazement with which the Scripture always represents the saints to have been impressed and disturbed, on every discovery of the presence of God. For when we see those, who before his appearance stood secure and firm, so astonished and affrighted at the manifestation of his glory, as to faint and almost expire with fear, we must infer that man is never sufficiently affected with a knowledge of his own meanness, till he has compared himself with the Divine Majesty. Of this consternation we have frequent examples in the Judges and prophets; so that it was a common expression among the Lord's people: 'We shall die, because we have seen God.' . . . And what can man do, all vile and corrupt, when fear constrains even the cherubim themselves to veil their faces? This is what the prophet Isaiah speaks of: 'The moon shall be confounded, and the sun ashamed, when the Lord of Hosts shall reign'; that is, when he shall make a fuller and nearer exhibition of his splendour, it shall eclipse the splendour of the brightest object beside."<sup>1</sup>

The new astronomy has been one of the abiding sources of the ineradicable differences between Greek and modern interpretations of life. It has tended to confer upon modern modes of thinking something of that spirit of moral intensity and religious humility which are so characteristically medieval. It has brought us into closer sympathy with, and better understanding of, the Hebrew attitude of mind—the attitude of

<sup>1</sup> Allen's translation.



inspired humility, which teaches that fear, and not wonder, as the Greeks in their intellectualism have sought to maintain, is the beginning of wisdom. Not a craven fear that swamps the mind, but a fear that searches the spirit, steadying it to clearer vision, and awakening it to consciousness of the serious issues of life.

But I turn to the second main set of causes, generative of the Renaissance, the revival of Greek, and in minor degree of Hebrew, studies. The Renaissance in its earlier periods largely consisted in a twofold attempt to restore antiquity. The majority of the humanists were chiefly interested in classical antiquity, but others, among whom we must count Reuchlin and Erasmus as well as Calvin, were much more concerned in penetrating to the sources of the Christian tradition. The *Hebrew Rudiments* of Reuchlin appeared in 1506. Erasmus published his edition of the Greek New Testament in 1516, and his editions of the Christian Fathers appeared in succeeding years.<sup>1</sup> Calvin, who came in the second generation of the Reformation movement, when it could first hope to succeed in adequately formulating to itself its philosophy of life, especially concerns us, and I may briefly dwell upon the profound influence which he has exercised.

Calvin is a modern, and belongs to the modern world. He was a very competent humanist, and his first work was a commentary on Seneca's *De Clementia*. But his historical significance is due chiefly to his sympathy with what we may call medievalism, to the fact that he reformulated medieval ideals in austere and noble form, and that he successfully carried them forward as living forces into the modern world.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Bacon, *Advancement of Learning*, bk. i. iv., s. 2: "Martin Luther, conducted (no doubt) by a higher providence, but in discourse of reason, finding what a province he had undertaken against the bishop of Rome and the degenerate traditions of the Church, and finding his own solitude, being no ways aided by the opinions of his own time, was enforced to awake all antiquity and to call former times to his succour to make a party against the present time: so that the ancient authors, both in divinity and in humanity, which had long slept in libraries, began generally to be read and revolved."

Professedly what he sought to do was to return to Christian antiquity, and to restore it in its pure and pristine form. What he actually achieved was to formulate the strictly medieval view of human life and destiny in the most unrelieved and definite manner. This success was due to his elimination of ecclesiastical and secondary considerations of every kind. His teaching is the teaching of St Paul, as interpreted by St Augustine. In this respect it is exactly analogous in character to the Jansenist movement, which in the seventeenth century and within the Roman Church generated the noble group of the Port Royal. It makes everything rest upon the doctrine of original sin, and views that doctrine not as a mere dogma, referring to a long-past historical event, the sin of our first parents, but as a correct and literal reading of human nature as it presents itself in each and every man. It declares that man is defective in will power, and is helplessly enslaved by passions and desires which in the most insidious fashion flatter his human pride and conceal from him his weak and evil state. I may cite the passage which in the *Institutes* immediately precedes that above quoted :

“It is plain that no man can arrive at the true knowledge of himself, without having first contemplated the divine character, and then descended to the consideration of his own. For such is the native pride of us all, we invariably esteem ourselves righteous, innocent, wise, and holy, till we are convinced, by clear proofs, of our unrighteousness, turpitude, folly, and impurity. But we are never thus convinced, while we confine our attention to ourselves, and regard not the Lord, who is the only standard by which this judgment ought to be formed. . . . The eye accustomed to see nothing but black, judges that to be very white, which is but whitish, or perhaps brown. . . . Thus also it happens in the consideration of our spiritual endowments. For as long as our views are bounded by the earth, perfectly content with our own righteousness, wisdom, and strength, we fondly flatter ourselves, and fancy we are little less than demigods. But if we once elevate our thoughts to God, and consider his nature, and the consummate perfection of his righteousness, wisdom, and strength, to which we ought to be conformed, . . . what strangely deceived us under the title of wisdom will be despised as extreme folly ; and what wore the appearance of strength will be proved to be most wretched impotence. So very remote from the divine purity is what seems in us the highest perfection. Hence that horror and amazement with which the Scripture always represents the saints to have been impressed and disturbed, on every discovery of the presence of God.”



Thus at the very time when the Greek spirit, in its freedom and self-assurance, was gaining converts on every side, Calvin reformulated the alternative interpretation of life. His theology is, like all the best medieval thought, genuinely mystical. It is Augustinian, and that is to say medieval, in the intensity of its emotional force. It is intense in exact proportion to its self-restraint, and to the narrowing of the channels in which it is made to run. Not expansiveness but sincerity and intensity are its ideals, not self-realisation but self-mastery, not happiness but discipline for the sake of a supreme perfection entirely transcendent of anything immediately attainable in a present successful and happy life. It would contrast the face, pale and drawn, of the Christian saint, in his never-ceasing combat for a surpassing perfection, with the ideal of health and competency, of success and achievement, to which the classical spirit pays all its homage. The one is preoccupied with the fact of inevitable failure for all who are living the religious life, who are aiming at ideals which transcend their powers and induce a perpetual humility of soul. It emphasises man's natural weakness, his lack of inspiration and lack of power. The aim of the other is health of body and social efficiency, and these being under favourable conditions readily attainable, it feels justified in maintaining that normal human powers are entirely adequate to all appeals that may be made upon them. It is, of course, to some reconciliation of these divergent ideals,—and it is useless to refuse to recognise that they constantly diverge and often conflict,—that the modern spirit aspires.

Now, as I have just said, the Renaissance was, at starting, largely historical in its interests. These historical interests originated, however, in the belief, entertained by the Renaissance scholars, that in returning to the past they were returning to the sources of all true life, secular and religious, and were therefore preparing the way for a better understanding of present conditions. Like so many reformers, they meant "forward," though their cry was "back!" Their historical

interests were only secondarily historical; they were really pragmatic in aim.

For this, and for other reasons into which I need not enter, the historical interest gradually receded, and in place of the watchword, "return to antiquity," was substituted the rallying-cry, more adequate because more truly expressive of the actual tendencies, "return to nature and to reason." And not until the end of the eighteenth century and the beginning of the nineteenth, did any genuinely historical interest re-emerge. The seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were centuries of unhistorical thinking, centuries that had no real understanding of their own roots, and in which therefore tendencies all too frequently brought about their own destruction by entering into confederacy with forces that were radically inconsistent with the essential values for which they themselves stood. This is especially true of the Reformation churches during those two centuries. They failed adequately to represent and enforce the ideals which were entrusted to their keeping. Their leaders lost touch with their sources, and were dragged at the chariot wheels of an overwhelmingly victorious classical tradition; with the consequence that they shed off from their Faith just those tenets which gave it meaning and a solid foundation in the psychology of the human mind. The English Deists, for instance, actually attempted to establish Christian theology upon the doctrine of the essential goodness of human nature. This was just the sort of theology to appeal to the poet Pope, to Voltaire and to Rousseau, and in their hands it became a European force. But it is the desertion of everything for which the Protestant reformulation of medieval values had professed to stand. The same criticism may be passed upon the programme of the Jesuit Order. That Society represented very different but none the less kindred tendencies within the Mother Church. They were Pelagians, and played into the hands of the secular classical agencies abroad at the time. They were the avowed enemies of Port Royal.



When I thus maintain that in the intellectual realm the Protestant churches proved false to the medieval traditions which were in their keeping, and so became a negligible influence in the philosophical field, I employ the word "intellectual" in order to mark an important limitation. For, of course, the various evangelical movements, such as Wesleyanism in England and Pietism in Germany, had a profound influence on the general life, and preserved the medieval values in an active though submerged form. But they generated no leaders intellectually capable of rendering them a force in the sphere of philosophical reflection.

The very fact that medieval sympathies were in intellectual circles in abeyance, and that the churches which stood for medieval ideals were in the main without important intellectual influence, — this situation enabled the classical tradition to develop a new vitality, and to inspire, under the altered modern conditions, a genuinely original, and astonishingly fruitful, interpretation of life. The main stages of its development appear in Francis Bacon, John Locke, the English Deists, Voltaire, the French Encyclopedists, and Rousseau. Francis Bacon strikes a note never before sounded. He was not himself scientifically trained, and in many respects, especially owing to his ignorance of mathematics, he radically misinterpreted the methods and ideals of the new science. But he prophetically expounded, in speech of magnificent power, a new vision of human possibilities upon the earth. He taught that knowledge, scientific knowledge, is power. In virtue of his intelligence man has a creative capacity, to which no limits can be prescribed, a power of subordinating nature, and of taking the destiny which hitherto nature has controlled into his own hands. If, as it seemed to the archæologists of that time, the Greeks may be said to have created the arts, the moderns, according to Bacon, were destined for the still greater task of recasting the entire economy of human life.

The beginnings of the next step appear in John Locke.

Bacon's vision had been limited to the material conditions of human existence. Locke applied the same free and forward-looking analysis to its political and educational aspects. And the seed which he sowed, slowly maturing, came to sudden flower in what have very fittingly been named the Enlightenment philosophies, the philosophies of the Encyclopedists and Rousseau. They taught that by the radical recasting of social institutions and by the development of new and better educational methods, human life may be transformed into something very different from, and immeasurably superior to, all that it has hitherto been. The future will be related only through contrast to the past. As Godwin, an enthusiastic supporter of this teaching, declared in his *Political Justice*: "Nothing can be more unreasonable than to argue from men as we find them, to men as they may hereafter be made." The entrance of this philosophy upon the stage of history was celebrated by the great drama of the French Revolution, which was at once the offspring of its aspirations, and the proof of its almost demoniac powers. It released energies which at once transformed it from an academic philosophy into a world-force. The Enlightenment is well named, and deserves more credit than we, who have profited by its labours, and can criticise its earlier manifestations, are usually prepared to admit. Its influence seems to me even more fundamental and far-reaching than that which has been exercised by the evolution-theories propounded by Darwin. It is the specifically modern standpoint. It is the type and norm of every philosophy which seeks to justify its methods and doctrines by the future rather than by the past. It is also the legitimate offspring of the classical tradition. For it expresses, under the altered conditions of modern life, and in view of the powerful weapon which modern science has placed in men's hands, the same free self-assurance that inspired the Greeks in the upbuilding of their civilisation. It expresses the same conviction of the supreme value of intellectual enlightenment as the chief agency of human progress.



I should like especially to emphasise the humanitarian character of the eighteenth-century Enlightenment. An extremely significant feature of its humanitarianism is its comparative independence of any very real interest in moral ideals. Anyone who identifies humanitarianism and morality would seem to rule himself out from understanding the movements of history. For many of those who are genuinely humanitarian in their instincts and sympathies—Voltaire is the supreme instance, Diderot is another—are almost completely non-moral in matters of the inner life. And many who are deeply spiritual are extremely indifferent to questions of social reform.

The cause is not far to seek. The spiritually ambitious value nothing so highly as the disciplinary tutelage of affliction and hardship. The only argument that they will readily listen to is that inequality, poverty, and oppression are so excessive as to remove all possibility of moral reaction. The more secularly minded, on the other hand, themselves locating the entire meaning of life in happiness and its material conditions, vividly appreciate, and cannot so easily condone or excuse, the glaring inequalities.

This explains many things. It partly explains why the Middle Ages, spiritually so ambitious, should stand notorious in history for the brutality of their political and ecclesiastical rulers. It also in part explains why the humanitarianism through which the nineteenth century is so strongly marked off from all preceding times should be due much more truly to classical than to Christian sources, and why the Christian churches should as a rule be so very dilatory in recognising that the spirit which inspires the demand for the removal of abuses and inequalities is that which is inculcated in the Gospels. It explains why, for instance, the doctrine of natural rights—a doctrine of very composite origin, issuing from Stoic teaching embodied in Roman law—why that doctrine, theoretically so unsound, historically so beneficial, should have found many of its chief supporters among the anti-religious,

and, as in Diderot, non-moral philosophers of the eighteenth century. It also suggests the reflection that a materialistic age may very easily contrive to conceal from itself its spiritual poverty by exclusively emphasising its humanitarian activities. Here, as elsewhere, the Christian and the classical traditions have each something to teach the other.

Before passing to my next main point, let me briefly indicate what would seem to be one of the chief defects of the Enlightenment philosophies, their inadequate appreciation of the truth involved in that most characteristic and fundamental of all the medieval tenets, the doctrine of original sin. The various Enlightenment thinkers one and all start from Locke's doctrine that the mind of the new-born child is a *tabula rasa*, a sheet of white paper, upon which society and the educator may inscribe whatever they please. There are, they taught, no inborn tendencies that set a limit to the possible transformations which human nature may be made to undergo. I have already quoted Godwin's dictum: "Nothing can be more unreasonable than to argue from men as we find them, to men as they may hereafter be made." They one and all trace man's evil conduct to the perverting influence of *external* causes. The explanation of the Deists and of Voltaire was that all moral evil is ultimately traceable to superstitions invented by priests for their own private ends. In place of this absurdly inadequate anti-clerical explanation Rousseau substituted the theory which has had so important an after-history—that evil is due ultimately to economic causes, reinforced by the perverting influence of the arts and sciences. But even that explanation is one which modern psychology cannot accept. Let me quote the words of a thinker who cannot be regarded as a benighted medievalist, Thomas Huxley:—

"With all their enormous differences in natural endowment, men agree in one thing, and that is their innate desire to enjoy the pleasures and to escape the pains of life. . . . That is their inheritance (the reality at the bottom of the doctrine of original sin) from the long series of ancestors, human and semi-human and brutal, in whom the struggle of this innate tendency to



self-assertion was the condition of victory in its struggle for existence. That is the reason of the *aviditas vitæ*—the insatiable hunger for enjoyment—of all mankind. . . . The maxim 'Live according to nature' has done immeasurable mischief. . . . It has furnished an axiomatic foundation for the philosophy of philosophasters, and for the moralising of sentimentalists. . . . The pertinacious optimism of our philosophers hid from them the actual state of the case. . . . The logic of facts was necessary to convince them that the cosmos works through the lower nature of man, not for righteousness, but against it. . . . The theory of evolution encourages no millennial anticipations. . . . The cosmic nature born with us, and, to a large extent, necessary for our maintenance, is the outcome of millions of years of severe training, and it would be folly to imagine that a few centuries will suffice to subdue its masterfulness to purely ethical ends. Ethical nature may count upon having to reckon with a tenacious and powerful enemy as long as the world lasts."<sup>1</sup>

Thus Locke's doctrine of the *tabula rasa* has given place to a sounder psychology which, if less optimistic, is no breeder of idle dreams, and need not make us any the less determined upon all possible furtherance of practicable reform. It emphasises the fact that man's future is not a natural destiny but a moral vocation, and that in face of the moral dangers by which the higher civilisation is constantly menaced, what is most called for is training and discipline in self-mastery; and so, while leaving us profoundly altered in our social aspirations by eighteenth-century optimism, restores the key for the understanding of medieval attitudes—of their moods of despair as well as of their spiritual ambitions—and indeed enables us to begin to divine what it was that the medieval moralists were after when they spoke eulogistically of fear. It was because they did not trace evil chiefly to the bodily appetites. (That is the defect in Huxley's distribution of emphasis.) The flagrantly sensuous life can be satisfying only to the vulgar-minded. The supreme source of evil according to medieval teaching is *pride* — pride in all its various and esteemed forms, emulation, desire for human affection, loyalty to this or that party or institution, and the like. It is this constant and insidious body of highly respectable temptations, and the deadening of the spiritual faculties which the yielding to them may produce—this sense of the danger of allowing the

<sup>1</sup> *Evolution and Ethics* (1894, Eversley series, p. 27 ff.).

heart to become set upon anything short of the highest—this was the source of the haunting fear by which the finest spirits of the Middle Ages were spurred to the never-ceasing combat of spiritual endeavour. Surely I am not wrong in saying that such a mood, while extremely unclassical, and almost unknown in the typical representatives of the eighteenth century, is by no means foreign to the modern mind. Tolstoi, for instance, a genuine modern, is profoundly medieval, and not at all Greek, in many of his spiritual traits.

And now I am brought to the last main point upon which I shall dwell. As I have argued, the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Enlightenment thinkers, in losing all appreciation of the Middle Ages, severed the roots of their culture, and cut themselves off from all possibility of any genuine comprehension of the tendencies which were sweeping them along. I shall now briefly trace, in bare outline, the interesting and circuitous routes by which the Christian and medieval tradition, secluded within the unenlightened church organisations, formed other channels of expression for itself, and so forced its way back into the intellectual life of the nineteenth century.

It was in and through the various tendencies that together compose what is usually called the romantic movement (a most unfortunate and inadequate title, but one which we must employ, as no satisfactory substitute has been suggested) that the modern mind resumed contact with its medieval sources. Let me recall some of the many events for which it stands. Mallet, a Genevan, who had gone to reside in Denmark, unearthed the romantic history and discovered the ancient literature of the Scandinavian countries. One of Mallet's works was translated into English by Bishop Percy, and by it he was inspired to form his epoch-making collection of old English ballads and poetry. His *Reliques of Ancient English Poetry*, published in 1765, has justly been described as "the Bible of the Romantic reformation." It was the chief cause of Sir Walter Scott's early awakened interest



in the past, and it likewise influenced Herder, the father of German Romanticism. Prior to Percy's *Reliques* in 1760 Macpherson had published his impudent but inspired forgeries, which were almost universally accepted as an ancient epic of the Celtic race. Jakob Grimm, the founder of Germanic philology, was directly inspired by a body of Celtic students—Cello-maniacs, as they were called—with whom he became acquainted while on a visit to Paris. He returned to Germany to collect the folk-lore, fairy-tales, and dialects of the German people. He published the first volume of his epoch-making *Deutsche Grammatik* in 1819. The romance of the Middle Ages was first studied by Thomas Warton and Richard Hurd, who in 1762 published his *Letters on Chivalry and Romance*. Hurd was also one of the first to appreciate the beauties of medieval architecture, hitherto denounced as barbarous and Gothic.

Thus new and wonderful worlds full of imaginative appeal were opened out to the astonished gaze of a generation which had lost all knowledge of its own past, and which was already weary of the arid and purely intellectual dogmas of the Enlightenment philosophies.

An immense impetus was given to this historical interest in the romantic past by the discovery that the sacred language of the Hindoos, a language rich in a very noble sacred literature, is akin to those of Western Europe. This discovery worked powerfully on men's imagination and inspired the most enthusiastic study not only of Sanscrit and the Vedas, but of all the accessible sacred writings of the Oriental peoples. And in due course the Bible, especially the Old Testament, which had hitherto been more or less despised as a relic of a merely barbarous and superstitious age, was re-read with renewed interest and a deeper human understanding. The Bible soon became one of the chief sources of romantic inspiration.

That, however, was in large part also due to the influence of a work, now seldom read, and not indeed very readable,

save for occasional passages, which played an important rôle in the opening decades of the nineteenth century—Chateaubriand's *Génie du Christianisme*, published in 1802. As a European influence, awakening the mind of his generation to a keen and sympathetic interest in medieval life and ideals, Chateaubriand preceded Scott, whose *Waverley* was not published until 1814. Hitherto Christianity had been associated, in the minds of the enlightened, chiefly with the abuses and intolerance, and with all that was most odious and degenerate in the surviving medieval Church. Chateaubriand imaginatively depicted and sympathetically portrayed all that is sublime, generous, or tender in the teaching, history, and ideals of the Church. And the enthusiasm with which his message was welcomed marked the extent to which it opened out fresh sources of thought and feeling, and satisfied needs which had been starved on the scanty spiritual fare of the intellectual philosophies.

This interest in the past, though at first largely literary and imaginative, soon became genuinely historical, and finally scientific. It led, by easy and natural stages, to the creation, not only of history strictly so-called, but also of the historical sciences of philology, of comparative religion, of the development of social institutions and of morals. The historical and genetic method came more and more to be the method almost universally employed in the various human sciences. This method finally, through Cuvier, Lamarck, Lyell, and others, invaded the geological and biological sciences, and in the hands of Darwin gave rise to the modern evolutionary science of biology; and its astonishing success in this department powerfully reinforced the hold which it had already obtained in the human disciplines.

The romantic movement has undoubtedly inspired many extremely reactionary tendencies. No movement that looks upon the Middle Ages with admiration and sympathy could help doing so. But in the main its influence has been on the line of genuine progress—deepening our thought, enrich-



ing the emotional and spiritual life, and enabling us more wisely to direct those humanitarian enterprises upon which, thanks largely to the eighteenth century, the modern mind is immovably set. We have only to think of Edmund Burke in the field of political theory, and to compare him with such as Montesquieu, to realise that, profound and impressive as the latter undoubtedly is, and reactionary as Burke could often prove, a new and deeper way of thinking is making its appearance—one that in its reverence for tradition and for the organic processes that transcend the scope of the designing intelligence vindicates something very valuable in medieval attitudes, too valuable to be ever again lost. The state is an organic growth, that, like language, is capable of being altered only in accordance with *indemonstrable* laws inherent to itself. I say *indemonstrable* laws, for romanticism, at its best, culminates in a very genuine empiricism. Just as in social matters it would emphasise the analogy between the development of social life and the development of language, so in the field of logic it would stress the analogy of the work of art. The significance of a work of art is always bound up with the special detail of its uniquely individual character ; and only through patient study, specially directed upon it, can its meaning be deciphered. If all reality be interpreted in this fashion, only a genuinely empirical method can be regarded as adequate. The sweeping generalisations, and the correspondingly wide deductions, of enlightenment theory seem to the romanticist a caricature of genuine thinking. The Encyclopedists, in ignoring the specific characteristics of the individual (and they were always speaking about man and humanity in the abstract), turn their backs upon the source of all true insight.

For this reason romanticism, in its best forms, has proved extremely favourable to the cultivation of the sciences. It is inspired by the conviction that the details of nature and of history are pregnant with mysteries more marvellous than any which the discursive understanding or mere fancy can possibly divine, and are therefore worthy of the most laborious study.

And yet, being, if I may so name it, a visionary empiricism rooted in the sense of wonder, it has discountenanced the uninspired accumulation of mere detail. It has insisted upon the indispensableness of that element of hypothesis or theory, of meaning and significance, which is so underestimated in the philosophies of Bacon and Locke.

Romanticism has also, in equal degree, proved favourable to the philosophical disciplines. For the great scientific periods and the great philosophical periods have always, for very good reasons, more or less coincided. The period when the mathematical sciences were getting on to their feet was also the period of Socrates and Plato. The Middle Ages, second-rate in philosophy, are negligible in the matter of science. The eighteenth-century thinkers were, with very few exceptions, theorists, in the bad sense of that term; and they one and all followed Voltaire in denouncing metaphysics as idle, incompetent, and altogether fruitless. Nineteenth-century thinking, in becoming historical and genuinely empirical in method, led to a rejuvenating of the philosophical sciences. What Hegel, for instance, set himself to do was to rationalise romanticism, to develop the logic which its higher empiricism presupposes. And this task he fulfilled with a wealth of historical knowledge and with a wonderful felicity of illustration, in his doctrine of what he named the *concrete* universal. That is why he inspired so many of the foremost historical students of his time—Renan and Strauss, Proudhon and Karl Marx, Michelet, Taine, Ranke, Zeller, and a host of other less distinguished scholars. The measure of Hegel's success is, I should say, the degree in which he profited by the fruitful influences of the romantic movement. The extent to which he failed was determined by his retention, in spite of his deeper tendencies, of the excessive rationalism of the Enlightenment philosophies. He professed to be able to rationalise history in the light of his doctrine of logical dialectic. The result is all too frequently a flagrant violation of the fundamental romanticist principle, that only by mastery of significant detail can ultimate meanings be even approximately discerned.



But the tasks of philosophy, as formulated by Hegel, still remain the central tasks of present-day speculation. That may be seen even in the current popularity of the Bergsonian metaphysics. In his stressing of creative activity and of what he names intuition, Bergson would seem to incline as unduly towards an extreme romanticism as did Hegel towards an excessive rationalism. Bergson is, however, a comprehensive and genuinely philosophical thinker, for he at least valiantly strives to transcend the oppositions and half-truths to which all those thinkers succumb who are inspired exclusively by classical or medieval ideals, and who are therefore not prepared to look for inspiration impartially, as occasion may offer, to both of those great traditions. The really great nineteenth-century philosophical thinkers have sought, at least in aim and purpose, even, for instance, such as Auguste Comte, to fulfil the noble ambition of the medieval and early Renaissance thinkers, that of vindicating the unity of all past human endeavour, the ultimate working together of classical and Christian influences to the upbuilding of a civilisation in which both alike may find their completion and justification.

I may conclude by briefly restating my main thesis. The task of the Renaissance thinkers was that of combining, in a more adequate synthesis than was possible in the Middle Ages, the two great traditions upon which our European civilisation rests, the Christian and the classical. In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries the two sets of influences acted and reacted upon one another in the most complex fashion. Both are prominent in Michael<sup>2</sup> Angelo, and even in Calvin. But in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the medieval forces failed to maintain themselves in the intellectual field, with the consequence that the classical tradition acquired a predominant influence and generated, under the altered conditions of modern life, a genuinely new and profoundly fruitful interpretation of life, in what have very fittingly been named the Enlightenment philosophies. To them our humanitarianism, our belief in reason and in

reasoned foresight, are in large part due. But towards the end of the eighteenth century the inevitable reaction began to appear. The medieval forces which had been driven underground, and which had actively survived only in such popular movements as Wesleyanism and Pietism, or in the corresponding movements within the Roman Church, but which, as it would almost seem, had accumulated upon themselves, rather than weakened, in the prolonged and unfavouring age of reason, now formed new channels of expression for themselves, and so forced their way back into the intellectual life of the nineteenth century. The complex of connected tendencies thus set agoing have been very inadequately named the romantic movement. Through it the modern mind resumed contact with its medieval sources. And so at last, for the first time since the sixteenth century, or, to be more accurate, since the middle of the seventeenth, the two opposed interpretations of life, the Christian and the classical, adequately represented and convincingly maintained, stood face to face, clamant for thinkers sufficiently Catholic to comprehend both, and to take up afresh, enriched by all the accumulated gains of the intervening centuries, those tasks to which such Renaissance scholars as Mirandola, Reuchlin, and Erasmus had in the early periods of the Renaissance so courageously devoted themselves, of reconciling, and, in view of modern circumstance, of reformulating, the two great traditions upon which our civilisation historically rests.

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## CRITICISM OF PUBLIC SCHOOLS.

### THE HEADMASTER OF ETON.

IT is probably well known to readers of the HIBBERT JOURNAL that our Public Schools are among our most distinctively English institutions; and it may fairly be said that, excepting in the case of a few very modern imitations in America, there is nothing like them outside the Empire, and at present only rather pale reproductions of them in our Dominions. But among foreigners there exists a widespread and unfeigned admiration for some features of our Public School education, and every month of the school year leading educationists from Japan or China and various European States visit Winchester, Eton, Harrow, Rugby, etc., in the hope of catching the secret of something in the life of those places which they find themselves unable to produce in their own countries.

There is, therefore, something of dramatic irony in the fact that while this is going on there should be in England numerous and very vocal critics of Public Schools *en masse*, whose writings seem to betray a desire to abolish, root and branch, all that has been most distinctive of the schools, and to assimilate them to something of a Continental type: or merely to fulminate against huge and palpable defects, the existence of which no one but an interested partisan could doubt, and no governing body which was not inexplicably stupid could fail to remedy to-morrow. It appears, indeed, to those behind the scenes as if, at a time of much mental restlessness, supposing a newspaper editor is in want of some profitable "copy," it is

only necessary for him to turn on some ready scribe to write a vague and frothy tirade against the schools to secure the approval of a large circle of readers.

If this is so it is a singular fact, because, as far as outward indications go, the English system of boarding schools is apparently as well supported by the public as ever. In fact, so large is their clientele, that I am driven to the conclusion that some of the people who write these effusions, and many who read them, must be parents who, at the moment, are putting themselves out to send their sons to one of the schools. Such action might be thought inconsistent, but it could easily be paralleled in other departments of national life, and would not be surprising to any close observer of English society. But it has this drawback, that it blocks the way against thoughtful and intelligent criticism which might be valuable to headmasters. The diatribes with which the public is growing familiar are so unmeasured in statement, and exhibit so much of what looks like burning conviction, that a careful and accurate judgment pointing out blemishes and shortcomings, but always with knowledge of underlying facts, would fare ill, I fear, with magazine readers. It would be too barren of glitter and varnish and of heated and sweeping condemnations to attract attention; but meantime it may be worth saying that the schoolmasters cannot find time to attend to any random utterances of the kind mentioned. I doubt if they are more impervious to criticism than any other members of the body politic; but it is possible that their training makes them more ready to detect the difference between ignorance and knowledge of the important facts. Certain it is that if you wish to set busy men right you must show that you know something of their business; its setting in social life; its claims; its difficulties; its aims.

As one who would cordially welcome such criticism as fulfils these conditions, I venture to indicate certain facts underlying the work of the larger Public Schools which are very generally ignored, and the ignoring of which at once



turns any criticism that may follow into a "sounding brass or a tinkling cymbal." If, after reading them, some honest and wholly well-intentioned critic, who sincerely wishes to make things better than they are, should feel inclined to hold his peace, I shall be sorry: I don't wish for silence, but for consideration: for some insight into a problem among the most interesting of those which engage public attention, and the solution of which requires not controversy but co-operation.

In the first place, is it not true, broadly speaking, that the schools are so directly the outcome of the national life that to criticise them at all is like criticising the tone of a society's conversation? I imagine many people often think that in the talk of their friends and neighbours there are many things said which contribute very little to human happiness: which are only partially true; which reveal little or no interest in the speaker's mind, and so forth. But unless he is a prig and wholly devoid of tact to boot, he will never tell a drawing-room full of people that their talk is vapid or platitudinous, or inconsequent or acrid, though it often is some or all of these. Why not? Why, if he did so, would he be thought an insufferable ass? Clearly because talk is the product of personalities, and to stand on a hearthrug and inform a number of fellow-creatures that their personalities are unsatisfactory is conduct to which exception may rightly be taken. Not only would it be most offensive, but it would be wholly useless. Before you can raise the level of conversation you must raise the level not only of their minds but their characters: and that takes a long time.

To take one matter first which touches the intellectual output of our schools. It ought to be realised—but it is not—that if a boy of ten is badly grounded in some subject like Latin or mathematics there is a likelihood of his intellectual training being seriously marred all through his school life. Unless he is decidedly sharper than most boys he never clearly understands what it is all about; and it is certain that permanent harm is done to his powers of mind. But ground-

ing in a difficult subject means care, discipline, and some severity in the Preparatory School. If the master of that school is a born teacher, or even short of this, if he is a man with a backbone and common sense, he will resist the pressure of many foolish mothers who have no idea of education except a wish that their offspring should write cheerful letters home. He will insist on the A B C of these subjects being thoroughly learnt, and for that purpose he will appeal, if needful, to fear. But if he is a bit of a weakling, or a poltroon anxious about his numbers, he will let the small boys down easily. I fear there are cases where this is done, and the master has his reward. Suppose the pressure from parents increases, is it likely that all masters will be able to withstand it? What the society is, so will the schools be.

Similarly, the schools reflect most faithfully the varying standards of character in the society whose sons they educate. Most faithfully I say: very nearly as faithfully as the talk of the five o'clock tea-party reflects the characters of the different people sitting round the table. If these are philosophical in mind, the talk will be of principles. If they are keen on making their surroundings better, they will talk *parochialia*. If they are eager to make money, there will be some *sotto voce* confidences about investments. If they read good books, they will mention them. So the schools are largely the product of the masters, and these are the outcome of the English home; the best thing of its kind in the world, but still not always intellectual in its interests, not very wide in its horizon, but inclined to make a young fellow think that a fair income, good fellowship, good holidays and plenty of golf constitute the main attractions of school work, the lifting the characters of the boys and opening their minds coming second. Supposing then that the homes begin to turn out rather more of the Philistine product than formerly, there will be more of this element among the boys, and soon more among the masters. If this is the case, as seems probable, is any good to be done by scolding the masters? If the scolding showed sympathy



and knowledge it would be listened to. If it shows neither, it is a heinous waste of time.

Much of what is written certainly shows astonishing ignorance not only of schools but of various departments of modern life, and among them of Government Departments. For the last diatribe which I had the pleasure of reading recommends a suddenly and greatly increased State control. What would this mean in actual fact?

We will consider the nationalisation of endowments. This would mean the transferring of the management of certain funds now administered by governing bodies to a State Board, nominated probably by the Board of Education. If there were the slightest presumption that one set of men would be superior to the other I should welcome the change. But if the new officials proved only as competent as the present ones, the only difference would be a fresh bureau and an increased burden on the taxes. Some people seem to think that in themselves these are good things, but I cannot believe that all critics of schools are among them. Anyone who has had any experience of a State Board knows perfectly well that the human characteristics of muddle-headedness, timidity, rashness, short-sightedness, ignorance of necessary facts, etc. etc., are present in State Boards as they are in every other group of men and women who manage anything on this earth. Is there the faintest reason for believing that in a matter of great intricacy and delicacy the State administration of the funds would be an improvement on that of the governing bodies?

But only a few of the gentlemen who clamour for radical changes in the schools express themselves so plainly as to let us see what their hopes are. For the most part they confine themselves to bewailing the miserable intellectual output: the number of young men who have been at school for ten years and then go out into the world with a very poor knowledge of Greek, a Teutonic French accent, and uncertain as to the latitude of Honduras.

Let me say at once that there is no zealous schoolmaster

who is not astonished at the large amount of failure which attends the intellectual work of the schools, Most of us begin by thinking certain changes would improve it indefinitely; and when our radicalism later on begins to take a less confident tone, the change is ascribed to advancing years, good salaries, or self-interest. But what if it is due to deeper knowledge?

Experience shows that here and there you may find a man who will stimulate the minds of boys with whom he takes special pains: and this he does mostly in private talks or individual work: not in class-teaching. Class-teaching is a very defective form of intellectual stimulus: and there would be less nonsense heard if it were understood that the slower the boys are by nature, the less they will learn in class, and the more dependent they become on individual training. There have been, and are, many excellent teachers in class from whom students gain much, and recognise later on that they have done so. But there are many English boys in whom no one has ever yet been able by class-teaching to kindle the love of learning for its own sake: and it is no contradiction of this to say that many of these boys become sensible men on committees or County Councils. They have in the interval learnt to some extent how to use their brains under the pressure of threatened impecuniosity. But the experience of centuries shows quite distinctly that, in spite of the high standard of industry which prevails in many schools, there is only a minority of English boys who can fairly be said to be intellectually keen, whatever be the subject on which they spend most time. Now, the number of those to whom lessons are distasteful perhaps grows less as the classes dwindle in size: because a larger proportion feel themselves advancing. That is to say, they gain in opportunity of understanding: but if the class becomes small enough to suit the very slow, it loses in corporate *esprit* and the swing which only numbers can give. But apart from that, the general benefits of school training in social matters, in the power of getting on well with



equals, has to be paid for by a loss due to the necessity of the teaching being in class. This is a kind of teaching from which boys gain in direct ratio to their alertness of brain.

Now, in intellectual matters the fact of class-teaching is so important that it throws into the shade all questions of curriculum. What boys are set to work at matters little in comparison with the brains they are born with, the man they are taught by, the size of the class they are taught in. There is one more factor in their progress, as important as any: that is, the intelligence of the boys they consort with out of school. Here again we trace the close dependence of the school on the society. But, in regard to all these factors, impatient people are far too ready to conclude that everything is wrong because the boys are not prizewinners at twenty or twenty-three. But that again is a trifle. The questions that matter are whether they have learnt how to grapple with a difficulty, and know the difference between ignorance and knowledge, and if in general they are desirous of continuing to learn. Besides this, if a boy at twenty is still very infirm in these respects, it is far from certain that he is going to remain so. There are many English boys who must develop at their own pace, or they do not develop at all: and there are not a few very brilliant boys who grow up ineffective men, not in spite of their precocity but because of it.

If critics of the intellectual output of our schools would bear these truths in mind, their suggestions would be less wide of the mark than they often are.

There are other underlying facts the importance of which has only lately been appreciated by the schoolmasters themselves: facts which have begun to tell upon the situation only in consequence of recently changed conditions. Till lately each large Public School looked upon itself as a separate entity, and with some justice, as it was thought that whatever were the antecedents of the boys the result at twenty or twenty-three was the outcome of the Public School's work. But now we know better than that. We have learnt that

the Preparatory Schools can do a great deal to help or to mar a boy's intellectual life near its starting-point. In character-building they are of course vastly less telling than the home: but as to the development of the mental faculties, the mischief anyhow which they can do is enormous; for if a boy is thoroughly muddled in brain, as some are, at fourteen, the conditions of life in the larger school and the near approach of puberty make it very unlikely that his mental air will thoroughly clear before he goes out into the world, and in a good many cases no clearance takes place at all.

Now, if there is to be, as there of course ought to be, fair co-operation and unity of spirit between the Public and the Preparatory Schools, it is necessary that the curriculum of the former shall be fairly uniform. That is to say, it is useless for any single Public School to insist on boys coming to it prepared in a peculiar way unless other Public Schools agree in demanding the same preparation. For no Preparatory School can alter its work to suit one school: it must follow the majority of Public Schools which it supplies. This fact makes an enormous difference to the possibilities of reform in curriculum. For it is no longer a question of a headmaster simply conceiving an idea—not a simple matter for any Englishman—and then converting his governing body to it and if possible his staff of masters; he has to harness other headmasters to his chariot; and each of them may have local difficulties of his own to contend with. Hence the advance of reform of the curricula is not likely to be of headlong speed.

But this collaboration and joining of hands, besides being in itself a very salutary change, is becoming necessary in view of increased State control. Only a few years ago each big boarding school could boast its independence of any outside influence, except perhaps that of the old Universities, and of general unformulated public opinion. But nowadays we are faced by the problem of admitting by degrees a considerable measure of control on the part of the Board of Education, and



combining it with liberty to make experiments, and if possible with the sense of being unshackled in our movements. This appears to be a most complex, not to say alarming, prospect. But so far I think we should all agree that the action of the State has been cautious and enlightened and certainly beneficial. There is, of course, a danger of the paralysing power of routine. It is not certain that if the present generation of officials are men of understanding and sympathy, while the new state of things is still soft and malleable, the same will be said of their successors forty years hence, when the regulations will have stiffened into formulæ, and the coils of tape will be larger and redder than they are to-day.

There is one more remark which I am constrained to make, as it bears not only upon superficial criticism of Public Schools, but on a possible danger to their efficiency.

If we clear our minds of cant we shall cease to ascribe to any kind of school the power to *produce* what is properly called character. A good school can *educate* character by fostering its good qualities, and a bad school can make some bad characters, for the time, worse. No human institution can produce character except the home. But what a good school undoubtedly can do is to give a sensibly brought-up youngster the knack of getting on with his equals without quarrelling. True, the disposition to give and take; the tolerant understanding insight; the adaptability to new surroundings, and independence of rules,—these seem to be gifts at birth of Englishmen. But unquestionably the social life of a Public School does foster these qualities, and I fancy it is that in them which chiefly excites the admiration of foreigners.

But when I say “the social life,” I mean the life that a boarding school supplies in far richer measure than a day school. In discussions on the comparative merits of the two sorts of schools this very important truism is often forgotten.

E. LYTTETON.

## THE ANTHROPOLOGICAL POINT OF VIEW.

ARCHIBALD WEIR.

THERE was an indeterminate moment, Professor Gilbert Murray has recently told us, when the Hellenic race attained to its peculiar position in ancient civilisation by reason of its having become "more intelligent and more emancipated from silly nonsense."<sup>1</sup> And this change was brought about almost unconsciously under the guise of a professed return to something very old, in the fashion characteristic of many great social movements. We also of the present day are quietly emancipating ourselves from silly nonsense, and some of us are using for the purpose knowledge about what is very old.

But at this point our procedure ceases to share in the characteristic common to so many bygone social movements. Our knowledge of what is very old is so much more extensive, detailed, and accurate than was any earlier acquaintance with the far past, that a professed return to it is the last thing that we should find attractive. In point of fact, the precise contrary results from our better information. Our interpretation of what is silly nonsense has been changed entirely, and our methods of emancipation have been revised fundamentally. Instead of identifying *εὐηθία* *ἡλιθίος* with modern sophistications, we trace much of it to the brutish stupidity of our ancestors; instead of feeling plausible any idea of reversion

<sup>1</sup> δεξιώτερον καὶ εὐηθείης ἡλιθίου ἀπὸ ἀπληθαγμένον μᾶλλον, Herodotus, i. 60. *Four Stages of Greek Religion*, p. 57.



to the very old, we find the thought unspeakably revolting; instead of seeking freedom in a return to the past, we tend to discredit our faulty beliefs and institutions by exposing their connection with what we have learnt to loathe.

This process is making no great stir in the world. The studies, which are disentangling the primal scheme of man's mental and social growth, are regarded somewhat airily by indifferent spectators as chiefly useful for the understanding of the more backward races surviving to the present day. When scholars compare the notices and inferences derivable from antiquity with the practices and beliefs of recent or existing peoples, it is supposed that they are but amiably striving to strengthen the web of a history necessarily too tenuous to carry much of vital import. Now and then someone charged with the protection of vested interests grows suspicious of the direction which research is taking. But such disquietude rarely leads to serious apprehension. At the utmost an effort is made to show that, if a rite or belief of the present day can be traced back to usages generally common among primitive folk, the proper deduction is to establish a radical need of human nature, however dark or bloody were the original methods of meeting that need.

Hence an apologist, greatly daring, will occasionally claim to fortify some especially perplexing tenet of his creed by accepting its obvious relationship to the doings of wild and pagan men, and by dwelling on the mystery that comprehends in one spiritual aspiration the gross atrocities of the savage and the refined obscurities of civilised religionists. The most picturesque and therefore most frequently noticed instance of this kind is that of the Christian Eucharist; but intrinsically the fundamental idea of sacrifice lends itself more appropriately to this sort of treatment, while the support that may be gained for the bewildering doctrine of vicarious atonement seems to many minds to be of still more profound significance. As yet opinion is so little aware of the real trend of investigations into the cultures which lie behind us that there is no great

danger attending tactical feints of the kind. For in thought the start is still made from present personal belief back to a conjectural past. Thus the tendency is to hallow distant crudities without impugning the sanctity of present forms. And the investigators themselves, clear-sighted and outspoken though they be, have the best of reasons for permitting the imposture to pass unrebuked.

Biologists have made us familiar with the truth that individual organisms recapitulate succinctly in their growth, and preserve vestigially in their maturity, sundry stages in the evolution of their species. Now it must be granted that analogy between the biological and sociological spheres used to be pressed far too confidently, and in the present instance we cite biology rather as an illustration than as an analogical argument. Research into the nature of man provides on its own independent authority abundant testimony that something very like the biological sequence obtains among human societies and among individual men, both in their mental and social capacities. A learned observer like Dr Frazer does not scruple to say that "superstitions survive because, while they shock the views of enlightened members of the community, they are still in harmony with the thoughts and feelings of others who, though they are drilled by their betters into an appearance of civilisation, remain barbarians or savages at heart."<sup>1</sup> Hence the fair-minded student has no inclination to judge severely either societies or individuals by the standard of those more advanced in the anthropological scale. He knows that societies are at different levels and contain within themselves institutions and members typical of various degrees of the scale. He has learnt that it must be disastrous to force a society prematurely to a higher grade. And he gradually discovers that individuals should be treated with even greater tenderness, because they not only share the complex constitution of their parent societies, but in their personal recapitulation of racial experience they are subject to prodigious

<sup>1</sup> *Psyche's Task*, 2nd ed., p. 169.



variations from the embryonic stage through infancy, adolescence, maturity, and old age.

Further consideration adds to this tenderness the conviction that it is a matter of urgent politic expediency to deal with every social, moral, and religious system as if it were worthy of respectful sympathy. No sane observer believes in a fixed series of social steps after the style of Comte's law of the three stages. But every dispassionate critic understands that man must have some rules of life which cannot be repealed abruptly without grave peril to what the Germans call *Sittlichkeit*; and all experience proves that attempts at a very rapid passage from one set of rules to a much higher set result in mere abrogation and not in progress. Only system-mongers would venture to assert that we can discover any sufficiently detailed order of development to guide pragmatically those who would replace a low scheme of culture by a higher. Work of the kind, to be successful, must be conducted tentatively, with thorough understanding and sympathy. All this is mere commonplace to those familiar with the history of Christian missions. But the case is not so obvious when it concerns our fellow-citizens, near neighbours, and relatives. Nevertheless, the silent changes now taking place around us and within us should be conducted according to the like un-aggressive charitable principles, and, as a matter of fact, they are being so conducted to a far greater extent than could be inferred from the demeanour of our noisier protagonists.

In the history of Christendom this is quite a new thing. Before the rise of this great aggressive, intolerant world-religion, the usual course of religious development proceeded on the lines of gentle modification and syncretism, in the way that brought Isis to Greece, and later quietly spread Mithraism over the Roman Empire while its eventually victorious rival was battling for existence. Since then every change has been attended by fierce discord and conflict. It is only in our own day that, almost unperceived, the lessons of what is known as anthropology have begun to match, account for, and dissolve

the dogmas and doctrines which appeared on the surface unique, unaccountable, and inviolable; while the most authoritative of these lessons commands at the same time that the process of dissolution should be tempered down to a gentle infiltration that will leave every mind, unready to rise in the anthropological scale, at peace with itself and its traditional consolations.

Hence, if orthodox teachers interpret the naturalisation of the Christian Eucharist as evidence that the mystery gains in authority by being shown to be universal as well as Christian, anthropologists will be loth to say them nay. If the want met by the mystery still survives in such strength that its *provenance* in repulsive cults is felt to support rather than to discredit it, then the want must be recognised and respected. The method which traced the connection traces still more clearly the past dependence of human nature on curious mystic ceremonies. In the name, therefore, of humanity such rites and ceremonies must be treated with sympathetic insight as long as considerable portions of society remain in the appropriate stages of mental and emotional development.

And indeed it is true that anthropology does elaborate and enforce a perfect code of the charity which rests on the maxim once expressed by Mme. de Staël as, *Tout comprendre rend très-indulgent*, and now passing under the proverb, *Tout comprendre c'est tout pardonner*. It is true that a liberal and learned comprehension of man's fears and strivings in the past, as they are related to their after-effects in the present, has silently persuaded the more cultured members of society to view with gentleness the most antagonistic principles and disclaimers. We can almost recognise the arrival of a special form of sweet reasonableness from a quarter which Matthew Arnold may have had in mind when he translated the Adonis Idyll of Theocritus. For the lesson is not confined to those openly professing the anthropological point of view. So pervasive and emollient is its gentle influence that the conservative opposition tends to suffer gladly all things and be



kind. This is greatly to the good. But after all, though it be of the highest importance, it only invests with a genial spirit a profoundly significant process, the quiet, unobtrusive work of emancipation from *εὐηθία ἡλίθιος*.

Happily the relevance and cogency of the anthropological point of view are not dependent on any particular scheme of anthropology. We may demur at obvious peculiarities of some of its professors. We may question the inclination to follow Herodotus in supposing that anything is possible if long enough time is assumed,<sup>1</sup> especially since radium removed the time-limits imposed by the last generation of physicists. We may smile at pathetic attempts to derive from an immense number of noughts the desired sum of one. We may weary sometimes of the hunt ranging in all directions, from catscradle to the taurobolium, from eoliths to circumcision. Yet the study remains in control of our criticism of life, for the simple reason that the chief distinction between man and the brutes is the historical sense, which deals with facts recognised by intelligence after inquiry (*ἱστορία*), and is accordingly concerned with facts as known to man as a rational animal.

Man is necessarily tied in action by his historical judgments, and hitherto these have been precarious and dangerous in the extreme. Not a form of forcible oppression, not a mode of voluntary suffering, not a social absurdity, but has had its fabled sanction in man's historical consciousness. Now, however, unresting critical examination of all the material accessible to him is in course of supplying him with a corrective for the rash, ill-conditioned methods of the past. Beginning with simple appeals to our unsophisticated historical sense, anthropology can lead ordinary intelligence from point to point of interest till the rudiments of human culture are reached in all their fantastic shapes. Then a survey of the whole field reveals the essential unity of the rudimentary with our advanced attainments, till the natural assumption that our

<sup>1</sup> γένοιτο δ' ἂν πᾶν ἐντῷ μαχρῷ χρόνῳ, Herodotus, v. 9.

civilisation is uniquely rational and self-sufficient is effectually disposed of. The historical sense provides its own cure, and Clio, the Muse, is left a fair field.

In this way anthropology first admonishes by disclosing the foolish, fanciful beginnings of human improvement; then encourages by exhibiting the interconnection between all stages; then advises by showing how all stages survive in the latest results and must be provided for judiciously; and finally enjoins intellectual humility and emotional tenderness in those charged with bringing the treacherous powers of reason to bear on the difficulties of the present.

Most of these difficulties can be traced to the coexistence of elements derived from different zones of the anthropological scale. Progress is neither invariable nor uniform. Allowances must be made for what has persisted unchanged as well as for what has resulted from progress or is still tarrying on the road. Thus anthropology consoles us by accounting for the crookedness of human affairs, and gives us wary counsel for the amelioration of what might be a great deal worse. The whole pith of its lessons is the trust that the more we strive to ascertain the broad facts of our condition the better qualified we shall be to assist in social service. And all this inspiration comes to us free from any particular tenets, free from any general doctrine, conditioned only by fealty to a gracious point of view.

In the course of his comfortable meditations the gentle Stoic Emperor wrote: "Men co-operate after different fashions: even those co-operate abundantly who find fault with what happens and who try to oppose it and to hinder it; for the universe had need even of such men as these."<sup>1</sup> As a speculative principle this anthropological lesson avails much amid the puzzles of life, but as a rule of conduct it is of little regulative value. We may conclude that everything in the

<sup>1</sup> ἄλλος δὲ κατ' ἄλλο συνεργεῖ, ἐκ περιουσίας δὲ καὶ ὁ μεμφόμενος καὶ ὁ ἀντιβαίνειν περὶόμενος καὶ ἀναιρεῖν τὰ γινόμενα· καὶ γὰρ τοῦ τοιούτου ἔχρηξεν ὁ κόσμος, Marcus Aurelius, vi. 42; Long's trans. (1901), p. 167.



cosmos is permissible, perhaps necessary, but we have no right to infer that we as individuals should give and receive complete amnesties for whatever behaviour our limited personalities produce. Among the forces which lead to the grand result are wrong and blame and punishment, with which as individuals we cannot shirk acquaintance on the plea of cosmic necessity. Within our own narrow spheres we have to subordinate ourselves to ethical rules, notwithstanding our perception that conduct is a matter of continuous change and adaptation. And if we consider carefully the apparent contradiction involved, we shall discover that there is a master rule which reconciles for the purposes of common life the regulative order with the speculative scheme. This master principle is no other than loyalty to our own stage in the anthropological scale, and insistence that others should be true to their stage though it be not the same as ours. Whether we be among Dr Frazer's enlightened members of the community, or among those drilled by them into the appearance of civilisation, we must drill or be drilled with all honesty and zeal till the logic of events either promotes or degrades us to a different set of functions. Only thus can we avoid treason to the plan of our world: only thus can we recognise our obligations as individuals in a transitory life within an organic whole.

In everyday affairs the master rule is instinctively obeyed. We have to reflect to become aware of its authority. But there are occasions when it has to be invoked with some urgency. Ordinances transmitted from the past lose their identity and force when applied on a vastly larger and more intricate scale. They need to be developed along with the society they serve. Above all, they need to be applied so that individuals belonging to the van of the movement should not be permitted for purposes of private gain and influence to accept offices and emoluments attached to faiths of yesterday. The faiths of yesterday should be served by those still firm in the culture of yesterday. Those who have passed on

to the enlightenment of to-day do wrong when they attempt to offer traditional services in exchange for traditional pay and position. They give inferior value for what they receive, and they supplant those who could give what the pay was intended to secure. Further, they impair the efficacy of their own example and doctrine by yielding lip-service to what they have left behind, and by entering into compromises with what they feel to be effete.

In appealing to the ideas of right and honesty in this connection, we may seem to be guilty of an illegitimate extension of bourgeois morals. But in point of fact all that we are doing is to hold that in our membership of the human race inhere possibilities of righteousness which it is culpable to neglect. Aristotle recognised these possibilities when he commended the *αὐθέκαστος* who is always himself, truthful in word and deed, truthful in his speech and in his life, because that is his character. And the reason why merits of this order must persist, even though all our conventional morality is analysed into non-moral constituents of the world-process, is because they represent the driving force which has made men rise to what they are. Only because men of ready insight and resource did not flinch, did not palter with their initiative, or weaken for the sake of gain, has mankind travelled to the point marked by our achievement.

The answer to the question, "When Adam dalf and Evè span, who was then the gentleman?" is that there never was an Adam, and there never was an Eve, but that there has always been the gentleman, though he might be as hard to discover as he was in John Ball's time. To him we owe what elevation we possess: to his survival the future will owe what graces it may attain. The strongest justification of the present capitalistic phase of society is the facilities, so lamentably wanting in primitive communities, which it offers for the independence and enlightenment of individuals who may show the way unhindered by economic considerations. And every influence which may corrupt their activity must be detrimental to



humanity's career. Regarded in this way, what we have spoken of as right and honest amounts merely to what conduces to the self-affirmation of society, beyond which authority there can be no appeal.

The results of the work of emancipation are already considerable, but, unless they are sought for by help of the correct clue, the observer may fail to be aware of their significance. Repudiation of tyrannical customs and duties will either be ignored or attributed to some sporadic vice. A veteran journalist has recently repeated, that believers in the permissibility of suicide under certain circumstances can be counted on the fingers of one hand. Such blindness seems incredible to one aware of the solvents which a fuller view of human existence has applied to traditional prejudices and sanctions. Again, a multitude of excellent people seem to think that mild expostulation will reimpose on society the superstitious subjection to a high birth-rate. Such fatuity can only be explained by ignorance of a study which shows that through the ages the twin curses of the human race have been erotics and religion. The new world is determined that the curses shall henceforth be regulated into blessings.

Outwardly the medical profession is still tied and bound by the old vow of the Asklepiadæ, "Never will I give a deadly drug, not even if I am asked for one, nor give any advice tending in this direction." But anyone conversant with the inner thoughts of intelligent contemporaries is aware that this attitude is deplored by numbers who are disgusted with the amount of suffering which the race has already had to endure. At the bottom of his heart the modern man is grateful beyond measure that he lives in an age of anæsthetics and ready lethal resources, and is in nowise contented to be deprived of their assistance at the moment of anguish. Maeterlinck, the latest writer to dwell on the nature of death, assigns its real terror to the dreadful circle which the doctors compass for us, the circle of "prolongation of the agony increasing the horror of death, and the horror of death demanding the prolongation of

the agony.”<sup>1</sup> But now that society has reached a stage when our life frequently depends for its very being on the volitional policy of others, it seems as if we cannot be very far from making its continuance dependent on a sanely regulated judgment. The medical profession will then be required to assist in the ordering of our viaticum as judiciously as it has assisted for generations in all matters relating to our arrival.

Recalcitrancy of this order cannot be attributed to casual rebellions of the flesh. It is due rather to a dim sense that the only categorical imperative is the biological imperative, and that the bull-roarer is an exploded device. The latter consequence is peculiarly fateful because it touches most nearly the attitude of women to their traditional position in society. The primitive bull-roarer owed its social authority principally to one artful precaution of those who whirled it. Sometimes the common men, but always all the women and children, were kept in a state of delusion as to the mysterious sound which they believed to be the voice of a god. They tamely acquiesced in the observances prescribed by their social superiors because they imagined that the officiating ministers were supported by an audible deity. It is a far cry from the social stage, when a slip of wood and a long string could do this thing, to the stage in which we are born to-day. Yet a perfectly efficient bull-roarer of some sort has been operative during the whole long interval. For most people it still drones and threatens. But for the first time in the history of the race an appreciable fraction of mankind has found the bull-roarer out. The effect thus wrought on the men is great enough, as we can easily believe, but the changes that are crowding into the minds of women after their enforced ignorance and intimidation must be past male understanding.

<sup>1</sup> *Our Eternity* (Eng. trans.), p. 12. “All our knowledge merely helps us to die a more painful death than the animals that know nothing. A day will come when science will turn upon its error and no longer hesitate to shorten our woes. A day will come when it will dare and act with certainty; when life, grown wiser, will depart silently at its hour, knowing that it has reached its term” (p. 15).



Never before has human life suffered such a radical change in values. The sex nearest the source of life is being initiated into the facts of life, and nothing but the facts.

But it is not only the sort of vital matter which always has worn a problematic aspect that the new criticism of life interprets afresh. The workaday rules of the Decalogue are not exempt from like treatment. After we have repeated that we must not steal, murder, commit adultery, or covet, we are in nowise advanced until we have determined what is stealing, what is adultery, and how we are to define murder and covetousness. These questions spring from rules sufficiently plain and definite when society was innocent of reflection on its own history. But when the rules are scrutinised in their latest surroundings by the light of our knowledge of the past, the questions raised prove to be complicated, and the answers they elicit prove to be sharply divergent according to the viewpoint adopted. Men governed by positive codes from the past decide in one way, and accept as part of the nature of things the difficulties and enormities which inevitably occur. Men guided by the light of historical investigation into humanity, its rules and institutions, decide in quite different ways, and strive to avoid as far as possible the horrors and cruelties which attend misfits between old rules and new situations.

From the anthropological standpoint, therefore, our present industrial turmoil, with its wages, capital, and land difficulties, is due to inept interpretations of the law, "Thou shalt not steal." Precisions hold fast to the principle that a bargain is a bargain; that legal exchange is no robbery. But nothing has been demonstrated more certainly by the course of events than that a rigorous application of the eighth commandment leads eventually to theft of the most atrocious nature, the sort of theft which consigns whole classes to slavery or degradation. Owners of land, owners of capital, owners of labour, may in all good faith exclude technical stealing from their mutual operations, and yet arrive at a social order characterised by the simple distinction between those who steal and those who are

robbed. Nor in this statement is any account taken of the businesses of the advanced industrial state which deliberately employ the laws against theft in order to rob persistently and with fair fame: nor is account taken of the gambling conducted under legal forms to the certain dispossession of those who produce the plunder. And the confusion thus created is perpetuated and increased by the struggles of those, caught in the vice of inviolable contract, who nevertheless cannot prosper in their private dealings with their fellow-men unless they observe narrowly the Mosaic prohibition against stealing.

On the other hand, those imbued with the true spirit of give and take, which has enabled mankind to worry through a thousand ordeals, hold fast to nothing but a point of view. They seem to possess a method or secret of mediating between conflicting ideals and interests. But their method is no mystery. It is the plain consequence of being emancipated from the delusions that property is an end in itself, that money and finance are other than recent devices of limited utility, that contract is an eternal obligation, that society is necessarily organised on a flagitious basis. Freedom of this kind is the gift of no dogma or principle. Like the Kingdom of God, it cometh not with observation, is not here or there, but is a state of the mind won from liberal acquaintance with the ephemeral follies, delusions, shifts, and strivings which, by splendid transitoriness, have developed men to the latest stage of variety, resource, and instability.

The difficulties surrounding the institution of property are peculiarly intricate and obscure. Those attending the seventh commandment are comparatively simple but intrinsically more momentous, because they deal with both a quality of life and the quality of the race. Few of us have not been affected intensely by what was held permissible in the relations between the sexes at our individual stage of moral culture. Wiseacres would have us suppose that in love we cannot expect any great enhancement of the value of life, but no richly emotional person believes them. Hence there is



always some beating against the bars set up by the society of the day.

The main framework of the bars to-day is formed by regard for the welfare of the children born and reared past adolescence. And in this solicitude for the quality of the race our generation has shown notable recognition of the anthropological point of view. Under the guidance of much questionable genetics it is sought to elucidate new principles of erotics which shall ensure the birth of a superior class of child, and an ultimate improvement in the constitution of mankind. The object is an admirable one. But the practicability of its attainment depends on a proper comprehension of what is behind the present representatives of the race, and of what would constitute an improvement in the future if we were able to attain it.

The question of the norm of human excellence under modern civilised conditions has not yet been faced. Such is the confusion of thought prevailing at the present moment that the perusal of reputable books leaves one under the impression that the sort of ability we should breed for is that which we might succeed in fixing in a hereditary caste of University Dons. Such a prospect ought to dismay the most sanguine reformer. Hitherto the fine quality of our University staffs has been obtained by selection from an immense mass of heterogeneous material from outside sources. The type that could be got by inbreeding from them would soon cease to be of value either to the Universities or to the great world—a fact which, perhaps, accounts for their limited fertility resulting in a redundancy of daughters.

Property and love happen to be the prominent matters under discussion at the present time, because never before has there been so much property to divide, and never before has there been so much love to enjoy unstaled by custom and unvisited by parental cares. But the fact in nowise impairs the importance of all that remains of human ideas and activity. In religion, morals, politics, and philosophy, all thinking will

henceforth have to endure examination in the light of human origins. Every term and notion will have to account for itself as it has come to grow up in our mentality; every institution and theory will have to yield its true import to a criticism that grants nothing to intuitive assumption or traditional reverence. And the reason why such an inquisition is urgent and imminent is because the highest aims of our industry and our marriages cannot be determined till we have revised all our standards and ideals from the anthropological point of view.

Under such a discipline we cannot doubt that a great part of what we hear and read at the present moment will be ruled off the record. Our professional philosophers, moralists, priests, and jurists will be deprived of much of their existing stock-in-trade. Professions, however, can always be trusted to put up ample defence for their authority, and no advantage is to be gained by trying their case prematurely. It is the layman, before whom the issues will have to be argued finally, to whom attention should first be paid. It is the inquirer, exempt from professional equipment and bias, to whom warnings must now be addressed and suggestions should be adumbrated.

At present our inquiring layman is chiefly distinguished from professional teachers by the naïveté with which he yields to the dictates of the personality which a singular concatenation of events has produced in his own self. Reflection should tell him that he is the last unit issuing from a prodigiously long series of parental combinations, and that his self is only an infinitesimal in an immeasurable sequence of diversity. Though he be a stranger to the thorny paths of dialectics, his acquaintance with the derivative character of his organism ought to make him pause before he accepts offhand the specious verdicts of his particular consciousness. Yet he is prone to ignore the disabilities of his position, and to assume the objective validity of all sorts of principles that commend themselves to his emotions and his will. He is apt to argue



as if truth, goodness, justice, love, beauty, happiness, loftiness, and similar concepts were things in themselves. He constructs ideals, and imagines developments, which shall satisfy the cravings thus created. He impatiently scorns the humble aims of the meliorist. He demands plenary powers for his ennobling thoughts, and hopes thereby to arrive at a new heaven and a new earth, whereas in truth his concepts are but the roughest possible approximations to sundry classified experiences of the race, destitute of validity apart from that fluctuating experience, which can only lead to absurdities if they are invested with authority beyond the scope of their special relative values.

The eidola of the schools work much the same harm in a narrower sphere, and sometimes do most damage when the leading phantom of the school is that it has no eidola. But internecine controversy provides a safeguard against serious mischief in this quarter, and incidentally yields an excellent discipline epitomised by the history of philosophy. Indeed, it is to philosophical criticism that we have to look for effective exposure of the pretensions of commonsense ethical and metaphysical notions, before there is much chance of anthropology being able to gain a hearing for its humble, unpretentious versions of human faculty. Otherwise we should never be free from captivating dogmas about the good, the beautiful, and the true. Otherwise we should never obtain freedom to trace the genesis of such notions, and to elucidate thereby hints towards raising our present perceptions and conduct to a higher power. Otherwise we should never be secure from irruptions of emotional obscurantism which the past history of the race lavishly laid up in our organisations during the tedious twilight of the struggle with famine and extinction, a struggle waged by every sort of rude and fanciful means that groping, purblind intelligence could fumble after.

If a Boethius had to seek consolation in these days, he would hardly invite a visit from divine philosophy. For his central thought, the Platonic paradox,—“that only *is* which

maintains its place and keeps its nature,"<sup>1</sup>—he would have to importune Anthropology. Thus he would come to contemplate existence as a variegated stream, maintaining nothing in its place for long, keeping the nature of nothing permanently, good turning to bad and bad to good, diverse qualities flowing at the same time side by side, all equally portions of the stream, all to be judged relatively to the moment, leniently, charitably, in the light of the best result at the latest date. And out of the bewildering flux of time there would appear the one surviving spiritual principle that through all the changes had maintained its place and kept its nature, the life of man's conflict through the ages, the soul that has sustained him in the past and consoles him in the present, the spirit which Goethe hymned when he made the Angels carry Faust to heaven chanting :

"Wer immer strebend sich bemüht,  
Den können wir erlösen."<sup>2</sup>

The days, which we are now living with such zest and confidence, may yet bring to society effects far transcending our obvious and splendid advances in *matériel* and organisation. The work is inconspicuous and unpretending, the methods employed are quiet and insinuating. But the result may well amount to a new freedom, a new charity, a new outlook.

### ARCHIBALD WEIR.

OXFORD.

<sup>1</sup> "Est enim quod ordinem retinet, servatque naturam. Quod vero ab hac deficit, esse etiam quod in sui natura situm est, derelinquit." *De Consolatione Philosophiæ*, iv. 2; James's trans., p. 135.

<sup>2</sup>

"Whoe'er aspires unweariedly  
Is not beyond redeeming."

BAYARD TAYLOR's rendering.



## THE TWENTIETH-CENTURY CHRIST.

PROFESSOR BENJAMIN B. WARFIELD,

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WHAT may very properly be called the Chalcedonian "settlement" has remained until to-day the authoritative statement of the elements of the doctrine of the Person of Christ. It has well deserved to do so. For this "settlement" does justice at once to the data of Scripture, to the implicates of an Incarnation, to the needs of Redemption, to the demands of the religious emotions, and to the logic of a tenable doctrine of our Lord's Person. But this "settlement" is a mere statement of the essential facts, and therefore does nothing to mitigate the difficulty of the conception which it embodies. The difficulty of conceiving two distinct natures united in a single person remains; and this difficulty has produced in every age a tendency more or less widespread to fall away from the doctrine, or to explain it away, or decisively to reject it. Weak during the Middle Ages, this tendency acquired force in the great intellectual upheaval which accompanied the Reformation; and then gave birth, amid many other interesting phenomena, to the radical reaction against the doctrine of the Two Natures which we know as Socinianism. The shallow naturalism of the Enlightenment came in the next age to the reinforcement of the movement thus inaugurated, and under the impulses thus set at work a widespread revolt has sprung up in the modern church against the doctrine of the Two Natures.

Germany is to-day the *præceptor mundi*. And how things

stand in the academical circles of Germany Professor Friedrich Loofs informs us in his recent Oberlin lectures. "The whole German Protestant theology of the present time," he tells us, has, "to a certain extent," turned away from the conception of the Two Natures. "In the preceding generation," it seems, "there was still a learned theologian in Germany who thought it correct and possible to reproduce the old orthodox formulas in our time without the slightest modification, viz.: Friedrich Adolph Philippi, of Rostock (1882)." "At present," however, Loofs proceeds, "I do not know of a single professor of evangelical theology in Germany of whom this might be said. All learned Protestant theologians in Germany, even if they do not do so with the same emphasis, really admit unanimously that the orthodox Christology does not do sufficient justice to the truly human life of Jesus, and that the orthodox doctrine of the two natures in Christ cannot be retained in the traditional form. All our systematic theologians, so far at least as they see more in Jesus than the first subject of Christian faith, are seeking new paths in their Christology." No doubt matters have not yet gone so far in lands of English speech; but the drift here, too, is obviously in the same direction, and even among us an immense confusion has come to reign with regard to this fundamental doctrine of the Christian religion.

The alternative of two natures is, of course, one nature: and this one nature must be conceived, naturally, either as Divine or as human. The tendency to conceive of Christ as wholly Divine—so far as it has asserted itself at all—has been rather a religious than a theological tendency, if we may avail ourselves here of this overworked and misleading terminology. It has existed rather as a state of heart, and as a devotional attitude, than as a reasoned doctrine. Nothing has been more characteristic of Christians from the beginning than that they have been "worshippers of Christ." To the writers of the New Testament, the recognition of Jesus as Lord was the mark of a Christian; and all their religious emotions turned to



Him. It has been made the reproach of the Evangelists that they—following their sources—were all worshippers of Jesus: and it is precisely on that ground that modern naturalistic criticism warns us that we are not to trust their representations as to His supernatural life on earth. To the heathen observers of the early Christians, their most distinguishing characteristic, which differentiated them from all others, was that they sang praises to Christ as God. A shrewd modern controversialist has even found it possible to contend that the only God the Christians have is Christ. "Christianity," says he, "is pre-eminently the worship of Christ. Far away in the background of existence there may be a power, answering to Indian Brahma or Greek Kronos and conceived as God the Father. But the working, ever-living, ever-active Deity is Christ. He is the creator and preserver of the world, the ruler, redeemer, and judge of men. He and no other is worshipped as God, hymned, prayed to, invoked. To Him have been transferred the attributes of Jehovah. He and no other is the Christian God." If there is some exaggeration here, it is not to be found on the positive side; and G. K. Chesterton is not overstating the matter when he speaks of Christ incidentally as "the chief deity of a civilisation."

This worship of Christ has had, of course, theological results of great importance, some of them even portentous—if, for example, we can with many historians look upon adoration of saints, and especially of the Virgin Mary, as, in part at least, an attempt of the human spirit to supply, outside of the Christ thought of as purely Divine, the human element in the mediatorially conceived Divine relation. But only now and again has it worked back and sought a theological basis for itself by the formal divinitising of the whole Christ. We think here naturally of the Apollinarians, and the Monophysites; but more particularly of confessional Lutheranism, which by its theory of the *communicatio idiomatum* managed to preserve indeed to theology a human nature for Christ, but

at the same time to present a purely Divine Christ to our religious emotions. But we shall have to go back to the Gnostic Docetism of the first Christian centuries for any influential effort speculatively to construe Christ as a wholly Divine Being. If men have here and there forgotten the human Christ in their reverence for the Divine Christ, they have shown no great inclination to explain Christ to thought in terms of the purely Divine.

Revolt from the doctrine of the Two Natures means, therefore, nothing more or less than the explanation of Christ in terms of mere humanity. When we are told by Loofs that the whole of learned Germany has rejected the doctrine of the Two Natures, that is equivalent accordingly to being told that the whole of learned Germany has rejected the doctrine of the Deity of Christ, and construes Him to its thought as a purely human being. It may continue to reverence Him; men here and there may even continue to worship Him. As many of the older Unitarians found it possible still to offer worship to Christ, and incorporated in their official hymn-books hymns of praise to Him as God—such as Bonar's "How shall Death's Triumph end?" in which Christ is celebrated as "The First and Last, who was and is," or Ray Palmer's "My Faith looks up to Thee," in which he is addressed as "Saviour Divine"—so many of our new German Humanitarians still worship Christ. Karl Thieme, for example, who righteously rebukes his fellows for continuing to use such phraseology as "the Godhead," "the Deity," "the Divinity" of Christ, when they know very well that Jesus is not God but only man, yet strenuously argues that He is worthy of our worship, because of what he calls His "representative unity with God." When asked how his worship of Jesus differs in principle from the gross hagiolatry of the Church of Rome, Thieme naïvely and most significantly replies, Why, in this most important respect, that he worships only *one* such holy one, the Romanists many! The adoring attitude preserved by men of this class towards Jesus—whom they nevertheless declare to be mere man—has called



out not unnaturally in wide circles a deep disgust. They are not unjustly reproached with idolatry, are contemptuously dubbed "Jesusites"—worshippers of the man Jesus; and occasion has even been taken from their corrupt Jesus-cult to inaugurate a movement in revolt from Christianity as a whole, wrongfully identified with them, in the interests of a pure and non-idolatrous service of God. Men like Wilhelm von Schnehen and Arthur Drews are thus able to come forward with the plea that in their philosophical cult alone can be found true worship, and do not hesitate to declare that the greatest obstacle to pure religion in the world to-day is precisely this idolatrous adoration of Jesus, interpreted as merely a human being. We can only record it to their honour, therefore, when the majority of those who have given up the Deity of our Lord refuse to worship Him, and, while according to Him their admiration and respect, reserve their religious veneration for God alone.

The present great extension of purely humanitarian conceptions of the person of Christ has, of course, not been attained without a gradual development, in the progress of which there has been enunciated a variety of compromising views seeking to mediate between the doctrine of the Two Natures and the growing Humanitarianism. The most interesting of these is that wonderful construction which has been known under the name of Kenotism, from its vain attempt to intrench itself in the declaration of Paul (Phil. ii. 8) that Jesus, being by nature in the form of God, emptied Himself—as our Revised Version unfortunately mistranslates the Greek verb from which the term, Kenosis, is derived—and so became man. The idea is that the Son of God, in becoming man, abandoned His deity, extinguished it, so to speak, by immersing it in the stream of human life. This curious view bears somewhat the same relation to the tendency to think of Christ in terms of pure humanity that the Lutheran Christology bears to the opposite tendency to think of Him in terms of pure deity. As that was an attempt to secure a purely Divine Christ while

not theoretically denying His human nature, so this was an attempt to secure a purely human Christ without theoretically denying His Divine nature. In effect it gives us a Christ of one nature and that nature purely human, though it theoretically explains this human nature as really just shrunken deity. Therefore Albrecht Ritschl called it *verschämter Socinianismus*—Socinianism indeed, but a Socinianism differing from the bold Socinianism to which we are accustomed by shyly hanging back and trying to hide itself behind sheltering skirts.

Kenotism differs from Socinianism fundamentally, however, in that Socinianism took away from us only our Divine Christ, while Kenotism takes away also our very God. For what kind of God is this that is God and not God alternately as He chooses, and lays off and on at will those specific qualities which make God the kind of being we call "God," as a king might put off and on his crown, or as a leopard might wish to change his spots but cannot, or an Ethiopian his skin? Of course, this is all—as Albrecht Ritschl again aptly described it, and as Loofs repeats from his lips—"pure mythology"; and the only wonder is that it enjoyed considerable vogue for a while, and, indeed, has not yet wholly passed out of sight on the outskirts of theological civilisation. Loofs seems to raise his eyebrows a little as he remarks that, as it has gradually died out in Germany, it has seemed to find supporters in England: "in Sweden, too," he adds, with meticulous conscientiousness, "it was confidently defended as late as 1903 by Oskar Bensow." The English writers to whom he thus refers are men of brilliant parts—such as D. W. Forrest, W. L. Walker, P. T. Forsyth, and latest of all H. R. Mackintosh. But even writers of brilliant parts will not be able to fan the dead embers of this burned-out speculation into life again. The humanitarian theorists are in search of a true man in Jesus, not a shrivelled God; and no Christian heart will be satisfied with a Christ in whom (we quote Ritschl again) there was no Godhead at all while He was on earth, and



in whom (we may add) there may be no manhood at all now that He has gone to heaven. It really ought to be clear by now that there cannot be a half-way house erected between the doctrines that Christ is both God and man and that Christ is merely man. Between these two positions there is an irreducible "either or," and many may feel inclined to adopt Biedermann's caustic criticism of the Kenotic theories, that only one who has himself suffered a kenosis of his understanding can possibly accord them welcome.

On the sinking of the Kenotic sun beneath the horizon, there has been left, however, a certain afterglow hanging behind it. A disposition is discoverable in certain quarters to speak in Kenotic language while recoiling from the Kenotic name; to claim as a Christian heritage the essential features of the Kenotic Christology while declining to lay behind them the precise Kenotic explanation. An isolated early instance of this procedure was supplied by Thomas Adamson, who draws a portrait of Jesus in his *Studies of the Mind in Christ* (1898) which seems to require the assumption of kenosis to justify it, but who vigorously repudiates the attribution of that assumption to him. Much more notable instances are found in such writers as Johannes Kunze of Vienna (now of Greifswald) and Erich Schäder of Kiel, whose formula for the incarnation is that in Jesus Christ the Godhead is "presented in the form of a human life." According to Kunze the Godhead appears in Jesus always as humanly mediated: the two, Godhead and manhood, can never be contemplated apart; all that is human is Divine, and all that is Divine is human. The omnipotence which belongs to His deity appearing in Christ only as humanly mediated, for example, is conditioned on His *prayer*; Jesus could accomplish all things by the power of prevalent prayer! So also with all the Divine attributes; the result being that we have in Jesus phenomenally nothing but a man, but a man who, we are told, is nevertheless to be thought of as the Eternal God.

Similarly, according to Schäder, God in becoming flesh

has not at all ceased to be what He was; He has only become it "in another way." In the place of the doctrine of the Two Natures, Schäder places the idea of what he calls "the Being of God in Jesus"—*das Sein Gottes in Jesus*—a phrase which becomes something like a watchword with him. "We have here," he says, "a man before us to whom there is lacking not the least thing that is human, a man who is man in everything, be it what it may"; and yet who is just God become flesh, "having ceased to be nothing which He eternally is," but "having only become it in *another* manner." By what a narrow line this doctrine of "God in human form" is separated from express Kenotism may be observed from the difficulties in which Schäder finds himself when he comes to speak of the act by which the mighty transformation, which he postulates in the Son of God, takes place. Here his language is not only distinctly Kenotic, but extremely Kenotic, assimilating him in his subordinationism and transmutationism to what Loofs does not scruple to speak of as the "reckless" teaching of Gess. "Now, God our Father," he writes, "lets it, lets this Son proceed from Himself as man, and *thus* enter into history. This is an almighty act of His love, of His reconciling will": "what is in question here is an almighty transformation of the mode of being of the Logos by God." When we are thus told that, "by God's almighty act, God's eternal Son becomes a weak, developing child," we are not so much reassured as puzzled that we are told in the same breath that thus "He does not cease to be what He was, He only becomes the same thing in another way"; nor are we much helped by having it explained to us that even in His pre-existent state the Son of God, because He was Son, was dependent on God, subordinate to Him, and wrought only God's will—so that even in His pre-existent state He used prayer to God, preserved humility in the Divine presence, and lived in obedience to God. It is only borne strongly in upon us that it is an exceedingly difficult task at one and the same time to evaporate and to preserve the true Deity of Christ.



The fundamental formulas with which Kunze and Schäder operate—that the incarnation consists in “the Being of God in Christ,” that “God is in Christ in human form”—reappear in perhaps even more purity in the writings of the late R. C. Moberley. “Christ,” he says, “is, then, not so much God *and* man, as God in, and through, and as man.” “God, as man, is always, in all things, God *as man*”; “if it is all Divine, it is all human too.” So also W. P. Du Bose wishes us not to forget that “God is most God at the moment when He is most love,” and not to fail to recognise God “in the highest act of His highest attribute,” confusing external pomp with internal nobility—all of which has the appearance at least of being only a way of laying claim to the inheritance of the Kenotists, while avoiding the scandal of the name. Reviewing Du Bose, Professor Sanday falls in with the notions he here expresses, and pronounces it likely that the moderns in their insistence on the single personality of our Lord, which is both Divine and human—and, apparently, Divine only because it is perfectly human,—have made an improvement on the old Two Nature doctrine of the Creeds. We may perceive from this how completely the movement is but a phase of the zealous propaganda for a one-natured Christ, and but propounds a new method of submerging God in man. This method is to proclaim the paradox that God is most God when He ceases to be God—when He becomes man. For this condescension marks the manifestation at its height of the highest of all the activities of God—Love.

But we may perceive here, too, what may also legitimately interest us, a stage in the drifting of Sanday’s christological views towards the apparently humanitarian position at which they seem ultimately to arrive. In earlier writings Sanday had taught with clarity the essentials of the Trinitarian Christology, and had pronounced himself unfavourable to the Kenotic speculations. In this review of Du Bose he falls in, however, with Kenotic modes of expression; and soon afterwards he is found confessing himself in some sense a Kenotist—while,

nevertheless, in the act of propounding what seems really to be a merely humanitarian Christology. For Sanday's final suggestion is to the effect that we should think of Christ as the man into whose subconscious being—which is to be conceived as open at the bottom and through that opening in contact with the ocean of Deity which lies beyond—the waves of this ocean of Deity wash with more frequency, fullness, and force than in the case of other men, and so with more frequency, fullness, and force make themselves felt in the upper stratum of His being, His conscious self, also than in the case of other men. At the basis of this suggestion there lies a mystical doctrine of human nature, which makes the subliminal being of every man the dwelling-place of God. If we only go down deep enough into man's being, we shall find God; and if the tides of the Infinite only wash in high enough, they will emerge into consciousness. Man differs from man, no doubt, in the richness and fullness with which the Divine that underlies his being surges up in him and enters his consciousness; and Jesus differs from other men in being in this incomparably above other men. There is Deity in Him as well as humanity; but not Deity alongside of humanity, but Deity underlying and sustaining His humanity—as Deity underlies and sustains all humanity. The mistake of the orthodox Christology has been to draw the line which divides the Deity and the humanity vertically: let us draw it rather horizontally, “between the upper human medium, which is the proper and natural field of all active expression, and those lower depths which are no less the proper and natural home of whatever is Divine.” Thus we shall have a Christ whose life, though, “so far as it was visible, it was a strictly human life,” yet “was, in its deepest roots, directly continuous with the life of God Himself.” That the same may be said in his measure of every man Sanday expressly affirms, and he as expressly identifies this Divine element which is to be found at the roots of the being of both Christ and all other men with what the Scriptures call “the in-



dwelling of the Holy Spirit." Christ thus becomes just the man in whom the Holy Spirit dwells in greater abundance than in other men. He is not God and man; He is not even God in man; He is man with God dwelling in Him—as, though less completely, God dwells in all men. We have reached here a Christology which substitutes for the Incarnation a notion which librates between the two conceptions of the general Divine immanence and the special indwelling of the Holy Spirit. According as the one or the other of these conceptions is given precedence will it find its affinities, therefore, with one or another widely spread form of the humanitarian theorising now so popular. For there are many about us who, declaring Jesus to be no more than man, wish to explain the Divine that is allowed also to be found in Him on the basis of the Divine immanence; and there are equally many among us who wish to explain it on the basis of the Divine indwelling or inspiration.

Those who occupy the former of these standpoints are prone to speak of Jesus as "a human organism filled with the Divine thought." This conception may be presented in a very crass form, or it may be clothed in very beautiful language and made the vehicle of very fervent expressions of reverence for Christ. "I see," explains James Drummond, "in the beauty of a rose a Divine thought, which is no other than God Himself coming unto manifestation through the rose, so far as the limitations of a rose will permit; but I do not believe that the rose is God, possessed of omniscience, omnipotence, and so forth. . . . So, there are those who have, through the medium of the New Testament and the traditional life of the purest Christendom, looked into the face of Jesus, and seen there an ideal, a glory which they have felt to be the glory of God, a thought of Divine Sonship which has changed their whole conception of human nature, and the whole aim of their life. . . ." Such a conception, we are told by its advocates, is far superior to the "masked God" of current orthodoxy; it "exalts Christ above all men, and

gives Him a place at the right hand of God." He was, no doubt, only a man—a human organism—but He was a man whose "attitude of will was such that God could act upon Him as upon no other in the history of humanity." "From the dawn of consciousness the human Christ assumed such an ethical uprightness before God that God could pour Himself out on Christ in altogether exceptional activities." In Him "for the first and only time the Almighty was granted His opportunity with a human soul," and, "as the Master kept Himself in unique ethical surrender to God, God acted upon Him in such a manner as to make the metaphysical relationship also unique. The ethical uniqueness implies and renders inevitable its corresponding metaphysical uniqueness of relation to God." For, we are told, "it is possible for God so to fill a responsive heart with His own spirit that every word of that soul becomes a word of God, that every deed becomes a deed of God, that every feeling reveals the loving heart of God willing to suffer with His children. In short, the life becomes such a life as God Himself would live were it possible for Him to be reduced to human circumstances. God could not suggest any improvement. He would find this soul such an open channel that He could at last pour Himself out to the utmost drop. There would be such complete mutual sympathy that the sorrows of God would become the sorrows of this soul, and the sorrows of this soul the sorrows of God. If in a moment of distress at the onslaught of sin the soul should cry out, 'Why hast Thou forsaken me?' the distress would be as real to God as to the soul, for every sorrow of either God or this soul would cut both ways. The soul would become God's masterpiece. God would throw Himself into its development with such flood that the metaphysical relationship would be beyond anything known to humanity, and beyond anything attainable by humanity. As the supreme work of the Father, and as the supreme response to the ethical cravings of the Father, such a creation could be called in the highest sense the Son of God."



Perhaps we may say that the exaltation of the man Jesus could go little further than this. And we can scarcely fail to observe that we have before us here a movement of thought running on precisely opposite lines from that of the Kenotic theories. In them we were bidden to observe how God could become man; in this we are asked in effect whether it may not be possible to believe that in Jesus Christ man became God. We are naturally reminded at this point that consentaneously with the rise of the Kenotic theories in the middle of the last century there was born also a contradictory theory—that of Isaac A. Dorner—which, with a much more profound meaning, proposed to our thought a solution of the problems of the Incarnation which formally reminds us of that just described. Dorner, beginning with the human Jesus, asked us to watch Him become gradually God by a progressive communication to Him of the Divine Being, so that, though at the start He was but man, in the end He should become in the truest and most ontological sense the God-man. The difficulties of such a conception are, of course, insuperable; it would compel us to think of the Godhead as capable of abscission and division, so that it could be imparted piecemeal to a human subject, or of manhood as capable by successive creative acts of being itself transmuted into Godhead. But it was inevitable that this theory, too, should leave some echoes of itself in the confused discord of modern thought.

We hear these echoes in the high christological construction of Martin Kähler. We hear them also in the lower theories of Reinhold Seeberg. According to Seeberg, Jesus Christ is just a man whom the willing God has created as His organ and through whom the personal will of God has so worked that He has become fully one with this personal will of God. "The will of God," he says, "chose the man Jesus for His organ, and formed Him into the clear and distinct expression of His Being." He emphasises the personal character of the Divine will in Jesus, but he allows no second hypostasis in the Godhead as its Trinitarian background. In his view we

can admit the eternal existence of only one thinking and willing Divine personality, though in that one personality there co-existed a threefold tendency of will. That particular tendency of the Divine will-energy which aims at the realisation of a church, manifests itself in the man Jesus, and so fully takes possession of Him that in Him it becomes for the first time personal and makes Him really the Son of God. Before God thus created Jesus into His organ there was no second ego standing over against the Father; there pre-existed in the eternal God only the eternal tendency of will to create a church. "What is peculiarly Divine in Christ" is therefore only "the peculiar will-content which we can distinguish from other will-contents, the tendency of the Divine will to the historical realisation of salvation." Seeberg thinks that thus he does justice to the Godhead of Christ. He looks upon Him as the Redemptive Will of God forming as organ for itself a human subject and coming to complete personality in it. "Jesus," he says, "in the peculiar contents of His soul is God." "Herrschaft," authority, therefore belongs to Him; but also "Demut," humility; but especially "Herrschaft," for is He not the personal Son of God, the only personal Son of God that ever was or ever will be? "That ever will be," we say: for the question arises, what has become of this personal Son of God now that His life on earth is over and He has ascended where He was before? As before the "Incarnation" the particular Divine will of salvation was not a Divine personality over against the Father, but acquired personality only as it flowed into the human person, Jesus Christ, and formed Him to its organ—has it, now that this man Jesus has passed away from earth, lost again its personality and sunk again into merely the tendency of the Divine will making for salvation? It is Karl Thieme who asks this question. For ourselves, we may be content with observing that in Seeberg's construction it is not God, but only the Divine will of salvation, that becomes incarnate in Jesus Christ; and that Jesus Christ is



therefore not God, but only, as we say in our loose everyday language, "the very incarnation" of the Divine will of salvation. We see in Him, not God, but only the will of God to save men—and this seems only another way of saying that Christ is not Himself God, but only the love of God is manifested in and through Him. What we get from Seeberg, then, is obviously not a doctrine of the incarnation, but only another form of the prevalent doctrine of Divine indwelling or inspiration, and it is because of this that Seeberg's theory seems to Friedrich Loofs one of the most valuable of those recently promulgated.

In an interesting passage Loofs selects out of the results of recent speculation the three conclusions which he considers the most valuable, and thus reveals to us his own christological conceptions. These are: "First, that the historical person of Christ is looked upon as a human personality; secondly, that this personality, through an indwelling of God or His Spirit, which was unique both before and after, up to the ending of all time, became the Son of God who reveals the Father, and became also the beginner of a new mankind; and, thirdly, that in the future state of perfection a similar indwelling of God has to be realised, though in a copied and therefore secondary form, in all people whom Christ has redeemed." The central point in this statement is that Christ is a man in whom God dwells. "The conviction," remarks Loofs in his explanation of his views, "that God dwelt so perfectly in Jesus through His Spirit as had never been the case before, and never will be till the end of all time, does justice to what we teach historically about Jesus, and may, at the same time, be regarded as satisfactorily expressing the unique position of Jesus, which is a certainty to faith." He is willing to admit, indeed, that he does not quite know what the dwelling of the Spirit of God in Jesus means; and, indeed, he is free to confess that he does not understand even what is meant by the "Spirit of God." And he agrees that the formula of the indwelling of the Spirit of God in Jesus is capable of being taken in so low a sense as

to destroy all claim of uniqueness for Jesus. He does not feel so well satisfied with it, therefore, as Hans Hinrich Wendt, for example, expresses himself as being. But he knows nothing better to say, and is willing to leave it at that, with the further acknowledgment that he feels himself face to face here with something of a mystery. Loofs is a Ritschlian of the extreme right wing, and in his sense of a mystery in the person of Christ, leaving him not quite satisfied with the definition of His person as a man in whom God uniquely dwells, we perceive the height of christological conception to which we may attain on Ritschlian presupposition.

What Ritschl himself thought of Christ it is rather difficult to determine ; and his followers are not perfectly agreed in their detailed interpretation of it. He himself warns us not to suppose him to be unaware of mysteries because he does not speak of them : it is precisely of the mysteries, he says, that he wishes to preserve silence. Meanwhile he is silent of all that is transcendental in Christ, His pre-existence, His metaphysical Godhead, His exaltation—if these things indeed belong to Christ. If Jesus had any transcendent Being other than His phenomenal Being as man, Ritschl says nothing about it. He seems, indeed, to leave no place for it. He speaks, no doubt, of the “Godhead” of Christ ; but by this he means neither to allow that Christ existed as God before He was man, nor to attribute a Divine nature to the historical Christ, nor to suggest that He has now been exalted to Divine glory. He means merely to express his sense that Christ has the value of God for us—that is to say, that we are conscious that we owe salvation to Him. The “Deity” thus predicated to Him, it is explained, is purely “ethical” and not “metaphysical,” and, moreover, is transferable to His people so that His Church, viewed as the sphere of His influence, is as Divine as He is. It is the “calling” of Christ to be the founder of the Kingdom of God ; and in fulfilling this “calling” He fulfils the eternal purpose of God for the world and mankind. And it is only because His personal will is thus one with the will of God that the predicate



of Godhead belongs to Him. "Christ is God" with Ritschl—thus S. Faut sums up the matter—"so far as He is on the one side the executor, on the other the object of the Divine will." It all comes, we see, at the best, to the conception that Jesus is the unique Revealer of God and Mediator of Redemption; and it is in these ideas that the higher class of Ritschlian thinkers live and move and have their being. To them Jesus is indeed purely human—"mere man" if you will, though the adjective "mere" is objected to as belittling. On the other hand, however, he stands in a unique relation to God "as the embodiment of God's life in humanity, and the guarantor of its presence and power; in whom God verifies Himself to us as Father and Redeemer." There is indeed no metaphysical Sonship with the Father in question; Sonship is an ethico-religious idea when applied to Jesus. When we call Him Son, we do not mean to declare Him God in a metaphysical sense; we but indicate "His superior mission for humanity as representing and communicating the Father's life." By His "centrality for the whole human race, as the one perfect mediator of the Divine life," He is so identified with God that those who have seen Him may be said to have seen the Father also. Through Him and Him only indeed has the Father ever been seen; in Him alone is "manifested the Father's ideal of humanity and the Father's purpose of grace toward the sinful." Through Him alone have men or can men come to the knowledge of the Father and to true and full communion with Him. "He is the one supreme Revealer," and "not only utters the thought of God"—who thus speaks through Him—but "incarnates the life of God, which through Him communicates itself to mankind as a redeeming and renewing power."

It is thus, we say, that the highest class of Ritschlian thinkers conceive of Jesus. We must emphasise, however, the words "the highest class." For this sketch of their thought of Jesus goes fairly to the limit of what can be said of Christ's dignity on Ritschlian ground. It not only, of course, gives

expression to views which would be deemed impossible by a Schultz, a Harnack, a Wendt, but it transcends also what a Kaftan, a Kattenbusch, a Loofs, a Bornemann might be willing to say. For the whole Ritschlian school Christ is not so much Himself God as the means by which God is made known to us, and the instrument through which we are brought to God—and it is therefore only that they are willing, in a modified sense, to call Him Divine. “The term Divinity, applied to Jesus, expresses at bottom” in Ritschl’s usage, says a careful expositor of his thought, “nothing more than the absolute confidence of the believer in the redemptive power of the Saviour.” “The Godhead of Christ, therefore,” says Gottschick, “expresses the value which the historical reality of this personal life possesses, as the power that produces the new humanity of regenerate and reconciled children of God.” It is common, indeed, for Ritschlians, like Herrmann, to repudiate altogether experience of the power of the exalted Christ, and to suspend everything on the impression made by “the historical Christ,”—and often, like Otto Ritschl, they mediate this through the Church to such an extent that Jesus appears merely as the starting-point of a movement propagated through the years from man to man; and He may therefore, without fatal loss, be lost sight of altogether. The Ritschlian conception of Christ must take its place as merely another of the numerous forms which the Humanitarianism of our anti-supernaturalistic age manifests.

For the characterising feature of recent theories of the person of Christ is that they are all humanitarian. The Kenotic theory, which tried to find a middle ground between the God-man and the merely-man Jesus having passed out of sight, the field is held by pure Humanitarianism. The situation is very clearly revealed in the classification of the possible Christological “schematisations” which Otto Kirn gives us in his *Elements of Evangelical Dogmatics*. There are only four varieties of Christology, he tells us, which we need bear in mind as we pass our eye down the labours in this field of all the



Christian centuries. These are, in his nomenclature, the Trinitarian, the Kenotic, the Messianic, and the Prophetic Christologies. The former two—the Trinitarian and the Kenotic—allow for a God-man; the first in fact, the second in theory. They are theories of the past. Only the Messianic and the Prophetic are living theories of to-day; and both of these give us merely a man Jesus. They differ only in one respect. Whereas in the Messianic Christology no less than in the Prophetic, Jesus in His self-consciousness as well as in His essential nature belongs to humanity and to humanity only, He is yet held in the Messianic Christology to be God's absolute organ for carrying out His counsel of salvation, and to be endowed for His work by a communication of the Holy Spirit beyond measure, fitting Him for unity with God and constituting Him the head of the community of God. The Prophetic Christology, on the other hand, looks upon Him as merely a religious genius, who in reaction upon His environment has become the unrivalled model of piety and as such the supreme guide to humanity in the knowledge of God and in the religious life. We may conceive of Jesus as the God-endowed man, or as the God-discovering man. In the former case we may see in Him God reaching down to man, to do him good: in the latter man reaching up to God, seeking good. Between these two conceptions we may take our choice: beyond them self-styled "modern thought" will not let us go.

Whether this reduction of Jesus to the dimensions of a mere man marks the triumph of modern christological speculation, or its collapse, is another question. The reduction of Jesus to the dimensions of a mere man was a phase of thought concerning His person which required to be fully exploited. And in that sense a service has been done to Christian thinking by the richness and variety of modern humanitarian constructions. Surely by now every possible expedient has been tried. The result is not encouraging. To him who would fain think of Him as merely a man, Jesus Christ looms up in history as ever more and more a mystery; a greater mystery

than the God-man who is discarded in His favour. Say that the union of God and man in one person is intrinsically an incomprehensible mystery. It is nevertheless a mystery which, if it cannot be itself explained, yet explains. Without it, everything else is an incomprehensible mystery: the whole developing history of the kingdom of God, the gospel-record, the great figure of Paul and his great christological conceptions, the rise and growth and marvellous power of nascent Christianity, the history of Christianity in the world, the history of the world itself for two thousand years—your regenerated life and mine, our changed hearts and lives, our assurance of salvation, our deathless hope of eternal life. And yet we are invited to believe Him to have been a mere man, on no other ground than that it is easier to believe him to have been a mere man than a God-man! For that, after all, is what the whole ground of the assertion that Jesus was a mere man ultimately reduces to. It is intrinsically easier to believe in the existence of a mere man than in the existence of a God-man. But is it possible to believe that all that has issued from Jesus Christ could issue from a mere man? Apart from every other consideration, does there not lie in the effects wrought by Him an absolute bar to all humanitarian theories of His Person? The humanitarian interpretation of the Person of Christ is confronted by enormous historical and vital consequences, impossible of denial, which apparently spring from a fact which it pronounces inconceivable; though, apart from this fact, these consequences appear themselves to be impossible of explanation.

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## THE SUFFERING OF GOD.

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PROFESSIONAL theologians know of many, and those not unimportant, controversies stirred up over the question of the Divinity of Christ, but one alone, the Arian, has impressed itself on the imagination of the Church at large as being of vital and eternal significance.

It was the view of Arius that the Son was God indeed, but that His Divinity was essentially different in kind from the Divinity of the Father. Backed up as it was by an influential section of the episcopate, and still more by the support of a succession of emperors, his view, or some slightly modified form of it, would probably have become the official doctrine of the Church but for the heroic resistance of Athanasius, the only one of the Fathers whom even Gibbon condescends to admire.

Doubtless the philosophical categories in which Athanasius and his opponents alike expressed the point at issue between them are unilluminating and even misleading to modern thought. To ask whether the Son was *ὁμοούσιος* or *ὁμοιούσιος*, *i.e.* of the same or merely of similar *substance* to the Father, only obscures the issue at stake to an age which does not think of God in terms of substance at all.

Modern thought conceives of God rather under categories, like mind or life or will. Transmute the Athanasian formulæ into these categories, and it is plain at once that it really is a vital question whether or not the Will-attitude, the ethical

aim, the value-judgments of Christ are identical with those of the God of whom He is the mirror. God is love, says St John; and it is a God whose *οὐσία*, whose essence, is love that is manifested in the life of Christ. If the life manifested in Christ is in its essential quality intrinsically alien to the life of God, "then is our preaching vain."

But though the religious instinct of the Church at large has never wavered in its loyalty to the cause championed by Athanasius, the Arian position, and positions in spirit allied to it, have always had some support. The strength of the Arian position is its recognition of a real distinction between God considered as the Absolute, and Christ the manifestation of God on earth—a recognition essential, as the Cappadocian Fathers saw, to any sane philosophy of religion, besides being one clearly implied in the Gospel narrative. The Monophysite cry, *Θεὸς σταυρώθεις ἡμῶν*, "God crucified for us," has no small value as a purely religious symbol; but the implication that the Christ who hung on the Cross is indistinguishable from the Father in Heaven offends equally against philosophy, common sense, and Scriptural tradition. It was because of its apparent affinity to positions like the Patripassian and Sabellian, which preceded it, that the Athanasian position had to fight so long and so hard for victory.

The fact, however, that I wish to press home is this, that, owing partly to the inadequate and misleading implications of the *οὐσία* terminology which was forced upon Athanasius by the philosophy of his time, partly to other causes, the victory of his position was never really won, except of course in words. The formula he fought for so nobly was accepted into the Creeds, but in so far as the *imagination* of the Church is concerned it has really been the Arian who has triumphed. And for practical religion the imaginative presentation of its creed counts for far more than its actual philosophical assertions. A few words will make this clearer.

From Greek philosophy the Church inherited a conception of God as an Absolute remote from the world, of whom



nothing but negatives can be predicated, a being in particular inaccessible to change and suffering. A quite different conception she inherited from the Old Testament—a God of Righteousness and of Judgment, a God alive and active, a God alike of mercy and of wrath, very different from the cold, bare abstraction of Greek philosophy.

A third conception of God as pre-eminently the loving Father came from the New Testament. Something of each of these conceptions was combined in the Church's conception of the First Person of the Trinity. The proportions in which they were blended would naturally vary with the different temperaments of different individuals. But in one point there was general agreement. The Hebrew imagination pictured God as dwelling in regal splendour in a far-off luminous Heaven remote from suffering and pain; and though even in the Old Testament another note is struck at times—"in all their afflictions he was afflicted," Is. lxiii. 9—it is only very rarely. Still less could Greek thought tolerate the idea that the Absolute could suffer. Thus the doctrine of the impassibility of God becomes a postulate of theology. But capacity to feel, and if need be to suffer, is surely involved in the very conception of God as love.

Men still spoke of the love of God: they only really meant it when they thought of God the Son; clemency at most—a royal prerogative—was imagined of the Father. God the Father is conceived as Majesty, God the Son as Love.

The Christian *Creed* acknowledges but one God and one quality of Godhead—so far Athanasius won his cause; but the Christian *imagination* has been driven by this postulate of the impassibility of God to worship two. Side by side sit throned in Heaven God the Father, omnipotent, unchangeable, impassible, and on His right hand God the Son, "passus, crucifixus, mortuus, resurrectus."

What is this but Arianism, routed in the field of intellectual definition, triumphing in the more important sphere of the imaginative presentation of the object of the belief?

What Christianity most needs to-day is a resolute reassertion in terms of modern thought of the principle championed by St John and Athanasius. Of the principle, I say, but not of the language. λόγος to us is a dumb word ; ὁμοούσιος even points us towards a static and purely intellectualistic conception contrary to the real spirit of the view of Athanasius. Darwin has taught us that everything that lives must develop, and development means such intrinsic modifications of the organism as shall adapt it to its ever-changing environment. If the adaptation is good, the vital principle will gain an added life ; if clumsy, it will just maintain its life until it can put forth a better ; but if it can put forth no new modification to meet the changing environment, it dies. The Christian religion is no exception to this universal principle, and in so far as belief cannot exist without some attempt to justify and express itself in intellectual categories, theology must and will revise and improve its terminology.

The modern world feels with an acuteness never felt before the problem of suffering and evil. So long as God is pictured to the imagination as living in regal splendour in a gorgeous heaven untouched by suffering and ill, there is no answer to the question, If God is, and God is good, why did He create a world of sin and pain ? Either there is no God, or He is not a good God, we say. Boldly press home the principles of St John and Athanasius, "He that hath seen me hath seen the Father," the Father is essentially as the Son, and all is changed. God Himself is seen to share the suffering He allows. More than that : by an eternal activity, of which the Death of Christ is both a symbol and also an essential part, He is everlastingly, at the cost of His own effort and His own pain, redeeming and perfecting the world He made.

Thus far I had written three years ago, with a view of clearing up my own mind on the subject, and had then laid the paper on one side. And of course I am aware that the



views I have expressed were even then no novelty, but merely a summary of a tendency which had for some time previously been making itself felt in theology. But I have been moved to print what I had written by reading a book by Mr C. E. Rolt, *The World's Redemption* (Longmans, 1913), in which the principles which I had myself been trying to work out clearly to my own mind are carried to their logical conclusion by means of a trenchant criticism and re-examination of the current conception of the meaning of the term Omnipotence as applied to the Divine. I am not prepared to go the whole way with Mr Rolt; in particular (although, or possibly indeed because, I make no pretence to be a metaphysician), I am not certain that his efforts to clear himself from the charge of postulating an ultimate dualism between God and matter are quite successful; but his main contention is so suggestive that, as the book, in spite of its brilliant style and profound thought, is practically unknown to theologians, I make no apology for presenting a summary of his position almost entirely in the author's own words.

In the growth of man's inward life the perception of the material world comes before his perception of the spiritual. His senses are the starting-point of all his spiritual consciousness. Hence it is almost impossible for words to deal directly with anything but the world of matter; thus the spiritual quality of men can but be suggested by appropriate metaphors. We speak of a man's character as deep, of his imagination as lofty, of his sympathies as wide, of his genius as splendid; and in every instance we are using a figure of speech borrowed from the world of matter and space.

Such language is but metaphor; therefore it is true, but therefore also it may be misleading, most of all so when we try to use it to express that inscrutable mystery of the Infinite which breaks loose from all fetters of man's finite thought and language. Thus we say that God is great, but the greatness of God differs from all earthly magnitude. It cannot be meted with a measuring rod or conceived in terms of material pro-

portion. We cannot say that it is so many—not even if we name an infinite number—of yards or miles or leagues in height or depth or vastness. He is infinitely great, yet He exists wholly and individually in this place and in that, and in any point or spot of the whole spatial world.

Hence follows the important principle that, whenever we apply to God any words drawn from the outward world of matter and of space, such words, while true and necessary as far as they go, will always become *wholly* false unless used in a purely spiritual sense.

Apply this principle to the interpretation of the fundamental theological concept of the Divine Omnipotence. Our first instinctive concept of omnipotence derives from two sources, the one from without us, the other from within. We see the avalanche and the volcano and the terrific cataclysms of Nature. We see the action of the winds and storms, of the cataracts and the ocean waves, as they pass along with resistless fury and drive before them all that would obstruct their course. We see above all things the working of one mighty law—that law of gravitation which nothing can resist.

Within us is the mysterious power of will. I will to move a stone from my path, my body obeys the impulse. The stone resists me, but I tear it from its place. I am using compulsion and brute force. If I succeed in uprooting it, then I am stronger than the stone; if it defies my efforts, then it is stronger than I.

Thus within us and without we see at work a principle of *force*. That thing we regard as the most powerful which can crush and coerce the rest. It is natural to approach the concept of Divine omnipotence from the point of view of this experience of the material world. Man is stronger than the ant, the avalanche is stronger than man, the mountain than the avalanche, until at last we come to One who is yet stronger than the Universe itself, who, just as a man by the act of his will moves the pebble from his path, so by the act



of an almighty will which nothing can resist bends all things to His purposes, and compels the whole material system to obey his irresistible commands.

But is not this virtually to conceive of the Divine omnipotence as a kind of infinite brute force—a conception which, on the face of it, does not appear particularly Christian, to say the least of it? Far nobler is the attribute of power as claimed by the sufferer in Shelley's *Prometheus Unbound*:

“To suffer woes which Hope thinks infinite;  
To forgive wrongs darker than death or night;  
To defy Power, which seems omnipotent;  
To love, and bear; to hope till Hope creates  
From its own wreck the thing it contemplates;  
Neither to change, nor falter, nor repent:  
This, like thy glory, Titan, is to be  
Good, great and joyous, beautiful and free—  
This is alone Life, Joy, Empire, and Victory.”

The power to crush opposition is the false power “which seems omnipotent,” and is the power of heathen Jove. But surely, is not the power here claimed by Prometheus a better analogue to that of the Christian's God?

But where the notion that God's omnipotence consists in an infinite “physical” force, with infinite power to do or to prevent, breaks down most conspicuously is in the face of the Problem of Evil. Evil is only ultimately and really evil because it is contrary to the will of God, and therefore, if in the “physical” sense God *could*, He also *would* prevent it.

The facts of this world form a Procrustean bed from which there is no escape. On to this bed our theological beliefs must all be placed, and they can ultimately survive the process only if they succeed in fitting themselves within it. Now, this is precisely what the conception of an omnipotence consisting in force cannot possibly do. If we put it upon the bed, we find that large portions of it are promptly lopped off; in fact, it loses its feet and cannot stand upright. Unable any longer to carry us, it requires to be carried by us instead: it needs the support of apologetics—a sure sign of decrepitude. And so

we try to perform the pious duty and to give it what first aid we can. We say that there is in God a principle of self-limitation whereby, though He has unlimited coercive power, yet He is prevented from using it; or else that omnipotence is a vague term; or else that the whole thing is beyond the range of our feeble minds. Anything, in fact, rather than give up the notion finally, completely, and absolutely.

And yet this is what must be done. The conception of a Being who possesses infinite coercive power in addition to infinite moral goodness will not through any human ingenuity fit the uncompromising bed. But there is another conception which will fit into it exactly. It is that of a Being whose omnipotence consists in His moral goodness and in nothing else. If God's power is itself nothing else than love, then all becomes clear and intelligible.

It is the nature of God, by patient meekness, to suffer ill, and, suffering it, to lead it into the paths of goodness. Even as He suffered the crime of Judas the traitor, and through it wrought our great Deliverance, so does He ever act throughout all time.

The forces of evil need space and time in which to assert themselves; and God needs space and time in order that, by enduring their assertion, He may win His gradual triumph. Hence the whole process of the world, and hence the almost incredible slowness with which its purpose is fulfilled. In meekness, in gentleness, in long-suffering and patience God endures the contradiction of blind and raging forces; He guides them little by little, as they allow His guidance, into definite channels; and slowly He changes the very things which thwart His tranquil power into a means for helping on His great redemptive purpose.

Thus—I am still quoting Mr Rolt's own words—we are saved from the degradation implicit in the ordinary religious attitude which bids us thank God for facts which our hearts condemn. Thus we are not passive slaves with mind and conscience fettered, but possess instead a glorious and



terrible liberty of untrammelled thought and action. The true Christian spirit is no spirit of acquiescence in things as they are; rather it is one of passionate though patient revolt. And, while it enables us to see that all things work together for good to those who love God, yet it also compels us to acknowledge that the universe does not in all its details express His holy will. All things, in fact, to some extent run counter to His will, inasmuch as nothing is perfect.

Such, briefly, are the conclusions towards which the latest efforts to think out the full implications of the doctrine of the Incarnation seem to be leading us. Truth is many-sided, and as new aspects catch our sight older and more important ones may for the moment be obscured, and in the eddies of theological tendency it is impossible for contemporaries always to be sure that the current by which they themselves are being carried along is that of the main stream; but I would dare to commend the position I have outlined to the serious consideration of religious thinkers as at least an aspect of the Truth.

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## MECHANISM, INTELLIGENCE, AND LIFE.

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THE so-called vitalistic hypothesis has itself in recent years shown fresh vitality. The great and rapid progress of physical science in the last century, and the new interpretation placed by Darwinism upon the word evolution, had led men to think that the processes of life and of the history of species might be wholly mechanical, and that only time and a knowledge of detail were needed to discover this. The successful do not readily admit that their progress can be barred; and those who see scientific success chiefly in substituting for problems of qualitative change problems of purely quantitative character desire to reduce to these the problems of life and even of understanding itself. What was achieved encouraged the more confident to declare everything achievable. But time, which was to bring us nearer to the goal of complete mechanical explanation, has revealed fresh difficulties in applying it even to matters where it had been supposed to have triumphed; and that confident morning has passed. Yet many men of science view with angry apprehension the revival of anti-mechanical conceptions; and in vitalism they think they see an enemy of progress, a theory inapplicable to the solution of any particular problems, like the theory of divine intervention, the "thus far and no farther" against which reason protests.

That scientific explanation ends where the factors on which vitalism insists come into play, I believe to be true. Whether



for all this these factors must be admitted is another question. It is far beyond me to determine this. The object of the present paper is rather to try and clear the issue by showing what exactly a mechanical explanation is, and in what a vitalistic theory must, so far as I can see, differ from a mechanical; it will, I think, appear that the real antithesis to mechanism is intelligence; and that vitalism assumes in living things activity such as nothing known to us except intelligence can show.

Every machine is an aggregate of parts, and these parts act variously one on another. Forces applied at certain points set parts moving; and their motions are communicated to other parts, or checked and modified by others, according to the divers ways in which the parts are conjoined or brought together. These various movements may result in some peculiar movement of one particular part, which we call the movement or the work of the machine, because the machine has been constructed as it has for the sake of this: *e.g.* in a watch, the movement of the hands; in a ship's engines, that of the screw; in a Nasmyth hammer, that of the descending block of steel. But there is no intelligence nor purpose in the actual movements of the machine; its parts would not have been thus put together, except by an intelligent being with a purpose—this I am at any rate not concerned to dispute; but when it exists, and the moving force is applied to it, I do not need to ascribe intelligence or purpose to the machine in order to explain why it performs its work. On the contrary, that is the only possible result of applying force to a particular member of a system of parts thus interlocked; and though the parts may be many, and their interactions complicated so that the movement of any one part is determined by many others, yet it is nothing more than the resultant of all the forces which are brought to bear on that part, and which would each severally produce or prevent some movement in it according to general mechanical principles.

This fact is important. In a mechanical explanation we

start from the principle of inertia. An isolated body at rest or in motion would continue thus moving or thus at rest indefinitely. If it is a member of a system of two bodies, they influence each other according to some law. Given this law, and the masses and velocities of the two bodies at a certain time, with the direction of their motion, it is a mere matter of calculation to determine how they will be moving—or what will be the condition of the system—at another time. We reach our conclusion by mathematical reasoning; nor do we take account of any design, or any result desired or judged to be good. Introduce a third member into the system. Each member is now interacting with the other two; its movements are determined by them together; but the movement of every one exemplifies as fully and necessarily the laws according to which it and every one other severally would behave when interacting, as if it were only interacting with that other. The calculation indeed may be more difficult, or altogether beyond the resources of our mathematics; but what we cannot calculate, each member of the system performs. This at least is the faith of mechanics. And it is the same however many members there are in the material system. The system, therefore, is a mere aggregate. Its behaviour is nothing but the mathematical resultant of the behaviour of its several parts. All transactions are at bottom transactions between one part and another part, and they all take place according to a law which is constant, though expressed in varying events. Hence, too, there is nothing really new. No unity, and nothing new: these are the characteristics of the purely mechanical.

I began with considering a machine like a watch or an engine, and I took as the members of a machine those large masses which we should distinguish from one another by the cohesion of their parts: roughly speaking, that is one part which so coheres as all to move together, like a piston-rod or a cog-wheel. I might have begun with the solar system, whose members are sun and planets and their satellites, which influ-



ence each other's movements manifestly without direct contact. But the behaviour of such masses is taken to be really the behaviour of the molecules composing them, and in the last resort of the atoms, or whatever those parts may be called, which are the least things ever requiring to be considered separately. There are doubtless difficulties about regarding even these as units; but since they have no parts that act independently, but each "moveth all together if it move at all," these difficulties are allowed to rest. These atoms, or what not, need not be treated as aggregates, because we need not distinguish their parts, if they have such: hence they are treated as units. They are not supposed ever to come into absolute contact with each other, but to influence each other's movements from a distance, attracting or repelling, as the masses which we count as members of the solar system influence each other's movements from a distance. And the amount of the influence exerted is a function, though by no means in every case the same function, of the distance.

Now there are, notoriously, difficulties in this view of things, to some of which I will briefly refer. In the first place, though there are parts which are treated as least parts and as units for the reason given above, it is difficult to understand their unity. We can, by a kind of picture-thinking, imagine them as each something which, if sufficiently magnified, would appear possessed of a definite figure: and this figure we can suppose preserved unaltered in every way throughout all time; the thing so figured suffers neither compression nor distortion nor disruption. But it occupies space, and therefore contains undivided parts, and if an aggregate of such things attracts or repels to the extent it does in virtue of the separate attractions or repulsions of its real or separate parts, each such thing should do so in virtue of the attractions or repulsions of its potential or undivided parts. Yet this argument will carry us *ad infinitum* in vain search of the real units, of whose influences the influence of an aggregate is the sum. And Leibniz was so much moved by this consideration that he declared it

impossible for extension to be the essence of body, as the Cartesians held, or for any real thing to be extended, and held that the reals must be monads, beings having rather a sort of spiritual unity.

Secondly, there is the problem of qualitative differences, and this takes two forms, as it involves or not the fact of sense-perception. The sensible qualities of things, whereby we distinguish one kind from another, are supposed to be nothing inherent in the things themselves. Sensible things look coloured, taste sweet, smell fragrant, feel rough or cold, are sonorous or dull-sounding to us in virtue of their constitution and the constitution of our organs of sense. But the ultimate parts composing both sensible things and our organs of sense (which are themselves sensible, though not always to us, nor always to others until they have ceased to function) have no such qualities: they are not perceived at all; they are held, however, to be extended, figured, solid, and to influence each other's movements variously, as already described. To perceive as we do is one of the manifestations of life in those aggregates which are called conscious. It is a result which cannot be mathematically deduced from any knowledge of the ways in which the ultimate real members of a material system are influencing each other's movements. Hence it remains unexplained. The same must be said of the fact of knowledge; and there are greater difficulties in treating knowledge as an unexplained result of such interactions than in so treating sense-perception: greater not because the production of the one is more inexplicable this way than the production of the other, for both are equally inexplicable, but because such an origin seems inconsistent with knowledge being knowledge. It may be urged that no theory explains sense-perception, nor knowledge either: but that the hypothesis of a soul does not help us, because we cannot see why a soul should behave as it is alleged to behave. But whatever degree of truth there may be in this retort, at least, if a mechanical theory will not explain everything, it is best to acknowledge the fact. And waiving the



inexplicability of sense-perception and of knowledge, we shall find it hard to understand what a mechanical theory is to make of those differences in things themselves called chemical which it supposes to exist. They show themselves, in the behaviour of atoms, by different degrees of affinity; but there must be something in an atom of oxygen which differentiates it from one of iron, and again from one of hydrogen, in virtue of which when iron is left in water the oxygen in the water leaves the hydrogen and combines with the iron. If the elements themselves were homogeneous, they must behave alike. Though we might calculate their movements therefore from some formula of their affinities, that will not express the nature of the difference between them. And it is hard to see how this difference can be stated quantitatively. Difference of specific gravity might be so stated, if it could be resolved into a difference in the closeness with which homogeneous units are aggregated; but the very homogeneity of units which is thus assumed as the basis of difference in specific gravity makes it all the more difficult to see what basis there can be for differences of chemical affinity: while if we regard difference of specific gravity as ultimate, and suppose that two absolutely solid bodies of equal volume can have different masses, it is equally difficult to conceive what it is in the body which is the ground for the differences in the force of gravitational attraction, or in the extent to which one causes another to move towards it, wherein differences of mass express themselves.

Thirdly, it may be asked how one body can determine movement in another. A mechanical science will give a formula enabling us to calculate to what extent it will do so, but that is all. Its doing so, and doing it always according to the formula, seems to involve (if we reflect) that these bodies have a nature of their own which cannot itself be expressed quantitatively. The need for supposing this we have already to some extent seen; and it seems still more necessary if one body is to combine in itself and express in one movement the effects of the action of many others; but we may add that the

*interaction* of bodies according to the same formula seems to imply a real unity pervading or connecting them all. And this unity cannot be explained by adding more units to the aggregate, of the sort which are already recognised as aggregated therein. But those who uphold a mechanical theory, so long as their formulæ are intelligible, and enable them to calculate the behaviour of aggregates from a knowledge of how these units would behave, any two of them together, will perhaps regard this last consideration as a sign of superfluous metaphysical apprehensiveness. It is, however, connected with a consideration which, in regard to organisms, is of the first importance.

Let us ask, then, having thus attempted to discover what we mean by a mechanical explanation, and wherein such explanation would be complete, what reasons there are for refusing to apply it to organisms, and in respect of what departure from such a theory a theory should be called vitalistic. Now, I suppose that speaking generally what we seem to find in organisms, as distinguished from machines, is a power of adaptive response to stimulus. Adaptive, however, is a relative word, and means adaptive to something. If we ask to what, we must say to the growth and preservation of the organism and the reproduction of its kind in other organisms by the processes of generation. If the organism *is* a machine, it is one which builds up and for a while renews its own parts, as other machines do not: and which produces other machines like itself, that begin their course, like it, as aggregates comparatively minute, and proceed like it to build up their own parts, and so forward in a perpetual succession.

Now, I will not enlarge upon the difficulty of supposing that a machine so complex as this, having all the apparatus needed for all the different reactions, without which such a result could not arise, could come together out of atoms that interact according to mathematical formulæ, by a process fundamentally the same as that whereby a system of particles may shake or settle down into a moving equilibrium. It will



be admitted that those who uphold a mechanical interpretation of life cannot show that such a machine is possible, but must rely on the inability of their opponents to show that it is not possible; and here perhaps they cannot properly avail themselves of Spinoza's observation that the powers of matter are very imperfectly known to us; for in principle they think we do know these powers, and it would rather be the possible complexity of a machine that is very imperfectly known to us. I will only say two things: first, that if organisms were such machines they would have no real unity, but would only be aggregates whose constantly shifting components preserved for a time a more or less constant grouping, like the constantly shifting particles which compose a dust-devil; secondly, that it is the view of many biologists, as it is the view also of those who are content with the *primâ facie* view of the facts, that an organism has a unity such as a dust-devil has not, and does respond to stimuli differently from a machine. What I want to discover is the nature and implications of this difference.

A machine, we saw, even if there is some unity other than what belongs to each of its ultimate parts, behaves in a way that can be calculated from the laws of the behaviour of its several parts *inter se*. These laws have nothing to do with the fact that the parts are brought together into any particular aggregate; they are the same for all aggregations of the parts, and therefore indifferent to any particular aggregation. Whatever response a particular aggregate or machine may make to stimulus, it will result from laws which have no special relation to that aggregate, which are equally exemplified in events that maintain it or disrupt it. It cannot therefore be said that any response is adaptive to the maintenance of an aggregate, except accidentally, *i.e.* that the aggregate is actually maintained as a result of it. There is nothing of the nature of purpose or design. And in particular the fact that if one response were made the aggregate would be maintained, and if another it would be disrupted, does not in any way influence the response. If an organism has a power of adap-

tive response, what does this imply in it to differentiate it from a machine?

It implies that the organism is not an aggregate of material parts: that there is an unity in it totally different from that of any of the members of such an aggregate: and that its behaviour cannot be calculated from the laws which express the behaviour of the material parts *inter se*. Let us call this unity, if anyone likes, a soul, or for the moment by a symbol dissociated from the implications of the word "soul": let us call it  $x$ . Now, the important thing to realise is that this  $x$  cannot be homogeneous with the parts of the material aggregate which we will now call *its* body, and cannot interact with them as they do with one another. For otherwise it would not be the sort of unity required. Our position was that an organism is not an aggregate of material parts, whose total behaviour is explicable from, and at bottom is, the behaviours of those parts *inter se*, expressible in formulæ from which it can be calculated. The reason for taking up this position was, that the organism responds adaptively to stimulus, *i.e.* that its responses are determined, at least to some extent, by the fact that they maintain it in being, and help it to function in determinate ways, and not merely by those attractions and repulsions between its parts or between them and bodies outside it, which have their play indifferently in what maintains it in being and in what destroys it. Of what use, then, can it be to suppose the organism to contain an additional part  $x$ , interacting with the rest in the same mechanical way as they with one another? The difficulties in the mechanical view did not arise from the precise number of the parts in the machine, and will not be removed by adding one to the number. The problem will break out again. If the behaviour of such additional part is subject to mechanical laws, and calculable accordingly, like that of the other parts, we must look again beyond it for the unity we seek.

We saw that there was some reason to think that even a mechanical system could not be understood as a mere aggre-



gate, but that some kind of unity must be supposed that was not like any of the parts of the aggregate. But that unity, if there is such, differs from the unity of an organism in two important respects. Firstly, it will not be the unity of any one aggregate, whereas the unity of an organism is the unity of that organism and not another. The unity, if any, presupposed by a mechanical system will belong equally to all aggregates for the reason that, although the groupings of the ultimate parts of matter may bring some into closer conjunction than others for a time, yet their mutual behaviour illustrates the same laws, whether they are near or far, or at least whether it be these or those particles of a given sort, with which they are interacting. As there is nothing in their behaviour directed to the preservation of a particular grouping, there is nothing which can be regarded as the soul of that group, or in less questionable language, as an unity directing the reactions of that group more than of any other. The mechanical system is one and not many. Organisms, on the other hand (if they do display adaptive response or variation), have their separate individuality: though the relation of these individuals to each other is a further problem. This thought is, of course, conveyed by talking about *self*-preservation as the first law of nature: merely mechanical aggregates are not selves: only the whole preserves itself: partial aggregates dissipate into one another, and the whole and its laws are the same throughout. The second difference between the unity of a mechanical aggregate, if there be any, and of an organism is this, and it would have to be recognised even if the first were denied and particular groups were allowed their several unities: the unity of the mechanical aggregate is ineffective, and its changes are deducible from the principles of interaction between any two parts, without any account taken of anything else; this, indeed, is part of what is meant by calling it mechanical. But the unity of an organism determines the reactions of the organism in a way which could not be deduced from any knowledge of the principles in accordance with which

the parts would interact mutually without it. Nor can they be deduced from a knowledge of that and a knowledge of the way wherein the unity, our  $x$ , interacts with each part; for to suppose that would be to make of it another part like to the rest, in the way which we have seen to be inadmissible, because not satisfying the problem proposed. And this difference between an organism and a machine is very important, and it explains the reluctance of many to conceive of an organism as having any unity of this kind. For there would really be a limit to our powers of explanation at the point where the influence of the organism as an unity is invoked. We might, indeed, learn empirically how it behaves; but we should never be able to deal with it as with the material parts. It would not be measurable like them in respect of such and such physical properties, so that its changes and theirs could be connected by any equation. And, if it is not so measurable, its power to modify the reactions of its body cannot be limited in advance. Doubtless that power is limited, but we cannot ascertain its limits, as we ascertain the limit of the earth's power to deflect the moon by measuring its mass. There will remain something in the organism, so long as it lives, unexhausted by its activities hitherto; and its behaviour can never be wholly predictable.

There is a special interest in this consideration, because of its connection with two characters often claimed for man, and one at any rate for all organisms—viz. uniqueness and freedom. So long as we suppose an organism to be nothing more than an aggregate of unchangeable least parts, interacting according to laws, there need be nothing to distinguish one organism from another except the combination of these parts. Perhaps no two combinations are exactly alike; but their differences can be resolved into those of their elements, and so accounted for; and the elements themselves may, for all our mechanical theory has to say, be (as Clerk Maxwell thought them) like manufactured articles repeated according to pattern. But if there is in each organism an unity not resolvable into parts, it



can at least never be shown false that every such unity is different from every other, or unique. And this unity, as not resolvable into parts, so far as it determines the behaviour of the organism, will determine it unpredictably. It has often been considered that if action is predictable it cannot be free. Some have endeavoured to meet this objection, so far at least as it is connected with the divine fore-knowledge, by saying that God knows future contingents not by deduction from their causes, but as we know the objects of present observation. That expedient implies that if future events could be known beforehand by deduction from present events, they could not be free; and such a contention seems justified. Now, it is clear that that kind of prediction depends on our being able to determine precisely the nature of the elements, in a subject to which the predicted change is to occur, and the laws of their interaction. An unity not resolvable into elements interacting according to laws cannot be so treated; its powers can only be learned by its behaviour. From this we may be able to form some notion of its nature, and hence in turn to anticipate how it will behave on other occasions, but our knowledge of its nature, drawn from what we have observed of its behaviour, can never be so precise as to enable us to determine exactly the limits of its powers. There will always be what I may call unexhausted resources in it, so far as we can tell; and any behaviour in which these are manifested will spring from the nature of the subject that displays it, and will therefore be its own.

Hence there are two characteristics, which those who desire to maintain the freedom of man seek to vindicate for him, that will belong to the action of such a subject: (i) that his acts will be his own, not traceable to the nature of something else, such as the parts of which a machine is composed—such a being will be, in Aristotle's phrase, an ἀρχὴ πράξεων, or originator of actions; (ii) that we shall never be in a position to say that a man cannot in the future act differently to his custom in the past. On the other hand, it does not follow from the

nature of such a subject as the unity which we have described, that we may say he could have acted otherwise than he did. This unity may produce from itself what it does produce necessarily: we cannot anyhow suppose its resources to be altogether undefined and limitless; we may suppose them to be quite definite, so that if it could be replaced in the past situation it would behave in the same way. I am inclined to think that such necessity in action is not incompatible with the freedom which morality requires. We do not the less regard God as a free agent because we conceive him incapable of doing wrong; for we think his actions to be really his, and not due to the influence on him of anything else. Similarly, if we really thought that a man's actions were his own, and not due, *e.g.*, to the fact that his ancestors had been drunken or dissolute, temperate or brave, we should regard him as a free agent. It is perhaps worth while to notice that we do not consider a man unfree when he thinks coherently, although if he is rational he is bound to think that way: we are more inclined to regard him as unfree in his thinking if from pain or some other non-rational influence he thinks incoherently. This is because an intelligence has just such an unity as no aggregate can have, and we ascribe the issue to the activity of this intelligence and nothing else.

There are no doubt many difficulties in reconciling the existence of such unities as I have tried to describe with other of the facts of organic life. The character of any one organism seems to be bound up very closely with those of others, its ancestors in the way of generation, whereas these unities are not explicable from anything else. Biologists talk of heredity freely, and do not all of them seem to realise the difficulty of the conception; some of those who do, and substitute for it that of an identical subject, the continuous germ plasm, might be puzzled to explain how this is identical throughout the evolution which it undergoes, when it neither remains composed of the same material particles nor preserves through the change of particles composing it the same structure



and power. They might also find it harder to maintain the identity of the germ plasm in collateral and highly differentiated organisms, than of the germ plasm in the members of a single linear ascendant series; yet if there is a real identity of the germ plasms through successive generations, so that that of an ape to-day is the same with that of its remote prevertebrate ancestor, and if this is the ancestor of an elephant of to-day as well, then, since the common ancestral germ plasm is identical with the germ plasms of ape and elephant, these must somehow be identical with each other. But I do not escape from the difficulties which beset the conception I am stating by pointing to equal or greater difficulties besetting the conceptions which find more favour with the mechanistic biologist; and I must freely admit that it is a grave problem for the vitalist to determine how the unity of an organism, being something not resolvable into pre-existing parts, like the body, should yet, as it would appear, be determined in its nature, at least in large measure, by its relations to parents and ancestors generally, as the body is. The problem is, after all, the old problem of the genesis of a soul. Yet, before it drives us into admitting that there is nothing but the body, and that this, because its genesis presents nothing new, does not raise the same difficulty, we should remember that there are other things besides these questionable souls which, whether generated and destroyed or not, seem at least now to be, and formerly not to have been: such things as works of art, or natural beauty, or moral action, or the knowledge possessed by individuals. For the emergence of any of these may be connected with complex relations among things that exist before and after their emergence, but we cannot really sustain the thesis that any of them is those things in new relations.

And this reflection brings us to consider more closely some of these instances. The non-mechanical behaviour of an organism for which vitalism contends would fall to the ground if there were no unity in it; and, as I said at the outset, I have been concerned rather to make clear

what is implied in denying the adequacy of the mechanical hypothesis as to the nature of living things than in determining whether it is inadequate. But at any rate we are aware of certain processes which are not mechanical, those of a rational intelligence. And we may realise this if we consider artistic creation or speculative thought.

To this end, let us look first at what *is* like a mechanical process in the mind. Association of ideas, in which one school of philosophers or psychologists has sought a key to unlock all the mysteries of mind, is in principle mechanical. So far as transitions of thought are determined according to principles of association, the reason why I now pass from thinking of *a* to thinking of *b* is that I thought of them together in the past. If I have thought of *a* in conjunction with several other objects, *b*, *c*, and *d*, I shall pass from thinking of *a* to thinking of one or other of these according to the comparative recency, frequency, or what not of the past conjunctions. The conditions are many and variable: but one way or another, what determines transitions of thought is not any real connections between one element and another in the nature of the things thought of, but relations quite irrelevant thereto between past acts of thought. It is indeed—the point is become, since Mr Bradley, a commonplace of criticism—hard to conceive how past are to exert influence upon present acts of thought, if the mind is but a stream or series of states or activities. I am concerned, however, only with the conditions of the influence: and it cannot be disputed that on associationist principles an act of thought is determined to arise in the mind as the result of its relations to a great number of other such particular acts, in the same way as a molecule of water, let us say, is brought to the top of a wave as the result of its relations of interaction to countless other molecules, and theirs to one another. The school may talk about ideas or perceptions or presentations, instead of acts of thought: and it may swallow the difficulties connected with the recurrence of a particular idea. But our main point is



that what I think now is due to past conjunctions of these so-called ideas, and these did not depend on any intelligible and necessary connection between the elements conjoined. "All fancies," says Hobbes, "are motions within us, relics of those made in the sense: and those motions that immediately succeeded one another in the sense continue also together after sense: insomuch as the former coming again to take place, and be predominant, the latter followeth, by coherence of the matter moved, in such manner as water upon a plane table is drawn which way any one part of it is guided by the finger." This is clearly something mechanical, though Hobbes would have been hard put to it to show how the simile is applicable where there is a "passionate thought to govern and direct those that follow to itself, as the end and scope of some desire, or other passion." And later writers have tried to drop the movements of matter, retaining only those of ideas. But their theories abolished all apprehension of necessary connections in things, in favour of connections between apprehensions that were really nothing but psychical states, or at most nothing but apprehensions of psychical states; and the crowning triumph of their analysis, the theory of the inseparable association of ideas, explains to us that when we judge that  $x$  must be or cannot be  $y$ , what really happens is that because of their very frequent conjunction in the past, or their never having been conjoined, the one idea cannot now arise without arousing or barring out the other—though how we could judge  $x$  not to be  $y$  when  $y$  cannot arise in the mind remains a mystery.

Now, something like this "association" does no doubt determine many transitions in the mind. But in an intelligent process I am not led to pass from thinking of  $x$  to thinking of  $y$  because of any conjunction in my previous thoughts of them; on the contrary, I discover by thinking what I had not known before, I trace the connections of the facts; and another man does it better than I, not because the past conjunctions of his so-called ideas were different, but because he is more intelligent. When, indeed, I try to describe the process, so as to show why

I think thus, I cannot do it ; for I must either borrow the mechanical scheme of explanation, which is here false and inapplicable, or just repeat what happens in intelligent thinking. But I confess that when I reflect on that, I find myself bound to acknowledge in it something wholly different from “ association of ideas ” : something wherein a halting and confused apprehension clears itself up ; wherein there is genuine development, so that I can say at the end that my knowledge is the fulfilment of my previous more or less ignorant groping and questing. And the nearest analogous experience seems to lie in artistic production. I speak diffidently, as being no artist ; but I suppose a man conceiving a play or story, or designing a building or a picture, begins by being vaguely aware of what he seeks : and as he broods, this or that more definite detail occurs to him, and is seen to belong to what he seeks, or not ; but herein he does not just pick out from a mass of everything suitable or unsuitable, which may be suggested according to links of association, what is seen when presented to fit in best ; but the consciousness of the general nature of what he seeks somehow controls the movements of thought wherein detail suggests itself—that is Hobbes’ “ passionate thought ” or “ end and scope ” ; so that the thing sought might be said to reveal itself under the effort of his thinking, not by aggregation but as the bud reveals itself (or so we think until we try to describe life mechanically) in the flower. No mental advance is by aggregation ; aggregation is transference of something hither from elsewhere ; and the parts aggregated have no unity but their togetherness. When knowledge grows, when a design, as we say, takes shape, it is not by transference from another mind of what I now know or conceive, and did not know or conceive before. None is robbed by my gain ; another need not be less an artist because I am more. Nor is the new merely added to the old ; but the old is transformed into the new, so that nothing need be quite the same ; and what is known or conceived in a story or design, is all interconnected the more as the knowledge is more complete or the



art better—a thing not statable in mechanical terms, in which even the simplest judgment disappears as a mere co-presence of ideas, a simultaneous thinking of two things: though this clearly is not judgment, since whether I judge that life is mechanical or that it is not, I think of the same two things together, and when I think at once of Gog and Magog I do not judge one to be the other.

In the progressive understanding, then, of a subject of thought, or working out of a subject of art, we have change which is not explicable as a rearrangement of elements in accordance with the laws of their interaction, *i.e.* is not mechanical: in which something new emerges, and yet the new is so related to the old that it can be regarded as developing out of it. But these processes go on in a mind or—to speak more generally—in a soul: they are processes in a soul displaying it at its most intelligent; they are not the only processes in which a soul seems to change not by aggregation but by growth. And what I have said of them might be said of the soul or mind as a whole. This is the thing of which we may say with confidence that it develops or grows. The term growth was no doubt first applied to the body, to plant or animal, as a material thing: but it was applied to them in a sense in which on the mechanical hypothesis it is inapplicable. For everyone would admit that to speak of the growth of a flood or sand-bank or a crowd was metaphorical: that strictly they do not grow; and that admission means that aggregation is not growth. If, then, the history of the bodily organism is one of aggregation merely, though the aggregation may exhibit law (as does that of a sand-bank) yet it will be really of the same character with the processes which are called growth only metaphorically, and will itself not properly deserve the name. Of the mind, however, we cannot refuse to admit that what comes to be is what was imperfectly before. And as the “passionate thought” directs the mind in study, or the vague though passionate thought of the complete work of art directs it in designing, so it seems as if the nature of the mind helped

to direct the process by which it is developed. Hence the failure of psychology when it attempts to explain how we come to apprehend things in space by starting from feelings as data, and the laws of association or reproduction whereby these are revived and integrated: hence the mythological character of objectification and reification, or noetic synthesis, if these are anything more than new names for an achievement which is no more explicable by psychology than vital processes, on the vitalistic hypothesis, are explicable physiologically. The psychologist and the physiologist may indeed discover conditions without which the achievement would not occur; but they must admit a factor which escapes their treatment because it does not operate mechanically. Hence, too, the failure of an ethics which starts from man as a being with only animal impulses, and tries to end with moral man, yet thinks the change can be explained by the mere complication of what it started from. Even Aristotle, who had a much clearer perception of the problems connected with the conception of growth than most biologists or philosophers,<sup>1</sup> hardly seems to see in his ethics that mere repetition cannot explain how a man who begins by doing virtuous acts of any kind because he is told to do them, or for fear of punishment, should end by doing them virtuously because he sees that he ought to do them, or that they are good.<sup>2</sup> Habit, indeed, as has been urged by Professor J. A. Smith, may be said to be a differentia of living—at any rate of conscious—things. What is inorganic, anyhow, can acquire no habits. The ship that finds herself, the machine that runs better after a little use, do not really acquire habits. Use or wear and tear affect their parts, so that they yield better results than before; but these parts are after all aggregates; and there is no unity which becomes by repeated activity so differenced that its nature shows itself now in different activities from heretofore.

<sup>1</sup> v. *De Gen. et Corr.*

<sup>2</sup> I owe this remark, as well as the next, to Professor J. A. Smith's conversation.



We may feel dissatisfied with Aristotle's phrases when he says that the form is efficient in determining its own realisation in the individual, or recurs, as he so constantly does, to the antithesis of "act and power." But it is difficult to find any satisfactory phrase; for the thing to be indicated can be brought under no more familiar conception. Wherever we can speak of development there is the same thing to be noticed, even if the successive subjects in which it is displayed have not grown one out of another. Students of culture talk of the development of a style: comparative anthropologists set before us tools or weapons or ornaments of successive dates, arranged in series: and unless it is nonsense to speak of the development displayed in them, we must admit that there is something, not physical or sensible, a form, which is more fully revealed in the later, less fully in the earlier; but that they do not think it nonsense is implied by the fact that they will often date members of the series relatively to each other by the degree of this development. Nor could we otherwise mean anything by the word "progress." As has been often pointed out, the genealogy of a species need not, on Darwinian principles, display a progress; for to be later in the series is not to be higher or better, and may quite well involve the disappearance or diminution of what was more fully present in earlier members of it. How should men speak of degeneration or diskinding—"Entartung"—if they did not naturally distinguish between progress and succession? succession is as much involved in regress. It may be hard to be sure one has detected the true line of progress—to recognise in the germ what one can see in its completeness; and the biologist is not alone in being faced with the problem of divergent development, wherein it may be hard also to say which of the developed forms displays more fully or truly what was present in the nature of the earliest member of the series. But it is not really clear analysis or competent thinking to shut our eyes to differences, or force the lucidity of mechanical formulæ upon facts which are really not of that nature.

Nor in principle is the problem a different one as it concerns the growth or development of an individual, and as it concerns the evolution displayed in the history of a race. I do not mean that the latter, and again the evolution displayed in a series whose terms are not connected by natural generation, do not raise their own questions. But as far as the notion of development is concerned—the coming to be more fully of what was less fully realised before—the problem is the same; and it is the same so far as that in none of its forms can it be solved mechanically, or the process resolved into aggregation.

The biologist indeed may prefer to talk no more of progress or degeneration: to say that from the impartial standpoint of science no species, and indeed no individual, is higher than another, but only more capable of leaving offspring, or more useful or pleasing to men. He may deny that plants and animals grow, in any proper sense of the word, or—if he thinks the proper sense is the sense justified by his science—in any other sense than that in which a flood or a sand-bank grows. But he cannot deny that the mind grows in another sense than this, that rational thinking and design are processes in which the result is not explicable from the laws displayed in the interaction of parts, but that something which may be called the unity, or the whole nature, of the mind or the soul is at work in the very process by which it comes to fuller display. And if we must allow it there we cannot correlate this mental development with a cerebral change that moves on disparate lines; and we may be inclined to think, without wishing to check any of his inquiries, that life may after all have in it as much of intelligence as of machinery. At any rate he should look his own theories in the face, and see clearly what he affirms and what he denies, when he repudiates anything—call it vitalism or what you will—that goes beyond the simple assumptions of the physicist.

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# ONE AVENUE TO GOD : A TRANSCRIPT OF EXPERIENCE.

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## I.

“One avenue was shaded from thine eyes,  
Through which I wandered to eternal truth.”

KEATS' *Hyperion*.

I WANT to describe that avenue. Not for one moment do I suggest that I alone have traversed it. Rather, as these pages will show, part of the way I have been cheered by footprints of others. Yet is it my way, and not that of the majority of those religious persons with whom I associate.

To men of a certain school the accepted theoretic position of the Christian religion is apparently satisfactory. Christianity, they affirm, is an historical religion. Its foundations are in events and are to be tested by the ordinary tests of history. Its origins must be investigated by scholarship. And, “Once we have laid stress upon historical events as vital to our position, we cannot warn the critic off. Where history is, the critic has the right to come. . . . Such an inquiry has obvious risks. If it be free, and any other type of investigation is worthless, then it must have an open mind with reference to its possible results. The chance of unfavourable decision must inevitably be taken. Let us not delude ourselves with the idea that we can stop when we are half through.” Quite so, and that may be very well for the accomplished scholar<sup>1</sup> whose words I have quoted, but, in

<sup>1</sup> Dr Arthur S. Peake in *Christianity : its Nature and its Truth*, pp. 140–1.

the meantime, *what is to happen to my soul?* What am I to make of the contradictions of scholars? Am I really to balance all the relevant passages of a *Hastings' Dictionary of the Bible* and an *Encyclopædia Biblica* with the associated literature? Must I, indeed, travel with Professor Schweitzer all the way "from Reimarus to Wrede," perhaps at the end of the journey to be informed by Professor Peake that my guide was not a wise one? On the other hand, dare I ignore these people? An Oxford Professor of poetry once wrote:

"I have a life with Christ to live,  
But, ere I live it, must I wait  
Till learning can clear answer give  
Of this and that book's date?"

To that question he answered, No. But he did not show any way to Christ, except the way of a frightened child. And the soul has its intellectual rights. One cannot, indeed, even to get saved, separate spiritual satisfaction from mental process. How are the men—and there are multitudes of them—who know of the existence of relentless critical controversy to answer the question which, for Christendom at least, means so much, "What is the truth about Jesus Christ?"

Readers of Martineau's *Types of Ethical Theory* will remember an interesting passage in his treatment of Greek philosophy, in which he brings into striking relation the dialectic and the myth of Plato's writings. "If from the complex tissue of Plato's thought we try to isolate the ethical elements for separate estimate, we must not hastily assume that they all legitimately belong to his theory of the world, but must carefully consider whether they are to be credited to his system or to his personality. . . . Had he been able to justify his irresistible convictions of right and wrong by rigorous dialectic, he would not have dispensed with that severer security, and left them to depend on the persuasive charms of his symbolic myths. But there was a limit at which his metaphysics stopped short of the exigencies of his poetic and spiritual nature, and, bringing his counted steps



to an end, compelled him to take wing and pass the barrier through the air and in the light of intuitive truth" (*Types*, i. 109). That presents the dualism which we often find ourselves employing in our perplexed search after Reality. A similar antithesis confronts us in the present situation of Christian thought. On the one hand, we have "the counted steps" of a philosophical preparation, succeeded by knowledge of historical criticism and at last a creed of some kind, or the semblance of one. On the other hand, is there not something within us which offers a more immediate method, the taking wing with Plato, whereby we may "pass the barrier through the air and in the light of intuitive truth"? The object of this paper, couched largely in the language of personal experience, is to show such a method as safe and effective for those to whom religious authority must be sought within the circle of the soul's contact with God.

## II.

The first thing we must ask concerning the general portraiture of Jesus Christ in the Gospels, and the words attributed to Him, is not, "Did these things really so happen? Are these sayings authentic or not?" but, "Are these things and words true? Do I find spirit and life in them, so that I proceed to treat God as revealed by them?" Thus, when I look at the story of the Passion of Christ and see the manner of His death, its fidelity and obedience, mingled with such love and pity for Jerusalem, the vital question arises, "Do I believe that the Creator is as Jesus was in His sacrifice and love?" It does not affect that question, in the first place, that some men may dispute the correctness of the narrative as history. *Is God like that?*

"'What think ye of Christ,' friend? When all's done and said,  
Like you this Christianity or not?  
It may be false, but will you wish it true?  
Has it your vote to be so if it can?'"<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> "Bishop Blougram's Apology."

Here is a question I can answer without regard to any controversy of critics or of theologians. My answer to it will be regulated by the extent of my confidence in the vitality of Goodness, while this, again, is ever the fruit of deep ultimate things in the soul. There is a challenge of the universe which goes right home to the centre of life in us, in the untutored as well as in the learned. What finally rules? What is the Goal of things? What the Law and the Authority? And the answer which a man gives to this challenge will depend upon the measure in which he himself is good or evil, not in positive accomplishment but in vital desire, while as he shapes his response he further shapes himself. The just man believes that justice finally prevails because he feels in himself its moving spirit and authoritative verdicts. And if there be a man in whose tortuous life cunning and selfishness are entirely dominant, that man, if he thinks of God at all, will be tempted to fancy that God is "altogether such an one as himself." Our working and actual creed is framed not according to dialectic skill, but according to the stir and quality of moral instinct resident in our spirit.

If such a judgment as this is possible to us, there will be a real value in looking at the Christ-portrait in the Gospels as a thing that exists, apart from all questions as to how it came to be drawn and presented to us. And looking thus, perhaps I shall come to say with a recent writer—though the point of view is not so recent as the verse:—

"If He lived or died, I do not know,  
For who shall disprove the words of the dead,  
And who may approve of the wisdom they said,  
That lips of dust uttered so long ago?  
And where He is buried, I may not know.

If He lived or died, I cannot say,  
But loneliness knows the sound of His name;  
That men could imagine such love is the same  
To me as a living of yesterday,  
And words which God speaks are the prayers men say."<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Coningsby Dawson, *The Worker, and Other Poems*, p. 82.



Now it is here that the note of experience begins to sound clearly. To speak of it at all is to lay bare very sacred moments of one's life. That I venture to do so is only because the careful examination of personal experience—no matter who the experient is—affords material for religious certitude more valuable than merely intellectualistic reasonings can ever be.

If, then, I may make my confession, this point was the beginning of the straightening of my path, and, when I reached it, a long, clear beam came down to me, making morning through the trees. No words can ever describe the relief it brought to my spirit. I was like Bunyan's Christian at the Cross. For to me there was only one answer possible to the question which I had determined was the vital one. None could ever conceive and formulate the Christ-idea of the Gospels, whether by way of record or through imagination by art, without it were given him "from above." And I recalled Goethe's famous saying concerning the Christian religion: "It is a height to which the human species were fitted and destined to attain, and from which, having once attained it, they can never retrograde."

Yet, when I saw these things, I was only at the beginning of my way. Happily, one thing was irresistibly borne home to me: whenever in their discussions about Divine things men become bitter, or censorious, or harsh, that condition is the sure sign they have missed God Himself. The flame of the Holy Spirit has no smoke. The man who touches Reality is filled with an awe that solemnises and liberalises all his being. So, from the intense stillness of the Divine glory, believed in through "Jesus," one came to realise how full and manifold is the grace given to men. Many avenues converge upon God. Glimpses of companying souls bring home the certainty of a universal experience in numberless forms. As John Woolman writes: "There is a principle which is pure placed in the human mind, which in different places and ages hath had different names; it is, however, pure, and proceeds from God. It is

deep and inward, confined to no forms of religion, nor excluded from any, when the heart stands in perfect serenity. In whomsoever this takes root and grows, they become brethren." Such a charity of thinking has enabled me to remain unmoved, when some of my religious friends have insisted upon the necessity of particular forms of doctrine for the Christian salvation. The Love in which our manhood is constituted recognises Love, and attests it as both the Way and the End.

### III.

I feel if this is to be a faithful transcript of experience I must not hesitate to confess the next step, although, because to me the sacredness becomes more intimate, I would rather pass it by. In my professional work a tremendously difficult task was laid upon me—a task from which I shrank back in dread and helplessness. Driven to prayer, I approached God through the way I have described. I believed Him to be Christly, yet a sense of vastness and reality overwhelmed me. Words failed me. In my distress the most effectual formula of prayer I used was this: *Thou whom I cannot name*. I am not sure how far my previous pleading contributed, but the response to that cry appeared miraculous, and, indeed, I have no other opinion about it now in my later reflection. It led me, however, into a new phase of experience, into a fresh conflict. For, when the crisis of my difficulty was passed, the thought suggested itself that, having reached God in an immediate contact and through a prayer the reverse of theological, Jesus Christ was not essential to my spiritual life. I might use the Scriptures about Him for edification, but I could cheerfully put aside all questions concerning His Person as irrelevant to experience. From the moment this view commended itself to me, my hold upon the Unseen Presence was gone. Something had happened in my inner life, like the shaving of Samson's locks.

After the first sense of desolation, there came the suggestion that in this very bereavement of strength was a new



*datum* requiring thought, and that a further stretch of the Way was opened, in which the end might no longer be visible and yet be nearer than ever. What did my loss signify? This I pondered until I saw that the historical Jesus must be in some way identified with the great Unnamed Good, upon whom in extreme need I had cast myself, and, therefore, that He would be the reverse of unimportant to experience. I saw then that the "inspired-Galilean-peasant" category would never satisfy the case. So I was back at the old task, but with something gained in respect to Reality, and with a new sense of awe. At the same time the authority of priest or expert *for the inner necessities of my soul* was as distasteful as ever. Lowell's lines rang in my ears continually:

"If sometimes I must hear good men debate  
Of other witness of Thyself than Thou,  
As if there needed any help of ours  
To nurse Thy flickering life, that else must cease,  
Blown out, as 'twere a candle, by men's breath,  
My soul shall not be taken in their snare,  
To change her inward surety for their doubt  
Muffled from sight in formal robes of proof:  
While she can only feel herself through Thee,  
I fear not Thy withdrawal."<sup>1</sup>

I had accepted the "Jesus" of the Gospels as the symbol of God. I had ventured my soul upon God, relying that the Jesus symbol was at least a *portion* of the Truth. It seemed that the crippling of my strength had come in through an almost subconscious conclusion that in this case what was symbolically true was not historical fact as well. Therefore I went over some of the way again. If the symbol was true, God was Fatherly, whatever else He might be. Then might I not, I asked, in reattempting the problem of Jesus, work back from the Fatherhood of God to an historic fact of Incarnation, as necessitated by the character of God so described? Let me illustrate the point from literature. In more than one of his poems Horace pays a beautiful tribute to his father, "the best of fathers"; he relates how his father used to go

<sup>1</sup> "The Cathedral."

with him to his classes,<sup>1</sup> and sit with him while he was under tuition, advising him in all the company he kept, looking at the boy's life from the boy's side. So it came to me that the highest thing man can ever think of God, and therefore the truest thing, is that which sums up all revelation in the watch-word "Emmanuel." Surely it was Fatherly for God to come in some form fuller than that of an imperfect prophet-saint. Would He have been perfect Father if He had not crowned all past and partial revelations by such a gift of Himself as simple souls could accept? For perfect love must needs be a self-gift as complete as the recipient can welcome. Hence I saw that to deny the Incarnation is both to imperil the doctrine of the Fatherhood and to belittle the capacities of Man. I concluded that the Incarnation was Fatherhood's most nearly complete and expressive sympathy, the chosen and necessary mode—forgive the paradox—of the approach of Perfect Life to that which is fragmentary and faulty.

#### IV.

But, next, how should the Incarnation be reconciled with earthly life, that is, how should it be seen in its setting? Looking back over the history of our race, prior to the birth of Christ, I was reminded of the striking apothegm of a modern scholar, "The main religious history, not only of Semitic but also of Aryan races, converges to Christ, and radiates again from Him."<sup>2</sup> And surely no wise apprehension of the Incarnation will neglect to relate it to both past and future. All human life must ever have had some participation in the Divine life, reaching up to and overshadowed and nourished by that all-encompassing Presence in whom every man lives and moves and has his being. There is a Divine Immanence with a Divine Transcendence. But the doctrine of the Immanence of God is in no necessary conflict with faith

<sup>1</sup> "Ipse mihi custos incorruptissimus omnes circum doctores aderat." *Satira*, Liber I. vi. 81-2; cf. *ibid.* iv. 103-129.

<sup>2</sup> Dr Bennett in *Faith and Criticism*, p. 43.



in the Incarnation. Rather in the Incarnation do we see the very blossom and fruitage of God's Immanence. Of the joy of those Hebrew saints, such as Simeon and Anna, who were permitted to see the Lord's Christ, we may say in the language of a Messianic prophecy, "They joy before Thee according to the joy in harvest."<sup>1</sup> The Bethlehem manger was God's garner.

Thinking such things as these, I have reapproached the Gospels with a faith which requires them not simply as symbols but as history—history, of course, in a fairly free sense of the term. Under the guidance of criticism I can make detailed readjustments in the course of the narratives with neither timidity nor haste. At the same time, I confess my experience makes me shy of the denying mood. I prefer to leave some things about Jesus—as the Virgin Birth, for instance—in suspense. I am satisfied that in Jesus Christ was revealed the thing which is Divinest in God, what we call Holiness, in the full New Testament sense of the word—the coincidence of an unfaltering will with a perfect ethic—perfect, that is, in correspondence with all the occasions in which the life is wrought out. That of many years of that life we know nothing does not trouble me. I do not think we need treat our Lord after the manner of a police ticket-of-leave. I can trust Him through those unrecorded years. Common sense, indeed, apart from any higher feeling, suggests that one should. For sin always leaves its scars. Accepted forgiveness compels confession of mercy received. And in the case of Jesus there is no trace of any operation of pardon. Indeed, the sublimest feature of the Jesus of the Gospels is His own ethical self-sufficiency (*αὐτάρκεια*) in the face of sharp distinctions between the debts men owe to one another and those they owe to God (St Matthew xviii. 21–35). From His first emergence on my view to the revelation of His last experience in mortal life, Jesus arrests me as progressively filled with the very Spirit and Holiness which God is, filled so that in Him God and Man may be said to coalesce.

<sup>1</sup> Isaiah ix. 3.

This is the way I have come—through the supreme idea of the Central Figure in the Gospels, apprehended independently of criticism to an *a priori* faith in the Incarnation as God's historical act of sympathy and judgment. I do not now say :

“That men could imagine such love is the same  
To me as a living of yesterday.”

I hold to the worth of imagination. But I see the force of an event. Whatever spiritual thing comes to expression, whether in our individual lives or in history, is more than it could be immaterialised. Things that can happen are more than things that cannot. And what has happened remains. I believe that the Life which was made flesh, enhanced by the very fact of expression, has been taken back into the spiritual atmosphere of the world, to breathe Itself through our moments of openness into human lives, thus helping us to be that which It was and is. Yet still I often pray, “Thou whom I cannot name,” because all names fall short of my strongest consciousness of Him, and I have learnt that immeasurable breadths and depths of life lie behind the Keeper of my soul. George MacDonald<sup>1</sup> expresses this for me, better than I can for myself:—

“Not in my fancy now I search to find thee ;  
Not in its loftiest forms would shape or bind thee.  
I cry to One whom I can never know,  
Filling me with an infinite overflow ;  
Not to a shape that dwells within my heart,  
Clothed in perfections love and truth assigned thee,  
But to the God thou knowest that thou art.”

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<sup>1</sup> “Diary of an Old Soul,” p. 21.

A. D. MARTIN.

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## ORDER AND UNREST.

EDITH HUNTER.

THE relation of the State to its individual members is undergoing a gradual change. The demands of the State have enormously increased and are still increasing, and the attitude of the people towards this change raises questions of the utmost importance. The subject is far-reaching in its scope, and arguments are of necessity drawn from widely differing points of view. Broadly speaking, the purpose of this article resolves itself into an examination of the attitude of the people towards the State under these changed conditions.

I shall try to show that, viewing civic life as a whole, these three facts clearly emerge:—(1) That there is a growing tendency on the part of the State to demand more of the co-operation and individual attention of its citizens. (2) That on the part of the citizens there is equally discernible a great apathy and indifference towards reform generally. (3) That beside this apathy there is present at the same time an irrepressible spirit of unrest.

It will be admitted, I think, that the State is in the initial stages of a vast development of which the general public is as yet hardly aware—a development which will ultimately involve the intelligent, alert, restrained, and sympathetic co-operation of all adult citizens, if our civilisation is ever to reach a saner condition.

In order to support that statement I must direct attention to one or two spheres of administrative work which serve

to illustrate my point, namely, that the citizen is being more directly drawn to participate in national and municipal affairs.

Let us look first at that important department which deals with the elementary schools. The province of the State Schools at the present time involves not merely instruction and the feeding of necessitous children, but also medical treatment. Now, I suggest that this one small section of the community's teeming life reveals a vast area which is crying out for reorganisation.

An extremely difficult situation has arisen in regard to the relative functions and limitations of hospitals, school medical treatment, and medical service generally. Even the smallest practical experience discovers in this direction a background of confusion and overlapping, of misdirected energy and misdirected funds. The whole demands readjustment, but to all these urgent needs the indifference of the average ratepayer is appalling. There is doubtless a fine network of voluntary labour spread over this area, but, even among those actively engaged in these matters, there is apparent a curious scepticism, which seems to doubt whether the effort is worth while.

Let us look further at the second stage in the child's life—that period immediately succeeding the school-leaving age. The State has recently waked to the fact that the unqualified casual who turns up at the Distress Committee and the Workhouse is a man who, as a child, had at least passed through the Council Schools. As the outcome of this there is now a scheme which bids fair to be a fine one if the means and the energy are forthcoming to carry it through. It involves, broadly speaking, the linking up (it may be by a chain of voluntary workers) of the school authorities on the one hand and the industrial on the other. The need is to steer the child through the first stages of industrial life. What that involves in the way of making demands upon individual co-operation, I do not think I can adequately suggest in a few short sentences. To begin with, it touches



every home in the community whose children pass through the Council Schools. It involves not merely the joint work of State officials with possible voluntary assistance, but the sympathetic co-operation of the employing classes. It means the development of a civic conscience in the individual employer. To put it quite plainly, an employer should be willing to face the inconvenience of obtaining his workers through a public authority, if that method be for the public good. That such method is not for the public good is quite a legitimate objection, but it is surely justifiable to ask of those who take up this position that they should make some alternative suggestion.

Let us now turn from the sphere of education to one which involves a far wider public. It is scarcely possible to find a better example of the tendency of the State to increase its demands upon the individual citizen than the Insurance Act. The Act exemplifies this demand on the one hand and on the other has shown up, quite as clearly, an unreadiness and unwillingness on the part of the public, irrespective of class, to co-operate. Putting aside for the moment the merits or demerits of the Insurance Act, I believe it has been the means of bringing hundreds of individuals, who never dreamed that they had any connection with civic life at all, into direct contact with the State. It has made for the first time each employer, however insignificant socially, not merely individually responsible but civically responsible, responsibility entirely new to many people. It has for the first time linked the employment of a young servant or a charwoman to the great world of industry. The outcry concerning the trouble of stamps and cards, which came alike from employers and employees, served to show that both (the one not more than the other) were in many cases utterly unconscious of the links which bind the individual worker to the whole mass. We have become more or less accustomed to the public responsibilities of the large employer. We are constantly reminded of them by such Acts as the

Workmen's Compensation Act or the Employers' Liability Act and such like; but to have the matter forced upon the private individual, as the Insurance Act does force it, is, I believe, a new thing in everyday life.

Thus, if we confine ourselves merely to these three examples:—the State in its relation to the physical life of the child; the State in its relation to the industrial development of youth; the complex demands of the State through the Insurance Act—in these three we have examples of national demands made concrete. The machinery has been laid down, so to speak, to be worked, if we will, to be improved or perhaps merely to be scrapped and replaced, but at any rate to be worked. They come within the sphere of administration, and by administering, and by that only, shall we learn the way to improve and develop them.

What then has been the response of the public to these particular demands? To answer such a question is beyond measure difficult. Perhaps we are too much in the mist to really know, and only when to-day's happenings have become history shall we be able to notice the slow but steady advance. If we try to estimate the attitude of the average person, or the opinion of the majority, our reply to such a question would indeed be disheartening.

In the lowest walk of life we meet with ignorance and slave-like subjection. One step higher in the social scale we find indifference and mechanical submission. In what are called the middle classes one often finds superficial knowledge and rebellious pettishness side by side; and there remain, of course, the few, the leaven of the whole, who, irrespective of class, always set the pace and help the general movement forward.

Through ignorance or apathy, through disinclination or aversion, the greater portion of the democracy has no sympathetic connection with the social problems and the increasing demands of civic life. To go into the practical details of the schemes or problems I have mentioned would be to



immeasurably strengthen my argument. But I can speak here only in general terms.

The subject has a yet more serious aspect. I refer to the wide-spreading unrest which is to-day so apparent on every hand. I use that term in its widest meaning, as describing all the varied forms of dissatisfaction which have appeared in the ranks of labour during the last few years, and that larger unrest which pervades the whole of the woman's movement, and covers too the irritation and dissatisfaction brought about by recent legislation.

In the *HIBBERT JOURNAL* for October 1912, Professor Jacks had an article on this aspect of the subject. His theme, briefly, is this:—Legislation to-day is making great demands upon democracy, and these demands are likely to increase in the near future. He suggests that at certain points the strain upon democracy has already gone beyond breaking-point, and that this is shown by the general spirit of unrest and revolt which is in the air. His argument tends to show that legislation on the one hand, and on the other the development of the people and their education in democratic principles and practices, must progress simultaneously if democratic government is not to end in confusion and failure.

Broadly speaking, we should all agree with such a statement, but with Professor Jacks' classification of causes and from his manner of describing the remedy for the disease, ending, as it seems, on a somewhat pessimistic note, some of us may differ. There may be a small section whose restlessness is due to the cause he mentions, namely, the exacting nature of legislation in gripping too tightly on the minds and actions of people whose training has not fitted them to bear the necessary restrictions of a noble liberty. Such an attitude may possibly appear in either rich or poor; it may be that of the highly cultured or that of the entirely untrained mind. It is an individualism which lacks, in differing degrees, the modifying influence of the social instinct. In so far as unrest is

due to such a cause, it undoubtedly falls into line with those other deficiencies of which democracy stands convicted. But it is because unrest in its larger and more general bearing is not due to that limited cause that I join issue with the view expressed in that article. I differ from the writer's generalisations concerning the nature of the complex element of unrest. He says that democracy is overstrained, and as an immediate consequence of this we are witnessing outbreaks and eruptions on every hand, and he omits altogether to discriminate between the widely differing sections. Now, to keep exactly to this line of argument, namely, that legislation has gone too far—that some section of the public has been, as it were, over-legislated—we find one very striking example in the Insurance Act. But when we observe the nature of the various revolting sections in the community, do we find much in common between the doctors and the sweated women chain-makers, or between the duchesses who would not lick stamps and the taxi-cab drivers? Of course in a vague sense there is a ground of semblance, but the term “unrest” used to-day signifies not only the strike and the open militant revolt, but is a subtle and most potent force, whose very subtleties render generalisation misleading and dangerous. In the early stages of his argument Professor Jacks lays himself open to criticism because he does not (as I have said) sufficiently discriminate between the various resisting groups. He refers to the doctors' refusal (since overcome) to work the Insurance Act as an example of irritation under a too exacting law, and proves thereby the fallacy of the idea that democratic government necessarily engenders obedience in those governed; in other words, the fallacy that the people will of necessity obey laws of their own making. Probably there could be no better example of this point, but immediately following this the revolt of the women is mentioned and put into the same category. Now, I submit that in no way can the women's position be said to prove any such theory. The doctors, not as a class, but as men, and in the same degree as all other male



citizens, are directly represented in Parliament; women not being directly represented, their action cannot be cited as proving any result of democratic representation. The reasons for unrest differ so widely that they must be dealt with in almost every case on their particular merits.

It is easy to prove in the measured argument of an article such as the one I refer to that the spirit of revolt is reprehensible and unsocial. Such a view appeals to superficial common sense. Methods of violence offend our moral judgment and our sense of fitness. They appeal neither to the sensitive idealist nor to the practical opportunist. In short, no progressive life is possible in a state of anarchy. Doubtless this is true; there is an overwhelming weight of opinion on the side of law and order. There is, however, another side to the problem; there is an element in the spirit of unrest which counts, in intrinsic value, more a thousandfold than the one of which, by its noise, we are most easily made aware. What, after all, is really the meaning of a spirit of unrest? What is the meaning of that spirit which, silently or otherwise, slowly lifts a people onward? It is by no means to be confused with mere discontent, or impatient childish peevishness. Nor must we allow our intelligence to be dimmed by the steam which at the present moment is blinding our eyes. Because a few small pipes have burst we must not cease to recognise the value of the element whose controlled energy has such potent force. Expressed differently, it surely means nothing less than a realisation of evil—an awakened apprehension of a lack of justice. A spark ignited, it may be, in the soul of a prophet; and passing thence through the deep heart of humanity, it becomes a holy thing. None who has ever faced a great social or industrial problem, or rather faced the people who make the problem, but has realised that the first step along the road of emancipation is the effect of the presence of that same spirit of unrest.

Unrest may be dangerous, it is sure to be uncomfortable; it is none the less so intrinsically necessary that the writer who

enlarges upon the evils of unrest must not remain silent on the deeper meaning of the force which is behind that restlessness.

Indeed, one statement of Professor Jacks alone amply justifies my contention. He says: "Of all modern democratic governments, with scarcely one exception, it may be said that they were conceived in disobedience and born in rebellion." We cannot have life without heat, we cannot have heat without fire and friction!

Progress is confronted to-day, and perhaps always will be, with two evils. On the one hand there is a deadening weight of apathy, and on the other the outbreaks of unbalanced fanaticism. The greater of these two evils is undoubtedly the former.

Having thus acknowledged the value of a noble discontent, let us face frankly the danger and difficulty of the real but limited evil produced by laws which are ahead of the people.

I have tried to show that the demands of the State upon the individual citizen yearly grow stronger, that the gulf which stretches between our vast problems and the individuals who form the democracy is very great. It may be that legislation has already stepped beyond the bearing power of some sections of the community, or that it will do so in the near future. I would prefer to say that it is possible, but not probable. Responsibility carries with it its own education. If we look back on history we find that enfranchisement preceded the Education Acts—democracy was made responsible long before the individual citizens had reached the standard of responsibility.

Let us grant at once that democracy is, to all appearances, showing itself unready and even unwilling to bear its burden. Professor Jacks traces this attitude to our lack, as a nation, of discipline. Although we have fought and won battles we have never been drilled, we do not march in step, we do not act quickly and unhesitatingly at the word of command. He says: "The social discipline of the British is strongest on its



moral, religious, and historical side. Its weakness is the lack of 'drill.' "

Now, in regard to the need for what is termed social discipline, meaning by that phrase moral self-restraint, there can be no difference of opinion. But, while urging this view, the writer implies a policy which would run in a contrary direction to the cherished ideals of many. To use the terms discipline, drill, and self-restraint as if they were synonymous leads only to confusion of thinking, when we are dealing with a complex organism like democracy. Surely it is fatal to apply to a would-be free people the same terms as we apply to a standing army. The man who enters the army undertakes to surrender his conscience, while on duty, to his superior officer. It may be there is much to be said for this from the standpoint of army discipline; there is nothing to be said for it from the standpoint of civil and social development. It may be right for the soldier to act because he must, and not because he knows the reason why. The only attitude proper to the citizen is that of one who acts because he does know the reason why. A phrase of Mr Lloyd George's is quoted which, so far as it means anything and so far as it describes an actual fact, is very significant. Mr Lloyd George spoke of the nation as "mobilised" by the Insurance Act. Now any attempt to mobilise before taking the intermediate educative steps is dangerous. In so far as the Insurance Act is proving (and it is so doing) educative, it is to be welcomed; where it has merely marshalled people, merely drilled and mobilised without teaching its own reasons, its benefits are far more doubtful. To influence a people to act with the instinct of soldiers, to answer promptly to the word of command, to be ready and alert at a given signal, would foster a tendency which, in the opinion of many, is already a disquieting menace. I mean the growth of the party spirit; and it is in regard to this tendency that I question the wisdom of such a statement as the following: "The citizen, whether as subject or as legislator, needs . . . not merely instruction in

political science. He does need that, but he needs something else far more; something without which all the political science in the world will carry him but a little way. He must learn to obey."

The heart of the subject is touched by the phrase "self-restraint." Discipline and drill savour of the army and the school; self-restraint suggests a self-conscious individual in the related whole of the democracy. An ideal democracy is to be organised, but not marshalled; to be led, but not coerced. The quality of its common life is dependent absolutely upon the quality of each constituent unit.

To conceive that coercion or repression, marshalling or mobilising, or the use of any force other than moral, will mould democracy into a well-oiled machine, is to have lost all real faith in a democratic ideal. What is the ultimate goal of an ideal democracy, if it be not that each individual unit shall become a conscious unit in a concrete whole? How then is it possible to affect the whole except through the mind of the individual? But the standard of that mind is at present far too low to be raised by drill. If we risk such a course let us beware lest we manufacture puppets instead of intelligent agents.

The remedy, then, is education. Education not in its narrow but in its widest meaning; direct education and indirect which will come from altered conditions, shorter hours, better surroundings, from longer and better used leisure and a thousand other things. It is not drill we need, but self-restraint, and self-restraint will come most quickly from understanding. Ignorance is surely the most prolific cause of impatience. People move round in their own narrow circles and have not developed a civic conscience. They have not left behind the *laissez-faire* attitude of fifty years ago. They do not know the moral basis nor the practical necessity of a standard rate of wages. They have not yet waked up to the fact that in our modern complex life the individual touches at every point the whole organism. But neither coercion nor



drill will bring about the needed change. Nothing will make the individual forgo his private ends, endure discomfort, or exert his energy, but an alert consciousness of the vital connection which exists between the whole and each separate part.

If we look at the tendencies in democracy as a whole we see hopeful signs. We see the complex nature of unrest—how that if in some cases it be anti-social, in others it is the germ of life itself. We see springing up in the community the beginnings of a temperament which is susceptible not merely of revolting but of suffering, not merely of asserting but of forgoing its rights and even the necessities of life. We see a spirit abroad which breeds impatience for the vague benevolences of the past and welcomes the advent of concentrated scientific effort, which will only develop in an atmosphere of freedom, but will never remain quiescent under servile methods whether they emanate from Socialists or from a Liberal Government or from philosophic thinkers.

We need a change of mind. Are we awake to the fact that, whether with our consent or without, the trend of things has changed? The development of the individual may be (nay, is) the far-off but certain goal, but we do not now believe that the attainment of the one is at the expense of the many. "Make no more giants, God, but elevate the race at once!" But surely it may be that by elevating the race He may yet make greater giants. We need a change of mind that will restrain the impatience which defeats itself and loses sight of the general good in private grievance—a change that will banish apathy and all its fatal consequences.

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## THE GREAT ALTERNATIVE.

THE REV. CHARLES F. DOLE.

A MULTITUDE of people certainly live as if they had no certainty of God. In a recent number of the *Harvard Theological Review* Professor Ladd of Yale College discusses the decadence of theism in America. He points to the fact that people, who still repeat prayers in church, believe in money and luxury as they certainly do not believe in God. A growing class believe in liberty and in getting their rights and openly profess to have given up religion. The enormous militarism of the world, especially in Germany, is a practical denial of God.

There is a vague doubt in people's minds whether something has not happened in the realm of science to undermine the foundations of religion. It is pathetic that many people, and ministers among them, look to men of science in hope of a little assurance that God may exist. They trust that William James or Professor Bergson may perhaps have given us a glimmer of light, as if they had no light themselves.

I wish now to present a great alternative, which many thoughtful persons, skimming over deeper waters than they know, never seem to put to themselves: *Either God is, or there is no God.* In other words, either the faith of the heroes and poets and lovers is real, in a sense compared with which the deliverance of our senses is only superficial; either God's reality is fundamental and ever present like the atmosphere; either our religion is at least as substantial and rational



as any teaching of science, and its experiences, rightly interpreted, as valid as anything that we know; either our religion is free, and always has been free, from any possibility of interference on the side of physical discovery or research—or else all men's talk about faith and religion and God is empty words. God is, or there is no God. There is no middle ground between faith, as good as ever the martyrs thought they died for, and complete atheism. Let us not shrink from drawing sharp lines. I wish to show that, not actual and intelligent thinking, but rather hazy and slovenly thinking, and the slovenly living which hazy thinking induces and excuses, are alone responsible for the want or decadence of a happy religious faith.

Let me first try briefly to say what I mean, and also what I do not mean, when I use the word God. I do not mean a being, or figure, residing somewhere in space, whom we could see with our eyes, if we approached near enough; I do not mean an abstract "First Cause," which might perhaps have set the universe in motion and then left it to run by itself; I do not mean a bare "Absolute," as an impersonal fountain of being, but without any describable qualities or affections; I do not mean any such form of pantheism as might comprehend all things into a jumble of parts, without unity or purpose or distinction of values; I do not mean a God, standing outside of our world, so as to need to break through by special revelation or interposition, in order to make us aware of his existence. If God is not the fundamental reality of our lives, if He is not as near and essential as the encompassing air is to our bodies, if we can live at all without Him, if we need proof of His existence any more than we need proof of our own existence, such a God would hardly be worth speculating about.

I mean, then, the "Living God," the might, the mind, the beauty, the will, the goodness in and through all things and all persons, and at the heart of the world; I mean that which constitutes unity; I mean that which comprehends into

itself, and is the source of all precious values, being greater and not less for having attributes and affections; I mean not only that which, as Bergson says, is revealed in a wonderful urgency developing all forms of life; not only what "makes for righteousness," as Matthew Arnold used to say, but as certainly that which urges towards the growth of persons, makes life worth living, works towards human welfare, and in the highest and mightiest form of its manifestation, as good will, is seen daily, like a universal motion, as furthering and generating what we call "progress."

We might stand helpless to call this innermost reality by any name. But we do better to call it by lovely names, inasmuch as we surmise that all splendid thoughts come from its prompting. How else do they come? We call it Life and Light and Love; we call it the Eternal, and the Father of our spirits. We cannot define it, but only say what it means to us and how it impresses itself upon us.

As the bird rests and lives in the air, the fish in the sea, and the tiny cell in its place in the body, without being aware of the source of their life, so in a higher sense we live in the presence of God, whether aware or not of the fact. His pressure is upon us; His thoughts are pictured to us in all that exists; His care is over us; without this universal goodwill, we should not know justice or love.

May I briefly hint that the idea of God that I have tried to present is substantially that which in some form is beneath the most virile religions of the world, towards which their faith has tended, and into which the varying experiences of devout and genuine souls under all religions may be easily translated. It is also, I believe, in the line of the highest reaches of human thought. So far as philosophy has been positive and constructive, it has developed towards some such general statement of its faith. A careful study of the history of religions, and especially of the great religious literature, would make this plain.

My point now is that either God is, in the large and real



and religious sense in which we use the word, or there is no God worthy of the name. If we may compare great things with small, we have here the same kind of alternative that presents itself when a young child is born. The body is there, a certain appearance of life is also there, but what we want to know is whether the vital germ of human thought and affection is there. It either is or is not. If not, the child is an imbecile, and wonderful as the bodily life by itself continues to be, there is nothing human or spiritual to train or to love. So likewise with the greatest of all questions about the universe: Is it merely alive on the side of matter and force? or, is it also alive through and through in the spiritual terms of intelligence, beauty, will, purpose, and love? I do not see how anyone who opens his eyes to the facts—the human or spiritual facts as well as the material facts—can fail to answer this question in the affirmative. We do not indeed yet see as much love as we see power, but we see love as truly as we see power, and what love we see is vastly more wonderful and important. Moreover, we no more create the love than we create the power. Both are urged upon us and grown within us by the manifold impulse of the Great Life, of which we are the children.

It is good for us, however, to face our thoughts with searching inquisition. Let us try, if we can, to get away from faith or religion, to wipe out the idea of God, to think life downward into strictly negative terms, and imagine ourselves in an atheist world. Either God or not. Let us say *No God*.

The case presents itself somewhat as it would if a sailor on a great ship had a strange dream that the captain and all the officers had been swept away, that there were no charts or compasses or sextants on board, in fact that the ship was drifting like a raft without any course. I think the first feeling which came to the sailor might be a sense of relief from toil and responsibility, especially in view of the fact that the ship appeared still to be well provisioned. There would be nothing on shipboard to do except what people pleased. With the coming of night, with the first appearance of storm,

with the problem of the distribution of the ship's stores, the berths and the staterooms, with the question of what to do and whether to try to sail at all, I believe apprehensions and terrors would begin to overcome the sailor's mind.

In somewhat the same way we imagine ourselves out of God's world. I confess that, when I have tried this, supposing that there is no God, I have at times felt a momentary sense of relief, as if all stress of care and duty had been taken off and I were free to do or think as I might. But, thinking straight on to the verge, the sense of awful and hopeless orphanage sets in upon me. I had loved integrity, but there is and can be no real integrity, either in the universe or the soul of man, except the integrity that goes with the thought of God. I had loved truth and tried to follow it, but truth is either a spiritual reality, founded and compact in a spiritual universe, that is, a veritable universe, or else it is purely imaginary, or what happens to serve and please you at the time. Curiosity is indeed ours, as with all animals, but why should we reverence truth or make sacrifice for it in a world of "things" and illusions?

Kindliness indeed is left, as one of the various qualities that all animals share. But responsibility and obligation have gone out of our world, where now properly the strongest strive for survival. Duty has gone too with God who had established it. Duty now is only what seems agreeable or expedient. Why should anyone be strenuous for the selfish moralities in a world without spiritual significance, where no moral imperative is, and no standards exist, and ideals are merely a part of the dream? I may not say, "Let us eat and drink, for to-morrow we die," having been brought up in a faith that made cruelty and selfishness abhorrent; but what possible reason can I urge to the animal man, why he should not follow the promptings of his appetites and passions, and do as he likes in this godless world, where all things are running down sooner or later to death?

I have known love and had thought it eternal, allying man



with the Master of life. But I see now, in my strange dream, that love is no more than the bloom on a peach. It has also its time and it passes to decay.

I had talked of human progress and seen visions of a perfected humanity. I may still, for want of anything better to do, pursue the ancient gleam, with the sense at the bottom of my heart that the quest is useless. Why should I guess that it makes any difference how soon the cycle of destruction comes in and grinds the race of man beneath the ice fields? Progress? Whither and for what end, if the ship merely drifts purposeless on the unknown seas? Is man, merely conceived as the animal child of matter and force, worth loving or striving to save, or worth dying for?

The fact is, on the material or negative side, you cannot make anything rational out of this world, or explain anything. The force and the atoms, or the electrons, are a blind mystery. How should they come? How should they constitute laws of motion or form? How should they build up a universe, and create minds with no mind to guide? How should they work together and dissolve and make worlds and dissolve them again, in senseless processions of chaos? Much less can you account for man at his best, as thinking, obeying, loving, as stirred with the ideals of heroes and poets, fearless of death, possessed with a mystic chivalry, ready to respond at the call of his duty, affection, or Christ. The atheist world, which we imagine, has neither place, nor reason, nor incitement nor environment to create a real man, or to recognise him when he appears.

We have also got away from the world of beauty and order and music. What standard of beauty or art is there, except passing fashion? The work of Phidias is as good or as bad as the Polynesian war idols. The Beethoven and Bach music is as the beating of a tom-tom. Why not? What makes beauty or ugliness, good or evil, right or wrong? We are beyond all that. What is good, where nothing stands fast? or, what is evil, where the light of no constant Good

Will shines? Numbers, geometry, harmonies, unity, order, are not material terms; they are the framework of the world of the spiritual, which we have been dreaming away.

We have been trying to do a thing as impossible as it would be for the bird to think the atmosphere away. We can pump a little air out of a glass receiver, but only enough to make the fact of its existence the more obvious. There is the pressure just the same, against which we had to pump. It took labour to get the air out, being an effort against nature. So with the pressure of the spiritual life of the world, namely, the presence of God, present in matter, and in the laws under which matter acts and is acted upon, present in force, present in innumerable forms of intelligence and beauty, present in the eternal urgency of life, present in man's soul, as compelling duty, informing love, and infinite loyalty towards invisible ideals, present in glad and restful goodwill, leaping to the work of the world as a happy child to the voice of his father.

The fact is, you cannot translate life downward into the realm of the minus sign and not leave out pretty much all that gives life actuality, worth, and significance. Press with all your might and try to get away from God, and the further you push, the surer you are to come back again with a mighty rebound of faith.

People sometimes like to call themselves "materialists" or "free-thinkers," and to scoff at religious faith, while they still help themselves freely to all the noble words which religion has created. Is it that they must dress up atheism in borrowed plumage? I think it is rather that they pay unconscious tribute to the poetry, the eloquence, the inspiration that belong to God's world. They do not think straight, or they would see that no form of materialism or atheism could have ever produced one of those great words of the spirit. It is positively startling to have to confess what an impoverishment of language you have to make, unless God is! You cannot lose God, and have the great words to play with like toys.



I said that there is no middle ground. Either God is, with all the implications of that faith, or there is no God at all. But why cannot one take the middle ground of agnosticism? Suppose one says frankly: "We cannot know whether God is or not." But the great alternative still faces you. You can try as far as possible to be unaware of God. But He either is, or He is not. Moreover, you cannot order your life, consciously or unconsciously, without making some kind of tentative choice. You will either tend to one side or the other, or you will sway to and fro about the pivot of faith. You cannot help feeling the pressure and urgency, whatever you do about it. Thus Huxley, father of agnostics, felt this compulsion of truth and duty, and acted exactly as if this were a spiritual world. Practically he was not so agnostic as were most of the professing Christians in England!

In the sense in which we are considering religion, namely, the pressure of the life of a spiritual universe, nature will not permit a man altogether to live without breathing its air. As with the sailor in the darkest storm, the alternative faces him: "Either life or death." Seeing that it may be life, he is constrained to act as if he hoped to be saved. Let him be a good determinist, and his intelligence bids him go with all his might where he hopes the determining power leads. So men tend to follow the gleam of their hope for the universe. You cannot possibly act and think and live as if it made no difference whether God is or not. The vast complex of social relations draws you for ever under the play of subtle spiritual forces of sympathy and hope which no man can entirely resist.

Perhaps someone thinks that there may be middle ground outside of our great alternative in the idea of a dual constitution of the world; or, again, of a limited and evolving Earth-God with whose fate we are bound up, and whom we may indeed help to save from failure. But the dualism of good and evil powers, at the last resort, means either the victory of the good God or the bad one. In other words, it is another form of our alternative: Either God is, or there is

no God. Since, now, a universal and victorious power of evil is unthinkable, there can be no question, if a good God is at all, that evil has no ultimate chance, and never could have had any chance. Dualism, then, seems to be only a stepping-stone, like polytheism, towards a fuller conception of the real and valid God. It passes away before the thought of a universe. All science tends to make it impossible, and the highest philosophy thinks all things into the integrity of truth, in the absence of which there could be no philosophy.

The case is different with the idea of a partial and developing god or gods. This, too, may be a form that a climbing intelligence may grasp for a moment. But the partial god, or series of gods, is no god at all, but only a monster, as likely to crush man in his groping as to assist him. So far from being the ground and source of life, he seems himself to need ground and source, at least as much as man does. Where did he come from, and who shall guarantee his progress? Who can revere him, honour him, or follow his behests, who is himself liable to fall and perish, who does not even surely know his own mind! This type of a god seems to be only an added difficulty to account for, granting once that anyone has demonstrated that he exists. No! Our souls are made to "cry out for the living God," as if our lives fitted and answered to Him.

Someone may still ask: Can we not believe in what you call a spiritual universe without believing in God? This seems like asking whether we might not have a man by some kind of automatism, that is, a man without the soul of a man. That which makes him a man is not his body and the atoms, but the invisible unifying spirit, to use the best word we know. So we cannot conceive of a spiritual universe without any unifying life or spirit informing it. God is our name for the complete reality of the universe. It is not a machine. It is a life; in the largest sense of the word, it is what men have meant by a "person." At any rate, this is the form of our alternative. Either God is, as the life of the world, or there



is no God and no universe. We do not make this so by our thinking. It either is so or is not.

We have seen how impossible it is to get rid of any form of a universal life force. All that we can do is to ignore it, and to try not to use it, and to suffer for the lack of it, like a man who holds his breath. But there it is, pressing like the air to rush back and fill the man's lungs. So with the universal spiritual presence and urgency, which we have tried in vain to imagine ourselves as exhausting altogether from men's souls. The world and the nature of man absolutely refuse to behave as if God were not. Let us now boldly grant that God is, and see what happens.

Begin first, if you please, with a bare "perhaps," as they give famished men at first a mere sip of milk. *Perhaps God is.* But if God is, then all is that makes life worth living. As Emerson says, "Whatever is excellent, as God lives, is permanent."

Thus, love is what we had always found it to be—the chief of all values. Browning's poor little Pompilia, having won love, has changed her whole sorrowful life into gain. The Christ type of life, which we had tried in vain to put out of our world, is with us again, and draws all men to it for ever. In fact, it is every man's part now to stake all for love's sake and to win the same victory. If God is, the mother's tears and pains are never for naught. They go to purchase immeasurable good not for her children alone. If God is, then a great stream of loving life, mightiest of all forms of energy, is flowing through time. We men are of its essence and nature. Let us go with its motion; let us never fear wherever the good will may bear us. All this is so, if God is. Nay, better! Because *this is so*, we know that God is. Let who will try it and see. But if God is, you must try it. For this is the movement of life, and outside it there is no life. What else does it mean, that whenever for even an hour we go with this motion of love, and will with the universe Will, pure joy thrills us and makes us fearless of evil?

Again, because God is, truth is. It is one of God's names. If no living God were, no truth could stand fast. For truth is not abstract; it is essentially a quality of real being, a spiritual harmony at the heart of things. Why else must we spurn falsehood and cleave to the truth? But if God is, we cannot do otherwise, His truth being our nature and norm. As the born artist cannot bear to do ugly work, so we cannot bear to deal or speak falsely. Herein is the secret of "soul-liberty" or freedom of speech.

We see now, with the guiding fact of God, what conscience is and how precious it is. As we felt love in our hearts, and thus became aware of God, as we saw the vision of integrity or perfectness and thus saw God, so as we feel the prompting of conscience we are aware of the eternal reality, as a great life pressure. Grant that it begins feebly like the beating of an infant's heart, grant that it needs illumination, that love must move with it, that its growth obeys its proper laws like every other part of us; yet here it always is, as sure as God lives, like a mighty life-force pressing us to grow out of the darkness of bare physical existence into the realm of the light and so to become citizens of the universe.

I know nothing so disastrous for the health of the conscience as to try to explain it without God, as, for example, in economic or hedonistic terms. The facts will not answer to such explanation. The most characteristic motion of our conscience is when it threatens us with economic loss, when we are most alone in our obedience, when we are forced to go athwart social prejudices, or to withstand popular passion, and no one thanks or praises us, and yet we cannot do otherwise. I know no such invigoration and liberation of the action of conscience as when we wholly accept the testimony of the highest reason, declaring that in the motion of conscience God's will and our will are one heart-beat. All fear of man is taken away with this thought. Obedience becomes, as it ought to be, a delight. It is the supreme function of our spirits.

Test this in the most practical form. Here is an issue of



commercial integrity where, if a man goes with his conscience, he stands to lose his position or his fortune. On the other hand, he needs merely to conform with the custom of his associates in order to have favour and wealth. Suppose this man really believes that the mysterious whisper, bidding him risk all and be true, is the voice of the spirit of the universe. It is this, if God is. Can he do anything else but obey? This kind of fidelity in all times has actually set up new and permanent standards of honour, given the world moral advancement, and developed splendid character.

The thought of God illuminates the notion of human progress. Against progress as a merely physical or economical movement, arising out of a world of change and flux, you can raise the most tremendous pessimistic doubt. Material evolution by itself promises nothing but meaningless rise and fall. Why should anyone, comfortable and well fed, go to the cross for reform, for liberty, for democracy, on behalf of vast backward populations, in a world where no reason exists for either faith or enthusiasm?

That brotherhood, democracy, freedom, peace on earth, are valid without any religion is a baseless assumption. All these ideas have sprung out of a spiritual conception of the worth of human life. They imply faith that the things which unite men of all races and classes lie deeper than the forces that antagonise them, faith in the practical working force of ideals, faith that "it is more blessed to give than to receive," faith that you can "overcome evil with good," and dull, backward and selfish men by justice and goodwill—in short, faith in God, guaranteeing your vision of progress. Progress whither, if you drift on a raft in a meaningless world?

But suppose that the way of reform, of democracy, of progress, of whatever "socialism" is good for man, is the way of the universe-life, that we share in the majestic purpose, that everyone of us has his place in the beautiful order, and each life counts for good—what will not man do in this faith? What enthusiasm flames up in him to do the will of the

eternal! What can make us weary or afraid with this faith to hearten us? "If God be for us, who can be against us?"

The face of evil now changes. If God is, then no lasting evil can be. Grant that this is, and must continue to be, a matter of faith. But it is a reasonable faith, like the faith of the engineer or the aviator. Nothing is more notable than the procession of noble lives who have experimented with this faith in the presence of every kind of evil, as if "the everlasting arms were under them." They have wrought out the miracle of changing evil to good; they have annexed new territories to the realm of order. The fact is, evil only seems evil to creatures on a certain brutal plane; on that plane it is self-limiting. In the spiritual realm, where alone we are masters of fate, we are lifted above evil. Pain does no real harm to a man, once conceived as a child of God. Who would dare to be exempt from suffering! It is in the nature of the universe-life, as a deep law of spiritual cost, whereby all high values are brought to light.

Again, if God is, prayer or communion must be also. We do not mean the childish petition of greed or selfishness. Why should the sons of God will or wish anything that is not also the good will—that is, whatever is best? Movements of action and reaction are always taking place. Thoughts, insight, power, affection, will, surge ever and anon through our spirits and urge us to answer back with trust and gladness. It is not so much for us to make petition, as it is to wait and listen, to give free course to these motions of life, and to do what they bid. These things are true, if God is.

Again, we face the wonderful thought and hope of the immortal life. If God is, this hope simply cannot be kept back. It behaves like a life function, whenever we realise God. If God is (Himself the very ground and source of all science), nothing has ever been or can be discovered by science to hurt this hope. It does not come to us as a matter of demonstration, like a chain of argument, no stronger than its



weakest link, but rather as a network of reasonable considerations, rising out of the highest experiences of man as thinker and lover; it is at times so persuasive and overwhelming that we say, "It must be so." The facts out of which it arises are simply inexplicable, except in the thought of a spiritual universe.

I am reminded that we are shut in by vast mysteries. But if God is, we look out into the mysteries of being as into a mystery of light, and no longer of darkness. We would not have it otherwise, seeing there is that in us which rests content with no finite value.

My plea is for a frank, thorough, and radical treatment of our religion both in thought and conduct. We are either citizens of a spiritual universe, or we are not. Our religion is wholly true, if it is anything at all. In a word, the world is either actually adjusted to urge and to aid us in co-operating with one another in a divine type of life, or there is no such thing as spiritual adjustment or lasting civilisation. As there is no middle ground between the supreme fact of God and the alternative of hopeless atheism, so there can be no forceful, happy, complete life for a man midway between faith and unbelief.

Vast problems confront the world, problems of the toiling millions, problems of the oppressed or barbarous or backward peoples, problems of vice and crime, and of new, orderly, serviceable government, the everlasting problems of the human soul with its sorrows, its wearying ambitions, its personal defeats, its tragedies, its solemn march towards the grave, its aspirations and hopes. If God is not, no solution exists for these problems, or any rational answer to the ceaseless human questions; let us make no pretence of faith or hope. If God is, we have reason, answers, solutions, incitement to action, ground of enthusiasm, vital union here and now with the soul of the world.

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## DISCUSSIONS

N.B.—The contributions under this heading refer to matters previously treated in the "Hibbert Journal." Reviews of books are not open to discussion. Criticism of any article will, as a rule, be limited to a single issue of the Journal. The discussion ends with a reply from the original writer.—*Ed.*

### "EUGENICS AND POLITICS."

(*Hibbert Journal*, January 1914, p. 241.)

#### I.

No topic could be of greater moment than that which Dr Schiller discusses. So far as European countries, and particularly England, are concerned, I have neither the knowledge essential, nor the wish, to controvert or to criticise his generalisations or the inferences drawn therefrom. It is possible, however, that he takes a too pessimistic view of the eugenic problem in the United States. I quote two passages from his article:

"It is stated that the State of New York already spends one-seventh, and sometimes so much as one-fifth, of its revenues on the support of its defectives, and there is no reason why it should not have to spend the whole of it in this unedifying way if the social policy which has led to this result is persisted in, or why the community should not come to consist wholly of idiots, lunatics, and epileptics.

"The same phenomenon (lower birth-rate of the better parents, socially considered) is observable all over the civilised world; it is not quite so bad in Germany as yet, but worse in France and in America."

Upon the first-quoted passage the necessary comment is merely mathematical. It may not be generally understood abroad that under our federal system the expenditures of the State of New York are unimportant, as compared with those of the cities and counties within it, or with its share of national expenditures. The care of defectives was taken over by the State for humane reasons, for greater uniformity and skill in treatment than local authorities were giving them; but the total annual expenditures of the State are a small affair compared with those of New York City alone. In New York City, it may be of interest to add, the somewhat kindred



public expenditure upon poor relief, which is still left to the localities, is a small matter as compared with similar charges upon thrifty taxpayers in Berlin or London—less than one-tenth as much as is spent upon schools, for example.

Financially, the burden of the unfit upon the fit in New York State, and presumably elsewhere in the United States, is not alarming. Un-eugenic births may be a much more serious matter as affecting the future; but it is doubtful if in this respect America is really worse off than England and Germany. The birth-rate of what is inaccurately termed the “native American stock” is surprisingly low in the North-eastern portion of the country. Elsewhere it is better sustained. But, quite aside from that, is it fair to assume that the elements in our population that do maintain a high birth-rate are inferior? In New York City, the landing-place of most immigrants, the excess of births over deaths in 1913 was presumably more than 60,000, against possibly 50,000 in London, 20,000 in Berlin and its suburbs, and 1200 in Paris—the 1912 birth-rates being in these cities 26·22, 24·67, 20·26, and 16·81. The high birth-rates in this city are attributed mainly to the immigrants from Europe. In no sense are these generally inferior in capacity for development. The immigration authorities report venereal disease as rare among immigrants, who come quite generally from small towns. Their physical condition in other ways averages good. In mental capacity which of them is inferior? The German? The British, who are still a very large element? The Italian? The Jew? The Greek? The Scandinavian? The Slav? Only the negro, of whom a comparatively small number come in from the West Indies. The colour problem we have; and it is a frightful one. It would be hard to name an inferior white race represented largely among our immigrants.

For some years I have had to do with the award of a number of collegiate scholarships among deserving youth graduating from public (free) high schools in this city. Nearly thirty candidates each year from among the finest pupils of more than a dozen great high schools are personally examined. Their physique has rather improved in the past ten years. Their wonderful mental alertness is confined to no race; the British stock shows scantily in the number—in part for lack of the qualifying poverty; but other races are well represented. College professors tell the same story of eager students of the immigrant races. The census shows that the children of immigrants are illiterate in a smaller percentage than the children of native whites—mainly because of more concentrated distribution. Their racial energy is indubitable. Capacity for absorption differs in degree, but exists in all.

These racial elements that reproduce themselves so plentifully upon the new soil are in great part the same that Dr Schiller would call “the lower classes.” In this country their increase scarcely suggests a lowering of the national mental or physical energy, though it may mean a modification of the assumed national type. Is it not possible that the rapid

multiplication of precisely the same element upon the continent of Europe is a less serious menace than is assumed?

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## II.

It is a pity to spoil a good argument by partisan and unconsidered statements. Yet this is what Dr Schiller has done in his article on "Eugenics and Politics." The good argument is the paramount necessity of a sound family life as the basis of a sound society; the unconsidered statements are numerous: *inter alia*, the rash inference that the "biological process has probably come to an end" (p. 247); the false inference that intelligence varies as skull-capacity (p. 247); the highly dubitable statement that the present shortage of military officers is at bottom a biological problem (p. 250); the uncritical acceptance of the quite inadequate theory that the middle classes of the "Roman empire" were crushed out by taxation (p. 250); the false inference that the stocks of ability were "conserved" in the "lower" classes when they had no educational and industrial ladders to the "higher" classes (p. 251); the sweeping generalisation that "State control is never a success" (p. 253); the logically vicious theory that "the happiness and *perpetuation*<sup>1</sup> of the individual are secondary" (p. 253).

Dr Schiller's wider contention seems to be an attack on "the whole trend of social legislation." "Social reform costs money, and the money is raised by taxation, which bears very hardly on the middle classes, who cannot curtail luxuries like the rich, and will not lower their standard of comfort. They meet the extra expense, therefore, by further postponing the age of marriage and further reducing their output of children. One of the chief effects, therefore, of our present methods of improving social conditions is to deteriorate the race. And this in a twofold manner: they eliminate the middle class, and they promote the survival of the unfit and defective."

Karl Marx also had a theory, for which indeed he gave some grounds, that the middle class was being eliminated. Fortunately, facts have proved that Marx was wrong, and to-day there is absolutely no ground for the idea that the middle class is disappearing; on the contrary, there are some grounds for believing that it is becoming a relatively larger portion of the whole community—though of course any discussion of this particular point would involve a careful delimitation of the vague term "middle class." Let us waive that point, however, and consider the ground of Dr Schiller's inference. It is the old one (often emphasised by certain newspapers) that the State taxes this class out of measure. This may or may not be true, the argument remains fallacious. Let me give Dr Schiller some figures which show clearly that the birth-rate varies inversely as the standard of comfort—from which he may perhaps draw the inference that the more the

<sup>1</sup> Italics mine.



State diminishes by taxation the income of the members of any class, the greater will be the birth-rate within that class! It is an inference I would hesitate personally to draw, but there is at least some logic on its side.

*No. of Births per Annum per 1000 Women of 15-50 Years.<sup>1</sup>*

Character of District.	Paris (1886-95).	Berlin (1886-95).	Vienna. (1891-94).
Very poor . . . . .	140.4	221.7	200
Poor . . . . .	128.9	206	164
Comfortable . . . . .	111.2	195.4	155
Very comfortable . . . . .	98.7	177.7	153
Rich . . . . .	93.9	146.4	107
Very rich . . . . .	69.1	122	71

It is to be noted that a lower death-rate almost invariably accompanies a lower birth-rate, and that therefore these figures do not show us the relative growth of the respective classes. It is also to be noted that the classes are continuous, and that the fall in the birth-rate is also continuous as one ascends the social scale—it *does not stop at the middle classes*, but applies still more to the very rich, whom, as Dr Schiller admits, taxation does not vitally affect. We must therefore look for a deeper explanation than any Dr Schiller offers us. It seems possible that the reason is something more than the incidence of taxation. The French Commission on Depopulation has confirmed in this regard the words of Zola; “Si la France se dépeuple, c’est qu’elle le veut. Il faut donc simplement qu’elle ne veuille plus. Mais quelle besogne! Tout un monde à refaire.”

This brings me to a further point. Dr Schiller hits out nobly at individualism and socialism, Hellenism and modernism alike. He attacks, not unjustly, “abstractions like ‘the State’ and ‘the individual.’” But it is a pity to hit so indiscriminately as to hit oneself in the process. In this very article we have the following passage:—“The individual is helpless against social conventions: and, in effect, society already prescribes whom he shall (or shall not) marry, when and under what conditions and penalties in every class, and leaves him only limited and largely illusory freedom of choice.” What, then, is this society which prevents “the individual” from eugenic marriage? If the individuals who compose society will to follow eugenic principles, what shall prevent them? Si l’Angleterre se dépeuple, c’est qu’elle le veut. But it is yet very far from being depopulated, and the problems, difficult and profound enough, which our social world presents, are problems, as I have heard a wise Government official recently say, “not for hysterics, but for science.”

R. M. MACIVER.

ABERDEEN.

<sup>1</sup> The figures are taken from Bertillon, “Abaissement de la Natalité en France” (*Revue Internationale de Sociologie*, August 1910).

## III.

THERE is not much hope in Dr Schiller's analysis of our social condition. It is true he believes the family, which has its roots in a remote past, will not be easily displaced, but he thinks it will be a poor type of family that remains.

No doubt it would be difficult to exaggerate the importance of the family as a religious, social, and economic unit; religious instinct and belief, natural affection and responsibility, and proper pride all conspire together to make it so. It does not follow that evil influences cannot weaken the bond, nor that extension of State power need be used to weaken it. The State may do some useful scavenging and get rid of poisonous ingredients in the environment of poor families.

Real family life is rendered very difficult when there is no reasonably assured prospect before its members, when the mother is away at work all day, when the home is physically wretched, and when the income is insufficient for proper maintenance. There is little or no hope in such conditions, and without hope you cannot have self-respect or progress.

Buy your labour as cheaply as possible when it is abundant and unorganised; make immense profits and acquire boundless wealth, as England has done; let the weakest go to the wall, on the principle that business is business,—and you will find that no distribution of relief will make up for your original injustice and neglect. Listen, if you will, to the prudent, who tell you that all will be well if you will give relief only under stringent conditions, and who believe that the whole problem finds its solution in the magic word “deterrence,”—still you will not reach the edge of the question. All of us, except a few extremists, are continually praising the family with a big F, and most of us are engaged in manufacturing these very families that Dr Schiller deplores and fears.

But it will be objected that these families are not what they are by reason of any pressure of avoidable circumstance, but because they are biologically unfit and incapable of amelioration.

That, however, is just the point we know very little about. Out of the very poorest families you certainly do get school children who are well above elementary school average in all respects. Granting that you cannot go wrong in trying to eliminate the definitely feeble-minded, there are still thousands of families, which are at present a burden on the community, of whom you cannot say with confidence that the children are incapable of developing under favourable conditions into useful members of society.

We are uncertain in our minds as to what object we are really aiming at; belief in the survival of the fittest individuals exercises its silent pressure on our minds, yet we refuse to eliminate or allow hunger to eliminate the unsuccessful; thus we neither whole-heartedly abandon ourselves to an animal struggle for individual or family existence, nor definitely address ourselves to the task of looking to the well-being of the community



as a whole and before everything. For our pursuit of individual interests too exclusively helps to create the strata who are a burden on society, while our religious beliefs prevent our leaving hunger to eliminate them.

Is not the solution of the whole question mainly a moral one for all from top to bottom?

Physically sound stocks are not the only requirement for satisfactory marriages, and, even if they were, you have in general no means of knowing what stocks are physically sound.

Dr Schiller fears the elimination of the middle classes by taxation. The following estimate of numbers assessed to income tax and of average incomes does not seem to favour this creed:—

Years.	Gross Assessment to Income-Tax (£).	Average Income (£).	Numbers of Income-Tax Payers.
1895-96	678,000,000	698	970,000
1910-11	1,050,000,000	937	1,120,000

Thus income-tax payers increased rather more rapidly than population.

The following figures from *The Times* seem to imply an inferiority in our productive powers, but where is the responsibility for this inferiority to be placed? It will be noticed that the American workman has the advantage of 22 h.p. of machinery per man against the British average of 9½ h.p.

Country.	Number of Persons Employed.	Total Output in £.	Machinery per Head (h.p.).	Year.
U.K.	6,478,794	676,433,000	9½	1907
U.S.	7,678,578	1,753,236,000	22	1909

The figures are not at all strictly comparable, because prices were higher in 1909 than in 1907. And yet Dr Schiller tells us that New York State pays away ⅙th or ⅓th of its revenues in poor relief, and does not show or affirm that a large proportion of that ⅙th are congenital idiots, lunatics, or feeble-minded persons.

I am not quite clear as to Dr Schiller's opinion on the unfavourable biological effect of war; he tells us that *too much* war is bad, as it depletes the most vigorous stocks; but it is the *relative* depletion of vigorous and defective stocks that he thinks crucial; therefore it would seem to follow that in his opinion *all* war must be bad. War, however, is almost necessarily a school of unselfishness; the individual exists for the army and not for himself; out of it, therefore, spring gallant deeds and great achievements

which are national memories and certainly can enrich the whole life of a nation. The biological view seems to take no count of such spiritual possessions.

The good or bad effect of war seems to depend largely upon the kind of motives which animate armies, and these in turn depend both on the commanders and the men. Even Cromwell could make nothing good of decayed serving-men and tapsters, unless they had with them a good proportion of better men, and were well officered.

Dr Schiller seems indirectly to admit that there is something not biologically accounted for. He does, indeed, claim that the present shortage of officers is largely a biological phenomenon. "The families *with military traditions*,<sup>1</sup> in which the sons hereditarily went into the army and provided the best officers, are no longer large enough to provide an adequate supply of men."

Observe! the middle classes are larger and richer than ever; presumably they are biologically satisfactory, being well adapted to their environment, in which they have prospered exceedingly. Owing, however, to the predominance in them of the commercial element, the sons do not go into the army; they have different ideals and aims. Can this be called unfitness in the biological sense? Has biology anything to do with ideals?

Dr Schiller doubts "whether the law does well to attribute an equal sanctity and value to all families, and to put the worst on a par with the best, to regard sterile unions as no less precious and indissoluble than fertile, and to bestow the right to found a family indiscriminately."

Here is indeed an overwhelming flood of propositions, a veritable programme! Is it true that the law attributes an equal sanctity to all families? It seizes on the family that applies to it for help and breaks it up into its constituent atoms in a workhouse; it permits other families to remain intact. Does Dr Schiller hold a man should divorce his wife if she has no children, and that marriage should only be permitted to persons approved by a public official? This would indeed be "the meaningless triumph of an abstraction like the State," which he deprecates so much.

Eugenic considerations would naturally prevail if there were no snobs, no worshippers of wealth, and no classes so hopelessly sunk in poverty and wretchedness and insecurity that they cannot look beyond the morrow. Whoever heard of a family that did not critically examine the intended husband or wife of any one of its members, and generally conclude that he or she was not quite good enough!—only "good" has to be variously interpreted.

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<sup>1</sup> Italics mine.



### “A BROAD CHURCH DISRUPTION.”

(*Hibbert Journal*, January 1914, p. 332.)

IN his article on the above subject the Rev. Hubert Handley seeks to explain and justify his position as a Broad Church clergyman. May I, as a Liberal layman (once a churchman) who has followed the advancing tide of Liberal thought with keen interest for the last half century, be allowed to make a few criticisms on Mr Handley's paper?

I will first refer to the writer's attitude with regard to the Creeds. He maintains that the “I believe” need not be taken in an individual, personal sense. He says “the ‘I believe’ is representative.” He says Professor Sanday repeats the Creed “not as an individual, but as a member of the Church”; that Canon J. M. Wilson says we may repeat the Creed “as the essence of our Christian belief as a body, rather than as the scientific expression of our individual present opinions.”

Now I venture to ask, in the first place, what ground is there for the extraordinary assertion that the plain and simple words “I believe” do not mean “I believe,” but “somebody else believes”? If the Church did not mean the Creeds to be an assertion binding on the individual, why, in the name of common sense and common speech, was the word “I” used? Had the Church really meant what it is asserted she meant, is it not reasonable to suppose she would have stated the substance of the Creed and ended (as the Athanasian Creed ends) with “This is a Catholic Faith”? But to show that the Church meant to bind the “individual,” we have, in the second clause of the last-named Creed, “Which Faith except *every one* do keep whole and undefiled, without doubt he shall perish everlastingly.”

Again, as clearly showing the Church's meaning, we have only to refer to the Baptismal Services and the “Order for the Visitation of the Sick,” where the question is asked, “Dost *thou* believe in God the Father Almighty,” etc.; then follow all the sentences of the Apostles' Creed, and the answer is, “All this I stedfastly believe.” And yet we have reverend Deans, Canons, and Vicars of the Church telling us that “I believe” and “All this I stedfastly believe” only mean “the Church believes”!

And more than this. The clear implication from the frank confessions of their own beliefs and the drift of the argument of these Liberal churchmen is, that although the individual repeating the Creed or answering the question at a baptism actually himself *disbelieves* the statements, he is still justified in saying he believes them. This is truly an extraordinary position! What a pass we have come to! Here are leaders of the Church—an institution one of whose main objects is the propagation of truth—here are our “spiritual pastors and masters” actually asserting that it is justifiable to assert your belief in statements which you do not believe!

Of course we know what the answer is. It is said that all these creeds, formularies, and articles were framed more than three hundred years ago; that we have moved on since then; that the words have changed their

meaning ; that the old words are to be used now, not in a popular, but in a technical sense ; that the people in the pews do not take them literally.

But, first, it may be asked of those who make such assertions, What authority have you for putting this meaning into the old words? I maintain there is no authority but their own. The Church has not sanctioned such a course. Again, it is a mistake to think that the people in the pews understand all this sophistry—that they say “I believe” when they have ceased to believe.

What an extraordinary ethical confusion such teaching as this would lead to! Take an illustration from science. The memory of Galileo is generally thought to be stained by his assent, before the Inquisition, to the declaration that the new teaching of astronomy, to the effect that the earth revolved on its axis and the sun was stationary, was false, he being convinced that the new doctrine was true. Now, according to the reasoning of the Liberal clergy, Galileo was justified in what he said, for his “I believe” (in the old doctrine) need not have referred to his individual belief, but to that of the scientific world in general!

Let me refer to one other point in Mr Handley’s article. The advancing tide of religious thought has largely modified the views of churchmen as regards many leading doctrines ; for example, Inspiration, Revelation, Immortality, the Divinity of Christ, Eternal Punishment, etc., the words embodying these having been sufficiently elastic to permit, quite legitimately, of the expanded thought. But two crucial dogmas remained, two fundamental pillars, which it was thought were absolutely unshakable. These were the Virgin Birth and the Resurrection of Jesus.

Now, one would have thought that, whatever vagueness or elasticity such words as Inspiration or Immortality might possess, no two meanings could possibly attach to the Virgin Birth and the Resurrection of Jesus. But no ; as regards the first, Mr Handley says it may mean “a non-miraculous but sacrosanct birth.” The Resurrection may perhaps not be regarded as quite such a hard, clear, concrete fact, but all doubt as to the Church’s meaning is removed by the words of the fourth Article, which affirms, “Christ did truly rise again from the dead, and took again his body, with flesh, bones, and all things appertaining to the perfection of man’s nature.” And yet Mr Handley tells us the words in the Creed, “the resurrection of the body,” may mean “post-mortem idealism”!

Mr Nevinson lately informed us that he once asked the late Canon Barnett what he would say to someone who inquired whether he believed the Resurrection of Christ was a physical fact. He at once answered, “I should say No. But at the same time I should show how much more marvellous and vital His spiritual Resurrection has been.”

The Liberal clergymen seem incapable of viewing their position from the Liberal layman’s point of view. They fail to see the wisdom of obeying their Master’s injunction to put new wine into new bottles. Strange it is that they cannot see the injury they are causing both to religion and to their Church by these methods. Laymen who think and are in earnest are



fast deserting the Church, and, what is perhaps more serious, young men who think and are honest find it impossible to enroll themselves as her ministers.

Test the matter further from this consideration. If it is justifiable to put the construction on the Prayer Book language which is contended for, there is nothing to prevent Unitarians obtaining episcopal ordination. In fact—and I make the statement advisedly—those churchmen who hold the views justified by Mr Handley are virtually Unitarians.

P. E. VIZARD.

HAMPSTEAD.

### “THE SCOTTISH CHURCH QUESTION.”

(*Hibbert Journal*, January 1914, p. 306.)

It is obvious that Sheriff Orr has made a blunder from which legal training and experience should have saved him. He treats as decided, and decided in his own favour, questions which are still *sub judice*, if they have even got that length. He tells us that the Church of Scotland has made proposals “which constitute an entirely new departure,” that she is prepared to frame and adopt “a new constitution” which amongst other things will vindicate the action of the men who in 1843 stood for spiritual freedom, and so forth, to the general effect that the Church has already turned its back upon its traditions to an extent which has fairly ripened it for union with, and apparently assimilation to, the United Free Church. Now, no doubt, in those private conferences which are taking place in Edinburgh, where old opponents are learning to understand each other, hasty things may have been said which have misled the Sheriff. But the truth is that, so far, the Church of Scotland has recorded no opinion whatever on the points which Sheriff Orr indicates, nor has it been invited to do so in the usual constitutional way. It has appointed a Committee to confer with a similar Committee of the U.F. Church on “the ecclesiastical situation” and “the obstacles to union,” and for some years now the Committees have been prosecuting their remit. But neither Church has registered a judgment on the question. Each is still awaiting its Committee’s report. What the judgment on either side will be when it is given, no wise man will try to predict. It is understood that endearments are being exchanged in Edinburgh. But the Church of Scotland sits in her parishes amongst the glens and the straths and the isles of the sea, where memories are living and long, and high-flown sentiments appear as doughty facts, and the love of a principle is not considered to be narrowness of mind, and the question of union is weighed in an atmosphere which is not that of Edinburgh. No one can do more than surmise what her thoughts are or what her decision will be. There are many in her own communion

who have not observed that change of opinion which is so plain to Sheriff Orr. No doubt spectators see most of the game. It is curious that the Sheriff, who has so acutely detected a revolution in the convictions of another Church, has not observed any similar phenomenon in the convictions of his own.

The Sheriff founds largely upon a certain document known as the Memorandum. With consent of the General Assembly the Memorandum was sent by the Church of Scotland Committee to the Committee of the United Free Church, in order to allow negotiations to proceed until they should reach a stage at which the opinion of both Churches might usefully be ascertained. No doubt it has the effect of provisionally opening questions long held to be closed. But it decides nothing. It has not been submitted to, far less approved by, either Church. It has certainly provoked dissent in both of them. It is entirely tentative. To nothing whatever in it does the Church of Scotland stand committed.

It would be futile to discuss further the Sheriff's views of the present state of the Church question in Scotland. They are his own. It is not known how far they are generally shared. They are obviously, however, the views of a pleader, not of a judge who waits for evidence; they are largely founded on hearsay, and they are the views of one who possesses no right whatever to speak for the Church of Scotland, whatever right he may have to speak for his own. It would have been unnecessary even to enter this caveat against him had it not been that the *Hibbert Journal* is read by many who have not the opportunity of discovering for themselves that an article written in such a strain of confidence is in reality premature.

JAS. B. GRANT.

GLASGOW.



# SURVEY OF RECENT PHILOSOPHICAL AND THEOLOGICAL LITERATURE.

## PHILOSOPHY.

PROFESSOR G. DAWES HICKS.

THE publication of Mr F. H. Bradley's *Essays on Truth and Reality* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1914) is by far the most noteworthy event that has happened of late in the philosophical world; and although a review of the work appears in this issue, I may be permitted to say a word about it here. It is a great book, a permanent addition to philosophical literature. Whatever difference of opinion may prevail in regard to the conclusions it is written to support, there can be none in regard to the power and suggestiveness of its argument, and the penetrating keenness of its criticism. The metaphysical position of the author is still that which he developed years ago in *Appearance and Reality*. Only there is a difference of emphasis in some not unimportant respects, and Mr Bradley seems now more inclined than he once was to admit the claims of the religious consciousness as entitled to recognition in a metaphysical interpretation of experience. One is struck by the change of emphasis at the very beginning of the present volume. "Every aspect of life," so the opening sentence runs, "may in the end be subordinated to the Good, if, that is, we understand the Good in a very wide sense." It is true that there is no one aspect of life which possesses unqualified goodness, no one aspect in which the perfect good is found. But every aspect of life, so far as it is good, is justified in itself, and has its own sphere of relative supremacy. Just because everything in life is imperfect, and seeks beyond itself an absolute fulfilment of itself, everything in life is subordinate to the Good. And the Good is defined as satisfaction; so far as anything satisfies, there is no possible appeal beyond it. No doubt, by "the Good" is here meant much more than was included under that term in *Appearance and Reality*. But, nevertheless, the change of attitude is unmistakable. "The Good," it was contended in the earlier book, "is not the perfect, but is merely a one-sided aspect of perfection. It tends to pass beyond itself, and, if it were completed, it would forthwith cease properly to be good." Significant, again, is the way in which Mr Bradley insists, in the new book, that philosophy demands, and in the end rests on, what may fairly be termed faith. The aim of philosophy, it is insisted, is ultimate truth, or, in other words, intellectual satisfaction. In and for

philosophy, truth in the end is true because we have a certain kind of want and because we act in a certain manner, not because it is simply seen or follows logically from what is seen. Furthermore, philosophy is obliged to act on an unverified principle, and in so far it must continue to rest upon faith. There are some wholesome protests against the mistake of making philosophy into a religion. "It must be an unhappy world where a man can say that, if he had no philosophy, he would be left destitute of practical belief." On the other hand, from its very nature, as a rational interpretation of reality, philosophy must be conversant with the highest things, and it must recognise those things in their proper character. Religion, in Mr Bradley's view, consists in the identification of our wills with the Will that is completely good. And he lays it down, as a matter of principle, that "whatever ideas really are required in practice by the highest religion are true." Two religious beliefs are discussed in some detail—the beliefs, namely, in a personal God and in human immortality. With regard to the former, Mr Bradley's main contention is that if personality is to be ascribed to God, it must be formulated in such a way as to agree with the truth of the indwelling of the divine spirit in the finite soul. This latter is, he insists, a religious truth far more essential than God's "personality." At the same time, he unreservedly rejects the mode of escape adopted, for example, by Feuerbach, who held not merely that God is self-conscious only in us, but that his self-consciousness is in the end ours alone. For religion is throughout a two-sided affair, and to place the consciousness of unity and discord all on one side is to remove the essence of religion. If the belief in the separate individuality of God be required for religion, Mr Bradley would accept it as justified and true, "but only," he adds, "if it is supplemented by other beliefs which really contradict it." He will not subscribe to the doctrine that there is no truth except the truth which is self-consistent and ultimate, and urges that a blind devotion to consistency involves either in the end worse inconsistency, or else the mutilation of religion. With respect to immortality, a similar line of thought is pursued. What appeals to himself, Mr Bradley tells us, is "the demand of personal affection, the wish that, where a few creatures love one another, nothing before or after death should be changed." If religion really endorses that demand, then he thinks the belief is, so far, right and true, although exactly what its truth comes to in the end we cannot know. Of one thing at least we may be assured: goodness, beauty, and truth are all there is which in the end is real, and their reality, appearing amid chance and change, is beyond these and is eternal. Our life has value only because and so far as it realises the things that do not die. Mr Bradley's treatment of these high themes is dignified and impressive, and cannot fail to leave its mark on the mind of every thoughtful reader.

The article by Mr Harold H. Joachim in *Mind* (January 1914), entitled "Some Preliminary Considerations on Self-Identity," will serve to illustrate and reinforce the central argument of Mr Bradley's book. Mr Joachim tries to show that our belief in our own individuality and self-



sameness through life is itself a faith in a something we know not what, and that our spiritual individuality is certainly not an incommunicable and impenetrable privacy. He examines first of all the unity and persistence we attribute to the bodily organism. It soon appears that if we conceive of the body as a sum of atoms, we are forced to recognise a system of actions and reactions, and that the supposed impenetrable unity of the body as a solid thing in space is a pure fiction. So again, if we conceive our living body as a chemical and biological individual, it becomes evident that it is a shifting population of diverse cells, all descended from the same ancestor. So that "if I am asked whether my body, as a living whole, is 'the same' as that of the boy who went in my name to Elstree School in 1879, the answer would seem to be 'Yes—in a sense analogous to that in which the English nation is the same now as it was in the days of Queen Elizabeth.'" The unity and persistence of the living body are, indeed, relative and derivative, and the living body is an individuation of the universal life. Proceeding, then, to the unity and continuity of the self, Mr Joachim makes it clear that such unity and continuity cannot be found in any immediate oneness of self-feeling. For no individual whole of self-feeling can ever comprehend within itself my yesterday, my to-day, and my to-morrow. Great stretches of my past, not to mention my future, and many features even of my present, are clearly not "for me" as explicit constituents of my immediate sense of myself. Our spiritual selves are, he maintains, individuations of the universal spirit—that or nothing. To forget oneself in the reverence and in the creation of beautiful things, is to become an artist; to bury oneself in the pursuit of truth, is to become a thinker; to lose oneself in the love of God, is to become a saint. And these phrases help us to see in a new light the real meaning of the spiritual individuality of man. In this connection, I should like to mention an extremely acute and able little volume, *Vom Selbstbewusstsein*, by Broder Christiansen (Berlin: Feddersen, 1912). The author seeks by a careful piece of psychological analysis to establish the thesis that we have no immediate awareness whatsoever of states of our own consciousness, that there is no intuitive apprehension of the processes of the inner life. Self-consciousness, as indeed all knowledge of what is psychical, is, he contends, the result of reflective construction, and is in no way a fact of direct or perceptive experience. In *Logos* (iv. 3, 1913) there is an interesting article by Siegfried Marck on "Die Lehre vom erkennenden Subjekt in der Marburger Schule," in which the writings of Cohen and Natorp are chiefly referred to. The author points out that as Hegel rejected the Kantian notion of a "perceptive understanding," so Natorp dismisses Bergson's view of intuition, as the knowledge which would swim with the stream of life itself, on account of its suspicious approach to mysticism. Natorp would replace the assumed immediate experience of mental processes by a reconstructive psychology, in which the attempt would be made to trace the way in which the distinction between subject and object comes to be made, and the stages of development through which it passes.

Mr Bertrand Russell's paper on "The Philosophy of Bergson," originally read before "The Heretics," together with a reply by Dr H. Wildon Carr, and Mr Russell's rejoinder, has been republished in pamphlet form (Cambridge: Bowes & Bowes, 1914). Mr Russell, after a rapid survey of the leading principles of Bergson's philosophy, which culminates, he thinks, in "the great climax in which life is compared to a cavalry charge," concentrates his criticism upon the two fundamental doctrines of space and time. Bound up with Bergson's view of space is his contention that for the representation of number we are compelled to have recourse to an extended image. Mr Russell maintains that there are here three entirely different things which are confused by Bergson, namely: (a) number, the general concept applicable to the various particular numbers; (b) the various particular numbers; (c) the various collections to which the various particular numbers are applicable. So soon as it is perceived that a particular collection has been confused with the number of its terms, and this again with number in general, the theory that number or particular numbers can be pictured in space is seen to be untenable. And with that there is disproved also the more general theory that all abstract ideas and all logic are derived from space, on which theory the condemnation of the intellect is based. Bergson's theory of duration and time rests throughout, Mr Russell urges, on the confusion between the present occurrence of a recollection and the past occurrence which is remembered. Whilst believing himself to have given an account of the difference between the present and the past, what Bergson really gives is an account of the difference between perception and recollection, both *present* facts. And this is an instance of the more general confusion between an act of knowing and that which is known. In memory, the act of knowing is in the present, whereas what is known is in the past; by confusing them the distinction between past and present is blurred. Dr Carr argues it is only with regard to what Bergson calls intuitive knowledge that the charge of confusing subject and object can have any semblance of meaning, and there the identity of subject and object is the very essence of Bergson's doctrine. To which Mr Russell replies, that because such identification is of the essence of the doctrine, it does not follow that no confusion has been made. The only valid defence would be to show that remembering is in fact identical with what is remembered. Miss Karin Costelloe, writing in the *Monist* (January 1914) on Mr Russell's paper, contends that the charge of failing to distinguish the past from the *idea* of the past does not really apply to what Bergson means by memory. The only past that Bergson is here concerned with is the past of our own consciousness. What he claims is that this forms one process, continuous with our present consciousness, and *creating* it. Our present idea of the past does not, therefore, come into the question at all. In an article on "The Ethical Pessimism of Bergson" (*Inter. J. Eth.*, January 1914), Mr J. W. Scott asks the question whether there is any reason for the impression of pessimism which arises in the mind after reading Bergson's account of the comic. And he finds the answer in the



reflection that to rule out the mechanical, the rigid, from the life which society wants is to withdraw the good from the reach of common men and to make it the aristocratic privilege of a few. And not only that: it is to lose sight of what, definitely, the good can be, even for the few. Because the good life, then, implies no longer the remaining firm to a fixed law, and the moral imperative is in the end deprived of its absolute and positive character. The good life is transmuted into a game of skill.

A series of articles "On the Nature of Acquaintance" is commenced in the *Monist* (January 1914) by Mr Bertrand Russell, and the first is devoted to a "Preliminary Description of Experience," in which the author attempts not a logical analysis of experience but to determine its extent, its boundaries, its prolongation in time, and the reasons for regarding it as not all-embracing. It is maintained that, whilst some facts are experienced, namely, those which are known to us by the immediate insight of sense, most of the facts which we consider to be within our knowledge are not experienced. Again, the present images of past things may be experienced, and in the immediate memory of something which has just happened the thing itself seems to remain in experience, in spite of the circumstance that it is known to be no longer present. Our total experience is proved to be not all-embracing certainly in the case of mathematical entities. For example, the number of functions of a real variable is infinitely greater than the number of moments of time. If, therefore, we spent all eternity in thinking of a new function every instant, or of any finite number of new functions every instant, there would still be an infinite number of functions which we should not have thought of, and therefore an infinite number of facts about them which we should never experience. No such cogent argument can be produced with regard to existing particulars. But although the existence of other people and of unperceived physical things cannot be conclusively proved, yet no logical reason can be urged against it; the fact that in the logical world there certainly are entities which we do not experience affords a parallel; and the common-sense assumption of the existence of such particulars has been found to be thoroughly successful as a working hypothesis, and there is no argument of any sort or kind against it.

Several volumes dealing with the history of philosophy call for mention. Mr Edwyn Bevan's four lectures on *Stoics and Sceptics* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1913) give an interesting and suggestive sketch of these ancient schools of thought. The author lays stress upon the fact that the Stoic philosophy was determined all through by a practical need. Regarded from the point of view of pure speculation, it was on a lower level than the Platonic and Aristotelian systems. The Stoics went to their task *with the wish* to discover that the power governing the universe was rational, and were thus led into a dogmatism which was certainly a philosophic fall. Yet Stoicism provided a scale of values, and nerved men to brave action and endurance in a world where brute force and cruelty had dreadful scope. An extremely interesting account is given of the Sceptics, which

makes one hope that some day Mr Bevan may be induced to write more fully on Carneades, whom Adamson once described as "by far the acutest mind in antiquity, a regular Hume." Professor S. Belmond has published the first volume of a work entitled *Études sur la philosophie de Duns Scot* (Paris: Beauchesne, 1913), in which he deals with the doctrine of Duns Scotus concerning the existence and knowableness of God. The book ought to be of great help to students of mediæval philosophy. There is an excellent and readable translation by Mr R. G. Collingwood of Benedetto Croce's book on *The Philosophy of Vico* (London: Latimer, 1913). Croce finds in Vico neither more nor less than the nineteenth century in germ, and writes with genuine veneration for the *Altwater* of his nation's philosophy. The little volume by Mr A. D. Lindsay, on *The Philosophy of Immanuel Kant*, in "The People's Books" (London: Jack, 1913), is an exceedingly clear and lucid presentation of the leading principles of the critical philosophy, marked by much originality and independence of judgment in the interpretation of Kant's meaning. Mr Lindsay admits that the Kantian theory of perception is inconsistent and wanting in coherence, the reason of which he considers to be that Kant is not concerned with the nature of perception, but with the relation of what is immediately perceived to what is not, but may be, immediately perceived. Sometimes Kant speaks of perception reaching objects directly, and refutes the view that we perceive only what is in our mind. At other times he argues that we do not perceive things, but affections produced in us by things. Hence, when he talks of our knowing only phenomena, he sometimes seems to mean that we know objects, things in themselves, only in part, so far as they appear to us, and the distinction between phenomenon and thing in itself would then be a distinction between the same thing imperfectly and perfectly understood. On the other hand, he sometimes seems to mean that we are aware of appearances, as entities separate from the objects which produce them in our minds. I think, however, it is a mistake to represent Kant as meaning, in this latter sense, that appearances are produced by *objects*. Surely, as thus understood, the phenomena *are* themselves the objects; the whole drift of the Deduction of the Categories becomes unintelligible unless this be recognised. Professor C. Lloyd Morgan's Herbert Spencer Lecture on *Spencer's Philosophy of Science* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1913) is a very interesting and able criticism of certain aspects of Spencer's philosophy. Professor Lloyd Morgan contends that cognition is a mode of relatedness which science must endeavour to treat on precisely the same lines as it deals with any other natural kind of relatedness. The essential point to bear in mind is, he thinks, that the cognitive relation always involves relatedness of *many terms*, and that its discussion involves the analysis of what, in the higher phases of its existence, is probably the most complex natural occurrence in this complex world.

G. DAWES HICKS.



## THEOLOGY.

THE REV. PROFESSOR JAMES MOFFATT, D.LITT.

THE sixth volume of the *Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics*, which has just been issued with admirable punctuality, bears the name of Dr L. H. Gray as a new assistant-editor. Dr Gray, in addition to his editorial work, contributes several articles to the volume; most are upon Iranian topics, but the first is on Fiction (primitive, Oriental, and Græco-Roman)—a subject which at first sight looks astray in such a work. Fiction is mentioned also, however, in the bibliography to the article on Gambling, where, among novels which illustrate the effect of gambling on character, *The Old Curiosity Shop* might have been mentioned. These articles, however, belong to the department of ethics rather than of religion. The leading articles which belong to the subject of our present survey may be grouped as follows.

In the first place, Greek religion<sup>1</sup> is discussed by Dr L. R. Farnell in a lucid and well-proportioned article, a model of what an encyclopædia article of this kind should be; it does not diverge into details covered by special articles, and yet presents the long, intricate story of the development of Greek religion in such a way that the successive stages stand out as distinctly as the evidence of the literature and the art permits. Dr Farnell closes by stating that "anthropomorphism was the strongest bias of the Hellene's religious imagination; and with this we associate his passion for idolatry and hero-worship." The latter trait emerges in the article on Heroes and Hero-Gods, which ranks with that on Health and Gods of Healing as among the most important in the volume. The writers really break fresh ground more than once. The accident of the alphabet also brings some remarkable material on Indian religions into this volume, notably Mr Crooke's survey of "Hinduism." In discussing the prospects of Hinduism at the present day, which is an even more difficult task than surveying impartially its past, he points out that it possesses three sources of strength in grappling with the powerful opposition of religions like Islam and Christianity; one is the caste-system; another is "the universal recognition of the power of *dharma*—a term which connotes much, but may be roughly explained as personified social law"; the third is the influence of women. The impact of Christianity is discussed by Mr Bernard Lucas in his new book on *Our Task in India* (Macmillan). He asks his Christian readers, "Shall we proselytise Hindus, or evangelise India?" By the former he means the aims and methods of those who seek "the acceptance by individual Hindus of our Western theological Christianity, and their definite accession to the various ecclesiastical organisations of very pronounced Western types which we

<sup>1</sup> An equally good piece of work is Mr J. G. Milne's account of "Græco-Egyptian Religion." Almost every article about Greek things in this volume reaches a very high standard, not excluding Troitsky's compressed and frank account of the Greek Orthodox Church.

have established in their midst." Against this he pleads for an Evangelism which will recognise frankly the contribution which the Hindu can make to Western Christianity, and the need of preventing the Indian churches from being regarded as foreign communities. The author's case is argued with candour and seriousness. One of its difficulties is to determine how much Western dogma has to be retained in an Evangelism which strives to be loyal to historic Christianity. An aspect of this is presented by Mr J. L. Johnston in *Some Alternatives to Jesus Christ* (Longmans)—a study of the various forms which the Incarnation-idea has assumed in Buddhism, Hinduism, and Babi-Behaism; the author attempts to show that Christianity, with its stress on the historical appearance of the Saviour, His human suffering, and His abiding presence in the Church or community, has qualifications, such as no other faith possesses, for meeting the needs of those who crave a religion of divine Incarnation. Mr Johnston's book belongs to the "Layman's Library." It is addressed not to specialists but to those Englishmen or Churchmen who meet in various ways the problem of comparative religion as a practical question. The author's aim is to reassure any who may feel that Christianity can only claim to be one of several great faiths which appeal to different racial temperaments. Without endeavouring to score points against the Eastern religions which he discusses, he argues persuasively. One or two of the statements in the chapter on the historical features of Christianity seem open to question, and it is hardly correct to say that "dogmatic formulation" is what "constitutes the inner history of the first Christian centuries" (p. 2). But the tone of the book is good, and its method fair. Mr T. J. Hardy's *The Religious Instinct* (Longmans) is a similar volume of orthodox apologetic, on a larger scale, with an appendix on "Some Regulations for the Guidance of Students of Comparative Religion." Mr Hardy writes effectively, and marshals with care his evidence for the thesis that Christianity can be demonstrated to satisfy the religious instincts of man as no other faith is able to do, these instincts being defined as (a) the consciousness of some object other than ourselves which we have the (b) desire to approach. In the *International Review of Missions* (1914, pp. 149 f.), Mr K. J. Saunders interprets Mr Tagore's wonderful prose translation of the *Gitanjali* from a similar standpoint; he attempts to show that the Deity of the *Gitanjali* is "no impersonal, imperturbable Absolute of Hindu philosophy, but that in fact, whether He be Christ or not, He is at least a Christ-like God, and that the experience of His suppliant and lover is one with the deep core of all Christian experience." Mr Saunders evidently shares the feeling of Mr Lucas about the need of allowing India to offer her own contribution to her interpretation of Christian theology. He concludes by hoping that "the songs of Rabindranath Tagore shall be on every tongue and that churches of Indian architecture and having their own liturgy and ritual shall resound with these exquisite words." Kabir, the weaver mystic of Northern Hinduism in the beginning of the sixteenth century, is described by Miss Underhill in almost equally appreciative



terms, in the *Contemporary Review* (February 1914, 193 f.). Kabir was born a Mahommedan, and went over to Hinduism. Abu'l Ala, the Syrian, whose career has been sketched by Mr Baerlein in a pleasant volume of the "Wisdom of the East" series, also forsook Islam for a semi-Buddhistic philosophy, but his views were nearer those of Ecclesiastes than those of the Christian ecclesia. Neither he nor Kabir has the significance of Tagore, for literature or for religion.

Naturally, the supreme article in this volume of the *Encyclopædia* is the composite one on "God," in fifteen sections. In the article on the Jewish conception of God there are some statements which we cannot but regard, as Miss Seward regarded Dr Johnson upon a historic occasion, "with mild but steady astonishment." For example, to say that it is not possible to speak of faith in connection with Judaism, "which is a religion of mere observance," or to assert that "rabbinism is fast dying out," while "no other system can save Judaism from dissolution," are statements which Jewish scholars will very properly resent, and which are out of place in a scientific work. The other sections of the article are quite adequate. In connection with Judaism, we may chronicle the appearance of a serviceable monograph by Dr S. Daiches on "Babylonian Oil Magic in the Talmud and later Jewish Literature," and a popular introduction to the "Cabala" (Open Court Publishing Company), by Dr B. Pick, which fills a gap in English study and enables the reader to appreciate the influence of this curious theosophical system on Judaism and Christianity alike. The *Encyclopædia* also contains articles on Halevi and Hillel, with a study of Jewish heresy by Dr Abrahams, who evidently hesitates to commit himself to Bacher's view that the term *mîn* denoted originally the Sadducee as viewed by the Pharisee. In the *Theologisch Tijdschrift* (1914, pp. 1-26), Professor Eardmans writes on "Farizeën en Sadduceën"; and in the *Jewish Quarterly Review* (January 1914, pp. 443 f.), Professor Friedlaender pleads for the recognition of a historic nucleus in the Talmudic account of the rupture between the Pharisees and the Hasmonean ruler, contending that the latter was not John Hyrcanus, as Josephus declares, but Alexander Jannæus. In a notice of Dr Abelson's recent book on Jewish mysticism, Dr Abrahams (*Journal of Theological Studies*, 1914, pp. 267 f.) agrees that the tendency which threw up the mediæval Cabala was not a sudden, foreign influence, but suggests that mysticism implied a metaphysic as truly as its rival, scholastic rationalism, did, and also that Dr Abelson has perhaps underrated the erotic element in the Zohar. This erotic element is not peculiar to Judaism, though it was to the allegorical interpretation of Canticles that it probably owed its start or impetus in Christianity. Canon M'Culloch notes one expression of it in the cult of the Sacred Heart within the Roman Church (*Encyclopædia*, pp. 557-558). The broader problem of mysticism in relation to Christianity is discussed by Miss Underhill in *The Interpreter* (January 1914, pp. 131-148), with special reference to the atonement; and in the *Journal of Theological Studies* (January 1914, pp. 244 f.), Mr J. L. Johnston offers some criticism on her treatment

of mysticism and the New Testament in *The Mystic Way*, contending that Christ becomes, on this theory, little more than a path-finder or Prometheus, and that it is on Christology that the mystic reinterpretation tends to break down. This is one of the points urged by Mr Matthews in "Mysticism and the Life of the Spirit" (*Church Quarterly Review*, 1914, 323 f.). Miss Underhill's main position is reflected, for the most part, in a pleasant volume of *Studies in Christian Mysticism* by Mr W. H. Dyson (Clarke, 1913), which insists that mysticism means the intense core of personal religion. Mr Dyson, however, seeks to qualify some of Miss Underhill's statements as Mr Johnston does.

The emergence of mystic phenomena<sup>1</sup> in connection with theosophy in early Christianity is one of the features of Gnosticism, which is discussed by Professor E. F. Scott in a luminous and striking article in the *Encyclopædia*. This admirably follows up Professor Peake's earlier study of Basilides. Professor Scott's estimate, like that of M. de Faye in his recent study, marks a real advance in our knowledge of the subject. One of his cardinal points is that the affinities of Gnosticism were with religion rather than with philosophy, and yet that the redemption which the Gnostics preached was a spiritual enlightenment which operated by means that were not primarily ethical; it was a deliverance from the material world and also from fatalism, whose method used occult rites and formulæ. In conflict with Gnosticism, the Church had to win by partially adopting some of the tendencies which it controverted. Professor Scott enumerates among these (a) the ascetic bias; (b) the sacramental theory of "a secret praxis, which was itself sufficient to insure all spiritual blessings"; (c) mysticism, the most important of all; and (d) an impulse to theological statement. Redemption in the New Testament, as he points out, "is fundamentally ethical, although the ethical meaning is obscured, even in the New Testament, by apocalyptical or speculative forms." In an article on "le péché et la gnose dans la théologie de Paulinisme" (*Revue de l'histoire des Religions*, 1913, pp. 273 f.), M. Jeanmaire endeavours to show that *gnosis* for Paul meant redemption in two ways: one form of it was "proprement intellectuelle," the knowledge gained by the Spirit in faith, which frees the believer from the fatalism which shut up the individual to sin; the other form was the direct vision which destroyed the flesh and changed the elect. The essay suffers from a failure to realise how *cognitio* did not really carry with it, for pagans, any specific thought of a relation to a personal deity.

Professor Troeltsch's succinct article in the *Encyclopædia* on Historiography restates some of his well-known ideas on the relation of history to religion. The narrower problem of the relation of the historical element to the Biblical narrative is discussed by Professor Peake in the course of

<sup>1</sup> In a thoughtful paper on "The Evolution and Survival of Primitive Thought," reprinted from *Essays and Studies presented to William Ridgeway*, Mr S. A. Cook (pp. 30 f.) aptly uses the re-emergence of mystical phenomena to illustrate his thesis. The comparative study of mysticism, he points out, suggests "a fundamental relationship between the most primitive of existing totemic cults and the most advanced of the historic religions." This is particularly true of magic and the Eucharist.



his singularly useful and sagacious book on *The Bible* (Hodder & Stoughton), which is a scholar's account of the value which the Bible in the light of modern criticism may be held to possess for the Church. Along with this English monograph we may class the penetrating essay by Kessler in the *Studien und Kritiken* (1914, pp. 247 f.) on "Die Bibel und die Begriffe: Geschichte, Mythos, Offenbarung." Professor Peake, in his seventeenth chapter, does not deal at large with the eschatology of the Gospels; but this is handled by Dr Latimer Jackson in his Hulsean lectures on *The Eschatology of Jesus* (Macmillan), a conscientious and readable attempt to introduce some methods of recent German criticism to his fellow-Anglicans, and to estimate, pretty much along the lines followed by Dr Winstanley, the permanent value of the eschatology of Jesus. In the closing chapter he pleads for reasonable liberty of criticism within the confessional bounds of the creeds. On the other hand, Bishop Chase, who has reprinted an essay on *The Gospels in the Light of Historical Criticism* (Macmillan), adds a new preface in which he hints that a bishop may be compelled to deal strictly with a student whose views of Jesus repudiate "the specific statements and the general tenour of the Apostles' Creed." The strained feelings between various parties and the authorities in the English Church reappear in two other books which lie before us. One of these, by Mr C. L. Marston, on *God's Co-operative Society* (Longmans), is the sort of cross-bench production which forces the reader to ask whether in these latter days so-called "Catholics" have jettisoned the command, *Thou shalt not speak evil of the rulers of thy people*. As Mr Marston assumes that "the Church has the right to contradict the Bible," this probably would not trouble him very much. His little book shows how bad temper leads to bad taste, and spoils whatever good case an ardent High Church social reformer may have against things and bishops in general. It is very different with Father Bull's *The Revival of the Religious Life* (Arnold). Father Bull, like Mr Marston and others, makes up for insisting on episcopal ordination as essential to the ministry by cheerfully scoffing at episcopal dignitaries. He derides the Church of England as a national entity, "the Erastian establishment with its Privy Council Law administered by the nominees of the Prime Minister." But his anger and sorrow are due to a passionate belief in the heroic mission of the Church, and this is what makes his pages attractive even to those who cannot share his enthusiasm for monks and the celibate life. By "religious" life he means "a corporate life under Rule," not a life of personal devotion. He sketches and criticises the history of monasticism, but his chief aim is to urge the need of Religious Orders in the Church of England, in order to cope with the problems of evangelisation and education at home and abroad.

I have taken the sixth volume of Dr Hastings' *Encyclopædia* as the framework of this survey, since it meets often the needs of people who, like the Irish writer, feel "bothered entirely by the want of preliminary information" about a topic, and contains work of fundamental importance for the study of comparative and positive religion in its various branches.

The value of the *Encyclopædia* becomes more and more evident as each volume appears. It is perhaps superfluous to offer any suggestions to the distinguished editor upon the scope and method of his great task, but I venture to offer one or two. One is, that while he cannot be expected to include everything, or to make this a biographical dictionary, we would have been glad to have had articles, *e.g.*—in this volume—on people like Gratry, Hilary of Poitiers, Francis of Assisi (but perhaps he is to come under the rubric of Religious Orders), and Francis de Sales; they are surely as relevant as Heine, Herodotus, and Hooliganism. Another is, that in future the bibliographies might be improved. Accurate and adequate bibliographies are of very high importance for study, and in this volume the bibliographies are not always up to date or full enough. Thus, *e.g.*, the articles on Free Thought omit any reference to Professor Bury's recent monograph; the articles on Heredity (which are excellent) ignore Professor Arthur Thomson's work; the article on the Apocryphal Gospels fails to notice the discovery of the large fragments of the Gospel of Bartholomew or the very important monograph of Schmidtke; Troeltsch's bibliography on "Historiography" is only a note of a few German works; and the article on the Hyksos omits any reference to the results of the recent excavations at Heliopolis. There are many such omissions. The articles on Comparative Religion and Folk-lore are usually blameless in this respect; it is generally the theological articles which are the defaulters. A third suggestion, which may be offered in no carping spirit, relates to specific statements, which ought to be verified or modified. Thus, in an article on the Christian idea of Forgiveness, which is not otherwise distinguished by sound exegesis, Dr Cobb asserts that "justification" is a term "which bulks largely in the New Testament, especially in Romans, Galatians, and Hebrews"! One of the characteristic features of Hebrews is that this term does not occur. Again, in the article on the Greek and Roman idea of Friendship, Mr Stock tells us that there is "no word on friendship" in Marcus Aurelius. There are at least ten, no fewer than five in the first book of his *Meditations*, including the famous remark that he had learned from Severus to "believe I am loved by my friends"—a lesson, by the way, which George Eliot found it so hard to learn ("I can't help losing belief that people love me—the unbelief is in my nature, and no sort of fork will drive it finally out"). Similarly, Dr Ottley would not have written (p. 779a) that hope "cannot be said to have a place in heathen ethics," if he had read Professor Butcher's essay on "The Melancholy of the Greeks"; and his article misses entirely that importance of eschatology for a critical valuation of the New Testament doctrine of hope, which Dr H. R. Mackintosh recognises in his opening study of Christian eschatology (*Expositor*, February, pp. 111 f.). Mr Stock's article on Hermes Trismegistus also fails to notice the discussions by Professor Granger (in the *Journal of Theological Studies*, vols. v. and viii.) and Dr Zielinski (in the *Archiv für Religionswissenschaft*, viii.—ix.).

JAMES MOFFATT.



## A SOCIAL SURVEY.

### SOCIAL THEORY.

*Notes on Politics and History* (Macmillan, 2s. 6d. net), a revision of the address which Lord Morley delivered as Chancellor of the Manchester University last year, is a political philosophy in little, combining the profound and mellow wisdom and serene calm of mature experience with a youthful faith and hope. The clarifying of thought on public questions will be greatly assisted by the issue of several new journals. The first number of *The Political Quarterly* (Oxford University Press) has a suggestive article by Mr A. D. Lindsay on "The State in Recent Political Theory." Doubtless, though a painful, it will be a salutary process for the protagonists of politics, science, and literature to have Mr Thomas Gibson Bowles and his collaborators ruthlessly probing their vitals in *The Candid Quarterly Review* (Garratt, 5s. net). Another venture which will interest many who were not born in the Principality is *The Welsh Outlook* (Cardiff: The Welsh Outlook Press, 3d. net), a monthly which will concern itself with national social progress. A word of praise must be reserved for the sociological supplement (31st January) to *The Athenæum*, characterised by the same candour and competence which have marked that journal during its seventy years of life.

In the field of pure economics a stimulating volume is *The Economics of Enterprise* (Macmillan, 10s. net), by H. J. Davenport, Professor at the University of Missouri. Writing as a conservative in economic theory, he sees "the need of a new economics," and the underlying spirit of the book is crystallised in the following paragraph: "It is for someone to construct an economic science adapted not only to the requirements of the facts, but to the needs of their amelioration. To this end economics must cease to be a system of apologetics, the creed of the reactionary, a defence of privilege, a social soothing syrup, a smug pronouncement of the righteousness of whatever is—with the still more disastrous corollary of the unrighteousness of whatever is not. The facts which are and the facts which are to be, are equally in need of economic categories to fit them. If the programme of social progress does not harmonise with the existing economic science, something is the matter with one or with both. It is in the conviction that the fault is with the economics that this book

has been written." A brief but extremely clear and readable explanation of the causes of economic welfare is *Wealth* (P. S. King, 3s. 6d. net), by Professor Edwin Cannan. A specific economic question is ably treated in *Die Lohntheorien, von Ad. Smith, Ricardo, J. S. Mill, und Marx* (München and Leipzig: Düncker and Humblot, 3 marks), by Dr Ferdinand Graf von Degenfeld-Schonburg. Another question, hotly debated in every industrial country, is discussed with full knowledge in *Löhne und Lebenskosten in Westeuropa (Frankreich, England, Spanien, Belgien)* (same publishers, 8 marks), by Dr Carl von Tyszka. An interesting scheme, which by and by will react on economic and social theory and experiment, is on foot to establish at Oxford a permanent memorial to one of the sanest and most far-seeing of social workers. *Barnett House*, if the scheme succeeds, will be (1) the home of social and economic studies at the University; (2) the headquarters of the Committee established in 1911 to link Oxford with the various University settlements and other organisations for social work in different parts of the country; (3) a centre for the work of the Oxford Tutorial Classes Committee. Mr Sidney Ball, St John's College, is chairman of the provisional committee which has the scheme in hand.

*American Ideals, Character, and Life* (Macmillan, 6s. 6d. net.), by H. W. Mabie, is a series of addresses delivered under the auspices of the Carnegie Peace Endowment to audiences in Japan, Korea, and Manchuria. The social aspirations of present-day Americans are those which are shared by the best men in all sects and parties in every Western country. The test of faith is no longer the acceptance of a formula, and religion is estimated in terms of social service. We hope it is true, as Professor Mabie says, that Americans to-day "have undertaken to reorganise their business so as to bring it into accord with the spirit of their institutions and with the Christian ethics they profess." Some notable American achievements are described in *Labor and Administration* (Macmillan, 7s. net), by Professor J. R. Commons, of the University of Wisconsin, whose motto is, "Utilitarianism, idealism, constructive research, class partnership, administrative efficiency." The book abounds in all manner of useful and practical suggestions, and describes mainly what has been done in that laboratory of social experiment, the State of Wisconsin. *The Governance of England*, by Sidney Low (Fisher Unwin, 3s. 6d. net), which has become a classic, has appeared in a revised edition with a new introduction. In *The King's Government: a Study of the Growth of the Central Administration* (Bell & Sons, 2s. net), Mr R. H. Gretton, in a bright and readable survey of recent administrative tendencies, shows that since the Reform Bill government means "an organisation for carrying on continuously all sorts of accommodations, conveniences, ameliorations of the daily life, the daily work and business of the public at large."

In England, with regard to problems of education as with regard to those of land, there is a considerable amount of agreement even among political opponents. *The Schools and Social Reform* (The Report of the Unionist Social Reform Committee on Education), by S. J. G. Hoare, M.P.



(Murray: 6d. net), advocates a national settlement and denounces the waste of bad health, of misdirected teaching, and of child-labour, without overlooking the evil of bad marriages, bad houses, and insufficient pay. *A National System of Education* (Cambridge University Press, 2s. 6d. net), by J. H. Whitehouse, M.P., which in general represents the view of English Liberals interested in education, is a plea for the raising of the school-leaving age, for the abolition of half-time, and for control of the education and wage-earning hours of adolescents.

The general position of women is discussed from opposite points of view in (1) *The Vocation of Woman* (Macmillan, 4s. 6d. net), by Mrs Archibald Colquhoun, the ablest and most temperate statement in English of the anti-feminist position; and (2) *Conflicting Ideals: Two Sides of the Woman's Question* (Murby, 1s. 6d. net), by B. L. Hutchins, a careful analysis of the ideal of social life imbibed by a child and young girl brought up under Victorian conditions, as opposed to the ideal of economic independence followed by the modern professional woman. *The New Statesman* special supplement on Women in Industry (21st February 1914) is a most valuable statement of the facts with regard to women's wages, women's trade union organisations, and women's position under the recently established English Trade Boards.

A notable contribution to the knowledge that will be required to solve English land problems is *A Pilgrimage of British Farming, 1910-1912* (Murray, 5s.), by Mr A. D. Hall, a scientific expert of the highest authority, who thinks that the British agricultural industry is on the whole prosperous, and that revolutionary changes are not needed, though he is strongly in favour of co-operative marketing and purchase, and of improved methods of farming. Of no less importance is *An Agricultural Faggot* (P. S. King, 5s. net), by R. H. Rew, which is full of exact information about the national food supply, agricultural co-operation, the migration of labourers, and even on seldom-discussed themes like the social habits of the modern farmer. *The Colonisation of Rural Britain*, by Jesse Collings (Rural World Publishing Co., 10s. 6d. net), advocates occupying ownership by enabling tenants to become owners, and by establishing peasant proprietorship on co-operative lines. *The Rural Problem* (Constable, 2s. 6d. net), by H. D. Harben, expounds the Fabian policy of a minimum wage for labourers, afforestation, a State service of railways and motors, credit banks, co-operative raising and distribution of farm produce. *The Land Problem* (Collins: The Nation's Library, 1s. net), by "Home Counties," conveys a great deal of useful information, carefully and judiciously brought together, in the short space of two hundred and fifty clearly and brightly written pages. *Problems of Village Life* (Williams & Norgate, 1s. net.) is a vigorous though rather partisan plea for a minimum wage, the compulsory provision of cottages, and for a land policy which will ultimately lead to nationalisation.

An obvious trend of modern industry is discussed in *The Tendency towards Industrial Combination* (Constable, 6s. net), by G. R. Carter, who

maintains that the present-day tendency to centralisation and concentration is (1) the natural and almost normal development of a new form of business organisation to meet modern conditions of industry and commerce, and (2) a natural reaction against the unbridled operation of the competitive system and extreme individualism. It is curious to find that by combination Mr Carter merely means combination among employers, and that there is hardly any reference in his book to labour and trade unions, factors which surely cannot be ignored in any penetrating or comprehensive treatment of industrial tendencies. Two admirable little books are *Co-operation and Co-Partnership* (Collins, 1s. net), by L. L. Price, and *Co-Partnership and Profit-Sharing* (Williams & Norgate, 1s. net), by Aneurin Williams. *Unemployment* (Williams & Norgate, 1s. net), by Professor A. C. Pigou, analyses various causes of unemployment, but leaves untouched the most important of all, viz. that the modern competitive system of commerce and industry will not work without a reserve of labour.

### SOCIAL EXPERIMENT.

The International Conference on Safety of Life at Sea, convened by the British Government last autumn, has unanimously recommended that (1) an ice patrol service under the control of the United States should be established in the North Atlantic to observe the action of currents and to destroy dangerous derelicts; (2) all vessels travelling on international voyages and having more than fifty passengers on board shall be equipped with wireless telegraphy; (3) there must be accommodation in lifeboats or their equivalents for all persons on board. The International Association for Labour Legislation is endeavouring, for the moment unsuccessfully, to secure an international agreement to limit the hours of women and young persons to ten per day, and to prohibit altogether the night-work of boys. Sir George Askwith's Report on the working of the Conciliation Act during the year 1913 shows that both employers and employed show an increasing willingness to take advantage of the opportunities of bringing about industrial peace. *Insurance and the State*, by W. F. Gephart (Macmillan, 5s. 6d. net), is a reasonable statement of the pros and cons of the question of a State monopoly of insurance. Italy, the canton of Neuchâtel, and Wisconsin have a public monopoly of life insurance, and there are similar examples elsewhere. Sir John Collie, one of the greatest British authorities on legal and industrial medicine, speaking recently on the panel system in connection with the Insurance Act, declared that a State medical service was inevitable.

The need for exact information on the multifarious forms of modern municipal activity will be met, so far as England is concerned, by the recent decision of the London County Council to publish a statistical survey of British towns and a volume of comparative municipal statistics on the lines of those published by the municipal authorities of Paris, Berlin, and Vienna. Such surveys will help (1) to ascertain whether



economies can be effected by a yearly comparison of the cost of municipal services, and (2) to increase efficiency. Chapter XIII. of Professor Common's *Labor and Administration*, already mentioned, describes a successful experiment inaugurated by the Milwaukee City Council during the Socialist régime from 1910 to 1912. A Bureau of Economy was established to overhaul the work of all the executive departments, and to eliminate waste of time and money. The effect of various social experiments in England can now be to some extent tested by experience. During 1913 the 423 Board of Trade Labour Exchanges filled 921,853 vacancies out of 2,965,893 registrations. *The Seventh Report of the Central Unemployed Body for London* (P. S. King: 1s. net) records the fact that applications received were 50 per cent. under the average for eight years, and the percentage of cases assisted was higher than ever before. Nevertheless, in a year of unprecedented industrial prosperity 15,773 persons, nearly all with dependants, came for assistance. *The First Year's Working of the Liverpool Docks Scheme*, by R. Williams (Liverpool Economic and Statistical Society), shows that during a year of busy trade over 30 per cent. of the men received 15s. a week or less when working.

Even without the suffrage, women are winning their way to a position of equality with men. A woman judge has been appointed to the Juvenile Court at Chicago. In Berlin, notwithstanding the Imperial opinion that woman's chief concern is with *Kinder, Küche, and Kirche*, a financial journal edited and for the most part written by women has been started in January last, as the organ of the Berlin Frauenbank, all of whose directors and clients are women. More wonderful still, the Government of Turkey has decided to admit women to the university, and courses of lectures are being specially arranged for them on domestic science, hygiene, gynæcology, and—the position of women!

*Child Labour in the United Kingdom*, by F. Keeling (King, 7s. 6d. net), is a lucid and exhaustive study, prepared for the International Association for Labour Legislation, of the development and administration of the law relating to children employed outside the Factory and Mines Acts. *Rearing an Imperial Race* (St Catherine Press, Norfolk Street, Strand, 7s. 6d. net) is a mine of useful information about social experiments both in England and abroad with regard to the physical well-being of poor children during the years they are at school. The Order of the Local Government Board, issued on 31st December last, which excludes children from workhouses, is an important step in the right direction, and one that was scandalously overdue. *Young Delinquents* (Methuen, 3s. 6d. net), by Mary G. Barnett, is an account of reformatory and industrial schools in Great Britain, with suggestions for the solution of the problems which they involve. "The Little Commonwealth," a self-governing colony for young delinquents of both sexes, established only a year ago in Dorsetshire, has already achieved great success. One girl, a skilful shoplifter who had been committed to it as incorrigible, has already served her second term as judge. It has been found also that the sensible, business-like relations between the boys and

girls has checked the growth of a morbid or corrupt sex-consciousness. France has instituted a system of Children's Courts, modelled largely on American ideas, which came into operation on 4th March. Paris, but not the provinces, is favoured with a special president, judges, and a public prosecutor chosen from magistrates who have specialised in children's cases.

Interest in the housing of the masses continues to increase. *The Garden City*, by C. B. Purdom (J. M. Dent, 10s. 6d. net), is a readable and splendidly illustrated account of the aims and activities of Letchworth. The original purpose was to improve individual housing, not to build an artistic town. The municipality of Paris will erect for occupation not later than June 1915 cheap and hygienic dwellings for 60,000 persons at present living under unsanitary conditions. Spain has also a scheme for workmen's dwellings. In a suburb of Seville three groups of three-storied houses are being constructed, each containing accommodation for thirty families, an artesian well sunk on the premises, and a cinematograph for educational purposes. So much has recently been heard of the pernicious effects of the last-named invention that it is well to remember for what useful purposes it has been, and still more in the future will be, employed. Cinematograph films have been used not only as illustrations of surgical operations and for other scientific demonstrations, but as aids to scientific investigation. A Danish savant is trying to record the aurora borealis in motion upon the celluloid film. The cinema has been used as a means of studying certain industrial processes (like the testing of Sheffield steel), of teaching lip-reading to the deaf, of giving instruction in motor-bus driving, of exposing fraudulent spiritualist mediums, and of identifying people wanted by the police. Lastly, the "Oko" machine, the whole outfit of which, including appliances for developing and printing, is as light and compact as a snapshot camera, not only takes cinema photographs, but projects them on the screen, so that everybody of moderate means and leisure can make and exhibit his own films, and teachers can secure pictures of any subject they desire and show them in the ordinary class-room. The educational potentialities of the cinematograph are to be investigated by an International Committee which has recently been formed in London.

A valuable account of the personalities of some reformers, not so well known as their high character and intelligence deserved, is to be found in *Working Men Co-operators* (Co-operative Union, Manchester, 10d.), by Benjamin Jones and A. Dyke Acland, which has been revised on behalf of the Central Education Committee of the Society by Miss J. P. Madams. Another quietly forceful personality, whose merits ought to be more generally appraised, has had justice done to him in *The Life of Edward A. Moseley in the Service of Humanity* (Macmillan, 8s. 6d. net), by Jas. Morgan. Moseley, who, as he said himself, devoted his "life to the man with the patched trousers," was chiefly responsible for the introduction of the Safety Appliances Act, employers' liability, and the limitation of the hours of labour in America.

R. P. FARLEY.

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## REVIEWS

*Essays on Truth and Reality.*—By F. H. Bradley.—Oxford :  
Clarendon Press, 1914.—Pp. xvi + 480.

MR BRADLEY tells us in a short preface that he had intended to rewrite these essays and present them as a formal treatise on the nature and criterion of knowledge, truth, and reality. Everyone will sympathise with the author in the reason, his delicate health, which has prevented the fulfilment of this design, but everyone also will rejoice in the possession of these most valuable essays not merely collected in a volume but arranged with the special purpose of developing a continuous argument. It will also be welcome news to Mr Bradley's readers that he hopes to republish those early works which have long been eagerly sought for in booksellers' catalogues. Whilst sharing the disappointment he feels that he is not able to undertake the task he has so longed to perform of rewriting the *Principles of Logic*, some of us think, with at least one famous historical instance in mind, that philosophers are apt to underestimate the value of their early work. One thing at least is certain, the increasing devotion to metaphysical inquiry, and the wide interest in philosophy that is so striking a feature of our generation, is in no small degree due to the influence of Mr Bradley's writings. When the historian of our modern intellectual development takes stock of the remarkable awakening of interest in philosophy, *Appearance and Reality* will seem to mark its beginning and, to no small extent, to have determined its direction.

The main purpose of the book before us may be described as a restatement of the doctrine of *Appearance and Reality* in the general light of the criticism it has received, and a reaffirmation of its claim to present a reasonable view of the universe. The Introduction is new, and was written for the formal treatise that Mr Bradley originally designed, and with the two chapters which follow it, entitled "Faith" and "On Floating Ideas and the Imaginary," it gives us a vigorous exposition of the metaphysical principle that reality is the whole as a perfect individual experience. The three following chapters, on "Truth and Practice," "Truth and Copying," and "The Ambiguity of Pragmatism," form, with an introductory note, a division by themselves, and present to us Mr

Bradley's attitude towards the Pragmatist controversy. This is followed by an important chapter on "Our Knowledge of Immediate Experience," to which is added an appendix on "Consciousness and Experience," published twenty years ago, but of present interest as a criticism of certain views put forward by Dr J. Ward. The three chapters that follow, on "Truth and Coherence," "Coherence and Contradiction," "Appearance, Error, and Contradiction," also form a division by themselves, and deal with some fundamental criticisms directed against Mr Bradley's doctrine, chiefly in the writings of Mr Bertrand Russell and Mr G. F. Stout. This is the most difficult part of the book, and will probably be quite unintelligible to the reader who does not look up the references. Whoever does will be well rewarded, particularly if his delight is in dialectic, for it is here that Mr Bradley displays his amazing logical skill. Let those who enjoy a subtle argument turn, for example, to the discussion of "Class" with Mr Russell on page 283, and also to the note on page 253. The chapters on "Some Aspects of Truth," "Memory and Inference," and "Memory and Judgment" are republished articles which deal especially with Mr Bradley's doctrine of the logical principle in judgment. The last three, entitled "What is the Real Julius Cæsar?" "God and the Absolute," and "My Real World," are, with the concluding remarks, entirely new. They gather together the whole argument and distinctly advance the author's philosophical position, showing it to rest on a broader and firmer basis than it has ever before appeared to occupy.

I propose to do no more than note the controversial portions, not because they are less—they may be more—important than the direct argument, and certainly not because I would advise any reader to omit them—is it not often in controversy that the true inwardness of a doctrine is revealed?—but for two sufficient reasons. First, that to be fair to a controversial statement you must let each side speak for itself—it is this that makes a symposium, in which the writers present their case, each with reference to the others, so valuable; when you cannot have this you are bound to look up references and compare contexts. And, secondly, because contradiction or negation is of small value in comparison with positive statement. We may notice, then, that there is a marked difference in Mr Bradley's attitude towards Pragmatism and towards those other critics whom we have named. Pragmatism proclaimed a new gospel, an emancipation from some kingdom of darkness which it called intellectualism, and Mr Bradley's insistent demand is for explanation, for more light, for less shouting and heralding of the new era and for more cool reasoning. It is sad that the great mind who called forth the enthusiasm for and was the intellectual force behind pragmatism, William James, was lost to us by death before he could devote himself to reply to the challenge here personally addressed to him.

It is very likely that but for *Appearance and Reality* there would have been no pragmatism, or, at least, that the form and direction the movement took would have been very different. If logical advance is



through contradiction, and contradiction is implicit in the very affirmation itself, then we may see in Pragmatism the antithesis to Mr Bradley's thesis, the doctrine of reality in *Appearance and Reality*, and this may be the reason why the counter assertion was so emphatic. But it is hard to explain the strange perversity by which a doctrine that so decidedly rejected the bold saying, "The real is the rational," that declared intellect to be but a partial aspect of reality, that affirmed a felt whole of experience before thought, and sought ultimate reality in the satisfaction of an individual felt whole beyond thought—the Absolute as a perfect experience—should have been named intellectualism, and that intellectualism and absolutism should have been employed as convertible terms. In the light of this present book it must seem more than ever surprising. For what is Mr Bradley's doctrine? It is that every partial aspect of life shows imperfection inherent in it. Everything is subordinate to the Good, and the Good is that which finally satisfies, that which gives contentment and suppresses unrest. This final satisfaction is not to be found in the Hedonist principle of pleasure, nor in practical activity, nor in beauty, nor in knowledge, nor in love. Each of these has goodness, yet in none is goodness supreme, in none is satisfaction absolute. And this contention leads to his characteristic doctrine: "Philosophy demands, and in the end it rests on, what may fairly be termed faith. It has, we may say, in a sense to presuppose its conclusion in order to prove it." This is the logical ground of the Absolute; let us see its application. What are the limits of the real world—of my real world? In ordinary experience I identify reality with my world of actual fact, by which I mean the world which is continuous with my body, the construction that I build in time and space round my present, that is, my end waking moment. That is real, and outside it floats the unsubstantial realm of the imaginary. But this is a false assumption, false in the meaning that it will not work. None of my ideas merely float; all in some way qualify reality. If it is otherwise, reality is reduced to a pure abstraction, a present point without duration. Past and future are excluded, for theirs is not the reality of actual existence, and with their exclusion follows also art and science, morality and religion. No one does exclude, and no one can exclude, his ideas from reality. The worlds of politics, commerce, trade and manufacture, not to speak of poetry and imaginative art, are for each of us real. But to what reality are these ideas attached? In the end, to the Universe, to the Absolute reality as an all-inclusive whole. In what mode does this reality exist? Mr Bradley replies that it exists in finite centres, and that outside these finite centres, which are the appearances of the Absolute, there is no reality. The Absolute is not something over and above and beyond our individual lives; it is these individual lives carried out to their complete fulfilment. The doctrine that reality only exists in finite centres is insisted on with particular earnestness in the present work—it is almost, one might say, its main contention; and on it ultimately rests the theory of truth. You cannot by any possible means separate the nature of truth

from the nature of reality, for truth is the ideal aspect of reality—it is reality as it exists in knowledge.

“The Universe is one Reality which appears in finite centres.” This is the theme which is handled with extraordinary skill in the most striking chapter in the book, entitled “What is the Real Julius Cæsar?” The title is afforded by a quotation from Mr Russell which asserts, Mr Bradley tells us, the opposite of what appears evident to him. Mr Russell assumes, he says, that of any judgment he makes about Julius Cæsar, Julius Cæsar is not himself a constituent. Here, then, we have in its most direct form the problem of truth and reality, in the difference, if any, that there may be between the real and ideal Cæsar. And the problem, for Mr Bradley, resolves itself into the question, What is the relation of a finite centre of experience to other centres and to the whole? It would be obviously impossible to give even an account of the important argument in a brief notice of the whole book, but we cannot leave it without calling attention to the perfect frankness with which Mr Bradley here and elsewhere warns us that we are concerned with a problem that does not admit of solution. In the end it is not intelligible and therefore not explicable. But this does not and should not deter us. Mr Bradley feels as all philosophers must feel, that a universe which could be made perfectly intelligible to a finite understanding would be so poor a thing that it would not be worth understanding. “The complete experience which would supplement our ideas and make them perfect is in detail beyond our understanding.” It is this frank recognition which gives the note of scepticism that so many people think they discern in Mr Bradley’s philosophy.

Truth, then, for Mr Bradley, is the ideal aspect of reality. Truth and reality are inseparable aspects of one whole. Truth does not therefore stand over against reality; it differs from reality by falling short of it in the same way that the part falls short of the whole. Were truth finally satisfied by the addition to it of what it lacks, it would be reality. There are therefore degrees of truth as there are degrees of reality. “Reality for me is one individual experience. It is a higher unity above our immediate experience, and above all ideality and relations. It is above thought and will and æsthetic perception. But, though transcending these modes of experience, it includes them all fully. Such a whole is Reality, and, as against this whole, truth is merely ideal. It is indeed never a mere idea, for certainly there are no mere ideas. It is Reality appearing and expressing itself in that one-sided way which we call ideal. Hence, truth is identical with Reality in the sense that, in order to perfect itself, it would have to become Reality. On the other side, truth, while it is truth, differs from Reality, and, if it ceased to be different, would cease to be true” (p. 343).

In the two chapters on Memory we see the application of Mr Bradley’s principle to a special problem. The problem of memory is to him the problem of ideal construction. Whatever be the fact of memory, whatever be its origin in the felt experience of the individual, in knowledge it involves ideal construction. No recollection merely floats or comes to the



mind as a detached idea. A remembered event is attached to present consciousness by a series of events which may not, and in most cases cannot, have formed part of our actual experience. These events are ideally constructed or, as we say, inferred. What is our guiding principle in this logical process of inference? This is Mr Bradley's problem of memory. In regard to it I would like to give a personal impression not as a criticism but for what it is worth. In reading the chapter on "Memory and Inference" there comes back to me the vivid recollection of the effect the argument produced on me when I read it on its first appearance fifteen years ago. It seemed to prove that all reality was ideal construction, and its effect was to deepen my scepticism. It strikes me differently now—not that the logical argument has less force, but that the whole point of interest of the problem has shifted. It is impossible now to regard the problem of memory as purely a logical one, and this is due to a distinct advance in knowledge, mainly the result of the remarkable success of the new method of studying abnormal psychology. Memories are for the new psychology no longer merely personal and individual recollections, but psychical realities as stubborn and as active as any physical realities. It would be easy to make too much of this, and I do not pretend that it invalidates Mr Bradley's argument. Some may say it has no bearing on it, but it is no longer possible to regard memory as a clear case in point of a reality that involves or depends upon ideal construction and nothing else.

One final question will be present to most readers as they study this book. What is Mr Bradley's attitude to the concept of change or becoming? Original change or becoming has not only been recently proclaimed anew as the ultimate principle in philosophy, but the principle is modifying profoundly the older scientific theories in biology and also in physics and mathematics. "The Universe contains change, but the Universe itself cannot change" (p. 411, note). This to Mr Bradley appears essential to his concept of the Absolute. This also is his reason for refusing to identify God with the Absolute. In making the Absolute the object of religion you thereby transform it. It has become forthwith something that is less than the Universe. A personal God is a God with external relations, and therefore something within the Universe; less than the Universe, and therefore imperfect. This is the antinomy in the religious consciousness—the object of worship is a God who must be and who cannot be perfect.

The book concludes with the alternative,—if you reject the Absolute as a vain idol, you must set up in its place some abstraction, change itself, if you will, and declare that this is the only reality of things and all else illusion; and then, where else but in the real universe does this illusion fall?

We may conclude our notice by quoting a passage which occurs early in the book, and with which all Mr Bradley's readers, whatever their differences, will agree: "Philosophy always will be hard, and what i

promises even in the end is no clear theory nor any complete understanding or vision. But its certain reward is a continual evidence and a heightened apprehension of the ineffable mystery of life, of life in all its complexity and all its unity and worth" (p. 106).

H. WILDON CARR.

LONDON.

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*All Men are Ghosts.*—By L. P. JACKS.—London: Williams & Norgate, 1913.—Pp. 360.

BECAUSE of the hardness of men's hearts and the slowness of their understanding, the teachers of mankind are always tempted, sooner or later, to veil their meaning in parables, and to tell their audience a story instead of expounding a doctrine. They not infrequently succeed thereby in enlarging their popular appeal, without giving offence to the learned; for even pedants have found it a congenial pastime to interpret parables, and to debate the precise meaning and function of, say, a Platonic "myth." But there is always a danger that the world will swallow the story without assimilating the doctrine. I will not, therefore, attempt to review as literature Professor Jacks's stories (excellent as they are), nor add to the chorus of praise which they have elicited as such; I will discuss rather the very interesting doctrine of which I conceive them to be the vehicle. I do so with the greater gusto that I can conceive them also as illustrating doctrines I have been scientifically expounding for over twenty years (without ever eliciting a word of comment from those whom they concerned professionally), and as expressing an attitude towards life which follows logically from the profoundest philosophy and has been recommended by all the religions. And yet I greatly doubt whether by so doing I shall be doing Professor Jacks a service. The very fact that what seems so novel in his attitude is really of the hoariest antiquity shows that his ideas challenge stubborn prejudices which have always found them repugnant, and compensated for a nominal acceptance by practical neglect. When, therefore, Professor Jacks's real meaning is clearly grasped, I fear that the prophet will be stoned—as usual.

The two lessons Professor Jacks wishes us to take to heart and really live by are, (1) that "Illusion is an integral part of Reality" (p. 123), *i.e.* reality is *literally* "of such stuff as dreams are made of," and (2) that *therefore* there is *literal* truth in the belief in the supremacy of Spirit. Now, the first doctrine means, not so much that we are unreal as that "dreams" also are real, and that there are no real means of *theoretically* discriminating between their reality and that of ordinary reality, because the difference between them is *practical*, and a difference of value; the second, that the formula, "reality is ultimately spiritual," is not to remain the pale abstraction of a phrase, but to apply to the inmost life of every one of us. Both, plainly, are hard sayings for the commonplace. Con-



jointly, moreover, they generate the corollary that not only may there be a future life for every Spirit that has spirit enough to go on, but that already past, present, and future interpenetrate, and that "worlds without end lie enfolded one within another, like the petals of a rose" (p. 143), as we could see if only we had the courage to open our eyes and to look at the facts of our personal experience instead of at the convenient fictions by which they are standardised and classified.

Now, all these doctrines are of the most venerable antiquity. The first underlies the great Hindu doctrine of *Maya*. In the West it is first recorded by Plato in the *Theætetus* 158. He recognised its difficulty, and it has been recognised as a "difficulty" ever since, by an interminable succession of philosophers who have dreamt away their lives without ever finding any "valid proof" that *their* "realities" were not dreams. It dominates the life of every child, until he becomes able to distinguish practically between dream, fancy, and illusion and waking experience. The second has been orthodox Idealism since Plato. The corollary has been passionately emphasised, in one form or another, by every religion worthy of the name.

But has the world behaved as if it believed in any of the three? Not a bit of it. On the contrary, it has taken care to reduce them all to unreality and sterilised them so that they bear no fruits for life. For of course they are disturbing doctrines, and unsuited to the taste of philistines who wish for a quiet life and do not want to see abysses opening out before them at every step. Accordingly, it is an understood thing that when a philosopher speaks of "reality" it is of a tamed reality which has been rationally doped and purged of all reference to hallucination, dream, illusion, and madness, and that the Idealist's dictum about the "spirituality" of all reality is not to make the slightest difference to life or science, and to be perfectly compatible with the complete materiality of everybody. Similarly, the religions must not be allowed to mean that life is a perpetual miracle, and the miraculous must be weeded out of them; their utmost possibilities must be authoritatively explored by theologians, and properly catalogued and fixed in Creeds. Thus do philosophic and theological orthodoxies conspire in every age to pander to the timidity of the masses, to multiply the visions of the seers, and to eviscerate their own doctrines of their meaning.

Professor Jacks, however, is a protestant against this policy among theologians, as I have the honour to be among philosophers, and as the Psychological Researchers are among scientists. We have all discovered that the official formulas are empty and unsatisfying. We are consequently in for a battle royal, and can expect no quarter.

But will such minor prophets succeed where the major ones have failed? Will men be persuaded of the imminence of the kingdom of heaven by Professor Jacks, when Jesus and St Paul have failed? Will William James convince the Idealists that a "spirituality" which makes no difference has no meaning? Will the Society for Psychical Research render probable by

experiments the reality of a spirit world Plato could not establish by *a priori* argument? Their success does not look probable, and yet *gutta cavat lapidem*, and truth, as well as reality, grows "dropwise." There are, moreover, some hopeful symptoms. Science, after bullying religion out of all its romances about devils, saints, miracles, heavens, and hells, and reducing it to abject tameness, has of late itself grown very wild and romantic. It has become very critical of the convenient fictions it has hitherto venerated as unquestionable "principles," and seen that their methodological truth needs continual confirmation from experience. It has consequently had its eyes opened to the existence of less convenient alternatives in every direction, and is indulging itself in a gorgeous liberty of theorising which spares neither age nor repute. The result is that "nothing is true" (absolutely) any longer, and "everything is permitted," provided it works, while fixed ideas are everywhere uprooted and cast into the flux. And, worst of all, for those who have got into a groove and wish to stay in it, a growing number of philosophers applaud all this, and say that science is all the better for it! But, whatever happens, it is to be hoped that literature will be enriched further with some more of Professor Jacks's parables.

F. C. S. SCHILLER.

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*Pragmatism and Idealism.*—By William Caldwell.—London:  
A. & C. Black.—Pp. vii+268.

PROFESSOR CALDWELL enjoys the distinction of having been the first to introduce Pragmatism to the notice of the British public by his paper in *Mind* for October 1900, and he has therefore a right to expect his account of its relation to Idealism to be well received, the more so that there is no other general survey of the controversy which mediates between the extremes, and there are so many moderate men who shrink from going the whole way with Pragmatism, while yet unwilling to shut their eyes and harden their hearts with the older idealists. These, therefore, will welcome Professor Caldwell's book, and all will find it readable and interesting and appreciate his solicitude to hold the balance even between the contending parties, even though it sometimes leads him into apparent contradictions. For example, although on p. 47 he (strangely) speaks of "the impossible breach that exists in Pragmatism between the 'theoretical' and the 'practical,'" this does not prevent him from (correctly) drawing from it the insight that there is "*no rigid separation* between theory and practice" (pp. 93-5).

There are also more serious defects in the plan of the book. It fails to map out clearly the extent of the territories and the issues which are in dispute. Its standpoint is so dominantly metaphysical that it almost completely ignores the psychological and logical motives in Pragmatism. James's great *Psychology*, of which all the doctrines of Pragmatism are only the application to special problems, is hardly mentioned. And it is



hard to believe that if Professor Caldwell had read either Mr D. L. Murray's excellent little *Pragmatism* (which is the only comprehensive survey of Pragmatism from the inside in English), or the logical works of Mr Alfred Sidgwick (whom his index confuses with his cousin Henry), or my own *Formal Logic*, which gives a *catalogue raisonné* of the faults Pragmatism finds in the traditional "logic," he would have allowed his remarks about a "neglect" of logic by Pragmatism to stand on pp. 130-1. He has also been deceived into thinking that the *Essays in Radical Empiricism* represent James's last work simply because they were the last to be republished, and into rejecting them too unreservedly as "a new Humism" (p. 11).

On the other hand, he must be credited with a perception that the great question Pragmatism has raised is "the simple fact of human action and of its significance for philosophy" (p. 93), "the rediscovery of the fact of action" (p. 98), which intellectualism had disregarded (and indeed made unintelligible). He also recognises in full the "humanism" of Pragmatism, and consequently acquits it of the charge of "subjectivism" and "solipsism" (pp. 159 *f.*, 212, but *cf.* p. 261 *n.*), and even condemns Absolutism on this score (pp. 212, 216). He conceives Pragmatism widely enough to include a chapter on Bergson, and to call him "the greatest of the Pragmatists" (which is true only if Pragmatism is essentially a metaphysic), although he seems to understand neither his *durée réelle* nor his doctrine of "images." He also accepts from Schinz the derivation of Pragmatism from "Americanism" (which, however, in a neighbourly Canadian spirit, he approves of), and holds that James could have found no more favourable soil than at Harvard (p. 180). This may be true *academically*, but it is not saying much. For, after all, James had to contend throughout life with the hostility of all his philosophic colleagues, and did not get into Harvard as a philosopher but as a physiologist. Nor has either Professor Schinz or Professor Caldwell attempted to show how the general Americanism of the *people* could get James the entry into the self-coöpting *coterie* of natural "intellectuals" who form the academic caste in every country. But for the accident that the greatest genius America has produced happened to become a professor, there would have been as little *academic* Pragmatism in America as anywhere else. The American temper would (like the British) simply have continued to be flouted in academic circles, to find (intellectualist) "philosophy" unpalatable and unintelligible, and to leave it severely alone. Which is, after all, the attitude of most minds towards the subject everywhere, and of most of the best minds in the Anglo-Saxon world. As a matter of fact, therefore, its supposed conformity with the national temper has been the greatest *obstacle*, not only to the spread, but even to the intelligent appreciation, of Pragmatism. It made Pragmatism such an object of dread and detestation everywhere to all who shared the professorial bias that they completely lost their heads over it. Nothing, *e.g.*, aroused more *furor Teutonicus* at the Heidelberg Congress of Philosophy in 1908 than the harmless historical statement that Pragmatism was a movement of thought which had originated in *America*.

About the practical problem Pragmatism finally puts to the professor, viz. whether philosophy should remain merely a means of enabling the superior person to feel superior or should attempt to influence the minds of men, Professor Caldwell does not seem to have quite made up his mind (*cf.* pp. 187, 190, 265). He sees that with the intellectualist conception of philosophy it can never be made palatable to the ordinary man, who does not really need overbeliefs that have no value for life. But he also realises that if philosophy is to survive even as a subject of academic instruction or amusement under these circumstances, it will require a good deal more "protection" than it is likely to get (except perhaps at Oxford).

Passing, lastly, to Professor Caldwell's treatment of Idealism, it is to be noted first that he conceives it both as affirming "the necessary implication" of subject and object (pp. 143, 160 *n.*, 264), and also as "the great doctrine of the sovereignty of the spirit," without perceiving that the latter by no means follows from the former. For, unfortunately, the implication-theory leaves the subject just as dependent on the object as *vice versa*, and only proves their *correlation*. Secondly, Professor Caldwell, being a strong theist, devotes a chapter to a keen criticism of Professor Bosanquet's *Individuality and Value*, which he takes as the high-water mark of absolutistic intellectualism. In this chapter he traces the process by which the terms "individual," "self," "God," "freedom," "morality," etc., are emptied of their ordinary significance, in order that they may be absorbed in the abstract and formal standpoint of a "whole" to which nothing "finite" can possibly attain. If Professor Caldwell had been able to include in his notice Professor Bosanquet's second volume also, he might have been tempted to use even more scathing language about this strangely paradoxical method of "rationalising" the world. And he is probably right in thinking that the modern spirit is more and more turning away from this sort of thing, though it would be sanguine to expect that this will make much difference to academic teaching of philosophy. For it is, after all, only in America that it makes any practical difference to a professor whether his pupils understand and like his doctrine, and that he is thereby forced to bring his theories into something like accord with the requirements of life.

F. C. S. SCHILLER.

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*Mechanism, Life, and Personality.*—By J. S. Haldane, M.D., LL.D., F.R.S.  
London: John Murray, 1913.—Pp. vi+139.

*Continuity.*—The British Association Presidential Address, 1913.—Sir Oliver Lodge, D.Sc., F.R.S.—London: J. M. Dent & Sons, 1913.  
Pp. 118.

*Some Intimations of Immortality.*—By Rt. Hon. Sir Edward Fry, G.C.B.  
London: Williams & Norgate, 1913.—Pp. 35.

THE year 1912 witnessed a rather remarkable output of literature advocating the claims of the mechanistic theory of life. This revival was due to



the growing conviction amongst scientific workers of the worthlessness of vitalism coupled with the recent rapid growth and recognition of the new sciences of bio-chemistry and modern physiology. It is safe to say that the development of these sciences received great impetus from the adoption of the mechanistic theory as a working hypothesis. We have so much yet to learn concerning the mechanism of living things, and the progress already made is so startling, that many workers have succumbed to the temptation of regarding an organism as nothing more than a complex machine. This danger of losing sight of the whole by concentrating attention upon the details is one against which every scientific investigator must be on his guard. In assigning, then, much of the credit for the success of recent biological research to the mechanistic conception, it is necessary to keep in mind that all the experimentation concerned is solely directed towards investigation of the mechanism of living things. The bio-chemist starts fully armed with the resources of his physico-chemical laboratory, with instruments for detecting physical processes and apparatus for determining chemical changes. The working hypothesis decides both the means and the end, which is to unravel the mysteries of the mechanism, and that alone.

The amazing success which the biologist working on these lines has achieved does not, however, warrant him in attempting to construct a philosophy of life upon the results of investigations so strictly limited in their scope. Though he dissect an organism and analyse it down to its very atoms, and so gain complete knowledge of all the physico-chemical changes that occur in it, the organism as such will still remain unexplained, because it transcends a mere integration of its parts. Sir Oliver Lodge, in his address on "Continuity," very justly insists on this point. "If we dogmatise," he says, "in a negative direction and say that we can reduce everything to physics and chemistry, we gibbet ourselves as ludicrously narrow pedants and as falling far short of the richness and fulness of our human birthright."

In his lucid criticism of the mechanistic theory, Dr Haldane emphasises the hopelessness of this doctrine on scientific grounds, as a philosophy of life. "We now know," he says, "that the problem of the process of cell growth and cell nutrition is not one which we have at present any prospect of solving in a mechanistic direction." The résumé which he gives in this connection, of recent progress in physiological investigation, is of great interest. The result of all the marvellous progress in physiological knowledge is, he urges, to show "with ever-increasing clearness that physico-chemical explanations seem to physiologists of the present time far more remote than they appeared at the middle of last century."

During the course of this searching criticism of the mechanistic conception, the rival theory—vitalism, or animism—is also submitted to careful scrutiny, and the author decides that it also is unavailing. It is necessary, however, to be quite clear as to the precise meaning which Dr Haldane attaches to the term vitalism. He evidently does not mean the

comprehensive principles enunciated by Sir Edward Fry; or the corresponding theory of an immanent spiritual power, advocated by Sir Oliver Lodge in his address to the British Association, and in some of his other writings; or the equivalent ideas of the late Dr Alfred Russel Wallace, and of Professor Bergson. In the strict sense these savants are not vitalists. Vitalism proper is a doctrine which is supposed to account for purely physical effects, the direct causes of which are not immediately traceable to the usual physical forces. For instance, a writer in a recent number of a well-known magazine says that the explanation of the rise of sap in a tree requires the supposition of some other force than the merely mechanical forces of osmosis and surface tension. The extra work involved is transferred by him to the account of the *vital force*—whatever that may be. It is evident that in such a case the *vital force* ought to be measurable in terms of its purely mechanical effects. Sir Oliver Lodge directly challenges this assumption of the vitalists. "To attribute the rise of sap," he says, "to *vital force* would be absurd, it would be giving up the problem and stating nothing at all. . . . The long-standing puzzle as to how vegetable sap is raised against gravity from the ground to the tops of the highest trees has been practically settled by recent workers, notably by Professor H. H. Dixon, of Trinity College, Dublin, who has made a clear statement of the way in which osmosis, or molecular diffusion through semi-permeable membranes, enables it to occur." Since, therefore, vitalism has become associated with such absurd ideas, the label had better remain attached to the vitalistic impedimenta and both consigned to the left-luggage office of the past. Dr Hans Driesch, of Heidelberg, it is true, still calls himself a vitalist. But, pending the publication of his recent lectures at King's College, criticism of his attitude may be deferred. Having thus defined the point of view of Dr Haldane, one example of the weakness of his argument against animism may be referred to. He says that "any guidance of living organism by the vital principle would imply a creation or destruction of energy." Now, I believe that this objection was very effectively destroyed by Professor Poynting some years ago in the *Hibbert Journal*. In that article he gave a very clear demonstration of the possibility of a purely mechanical force guiding a system without doing any work—that is to say, without violating the principle of the conservation of energy. It should, therefore, be quite possible for the *vital force* to act in the same way.

The real objection to vitalism is that it is a mechanistic conception in disguise. It is a theory mainly concerned with the explanation of physical effects in living matter. It is not a philosophical conception, because it does not seek to exhibit the connection between matter and consciousness. It regards them as separate realities rather than as aspects or abstractions of one universal reality. Whether one is a vitalist or mechanist, to construct a philosophy of life on the presumption of its origin in a primordial jelly is to beg the whole question. The starting-point of the thought process which is ultimately to solve the problem must be the thought of



life as it is actually experienced and known—the almost defiantly complex and sometimes depressingly bewildering interaction of spirit and matter. The whole of life, viewed from this standpoint, reveals an ever-extending panorama which manifests the continuous, unbroken activity of some mysterious “I am”—assertive and creative, the only entity which seems fittest to survive. All the sciences are mere abstractions of the manifestations of this reality. Physics, chemistry, biology, psychology, etc., give us information about the distinctive features of living things; but the simplest organism is infinitely greater than a mere catalogue or summation of its characteristics. It is part of a wider life, and we cannot know it, any more than we can know ourselves, apart from the whole universe. Along these lines Dr Haldane leads the reader through an interesting metaphysical argument, the key to which is supplied in the closing sentence of the book: “This world, with all that lies within it, is a spiritual world.”

It is rather disappointing, after an interesting journey under his guidance, to be landed in a new country and left there. Hundreds of questions suggest themselves. If “personality is the great central fact of the universe and includes within itself our whole universe,” in what way does personality act, since Dr Haldane seems to deny (in his criticism of the vitalists) the existence of a guiding power? How does this conception of a spiritual world, in which and through which a conscious personality is acting continuously, cohere with the facts of evolution? How does it account for the creation of an ever-ascending order of beings and a concurrent destruction and disappearance of lower types? What is the design and purpose of it all? Are “natural selection” and “survival of the fittest” only empty phrases to conceal our ignorance? Otherwise, what is it that selects, and why should anything, let alone the fittest, survive? Dr Haldane seems to suggest that our knowledge is not extensive enough to enable us to answer these questions. But these are the questions which all the ages have asked, and which every age ought to attempt to answer in accordance with its lights. Sir Oliver Lodge briefly touches on these themes in his address, and seems to hint at a philosophical solution (as he does also in *Man and the Universe*, and other books) when he says: “It is not guided from outside but from within, and the guiding power is immanent at every instant. Of this guiding power we are a small but not wholly insignificant portion.” Looking at life from his own undeniably original point of view, Mr Bernard Shaw challenges the world (and shocks one-half of it) with his idea of life-force—the God within, which has been experimenting in the world, and after making a good many mistakes has at last succeeded in producing man. The Rev. R. J. Campbell conceives of a limited mode of God, denuded of His powers of omniscience and omnipotence, who is compelled through pain and suffering to struggle and strive against self-imposed limitations in order to express Himself in the universe. Professor Bergson asserts that “the force which is evolving throughout the organised world is a limited force

which is always seeking to transcend itself. . . . Even in its most perfect works it is at the mercy of the materiality which it has had to assume." Here then is an idea which at least is worth consideration. Physical science, psychic research, theology, philosophy, and Mr Bernard Shaw all point to a limited, guiding, yet struggling power behind and immanent in all phenomena. The fact that it struggles means, of course, that it is experimenting to find the best way of accomplishing its purposes. And experimenting, as every true experimentalist knows, involves frequent failure. Failure, however, need not necessarily mean defeat; it often is an incentive to fresh thought, a stimulus to originality, if the aim and purpose of the experiment is definite and clear. In this sense evolution is a series of experiments by the immanent guiding power which is sometimes in its efforts "diverted from what it should do by what it does." The ultimate object is, surely, the production of a being capable of understanding and of expressing in thought and action the eternal purposes of the transcendent God Himself. Herein lies the germ of a new philosophy—a philosophy not only embracing the conclusions of science (including psychic research and theology), but illuminating the whole with the clear light of spiritual and religious experience.

O. W. GRIFFITH.

CRICKLEWOOD, LONDON.

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*The Development of English Theology in the Nineteenth Century.*—By  
Vernon F. Storr, M.A.—London: Longmans, 1913.

THE most marked quality of Canon Storr's learned and important work is its sense of proportion. He is extraordinarily successful in the construction of theological balance-sheets. In dealing with a subject-matter at once wide and varied he is neither superficial nor over-precise. Much is necessarily omitted: but the significant movements and persons are treated with a thoroughness which is more valuable than the multiplication of names. Again, the method of treatment strikes a just balance between the old way of attributing everything to a few outstanding personalities, and the new way of merging all individuals in general and almost unconscious movements of thought. So, too, in dealing with a subject which might easily become either dry or disputatious, Canon Storr is at once scientific and didactic; but he neither bullies nor bores. The book is thoroughly historical. But it is the work of a man who is interested in the past for the sake of the present; and therefore its importance is not merely, or even mainly, historical. Its verdict on the past suggests an interpretation of the present, and a faith as regards the future.

The period covered by the present volume is the first sixty years of the last century: a second volume is promised, carrying the history down to the end of the century. These sixty years were a time of extraordinary importance for the theological and religious history of England. The



eighteenth century had, on the whole, solved the problem of existence to its own satisfaction. It was a constructive age, and built quite a good glass house, considering its very limited resources. The nineteenth century was inundated with new experiences and ideas, which it never quite assimilated. Scattered thinkers tried to piece things together, but only succeeded in being misunderstood by their contemporaries and plagiarised by their successors. Modern Broad Churchmen are thought advanced if they repeat views which were held by Stanley and Jowett, and which they, in their turn, borrowed from Hampden and Arnold. The modern critic finds it dangerous to revive controversies which might almost have been regarded as settled in the days of Huxley, or even of Hume. And a comparative study (such as that of which Canon Storr avails himself) of the series of Bampton Lectures, or even of *Essays and Reviews*, *Lux Mundi*, and *Foundations*, whilst it shows a remarkable advance in many ways, illustrates also the slowness of the Church's mind to accommodate itself to new ideas. The fact is that our experiences have for a long time been outrunning our judgment. We have not been able to deny the experiences, but we have dimly resented the conclusions which hasty people asked us to draw from them. The Church is just now becoming conscious again of questions which were asked it fifty years ago. It remains to be seen whether the twentieth century can find an answer where the nineteenth failed. We have, at any rate, reached a point from which it is possible to form a fair estimate of the two main influences affecting theology in the last century: and the chief value of Canon Storr's book lies in the clearness with which he describes these influences, and the definiteness with which he judges them.

The first was the Critical movement. The seeds of this, as of other nineteenth-century movements, were sown in the eighteenth century. In the course of the Deistic controversy, writers little read to-day, such as Tindal, Middleton, and Woolston, anticipated many of the arguments of modern rationalists and critics. But the world was not ready for them: Paley and Butler (that John Bull in theology) held the field. The growth of the historical spirit, which Canon Storr rightly puts in the forefront of the new influences shaping the thought of the nineteenth century, altered everything. It changed the attitude of the present towards the past. "The historical method arose in reaction against the abstract and artificial manner of writing history prevalent in the eighteenth century. The rationalism of that age was content to move lightly over the surface of events, without caring to explore the deeper causes of change and movement. The writing of history became a matter of the use of abstract formulæ, or shallow generalisations. Of a true sympathetic feeling for the past there was little or none; the past, in fact, was often frankly despised. But the historical method revived the feeling for the past, though it was itself in part created by it. Men began to realise that the past was not entirely past, but was active in a present which had absorbed all that was living in it" (p. 116). The immediate effects of this method in theology were the growth of the science of Biblical criticism, and the application

of the idea of development to Christian doctrine and organisation. But its wider influences were no less important. It revolutionised the notion of authority. It taught that "the present must always be the critic of the past, and that the past can never be imposed upon the present as an authoritative arbiter or standard" (p. 119). More, it began to break down the barriers between the Christian facts and all other facts, between the method of science and the method of faith, which centuries of dogma and devotion had set up. On this point Canon Storr's remarks are of particular value, in view of recent controversies as to the nature and claims of the historical method. "Its claim," he writes, "to interpret history causally and genetically implies the abandonment of the customary antithesis between the natural and the supernatural. The scientific historian feels that he is untrue to his ideal if he excludes any part of history from the operation of the natural forces which govern all historical movements. Traditional theology singled out a particular race and country, and asserted that here was a sphere in which the divine activity worked supernaturally by miracle or special intervention, and that only by conceding this could you explain the history of the Jews, or their peculiar religious achievement. But religion for the historical method is, equally with art or poetry, an expression of the common spirit and character of the race, and must be interpreted by reference to the general conditions, physical, moral, social, political, under which the race developed. Exclude all thought of God, and then all becomes natural. Include God, with Lessing, and then all becomes supernatural. The demand, in other words, is for a self-contained whole, developing by its own inherent powers, and the rejection of the hypothesis of an intermittent divine agency in the background, whose operation could always be invoked to explain something which seemed inexplicable by natural causes. The historical method . . . can come to no terms with the belief in an irregular or occasional supernatural activity" (p. 119). It would be difficult to put more clearly the fundamental principle of modern liberal theology; and the thorough-going acceptance of it by one who has carefully weighed its influence and results during a century of theological development is a fact of great significance. Canon Storr, of course, realises that the antinomy between the historical method and the method of faith is still far from being solved—in theory, at least; for in practice there are plenty of people who find no difficulty in it. "It is," he admits, "a problem for philosophy whether any reconciliation is possible between theology and the method" in regard to the idea of the supernatural (p. 119). And again: "What is needed is some reconciliation between the two [the natural and the supernatural], some definition of Christianity which, while it preserves its uniqueness, shall set it forth in its universal relation to all other faiths. It is in this direction that the deepest theological thought of the time is moving" (p. 158). One more quotation will show the particular problem in which Canon Storr considers that this movement comes to be a head. "It appears to me," he writes, that all the problems which confront theology to-day are parts of the one



great problem of the place and significance in Christian theology of the Person of Christ. The quarrel between naturalism and supernaturalism comes to a head when His Person is considered. In Him centres the problem of a progressive revelation and a teleology of history. The problem of how to present Christianity as a universal religion will be best met if He is exhibited as capable of satisfying human need, and providing a spiritual power for the regeneration of humanity" (p. 159).

It will be enough to refer to the chapters in which Canon Storr describes the subsidiary parts and consequences of the historical method—the influence of physical science, philosophical idealism, and the French Revolution (ch. viii.); the course of Biblical criticism in Germany (ch. ix.) and in England (ch. x.), the results of the application of Hegelianism to criticism, as seen in Strauss and Baur (ch. xi.-xii.), and the synthesis of all these tendencies in Schleiermacher, "the creator of modern theology" (p. 247), of whose work there is an important criticism and appreciation (ch. xiii.). Throughout these chapters the details are never allowed to obscure the main line of development. We see the century thinking, and thinking in a definite way, towards a definite conclusion.

Then, almost dramatically, a new style of theology comes upon the stage. The Oxford Movement, indeed, was not quite a new thing. The protest against the theologising of religion had been anticipated by the Cambridge Evangelicals, whose theology Newman himself ridiculed in *Loss and Gain*. Not a few of its special doctrines were held by the Early Orthodox party, and can be found in the writings of Alexander Knox, who died in 1831. But, as the historical method progressed, it roused an increasing resentment among the orthodox, and Canon Storr is right in bringing out the fact that the Oxford Movement was essentially a reaction against Liberalism in politics and theology, analogous to the Catholic revival in France under Chateaubriand and Le Maistre. Too little, perhaps, is made by our author of the positive side of the movement, regarded as an ecclesiastical, if not a religious, reformation. But it is inevitable that the twentieth century should judge the nineteenth more hardly than it did itself; and we stand far enough off the Tractarian movement, whilst being sufficiently familiar with its later developments, to be able to see its inherent danger and weakness. The most novel and significant part of Canon Storr's book, and the part that is most likely to arouse controversy, is his trenchant criticism of the Oxford Movement.

"The Oxford Movement . . . was an attempt to combat Liberalism in theology, and to set up the authority of the Church as that which alone could provide a principle of order and stability amid the changes which seemed to be threatening the very foundations of the national life" (p. 253). Like Romanticism in literature, it was an appeal to the past. But Romanticism was free, Tractarianism bound to authority. The Romanticist's motive was æsthetic, the Tractarian's (until Pusey did for the Oxford Movement what William Morris did for Pre-Raphaelitism) was logical. But the real weakness of this appeal to the past was that it did not go

with any real attempt to understand the present, or to make the best of the future. "The Oxford Movement had its face turned to the past, rather than to the future. There, in this idealised past, lay the Golden Age. What was wanted was to recover in their original purity the theology, the discipline, the life of the primitive Church, and hold them up before the nineteenth century as its model for imitation. But no past epoch can be so recovered in its entirety, and what of it you can recover cannot be imposed as a pattern and standard on an age which lies further down the course of history, and breathes a different atmosphere. The attempt which the Tractarians made was doomed to failure" (p. 257).

Further, the Tractarian appeal to the past was uncritical and unfair, both in the methods which it used (and which Pusey, at any rate, who had studied German theology at Göttingen, had corresponded with Schleiermacher, and had published an indiscreetly liberal pamphlet, could have corrected if he had cared to do so) and in the artificial standard which it set up—not the mind of Christ, but the mind of the Church at a particular stage of its ecclesiastical and dogmatic development.

Again, the essence of the Tractarian church-theory was the Apostolic Succession, which substituted an external organisation for an internal spirit as the test of Christianity. The doctrine is one to which recent controversies have given critical importance, and Canon Storr's deliberate verdict upon it should carry much weight. Unquestionably, he says, Christ gave a commission to the Apostles, and "it was necessary that the new society should have some organisation and government. But there is no evidence whatever that Christ taught that any special form of organisation was essential. The Church was left to develop its own structure as need arose and occasion demanded. That there was a rapid growth of the Episcopal form of government is clear; but it is equally clear that Episcopacy came into being in different areas of the Church at different times, and that full communion existed between local churches which were episcopally organised and churches which were not. Of the theory of Apostolic Succession, as interpreted by the Tractarians, there is no trace in the earliest ages of the Church, and there is no suggestion that non-episcopal bodies were lacking in any element essential to the constitution of the Church. . . . If the test of discipleship is 'by their fruits ye shall know them,' it is nothing less than a degradation of Christ's teaching to substitute for that spiritual test of membership in His society a rigid mechanical test, such as that which Tractarianism implied" (p. 263).

True, the original principles of the Oxford Movement have been considerably modified in later years. Neo-Tractarianism, "by substituting for the static a dynamic view of the Church, has brought new life and vigour to the movement. The change may be described by saying that, in place of a theory of the Church as the accredited organ for the transmission of divine truth, was set up a theory of the Church as an extension of the Incarnation, and the channel through which the living Christ works His age-long work of Redemption" (p. 261). But this view, though more



philosophical than the other, is no less open to objection. It tries to make provision for development. "It seeks to show how the Church, while still remaining true to its fundamental principles, can accept new knowledge, and harmonise it with the old. But what is meant by the Church in this connection? Not the Church Catholic, for no universal synod of Episcopal churches existed. Not that branch of the Church which is found in England; for where has the Anglican Church formally pronounced on any of the questions which interest the modern thinker? What organ does the Church possess for making any such pronouncement? The phrase 'the Church teaches this or that' means, as regards any new truth not already enshrined in its creeds or formularies, that the more intelligent minds in the Church have come to agree that certain views must be adopted. . . . If the Church were formally to pronounce upon the validity of any new teaching, it would add nothing to its reasonableness. 'The new views must commend themselves by their own inherent truth'" (p. 265). There is a similar difficulty in deciding what is the Catholic tradition, where it is deposited, and how it is to be interpreted. "The only answer is, that each individual is left free to interpret Catholic tradition as he pleases. Thus, what began as an organic theory of authority ends in individualism. Can anyone deny," concludes our author, "that the most ardent defenders of the Catholic theory of the Church to-day are just those who most strongly display the individualist temper, making themselves their own law, and interpreting Catholic practice as it suits their fancy?" (p. 265).

It is impossible not to add Canon Storr's deliberate words about the Creeds. "The statements in the Creeds," he writes, "have come down to us invested with an immense weight of authority. They represent the organic consciousness of the Christian community, the verdict of centuries of thought and experience. Lightly to set them aside is the height of folly. But to deny to any individual the right of criticising them, to fence them around with an impassable barrier, and to demand that they shall be forthwith accepted, because they have received the formal recognition of the Church, is irrational. Any attempt to set up authority as an independent principle, where the search for truth is concerned, is illogical" (p. 266).

The ritualism of the Neo-Tractarians was, as is well known, no part of the original movement, and even those who have most welcomed it as a help to devotion, and an assimilation to Catholic forms of worship, must doubt sometimes whether it does not tend towards materialistic and superstitious ideas, especially in regard to the Sacraments. "Sacerdotalism, high eucharistic doctrine, elaborate ritual, the three cohere together: and the layman can find no warrant for any of them in the teaching of Christ" (p. 269). When, side by side with this development, we mark the intellectual narrowness and sterility of the movement—"I question," says Canon Storr, "if the movement can be said to have produced any great theological work": nor did it seriously influence the

great writers of the age—we shall probably conclude that, much as Tractarianism has done to revive the religious life, and the sense of Church membership, yet “the essential temper of the movement, and the determinative principles of its theology, are incompatible with the larger intellectual forces which are moulding our present thought” (p. 272).

We have quoted largely from a single chapter of Canon Storr’s volume, because his criticism of the Oxford Movement provides a natural antithesis to his approval of the Historical Method. Those are, indeed, the two banners under which the old contest between theology and religion, between faith and fact, is being fought and refought to-day. If his verdict is right, the ultimate victory must lie with Liberalism. The appeal to the past cannot permanently withstand the demands of the future.

There follow two interesting but less vital chapters dealing with the philosophy of the Oxford Movement, and especially with Newman. The latter is rightly described as “at least a thorough-going sceptic in this sense, that he utterly distrusted human reason. He fell back therefore upon two supports, his own deep-seated moral and religious instincts, and the guidance of the external authority of the Church. He cut human nature into two. Conscience was the voice of God, but reason was not. Conscience led to truth; intelligence, if not guided by authority, could only issue in scepticism” (p. 284). Was there ever greater irony than that the idea of development, which Newman (by a flash of genius that outran his conservative intentions) applied to theology fifteen years before the publication of the *Origin of Species*, should have become the mainspring of the Modernist movement?

While Newman and his friends were organising the Oxford Movement, Coleridge was talking. Talking is perhaps, as F. D. Maurice thought, the besetting sin of Broad Churchmen: but if they talked as Coleridge did, they would be forgiven. His was the “seminal mind” of theological Liberalism in England at this time, and his influence fell short of Schleiermacher’s only because his work was less systematic. Like other Christian philosophers, he has been accused of Pantheism—a charge which Canon Storr has little difficulty in refuting (p. 327). He was the teacher of Maurice, Arnold, Robertson, and their friends—the founders of the old Broad Church party, which is just passing away, and the teachers, in their turn, of Stanley, Jowett, and the other authors of *Essays and Reviews*. “I do not know well,” wrote Maurice, “what the Broad Church is. I always took it to be a fiction of Conybeare’s [this refers to an article on ‘Church Parties,’ in the *Edinburgh Review*, 1853]. If it means anything, I suppose it is a representation, under different modifications, of that creed which is contained in Whately’s books, or of that which has arisen at Oxford out of the reaction against Tractarianism” (351). This was no doubt its historical origin. But it included from the first men of very different types: and Canon Storr is justified, when looking for “a place for Carlyle in the development of English theological thought of the nineteenth century,” in finding it on the circumference of the circle whose



centre was Maurice, Erskine, and Hare (p. 358). Carlyle, it is true, had a strain of Nietzsche, and perhaps of Calvin, in him: but, though he could not accept Christianity as a system, the positiveness of his moral and religious convictions puts him more on the Christian side than Francis Newman, Froude, Mill, Clough, and the rest whom Canon Storr classes together under the title of the Negative Movement (chap. xix.).

Some such movement, probably, precedes every constructive era: and this one undoubtedly led up to the "Broadening Influences" (ch. xx.) which culminated in *Essays and Reviews*. "English theology at this time," says Canon Storr, "was infected with a spirit of blind traditionalism. It was good for it, under the presence of a hostile attack, to be driven to become reflective. Such reflection could only make it stronger, while it would bring into clearer light the fundamental antagonism between its own presuppositions and those of negativism" (p. 397).

Canon Storr ends the present part of his work with an analysis and criticism of *Essays and Reviews*. Many of the views expressed in this famous volume, notably in Wilson's essay on the National Church, and in Baden-Powell's on Miracles, would not be out of date to-day, fifty years after their publication—so slowly does theological opinion change in England; nor would their authors be much surer of escaping episcopal censure.

"A national Church," Wilson maintains, "need not be Christian; or, if it is Christian, it need not be tied down to the forms of the past. If it is to be really national, it must assist the spiritual progress of the nation," being as comprehensive and progressive as possible, and moral rather than speculative in its interests (p. 431). The object of Baden-Powell's essay was to defend the scientific objection to miracles as breaches of the uniformity of nature, "and to show the unsatisfactory character of most of the apologies for miracles" (p. 439). But if the modernity of *Essays and Reviews* is remarkable, there are important differences between its standpoint and that of later Liberalism. The comparison with *Lux Mundi* (p. 446) is not, perhaps, very fruitful. But there is real significance in the two points in which, according to our author, the Broad Churchman of to-day differs from his predecessor of half a century ago. "The modern Broad Churchman has a keener historical sense, a truer appreciation of the value of historical facts, and in particular of the central facts of the Christian revelation. . . . Again, the modern Broad Churchman makes the Person of Christ the central figure in his system" (p. 446).

Looking back over the sixty years which Canon Storr describes, we may see in these last two principles the results won, after much controversy and misunderstanding, from the two contending forces of criticism and institutionalism. Criticism has given us a reverence for truth. Tractarianism has reminded us of the Catholic experience of Christ. With those great possessions won from the past, it will be strange if the future cannot come a little nearer to the object of its search. But the stubbornness of the raw material of religion grows no less. The problems alter, but they

hardly decrease. We are already beginning to find that to reconstruct the Christian facts does not enable us to recover the Christian religion. And even Christian experience, which seems to us the ultimate basis and standard of our religion, is by no means beyond doubt and criticism.

Nevertheless there has been clear progress in the past, and in the fruit of it lies hope for the future. No one can fail to be grateful to Canon Storr for the guidance and inspiration which his book gives. His years of patient work have not been wasted.

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OXFORD.

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*With the Russian Pilgrims to Jerusalem.*—By Stephen Graham.—London : Macmillan & Co., 1913.—Pp. 306, with illustrations.

IN the author's words this book is "an attempt to give the story of a pilgrimage and to make intelligible the religious life of the Russian peasantry." The story is delightfully told, and what the author has to say about the religious life of the peasants is extremely interesting and illuminating. It is remarkable that a foreigner should understand so well the inner life of another nation. Such understanding is the result of true sympathy. Mr Graham made the pilgrimage with the peasants as one of themselves, not only in the sense of sharing their hardships, but in the deeper sense of going to the Holy City with a religious object, just as they did. The pilgrimage to the earthly Jerusalem was for him a religious rite, a symbol of the eternal pilgrimage of the human soul seeking the heavenly Jerusalem. "The procession to the altar is a rite in the Church; the pilgrimage is a rite in the larger church of the world; life itself, the pilgrimage of pilgrimages, is a rite in the larger church of the universe—we complete in a symbolic act an eternal journey," he writes in the prologue. And it is his insistence on the inner meaning of the pilgrimage that gives a singular charm to his book and makes it of permanent value to all students of religion.

Each year some seven thousand Russian peasants go to Jerusalem. Why do they go? They are not bidden to do so by their priests. It is not an infection; large numbers do not go from one district. People go singly, or at most in twos or threes, and meet together only at the ports of embarkation. What is it that induces them to undertake the pilgrimage? Mr Graham asked this question of many pilgrims, but their answers did not really explain their action. "They knew not why they came; some force deep in them urged them—a force much deeper than their power of articulation."

The pilgrims often have to tramp hundreds of miles in Russia before they reach the coast. The sea voyage in filthy, overcrowded, unseaworthy ships is terrible. From Jerusalem they tramp to the Jordan and to Nazareth, and the journey is so hard for those going on foot that many



die on the way. Yet the peasants will not take advantage of comforts, though many of them are able to afford it. "What good is it to come if we take no trouble over it?" said one of the pilgrims. They look upon the hardships they have to endure as an essential part of the pilgrimage. "Think what He suffered," said another peasant; "what are our sufferings beside His! . . . It is good for us to suffer." This attitude to suffering is very characteristic of the Russian people, and accounts for a great deal in Russian history. In a significant passage Mr Graham compares the Russian and the modern protestant conception of life and of the relation between God and man: "The modern protestant says: 'Live well, use your wealth with a sense of responsibility to God, be sober, be just to your neighbour, be temperate in your passions.' The Russian says: 'All that is minor matter; it is chiefly necessary to die well.' Breaking the commandments means for the protestant breaking with God until repentance; but for the Russian peasant there is no such feeling of breaking with God. The drunkard, the thief, and the murderer are as intimate with God as the just man; and perhaps even more intimate." There is a great deal of truth in this statement. Mr Graham does not mean, I take it, that Russians think an evil life of no consequence so long as one dies a Christian death. He would admit that for the Russian just as much as for the protestant the ideal is that there should be holiness both in the inner life of the soul and in the external life of action. But from the Russian point of view the lack of holiness in the external life is a lesser departure from the ideal than it appears to be from the protestant standpoint. Russians regard the holiness of "the inner man" as of more importance than the conformity of behaviour to the recognised moral standards. The protestant nations, on the other hand, attach greater weight to what a man *does* than to what he *is*. What matters most to the Russian mind is a right attitude to the great things of life, right feeling and right thinking. It is the inner state of a man's soul that determines whether he is really good or bad. A drunkard who is humble and loving may stand nearer to God than an upright man who is hard and proud. But no strict line of demarcation can be drawn between the righteous and the sinful, for, from the Russian point of view, sin is essentially a misfortune, which may befall anyone. It is not in the Russian character for "the just" to feel morally superior to "the sinners." Mr Graham brings this out very beautifully when he says that the absence of self-pride among the pilgrims gave him the idea "that after death, when, after life's pilgrimage, the Russians come to the judgment-seat, there will be such a feeling of brotherhood and affection that to condemn one and reward another will be an impossibility."

From one point of view, then, religion is not for the Russian so closely connected with conduct as it is for the protestant; and yet, from another point of view, it forms a very intimate part of his life. It enters into relation with the little everyday things of his existence. Mr Graham gives a touching account, *e.g.*, of how, when the pilgrim boat was nearing Jaffa, all the pilgrims put on clean shirts and new boots, "for they counted it a

sin to face in stained garments the land where the Author of their religion was born, or to tread it in old boots." The ikons are not only in the church, but in every peasant home. The great festivals are not merely days on which one goes to church, but days of rejoicing. Russians often use such expressions as "a dress good enough to wear at Easter"; and on Easter morning people kiss one another in their joy at Christ's resurrection. The feeling of the intimate connection between the events of this life, even the most trivial ones, and the universe of the unseen is very characteristic of the religion of the Russian people. As Mr Graham says: "Life does not matter very much" to them; "what matters are the everyday ties between man and God, that for which the ikon stands and the great rites by which man enters into communion with his higher destiny." In other words, life is seen to be only a small portion of a great whole, only a stepping-stone to eternity. Hence death is an essential part of life, one never to be lost sight of. Mr Graham remarks that he was amazed to see to what extent the pilgrim's thoughts were centred on death and on the final resurrection morning. They sought in Jerusalem numberless tokens for the clothing of their dead bodies; they took home from the Holy Land crosses to wear round their necks in the tomb, earth to be put into their coffins, shrouds they had dipped in the Jordan. One of the most beautiful chapters in the book describes how the pilgrims, wearing their death shrouds, bathe in the sacred river.

If life is regarded in the light of death, things acquire a different value. One who has recognised life to be a pilgrimage can no longer attach the same importance to temporal things. That is what we find in the case of the peasant pilgrims. They face the terrible hardships of the journey, wear themselves out with fasting and prayer, not for the sake of any worldly gain but for the sake of a spiritual reality. "The pilgrim's ideal is a sweet feeling of the heart in prayer," and for the attainment of that ideal he sacrifices time, money, comfort, health—even life itself, for many die in the Holy Land or on the way to it. During the latter part of Lent every day there were funerals of pilgrims who had succumbed to the fatigue of the journey, the fasting, and the sustained mental excitement.

From the point of view of common sense, the pilgrim's sacrifice is no doubt useless and absurd. Mr Graham's book will probably make many people regret that so much enthusiasm should be wasted by the peasants on a religious rite instead of being devoted to some practical end. But, looked at with the eye of the spirit, it is just this readiness to give up the temporal for the sake of the eternal, this firm grasp of spiritual verities, that is the most precious thing in the Russian character. As Mr Graham puts it, "The seven thousand pilgrims at Jerusalem are *the* seven thousand that make a nation worth to God."

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LONDON.



# THE HIBBERT JOURNAL

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## CREEDS, HERESY-HUNTING, AND SECESSION IN GERMAN PROTESTANTISM TO-DAY.

A. D. M'LAREN,

Berlin.

"THE province of religion in the human soul is like that of the Red Indians in America, which, deplore or disapprove as we may, is being narrowed more and more every year by their white neighbours."—David Frederick Strauss in 1872.

"Most interest has centred round the agitation for an *Austritt* [secession] from the Prussian State Church."—*Christliche Freiheit*, 11th January 1914 (reviewing the religious life of Germany for the preceding year).

What comment on the first of these citations is offered by the religious evolution of Germany during the four decades that have passed since Strauss asked the question, "Are we still Christians?" Perhaps the other—and it would be easy to lengthen the list—helps to answer this question.

Anyone reading the German newspapers will notice daily some reference to the *Austrittsbewegung*—that is, the organised movement to urge those who no longer accept the doctrines of the Prussian State Church to make a formal severance of their connection with it. Unless those baptized

in the Church thus formally declare their withdrawal (*Austritt*) they remain members, and, in the case of those whose incomes exceed a certain sum, must pay the Church tax, though they may be members of the Monistenbund. It is only a few months since Professor Haeckel, the author of what has been called by his orthodox opponents "The Rationalist's Bible," ceased to be a member of the Prussian State Church! The body of men working aggressively for the movement is the "Komitee Konfessionslos," which is being actively supported by Professors Ostwald, Haeckel, and Drews. Thousands of Social Democrats are also giving countenance to the movement. They make it quite clear, however, that the party is in no way officially connected with the "Komitee," that they have nothing to do with the Church as a religious organisation but only as a political force and a bulwark of *Preussentum*.

The nominally Protestant population of Berlin is 2,060,000. Last February, on a Sunday when numerous confirmations were to take place, there was a total attendance at the various Protestant churches of 35,000. In 1913 Church taxes to the amount of 385,000 marks were collected by the city bailiffs, compulsorily, after the issue of 116,776 final notices. Since 1st January 1908 in Berlin alone 31,967 Protestants, 5029 Roman Catholics, and 196 Jews have notified their *Austritt*. In several other large cities, particularly Hamburg, the movement is meeting with equal success. Formal "withdrawal" from the Church is not easy. It involves no little trouble and loss of time, it means incurring the bitter hostility of an influential section of the community.

For some time the clerical party affected to regard the *Austrittsbewegung* with contempt. It is not doing so now. A counter-movement has been organised. Sunday, 11th January, was set apart in all the Berlin churches for special reference to the present agitation; numerous public meetings are being held; and a circular, "Wie stellen Sie sich zur Austrittsbewegung?", has been spread broadcast over the city.



No one who hears and reads the earnest exhortations to consolidate the still living powers in Protestant Germany, to co-operate in making the Prussian Church a living spiritual community within the State, can fail to note the undertone of misgiving that all is not well. The most striking thing about the counter-movement is the almost complete absence of suggestion of deeper questions underlying the agitation.

The attitude of the authorities towards the *Austrittsbewegung* has been undignified to the last degree. Meetings arranged by the "Komitee," the affixing of placards to the public columns, the distribution of leaflets, have all been forbidden by the police. It has further been widely proposed that the small fee charged for recording the "withdrawal" should be raised. Some have suggested an amount as high as a hundred marks. This effort to retain in the Church, by compulsion, those who have ceased to subscribe to its doctrines, only helps the "Komitee" to prove its oft-repeated assertion—that the Prussian Church is a *Zwangskirche*, that the authorities, unable to maintain real unity in the religious life of the people, are striving to shore up a tottering edifice. The Government has not strengthened the position of the Church even politically. There are certain kinds of warfare that can only be carried on by spiritual weapons.

Protestant Christianity in Germany to-day presents us with an attractive complex of spiritual forces. Religion has never been neglected in Prussia. In the schools it has always been assiduously instilled into the child-mind. Neither dissenters nor freethinkers are allowed to withdraw their children from this religious instruction, and many influential journals are now making a vigorous demand for similar compulsory instruction in the continuation schools. No one who openly opposed the Christian religion would have any chance of obtaining a position in the Civil Service; no one already in the Service would look for promotion if he formally left the Church. Organised irreligion has contributed little to bring about the present situation. Until quite recently the number

of avowed anti-Christians disclosed by official returns has been small—so small as to evoke the sneers of those whose religious enthusiasm exceeds their discretion. For statistics and figures are an artificial touchstone of a nation's soul.

But the yeast has been at work deep down. For two centuries two main currents, one liberal, the other conservative, have been streaming through the Protestant world, not only in Germany but in England, and the liberal current has been steadily gaining momentum. German thought and speculation have nourished it throughout its long course. The immediate source of the stream is usually found in the *Aufklärung*, but the *Aufklärung* itself is only one of the large features of the Teutonic folk-mind.

It would require a volume to give a history of the welter of "cases," charges of heterodoxy, in the Prussian State Church during recent years, but two of these "cases" have filled a large part of the popular mind. Under the law which had just been passed against erroneous teaching in religion, on 24th June 1911 Dr Karl Jatho, of Cologne, was called upon by the Consistory of the Prussian State Church to resign his pastorate.<sup>1</sup> The case went finally before the *Oberkirchenrat*, the highest Protestant ecclesiastical authority in Prussia, which confirmed the finding of the Consistory. From one end of his parish to the other Dr Jatho's twenty years' care of his flock was known as few other men's in the Protestant Church. But his retention of the position was declared to be inconsistent with his open rejection of the cardinal doctrines of Christianity. Protest meetings in Cologne, Berlin, and other places, and the comments in a section of the press, including many of the organs specifically devoted to religion, showed a widespread sympathy with "the heretical spirit of the Rhine." In Hesse alone eighty-one Protestant pastors

<sup>1</sup> One feels a pathetic interest in mentioning that he died on 11th March 1913. A few months later his friend, F. M. Schiele, another well-known liberal theologian, who had stood by him loyally throughout the proceedings, also died.



expressed their regret at the decision of the *Oberkirchenrat*. The attitude of Professor Harnack, the greatest personality in German theology to-day, was peculiar throughout, and yet its very inconsistency indicated with wonderful clarity the trend of thought in German Protestantism. He also regretted the court's decision. But he could not think that any man whose theology excluded a personal God and an historical Christ was to be endured in the Prussian Church. "It would have been better if the proceedings had never been instituted."

In August 1912 the Consistory likewise deposed Pastor Gottfried Traub, of Dortmund, one of the men chosen by Dr Jatho to defend him. Nominally, the charge against him was not heretical doctrine but defiance of the ecclesiastical authorities. His "case" roused as much comment and opposition as Dr Jatho's. The mass of publications on "Der Fall Jatho" and "Der Fall Traub" which appeared within a space of about twelve months constitute a library in themselves. If these two men had stood alone the attention given to their "cases" in the public press would have been out of proportion to their importance. But everyone in Germany knew that they did not stand alone. Behind Drs Jatho and Traub was ranged a very large party which represented a force long latent in the Church. That is why the "cases" were the subject of lengthy polemics in which the most eminent intellects in Germany took part.

More recent "cases" are those of Pastors Fuchs and Heydorn. The former was unanimously chosen by the Dortmund parish to succeed Pastor Traub; but as he had expressed in quite unmistakable terms his sympathy with Drs Jatho and Traub, the Münster Consistory would not confirm the appointment. Pastor Heydorn was a member of the Hamburg branch of the *Monistenbund*, and gave regular ethical instruction to the children of members.

These cases, the party discussions which they have aroused, and the *Austrittsbewegung* throw a sinister light on both the

interior and the exterior of the Prussian Church. Quite recently Professor Troeltsch said, speaking of German Protestants and their attitude towards Confessions: "All we can say with certainty is that we are not Catholics." Professor Wach is equally definite on this head: "There is not in the Protestant Church any fair-minded, serious-thinking Christian who subscribes unconditionally to the letter of the Confessions." A religious faith which, doctrinally, stands for anything so indeterminate will feel restraint and difficulty in any organisation, be the effort of the State to hold it together ever so energetic. This was the ugly paradox with which the ecclesiastical authorities in Prussia were confronted: Was it better to have Drs Jatho and Traub in the Church, or to expel them and retain hundreds of others with the same views but powerless to express them? What were the views of these two exponents of "liberal" Christianity? Pastor Traub rejects utterly the Apostolic Confession of Faith; he is unsparing in his denunciation of dogmatic theology. His hold on belief in a personal God is far from tight.<sup>1</sup> Dr Jatho called himself a panhentheist. In his replies to six questions to which he was asked to give "definite answers" he declared that he did not believe in "an external, creating God," that "every age must create its own Christ anew in accordance with its new ideals and hopes and aspirations." His "Christianity" was, in short, an academic religion, an æstheticism clothed in the garb of New Testament symbolism—what is called here a *Bildungs-religion*.

The author of the *Riddle of the Universe* a member of the Prussian State Church, a leading pastor in Hamburg a member of the Monistenbund, whose official organ, *Das monistische Jahrhundert*, contains every month articles which nine men out of ten who call themselves Christians would certainly regard as vigorously anti-Christian—can a similar spectacle be found outside Germany? Truly, the unrest in the religious life of Prussia is no fiction of the newspapers.

<sup>1</sup> See his book, *Staatskirchentum oder Volkskirche* (1911), p. 13.



Many assert, however, that this is a healthier sign than the security born of a "safe theology." It remains a fact, nevertheless, that to most sincere—not conventional—Christians the whirl within German Protestantism is a source of gloomy foreboding. Protestants cannot deplore their "unhappy factions" as a hindrance to unified Christian belief and in the same breath welcome them as signs of vitality. At the beginning of last year a clergyman in the Prussian Church, greatly beloved by his congregation as well as respected by the public at large, told me that the Church was committing a fatal blunder in trying to exclude men like Drs Jatho and Traub, that those who could not accept the Christ without subscribing to such legends as immaculate conception and miracles were the worst apologists for Christianity. But is it possible to regard the pastors whom the ecclesiastical authorities have deposed in the light of martyrs? At one of the meetings to protest against the Jatho decision the question was asked: Can a sincere Christian remain in a Church which has room for Dr Jatho? One cannot but respect the asker of that question, which was not met by the chairman. There was much rhetoric about the right to free religious development being inborn and God-given, "no man or assembly of men has a right to take it away," all of which may be true but does not touch the core of the subject. Does "spiritual freedom" confer upon anyone, lay or cleric, the "right" to stay in the Church after he has ceased to accept its teachings, the "right" to believe what he likes and openly avow such belief while remaining a member of a religious community which has subscribed to a confession of faith? What right, then, still adheres in a Christian body? Can a Christ-ideal, identified with the true, the good, and the beautiful, be substituted for the historical person of Jesus Christ without fundamentally overturning Christianity as a spiritual religion?

Within the past five and a half years I have visited many German Protestant churches in town and country. The large imposing edifices in Berlin (St Immanuel's), Bremen

(Cathedral), and Hamburg (St Nicholas) presented pictures of pathetic emptiness, and even then compulsion accounted for most of the attendants—the military, theological students, boys and girls from institutions. In the large cities the few Protestant preachers who can still draw a congregation owe their popularity to their eloquence, their command of a refined literary style, and—their unsound doctrine. In small places like Schwerte and Ahlen I found the churches well filled. But here too and throughout the country districts any man or woman over fifty years of age will tell the visitor who seems genuinely interested in the township that “the old-time piety,” with family prayers and Bible-reading, is more than on the wane.

At no time within the past half-century has the Prussian Church been a *Volkskirche* in the strict meaning of the term. It has never had, within this period, a fast hold on the common people in the cities. The nominally “Protestant” among them have been indifferent to religion, the Catholics have been loyal supporters of their own Church and of the Centre in politics. Nor has there been any variety of spiritual life in Protestant Germany corresponding to that in Great Britain, where the Established Church is confronted by an army of Dissenters, and the very rivalry between the two prevents stagnation. What then does the Prussian State Church represent? The question cannot be answered offhand in one word, but whatever else it stands for it certainly represents the upper class—not exactly what is called in England “society,” but the officials who rule the country. This does not mean that it has never represented any other class. In its history it has exercised immeasurable influence over the national life, but to-day it is little more than a link in a social and political chain, a constituent element in the State organisation, but one which only reflects a part of the heart of the nation. In fine, it is the political-religious side of *Preussentum*. Now, the indifference of the mass of the people towards this Church is crystallising more and more into a living hostility, and this



without any propaganda by Socialist leaders.<sup>1</sup> Several causes combine to produce this feeling. (1) The working class is becoming increasingly convinced that Christianity has moved somewhat from its primitive ideals and has been misused to bolster up the Prussian State-idea. (2) The mass of the people is growing more and more into the consciousness of a gap between the "modern" world-view and the world-view of the dogmatic system which they were taught by Church and school. (3) The conviction that those who have inwardly broken with the Church are morally bound to declare their *Austritt* is strengthening throughout all classes.

"Protestantism began to break up from the day it was formulated." That statement focusses Roman Catholic criticisms of the present situation in Prussia. The Jesuit priest, the Rev. Father A. M. Rump, in a recent penetrative criticism of Dr Jatho and his views, thinks it in the highest degree improbable that Protestantism will ever again become a vital force in the national life of Germany.<sup>2</sup> But was any form of Christianity ever completely assimilated by the Northern European? In spite of much pious sentiment about the universality of Christianity—and the note has been sounded as loudly in Protestant Germany as anywhere else—among the Northern races this religion remains an exotic which a thousand years have not been able to acclimatise. Christianity broke upon them with what purported to be new light on Nature and Man, his origin and destiny. Men were equal before one Father over all races and nations. But Christianity came loaded with Judaism, a "jealous God," religious tribalism, and it was this element that Northern Europe seized upon when Luther and the Reformers, by "purifying" Christianity, gave it the chance. These men were reverting to the original

<sup>1</sup> The attacks on the Socialist Party as the spring of the *Austritt* movement are unjustified. The party resolved on 20th December 1913, in most outspoken terms, to give no aid of any kind to the agitation: "The party declines emphatically to allow its organisations to be used to further this movement."

<sup>2</sup> *Stimmen aus Maria-Laach*, 1914, Heft 5, pp. 511, 512.

mind of their race—that mind in which the Berserker and the mystic are still striving for the mastery.

It is usual in certain quarters of Germany to underrate the extent to which the changed intellectual outlook is responsible for the falling away from Christian ideas and ideals of the mass of the people. "The sweeping tide of rationalism," it is energetically asserted, is only an everyday phrase which represents a side-glance in a wider survey. Anti-Christianity as an intellectual movement has spent its force, and materialism is bankrupt. How many people either know or care one jot about the Higher Criticism, about the date or authorship of Isaiah? And yet the sojourner in Germany to-day will have to listen to many tirades against "materialism": not the scientific monism of Haeckel, but that form of materialism which is identified with a feeling of satisfaction in the present life. Much of the denunciation is very cheap. This satisfaction is born of the achievement of the age. In the last analysis the intellectual outlook remains the efficient cause of the present religious unrest. With the new *Weltanschauung* has come a tendency to stress the value of this world as an end in itself. Everywhere, but pre-eminently in Germany, science has given many thinkers—and these not the least aspirant to high ideals of truth—a confidence in facing problems, "ultimate" or otherwise, which previous ages did not possess, and it has brought with it an attitude of strict objectivity before the whole realm of thought, religious and secular. When man's outlook on "ultimate problems" underwent a profound change this in itself constituted a new culture-type with which Christianity has ever since been trying to compete. Throughout the *Austrittsbewegung* and the other movements ensuing from the present turmoil the Church Party, seeing nothing but destructive forces at work, has entirely overlooked the positive impulses building up a new spiritual world.

"Mere intellect can never satisfy the religious soul." In Germany leading thinkers have always proclaimed, and are still proclaiming, not in the byways but in every seat of



learning, that intellect alone is inadequate to give life its fullest and worthiest content. But can any religious "satisfaction" grow out of a system when it once fails to satisfy that instinctive love of truth which has always characterised the finest minds? "Wahrhaft leben heisst wahrhaft denken." This is the meaning of the world-process for Fichte. The ceaseless striving forward of the mind and the idea of freedom are an identity.

Neither the world-view of the Roman Church nor that of the Bible has ever satisfied any great German thinker. In spite of all that has been said to the contrary during the past two years, the *Austrittsbewegung* was originally mainly a religious, not a political, movement. Some of those supporting it belong to the finest minds in Germany, and a large proportion of those who have declared their "withdrawal" are recruited from the middle class that is increasing every day as the country becomes industrialised. There has been a moral revolt against State-pressure in religion, and against the network of insincerity which can reconcile offhand the Christian *Weltanschauung* with the scientific and adjust it to advancing thought by "restatements" of essential positions and theories of a progressive revelation.

It is not easy for a strong partisan to hold the scales evenly between the various types of mind struggling for sway in the religious world of Germany. The devout Catholic, sensitive to all criticism of his faith, more convinced that his Church has her eyes fixed on God and that God has His fixed on her, than that he himself sees anything at all—what is the meaning to him of "conscientiousness" in those that fight her as the historic foe of mental freedom? Hardly less difficult is it for the defender of the State Church as a prop of *Preussentum* to sympathise either with the "intellectual doubter" or with those to whom the State connection is repugnant as being inimical to vital religion—those who seek to found "a free church in a free commonwealth." "Religion," argues such a defender, "is an affair of the whole people and cannot

be separated from a State which is ordained of God. Prussia is not a commonwealth." Lastly, the men to whom anti-Christianity has become a creed, men driven to reprisals by persecution, will direct their attention to that side of a religion of which they have had most intimate experience. About two years ago, when Drs Jatho and Traub were lecturing in various parts of Germany, they were frequently asked why, holding the views they did, they wanted to remain in the Prussian State Church. The question "leaps to the eyes." For all that, it was impossible for any fair-minded individual who heard their answers not to feel that both men were convinced that they were doing a useful work within the Church.

"Can we still be Christians?" is a question which Professor Eucken has asked recently. He himself, after much defining and reconstructing, answers it in the affirmative. But it is as clear as noonday that Eucken's spiritual philosophy is to some extent coloured by his own early Christian training, to which he refers, not without a touch of pathos, in the preface to the book having that question for its title. Can Christianity rise to the new knowledge and the new aspirations and still develop *true to type*? Can the modern man over whom the spiritual and cultural needs of our age exert a living influence call himself a Christian, in the New Testament sense, without self-deception? Lastly, when Professor Eucken answers these questions does he understand by them what the ordinary man would understand?

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## POST-MODERNISM.

THE REV. J. M. THOMPSON, M.A.

*Le modernisme est mort. Vive le modernisme !*

Modernism was an attempt to live in two worlds, and to think in two ways at once. Because it was double-minded it failed. But its failure is of greater value to the world than the success of more facile solutions of our religious problems. And the spirit which was in it is already formulating new statements, establishing new positions.

Within the last few years two lines of development, which can be traced back through at least a century of English theology, have finally converged. The critical movement, resulting from the influence of scientific methods of study upon the Bible and the Church, has come to a head in a number of Liberal theological books, of which the latest and the most widely known is *Foundations*. The institutional movement, reacting against eighteenth-century Rationalism and nineteenth-century Utilitarianism, ran its course in the development of Tractarianism, and culminated in the writings of the *Lux Mundi* school. Its latest phase is seen in *Some Loose Stones* and the open letters of the Bishops of Oxford and Zanzibar. In so far as both movements came from Oxford, where all religious systems borrow from one another, Tractarianism has been mildly critical, and criticism moderately institutional. Nevertheless, whereas *Lux Mundi* was essentially Conservative, *Foundations* is essentially Liberal. And there is no doubt that in the present theological and

religious situation the antagonism between these two distinct movements has come to a head.

Modernism was an attempt to combine both lines of development; to be faithful both to the critical claims and to the institutional; to hold the faith of the society, and to accept the conclusions of the critics.

This attempt at reconciliation was local and temporary. Local, because it was only needed where the institutional tradition was very strong, as in the Roman Church, or in later Tractarianism—elsewhere the claims of tradition easily broke down before the attack of criticism. Temporary, because the Modernists wished to tide over a crisis, both for themselves and for their Church, rather than to establish a new and permanent position on Modernist lines. Their real object was to secure movement.

The Pope massed all modern tendencies of thought together, and called them Modernism: and the name has stuck. This was clever, because it enabled him, in dealing with particular Modernists, to lay on each the iniquity of all. And it was true, in so far as it focussed attention upon the pre-suppositions of the movement, in which its real significance lay, and which were, in fact, the ruling conceptions of the modern mind.

The attempt to suppress Modernism has been successful, as religious persecution generally is, just in proportion to its thoroughness. In the Roman Church abroad, with neither an educated lay opinion nor a popular press sufficiently interested or powerful to resist it, Authority has succeeded in at any rate driving the Modernists underground. At home it had a harder task with Tyrrell, and has not ventured to touch that academic Tolstoy, Baron von Hügel. But Modernism is not dead. Abroad, great things are preparing underground, and in due time there will reissue from the catacombs a new Christianity not less remarkable than that which was born in the same darkness long ago. At home not a few of the faithful are inwardly in revolt. But they are



held in check by that politic and very British principle of liberty of opinion, which allows them to think whatever they like so long as they do not express it.

In the English Church there has been a steady progress towards Liberalism in theology and in religion—a progress not adequately represented by any one party or society, as neo-Tractarianism has been represented (indeed over-represented) by the English Church Union. But there have only been individuals who could be called Modernists in the strict sense of the word—young High Churchmen, for the most part, rescued from traditionalism either by an interest in modern theology, or by contact with educated laymen. They are distinguished from the main body of Liberal theologians, who are generally Broad rather than High in their Church views, by their feeling for the society, for its sacraments, and for its traditions. The ordinary course of education at school and university throws these men into the absorbing interests of parish work with a great desire to do good, and (very often) with an enthusiasm for the Catholic position in doctrine and worship, which they have never had the inclination or the opportunity to criticise. But if such a man, whilst feeling in himself, and seeing in the lives of his parishioners, the power and attractiveness of Catholicism, finds himself driven at the same time to accept the results of Biblical Criticism, or the idea of the development of doctrine, he is almost sure to become a Modernist.

What is the inner side of this outward alliance of criticism and Catholicism? What does it *feel* like, to be a Modernist?

Modernism is a state of unrest. An anti-critical writer has recently protested against the assumption that the orthodox theologian has an easy time—that his mind is stagnant, and his conscience at ease. *A fortiori* with the Modernist. The critical side of him is for ever making new demands. He can set no limits to its invasion of traditional beliefs. He feels bound to meet its advances by repeated attempts to construct new positions. Looking through his old note-books in later

years, he will be surprised at the number of changes which his beliefs have undergone. He will be unfortunate if he does not also find evidence of a consistent development underlying them all. Anyhow, to be a Modernist is to be (theologically) always on the move.

Nor does criticism concern itself merely with a man's theological opinions. It would be surprising if it did not also affect his religious practices. The force of habit may in some cases keep a Modernist's prayers or his sacramental experience unaltered. Sometimes he may be able to revise them from time to time, without losing their reality. But in many cases the critical process goes further. Study, and thought, and the social service which so often goes with theological doubts, tend to take the place of the traditional prayers, and meditations, and saying of offices. Institutionalism becomes mysticism. However inevitable this change may be, it is to many men the most painful part of their modernisation.

All the time there is, more or less urgently, the pressure of public opinion. The Modernist may not be in a position to express unorthodox views, or to be penalised for expressing them. But his opinions become known. His fellow-clergy suspect him. Worse, he suspects himself. He is for ever asking himself, "Ought I to be where I am? Can I honestly go on saying the creeds, and celebrating the sacraments? Am I trying to live in two incompatible worlds? May it not be a form of hypocrisy, or of cowardice?" His criticism forbids his ever again being a mere traditionalist: but his tradition is much less strong as against his criticism. He knows that the old beliefs and practices have helped him. He sees them effective in lives far finer than his own. Yet he cannot reverse his own natural development. He cannot even stand still. He must go on, with the hope that some day the rival claims which distract him will be reconciled, and his double-mindedness become single-minded once more. But he wonders whether his attempts to reconstruct his beliefs



will ever end, or *can* logically end, in anything which can be properly called a Christian position.

It is to this phase of reconstruction, in which many who were once Modernists now find themselves, and to which they naturally wish to give all the security and permanence that may be possible, that we may give the name of Post-Modernism.

Why Post-Modernism? Not simply because it is something which comes after Modernism, but rather as implying that it has some likeness (to claim no more than that) to the school of art which is called Post-Impressionism.

The authors and the reading public are at a great disadvantage when compared to the artists and the art critics. There is no means by which all the works of a particular school can be collected together and put on public exhibition. If some such plan could be adopted in the case of theology, there can be little doubt that a surprisingly large collection could be made of recent books which adopt something like a Post-Impressionist treatment of theology. What the Post-Impressionist holds is that our power of reproducing nature, and even our power of seeing it as it is, has been perverted by conventional methods of expression; and consequently he endeavours to find new forms which shall truly express what is really there. Similarly, the Post-Modernist is trying to find a scheme of forms which shall express the real and directly felt values of spiritual things, not perverted and obscured by their conventional embodiments. It is the effect of criticism to show that things are not quite as they have been represented. It is the duty of institutionalism, through a particular institution—in this case the Catholic Church—to say that the traditional representations were the best that could be produced, under the circumstances, and to insist that it is more important (and also more possible) to devise a scheme of forms which shall be intelligible than one which shall be absolutely true. The Post-Modernist tries to satisfy both these claims.

How is it to be done? The Post-Impressionist adopts a style as far removed as possible from the coloured photograph

which is the ideal of conventional art. By disregarding the conventional expressions he hopes to liberate the underlying ideas. His ideal artist is the man of the world who sees and expresses things like a child. The Post-Modernist, too, must put the whole content of experience into his faith: yet his ideal is to believe simply and truly, as a child does, who has not yet learnt the conventions which its parents teach it.

That is curiously like the faith that Christ himself held and taught.

But we must not let this rather attractive analogy obscure what is, after all, the essence of Modernism, as distinct from other forms of Liberalism in religion—namely, its respect for the Catholic and corporate experience of the Church. If, on one side, Post-Modernism stands for a thorough-going Liberalism, on the other it stands for a rational Conservatism.

Newman's essay on Development was the justification of his desertion of Anglicanism, when he found it impatient of a Catholic interpretation. It was a Conservative document which unintentionally started a Liberal movement. Loisy, of course, is a Liberal critic, as Newman never was. But Loisy's Modernism began as a Catholic protest against Harnack's Protestantism. The essence of Modernism is its feeling for the Catholic tradition, its conviction that reconstruction (which it never doubts is necessary) must somehow begin on the original foundations, and use up what is valuable in the old materials.

Baron von Hügel, himself one of the most distinguished of Modernists, is for ever insisting that the full Catholic position demands loyalty to three kinds of experience—critical, institutional, and mystical. Let us try to define Post-Modernism a little more closely under each of these heads.

### I. CRITICAL.

Here we may distinguish the presuppositions of criticism from its practical use and results. This does not mean that nobody can be a critic without holding a particular philosophy ;



but that criticism is only one activity of the modern mind, and that the modern mind has a definite character of its own.

The Pope was quite right when he said that the ruling philosophical idea of Modernism was Immanence. What, then, are the implications of Immanence, when applied to the subject-matter of religion?

Immanence means that in theology we no longer look for the supernatural in abstraction from the natural, but by penetrating deeper into it. This is a big change of view, with results in almost every department of religious thought.

Immanence means that in Christology we look for Christ's divinity in his humanity, not outside it. And this enables us to meet the failure of criticism to find anything superhuman in the historical Jesus.

Immanence means the surrender of the old idea of miracles as interferences with the natural order from outside, and, with it, of the necessity of believing that such events have happened. The question has to be restated in this form: What are the possible manifestations of supernaturalism from within the natural?

Immanence means that God is in all men, not otherwise (though in other degrees) than in special individuals, or societies, or sacraments. It means that revelation is not necessarily more divine than reason, nor grace than free will, nor the Church than the world. They are different ways of God's working.

This is indeed a turning inside-out of the old methods of thought; and very much remains to be done before the implications of the idea of Immanence are fully realised. Yet its principles are not new. The divine possibilities of man; the supernatural meaning of nature; the implicit Christianity of the whole world—all these are in the Gospels. They are Christ's own faith. They are the inner meaning of "the kingdom of God." And so long as the idea of Immanence is purified by the worship of Him who is immanent, Post-

Modernists will quite rightly give full value to it, and make it the basis of their whole position.

Secondly, as regards criticism in the proper sense of the word—its practice and its results.

Post-Modernism has no scruples about applying to the New Testament the same theory of Inspiration, and the same principles of interpretation, as to the Old. It studies the written sources of the Gospels as it would any other ancient documents. It estimates the trustworthiness of sacred, as it would that of secular, traditions. It makes no reservations. It sets no limits to free inquiry.

It is prepared, if need be, to follow history to the point at which it can find no evidence that Jesus was more than man: if it refuses to go further, and to doubt whether he ever lived at all, it is solely on historical grounds.

It is prepared, if need be, to believe that Jesus consciously founded no Church, ordained no ministry, instituted no sacraments; but that these were inevitable afterthoughts, inspired by the memory of his teaching and personality.

It is prepared to accept whatever history may prove as to the degeneration and the errors of the Church; and to let every Christian institution stand or fall by its merits, by its proved service to men's spiritual needs.

This is not to suggest that we are asked at this moment to subscribe to any of these conclusions. There is none of them about which criticism has said its last word. But certainly it has settled into methods, and outlined results, which will not easily be reversed. The Post-Modernist does not jump at novelties, or delight in shocking orthodox feelings. But he recognises clearly that established methods of criticism are at work, which may at any moment call for the revision of our most cherished ideas. His duty is to insist on the method more than on the results, and yet to welcome every new bit of truth as definitely more divine than any untruth, however venerable.



## II. INSTITUTIONAL.

The Post-Modernist owns to no authority but that of God speaking through men. Tradition is the summary of what men have said in the past. Creeds are their attempt to express what they have believed: sacraments, what they have experienced. The Church is their most congenial form of self-government, the ministry their system of representation. All these things have the authority of ancient adoption and of long use. They are some of the ways in which God has allowed himself to be represented by men and to men. They are the embodiment of a divine heredity. This gives them a real value and sacredness for all men who reverence humanity. But it gives them no absolute claim to override the few in the name of the many, or the present in the name of the past. For these institutions and formulæ have changed as men have changed. They have no validity that cannot be taken away by the same human nature which conferred it. And in religion minorities need special consideration. The development of Christian opinion and experience as a whole is determined by the leadership of the few. The minority suffers: the majority enjoys the fruit of its passion.

It is on this institutional side that Post-Modernism differs most from Modernism, and comes nearest to non-Catholic Liberalism. The Modernist felt himself to belong to a Church which would never tolerate a gradual Liberalisation, a surrender by detachments. He must either accept the faith as a whole, or leave the society. Consequently he sought means to secure his position. He either argued, with Loisy, that the idea of development brought within the circle of faith that which history excluded from the circle of fact; or he held, with Tyrrell (in his last phase), that the very fanaticism and irrationality of the Catholic claims showed their true descent from the eschatological Jesus.

The Post-Modernist can no longer argue in this way. He sees that development cannot stop at the limits of Ultra-

montanism, any more than at the end of the sixth century: it carries one right on into Protestantism and Nonconformity. On the other hand, eschatology was one of many phases through which Christianity passed. It was, indeed, the phase of the Founder, and of his immediate followers. But it was not Christianity itself. Nor could the apocalyptic temper, even supposing that it were confined to the Roman Church, be a proof of the exclusive claims of that communion.

The Post-Modernist, like the Modernist, holds with the traditional beliefs so long as he can, and stays in the society so long as it will let him. But it is on historical and psychological grounds. Historical, because through the doctrines of the Church he secures that continuity with the past which he believes to be a mark of true development. Psychological, because as a member of the society he keeps in touch with the typical Christian experience; because he shares, especially through the Catholic devotions and sacraments, the communion of saints.

But, however faithful he may be to tradition, the Post-Modernist has no illusions as to its real nature. He does not deceive himself into thinking that all he has to do is to re-interpret and re-express an unchanging faith. He believes that the faith has changed, and is changing, far more than one would judge from the rigidity of its formulæ. That, indeed, is just where its strength lies. Its flexibility, not its rigidity, has enabled it to survive, and to accommodate itself to so many different types and stages of the religious sense. And that is why it still seems able to embody all that is best in the religious experience of mankind. The Post-Modernist, then, would be showing as little faith as sense, were he to spend his time in defending particular positions, however long defended, and however defensible. His business is rather to be loyal to those principles without which neither Liberalism nor Conservatism in religion can be Christian—to honesty, to charity, and to truth.

And, whilst laying more stress on the principles than on the



doctrines of Christianity, he will perhaps be specially on his guard against that last infirmity of noble minds—the desire to construct a theological system offhand, to have a definite “position,” and a clear-cut answer to every important question. For the present, at least, most of us cannot hope to be constructive in more than outline. The best that we can do may be to expose shams, to pull down unsafe hypotheses, to re-examine common assumptions. It is often dull and depressing work, and we sometimes doubt whether we shall ever reach a solid foundation on which the new building may rise. But the foundations *are* there. The building is, indeed, already rising.

### III. MYSTICAL.

Most men are Liberal in parts. Very few are Liberal through and through—just as, biologically, new developments start from an abnormal variation in an individual or a species which is normal in other respects. Abnormality all over means death.

Modernism abroad was the attempt of Liberal thought to live under the same roof as Conservative feeling. Church tradition and discipline, Catholic worship and ritual, were too much ingrained to be erased by Biblical criticism. Modernism at home was almost as heavily influenced by Tractarianism. In the nature of the case all that could be achieved for the moment was a *modus vivendi*; and this was bound to break down as soon as criticism spread from the Bible to other parts of the Catholic position.

It began with the Bible, because the Reformation made the Bible worth reading. It has already spread to the Church—all the more readily, since Tractarianism appealed from the Bible to the Society which interprets it. It cannot very much longer leave untouched the mystical or experimental side of Christianity.

It is the habit nowadays to assume that, whatever else may be open to criticism, one thing stands clear, firm, and unchanging—the typical Christian experience. Not that special

form of it which is found in the Mystics, and which must always be too exceptional to furnish a basis for apologetics, but that personal experience of Christ which it is supposed that every Christian may fairly expect to have. One finds more and more, in recent apologetic, the tendency to assume that there is this experience, that it has always been much what it is now, that it can be handed on from one individual to another, and that it can be appealed to as evidence for the truth of Christianity. Christian experience is indeed being placed on the pedestal from which the Bible and the Church have in succession been cast down. It is coming to be regarded as an infallible authority.

Now it certainly cannot be wrong to shift the weight of apologetic from tradition to experience. Indeed it is obvious that this is a right and necessary development; and it is one of the leading principles of Post-Modernism. But it is surely clear that we need to criticise the new apologetic as carefully as the old, and that it would be unwise to lay too much stress on the argument from experience until we are sure how much weight it will bear. Questions are being asked about it, and they will have to be answered. How far is the modern Christian experience continuous with the ancient, so that we can claim for it more than a temporary validity? How far does it spring direct from the real person of Christ, or how far is it derived from things which we have been taught to think about him? What proportion of Christians have this experience, and is it the centre of their religious faith? Can an experience of this kind be evidence for anything beyond itself? In what way, if at all, can it validate the historical statements and dogmatic beliefs of Christianity? And can any religious experience—anything on the mystical side of man—be regarded as that which matters most in religion?

Post-Modernism must face and try to answer these questions. The old *modus vivendi* between Liberalism in theology and Conservatism in religion has broken down. The *raison d'être* of Post-Modernism is to escape from the double-



mindedness of Modernism by being thorough in its criticism—by extending it to religion as well as theology, to Catholic feeling as well as to Catholic tradition. It has criticised the external traditions of Christianity: it must criticise its internal presuppositions. And I do not doubt for a moment that there will emerge from this criticism, as from that, a rational account of the faith, worthy of all reverence and trust.

That is Post-Modernism. It is, no doubt, a position which lays itself open to attack by deliberately courting criticism of the foundations of Christianity, and indeed of religion. But that is surely wiser than to spend one's time—as many seem to do—in defending a series of sand castles against the incoming tide. No doubt there are those who are never so happy as when they are waving their spades above a crumbling sand-heap, and who view with dislike their comrades' preference for that part of the beach which is above the high-water mark.

But the Post-Modernist sees no sense in sham fighting. He has done, once and for all, with the old antagonisms between faith and reason, grace and free will, the Church and the world. He would put his Christian experience and his Catholic resources at the disposal of any who will use them, and who will contribute, in their turn, something that he does not possess. He would ask for the co-operation of all in that adventure which is too great for anyone alone to undertake—the discovery and the development of the kingdom of God.

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## CRIMINOUS CLERKS.

ARCHIBALD WEIR.

THE harsh title of this paper is meant to indicate that it refuses to confound the issues at stake by complimentary disclaimers and assurances dear to professional brethren in conflict.

The Bishop of Oxford has lately published an open letter to his clergy manfully protesting that "it is totally unjustifiable that one who has come finally and seriously to disbelieve that certain miraculous events really occurred should continue to exercise a ministry which involves his constant personal profession of belief that they did occur." And in that letter he strenuously insists that all who care for our religious life should read two essays by the late Henry Sidgwick.

Dr Gore adds that Sidgwick was not himself a believer. This is true, but it is only half the truth. If we approach the case without any prepossession except intense admiration for Sidgwick, as I wish to do on this occasion, we shall find that the force of his indictment fell short of the standard on which ethical censorship must now insist. This came about because he imported into his judgment beliefs which can no longer be admitted.

Sidgwick in his life showed a conspicuous example of integrity by sifting the faith of his youth, renouncing the thought of taking orders, and later by resigning his fellowship when he found that he disbelieved important doctrines of the Anglican Church. Yet he belonged to a generation which



cherished a sentimental affection for ecclesiastical institutions even when it rejected their cardinal tenets. Above all, during his whole life he was an ornament to the profession then most intimately associated with clericalism, so that he never detached himself from the fundamental position which united in theory the teacher and the priest. "Now, actually, in the world we live in," he averred in the essay called "The Ethics of Religious Conformity," "the great moralising agencies are the Christian Churches; and the most advanced thinker can hardly suppose that this will not continue to be the case for an indefinite time to come." Though "hypocrisy and insincere conformity have always been a besetting vice of established or predominant religions," "the work that the Churches are doing, with their vast resources and traditional influence over men's minds, is work in the efficacy of which we must always be keenly interested."<sup>1</sup> In point of fact, Sidgwick disbelieved Christian dogmas, but he did not disbelieve in Christian Churches. He was indeed solicitous for the institutions, and tender towards the individuals they harboured.

Nowadays this measure of regard for the Churches should save him from being characterised without qualification as not himself a believer. For we have travelled so far from his standpoint that unless we are zealous members of a Church we are no longer influenced by lurking partiality towards either the institutions or the individuals. Our criticism is now directed by quite a different motive. We have ceased to regard the institutions as necessary to any sort of salvation for an indefinite time, because we have learnt to devote our thoughts to the welfare of the race in the light of the history of the race. Hence the modern mind (the expression is Sidgwick's) has no sympathy with either a lax lukewarm Church or with men who distract it by occupying positions in it while repudiating fundamental tenets. It regards them as it would regard any other defaulting officers in any other

<sup>1</sup> *Practical Ethics*, pp. 114, 116.

lethargic corporation. If it cared to give the delinquents a distinctive name, it would not trouble to invent a new term. It would adopt the old historical phrase which serves as our title.

Every profession suffers from its own peculiar forms of professional misconduct, and the lay world requires that every profession take sufficient measures to deal with such obliquities as they come to light. But even then the most generous observer is aware that misconduct always exists to some extent. As Sir Thomas Browne puts it, "Those three noble professions which all civil commonwealths do honour, are raised upon the fall of Adam, and are not any way exempt from their infirmities"; and as a recent preacher in St Paul's Cathedral put it with regard to Christianity, "It is not the love of the marvellous, but the insight of the true historian that leads St Luke in the Book of the Acts to set the deceit of Ananias and Sapphira in clearer prominence even than the persecution of Herod." It might, therefore, be concluded that false pretences or any other form of malpractice in the Churches should be treated as matters of internal discipline, and should be left to the Churches to deal with by their own inherent powers, without interference or criticism from the lay world. And indeed that attitude would seem to be correct if we were content with the narrow individualist view of competitive existence and personal salvation which used to obtain wherever the Reformation established the supremacy of Protestantism. But this view has lost its authority. It was from the beginning a partial, sectarian, dehumanised view; and now that it is discarded it opens out a prospect of common racial interest which is seriously jeopardised by moral delinquencies on the part of any members charged with the maintenance and elevation of spiritual standards.

Such an interest is no new thing in the history of the human race. Early religion and morality reposed on the common interest of all members of a society in avoiding offence to gods or pollution of territory. Civilised communi-



ties have outgrown the delusions which attended primitive practice, but they earnestly revert to the conception of the common guardianship of a common standard as soon as they free themselves from other delusions of more recent date. We do not now demand that those who eat with us should abstain from fornication for the reason that that sin was supposed in St Paul's time to defile not only the sinner but also those who associated with him. We dispense with the legal fiction,<sup>1</sup> and find our moral position all the stronger. Hence, when we also have emancipated ourselves from ideas of pursuing salvation on the principles of individual or joint-stock enterprise, we dispense with the administrative fiction that veracity and integrity are elastic principles when the object in view is to further the interest of a religious society. We declare that veracity and integrity are principles whose strict interpretation and maintenance must take precedence of any convenience that laxity may be fancied to bring to a Church or a communion; and we find our moral position all the stronger. In a word, we have arrived at a stage when no conceivable advantage to religious teaching and organisation can be allowed to legitimise any sort of debasement of the moral currency.

Nor can we stop here with an emphatic expression of ethical feeling. We must carry our solicitude for the race as against institutions to the point of wresting good out of evil. It is a commonplace of the day to declare that a great number of our law-breakers injure themselves and society because their abilities and energies have been misdirected—that if their activities were suitably employed their lives would be a benefit to society instead of a burden. It is also common to hear defenders of our more prominent misbelieving clergy allege that it would be prejudicial to the institutions they pretend to serve if their unusual abilities and enterprise were withdrawn. But as soon as it is understood that it is not the interest of institutions but the interest of the race which we must regard

<sup>1</sup> A touch of what Herodotus referred to as "silly nonsense"—*cf.* "The Anthropological Point of View," HIBBERT JOURNAL, April 1914.

as pre-eminent, this argument falls to the ground, and it is replaced by the argument that the qualities so misdirected within the bounds of a Church would yield great benefit to the world if suitably directed outside institutional limits. The only thing that we have to deplore is that at present we cannot guarantee equally considerable pay, position, and influence to superior abilities when they are exercised at large for the enlightenment of society as when they are tied to the offices of a Church. But this inconvenience may be trusted to cure itself. As society wakes up to full appreciation of the moral aspect of the case, position and influence within the Church will wane rapidly; while the rewards of single-minded ability in the service of spiritual health may be trusted to increase *pari passu*. And, indeed, many examples of desirable success in this direction have already been achieved.

Sidgwick's remarkable power of balancing the merits and demerits of every question he handled did not save him from partiality towards institutions and neglect of the larger entity of the race. In this matter he was a child of his time. Not till the last months of his life did he attain to a strong doubt whether untheological morality is really abnormal, whether it does not rather represent the beginnings of a more advanced stage in the development of the moral consciousness. "It seems to me," he then said, "a tenable view that the development of scientific sociology and of social sentiment in average men tends ultimately to disconnect morality from its present theological scaffolding, and exhibit it as simply the outcome of social feeling guided by a rational forecast of social consequences."<sup>1</sup> Though his essays on "Religious Conformity" and "Clerical Veracity" were written less than twenty years ago, the wider anthropological view was beyond their horizon. He did not learn soon enough that it was a mistake to consider Churches as either good or bad, that the only proper view was to consider them as institutions instrumental in their

<sup>1</sup> *Henry Sidgwick: A Memoir*, p. 615. The occasion was a paper read to the Synthetic Society, 24th February 1899.



time to the development of the race, but subordinate to that greater conception. He could censure effectively priests who seemed to suggest "that any clergyman may lie without scruple in the cause of religious progress, with a view to aiding popular education in the new theology, and still feel that he is as veracious as his profession allows him to be."<sup>1</sup> But he could not exhibit the full enormity of perverting one of the most typical institutions for the humanising of man in a manner which must defeat all its power for good, because he judged the offence as one against ecclesiastical morals and ethical example, and not as one against the forces of spiritual assertion inherent in the race. Treason to a Church, we now know, is a small matter compared with treason to the race. But the offences against veracity and fidelity to pledges which Sidgwick condemned are really treason against both.<sup>2</sup>

It is not, however, admiration alone which makes me think it worth while to consider the point Sidgwick reached in his endeavour to arrive at a correct attitude towards misbelieving priests. Gratitude is an equally strong motive. I came up to Oxford with the fixed determination of qualifying myself for the clergyman's life, well and favourably known to me by experience in the home and the village. Among the studies undertaken to that intent perhaps the most influential in persuading me to preserve my independence of mind and

<sup>1</sup> *Practical Ethics*, p. 155.

<sup>2</sup> The last word of the *Times* April correspondence on the minimum of orthodoxy would have us believe that Sidgwick's reasoning was irrelevant because he "approached the whole subject from the outside." The pamphlet of 1870 disposes of this charge from one point of view. Deep personal experience had given its writer an inside acquaintance with the possible conflict between veracity and conformity such as, we may hope, is granted to few practising ministers. From the complementary point of view the charge fails, because, as we have noted, Sidgwick did not approach the subject as perfectly from the outside as present public policy demands. And the laymen, who took a part adverse to Dr Gore in the discussion, resembled Sidgwick in imperfect detachment from the Anglican Church, and consequent inability to state the case quite satisfactorily to national and racial ethics. Yet the wisest of them confessed "that *primâ facie* the plain man—whether Christian or non-Christian—unquestionably agrees with the Bishop's contention."

to refuse to bind myself by vows or declarations were Sidgwick's earlier writings. And here it should be noted that the ethical teaching of the *Essays* was reproduced from a pamphlet published in 1870, immediately after Sidgwick had resigned his fellowship; but the *Essays* do not contain the most moving passage of the pamphlet, describing the plight of an intelligent and promising young clergyman confronted with the possibility of finding in the course of his studies that honour and duty will call upon him to withdraw from his ministerial functions. Thus I was spared the doubts and struggles which must have overcast my life if, as was usual among young men in my position, I had received ordination in ignorance of my real intellectual temperament. To have accepted Sidgwick as a teacher was in those days the greatest help to a youth against rash assent and still rasher pledges. During the thirty odd years which have since elapsed, the subject of clerical veracity has been agitated again and again, and the conviction has been growing that something ought to be done of a more wholesome nature than sterile recrimination. I believe that we have now reached a phase of opinion which will admit the trial of a measure likely to cure some of the evil and to prevent still more.

My proposal is that a society should be formed to assist those unfortunate clergy who have learnt too late that their intellects cannot acquiesce in doctrines to which they pledged themselves as undeveloped youths. Such assistance would have to take the form of inquiry, counsel, and money. Many a doubter would be nursed through his difficulties and sent back to his cure of souls all the stronger and more self-reliant for his temporary retreat. Many a backslider would be encouraged to take the brave and candid course, and would be shown alternative occupations suitable to his abilities. And some, demoralised by the pressure of immediate pecuniary need, would be given grants sufficient to enable them to recover their judgment and will-power. If a society of good repute engaged in work of this kind it would soon gain a



standing which would enable it to advise uneasy candidates for ordination as to whether they should persevere with their intention. Most beneficent of all would be the knowledge that such work was done, though perhaps within very modest limits, for this would remind the most light-hearted aspirants that they should ponder their decision anxiously and avoid ill-considered acquiescence in solemn engagements.<sup>1</sup>

Money and administration are found for increasing the number of unequivocating clergy. In the interests of religious efficiency and ecclesiastical stability money and administration would be put to far better use if it obviated the presence of clergy who cannot minister to their flocks in the sense which the flocks consider veracious and honest, and threw open the places to men who can do so. Under the head of administration would come the services of men gifted with tact, knowledge of human nature, and personal influence, quick to detect imposture and ready to discriminate real from imaginary difficulties. The clerical world could meet these needs with little lay assistance, if an outside spectator may hazard an opinion. The whole subject, in truth, requires discussion from many points of view quite beyond the competence of the present writer. But it is not open to question from one important point of view, and that is the anthropological. Consequently, much as the cause would appeal to the support of the faithful, it would appeal yet more forcibly to the great

<sup>1</sup> These pages were written before Canon Sanday's reply to the Bishop of Oxford appeared. It may not be impertinent, however, to observe at this point that, though Dr Sanday may have a fair prospect of remaining in the position indicated in his pamphlet, I can vouch from my own experience that for a young man such a position will be only a halting-place on a road which must lead him eventually beyond the minimum described on p. 9. "We should all agree that anything really less than this would be hypocritical. The man who, in his heart of hearts, really believed less ought not to stay where he is" (p. 10). But it is impossible to judge fairly the peculiar position of Professor Sanday, as one of the most respected Fathers of neo-Christianity in England, unless liberal allowance is made for the neglect of philosophy, to which he confessed in the *HIBBERT JOURNAL* for April 1912, p. 693, and for the want of sense of direction manifested in his pamphlet, *A New Marcion*, published in 1909.

mass of citizens mainly interested in the purity of national and racial life. With such wide sources of strength a society for facilitating the resignation of doubting clergymen should be able to mitigate much individual hardship, pull together many a riven soul, and maintain such a standard of integrity in matters relating to veracity and fidelity as would constitute a new ethic for our candidates for ordination.

If we believe that through the triumph of a finer ethic, unity and veracity would be promoted in the Churches, that the more able and enterprising clergy would be set free for a larger work in the secular field, and that virtue and intelligence would thus be encouraged in the growth of the race, we must still ask ourselves in our detachment how we may expect the institutions themselves to fare in competition with the greater world of purely human and social forces. We cannot dismiss the Churches to pursue the perfection of integrity without a thought of the sort of result that may be expected to accrue to them.

Now the Churches serve certain zones of the anthropological scale which in themselves are essentially transitory. Once it seemed otherwise. Once it seemed as if the race must always lean on the incorporated priest. We have at last learnt that Churches are made for man, and not man for the Churches. Mankind is perpetually changing, and contains within its shifting existence elements derived from different stages of development. Some of the more persisting of these elements need the ministration of Churches. The proportion of these elements to the whole diminished much during the last century, and we may be tempted to think that the diminution will continue at a still more rapid rate. But this is wholly uncertain. Future changes may call for more priests instead of less. Man is quite capable of this. When the average man has learnt, as well as the philosopher knows now, that all our science and positive information has not brought us one whit nearer intrinsic acquaintance with the fundamental conditions of existence,



the average man is not so likely to scorn the visions of the priests, unless he develops a strength of character unsuspected by anthropological research up to date. On the contrary, popular reliance on science as popularly understood is so simple-minded that, when the true metaphysical situation is comprehended, a spiritual reaction is probable. And when science is popularly impeached, there will be discredited along with it the bastard rules of historical science which have been conceived within very recent times for the study of history by historians, and are now applied to sustain the latest liberal readings of neo-Christianity. Hence if a spiritual reaction does master the zones containing the average man, it will probably be towards faiths of yesterday administered in spirit and in truth by men firm in the faiths of yesterday.

ARCHIBALD WEIR.

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## “SACRAMENTS AND UNITY.”

HON. AND REV. CANON ADDERLEY,

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THE article by Mr Coats on Sacraments and Unity seems to me to have been conceived in the most right and hopeful spirit possible. The sentence in which, writing of sacramental claims, he remarks, “These are still affirmed while the efficacy of something else is not presumed to be denied,” contains an approach to unity even greater than Mr Coats discloses. Take the three views as complementary rather than mutually exclusive, and it is surprising to find how near we get to one another. Let us begin with the real presence. Though it is sometimes supposed that this is the doctrine which divides Christians in the matter of the Eucharist, I do not think that when we come to close quarters it is so. It is, to begin with, notorious that consubstantiation, the “virtual presence,” and the symbolical view did not divide Protestants very sharply when it came to opposing Rome, nor are modern Anglicans kept from Rome by transubstantiation nearly so much as by the infallibility of the Pope. Within the Church of England it is much more the ritual acts of recognising or slighting a real presence which disturb people of varying views than fundamental disagreement in doctrine. If the Bishop of Durham can say that at the Eucharist Christ is the invisible priest holding out the Blessed Sacrament to us, and the Bishop of Ripon can allow a real difference between the sacrament before and after consecration, we cannot be so very far from one another. An old Evangelical to whom I



often gave communion used to murmur the words, “Jesus, Jesus,” as I approached him with the elements. Did he not believe in a very real presence, and would not his belief have justified the whole ritual of a Roman Catholic church—incense, lights, vestments, and all?

Even the symbolical view of the “rationalists” is by no means incompatible with that of the Catholic. Mr Coats himself notes the instinctive reverence for the national flag. The flag as a symbol was, I believe, given as an instance by Zwinglians of what they meant by a symbolical sacrament. The relative importance attached successively to a piece of bunting in a draper’s shop, then cut into the shape of a Union Jack, then carried into battle and fought for, or exhibited in Paris during the King’s visit, is very much like the relative importance of a wafer or a piece of bread in a church shop, then brought to the credence table, then consecrated, then partaken of or perhaps carried in procession on Corpus Christi day. Even Dr Arnold’s “mourning ring” view of the sacrament need not have been so distressing to Catholics as it was, for, after all, there is a great deal of spiritual difference between a piece of gold by itself and one that has been made into a ring and inscribed with the name of a dear departed one. Our museums are full of pieces of paper to which has become irrevocably attached a real presence of something intensely spiritual.

If only we could persuade Christians to cease from affirming too much, and equally from denying too much, about the sacraments, we should probably find ourselves becoming more and more united by using them. And, in fact, this is what is happening. We can hardly imagine a recrudescence of battles over the precise meaning of the real presence. What we all want to get at is the thing symbolised, the presence of a living Christ. Agreeing upon that, we should leave each other alone, coming together where we can in the common belief in a Master who is alive for evermore. Underlying each sacrament there is, I believe, a truth which unites all

Christians, and, provided we are none of us in too much of a hurry, we shall rediscover it. The rediscovery is not best made by hasty attempts at external reunion. The present clamour for common communion before we have acquired the spirit of unity is a case in point. Even if Nonconformists and Anglicans are ready to meet one another at the Lord's Table, it is obvious that Romans and Easterns are not so, and the ultimate reunion of all Christians is only retarded by this hurry. Co-operation in silent meetings and in Christian social service has brought Quakers and others much closer to one another of late years than would ever have come about by attempts to bully the Society of Friends into trying the use of sacraments, or, *vice versâ*, by Quaker attempts to show the rest the futility of them. As with everything else in religion, so with sacraments: those who use them must show their intimate connection with everyday life if they want to attract others to their use.

Perhaps the chief obstacle in the way of recommending the sacraments is the suspicion in so many people's minds of "sacerdotalism." Mr Coats kindly refers to a paper of my own in which I dealt with this subject. The most hopeful way of approaching reconciliation is by a policy of "give and take." On the side of Catholics there should be a much more frank recognition of the sacramental efficacy of non-episcopal preaching, teaching, and administration. It seems to me perilously near the sin against the Holy Ghost to deny or seem to deny the valid gift of prophecy in Nonconformists. I purposely do not mention names, partly because I am a sacerdotalist and believe in the office more than the man. I will go further and say that I hope and believe that there are few Anglicans nowadays who would talk as if non-episcopal sacraments conferred no grace. I would agree with Father Dolling, who, when an enthusiastic Churchman, speaking to him of a Methodist communion, said, "They do not receive anything," replied, "I am quite sure you don't."

Then, on the other side, would it not be well if anti-



episcopalians were to be more careful to understand what the Church really claims with regard to priesthood, and not merely shout blindly “Sacerdotalism” and “Priestcraft”? Frederick Denison Maurice, followed by Charles Gore and Doctor Moberly, have pleaded that what we mean by priesthood is primarily an official position; that priests are representative men, not substituted men; that they act for the whole body, not instead of it; that they are tongues or hands doing or saying the things God wants done or said, or that the laity want done or said. Dean Farrar used to maintain that Dr Gore had invented this new idea of priests, but it is not really new. It is implied in St Paul’s words about the Eucharist, “The cup of blessing which *we*,” not *I*, “bless,” and in the words of absolution in our Prayer Book: “Our Lord Jesus Christ hath left power to His Church (not to me) to absolve all sinners who truly repent, and by His authority committed to me (the authority to declare forgiveness, not the forgiveness itself) I absolve thee (not in my own name, but in God’s).” This representativeness of the priest is cheerfully recognised in plenty of ways—for example, in a marriage, where he says, “I pronounce them to be man and wife together,” or even in baptism. “I baptise thee” and “I absolve thee” are each equally representative words, not personal, individual pronouncements.

It always seems to me that there is much more danger of a false kind of sacerdotalism in the pulpit than at the altar or in the confessional. I can imagine being preacher-ridden more easily than being priest-ridden. Regarding myself as a layman, I should be more tempted to rest too much on the priest in the pulpit than when he is performing any other function. I might go a long way to hear a particular preacher, and might be inclined to pay undue attention to what he said, as if it were a guaranteed Divine message, but if I wanted my communion or an absolution I should only seek an official priest with the minimum of consideration for his name or personality. The sacramental official priesthood

seems to me to suggest exactly the contrary to that which it is generally supposed to do. So far from putting a man between the soul and God, it rather brings God direct to the soul. A man comes to be married in church, not because he wants another man to bless his union but, because he wants to be sure that God blesses it. He could get the man in the registry office to join him to his bride, but he desires God's approval, so he comes to God's minister. This would apply, I think, to all sacraments. They assure us of God's good-will towards us, and the priest is there to give authoritative expression to that good-will. I do not suppose this modified view of Holy Order will satisfy all parties, but I believe that something like it is necessary if we are to parley with much hope of agreement upon the sacraments.

I do not think we can expect, nor indeed ought we to hope for, complete uniformity about sacraments. But we may look for such a belief as will enable us to worship together, each holding his view which is not antagonistic to but complementary with the others. We already do this in many matters. Is it to be for ever impossible in the matter of sacraments? Of course, the Roman Catholics will not even pray with us, and that always seems to me the saddest mark of division in Christendom. But just as Anglicans and Nonconformists can and do pray together, while holding, it may be, very different views of prayer; and just as Anglicans of all schools, holding every sort of view of the Blessed Sacrament, can yet use the same liturgy, and can sing hymns written by every kind of Christian, from Newman to Frances Ridley Havergal, it ought not to be impossible for us to come together, even though we may differ on doctrinal points. Can the three conceptions of the sacraments, which Mr Coats has so temperately defined, be in some way harmonised so that Christians holding them could yet communicate happily together? Do not the three views of Holy Baptism overlap one another in some respects? The Evangelical insists on faith, but so does the Catholic.



Faith must be maintained or the grace of baptism will not fructify. Conversion is insisted upon by Catholic and Evangelical alike. Again, is not a symbolical view of baptism common to all three? It seems likely that the somewhat magical view of baptism, as a rite which *ex opere operato* admits people into the Christian community, is likely to get us out of a great many difficulties and to bring us together. The Anglican Church has been finding it increasingly hard to maintain the sponsorial system, and to justify the answer in the Catechism that infants are baptised because the reality of the rite is secured by having god-parents. The Roman Church does not find this difficulty, because it frankly holds the *ex opere operato* theory. Evangelical Churchmen find another difficulty in the very strong language of the Prayer Book about regeneration.

I think we are likely to find relief in the symbolical view, and I do not see that it involves any serious change in our formularies. Infant baptism as a great initiatory rite, a sort of coronation, as F. D. Maurice thought it, by which we are declared to be children of God, could be accepted by all, without our insisting on or denying other and additional gifts of grace that some might think accompany it. The insistence on conversion might be symbolised by the rite of confirmation, a ceremony which I have been told many Free Churchmen would like to revive in their churches. This, again, should be done without too much definition of a particular or exclusive grace conferred thereby. I can even conceive the idea of our coming together on the subject of confession and absolution, especially if that broader view of priesthood which has been outlined above could be accepted. With regard to Holy Communion I have already indicated a *rapprochement* on the subject of the real presence. I cannot but think we are approaching a reconciliation on the subject of the sacrifice also. Our whole idea of what sacrifice implies is being altered, and therefore we are not so much afraid as we used to be of calling the Eucharist sacrificial. We are one in looking upon sacrifice

as a spiritual approach to God, and the sacrifice of Christ as the perfect sacrifice. The idea of an angry God to be appeased has practically vanished, and in the same way the eucharistic sacrifice is chiefly thought of less as an expiatory rite, and more as a presentation before God of the perfect life and death of Christ, and of our lives in His. Dr Robertson Smith ends his great book on the religion of the Semites thus :

“One point that comes out clear and strong is that the fundamental idea of ancient sacrifice is sacramental communion: and that all atoning rites are ultimately to be regarded as owing their efficacy to a communication of Divine life to the worshippers, and to the establishment or confirmation of a living bond between them and their God.”

Newman's interpretation of Article 31, which caused such a disturbance sixty years ago, is now accepted as legitimate by men like Sir Oliver Lodge on the one side, and the Abbé Portal for the Romans on the other. Anglicans of all schools can meet and sing together Dr Bright's eucharistic hymns without experience of any shock. Mr R. J. Campbell can attend Mass on the Continent, and describe it in language that warms the hearts of Catholics towards him and one another.

M. Paul Sabatier in his last book, *L'Orientation de la Religion Française*, tells us that freethinkers steal secretly into the churches and gaze at the great drama of the Mass, longing for the day when they can join in it again. I have found simple-hearted men of the type which uses early morning schools and P.S.A.'s ready to recognise the attendance at the Eucharist as a natural and effective way of corporate Christian worship, much more intelligible to them than the elaborate Matins of the average Anglican church. Children, too, can readily understand the Gospel simplicity of the Eucharist as a symbolical action. Jesus gave Himself for us. He gave His body and blood for us, and so brought us to God. We are to give our bodies and our blood for others. To enter into the spirit of Matins, with its lessons and psalms, requires a far greater advance in religious attainment than



to remember Christ at the Eucharist. Could not common ground be discovered in the simple words of institution, “Do this in remembrance of Me”? Is not the weekly “Breaking of Bread” by the Plymouth Brethren really the same thing as the Pope’s Mass?

Finally, I would say a word on sacraments generally, and on what we exactly mean by grace. Sacraments are means and not ends, as Father Tyrrell used to say. It must be wrong for us to ignore the fact that there are many Christians who do attain to something like the same ends by other means. We may cling to the well-tried means, not only because of our own spiritual experience of the use of them, but also quite legitimately because they do come to us with a tremendous weight of the recorded experience of Christians in all ages. But we must also remember that Christianity is a very young religion, and that we are only at the beginning of Church history, even now. Catholic mystics and the Society of Friends have found silence and contemplation more sacramentally efficacious than the ordinary sacraments. The author of the Fourth Gospel does undoubtedly describe the feet-washing as a kind of sacrament ordained by Christ, just at the point where we should have expected him to tell us about the Lord’s Supper, especially in view of what he had already written in his sixth chapter. Many Christians who seldom or never communicate do seem to get grace from action which is more like feet-washing than like eating bread and drinking wine. These facts, and many others of the same nature, should make us very chary of claiming too much in the way of special sacramental grace to be got in no way except by the appointed channels. Let us concentrate on the end for which we look rather than on the means we use, however venerable. Anyhow, that is the way to preliminary agreements. The hem of Christ’s garment became a sacrament of Christ’s virtue to the woman who wanted Him, while it was nothing to those who pressed it without the desire for that end. We need also to reconsider what we mean by

grace, of which the sacraments are said to be the means. There is a tendency to talk of grace in terms of quantity, as if it were so much measurable stuff like the grease of a wheel or the fuel of an engine. But we cannot really measure spiritual force in that sort of way. We do not get twice as much inspiration by reading two plays of Shakespeare as we should if we only read one. Neither are two communions necessarily better than one. The very phrase "my communion" suggests a mechanical view of grace. Had not Cardinal Manning some thought of this kind in his mind when he deplored the fact that many of his priests had become mere "sacrament-mongers"? Grace is spiritual power, a force of suggestion, encouragement, inspiration, but needing the co-operation of the will of the receiver to make it really efficacious. The Church may be right in rigidly adhering to a fixed number of sacraments and a regular way of obtaining valid gifts of grace, but the door should not be closed so that a faithful and enthusiastic Christian should not be encouraged to expect grace in all sorts of ways. As a matter of fact, the Roman Catholic Church, in spite of her severely exclusive and mapped-out doctrines, does encourage her children to look for what is practically extra-sacramental grace. Chiefly this is done in her insistence on hearing Mass.

I was taught as a boy (by Anglican clergy) that I must be careful not to think that there was any special grace in attending the Eucharist without communion; that it could only come from actual partaking of the elements. I believe now that this was a mistake. Hearing Mass, or, as our Continental fellow-Christians call it in a most suggestive phrase, "assisting" the priest, does also confer grace in the sense in which I have tried to define it above. It appeals to the imagination. Christ crucified is "placarded" before our eyes. We behold in a magnificent yet simple drama the only perfect approach to God, through a sacrificed body and a poured-out life-blood. Now, this seems to me a most important concession that has been made by Catholics in the matter of



grace, because we cannot say that hearing Mass is strictly part of the original institution of the Eucharist, or, at least, not a grace-conveying part of it. If the Holy Spirit has taught the Church this extra-sacramental source of grace, how do we know that He may not be teaching other ways to those who do not use the ordinary sacraments?

I hope I shall not be misunderstood. I absolutely believe in the sacraments myself. The Holy Communion is to me the great assurance that Christ is a living Master and King. I feel about it what Maurice felt when he said: “If I had not been to communion this morning I should be inclined to say that the devil reigned.” Just at this time, when the Bible is ceasing to be a complete historical bedrock on which to rest, it is the sacraments which embody and keep alive and moving the spiritual realities for which the first disciples and martyrs lived and died. What the spoken words and visible deeds of Jesus were to the disciples, I believe the sacraments are meant to be to us. The Church itself is the arch-sacrament, the visible embodiment of Him in whom dwelt the fulness of the Godhead bodily. The communicant without faith, without the desire for unity, does not discern the Lord’s body. The sacraments might be, if lived out to the full in everyday life, just that visible proof for which, in these days, the world is asking, that Christianity is not played out. It is by trying to make the sacramental life a reality that the Socialist clergy have found an inspiration for their work, and it was no mere form of words which made Stewart Headlam, when founding the first Socialist society in England nearly forty years ago, adopt as its first rule “to make the Eucharist the chief act of Christian worship.” Somewhere underlying this feast of the common bread there must be the principle which in God’s good time will bring into one active, co-operative body all who name the Name of Christ.

JAMES ADDERLEY.

BIRMINGHAM.

# INSTITUTIONALISM AND MYSTICISM.<sup>1</sup>

THE VERY REV. W. R. INGE,

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IT happens sometimes that two opposite tendencies flourish together, deriving strength from a sense of the danger with which each is threatened by the popularity of the other. Where the antagonism is not absolute, each may gain by being compelled to recognise the strong points in the rival position. In a serious controversy the right is seldom or never all on one side; and in the normal course of events both theories undergo some modification through the influence of their opponents, until a compromise, not always logically defensible, brings to an end the acute stage of the controversy. Such a tension of rival movements is very apparent in the religious thought of our day. The quickening of spiritual life in our generation has taken two forms, which appear to be, and to a large extent are, sharply opposed to each other. On the one side, there has been a great revival of mysticism. Mysticism means an immediate communion, real or supposed, between the human soul and the Soul of the World or the Divine Spirit. The hypothesis on which it rests is that there is a real affinity between the individual soul and the great immanent Spirit, who in Christian theology is identified with the Logos-Christ. He was the instrument in creation, and through the Incarnation and the gift of the Holy Spirit, in which the Incarnation is continued, has entered into the most

<sup>1</sup> A lecture delivered at the Memorial Hall, Farringdon Street, 5th March 1914.



intimate relation with the inner life of the believer. This revived belief in the inspiration of the individual has immensely strengthened the position of Christian apologists, who find their old fortifications no longer tenable against the assaults of natural science and historical criticism. It has given to faith a new independence, and has vindicated for the spiritual life the right to stand on its own feet and rest on its own evidence. Spiritual things, we now realise, are spiritually discerned. The enlightened soul can see the invisible, and live its true life in the suprasensible sphere. The primary evidence for the truth of religion is religious experience, which in persons of religious genius—those whom the Church calls saints and prophets—includes a clear perception of an eternal world of truth, beauty, and goodness, surrounding us and penetrating us at every point. It is the unanimous testimony of these favoured spirits that the obstacles in the way of realising this transcendental world are purely subjective, and to a large extent removable by the appropriate training and discipline. Nor is there any serious discrepancy among them either as to the nature of the vision which is the highest reward of human effort, or as to the course of preparation which makes us able to receive it. The Christian mystic must begin with the punctual and conscientious discharge of his duties to society; he must next purify his desires from all worldly and carnal lusts, for only the pure in heart can see God; and he may thus fit himself for “illumination”—the stage in which the glory and beauty of the spiritual life, now clearly discerned, are themselves the motive of action and the incentive to contemplation; while the possibility of a yet more immediate and ineffable vision of the Godhead is not denied, even in this life. There is reason to think that this conception of religion appeals more and more strongly to the younger generation to-day. It brings an intense feeling of relief to many who have been distressed by being told that religion is bound up with certain events in antiquity, the historicity of which it is in some cases difficult to establish;

with a cosmology which has been definitely disproved ; and with a philosophy which they cannot make their own. It allows us what George Meredith calls "the rapture of the forward view." It brings home to us the meaning of the promise made by the Johannine Christ that there are many things as yet hid from humanity which will in the future be revealed by the Spirit of Truth. It encourages us to hope that for each individual who is trying to live the right life the venture of faith will be progressively justified in experience. It breaks down the denominational barriers which divide men and women who worship the Father in spirit and in truth — barriers which become more senseless in each generation, since they no longer correspond even approximately with real differences of belief or of religious temperament. It makes the whole world kin by offering a pure religion which is substantially the same in all climates and in all ages—a religion too divine to be fettered by any man-made formulas, too nobly human to be readily acceptable to men in whom the ape and tiger are still alive, but which finds a congenial home in the purified spirit which is the "throne of the Godhead." Such is the type of faith which is astir among us. It makes no imposing show in Church conferences ; it does not fill our churches and chapels ; it has no organisation, no propaganda ; it is for the most part passively loyal, without much enthusiasm, to the institutions among which it finds itself. But in reality it has overleapt all barriers ; it knows its true spiritual kin ; and amid the strifes and perplexities of a sad and troublous time it can always recover its hope and confidence by ascending in heart and mind to the heaven which is closer to it than breathing, and nearer than hands and feet.

But on the other side we see a tendency, even more manifest if we look for external signs, to emphasise the institutional side of religion, that which prompts men and women to combine in sacred societies, to cherish enthusiastic loyalties for the Church of their early education or of their



later choice, to find their chief satisfaction in acts of corporate worship, and to subordinate their individual tastes and beliefs to the common tradition and discipline of a historical body. It is now about eighty years since this tendency began to manifest itself as a new phenomenon in the Anglican Church. Since then, it has spread to other organisations. It has prompted a new degree of denominational loyalty in several Protestant bodies on the Continent, in America, and in our own country; and it has arrested the decline of the Roman Catholic Church in countries where the outlook seemed least hopeful from the ecclesiastical point of view. Such a movement, so widespread and so powerful in its results, is clearly a thing to be reckoned with by all who desire to estimate rightly the signs of the times. It is a current running in the opposite direction to the mystical tendency, which regards unity as a spiritual, not a political ideal. Fortunately, the theory of institutionalism has lately been defended and expounded by several able writers belonging to different denominations; so that we may hope, by comparing their utterances, to understand the attractions of the theory and its meaning for those who so highly value it.

Aubrey Moore, writing in 1889, connected the Catholic revival with the abandonment of atomism in natural philosophy and of Baconian metaphysics. These were, he thought, the counterpart of individualism in politics and Calvinism in religion. The adherents of mid-Victorian science and philosophy were bewildered by the phenomenon of "men in the nineteenth century actually expressing a belief in a divine society and a supernatural presence in our midst, a brotherhood in which men become members of an organic whole by sharing in a common life, a service of man which is the natural and spontaneous outcome of the service of God."<sup>1</sup> In the view of this learned and acute thinker, Catholicism, or institutionalism, is destined to supplant Protestantism, as the organic theory is destined to displace the atomic.

<sup>1</sup> Moore, *Science and the Faith*, Introduction.

More recently Troeltsch, writing as a Protestant, has emphasised the institutional side of religion in the most uncompromising way. "One of the clearest results of all religious history and religious psychology is that the essence of all religion is not dogma and idea, but cultus and communion, the living intercourse with the Deity—an intercourse of the entire community, having its vital roots in religion and deriving its ultimate power of thus uniting individuals, from its faith in God." "Whatever the future may bring us, we cannot expect a certainty and force of the knowledge of God and of His redemptive power to subsist without communion and cultus. And so long as a Christianity of any kind shall subsist at all, it will be united with a cultus, and with Christ holding a central position in the cultus."<sup>1</sup>

From America, that last refuge of individualism, there has come a pronouncement not less drastic. Professor Royce, the author of the admirable metaphysical treatise entitled *The World and the Individual*, has recently published a double series of Hibbert Lectures on "The Problem of Christianity," in which he affirms the institutionalist theory with a surprising absence of qualification. The whole book is dominated by one idea, advocated with a *naïveté* which would hardly have been possible to a theologian—the idea that churchmanship is the essential part of the Christian religion. "The salvation of the individual man is determined by some sort of membership in a certain spiritual community—a religious community, and in its inmost nature a divine community, in whose life the Christian virtues are to reach their highest expression and the spirit of the Master is to obtain its earthly fulfilment. In other words, there is a certain universal and divine spiritual community. Membership in that community is necessary to the salvation of man. . . . Such a community exists, is needed, and is an indispensable means of salvation for the individual man, and is the fitting realm wherein alone the kingdom of heaven

<sup>1</sup> Troeltsch, *Die Bedeutung der Geschichtlichkeit Jesu für den Glauben*, pp. 25 sq.



which the Master preached can find its expression, and wherein alone the Christian virtues can be effectively preached.”<sup>1</sup> These statements, which in vigour and rigour would satisfy the most extreme curialist in the Society of Jesus, are not a little startling in an American philosopher, who, as far as the present writer knows, does not belong to any “Catholic” Church. The thesis thus enunciated is the argument of the whole book, in which “loyalty to the beloved community” is declared to be the characteristic Christian virtue. It is true that the satisfaction of Professor Royce’s Catholic readers is destined to be damped in the second volume, where he forbids us to look for the ideal divine community in any existing Church, and expresses his conviction that great changes must come over the dogmatic teaching of Christianity. But for our purpose the significant fact is that throughout the book he insists that Christianity is essentially an institutional religion, the most completely institutional of all religions. For Professor Royce, to be a Christian is to be a Churchman.

Our last witness shall be the learned Roman Catholic layman, Baron Friedrich von Hügel, the deepest thinker, perhaps, of all living theologians in this country. “It is now ever increasingly clear to all deep impartial students, that religion has ever primarily expressed and formed itself in cultus, in social organisation, social worship, intercourse between soul and soul and between soul and God; and in symbols and sacraments, in contacts between spirit and matter.” He proceeds to discuss the strength and weakness of institutionalism in a perfectly candid spirit, but with too particular reference to the present conditions within the Roman Church to help us much in our more general survey. He mentions the drawbacks of an official philosophy, prescribed by authority; “only in 1835 did the Congregation of the Index withdraw heliocentric books from its list.” He emphasises the necessity of historical dogmas, but admits that orthodoxy cherishes, along with them, “fact-like historical pictures” which “cannot be

<sup>1</sup> Royce, *The Problem of Christianity*, vol. i. p. 39.

taken as directly, simply factual." He vindicates the orthodoxy of religious toleration, and refuses to consign all non-Catholics to perdition, lamenting the tendency to identify absolutely the visible and invisible Church, which prevails among "some of the (now dominant) Italian and German Jesuit Canonists." Lastly, he boldly recommends the frank abandonment of the Papal claim to exercise temporal power in Italy. This is not so much a critique of institutionalism as the plea of a Liberal Catholic that the logic of institutionalism should not be allowed to override all other considerations. The Baron is, indeed, himself a mystic, though also a strong believer in the necessity of institutional religion.

We have then a considerable body of very competent opinion, that a man cannot be a Christian unless he is a Churchman. To the mystic pure and simple, such a statement seems monstrous. Did not even Augustine say, "I want to know God and my own soul; these two things, and no third whatever"? What intermediary can there be, he will ask, between the soul and God? What sacredness is there in an organisation? Is it not a matter of common experience that the morality of an institution, a society, a state, is inferior to that of the individuals who compose it? And is organised Catholicism an exception to this rule? And yet we must admit the glamour of the idea of a divine society. It arouses that *esprit de corps* which is the strongest appeal that can be made to some noble minds. It calls for self-sacrifice and devoted labour in a cause which is higher than private interest. It demands discipline and co-operation, through which alone great things can be done on the field of history. It holds out a prospect of really influencing the course of events. And if there has been a historical Incarnation, it follows that God has actually intervened on the stage of history, and that it is His will to carry out some great and divine purpose in and by means of the course of history. With this object, as the Catholic believes, He established an institutional Church, pledged to the highest of all causes; and



what greater privilege can there be than to take part in this work, as a soldier in the army of God in His long campaign against the spiritual powers of evil? The Christian institutionalist is the servant of a grand idea.

There are, however, a few questions which we are bound to ask him. First, Is his idea of the Church Christian? Did the Founder of Christianity contemplate or even implicitly sanction the establishment of a semi-political international society, such as the Catholic Church has actually been? Orthodox Catholicism maintains that He did. Modernism admits that He did not, but adds that if He had known that the Messianic expectation was illusory, and that the existing world-order was to continue for thousands of years, He would certainly have wished that a Catholic Church should exist. And, argues the Modernist, if it is a good thing that a Catholic Church should exist, it is useless to quarrel with the conditions under which alone it can maintain its existence. The philosophical historian must admit that all the changes which the Catholic Church has undergone—its concessions to Pagan superstition, its secular power, its ruthless extirpation of rebels against its authority, its steadily growing centralisation and autocracy—were forced upon it in the struggle for existence. Those who wish that Church history had been different are wishing the impossible, or wishing that the Church had perished. But this argument is not valid as a defence of a divine institution. It is rather a merciless exposure of what happens, and must happen, to a great idea when it is enslaved by an institution of its own creation. The political organisation which has grown up round the idea ends by strangling it, and continues to fight for its own preservation by the methods which govern the policy of all other political organisations—force, fraud, and accommodation. There is nothing in the political history of Catholicism which suggests in the slightest degree that the spirit of Christ has been the guiding principle in its councils. Its methods have, on the contrary, been more cruel, more fraudulent, more unscrupulous,

than those of most secular powers. If the Founder of Christianity had appeared again on earth during the so-called ages of faith, it is hardly possible to doubt that He would have been burnt alive or crucified again. What the Latin Church preserved was not the religion of Christ, which lived on by its inherent indestructibility, but parts of the Aristotelian and Platonic philosophies, distorted and petrified by Scholasticism, a vast quantity of purely Pagan superstitions, and the *arcana imperii* of Roman Cæsarism. The normal end of Scholasticism is a mummified philosophy of authority, in which there are no problems to solve, but a great many dead pundits to consult. The normal end of a policy which exploits the superstitions of the peasant is a desperate warfare against education. The normal end of Roman Imperialism is a sultanate like that of Diocletian. It is difficult to find a proof of infallible and supernatural wisdom in the evolution of which these are the last terms. We read with the utmost sympathy and admiration Baron von Hügel's loyal and reverent appeals to the authorities of his Church, that they may draw out the strong and beneficent powers of institutionalism, and avoid its insidious dangers. But it may be doubted whether such a policy is possible. The future of Roman Catholicism is, I fear, with the Ultramontanes. They, and not the Modernists, are in the line of development which Catholicism as an institution has consistently followed, and must continue to follow to the end. I can see no other fate in store for the *soma* of Catholicism; the germ-cells of true Christianity live their own life within it, and are transmitted without taint to those who are born of the Spirit.

We must further ask the institutionalist what are his grounds for identifying the Church of God with the particular institution to which he belongs. On the institutionalist hypothesis, it might have been expected either that there would have been no divisions in Christendom, or that all seceding bodies would have shown such manifest inferiority in wisdom, morality, and sanctity, that the exclusive claims



of the Great Church would have been ratified at the bar of history. This is, in fact, the claim which Roman Catholics make. But it can only be upheld by writing history in the spirit of an advocate, or by giving a preference, not in accordance with modern ethical views, to certain types of character which are produced by the monastic life of the Catholic "religious." It is increasingly difficult to find, in the lives of those who belong to any one denomination, proofs of marked superiority over other Christians. Of course, we know little of the real character of our neighbours as they appear in the eyes of God; but in considering a theory which lays so much stress on history as Catholic institutionalism does, we are bound to make use of such evidence as we have. And the evidence does not support the theory that we cannot be Christians unless we are Catholics. Nor does it even countenance the view that we cannot be Christians unless we are enthusiastic members of *some* religious corporation. Professor Royce seems to have been carried away by the idea which prompted him to write his book; but a little thought about the characters of his acquaintances might have given him pause.

The mechanical theory of devolution which assumes so much importance in some fashionable Anglican teaching about the Church need not detain us long. The logical choice must ultimately be between the great international Catholic Church and what Auguste Sabatier called the religion of the Spirit. The religion of all Protestants, when it is not secularised, as it too often is, belongs to this latter type, even when they lay most stress on the idea of brotherhood and corporate action. For with them institutions are never much more than associations for mutual help and edification. The Protestant always hopes to be saved *qua* Christian, not *qua* Churchman.

A third question which must be asked is whether institutionalism in practice makes for unity among Christians, or for division. Too often the chief visible sign of the "corporate idea" of which so much is said, is the rigidity of the spikes

which it erects round its own particular fold. The obstacles to acts of reunion (which in no way carry with them the necessity of formal amalgamation) are raised almost exclusively by stiff institutionalists. The much-discussed Kikuyu case has brought this home to everybody. But for these uncompromising Churchmen, Christians of all denominations would be glad enough to meet together at the Lord's table on special occasions like the service which gave rise to this controversy. Anglicans are well aware that the differences of opinion within their body are far greater than those which separate some of them from Protestant Nonconformity, and others of them from Rome. Allegiance to this or that denomination is generally an accident of early surroundings. To make these external classifications into barriers which cannot be crossed is either an absurdity or a confession that a Church is a political aggregate. A Roman Monsignor explained, *à propos* of the Kikuyu service, that no Roman Catholic could ever communicate in a Protestant church, because in so doing he would be guilty of an act of apostasy, and would be no longer a Roman Catholic. This attitude is consistent with the Roman claim to universal jurisdiction; for any other body it would be absurd. The stiff institutionalist is debarred by his theory from fraternising with many who should be his friends, while he is bound to others with whom he has no sympathy. His theory is once more found to conflict with the facts.

Lastly, we must ask whether institutionalism is really a spiritual and moral force. Of the advantages of *esprit de corps* I have spoken already. No one can doubt that unity is strength, or that Catholicism has an immense advantage over its rivals in the efficiency of its organisation. But is not this advantage dearly purchased? Party loyalty is notoriously unscrupulous. The idealised institution becomes itself the object of worship, and it is entirely forgotten that a Christian Church ought to have no "interests" except the highest welfare of humanity. The substitution of military for civil ethics has worked disastrously on the conduct of Churchmen.



Theoretically it is admitted by Roman casuists that an immoral order ought not to be obeyed ; but it is not for a layman to pronounce immoral any order received from a priest ; if the order is really immoral, "obedience" exonerates him who executes it ; in all other cases disobedience is a deadly sin. The result of this submission of private judgment is that the voice of conscience is often stifled, and unscrupulous policies are carried through by Churchmen, which secular public opinion would have condemned decisively and rejected. The persecution of Dreyfus is a recent and strong instance. If all France had been Catholic, the victim of this shocking injustice would certainly have died in prison. It is extremely doubtful whether the presence of a highly organised Church is conducive to moral and social reform in a country. The temptation to play a political game seems to be always too strong. In Ireland, the priesthood has probably helped to maintain a comparatively high standard of sexual morality, but it cannot be said that the Irish Catholic population is in other respects a model of civilisation and good citizenship. In education especially the influence of ecclesiasticism has been almost uniformly pernicious, so that it seems impossible for any country where the children are left under priestly influence to rise above a certain rather low level of civilisation.

The strongest claim of institutionalism to our respect is probably the beneficial restraint which it exercises upon many persons who need moral and intellectual guidance. It is the fashion to disparage the scholastic theology, and it has certainly suffered by being congealed, like everything else that Rome touches, into a hard system ; but it is immeasurably superior to the theosophies and fancy religions which run riot in the superficially cultivated classes of Protestant countries. The undisciplined mystic, in his reliance on the inner light, may fall into various kinds of *Schwärmerei* and superstition. In some cases he may even lose his sanity for want of a wise restraining influence. It is not an accident that America, where institutionalism is weakest, is the happy hunting-ground

of religious quacks and cranks. But also an institution has the power of setting everyone to work for it. In unorganised Christianity a great deal of spiritual energy runs to waste, which a great Church would know how to utilise. Lastly, we must not undervalue the steadying influence of ancient and consecrated tradition, which is kept up mainly by ecclesiastical institutions. These probably prevent many rash experiments from being tried, especially in the field of morals. Even writers like Dr Frazer insist on the immense services which consecrated tradition still renders to humanity. These claims may be admitted; but they come very far short of the glorification of institutionalism which we found in the authors quoted a few pages back.

The institutionalist, however, may reply that he by no means admits the validity of Sabatier's antithesis between religions of authority and the religion of the Spirit. His own religion, he believes, is quite as spiritual as that of the Protestant individualist. He may quote the fine saying of a medieval mystic that he who can see the inward in the outward is more spiritual than he who can only see the inward in the inward. We may, indeed, be thankful that we have not to choose between two mutually exclusive types of religion. The Quaker, whom we may take as the type of anti-institutional mysticism, has a brotherhood to which he is proud to belong, and for which he feels loyalty and affection. And Catholicism has been rich in contemplative saints who have lived in the light of the Divine presence. The question raised in this paper is rather of the relative importance of these two elements in the religious life, than of choosing one and rejecting the other. I will conclude by saying that our preference of one of these types to the other will be largely determined by our attitude towards history. I am glad to see that Professor Bosanquet, in his fine Gifford Lectures, has the courage to expose the limitations of the "historical method," now so popular. He protests against Professor Ward's dictum that "the actual is wholly historical," as a view little better



than naïve realism. History, he says, is a hybrid form of experience, incapable of any considerable degree of being or trueness. It is a fragmentary diorama of finite life-processes seen from the outside, and very imperfectly known. It consists largely of assigning parts in some great world-experience to particular actors—a highly speculative enterprise. To set these contingent and dubious constructions above the operations of pure thought and pure insight is indeed a return to the philosophy of the man in the street. “Social morality, art, philosophy, and religion take us far beyond the spatio-temporal externality of history; these are concrete and necessary living worlds, and in them the finite mind begins to experience something of what individuality must ultimately mean.” Our inquiry has thus led us to the threshold of one of the fundamental problems of philosophy—the value and reality of time. For the institutionalist happenings in time have a meaning and importance far greater than the mystic is willing to allow to them. Like most other great philosophical problems, this question is largely one of temperament. Christianity has found room for both types. I have only argued that the aberrations or exaggerations of institutionalism have been, and are, more dangerous, and further removed from the spirit of Christianity, than those of mysticism.

W. R. INGE.

## MYSTICISM AND LOGIC.

THE HON. BERTRAND RUSSELL.

METAPHYSICS, or the attempt to conceive the world as a whole by means of thought, has been developed from the first by the union and conflict of two very different human impulses, the one urging men towards mysticism, the other urging them towards science. Some men have achieved greatness through one of these impulses alone, others through the other alone: in Hume, for example, the scientific impulse reigns quite unchecked, while in Blake a strong hostility to science co-exists with profound mystic insight. But the greatest men who have been philosophers have felt the need both of science and of mysticism; the attempt to harmonise the two was what made their life, and what must always, for all its arduous uncertainty, make philosophy, to some minds, a greater thing than either science or religion.

Before attempting an explicit characterisation of the scientific and the mystical impulses, I will illustrate them by examples from two philosophers whose greatness lies in the very intimate blending which they achieved. The two philosophers I mean are Heraclitus and Plato.

Heraclitus, as everyone knows, was a believer in universal flux: time builds and destroys all things. From the few fragments that remain, it is not easy to discover how he arrived at his opinions, but there are some sayings that strongly suggest scientific observation as the source.

“The things that can be seen, heard, and learned,” he says,



"are what I prize the most." This is the language of the empiricist, to whom observation is the sole guarantee of truth. "The sun is new every day," is another fragment; and this opinion, in spite of its paradoxical character, is obviously inspired by scientific reflection, and no doubt seemed to him to obviate the difficulty of understanding how the sun can work its way underground from west to east during the night. Actual observation must also have suggested to him his central doctrine, that Fire is the one permanent substance, of which all visible things are passing phases. In combustion we see things change utterly, while their flame and heat rise up into the air and vanish.

"This world, which is the same for all," he says, "no one of gods or men has made; but it was ever, is now, and ever shall be, an ever-living Fire, with measures kindling, and measures going out."

"The transformations of Fire are, first of all, sea; and half of the sea is earth, half whirlwind."

This theory, though no longer one which science can accept, is nevertheless scientific in spirit. Science, too, might have inspired the famous saying to which Plato alludes: "You cannot step twice into the same rivers; for fresh waters are ever flowing in upon you." But we find also another statement among the extant fragments:

"We step and do not step into the same rivers; we are and are not."

The comparison of this statement, which is mystical, with the one quoted by Plato, which is scientific, shows how intimately the two tendencies are blended in the system of Heraclitus. Mysticism is, in essence, little more than a certain intensity and depth of feeling in regard to what is believed about the universe; and this kind of feeling leads Heraclitus, on the basis of his science, to strangely poignant sayings concerning life and the world, such as:

"Time is a child playing draughts, the kingly power is a child's."

It is poetic imagination, not science, which presents Time as despotic lord of the world, with all the irresponsible frivolity of a child. It is mysticism, too, which leads Heraclitus to assert the identity of opposites: "Good and ill are one," he says; and again: "To God all things are fair and good and right, but men hold some things wrong and some right."

Much of mysticism underlies the ethics of Heraclitus. It is true that a scientific determinism alone might have inspired the statement, "Man's character is his fate"; but only a mystic would have said:

"Every beast is driven to the pasture with blows"; and again:

"It is hard to fight with one's heart's desire. Whatever it wishes to get, it purchases at the cost of the soul"; and again:

"Wisdom is one thing. It is to know the thought by which all things are steered through all things."<sup>1</sup>

Examples might be multiplied, but those that have been given are enough to show the character of the man: the facts of science, as they appeared to him, fed the flame of his soul, and in its light he saw into the depth of the world by the reflection of his own dancing swiftly-penetrating fire. In such a nature we see the true union of the mystic and the man of science—the highest eminence, as I think, that it is possible to achieve in the world of thought.

In Plato, the same twofold impulse exists, though the mystic impulse is distinctly the stronger of the two, and secures ultimate victory whenever the conflict is sharp. His description of the cave<sup>2</sup> is the classical statement of belief in a knowledge and reality truer and more real than that of the senses. But in this passage, as throughout most of Plato's teaching, there is an identification of the good with the truly real, which became embodied in the philosophical tradition,

<sup>1</sup> All the above quotations are from Burnet's *Early Greek Philosophers* (2nd ed., 1908), pp. 146-156.

<sup>2</sup> *Republic*, 517.



and is still largely operative in our own day. In thus allowing a legislative function to the good, Plato produced a divorce between philosophy and science, from which, in my opinion, both have suffered ever since and are still suffering. The man of science, whatever his hopes may be, must lay them aside while he studies nature; and the philosopher, if he is to achieve truth, must do the same. Ethical considerations can only legitimately appear when the truth has been ascertained; they can and should appear as determining our feeling towards the truth, and our manner of ordering our lives in view of the truth, but not as themselves dictating what the truth is to be.

There are passages in Plato—among those which illustrate the scientific side of his mind—where he seems clearly aware of this. The most noteworthy is the one in which Socrates, as a young man, is explaining the theory of ideas to Parmenides.<sup>1</sup> After Socrates has explained that there is an idea of the good, but not of such things as hair and mud and dirt, Parmenides advises him “not to despise even the meanest things,” and this advice shows the genuine scientific temper. It is with this impartial temper that the mystic’s apparent insight into a higher reality and a hidden good has to be combined if philosophy is to realise its greatest possibilities. And it is failure in this respect that has made so much of idealistic philosophy thin, lifeless, and insubstantial. It is only in marriage with the world that our ideals can bear fruit; divorced from it, they remain barren. But marriage with the world is not to be achieved by an ideal which shrinks from fact, or demands in advance that the world shall conform to its desires.

Parmenides himself is the source of a peculiarly interesting strain of mysticism which pervades Plato’s thought—the mysticism which may be called “logical” because it is embodied in theories on logic. This form of mysticism, which appears, so far as the West is concerned, to have originated with Parmenides, dominates the reasonings of all

<sup>1</sup> *Parmenides*, 130.

the great mystical metaphysicians from his day to that of Hegel and his modern disciples. Reality, he says, is uncreated, indestructible, unchanging, indivisible; it is "immovable in the bonds of mighty chains, without beginning and without end; since coming into being and passing away have been driven afar, and true belief has cast them away." The fundamental principle of his inquiry is stated in a sentence which would not be out of place in Hegel: "Thou canst not know what is not—that is impossible—nor utter it; for it is the same thing that can be thought and that can be." And again: "It needs must be that what can be thought and spoken of is; for it is possible for it to be, and it is not possible for what is nothing to be." The impossibility of change follows from this principle; for what is past can be spoken of, and therefore, by the principle, still is.

Mystical philosophy, in all ages and in all parts of the world, is characterised by certain beliefs which are illustrated by the doctrines we have been considering.

There is, first, the belief in insight as against discursive analytic knowledge; the belief in a way of wisdom, sudden, penetrating, coercive, which is contrasted with the slow and fallible study of outward appearance by a science relying wholly upon the senses. All who are capable of absorption in an inward passion must have experienced at times the strange feeling of unreality in common objects, the loss of contact with daily things, in which the solidity of the outer world is lost, and the soul seems, in utter loneliness, to bring forth, out of its own depths, the mad dance of fantastic phantoms which have hitherto appeared as independently real and living. This is the negative side of the mystic's initiation: the doubt concerning common knowledge, preparing the way for the reception of what seems a higher wisdom. Many men to whom this negative experience is familiar do not pass beyond it, but for the mystic it is merely the gateway to an ampler world.

The mystic insight begins with the sense of a mystery



unveiled, of a hidden wisdom now suddenly become certain beyond the possibility of a doubt. The sense of certainty and revelation comes earlier than any definite belief. The definite beliefs at which mystics arrive are the result of reflection upon the inarticulate experience gained in the moment of insight. Often beliefs which have no real connection with this moment become subsequently attracted into the central nucleus ; thus, in addition to the convictions which all mystics share, we find, in many of them, other convictions of a more local and temporary character, which no doubt become amalgamated with what was essentially mystical in virtue of their equal subjective certainty. We may ignore such inessential accretions, and confine ourselves to the beliefs which all mystics share.

The first and most direct outcome of the moment of illumination is belief in the possibility of a way of knowledge which may be called revelation or insight or intuition, as contrasted with sense, reason, and analysis, which are regarded as blind guides leading to the morass of illusion. Closely connected with this belief is the conception of a Reality behind the world of appearance, and utterly different from it. This Reality is regarded with an admiration often amounting to worship ; it is felt to be always and everywhere close at hand, thinly veiled by the shows of sense, ready for the receptive mind to shine in its glory, even through the apparent folly and wickedness of Man. The poet, the artist, and the lover are seekers after that glory ; the haunting beauty that they pursue is the faint reflection of its sun. But the mystic lives in the full light of the vision ; what others dimly seek he knows, with a knowledge beside which all other knowledge is ignorance.

The second characteristic of mysticism is its belief in unity, and its refusal to admit opposition or division anywhere. We found Heraclitus saying, " Good and ill are one " ; and again he says, " The way up and the way down is one and the same." The same attitude appears in the simultaneous assertion of contradictory propositions, such as : " We step and do not

step into the same rivers ; we are and are not." The assertion of Parmenides, that reality is one and indivisible, comes from the same impulse towards unity. In Plato this impulse is less prominent, being held in check by his theory of ideas ; but it reappears, so far as his logic permits, in the doctrine of the primacy of the Good.

A third mark of almost all mystical metaphysics is the denial of the reality of Time. This is an outcome of the denial of division : if all is one, the distinction of past and future must be illusory. We have seen this doctrine prominent in Parmenides ; and among moderns it is fundamental in the systems of Spinoza and Hegel.

The last of the doctrines of mysticism which we have to consider is its belief that all evil is mere appearance, an illusion produced by the divisions and oppositions of the analytic intellect. Mysticism does not maintain that such things as cruelty, for example, are good, but it denies that they are real : they belong to that lower world of phantoms from which we are to be liberated by the insight of the vision. Sometimes—for example in Hegel, and at least verbally in Spinoza—not only evil, but good also, is regarded as illusory, though nevertheless the emotional attitude towards what is held to be Reality is such as would naturally be associated with the belief that Reality is good. What is in all cases ethically characteristic of mysticism is absence of indignation or protest, acceptance with joy, disbelief in the ultimate truth of the division into two hostile camps, the good and the bad. This attitude is a direct outcome of the nature of the mystical experience : with its sense of unity is associated a feeling of infinite peace. Indeed, it may be suspected that the feeling of peace produces, as feelings do in dreams, the whole system of associated beliefs which make up the body of mystic doctrine. But this is a difficult question, and one on which it cannot be hoped that mankind will reach agreement.

Four questions thus arise in considering the truth or falsehood of mysticism, namely :



I. Are there two ways of knowing, which may be called respectively reason and intuition? And if so, is either to be preferred to the other?

II. Is all plurality and division illusory?

III. Is time unreal?

IV. What kind of reality belongs to good and evil?

On all four of these questions, while fully developed mysticism seems to me mistaken, I yet believe that, by sufficient restraint, there is an element of wisdom to be learned from the mystical way of feeling, which does not seem to be attainable in any other manner. If this is the truth, mysticism is to be commended as an attitude towards life, not as a creed about the world. The metaphysical creed, I shall maintain, is a mistaken outcome of the emotion, although this emotion, as colouring and informing all other thoughts and feelings, is the inspirer of whatever is best in Man. Even the cautious and patient investigation of truth by science, which seems the very antithesis of the mystic's swift certainty, may be fostered and nourished by that very spirit of reverence in which mysticism lives and moves.

# I. REASON AND INTUITION.<sup>1</sup>

Of the reality or unreality of the mystic's world I know nothing. I have no wish to deny it, nor even to declare that the insight which reveals it is not a genuine insight. What I do wish to maintain—and it is here that the scientific attitude becomes imperative—is that insight, untested and unsupported, is an insufficient guarantee of truth, in spite of the fact that much of the most important truth is first suggested by its means. It is common to speak of an opposition between instinct and reason; in the eighteenth century the opposition was drawn in favour of reason, but under the influence of Rousseau and the romantic movement instinct was given the

<sup>1</sup> This section, and also one or two pages in later sections, are from a course of Lowell lectures "On Scientific Method in Philosophy," shortly to be published by the Open Court Publishing Company.

preference, first by those who rebelled against artificial forms of government and thought, and then, as the purely rationalistic defence of traditional theology became increasingly difficult, by all who felt in science a menace to creeds which they associated with a spiritual outlook on life and the world. Bergson, under the name of "intuition," has raised instinct to the position of sole arbiter of metaphysical truth. But in fact the opposition of instinct and reason is mainly illusory. Instinct, intuition, or insight is what first leads to the beliefs which subsequent reason confirms or confutes; but the confirmation, where it is possible, consists, in the last analysis, of agreement with other beliefs no less instinctive. Reason is a harmonising, controlling force rather than a creative one. Even in the most purely logical realms it is insight that first arrives at what is new.

Where instinct and reason do sometimes conflict is in regard to single beliefs, held instinctively, and held with such determination that no degree of inconsistency with other beliefs leads to their abandonment. Instinct, like all human faculties, is liable to error. Those in whom reason is weak are often unwilling to admit this as regards themselves, though all admit it in regard to others. Where instinct is least liable to error is in practical matters as to which right judgment is a help to survival: friendship and hostility in others, for instance, are often felt with extraordinary discrimination through very careful disguises. But even in such matters a wrong impression may be given by reserve or flattery; and in matters less directly practical, such as philosophy deals with, very strong instinctive beliefs are sometimes wholly mistaken, as we may come to know through their perceived inconsistency with other equally strong beliefs. It is such considerations that necessitate the harmonising mediation of reason, which tests our beliefs by their mutual compatibility, and examines, in doubtful cases, the possible sources of error on the one side and on the other. In this there is no opposition to instinct as a whole, but only to blind reliance upon some one interesting



aspect of instinct to the exclusion of other more commonplace but not less trustworthy aspects. It is such one-sidedness, not instinct itself, that reason aims at correcting.

These more or less trite maxims may be illustrated by application to Bergson's advocacy of "intuition" as against "intellect." There are, he says, "two profoundly different ways of knowing a thing. The first implies that we move round the object, the second that we enter into it. The first depends on the point of view at which we are placed and on the symbols by which we express ourselves. The second neither depends on a point of view nor relies on any symbol. The first kind of knowledge may be said to stop at the *relative*; the second, in those cases where it is possible, to attain the *absolute*."<sup>1</sup> The second of these, which is intuition, is, he says, "the kind of intellectual sympathy by which one places oneself within an object in order to coincide with what is unique in it and therefore inexpressible" (p. 6). In illustration, he mentions self-knowledge: "there is one reality, at least, which we all seize from within, by intuition and not by simple analysis. It is our own personality in its flowing through time—our self which endures" (p. 8). The rest of Bergson's philosophy consists in reporting, through the imperfect medium of words, the knowledge gained by intuition, and the consequent complete condemnation of all the pretended knowledge derived from science and common sense.

This procedure, since it takes sides in a conflict of instinctive beliefs, stands in need of justification by proving the greater trustworthiness of the beliefs on one side than of those on the other. Bergson attempts this justification in two ways: first, by explaining that intellect is a purely practical faculty designed to secure biological success; secondly, by mentioning remarkable feats of instinct in animals, and by pointing out characteristics of the world which, though intuition can apprehend them, are baffling to intellect as he interprets it.

Of Bergson's theory that intellect is a purely practical

<sup>1</sup> *Introduction to Metaphysics*, p. 1.

faculty, developed in the struggle for survival, and not a source of true beliefs, we may say, first, that it is only through intellect that we know of the struggle for survival and of the biological ancestry of man: if the intellect is misleading, the whole of this merely inferred history is presumably untrue. If, on the other hand, we agree with him in thinking that evolution took place as Darwin believed, then it is not only intellect, but all our faculties, that have been developed under the stress of practical utility. Intuition is seen at its best where it is directly useful—for example, in regard to other people's characters and dispositions. Bergson apparently holds that capacity for this kind of knowledge is less explicable by the struggle for existence than, for example, capacity for pure mathematics. Yet the savage deceived by false friendship is likely to pay for his mistake with his life; whereas even in the most civilised societies men are not put to death for mathematical incompetence. All the most striking of his instances of intuition in animals have a very direct survival value. The fact is, of course, that both intuition and intellect have been developed because they are useful, and that, speaking broadly, they are useful when they give truth, and become harmful when they give falsehood. Intellect, in civilised man, like artistic capacity, has occasionally been developed beyond the point where it is useful to the individual; intuition, on the other hand, seems on the whole to diminish as civilisation increases. It is greater, as a rule, in children than in adults, in the uneducated than in the educated. Probably in dogs it exceeds anything to be found in human beings. But those who see in these facts a recommendation of intuition ought to return to running wild in the woods, dyeing themselves with woad and living on hips and haws.

Let us next examine whether intuition possesses any such infallibility as Bergson claims for it. The best instance of it, according to him, is our acquaintance with ourselves; yet self-knowledge is proverbially rare and difficult. Most men, for example, have in their nature meannesses, vanities, and



envies, of which they are quite unconscious, though even their best friends can perceive them without any difficulty. It is true that intuition has a convincingness which is lacking to intellect: while it is present, it is almost impossible to doubt its truth. But if it should appear, on examination, to be at least as fallible as intellect, its greater subjective certainty becomes a demerit, making it only the more irresistibly deceptive. Apart from self-knowledge, one of the most notable examples of intuition is the knowledge people believe themselves to possess of those with whom they are in love: the wall between different personalities seems to become transparent, and people think they see into another soul as into their own. Yet deception in such cases is constantly practised with success; and even where there is no intentional deception, experience gradually proves, as a rule, that the supposed insight was illusory, and that the slower, more groping methods of the intellect are in the long run more reliable.

Bergson maintains that intellect can only deal with things in so far as they resemble what has been experienced in the past, while intuition has the power of apprehending the uniqueness and novelty that always belong to each fresh moment. That there is something unique and new at every moment is certainly true; it is also true that this cannot be fully expressed by means of intellectual concepts. Only direct acquaintance can give knowledge of what is unique and new. But direct acquaintance of this kind is given fully in sensation, and does not require, so far as I can see, any special faculty of intuition for its apprehension. It is neither intellect nor intuition, but sensation, that supplies new data; but when the data are new in any remarkable manner, intellect is much more capable of dealing with them than intuition would be. The hen with a brood of ducklings no doubt has intuitions which seem to place her inside them, and not merely to know them analytically; but when the ducklings take to the water, the whole apparent intuition is seen to be

illusory, and the hen is left helpless on the shore. Intuition, in fact, is an aspect and development of instinct, and, like all instinct, is admirable in those customary surroundings which have moulded the habits of the animal in question, but totally incompetent as soon as the surroundings are changed in a way which demands some non-habitual mode of action.

The theoretical understanding of the world, which is the aim of philosophy, is not a matter of great practical importance to animals, or to savages, or even to most civilised men. It is hardly to be supposed, therefore, that the rapid, rough-and-ready methods of instinct or intuition will find in this field a favourable ground for their application. It is the older kinds of activity, which bring out our kinship with remote generations of animal and semi-human ancestors, that show intuition at its best. In such matters as self-preservation and love, intuition will act sometimes (though not always) with a swiftness and precision which are astonishing to the critical intellect. But philosophy is not one of the pursuits which illustrate our affinity with the past: it is a highly refined, highly civilised pursuit, demanding for its success a certain liberation from the life of instinct, and even at times a certain aloofness from all mundane hopes and fears. It is not in philosophy, therefore, that we can hope to see intuition at its best. On the contrary, since the true objects of philosophy, and the habits of thought demanded for their apprehension, are strange, unusual, and remote, it is here, more almost than anywhere else, that intellect proves superior to intuition, and that quick unanalysed convictions are least deserving of uncritical acceptance.

## II. UNITY AND PLURALITY.

One of the most convincing aspects of the mystic illumination is the apparent revelation of the oneness of all things, giving rise to pantheism in religion and to monism in philosophy. An elaborate logic, beginning with Parmenides and culminating in Hegel and his followers, has been gradually



developed to prove that the universe is one indivisible Whole, and that what seem to be its parts, if considered as substantial and self-existing, are mere illusion. The conception of a Reality quite other than the world of appearance, a reality one, indivisible, and unchanging, was introduced into Western philosophy by Parmenides, not, nominally at least, for mystical or religious reasons, but on the basis of a logical argument as to the impossibility of not-being, and most subsequent metaphysical systems are the outcome of this fundamental idea.

The logic used in defence of mysticism seems to me faulty as logic, and open to technical criticisms which I have explained elsewhere. I shall not here repeat these criticisms, since they are lengthy and difficult, but shall instead attempt an analysis of the state of mind from which mystical logic has arisen.

Belief in a reality quite different from what appears to the senses arises with irresistible force in certain moods, which are the source of most mysticism and of most metaphysics. While such a mood is dominant, the need of logic is not felt, and, accordingly, the more thoroughgoing mystics do not employ logic, but appeal directly to the immediate deliverance of their insight. But such fully developed mysticism is rare in the West. When the intensity of emotional conviction subsides, a man who is in the habit of reasoning will search for logical grounds in favour of the belief which he finds in himself. But since the belief already exists, he will be very hospitable to any ground that suggests itself. The paradoxes apparently proved by his logic are really the paradoxes of mysticism, and are the goal which he feels his logic must reach if it is to be in accordance with insight. The resulting logic has rendered most philosophers incapable of giving any account of the world of science and daily life. If they had been anxious to give such an account, they would probably have discovered the errors of their logic; but most of them were less anxious to understand the world of science and daily life than to convict it of unreality in the interests of a super-sensible "real" world.

It is in this way that logic has been pursued by those of the great philosophers who were mystics. But since they usually took for granted the supposed insight of the mystic emotion, their logical doctrines were presented with a certain dryness, and were believed by their disciples to be quite independent of the sudden illumination from which they sprang. Nevertheless, their origin clung to them, and they remained—to borrow a useful word from Mr Santayana—“malicious” in regard to the world of science and common sense. It is only so that we can account for the complacency with which philosophers have accepted the inconsistency of their doctrines with all the common and scientific facts which seem best established and most worthy of belief.

The logic of mysticism shows, as is natural, the defects which are inherent in anything malicious. The impulse to logic, not felt while the mystic mood is dominant, reasserts itself as the mood fades, but with a desire to retain the vanishing insight, or at least to prove that it *was* insight, and that what seems to contradict it is illusion. The logic which thus arises is not quite disinterested or candid, and is inspired by a certain hatred of the daily world to which it is to be applied. Such an attitude naturally does not tend to the best results. Everyone knows that to read an author simply in order to refute him is not the way to understand him; and to read the book of Nature with a conviction that it is all illusion is just as unlikely to lead to understanding. If our logic is to find the common world intelligible, it must not be hostile, but must be inspired by a genuine acceptance such as is not usually to be found among metaphysicians.

### III. TIME.

The unreality of time is a cardinal doctrine of many metaphysical systems, often nominally based, as already by Parmenides, upon logical arguments, but originally derived, at any rate in the founders of new systems, from the certainty which is born in the moment of mystic insight.



It is difficult to disentangle the truth and the error in this view. The arguments for the contention that time is unreal and that the world of sense is illusory must, I think, be regarded as fallacious. Nevertheless, there is some sense—easier to feel than to state—in which time is an unimportant and superficial characteristic of reality. Past and future must be acknowledged to be as real as the present, and a certain emancipation from slavery to time is essential to philosophic thought. The importance of time is rather practical than theoretical, rather in relation to our desires than in relation to truth. A truer image of the world, I think, is obtained by picturing things as entering into the stream of time from an eternal world outside, than from a view which regards time as the devouring tyrant of all that is. Both in thought and in feeling, even though time be real, to realise the unimportance of time is the gate of wisdom.

That this is the case may be seen at once by asking ourselves why our feelings towards the past are so different from our feelings towards the future. The reason of this difference is wholly practical: our wishes can affect the future but not the past—the future is to some extent subject to our power, while the past is unalterably fixed. But every future will some day be past; if we see the past truly now, it must, when it was still future, have been just what we now see it to be, and what is now future must be just what we shall see it to be when it has become past. The felt difference of quality between past and future, therefore, is not an intrinsic difference, but only a difference in relation to us: to impartial contemplation it ceases to exist. And impartiality of contemplation is, in the intellectual sphere, that very same virtue of disinterestedness which, in the sphere of action, appears as justice and unselfishness. Whoever wishes to see the world truly, to rise in thought above the tyranny of practical desires, must learn to overcome the difference of attitude towards past and future, and to survey the whole stream of the time in one comprehensive vision.

The kind of way in which, as it seems to me, time ought not to enter into our theoretic philosophical thought may be illustrated by the philosophy which has become associated with the idea of evolution, and which is exemplified by Nietzsche, pragmatism, and Bergson. This philosophy, on the basis of the development which had led from the lowest forms of life up to man, sees in *progress* the fundamental law of the universe, and thus admits the difference between *earlier* and *later* into the very citadel of its contemplative outlook. With its past and future history of the world, conjectural as it is, I do not wish to quarrel. But I think that, in the intoxication of a quick success, much that is required for a true understanding of the universe has been forgotten. Something of Hellenism, something, too, of Oriental resignation, must be combined with its hurrying Western self-assertion before it can emerge from the ardour of youth into the mature wisdom of manhood. In spite of its appeals to science, the true scientific philosophy, I think, is something more arduous and more aloof, appealing to less mundane hopes, and requiring a severer discipline for its successful practice.

Darwin's *Origin of Species* persuaded the world that the difference between different species of animals and plants is not the fixed immutable difference that it appears to be. The doctrine of natural kinds, which had rendered classification easy and definite, which was enshrined in the Aristotelian tradition, and protected by its supposed necessity for orthodox dogma, was suddenly swept away for ever out of the biological world. The difference between man and the lower animals, which to our human conceit appears enormous, was shown to be a gradual achievement, involving intermediate beings who could not with certainty be placed either within or without the human family. But if human conceit was staggered for a moment by its kinship with the ape, it soon found a way to reassert itself, and that way is the "philosophy" of evolution. A process which led from the amoeba to man appeared to the philosophers to be obviously a progress—though whether the



amœba would agree with this opinion is not known. Hence the cycle of changes which science had shown to be the probable history of the past was welcomed as revealing a law of development towards good in the universe—an evolution or unfolding of an ideal slowly embodying itself in the actual. But such a view, though it might satisfy Spencer and those whom we may call Hegelian evolutionists, could not be accepted as adequate by the more whole-hearted votaries of change. An ideal to which the world continuously approaches is, to these minds, too dead and static to be inspiring. Not only the aspiration, but the ideal, too, must change and develop with the course of evolution: there must be no fixed goal, but a continual fashioning of fresh needs by the impulse which is life, and which alone gives unity to the process.

I do not propose to enter upon a technical examination of this philosophy. I wish only to maintain that the motives and interests which inspire it are so exclusively practical, and the problems with which it deals are so special, that it can hardly be regarded as touching any of the questions that, to my mind, constitute genuine philosophy.

The predominant interest of evolutionism is in the question of human destiny, or at least of the destiny of life. It is more interested in morality and happiness than in knowledge for its own sake. It must be admitted that the same may be said of many other philosophies, and that a desire for the kind of knowledge which philosophy really can give is very rare. But if philosophy is to attain truth, it is necessary first and foremost that philosophers should acquire the disinterested intellectual curiosity which characterises the genuine man of science.

Evolutionism, in basing itself upon the notion of *progress*, which is a change from the worse to the better, allows the notion of time, as it seems to me, to become its tyrant rather than its servant, and thereby loses that impartiality of contemplation which is the source of all that is best in philosophic thought and feeling. Metaphysicians, as we saw, have fre-

quently denied altogether the reality of time. I do not wish to do this; I wish only to preserve the mental outlook which inspired the denial, the attitude which, in thought, regards the past as having the same reality as the present and the same importance as the future. "In so far," says Spinoza,<sup>1</sup> "as the mind conceives a thing according to the dictate of reason, it will be equally affected whether the idea is that of a future, past, or present thing." It is this "conceiving according to the dictate of reason" that I find lacking in the philosophy which is based on evolution.

#### IV. GOOD AND EVIL.

Mysticism maintains that all evil is illusory, and sometimes maintains the same view as regards good, but more often holds that all Reality is good. Both views are to be found in Heraclitus: "Good and ill are one," he says, but again, "To God all things are fair and good and right, but men hold some things wrong and some right." A similar twofold position is to be found in Spinoza, but he uses the word "perfection" when he means to speak of the good that is not merely human. "By reality and perfection I mean the same thing," he says;<sup>2</sup> but elsewhere we find the definition: "By *good* I shall mean that which we certainly know to be useful to us."<sup>3</sup> Thus perfection belongs to Reality in its own nature, but goodness is relative to ourselves and our needs, and disappears in an impartial survey. Some such distinction, I think, is necessary in order to understand the ethical outlook of mysticism: there is a lower, mundane kind of good and evil, which divides the world of appearance into what seem to be conflicting parts; but there is also a higher, mystical kind of good, which belongs to Reality and is not opposed by any correlative kind of evil.

It is difficult to give a logically tenable account of this position without recognising that good and evil are subjective, that what is good is merely that towards which we have one

<sup>1</sup> *Ethics*, bk. iv., prop. lxii.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, pt. ii., df. 6.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, pt. iv., df. 1.



kind of feeling, and what is evil is merely that towards which we have another kind of feeling. In our active life, where we have to exercise choice, and to prefer this to that of two possible acts, it is necessary to have a distinction of good and evil, or at least of better and worse. But this distinction, like everything pertaining to action, belongs to what mysticism regards as the world of illusion, if only because it is essentially concerned with time. In our contemplative life, where action is not called for, it is possible to be impartial, and to overcome the ethical dualism which action requires. So long as we remain *merely* impartial, we may be content to say that both the good and the evil of action are illusions. But if—as we must do if we have the mystic vision—we find the whole world worthy of love and worship, if we see

“The earth, and every common sight . . .  
Apparell'd in celestial light,”

we shall say that there is a higher good than that of action, and that this higher good belongs to the whole world as it is in reality. In this way the twofold attitude and the apparent vacillation of mysticism are explained and justified.

The possibility of this universal love and joy in all that exists is of supreme importance for the conduct and happiness of life, and gives inestimable value to the mystic emotion, apart from any creeds which may be built upon it. But if we are not to be led into false beliefs, it is necessary to realise exactly *what* the mystic emotion reveals. It reveals a possibility of human nature—a possibility of a nobler, happier, freer life than any that can be otherwise achieved. But it does not reveal anything about the non-human, or about the nature of the universe in general. Good and bad, and even the higher good that mysticism finds everywhere, are the reflections of our own emotions on other things, not part of the substance of things as they are in themselves. And therefore an impartial contemplation, freed from all pre-occupation with Self, will not judge things good or bad, although it is very easily combined with that feeling of

universal love which leads the mystic to say that the whole world is good.

The philosophy of evolution, through the notion of progress, is bound up with the ethical dualism of the worse and the better, and is thus shut out, not only from the kind of survey which discards good and evil altogether from its view, but also from the mystical belief in the goodness of everything. In this way the distinction of good and evil, like time, becomes a tyrant in this philosophy, and introduces into thought the restless selectiveness of action. Good and evil, like time, are, it would seem, not general or fundamental in the world of thought, but late and highly specialised members of the intellectual hierarchy.

Although, as we saw, mysticism can be interpreted so as to agree with the view that good and evil are not intellectually fundamental, it must be admitted that here we are no longer in verbal agreement with most of the great philosophers and religious teachers of the past. I believe, however, that the elimination of ethical considerations from philosophy is both scientifically necessary and—though this may seem a paradox—an ethical advance. Both these contentions must be briefly defended.

The hope of satisfaction to our more human desires—the hope of demonstrating that the world has this or that desirable ethical characteristic—is not one which, so far as I can see, a scientific philosophy can do anything whatever to satisfy. The difference between a good world and a bad one is a difference in the particular characteristics of the particular things that exist in these worlds; it is not a sufficiently abstract difference to come within the province of philosophy. Love and hate, for example, are ethical opposites, but to philosophy they are closely analogous attitudes towards objects. The general form and structure of those attitudes towards objects which constitute mental phenomena is a problem for philosophy, but the difference between love and hate is not a difference of form or structure, and therefore



belongs rather to the special science of psychology than to philosophy. Thus the ethical interests which have often inspired philosophers must remain in the background: some kind of ethical interest may inspire the whole study, but none must obtrude in the detail or be expected in the special results which are sought.

If this view seems at first sight disappointing, we may remind ourselves that a similar change has been found necessary in all the other sciences. The physicist or chemist is not now required to prove the ethical importance of his ions or atoms; the biologist is not expected to prove the utility of the plants or animals which he dissects. In pre-scientific ages this was not the case. Astronomy, for example, was studied because men believed in astrology: it was thought that the movements of the planets had the most direct and important bearing upon the lives of human beings. Presumably, when this belief decayed and the disinterested study of astronomy began, many who had found astrology absorbingly interesting decided that astronomy had too little human interest to be worthy of study. Physics, as it appears in Plato's *Timæus*, for example, is full of ethical notions: it is an essential part of its purpose to show that the earth is worthy of admiration. The modern physicist, on the contrary, though he has no wish to deny that the earth is admirable, is not concerned, as physicist, with its ethical attributes; he is merely concerned to find out facts, not to consider whether they are good or bad. In psychology the scientific attitude is even more recent and more difficult than in the physical sciences: it is natural to consider that human nature is either good or bad, and to suppose that the difference between good and bad, so all-important in practice, must be important in theory also. It is only during the last century that an ethically neutral psychology has grown up; and here, too, ethical neutrality has been essential to scientific success.

In philosophy, hitherto, ethical neutrality has been seldom sought and hardly ever achieved. Men have remembered

their wishes, and have judged philosophies in relation to their wishes. Driven from the particular sciences, the belief that the notions of good and evil must afford a key to the understanding of the world has sought a refuge in philosophy. But even from this last refuge, if philosophy is not to remain a set of pleasing dreams, this belief must be driven forth. It is a commonplace that happiness is not best achieved by those who seek it directly; and it would seem that the same is true of the good. In thought, at any rate, those who forget good and evil and seek only to know the facts are more likely to achieve good than those who view the world through the distorting medium of their own desires.

We are thus brought back to our seeming paradox, that a philosophy which does not seek to impose upon the world its own conceptions of good and evil is not only more likely to achieve truth, but is also the outcome of a higher ethical standpoint than one which, like evolutionism and most traditional systems, is perpetually appraising the universe and seeking to find in it an embodiment of present ideals. In religion, and in every deeply serious view of the world and of human destiny, there is an element of submission, a realisation of the limits of human power, which is somewhat lacking in the modern world, with its quick material successes and its insolent belief in the boundless possibilities of progress. "He that loveth his life shall lose it"; and there is danger lest, through a too confident love of life, life itself should lose much of what gives it its highest worth. The submission which religion inculcates in action is essentially the same in spirit as that which science teaches in thought; and the ethical neutrality by which its victories have been achieved is the outcome of that submission.

The good which it concerns us to remember is the good which it lies in our power to create—the good in our own lives and in our attitude towards the world. Insistence on belief in an external realisation of the good is a form of self-assertion which, while it cannot secure the external good



which it desires, can seriously impair the inward good which lies within our power, and destroy that reverence towards fact which constitutes both what is valuable in humility and what is fruitful in the scientific temper.

Human beings cannot, of course, wholly transcend human nature; something subjective, if only the interest that determines the direction of our attention, must remain in all our thought. But scientific philosophy comes nearer to objectivity than any other human pursuit, and gives us, therefore, the closest contact and the most intimate relation with the outer world that it is possible to achieve. To the primitive mind everything is either friendly or hostile; but experience has shown that friendliness and hostility are not the conceptions by which the world is to be understood. Scientific philosophy thus represents, though as yet only in a nascent condition, a higher form of thought than any pre-scientific belief or imagination, and, like every approach to self-transcendence, it brings with it a rich reward in increase of scope and breadth and comprehension. Evolutionism, in spite of its appeals to particular scientific facts, fails to be a truly scientific philosophy because of its slavery to time, its ethical preoccupations, and its predominant interest in our mundane concerns and destiny. A truly scientific philosophy will be more humble, more piecemeal, more arduous, offering less glitter of outward mirage to flatter fallacious hopes, but more indifferent to fate, and more capable of accepting the world without the tyrannous imposition of our human and temporary demands.

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# THE PRESENCE OF SAVAGE ELEMENTS IN THE RELIGION OF CULTURED RACES.

AN APPLICATION OF THE METHODS OF  
ANTHROPOLOGY TO EARLY MEDITERRANEAN  
CIVILISATION.

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THE content and connotation of the term "anthropology" has not yet been fixed with perfect clearness and precision. Conceived of in its widest etymological sense, it may seem to pose as an encyclopædic science of all human ideas and customs and arts. Its professors, therefore, find it convenient to accept the conventional and narrower meaning of the word, which limits it to the study of the primitive forms, products, and manifestations of the social life of man. Its earliest pioneers concentrated their attention on the phenomena of contemporary societies that are still in the savage state; and, using the comparative method freely and boldly, were able to classify, analyse, and sometimes explain certain widely diffused types of institutions that have come to be regarded as specially characteristic of savagery. But they soon achieved the momentous discovery that many of these have survived as fossilised deposits in societies, both ancient and modern, of high civilisation; and the still more momentous conviction that some of them have served as the procreative germs whence some of our complex and most advanced institutions have evolved. In tracing out



this evolution, anthropology becomes a science or a method of social embryology. It theorises upon the genesis of culture, the culture of the present as well as the culture of the past. It is the object of this paper to estimate the value of its achievement when first, somewhat to the alarm of the Hellenist, the Latinist, and the Semitic scholar, it applied itself to solve some of the problems of Mediterranean civilisation.

The area in which this civilisation prevailed was certainly a fascinating field to work upon for the pupils of Dr Tylor, the founder of the science. For here, perhaps, more than in any other region of the earth, the highest products of culture and social life could be found in strange and bizarre juxtaposition to the lowest; and at no period in its long history was any uniform level of culture universal over the area. When the Minoan-Mycenæan art was at the height of its splendour in Crete or the Argolid, some Thessalian tribes were still living in neolithic mud villages. When Plato was framing the most humane ethical legislation concerning the duty of children to parents, the savage economic law prevailed in Corsica that old men over sixty should be beaten to death with clubs, and even the Greeks of the island of Keos seem to have retained some modification of this practice. It is in the sphere of religion and mythology where this sense of incongruity strikes us most sharply, and the most startling contrasts are found within the limits of the same community. In Egypt the high mystical and occasionally monotheistic speculations of the priesthood and the thinkers of the court clashed grotesquely with the low "theriomorphic" fancies of the crowd who might worship the cat or the crocodile. The pre-Christian religions of Greece and Italy had reached an advanced stage of theism and had evolved a high religious morality; yet the lower products of animism, demonology, and magic survived down to the last days of Paganism. If we take two of the most brilliant centres of Hellenic life, Athens and Delphi, we come upon certain surprising phenomena which the older generation of scholars usually ignored: on the one hand, a refinement of life and such

an achievement of philosophy and art as our modern world sighs for in vain ; on the other, certain ritual observances and ordinances as crude and grotesque as those reported of the modern African or the Ainos of Siberia.

The Panathenaic festival at Athens was a ceremony worthy of the most civilised people of the world, a consecration to their Virgin-Goddess of their own high-bred life : we see the fair and stately forms of the pageant on the frieze of the Parthenon, carved by the greatest sculptor of the world : the action is orderly and beautiful, the service serious and ennobling. But the same people that took part in it had two months before performed a ceremony of purification called the Thargelia, which bore upon it the shadow or the actual taint of savage cruelty. According to one ancient account, "it was the custom of Athens to lead two pharmakoi, one for the men and one for the women, to be a purification for the city. The one intended for the men had black figs round its neck, the other had white." A later record adds some thrilling details : "In time of plague, famine, or other disaster, the ugliest man in the city was led to sacrifice, as a purification and an expiation of the city ; bringing him to a suitable place, they put cheese into his hand and cakes and figs, and having smitten him seven times on his genital organs with squills, wild figs, and other wild growths, they at last burnt him with wood of wild fruit-trees and scattered his ashes to the winds into the sea." The unfortunate pharmakos appears to have been fulfilling the double function of the vegetation-daimon who is honoured, but whom it may be convenient at certain seasons to put to death, so that he may assume a fresh reincarnation ; and on the other hand that of the sin-carrier or scapegoat who is "despised and rejected of men," buffeted and treated with contumely, and perhaps put to a cruel death. We may call this ritual savage ; only that we find few real savages practising ritual of such ghastly elaborateness. We have reason to believe that the Athens of the age of Perikles had softened down into a mere pretence the primitive horror of the aborigi-



nal rite: just as, in the worship of the Attic Artemis near Brauron on the coast, a prehistoric human sacrifice only survived in the form of holding a man down above the altar and scratching a few drops of blood from his throat: the act appears to have had the significance of a vicarious sacrifice, the blood of one man atoning for the sins of the people. In other Mediterranean communities, at a high stage of civilisation, human sacrifice in full reality survived till the age of Hadrian, but was generally reconciled with men's sense of human justice and mercy by choosing a condemned criminal, who deserved a secular execution, or by inviting a patriotic volunteer to offer his or her life for the community.

Or, again, the same Athenians, the masters in art, science, and democratic institutions, were capable of compelling their daughters, when they reached the age of puberty, to dress up as bears and dance the bear-dance in honour of Artemis, the Bear-goddess. As civilisation advanced and bears became very scarce in Greece, they substituted a yellow robe for the furry skin; but the maidens still called themselves "bears," just as the men who dressed themselves in goat-skins in honour of the goat-god Dionysos called themselves "goats." Now, dancing in some animal-masquerade in honour of a sacred animal or animal-deity is a savage rite, of which anthropology has collected the world-wide evidence.

At Delphi the Pythian festival in honour of Apollo was the perfected expression of Hellenic art and grace. But it was preceded in the year by another Apolline festival called the Stepteria, or the Feast of Purification, in which strange things were done: a band of chosen boys were escorted by women in a torch-lit procession to a cabin near Apollo's temple which was called the "palace" of Python, the ancient snake-deity of the sacred chasm. Here certain things were enacted, of which only part is told: we hear of the table being overthrown, and the cabin being burnt down, and of the hurried flight of the boys, who run away into exile as far as Tempe, and were only allowed to return to their homes when they

brought back thence the purifying laurel bough. The whole ceremony was interpreted by the story of the boy-god Apollo slaying the Python. Professor Frazer, in illustration of the Stepteria, adduces many examples from savage communities of the necessity of purification after the slaying of certain sacred animals: in particular, a very curious parallel from Dahomey, where a man who slays a fetish-snake has to enter a faggot-hut thatched with dry grass, which is then set on fire; he escapes as best he can, and then has to run the gauntlet of the whole tribe, who fling missiles at him until he reaches a certain river.

In fact, throughout the Mediterranean world, in Egypt particularly, but also in Italy and even in Greece, where the people evolved the most anthropomorphic religion known to man, we come upon abundant testimony of the reverence, amounting at times to actual worship, paid to animals who were regarded in some confused fashion as half-human, half-divine, and for which Professor Robertson Smith invented the new term "theanthropic." In the Attic Bouphonia, the service consecrated to the High God Zeus on the Acropolis, the man who slew the ox at the altar fled as if the guilt of shedding sacred and kindred blood was upon him, and the whole people simulated horror at the deed. In the island of Tenedos, for some festival of Dionysos, they dressed up a carefully selected calf in the costume of the god, and reverently sacrificed it, doubtless for the purpose of a solemn sacrament: previously to its birth they had treated the mother cow with the tenderest reverential care as if she were a divine woman expecting a supernatural birth. We are enlightened by countless anthropological reports of modern savage societies concerning the significance of this mystic sense of communion between the worlds of men, animals, and gods.

It seems, further, that the civilised contemporaries of Demosthenes and Aristotle still retained somewhat of the savage vagueness of feeling which fails to distinguish between the animate and the inanimate object. The Athenians, who



had made great advances towards a high rational code of criminal law, were nevertheless capable of instituting a solemn court with all the complexity of advanced jurisprudence for trying inanimate objects which had been the instrument of killing a man—a stone that fell from a roof, or the falling bough of a tree. Such objects, if condemned, were formally exiled from the country or cast into the sea; as in the *Bouphonia* mentioned above, when they could find no person on whom they could lay the guilt of murdering the ox, they brought into court and formally condemned the axe that had felled him. Our own English lawyers who instituted the curious rule of deodand would sympathise with them: so also would the fetish-worshipping savage.

Finally, the practices of magic and the superstitious fear of ghosts—features most characteristic of savage societies—were rife in every community of the Mediterranean area. Egypt was always the hotbed of magic, which was too deeply inter-fused with the higher religion there to be separable from it; the view even prevailed that the gods had vouchsafed magic as a blessing to man. Even in Greece, which was probably less addicted to superstitious fears, and less under the spell of magic than most of the communities of this area, we hear of the guild of the “Wind-charmers” at Athens, of the Magi at Kleonai in Sikyon, who cut themselves with knives to draw blood as a charm against storms; in Arcadia, on Mount Lykaion, where men might pray to the High God for rain with a spirit as truly in accord with higher religion as that which animates our modern prayers, the lower methods of magic were also observed, and, to give the society a double chance, the priests tried to produce rain by stirring up water with a stick. A fifth-century law of Teos, containing an interesting commination service, solemnly curses a man who used evil magic against the State or his neighbours. Dr Frazer has made us realise, by means of countless citations of evidence, how the life of the modern savage is burdened by a system of tabus and purifactory rules that weigh heavily on his life,

diminish his joy of living, and clog his progress. And not a single state in the Mediterranean area was free from a similar burden of "cathartic" or purificatory codes, dealing with just the same uncanny phenomena that thrill the mind of the savage—childbirth, death, and ghosts.

What are we to make of it all? By what formula can we sum up our impressions of these incongruous facts? We know that our recently lost and lamented Andrew Lang, a free and irresponsible pioneer and spokesman of the new science, rejoiced when he could show the gifted Mediterranean races as on a level with his Australians. But, having so many gifts, he lacked the gift of historical perspective and the power of visioning the whole with its parts in true proportion. The more and the further back that we study the beginnings of Mediterranean civilisation, and the closer we compare it with real modern savagery, the more removed do its higher races appear from any period that we dare call savage. The Mediterranean is the immemorial land of civilisation, the home of the highest life of ancient man. But its higher races carried with them in their career the unmistakable marks and products of the lower culture from which, perhaps, many ages ago they had emerged.

Ritual is the most conservative of all human activities. And, as I have said elsewhere, "it is a marked feature of the evolution of Greek religion that the lower and more embryonic forms of faith survive through the ages by the side of the higher and more developed. This was natural, because, in its history, there were no cataclysms, no violent spiritual revolutions breaking away with the past and endeavouring to obliterate it. The priesthood was conservative and did not champion spiritual or intellectual reform. . . . Progress there certainly was through the slow course of centuries, but it was gradual and half-unconscious; crude and savage practices gradually fell into desuetude or retained only a faint semblance of life."<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Higher Aspects of Greek Religion*, pp. 5-6.



No Mediterranean society in pre-Christian days, save Israel alone, can be shown to have experienced a Protestant reformation; that which was attempted in Egypt by the King Khounaton faded before it could strike root. But the most progressive social institution, the Hellenic Polis, did much to soften and refine the old naïve uncouthness and cruelty: the savage dance was raised to a higher level by art and poetry, although animal-masquerades survived in Arcadia and backward regions; magic yielded to or became penetrated by the higher theistic ideas, and the deities came to work by direct exercise of supernatural will.

Nevertheless the ancient record of the Mediterranean culture shows us the survival of a more bizarre complex of primitive phenomena than does our modern Christendom, purged as this has been first by Christianity, later by such convulsions as the Reformation, and recently by the growth of large cities and the spread of popular education.

Our original question, In what manner and with what success has anthropology dealt with the problem of Mediterranean survivals? remains now to be answered. On the whole, our anthropologists have hitherto followed the method of universal comparison which ignores the demarcations of racial and geographical areas, which explains a phenomenon in Greece, for instance, by comparison with a similar phenomenon in Australia or South America, which fetches in any parallel from the centre to the circumference. Andrew Lang, for example, speaks of "the Pawnee version of the Eleusinia," having discovered a story among the Pawnee Indians that reminded him vividly of the legend told at Eleusis concerning the abduction of Proserpine. The method may strike us as vague, and in the writings of some who pursue it may often appear lax and uncritical, merely leading to the accumulation of doubtfully similar facts—"mera palpatio," as Bacon might call it. Yet its achievement has been undoubtedly great. All comparison is potentially helpful in various ways, though the conclusions of the person who makes it may be wrong.

To discover a similarity between an ancient Greek or Semitic fact and a number of facts found among modern savages in different parts of the world may enable us to allocate the former to its proper stratum of culture. And it is only by a widely viewing comparison of the cultured and progressive with the uncultured and unprogressive communities that we can appreciate the achievement and the conditions of progress of the former. For instance, the recent volume published by Dr Frazer on the belief in immortality, which includes a wide review of many savage societies in respect of their funeral rites, enables us to gather an impression of the self-restraint and sanity of the Greek peoples in contrast to the morbid exaggeration and grotesque violence of the savage. The Greek legislator controls and forbids excessive display of grief: the savage encourages it to a dangerous pitch of ecstasy and often works it off by ghastly self-mutilation. On the other hand, the offerings to the dead and some form of communion-meal with them are common to the savage world and to the progressive Mediterranean societies, and this may incline us to regard them as helpful in the evolution or the consolidation of society.

It is perhaps in the sphere of mythology or folk-lore and of ritual that the universal comparative anthropology—as I venture to name it—has achieved results of the greatest interest.

The more critical study of folk-lore by means of the comparative method has discovered—for instance, in the Hellenic, which is the richest mythology in the world—certain types or leading motives that are common not only to other parts of Europe, but are found so broadcast throughout the world that the hypothesis of their diffusion from a common centre cannot be maintained. Andrew Lang has emphasised the remarkable resemblance between the Maori cosmic myth of the struggle of Heaven and Earth and the Greek myth of Ouranos and Kronos. The stories of Jason and Medea, Peleus and Thetis, Cupid and Psyche, are only Hellenic structures built out of simpler elements that are found in the folk-lore of many



different peoples. And this branch of the science may be said to have established the interesting psychologic induction that the myth-making imagination works within very narrow grooves as far as motive goes, and is only free in its power of combining and interpreting anew the old materials.

Comparative folk-lore can supply us also with æsthetic tests and with a critical scale of judgment; the superiority of Hellenic mythology, for instance, can only be fully realised after the long course of comparative study.

This science also has taught us the value of folk-lore as evidence of primitive social institutions, and especially of religion and ritual. The popular legend is found to be a magic-glass that reflects much of a once real past. A native of the Greek territory of Phokis, according to a local story that Pausanias picked up, was consulting the Delphic oracle how he should find water for his fields that were parched with drought; the god bid him sacrifice the first live thing that met him on his return; his young and only son met him, and was at once stabbed by his father; the wounded boy ran over the fields, dripping blood, and wherever the blood sank into the ground streams of water were found. The story is evidence of a primitive water-magic worked by blood and by a human victim. The stories of Apollo and Herakles enduring a limited period of slavery to work off the penalty for homicide are the only record of the existence of a useful legal arrangement in prehistoric Greece, which is also attested of ancient Iceland by similar mythic evidence.

The comparative study of savage ritual may illuminate much of Mediterranean religion, or at least afford interesting illustration of certain points. But the most valuable induction to which it has brought us is that most of the forms of ritual practised by the ancient cultured races in the higher theistic service is performed by modern savage man without any discovered theistic significance at all. The full import of this observation for our future theories as to the origin of the sacrifice and sacrament has yet to be disclosed.

On the other hand, the impression has come to prevail among the most scientific students of the subject that the universal or unlimited comparative method in anthropology has its drawbacks and is specially exposed to certain fallacies; and we have seriously suffered in recent years from the rash theories of the half-trained and slack-minded votaries of the science. One fallacy that has been most rife in modern anthropological hypotheses concerning the origin of social institutions in the Mediterranean area may be called the fallacy of simple enumeration. The larger proportion of savage tribes possess a certain institution or belief; therefore the cultured peoples, though there is no trace of it among them, probably possessed it when they were savages. For instance, a large proportion of modern savage tribes whose social rules have been reported on have been found organised on a system that has been called "totemism," of which the definition becomes the more difficult to give the more we learn of the so-called totemistic tribes; a working account of it that has sufficed for most writers may be stated thus: a totem is an animal-species common in the tribe's vicinity, which has some mystic affinity with the life of the tribesmen, who call themselves after its name, treat it reverentially, abstain from eating its flesh and even worship it, and forbid intermarriage to those of the same totem-kin. Having such a conception of totemism, which is certainly imperfect and in some respects erroneous, modern writers, especially Andrew Lang, Robertson Smith, and Salomon Reinach, have tried to prove the existence of totemism among the early Greeks and Semites, their chief evidence being the occasional reverence paid among these cultured peoples to certain animals. Now, totemism might pass away and leave as its deposit the worship of a particular animal, once the totem of the tribe. As a matter of fact, where we study living and actual totemism it is rarely seen to engender the animal-god; yet authentic cases might be found, and it seems a rational development. But to argue, therefore, that because a community shows reverence



to a certain animal, therefore it must once have had the totemistic system, is to forget the plurality of causes. What is called "theriolatry" might be the effect of totemism, but it can be and is produced spontaneously by quite other causes and motives. There are only two doubtful records of Mediterranean communities which might excite a suspicion of the existence of totemism; the most interesting is that which is told us of the Ophiogeneis of Parium and Cyprus,<sup>1</sup> who traced their descent from a snake, revered the snake, and were immune from snake-poison; and Diodorus speaks of the worship of monkeys among the Libyans, of monkeys bred in their houses, and of children being given names derived from monkeys.<sup>2</sup> But the specific characteristics of totemism are wanting even here; nor have they yet been found in any Aryan community, nor clearly in any Semitic.

Even exogamy, which is essential to totemism, but can exist independently of it, cannot be traced among the classical peoples of the Mediterranean. It is so common and useful an institution in the primitive tribal society that, as we are all liable to the "simple enumeration" fallacy, we are tempted to believe that the ancestors of those peoples also must have had it, and thus to explain the four tribes of the Ionians and the three tribes of the Dorians as exogamous intermarrying divisions. But not a trace of it can be found in any historic or prehistoric Greek record; unless you regard the common story of the hero wandering round for adventures and winning an alien bride as evidence. But it has been the thoughtless use of just such evidence as this that has discredited anthropology.

Again, the matrilinear family-system is very widespread, though by no means universal, among savage communities; and it occasionally, though very rarely, survives among the cultured. The evidence as at present collected in no way warrants the conclusion that all human societies have passed through it. But writers like M'Klennan and some of his

<sup>1</sup> Strabo, p. 588. *Ælian, Nat. An.*, 12. 39.

<sup>2</sup> 20. 58.

rasher followers must have been possessed with this conviction when they posited this family-system for the earliest Greeks and Latins on the ground of evidence that without that *a priori* conviction must have seemed to themselves transparently futile.

Just as animal-worship is no proof of totemism, so, as I have pointed out, goddess-worship is no proof or sign of a matrilinear society. The only Mediterranean societies that counted their descent through the female were the Lycians and Etruscans; that is all that we know—it appears to have been alien to the Aryans and Semites when we come to know them; and their prehistoric legends, interpreted rationally, do not reveal a glimpse of it.<sup>1</sup>

Again, nearly all savage societies possess a tribal mystery, into which the males are initiated at or about the age of puberty. And recent writers such as Lang, Webster, Gilbert Murray, and Miss Harrison have explained the Greek mysteries, and especially the Bacchic, wholly on the lines of these. But the records of the Greek mysteries, carefully examined, do not support this hypothesis; and it ignores the fact that there are other types of mysteries and other motives for them besides the tribal initiation.

In fact, it appears that a too great preoccupation with the encyclopædic, and therefore probably superficial, study of all savagery produces in certain minds what we may call the *mirage sauvage*, partly no doubt in reaction from the stiff-neckedness of the older generation of scholars. This mirage has produced the illusion that the savage background was quite near to the progressive races of the Mediterranean at the dawn of their history—that they had only recently emerged from cannibalism, only at a late period in their career had turned from the futilities of a godless magic to the free worship of high gods and had escaped from the collective consciousness of the tribe to the freedom of self-consciousness

<sup>1</sup> The case of the Locrians depends on the interpretation of a doubtful passage in Polybius.



in the individual. Thus a vaguely comparative anthropology is capable of great anachronisms and illusions in its view of the evolution of civilised peoples and of their achievements.

Valuable as its method is, it must be supplemented and chastened by the application of another method—the method of what I have termed (and the term seems to have been accepted) adjacent anthropology; this means the intensive study of a restricted area, of contiguous peoples who may have interacted on each other, and especially the study of the proximate past, not of the infinitely remote past, of those peoples. The Mediterranean may well be taken as a practicable area for such a method. A culture more or less homogeneous, with its roots in a remote past, had touched the races of its shores and islands, at least in its eastern half, where there was a very ancient intercommunication; and this culture may have been fertilised by streams that flowed from the civilisations of the Hinterland, Syria, the Hittite Kingdom, and Mesopotamia.

The anthropology that would explain Egypt must include some knowledge of the primitive and contiguous North African tribes as well as of the social and religious life of the not distant Semitic communities. For Greece and Italy, where Aryan races from the North, probably in the second millennium, descended and blent with Mediterranean peoples, some of whom possessed a higher civilisation than the invaders, we must explore all that recent and future excavation and discovery can teach us of the great Minoan-Mycenæan culture; for this had touched the Greek world deeply—in a lesser degree Italy, Sicily, and Spain; we must reckon also with influences from Egypt, the Hittite Kingdom, possibly from Mesopotamia. We must also pursue the inquiry as far as any shred of evidence will allow into the degree and the forms of culture that the incoming Northerners brought with them; and if this exploration takes us up through the Balkans to the Danube, the Rhine, and Central Europe, and links a part of that population which built up Greece and Rome with

the Teutons and the Celts, it is still the method of adjacent anthropology, and more likely to be immediately relevant and fruitful than the vague comparative method that would link them with the Arunta or the Polynesians. The latter hitherto has mainly taught us how remarkably alike, and in some respects unlike, are the various races of mankind; the former alone can reveal the genesis or the evolution of particular communities with their peculiar institutions and temperamental character.

This intensive study, combined with the other, will give us a true feeling for scale, a truer sense of proportion, and will reveal how wide is the gulf between, on the one hand, the earliest Aryan Hellenes, the men of the Terramare culture who may have gone on to build up Rome, the men of the Minoan civilisation in Crete, Mycenæ, and Orchomenos, and on the other hand the modern races whom we know and properly call savage. It will make its students sceptical of such theories as that the men who organised the state of King Minos and the life of the Terramare period were governed by oak-kings who had to fight all comers, or that they had not yet developed an individual consciousness.

It will save us, in fact, from the *mirage sauvage*, which tempts us to interpret the higher phenomena wrongly, and in any given area to postdate the prevalence of the savage state.

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# THE HIGHER ANTHROPOLOGY :

## A DEFENCE OF "PERSONALITY" AS THE CENTRAL CONCEPTION OF PHILOSOPHY.

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LONG before a conscious science of mind had been attempted or was dreamed of, the idea of "personality" had become a possession of the human race; not as an elaborately reasoned belief, not as an out-and-out gift from a supreme creative intelligence. It was a gradual, imperceptible growth, the cumulative result of innumerable perceptions and convictions that had become an integral part of intuition. It was ultimate but not unchangeable. It continually grew by the assimilation of new experiences. It broadened and deepened and became ever a more distinct and controlling concept. It drew all things to itself as a centre, co-ordinated and unified them into a living synthesis. It constituted, in short, what we may call a *natural* psychology. It was the life-principle of the whole structure of human thought and practice. It ruled the situation, ruled it absolutely and ruled it well.

### I.

A notable modern attempt in the criticism of this idea culminated in Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*; a book which, contrary to the intentions of its author, greatly augmented an existing tendency to distrust the human mind. No sooner does the critical faculty begin to examine

the processes through which mind has become possessed of its fundamental concepts, than it is staggered to find that they have no reasonable basis, that they are apparently arbitrary deliverances, or at best no more than phases of human consciousness; and that, in the very nature of things, they must be held to represent no other than the peculiarities of the human species in which they have originated. Hence, the external world increasingly assumes the vagueness of a *terra incognita*. We may postulate it as an inter-related something-not-ourselves; but we may not reasonably infer that it has any real resemblance to our conceptions of it. We have, on the contrary, every reason to believe that it must be something essentially different. Like a curiously made machine, the soul responds in certain definite ways to stimuli from the outside world—a very wonderful and elaborate instrument, it is true, able to transform purely physical agencies into self-consciousness. But, that its responses are anything more like external realities than waves of light are like the pictures they produce, seems destined to remain an assumption not only without evidence, but in the nature of things most improbable.

It surely seems one of life's keenest ironies that any science should begin its development by undermining its own foundations, or we might say by paralysing its own motor centres. But this is just what the critical philosophy did. The winged thing we call soul found itself "cabined, cribbed, confined," a queer, nondescript entity, to be peeped at from behind bars and discussed by wiseacres. And the more one of these shook his head, the deeper he was thought to be. One thing was certain; the mind of man had been exercising prerogatives that did not of right belong to it, and it therefore rested under a suspicion of general untrustworthiness.

But here was an awkward situation; for when the balance had been struck it appeared that the intellect of man had just stuff enough left to make a philosopher but nothing wherewith to construct a philosophy, and all the philosopher could do



was to keep on shaking his head at every proposition that had a really affirmative outlook. In short, the results of the critical method were purely negative. And here we come upon another anomaly, superinduced by the critical philosophy: namely, that the human mind, thus handicapped, should be able to supply a philosopher, or school of philosophers, courageous enough to attack the problem of the universe. But nothing is more erratic than the human mind when it has once broken away from the restraints of experience.

From one point of view, indeed, the conditions for theorising seemed peculiarly favourable. What could suit the metaphysician better than complete emancipation from the hampering insistence of concrete facts and the interfering suggestions of analogy? But sudden liberation from restraint is upsetting; and there ensued a species of hallucination, an ability to see non-existent things, visions of grandeur and wealth where there was absolutely nothing. By the transmutation of negatives into affirmatives, the buoyant philosopher was filled with strange satisfactions, expansive concepts of pure being—vague swelling words that floated for a little, like much-reflecting soap-bubbles.

The Supreme One, the Absolute, is devoid of limitations. He, or it, knows neither space nor duration. There is no sequence in this absolute existence. It is the eternal now. It is not a person, for personality involves limitation. It cannot have sympathies or emotions of any kind. It is, in all respects, the otherness of that which man believes himself to be. Whatsoever characteristic he is warranted in predicating of himself must be excluded from his conception of the absolute. But the negative fades out in the effulgence of the suggested affirmative. *Infinite, unconditioned*—the obliteration of everything of which we have any knowledge, by a strange inversion, appears as the fulness of all things.

The philosophy that we have been considering severs the thought of God from its analogical attachments. Where nature uses the synthetic reason, moving from concrete wholes

to larger, more comprehensive wholes, it employs the analytic reason in the hope of reaching the true inwardness of things by taking them apart.

How disastrous this has been in the sphere of religion has not been hitherto recognised. I believe it is no exaggeration to say that a large part of our sectarianism, the most persistent monstrosities of our theology, the constant growth of scepticism, the vagaries of a one-sided mysticism, and the factitious antagonisms of reason and revelation, have their root in a defective psychology. I do not mean to represent the concept infinity as wholly modern in Western thought. It had its innocent beginnings far away in the past. It was nurtured by religion as a valuable enlargement; and only at a later stage of development was its pernicious form engendered by its union with analytic psychology. It was originally a part of worship—the outcome of man's effort to formulate a transcendent conception of the Being before whom he bowed himself. "My thoughts are not as your thoughts, neither are your ways my ways, saith the Lord." And, so long as this remained simply a part of worship, the poetical expression of man's emotions, it mingled perfectly with what has been, most inaccurately, called his *anthropomorphism*.

It was only when the intellect undertook to turn poetry into logic that the breach between formal theology and emotional religion began. Nor did the disorder become acute till the discovery of the heliocentric relations of the earth galvanised the civilised world into a reconstruction of its ideas of God. Then the boundlessness of space and the infinity of worlds seemed to be the actual corroboration of that which had previously been theoretical. I think we may truly say that the backbone of modern sceptical philosophy was a revolutionised astronomy.

But we may not linger on this aspect of the subject, for we have to give our attention to the history of a formidable attack from another quarter.



## II.

Taking its rise in the metaphysics of science, a new departure made the world of external things and its mechanical order the expression of ultimate reality. And at first this seemed to be a healthy reaction from the inanities of absolutism. It was a rally of natural as against sophisticated judgments. It declared those aspects of the world to be real that had always been thought of and treated as real. To the general intelligence it was substantiality *versus* moonshine: and to those whose attention was absorbed in the marvels of science it was a gospel. Its conception of an all-inclusive order of the universe was a very grand one. Its progressive demonstration of the inter-relatedness and solidarity of all things seemed to satisfy a long-denied intellectual craving; and so long as attention was riveted upon the outside world, the unification was apparently complete—nothing was left out, nothing was unrelated. Like a perfectly constructed mechanism, it represented a balance of forces that was sufficient to itself.

But, just in this apparent sufficiency was its weakness, for no sooner was attention diverted from the outside world to the consideration of the thinking agent than a somewhat serious oversight came to light. Mind, the creator, the coordinator and discoverer, of this wonderful unity, had been left out; and there was no possibility of getting it in. The circle was complete, the balance of forces could not be disturbed. And the system was too splendid, too perfect, to be spoiled by interference. There must be some mistake. The philosopher must find it. He has it. Mind is not outside. It is inside, without knowing it. It is part of the great congeries of atoms and forces that it has been in the habit of contemplating as something different from itself. This has been its delusion, its chronic self-deception, at last revealed by scientific methods.

Here is a tremendous discovery: not only startling, but terribly upsetting, for the old idea of mind as an entity distinct from material things is the generator of our whole scheme of

thought as well as of our organisation of society. Change the belief in mind as mind, transmute it into atoms and forces, and the whole edifice of morality and responsibility collapses with it. There is no longer any such thing as mental initiative or causation, or even modification or adaptation. Absolute determinism has taken the place of all that. There is no providing for the future, no possibility of controlling destiny in the smallest degree. Fatalism, absolute and hopeless, is the only outcome.

How could this conflict of ideas be adjusted to the exigencies of life? It seemed an easy matter to some. The old organisation of thought, with mind as the causative, responsible centre, was, and might be still left, in *practical* control of the situation. It is a useful thing to *live* by, as the scientific theory is a useful thing to *think* by. The necessities of scientific thought need not and should not be allowed to obtrude themselves upon the necessities of moral and practical concepts. That such a compromise should be distinctly formulated by anyone may well be doubted, but that it is implicit in the reasoning of not a few eminent philosophers is not to be questioned.

In the words of Professor Jacks: "The consciousness of subjection to its own results is the breath of the nostrils of speculative thought. Nowhere else is the rule of 'Practise what you preach' so stringent; and nowhere else is that rule treated with such supreme disdain."<sup>1</sup> Why? Simply because what is preached *cannot* be lived. No matter how convincing the logic, it breaks down when it comes to the test of actuality. It will not fit into the scheme of things that life has made for itself; it cannot be made to work with this. That is our salvation in squally weather. It is the ballast that saves the situation. Or, to change the figure, our accumulated, bedded-down experience is a court of appeal affording a stay of process.

But ought we to think of resting in this unreasoned and

<sup>1</sup> HIBBERT JOURNAL, January 1908, p. 402.



apparently unreasonable attitude? Most assuredly we ought not. Reason will not let us. It must never give over the expectation that its theoretical and its practical convictions can be harmonised.

All our upward progress has been a series of similar antagonisms, a succession of reactions from impossible situations, the getting out of scrapes into which our inquisitiveness has led us, learning the nature of quagmires and quicksands by getting into them. But our mistakes are not all of the same importance. They are more or less grave accordingly as they relate to the outskirts or the centre of our scheme of philosophy. Radical changes at the centre are revolutionary. Everything is transformed by the creative power of a new dominating idea, or by the suppression of an old one.

In the essay from which we have already quoted, Professor Jacks sums up the formative power of such a central principle in the phrase "Alchemy of Thought." "Whosoever," he says, "offers me a final philosophy, offers me a world. To accept the view, for instance, that the world is the manifestation of a good spirit, or again, of an unconscious will, is to accept a principle according to which the whole length and breadth of my experience must henceforth be constituted and to which it must be conformed. The function of such a principle is essentially creative: whatsoever it touches, whether in the realm of perception or morals or elsewhere, is changed as if by magic to a new thing. Nothing is left as it was before. The broad fact of the world becomes just such a fact as the principle makes it, and every one of my relations to that fact becomes charged with a corresponding meaning. To me, holding either one of these doctrines, nothing is what it would be if I held the other: neither God, my neighbour, nor myself retains the values under the second which they hold under the first."<sup>1</sup>

Now let us observe that our concept mind, or soul, is not simply a world-creating principle, but that it is *the* point

<sup>1</sup> *The Alchemy of Thought*, by Professor L. P. Jacks.

of departure for all hypothetical world-creating principles. However stated, they are all variations on one theme. If our world is not constructed from the unmutilated concept mind, it is always from some abstraction or group of abstractions derived from it. No hypothesis can be set over against it that has not a close relationship to it. The illustration used by Professor Jacks is a case in point. "A good spirit"—an intelligible, integral, living mind, on the one hand; and on the other, "unconscious will"—a semblance of mind made up from one detached characteristic of it, a branch, separated in all its bravery of leaf and flower from the parent tree.

The concept *mechanism* may indeed seem to be a palpable contradiction of this postulate: and, without question, our habitual idea of it is quite the opposite of mind. The one is determinism, the other is freedom. But how comes it that mechanism slips so easily into the place of mind? Since it is no other than stereotyped necessity, with no principle of growth or of progress, nor of any kind of change, how does it happen that trained minds should have dreamed of attributing such functions to it?

Many reasons might be adduced, but there are two of such dominating importance that I will confine myself to them. The first is that concentration of attention upon any one broad aspect of the world has a tendency to make all other aspects dwindle in clearness and importance. One is gradually drawn to see the whole cosmos in the light of one of its characteristics, until this becomes as the sun in the heavens. All other things shine with a borrowed effulgence. But this general truth accounts for no more than a predisposition to a one-sided view of the world. The second reason has, on the other hand, a very intimate and special bearing on the case in point.

It was comparatively an easy thing for the imagination to transfer its allegiance from mind to mechanism, because the two had been always closely associated; the latter having been the highest executive officer in the court of the former,



and therefore the representative of it with which men came in contact. In other words, mind, the originating, determining *cause*, was in the background, while mechanism, the agent and *instrumentality*, was everywhere in evidence. The former was known only to reflection, the latter impressed itself upon the senses at every turn. Hence mind, though implicit in mechanism, was so intimately bound up with it as not to be represented in consciousness.

Was this altogether a false conception, or was there an element of truth in it? Unquestionably the latter. In a most important and vital sense the two are a concrete whole in our experience. The separation of them is an abstraction. And when, in our thought processes, we hold them to be capable of functioning independently of each other, we fall into a chasm of emptiness between the two. And if, climbing out, on this side or on that, we use either mechanism or mind as the analogue from which to construct a scheme of the universe, our *terra firma* becomes a morass of absurdities.

And here let us, for a moment, give our attention to the importance of the part played in all our reasoning by that activity of the mind which we call the analogical faculty: the faculty to which we must credit all our advance from lower to higher forms of knowledge:—the constructive, the suggestive, the enlightening power of the soul, without which any degree of generalisation or any enlargement of the area of our thought would be impossible. If we may call imagination the wings of the soul, analogy is the instinct that shows how to use them. And yet, it is capable of being the most fatally misleading guide. It does not take care of us without our co-operation. If we are negligent in the accumulation of facts, and in the patient, critical, step-by-step application of real experiences—if, for the solution of our problems, we go forth and lay violent hands upon the first more or less comprehensive reality that comes our way, and make that our working principle of interpretation,—we necessarily come to grief.

But this is just what our pan-mechanical philosophers have

done. They have taken one half of a concrete experience, the half in which they, as specialists, have been absorbed, and made that the centre. And, on the other hand, the metaphysical idealists have taken the other half and made of it the impotent effigy of a God. Each has constructed from its captured half a universe, which is unworkable. The one, starting with the reality of an elaborate machine, demonstrates triumphantly that the world is just this on a scale inconceivably extended. The other, choosing the reality of mind, the principle of all origination and control, demonstrates that mind and mind alone has called the universe into being.

But who ever heard of a machine that was not the product of some mind? Who, that traces the history of a machine back through the stages of its becoming, does not find it instinct with mind? And, on the other hand, who ever knew of a mind that operated without instrumentalities?

Could anything be more certain than that we have here one actuality of experience torn in two, and the fragments set over against each other as contradictories? If any doubt remains it is finally disposed of by reuniting the two and applying them as a correlated unity to the solution of the problem. When this is done the whole aspect of the situation is changed. The two halves of reality that appeared as conflicting are now mutually supporting. One explains the other; and together they put us in possession of an instrument of thought that takes up the sum total of our experience into a coherent and rational whole.

Thus we are brought back to that unified duality which natural psychology prescribes: and the question arises, is this simply a return to a conviction that can give no account of itself, and therefore an unconditional surrender on the part of reason?

### III.

Let us be more explicit. Every unsophisticated man is equally certain of the truth of the following propositions:—*First: the external world, known to me through sensation and*



*reflection, is a world of real agencies that act upon each other and upon me. Second: my mind is a real originating cause which, to some extent, determines its own actions and also those of external agencies.*

Our two propositions come to us, not as wholly separate, independent truths existing side by side, but as vitally related members of one truth. They belong respectively to the categories of cause and instrumentality. Mind represents cause. Matter, in all its varieties of mechanical relatedness, represents instrumentality. The affirmation of this oneness may seem a purely dogmatic assertion. It is indeed a postulate that admits neither of proof nor of refutation of the argumentative sort. But, what is far more to the purpose, it is an ultimate fact of experience. The moment we turn from the use of abstract terms to the contemplation of actuality, we see it illustrated everywhere. Cause and instrumentality are inseparably linked together, often thought of as one, yet in practice as well as in thought quite separable.

Both are categories of the higher evolution only. They are the offspring of human self-consciousness in its various relations. They have had a long-drawn-out development from very slight beginnings: and, throughout the process, the tendency has been continually to a more distinct recognition of their diverse functions. Soul and body were, to ancient thought, one: together they energised as cause for the production of changes in the external world. Modern thought, except where it ignores one half of reality, discriminates ever more and more clearly between soul as originating, regulative cause, and body as instrumentality, while both are united in the composite yet ultimate and unique concept *personality*.

Not that these two are the exhaustive expression of ultimate personality. A third element must be recognised, out of which both have grown, and in which they have their being. Life, which seems almost an allotropic form of mind, having brought instrumentality into existence by organising the possibilities of matter, at a later stage gave birth to

conscious mind: and these three together constitute the highest product and the fullest expression of the world process. In this all the apparently separate and diverse elements flow together and declare themselves to be the unique source of the whole world, of man—the matrix of all that is, has been, or is to be. In the unity of a living soul and body we reach the norm of all thought and of all reality. Back to this all our problems must come for solution, and from this all our speculation either as to the constitution of the universe or as to the future of evolution must take its departure. It is a source that cannot fail us, because it is constantly growing. While it supplies coherence to our otherwise scattered concepts, it is itself nourished, amplified, and regenerated by the throbbing life that flows back to make it ever greater than itself.

#### IV.

We have seen how the antagonism between mechanism and mind seems insuperable so long as we employed one half of reality as the analogue for the explanation of the great whole; and furthermore, how it faded away as soon as we linked this with the other neglected half. But as this combination, though received and lived by the babes of common realism, was uncongenial to abstract thought, controversy might have gone on for ever, had we not been able to point to cause and instrument actually functioning as body and soul, in a mutually dependent unity. Nor is this as if the answer to a difficult problem had been given to us without an explanation of the solution. The explanation is in the facts laid before us. The whole process is a matter of our daily experience. If it escapes our notice, it is only because we are so familiar with it. Like all ultimate elements, it simply is. *Except for our blunder in not recognising the ultimate when we have reached it, there is no problem.*

Turning now to the doctrine of evolution, we have another universal concept, closely related to the foregoing, that illustrates with abounding fullness the grasp of our norm of



thought. We have already spent more than half a century in the effort to assimilate, or adjust ourselves to, this greatest of all the great revelations of science; and in some directions we have made wonderful progress. We have recognised it as a universal method, and we are reorganising all our thinking, all our history, all our outlooks upon the future in accordance with it. But as to the understanding of its nature and origin we are still very much at sea. We cannot consider at any length the causes of this, but we may touch upon some of the more palpable. Evolution came to us as a gift from natural science; and, following the rule of not looking a gift horse in the mouth, we accepted it, generally speaking, with the constructions which science put upon it. But let us discriminate with regard to this use of the word "science."

Evolution is distinctively the child of *biology*. Only through the study of life-processes have we been able to establish it. But at its advent speculative science was dominated by the purely physical aspect of it. This had so impressed itself on the imagination that every branch of constructive research was coerced into an attempt to demonstrate the possibility of its mechanical derivation. Biology, a young but aspiring member of the scientific family, having as yet no authoritative voice in its affairs, obediently set itself to the task of deriving its great discovery from the play of physical forces; and a most educative episode this has proved to be, for increasingly, as the years have moved on, the fact has emerged that no progress whatsoever toward the goal has been made.

Not that there has been any abatement in the advance of physical science, not that it has failed to supply an abundance of new links in the chain of instrumental factors. The point is that all this advance on physical lines brings the explorers no whit nearer to the sought-for proof of physical sufficiency. It is indeed continually claimed by the advocates of pan-mechanism that every unveiling of hitherto unknown instrumental sequences is a step in this direction; and if it were—

if, as the physical explanation of phenomena increased, the need of a psychical one diminished,—the prospects for a continued belief in the autonomy of mind would be, at best, shadowy.

But such is in no wise the case. It is not simply that biology advances with equal steps, revealing constantly new phenomena to be explained, but that the old ones have not yielded in the least to the mechanical solvent. What has been claimed as the substitution of a mechanical explanation for a psychical one has in every case been the resolution of a complex idea into its constituents. And, as in some chemical reactions one of the combined elements, when set free, becomes volatile, so, when the psycho-mechanical idea of causation is analysed, the psychic part disappears. Instrumentality remains in possession of the situation, and, set free from its psychic attachments, can be examined as a separate entity. But in its separateness it retains not the slightest trace of cause. Even if the human mind should succeed in laying bare the whole complex of physical sequences so that it could be read through like the mechanism of a motor car, the case would only be the more completely hopeless.

As I understand it, biology, in its reaction from the exclusiveness and all-sufficiency of mechanism, does not question the universality of the physical order. It is everywhere, but not everything. As Bergson, its most brilliant representative, puts it: "Analysis will undoubtedly resolve the process of organic creation into an ever-growing number of physico-chemical phenomena, and chemists and physicists will have to do, of course, with nothing but these. But it does not follow that chemistry and physics will ever give us the key of life."

Physical agency represents a *part* of the truth—the ubiquitous, instrumental, subordinate part: and biology has no controversy with it so long as this subordination is recognised. The highest interests of both are linked together. When a phenomenon of life that has been hitherto appre-



hended only from the standpoint of vitalism receives at the hands of physical research a mechanical explanation, biology is not discredited thereby, nor has it suffered loss. It is the gainer by the light that has been thrown on the instrumental side of that which was previously, and is still, known on the vital.

The situation is summarised by Professor J. Arthur Thomson somewhat as follows.<sup>1</sup> Vital activity is a principle between mechanical causality and our own conscious purposing. We have to recognise three orders of facts: the physical order, where mechanism reigns supreme; the animate order, where mechanism is transcended; and the psychical order. This seems to me a workable statement of the facts so far as separateness is concerned, a separateness that, in the interests of clear thinking, must be jealously guarded.

But where are we to look for an expression of their unity? Nowhere in the heavens above or in the earth beneath, nowhere in the whole range of our experience except in our one ultimate norm of reality, the *human person*. Here all three categories unite in an actual, perfect organisation. Cause, life, instrumentality, existing and functioning as one. This is our key to the animated world. Aided by the microscope, we look down through the vista of ever-decreasing organisation till we reach the single cell; and, by calling into play that still more wonderful instrument, the analogical faculty, we recognise in this cell a partially autonomous being like ourselves. Or, on the other hand, we rise by its use from the oneness of man's little world, the *microcosm*, to the intelligible synthesis of a mind-informed universe.

What, then, is evolution? Have we a comprehensive definition for it? Indeed I believe we have. *Evolution is the working out of a problem in organisation and education by a MIND of immeasurable resources, through and by means of a resisting medium.*

But, how shall we escape the charge of superficiality in

<sup>1</sup> HIBBERT JOURNAL, January 1912, "Is there One Science of Nature?"

venturing to assume, as the explanation of the great world-process, one of its latest products? To our ordinary thinking this question may well seem a poser. But, let us observe, the problem with which we have to do flies high above ordinary life. It belongs to a class of no-thoroughfare concepts that meet us everywhere on the confines of our knowledge. Every hen comes from an egg. Every such egg comes from a hen. Where did the first egg come from? "In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth." But if God was there to create, the beginning was not *the* beginning, only *a* beginning. We find it impossible to conceive of unlimited space, and equally impossible to conceive of its being limited.

Lotze has aptly described the situation: "We drive the problem back step by step, and at last have to make the confession that the primal origin remains to us a mystery; and that throughout the course of the universe we discern, at most, alternations of development, but nowhere the origin of that primary arrangement on which the possibility of this rotation absolutely depends. . . . Every orderly combination is based upon a prior combination; and, varied as is this melody of the becoming, now swelling into greater fullness, now sinking into an insignificant germinal form, it has for us neither beginning nor ending, and all our science can do is to climb up and down this interminable stem, comprehending the connection of particular portions, as the result of universal laws, but never attaining to the discernment of the originating principle of the whole, or of the goal of its development."<sup>1</sup>

So much for evolution in its externality. But now suppose we use the key of self-consciousness and enter within the temple. All is changed. We find ourselves not the outside spectators of an infinitely extended process, but the living, conscious centre of a veritable evolution. Not a segregated, independent whole, but a world within a world—autonomous, and at the same time related and subordinate.

<sup>1</sup> *Microcosmus*, vol. i. p. 372.



We learn from it not of the primal beginning of all things, but of beginnings and of eliminations innumerable—not of *one* act of creation, but of an unending succession of creations, proceeding from an ultimate, causative principle, the human soul. And when we study this progressive microcosm with a view to characterising its meaning as a whole, from its smallest beginnings to the most remote vistas of its possible future, it is essentially and beyond everything else *the working out of a problem in organisation*. And that part of it that is guided by the conscious intelligence of man is essentially the same process that confronts us in the wider field of the animated world. The relations to each other of the factors of the restricted field, made known to us in experience, become the analogical interpretation of those of the greater evolution, and the contradictions that haunted us disappear.

That which, detached from personality, presented hopeless contradiction, finds within its little world reconciliation and mutual dependence. Concepts that outside of it have purely negative determinations are inside transmuted into the fullest affirmation. Infinity is no longer the denial of all human attributes, but the inclusion and unlimited production of all. For man himself takes hold upon infinity; he is homogeneous with it, a factor in it, a source of it.

Shall we call this *anthropomorphism*? God forbid! No word could be worse, not simply or mainly because of its inadequacy, but because it is aggressively misleading. Capturing the attention with the idea of *form*, it leads it away from that which is essential, to fix it upon that which is superficial. The form of the Supreme One is the sum of all the agencies through which He manifests Himself: and when the concept MAN is used as analogue for the concept GOD, it is the whole psychic man that is to be thought of, not the physical form. Man the thinker, the creator, the purposer; man the inventor, the co-ordinator, the organiser; man the artist, the idealiser, the poet, the sympathiser, the helper, the inspirer; man at his highest, intellectually, morally, æsthetically; man also in his

militancy, in his overcoming while moving toward remote ends that seem to be for ever receding.

I have a conviction that the womb of the future contains more and better words for the expression of the meaning that lies locked up in these three pregnant, historic aphorisms : one Greek, one Semitic, one modern.

That of Protagoras—

*“Man is the measure of all things.”*

That of the Bible—

*“So God created man in his own image. In the image of God created he him.”*

That of our own day—

*“Man has created, and is creating, God in his own image.”*

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## THE HEREAFTER IN THE BIBLE AND IN MODERN THOUGHT.

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ANYONE passing from the Old Testament to the New is at once conscious of a great transition, of an entirely new mental environment. Of this great change, a conspicuous feature is that, whereas in the Old Testament as in the New we have everywhere reward and punishment for all actions good and bad, in the earlier Scriptures the only retribution clearly stated is in the present life, in marked contrast to visions of judgment beyond the grave throughout the books of the New Covenant. The one exception is Dan. xii. 2: "Many of those who sleep in the dust of the earth will awake, some to eternal life and some to shame, to eternal abhorrence."

In the New Testament all is changed. Its various and very different writers, also the Baptist, and Christ and His Apostles, as their words are there recorded, announce and describe in very similar words exact retribution beyond death for all actions done or left undone in the present life. So Matt. iii. 10, 12, vii. 19-23, xiii. 41-43, xxv. 31-46; John v. 28, 29, vi. 39, 40; Acts xvii. 31; Rom. ii. 16; Phil. iii. 19-21; 2 Thess. i. 6-9; Rev. xx. 11-15, and elsewhere frequently. For this great change we seek an explanation.

With Dan. xii. 2, already quoted, which was written probably in the time of the Maccabees, we compare, in the Apocrypha, the very valuable Wisdom of Solomon, iii. 1-8: "Righteous men's souls are in God's hand, and torment shall

not touch them. In the eyes of fools they seemed to have died, and their departure was counted injury, and their going from us a calamity ; but they are in peace. For, even if in the sight of men they be punished, their hope is full of immortality, and having been chastened a little they will receive great benefits, because God tried them and found them worthy of Himself. As gold in a furnace He proved them, and as a whole burnt-offering He accepted them. And in the time of their visitation they shall shine forth, and as sparks among stubble they shall run to and fro. They shall judge nations, and shall rule peoples: and the Lord shall be their king for ever."

So 2 Macc. vii. 9, where a dying martyr says, "The King of the world will raise up us, who have died for His laws, to an eternal revival of life." Evidently this hope was the inspiration of the courage of those who, as narrated in 1 Macc. i. 41-63, died for their religion under the deliberate and tremendous attempt of Antiochus Epiphanes, a Greek king of Syria, to blot out all the distinctive elements of the religion of Israel. Similar teaching is found in other Jewish literature of the same and the following century.

All this points to the source of this remarkable development in the religious thought of the sacred nation. For by this time Israel had been for a century and a half under Greek rule and the powerful influence of Greek culture and literature. Of this influence the Septuagint Greek version of the Old Testament is an abiding and most valuable monument. Now, the doctrine of retribution beyond death is clearly and forcibly taught by Plato, the most influential of Greek philosophical writers. So, in his *Republic*, bk. x. p. 615, we read: "For every wrong which they had done to anyone, they suffered tenfold. . . . If, for example, there were any who had been the cause of many deaths, or had betrayed or enslaved cities or armies, or been guilty of any other evil behaviour, for each and all of these they received punishment ten times over; and the rewards of beneficence and justice and holiness were in the



same proportion." Then follows an awful picture of corporal punishment for crimes committed a thousand years earlier.

An expectation of judgment to come is found, in different forms, in the literature of nearly all ancient nations and even among modern savage tribes. It is conspicuous in the Egyptian *Book of the Dead*; and in the strange doctrine of transmigration, which underlies the whole thought of India and of all forms of Buddhism, and is found even in Plato. This widespread belief of judgment beyond death was evidently evoked by the manifest inequality of retribution in the present life, looked upon in the light of the supreme majesty of the inborn moral sense, everywhere recognised which forbids us to doubt that its commands and prohibitions will be vindicated by due reward and punishment.

It is now evident that, just as a way was prepared for Christ's fuller teaching about our Father in Heaven by Israel's infinitely superior knowledge of one personal Creator of the Universe, the righteous and kind ruler of all men, so a way was prepared for Christ's announcement of eternal life for all who put faith in Him and walk in His steps by the knowledge, in many ancient nations and especially among some of the Greeks, of a retribution beyond death for all actions done in the present life. In other words, the supreme Teacher took over whatever of religious truth was already known and made it the foundation for His own further teaching. This already existing foundation was absolutely needful for the superstructure Christ came to erect: and this superstructure was absolutely needful in order to save our race from the ruin into which in His days it was helplessly sinking.

The two essential elements of all religion to-day are God and a FUTURE LIFE. A comparison of their ancient literatures proves that of these the former was possessed by Israel in a measure shared by no other nation; and that the latter, dimly apprehended by Israel, was much more clearly known in other nations, and especially by some of the Greeks. The progress of Greek arms brought the sacred race under Greek

rule and the transforming influence of Greek thought. At one time, under the tolerant rule of the Ptolemies in Egypt, it seemed as though this seductive influence would wipe out all the distinctive and invaluable elements of the religion of Israel. This great peril was followed by the tremendous persecution under Antiochus Epiphanes, which threatened to destroy the sacred race. This baptism of blood evoked the heroism of the martyrs and the heroic revolt of the Maccabees. This saved both the race and its faith in the God of Israel.

It did more. The hardships of the present and the death of the martyrs compelled the survivors to look within the veil for the highest rewards of righteousness and of loyalty to God. From their conquerors they learnt the great truth that a full recompense beyond the grave awaits everyone for everything done on earth. Enriched with this addition to their knowledge, Israel was prepared to listen to Him who afterwards announced pardon of sin, rescue from the power of sin, and eternal life for all who put faith in Him. From the same conquerors they learnt to speak and write another language, which brought them into closer contact with the Gentiles around, and enabled them in later days to convey to other nations the infinite riches of the Gospel of Christ. Next after the events of the life of Christ, nothing in the story of the Kingdom of God is more wonderful than the effects of the Greek conquest of Palestine.

It is now evident that the doctrine before us, so necessary as a preparation for the Gospel of Christ, was anticipated by some of the Greeks much more clearly than by Israel. This clearer knowledge must have been a gift of God. And, that it came to Israel through a military expedition of a Macedonian adventurer, reveals in that expedition the guiding hand of God, preparing, through the reverent thought of Socrates and Plato and the ambition of Alexander, a way for a supreme revelation designed for all mankind. This inference is confirmed by the recognition by Socrates, as we learn from the *Apology* of Plato, that he was under divine guidance.



The doctrine of retribution beyond death is well stated in Gal. vi. 7, 8: "Be not deceived; God is not mocked; for whatever a man sows, this he will also reap; because he who sows for his own flesh will from the flesh reap corruption; but he who sows for the Spirit will from the Spirit reap eternal life." Here the dual retribution is traced to man's dual nature; and, like the mysterious growth of a seed in soil, to mysterious natural or supernatural forces working out inevitable results.

The harvest of the righteous is here described by the simple words *eternal life*, which we have already traced to Dan. xii. 2. It is also found three times in the Similitudes of Enoch, a later Jewish work. So chap. lviii. 3: "Blessed are ye, righteous and elect: for glorious will be your lot. And the righteous will be in the light of the sun, and the elect in the light of *eternal life*: there will be no end to the days of their life." So chaps. xxxvii. 4, xl. 9. The same term is also found in Matt. xix. 16, 29, and their parallels, xxv. 46; seventeen times in the Fourth Gospel and five times in the First Epistle of John, nine times in the letters of Paul, in Acts xiii. 46, 48, and Jude 21. These verses leave no room for doubt that, already existing in Jewish books, it was a conspicuous element in the teaching of Christ. In the New Testament, beyond death the word *life* is reserved for the righteous, and connotes happiness; e.g. Matt. vii. 14, "the way leading to *life*," also chap. xviii. 8, 9, Acts xi. 18, etc. Elsewhere the resources of language are exhausted to describe their blessedness: and this is a sure inference from the great truth that they are children of God.

In Gal. vi. 8 the doom of the lost is described as *corruption*, a word denoting any injury, used in 1 Cor. xv. 42 to describe the rotting of a corpse. Its opposite, denoting the absence of decay, is found in Rom. i. 23, ii. 7; 1 Cor. ix. 25, xv. 42, 50, 52, 53, 54.

Another Greek word for the same, used in the New Testament much more frequently than all others put together,

has three English equivalents, *destroy* and *destruction*, *perish* and *perdition*, *lose* and *lost*; combining the meaning of all three. It is frequently used in classical Greek for bodily death; just as we say "*lost* at sea": so Matt. ii. 13; "seek for the child, to *destroy* it," chap. xii. 14, Luke xi. 51. This common use makes bodily death a symbol of the doom of the lost. So Matt. x. 28: "Fear not those who kill the body, but cannot kill the soul; but rather fear him who can *destroy* both body and soul in Gehenna"; and Rom. vi. 21, 23: "the end of those things is *death* . . . the wages of sin is *death*." In Rev. xx. 6, 14 the fate of the lost is called "the second death." A corpse is worthless and repulsive, and such we must conceive a lost soul to be.

In Luke xv. 4, 6, 8, 9 the same word describes a *lost* sheep and coin. These, though *lost*, were uninjured; but, till *found*, they had become to the owners worthless and practically non-existent. The ideas of *destroyed* or *lost* and *dead* are combined in ver. 24: "thy brother was *dead* and came to *life*, he was *lost* (or *destroyed*) and has been *found*." In Matt. ix. 17 "the wine-skins *perish*," i.e. they become worthless as such. In Mark xiv. 4 some ask, "To what purpose is this *waste*?" For, when poured out, the myrrh seemed to be useless.

Under these various uses the one meaning of the word is quite clear. It denotes the loss of something valuable, the utter failure of the maker's or owner's purpose regarding it; either objectively in itself, or from his own subjective point of view.

This ruin is not necessarily final: for the *lost* sheep and coin were afterwards *found*. "The Son of man came to *seek* and *save* the *lost*." Nor does it involve annihilation; for the lost sheep and coin still existed, uninjured. Nor does it suggest suffering, temporary or endless; else it could not describe a lost coin. Both annihilation and endless suffering, if plainly stated, would be *destruction*; but the word does not, in itself, convey either meaning. In Homer's *Odyssey*, bk. x. 237-240, Circe turned men into swine, leaving their minds



unchanged; and in so doing is said (l. 240) to have *destroyed* them. They still existed; but, as men, were ruined. So in bk. xi. 488-493 the dead are depicted as conscious, but in a worthless condition.

In Matt. iii. 10, 12, vii. 19, John xv. 6, and elsewhere, the wicked are compared to trees, chaff, and weeds, *burnt up* by fire. On the other hand, in 1 Peter i. 7, 1 Cor. iii. 13, we have gold tested by fire, and fire testing every man's work. But we have no hint throughout the New Testament that this punitive fire is remedial.

Does this metaphor imply or suggest annihilation? The burning of weeds, etc., comes as near to extinction as do any natural phenomena, and strongly suggests finality: for any restoration of burnt-up weeds or trees is inconceivable. But it seems to me unsafe to build up doctrine on metaphor. For all comparison fails somewhere; and it is impossible to distinguish between the essential teaching and the drapery of metaphor.

Punishment by fire suggests acute suffering, and this is conspicuous in the words "weeping and gnashing of teeth" in Matt. xiii. 42, 50, and elsewhere; but in this phrase nothing is ever said about the duration of this anguish. In Matt. xviii. 8, xxv. 41, the doom of the lost is called "eternal fire." This recalls Jude 7, where "Sodom and Gomorrah . . . are set forth as an example, undergoing just punishment of eternal fire." This example was not a flame burning endlessly and causing endless torment, but a visible and abiding desolation caused by a flame which had long ago burnt itself out. This forbids us to infer from this phrase endless suffering.

In Matt. xxv. 46, "the eternal fire" is further described as "eternal punishment." That this last word does not imply remedial punishment we learn from its use in Acts iv. 21. Nor does it imply endless suffering. For punishment is not synonymous with suffering; nor does it cease till the criminal is restored to the position in which he would have been had he not sinned.

This is well put by Irenæus, *On Heresies*, bk. v. xxix. 2. They who by their apostasy have cast away the things before mentioned, as being deprived of all the good things, experience every kind of punishment; not that God immediately punishes them, but that punishment follows because of their being deprived of all the good things. Moreover, the good things from God are *eternal* and *endless*. And because of this, the deprival of them is *eternal* and *endless*; just as, the light being continuous, they who have been blinded by themselves or others are continuously deprived of the enjoyment of the light. So ch. xxviii. 1. Similarly, the civil penalty of death is not measured by the pain inflicted but by the loss of life. No one thinks, apart from retribution beyond death, that the punishment is over when the criminal is dead. So Augustine, *City of God*, bk. xxi. 11: "He who for some great crime is punished with death, do the laws reckon his punishment by the space of time in which he is put to death, which is very brief, and not by this, that he is removed for ever from the society of the living?" We have already seen that this idea of *loss* is the chief thought conveyed by the Greek word which, more than all others put together, is used to describe the doom of the lost. The loss of endless life is itself endless punishment.

In Phil. iii. 19, Paul writes with tears, "whose *end* is *destruction*": cp. 2 Cor. xi. 15, Heb. vi. 8, 1 Pet. iv. 17. The word *end* in Greek denotes the full outworking of inherent tendencies, as in Rom. vi. 21, 23. But it always includes finality. If for these ruined ones there were ultimate restoration, even after long ages, these ages of darkness would roll by and give place to endless blessing. To them, destruction would be, not their *end*, but a long pathway to endless life. Had Paul foreseen this, he could not have written these words. Similarly Matt. xxvi. 24: "Good were it for him if that man had not been born." But if Judas be ever admitted into the endless and infinite blessedness of heaven, this would be worth having, even at the cost of long and terrible suffering.



We now see that the writers of the New Testament agree to teach frequently and conspicuously that beyond death exact retribution awaits all men for all actions done in the present life. This judgment divides the race into two widely separated classes; the one received into a glory on which falls no shadow, the other banished into a darkness in which we look in vain for one ray of light. This dual division leaves no place for many who seem to us unworthy of either blessedness or destruction. This difficulty the sacred writers do nothing to remove or mitigate. Christ indisputably promised eternal life to all who put faith in Him; but we have nothing from Him to satisfy our curiosity about the fate of the persons just referred to.

The same writers describe the doom of the lost as ruin, utter and hopeless and apparently final. The first three Gospels represent Christ as teaching also, and the Book of Revelation teaches in plain and awful language, that the lost will have acute and continuous pain. Actual suffering is also implied in the teaching of the Fourth Gospel and of Paul that retribution will be according to works. For this implies degrees of punishment, and these imply consciousness; for unconsciousness is alike to all. Moreover, consciousness of endless and glorious life forfeited through our own inexcusable folly and sin involves remorse and mental anguish beyond conception. To be compelled, in the unsparing light of eternity, to contemplate our past sins, when all fascination of sin has worn away, and our rejection of the infinite love of God and our consequent and deserved loss of the glories of heaven, and this without room for amendment or hope of restoration, will be an undying worm and unquenchable fire.

Of this acute suffering the sacred writers see no end, nor do they teach anything which logically implies, or even suggests, that it will ever end. On the other hand, they do not go so far as expressly and clearly to assert the endless permanence of these ruined and wretched ones, and the consequent endlessness of their torment. The curtain is raised

for a moment, revealing the anguish of the lost, and then falls, hiding them from our view.

This close agreement, amid small differences, leaves no room for doubt that the New Testament reproduces substantially the actual teaching of Christ. And the widespread acceptance of this or similar teaching, sometimes in exaggerated forms, proves that it is re-echoed by the moral sense of man.

Against this evidence there is nothing to set. It cannot be objected that this teaching involves failure in the purpose of God. For His purpose in creating man was (Rom. viii. 29) to surround "the firstborn Son" with "many" others whom He would not be ashamed to call "brethren," who of their own free choice, under temptation to do otherwise, should accept Him as their Lord. This eternal purpose will receive an eternal accomplishment. Nor can we object on the ground of the justice of God. For, of no case are all the facts before us. We know not the greatness of the sins, nor the exact nature of their punishment; and therefore cannot compare them. The analogy of parental and royal love forbids us to say that God's love is inconsistent with severe punishment of sin, or indeed with the final exclusion of some from the family of God. On the other hand, human justice and the tenderness of human love warn us not to put into the threatenings of the Bible more than its words legitimately convey.

We are therefore compelled to accept this teaching as, within the limits imposed by human ignorance, a substantially correct anticipation of the fate of those who persistently reject the salvation offered by Christ and persist in a path of sin.

The various conflicting opinions about the doom of the lost are due to unwarranted additions, in contrary directions, to the teaching of the New Testament. The traditional belief of their endless suffering rests chiefly on Matt. xxv. 41, 46, expounded above, read in the light of another traditional belief, viz. the immortality of the soul, *i.e.* the endless permanence of all human souls, a doctrine of which there is no trace in the Bible or adequate proof elsewhere. It crept into



Jewish thought, along with the great truth of retribution beyond death, when Israel came under Greek rule and the potent influence of Greek culture. The origin of this belief in the Christian Church is plainly stated, at the close of the second century, by Tertullian in chap. iii. of his treatise on *The Resurrection of the Flesh*: "Some things are known even by nature; the immortality of the soul, for instance, is held by many, the knowledge of God is possessed by all. I will use therefore the words of a Plato, when asserting, Every soul is immortal." So his work, *On the Soul*, chap. iv.

The only immortality or eternal life ever mentioned or suggested in the Bible is the endless blessedness promised to the righteous. Of this assertion, strong presumptive confirmation is found in Dr S. D. F. Salmond's well-known work on *The Christian Doctrine of Immortality*, in which this widespread traditional belief is passed over in almost total silence, and without any shadow of proof from the Bible; and in other similar works, where we find the same silence. Apart from this metaphysical speculation, there is in the Bible no sufficient foundation for the doctrine of the endless suffering of the lost. And, against it, the cultivated moral sense of nearly all the best men and women is in stern revolt.

This traditional belief has almost or altogether vanished from the modern pulpit. Unfortunately, along with it the solemn topic of the doom of the lost, so prominent in the teaching of Christ as recorded and expounded in the New Testament, has also almost disappeared. This unworthy silence is fostered by the reluctance of many, to whom the younger men look up for guidance, to acknowledge the great change which during the last fifty years has in this matter passed over the best Christian thought; or to state, even to sincere inquirers, their own belief. Their refusal to give to others the results of their own best thoughts, on this and other topics, has created in young students and in lay men and women widespread suspicion and mental unrest. The time has come for this reticence to cease.

Others, holding fast the immortality of the soul—which does not, like the doctrine of endless suffering, offend our moral sense—have asserted, with more or less confidence, the ultimate salvation of all men. Some appeal to John xii. 32, “If I be lifted up, I will draw all to myself.” The Greek verb here asserts only that from His cross the Crucified will exert an influence on all, drawing them towards Himself. So in Rom. ii. 4, God is said to be “leading into repentance” a man who in the next verse is said to be “impenitent” and treasuring up for himself wrath. In other words, the Divine influence was there; but owing to the man’s resistance it was without result. So again Acts vii. 26. Another appeal is made to 1 Cor. xv. 22: “In Christ all will be made alive.” But throughout this chapter Paul is writing about the followers of Christ. Of them only it can be said, in ver. 43, that “It is sown in dishonour; it is raised in glory.” The purpose of the mission of Christ in Phil. ii. 10 embraces all men; but in chap. iii. 19 we read of some “whose end is destruction.”

Some remind us that no human father would allow even a bad son to perish if he could save him; and suggest that there may be a purpose of mercy even beyond the words of the sacred records. To this suggestion I have no reply. Far be it from me to limit the mercy of God. But it seems to me that, in giving the message of Christ to men, we have no right to go beyond the cautious reticence of the New Testament. We must leave the doom of the lost in the hands of Him who so loved the world that He gave His only begotten Son in order that everyone who believes in Him may not perish but may have eternal life.

Against the baseless doctrine of the immortality of the soul powerful protests have been made in recent times by Henry Constable and Edward White and others, who have also endeavoured to prove that the New Testament teaches or implies the ultimate extinction of the lost, after suffering in proportion to their guilt. This theory maintains the finality



of the punishment of the wicked, and at the same time avoids the difficulties involved in the endlessness of their suffering and the consequent endless permanence of evil. It finds some support in the New Testament metaphor of the destruction of vegetable matter by fire; and perhaps in Plato's use of the word *destruction* to describe the extinction of the lost, which he denies. On the other hand, we have no right to rule out this suggestion as impossible. Certainly it avoids the serious moral objections to which the endless suffering of the lost lies open, and does not contradict anything in the Bible.

Others suggest or assert a further probation beyond the grave. This suggestion has no reliable foundation in the Bible. The very difficult passage in 1 Pet. iii. 19, of which no satisfactory exposition has yet been given, is a most unsafe foundation for doctrine. On the other hand, nothing in the Bible or elsewhere justifies an assertion that the ultimate doom of everyone is determined at death. Here again we must recognise the narrow limits of our knowledge. We must also remember that in Rom. ii. 14-16 we have a standard, viz. "the law written in their hearts," the inborn moral sense, by which Gentiles, who have no written law, will be accepted or condemned "in the day when God will judge the secrets of men." But we have no right even to suggest that they who refuse Christ's offer of a present salvation and pursue a path of sin will or may have another probation after death.

Retribution beyond the grave and especially the future punishment of sin are to us, reason about them as we may, insoluble mysteries. The entire teaching of the Bible, abundantly sufficient as it is to guide us safely along the way of life, is altogether insufficient to enable us to anticipate the sentence which the great Judge will pronounce on the men and women around us. But in the New Testament two doctrines stand out as clearly and frequently taught: (1) that eternal life in infinite blessing awaits all who put faith in Christ and walk in His steps; (2) that utter ruin awaits those

who reject the salvation He offers and persist in what they know to be sin. These doctrines may be traced by decisive documentary evidence to His lips as part of His message from God to men. We are therefore bound, especially those who are recognised as teachers in His Church, to announce these solemn truths to all who will hear us. To go further is to overstep the limits of His message, and to announce in His name that which He has not spoken. This we have no right to do.

Closely connected with the great doctrine of retribution beyond death, but of much less practical importance, and surrounded by greater difficulties, is another conspicuous element in the New Testament, viz. the second coming of Christ to raise the dead and judge all men, and to supersede the present order of the material world by a new and permanent and infinitely more glorious order. This element reappears, with marvellous uniformity of vocabulary, phrase, and modes of thought, in all the various types of New Testament teaching.

In all these the retribution which awaits everyone is represented as taking place, not at death, but simultaneously at a definite time in the future, when suddenly with a voice from heaven, waking the dead, Christ will appear from heaven, all nations will be gathered before Him, and on all men He will pronounce judgment; while the present realm of nature will pass away and a permanent one take its place.

All this is very conspicuous in the First Gospel, and somewhat less so in its parallels in the Second and Third. In a document differing widely from them in thought and phrase, it reappears in John v. 28, 29, vi. 39, 40, 44, 54, xi. 24, xxi. 22: in remarkable agreement with the mention of "resurrection" in Matt. xxii. 30, 31; Mark xii. 25, 26; Luke xiv. 14, xx. 35, 36. It is very conspicuous, clothed in the same phraseology, in the letters of Paul, and in his addresses as recorded in Acts xvii. 31, xxiv. 15, 21. Similarly, in a very different environment, in Rev. i. 7, vi. 17, xx. 11-15, xxii. 12.



This remarkable agreement of various and very different writers reveals the unanimous confidence of the early Christians that Christ would return to raise and judge the dead. The argument in 1 Cor. xv. proves that a resurrection on the last day was an essential part of the gospel preached by Paul. But to us it presents insoluble difficulties. To the apostles and their companions these difficulties were lessened by an expectation of the early return of Christ, which finds expression in Matt. x. 23, xvi. 28, xxiv. 36; 1 Thess. iv. 15; 1 Cor. xv. 51. It is modified, however, by 2 Cor. v. 9, Phil. i. 20-23, Acts xx. 29, where Paul contemplates his own death as possible or certain; and in Matt. xxv. 19, Luke xxi. 24, which suggest delay.

This expectation was not realised. The promise of the abiding presence of Christ in Matt. xxviii. 20, and of the Paraclete in John xiv. 16, etc., was fulfilled in the gift of the Spirit at Pentecost, and in the immense influence of Christianity, turning back the whole course of human life from the ruin into which in His day it was helplessly sinking, into a new path of sustained progress. But nothing has happened corresponding to the descriptions of the coming of Christ quoted above.

We ask at once, Where are now the faithful servants of Christ who during long centuries have passed within the veil? Paul's answer, in Phil. i. 23, is that they are "with Christ," which is "much better." Yet he speaks, in 2 Tim. iv. 8, of "the crown which the righteous Judge will give me in that day." The position of these uncrowned conquerors is a difficulty I cannot solve. But it casts no shadow of doubt on the confident hope, throughout the New Testament and all Christian literature, that endless and infinite blessing awaits the righteous.

Can we go any further than this great elementary principle which underlies all modern religion? If not, we shall throw overboard a very conspicuous element of the teaching of the New Testament. This we dare not do without careful

examination. Something may be learnt from the prophecies in the Old Testament and the measure of their fulfilment. This differed greatly both from the expectation of Israel and from the letter of the prophecies. But the fulfilment surpassed infinitely both expectation and letter. And the reality could not have been put before those to whom the prophecies were given in any form better than the words used by the prophets.

For example, the prophecies recorded in Jer. xxxi. 31-40, Isa. lx.-lxii., whatever be their date, prove that in the nation's deepest darkness, while Jerusalem lay in ruins, there were men in Israel who foresaw that from the apparently ruined race there should go forth, superseding the old Covenant, on which rested all the religious advantages and superiority of Israel, a new and better Covenant, placing man in a new relation to God, and announcing for all men pardon of sins, a life-giving knowledge of God, and infinite and universal blessing. In the Gospel of Christ, in the spread of Christianity, and in the blessings thus conferred on all Christian nations, now spreading rapidly over the whole world, these prophecies have already received a fulfilment far beyond all human foresight in the prophets' days. But the fulfilment has been, not in details, but in broad principles.

In view of this fulfilment, we turn now to prophecies in the New Testament still unfulfilled. It must be at once admitted that the expectation of the return of Christ cannot have in our thought the place it had in the days of the apostles. For we have no indication of His return to judge the world in our day. Indeed, this is practically shut out by Paul's argument in 2 Thess. ii. 3. For nothing now existing bears any resemblance to "the apostasy" there mentioned, or to the revelation of "the lawless one" in ver. 8. The arguments adduced by some for the approaching appearance of Christ are a mere play on words and numbers.

The only practical question is whether the teaching of the New Testament about the second coming of Christ has any



moral or religious worth to us. In my view, the all-important doctrine of exact retribution beyond death for all actions, good or bad, in the present life, could not be so well set before the minds of average men and women of all ages, in any form other than something like the symbolic visions of judgment in Matt. xxv. 31-46, Rev. xx. 11-15, and others similar. These pictures have in all ages been effective means of moral education.

We may go a few steps further. "The *revelation* of the Lord Jesus from heaven," in 2 Thess. i. 7, must be a raising or rending of the *veil* which now hides from mortal view the eternal realities beyond it—a bursting in, upon the visible universe, of the greater Unseen beyond and above it, in order that the Invisible may transform and glorify the Visible. This expectation implies, and is the strongest expression of, a conviction that above the visible universe is a greater world unseen; and that the present order of things, in which so many generations have lived and died, will be superseded by an order infinitely greater, more permanent, and more glorious than that which we see around us. This conviction is the foundation of the Christian hope. In all ages this hope has been a great moral force. And its force has been greatly increased by the visions in the New Testament of the day of judgment, the doom of the lost, and the city of God.

The return of Christ will be a complete and abiding victory and dominion of mind over matter. In the present life the nobler element of our nature is fettered and limited by the lower. We now learn that this inversion is only transitory and preparatory. Still more conspicuously will it be an absolute and endless victory of good over evil. It will thus be a full and permanent realisation of the creative purpose of God, who made man spirit and body, in order that the spirit might rule the body and make it the organ of the spirit's self-manifestation, to the end that thus spirit and body might attain their highest well-being.

It may be objected that the above suggestions are only

an attempt to conceal our ignorance of the future awaiting us. But all human knowledge is surrounded, at a short distance on every side, by impenetrable mystery. Yet we know something. And what we know is sufficient to guide us safely through the intricacies of life. Along this path we welcome every ray of light. And in the teaching of the New Testament about the second coming of Christ many a pilgrim has found help. In the above suggestions I have indicated what seem to me helpful elements. The chief point seems to be that the final and glorious consummation promised in the New Testament is to be realised, not in the gradual amelioration of evils around us—although for this we must work and may confidently hope—but in an altogether new order of things, for which the order around us is but a temporary preparation.

The whole subject is fully discussed in a volume by me entitled *The Last Things*, of which several editions have been published by Hodder & Stoughton.

The practical value to-day, as for long ages past, of the doctrine of the second coming of Christ and the great assize, is a symbolic setting forth of the great doctrine of retribution beyond death. This matter has been greatly complicated by the baseless theory of the immortality of the soul; and by the reluctance of many influential and able teachers either to disown or to discuss this theory, or to acknowledge the great change which in recent years has passed over modern thought about the doom of the lost. Practically no one now ventures or wishes to assert their endless suffering. But many refuse to admit the change or to state their own opinions.

This reticence about the above and other important matters in which great changes of opinion have taken place is a chief cause of the mental unrest of which many complain as a hindrance to effective evangelistic work. In times of theological transition it is all-important that the leaders of thought state plainly and without reserve, to all sincere inquirers, what opinions once prevalent have been abandoned



and for what reasons, and what other opinions have taken their place. Those who enjoy the advantages of sacred scholarship are bound, by their loyalty to Him who said, "I am the truth," and who came "to bear witness to the truth," to give to men and women in the weary conflict of life, as fully as they can, the best results of their research. If this were done, it would appear that modern scholarship has not robbed the Church of anything worth having, and has saved it from many difficulties which in days gone by have pressed very heavily on some very godly and thoughtful people. This broader and deeper knowledge of the real significance and worth of the Christian Scriptures is a precious gift of God to the age in which we live. We must prove ourselves to be not unworthy of it.

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# ON WHAT PRINCIPLE ARE WE TAXED?

## A PLEA FOR A NEW SYNTHESIS.

JAMES CUNNISON.

THE argument in this paper falls into three parts:

- I. A statement of the generally accepted theory that the ideal system of taxation is one that expresses "justice," and that justice is to be attained by taxing individuals according to their "ability."
- II. A discussion of the possibility of attaining such an ideal in a system of taxation which demands measurement of quantity. Illustrations of the fact that recent Budgets are departing from the "ability" criterion.
- III. An attempt to interpret the new taxation experiments as implying a dynamic in place of a static ideal of taxation.

### I.

One would not be disposed to quarrel with the assertion that the State exists to maintain the general interest, bearing in mind that the general interest includes the particular interests of individuals and groups. The assertion is so far non-committal. Both Socialists and their opponents would probably agree, though they would put different interpretations upon the phrase "maintain the general interest." The function of the State, in other words, is the preservation and the



furtherance of justice. But owing to the variety of the actual the one purpose of the State breaks up into many differences of State activity. The general purpose must be expressed in this and in that. The State is policeman, and road-mender, and shipowner, and tax-collector; and there is a question whether it can or ought to attempt to express complete justice in each of its activities, or only to aim at justice in the sum total of them. It is at least conceivable that the alteration of relations to secure justice as between one set of individuals and another may cause maladjustment in other spheres.

At a first glance, this seems to present little difficulty in the case of taxation. For taxation seems to stand as complementary to all the varied activities of the State, to sum up in itself one whole side of the relationship between State and individuals. On the one hand we have the services performed by the State to its members: these are many. On the other side is taxation, which may be assumed (an assumption to be corrected below) to be the source of all State income, and the complement, therefore, of the good which individuals enjoy at the hands of the State. If, then, the function of the State is to preserve justice, taxation must be just. And, indeed, this view is accepted, and there is probably no criticism which the Chancellor of the Exchequer would more emphatically repudiate than that his system is unjust.

This granted, the next thing is to decide what form of taxation will give the best expression of justice. At first, and so long as the relation of State to individual was conceived as one of externality, the solution was looked for by analogy with the economic method. In economics, a rough approximation to justice in exchange is expressed in price, which measures service against service. Justice in taxation, on the same principle, was believed to be secured by a system in which the individual gave economic value, measured in terms of money, for State services. One bought one's goods over the State counter, and paid for them in taxation. But since

then, political philosophy has revised her notions, and has decided that the relation of State to individual is different from the relation of individual to individual in an economic act of exchange. The former is an organic relation, with all that that implies. Among its implications, the one relevant to our purpose is that the services of the whole to the part are of a kind which cannot be assessed at exchange value; and therefore the ideal of taxation according to benefit falls. But, on the other hand, the organic idea suggests a new statement of taxation theory. Since the individual owes his all to the State, the measure of just taxation is not the payment for this or that benefit, but contribution according to his ability. Let him give to the State as he would give to his family, that is, in proportion to the means which through the activities of the State he is enabled to gain and to retain. This view was first clearly expressed by Adam Smith, who said: "The subjects of every State ought to contribute towards the support of the government as nearly as possible in proportion to their respective abilities"; and he defined it thus: "that is, in proportion to the revenues which they respectively enjoy under the protection of the State." And soon the aim came to be expressed negatively, namely: "To induce equality of sacrifice on the part of individuals."

Thus we arrive at the generally accepted form of a just system of taxation. But it still remains to give content to the form; to show how in practice equality of sacrifice is to be brought about; and this involves the difficult problem of measurement.

## II.

Granting, then, that justice in taxation is to be obtained by inducing equal sacrifice on the part of individuals, how is this to be measured? Measurement deals in quantities; whereas the notion of sacrifice implies qualitative elements which are subjective in the sense that their value is known to and can be estimated by the individual only, if even by him. This diffi-



culty of comparing different qualities in terms of quantities of a commodity is one which makes itself felt even in the sphere of economics,<sup>1</sup> where we are dealing with the relatively simple process of exchanging one good for another. Whenever one buys or sells an article, whenever one compares alternative ways of spending, whenever one balances goods against goods, enjoyment against enjoyment, satisfaction against satisfaction, one is making a qualitative choice, which one somehow translates into terms of quantities. We are not concerned here to explain the process. But the point serves to indicate how much greater is the difficulty when we set out to cause equality of sacrifice on the part of different individuals by taking from them compulsorily a part of their income.

For purposes of taxation we simplify things. At a blow we change a thing which is subjective and qualitative into one that is objective and capable of quantitative expression. In other words, we take a man's money income as a criterion of his ability to support the State, and we endeavour to induce equality of sacrifice by compelling him to yield up to the State a certain portion of his income. But in so doing we are touching a delicate business with rough fingers. We simplify things by ignoring difficulties. First, we omit all the other kinds of income which a man holds through the protection of the State, all the non-measurable elements in the sum-total of the things which he enjoys; and we think only of his money income. This point we shall consider later. Secondly, even on this basis we seek in vain to reach equality of sacrifice, for we ignore the unique character of subjective valuations, and consider them as on a dead level and capable of measurement.

A. This second point I take first. I wish to show that, assuming that money income is the whole of a man's income, even then no method of taxation can bring about equality of sacrifice. What methods have been tried? Apart from the

<sup>1</sup> Cf. HIBBERT JOURNAL, April 1913: "How is Wealth to be Valued?" by Mr J. A. Hobson.

poll tax, two lines of procedure have been held out as likely to secure justice in taxation on the basis of ability. The first is proportional taxation, the second progressive taxation, or one of its variants. On the first method, it was believed that justice would be attained by taking from all individuals a uniform percentage of their incomes; but the introduction into economics of the conception of marginal utility gave the death-blow to this idea. The marginal conception, by connecting desire with the supply of things on which the desire depends for its fulfilment, shows how, with every increase in the stock of the desired thing which one possesses, the desire for the unit of increment diminishes. This conception is obviously true of the desire for any single class of object, as for example food or furniture; and though its application is not so clear in the case of desire for more income, inasmuch as income is potentially the means of meeting any desire, yet the marginal conception claims to be valid here also. It is pointed out that 5 per cent. of a millionaire's income is of much less utility to him than £5 is to the man with £100 income. Consequently, to give greater definiteness to our ideas we have to say that justice in taxation is to be secured by inducing "equi-marginal sacrifice," and this proportional taxation obviously fails to do.

Hence we get the idea of progressive taxation as a better approach to the ideal, and in income tax we take a greater proportion from higher incomes than from lower. Yet while this method causes something nearer equality of sacrifice, it fails to attain the ideal, and its failure is due simply to the inherent nature of the case. It is true that on the whole, as income increases, the utility of the marginal unit of income falls. The utility of a sovereign is less to me if I have £1000 than if I have only £100. But the extent to which the utility falls, the rapidity with which it falls, and the regularity or irregularity of its fall, all depend on subjective considerations which vary from individual to individual, and even vary in the same individual at different



times and under different conditions. The level of the marginal utility, says one of our clearest exponents of the marginal theory, depends on "the relation existing between a man's wants and the resources or provision he has to meet them. . . . The value of an additional sovereign to a rich man, for instance, is very small, simply because he has few wants that remain unsatisfied. The same is the case if wants are what we might call 'weak.' To the plain liver, the value of the additional sovereign is perhaps as small as to the rich man."<sup>1</sup> Or take as illustration the case of a single individual under varying circumstances. At the £300 level the calls for necessary expenditure may be few, and he may be able to afford an occasional theatre, or even a trip to the Continent; the marginal utility of his income is relatively low. The same individual with a £1000 income may be brought into such social connections that he must keep a motor and a manservant, and incur such other additional items of expenditure as reduce his surplus and cause even a rise in marginal utilities. At the best it cannot be said that even for the single individual the fall in marginal utilities with increasing income is either regular or continuous; and the same difficulty occurs *a fortiori* in the case of different individuals. Thus there is no mathematical scale of decreased utility with increased wealth. The condition of such a mathematical relation would be that there was one uniform scale of wants, each of which pressed equally on all individuals, and could be satisfied only in a certain way. But this condition is absent.

The result, therefore, is that no single person, no Chancellor of the Exchequer, can measure the variations in the marginal utilities of the different incomes; these depend on the nature of individual wants, standard of living, etc. Therefore no person can calculate the amount of sacrifice undergone by any individual through the compulsory payment of a certain proportion of his income. Hence, even progressive taxation may fail to correspond with the diminishing utilities of money

<sup>1</sup> Professor Smart, *The Theory of Value*, third edition, p. 40.

to the richer classes. We cannot know. Owing to the nature of the subject-matter, we are necessarily ignorant whether equality of sacrifice is in any particular case attained by any system of taxation. If it is attained, it is more by chance than by knowledge.

B. To return now to the first point. We have seen that even by simplifying the problem and assuming that a man's money income is all that he holds under the protection of the State, any system of taxation must necessarily fail to bring about equality of sacrifice, and therefore, on the orthodox hypothesis, to embody justice. Much more is this true when we remember that the money income of an individual is only a part of his true income. In taxation the State lays no direct claim upon the many kinds of skill, possessions, talents, faculties,<sup>1</sup> with the manifold personal wealth that is contained in them and is tinged with subjective sentiment.<sup>2</sup> The ideal is an equal contribution by all of that which they possess. But we tax only that form of a man's wealth which can be translated into terms of money. The reason of this is, of course, apparent. It is simply that those other things are not capable of objective expression, and therefore do not submit to the Chancellor's method. We, therefore, because of the difficulties, ignore them altogether, and fix our attention on that part of his wealth which we can measure. But the impossibility of measuring those other elements, the impossibility, therefore, of assessing them for taxation, is just a proof of the impossibility of attaining that justice in a system of taxation which is expressed in the term "equal sacrifice." For, obviously, those things are as much part of his wealth as the merely material things which we can measure. Obviously, again, they are enjoyed by him under the protection of the State. By way of illustration it is necessary only to contrast the case of the professional man who, in addition to receiving an income for his work, gets also enjoyment and satisfaction

<sup>1</sup> And one might add "leisure or enjoyment from occupation."

<sup>2</sup> Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, § 299, note.



in every hour of its performance, with the case of the man whose work is all toil and drudgery, for whom satisfaction from his work is to be represented negatively. Each, we may assume, is through his work benefiting society: and yet the one receives income plus satisfaction; the other, little or no satisfaction, and probably a smaller income.

C. If we now revert to our first assumption that in taxation we have the sole contribution of the individual to the State and make the necessary correction, we shall see that from this side also large elements are omitted, and that in considering what the individual does for the State we are apt to look again only at those things which can be measured in money. The accepted ideal of justice in taxation is contribution to the State in proportion to one's capacity to support oneself. But the only measure of such sacrifice which the State can apply consists in the money contributions in the form of taxes. There is no test which can actually gauge all the non-monetary contributions of each individual to the good of the State. For instance, there is the benefit an individual does by being a good citizen, promoting security, furthering the industrial work of the State, adding to its knowledge—every sacrifice which he makes in accordance with the law. On the other hand are the negative contributions of the bad citizen, of him who, though perhaps paying a large sum of money in taxation, nevertheless by his bad social conduct, by his standing in the way of better conditions, may be taking more real wealth from the community than he contributes to it. That is, in practical working we have failed, as we must fail, to apply the teaching of the organic theory of society in this matter of taxation. Theoretically we have acknowledged the truth that the relation of the society to individuals belongs to a higher category than the mechanical, that the services rendered by the State to the individual are not merely measurable benefits, and that therefore the crude benefit theory of taxation is wrong. We have also grasped in theory the complementary truth that the relation of the individual to

society is also something higher than a mechanical relation ; that the services actually rendered by the individual to society are more than his definite measurable contributions in the way of taxation, and that therefore for a complete expression of justice as between individual and State the immeasurable contributions would have to be taken into account. The individual receives from the State more than this or that benefit, but he also gives to the State more than taxes. But the measurement of these relative contributions is impossible, because they cannot be reduced to quantitative terms. And this just means that taxation, which must necessarily be based on a measurable foundation, cannot in itself give expression to social justice.

To sum up so far: (1) We have seen that the accepted criterion of justice in taxation is ability to contribute to the support of the State, this ability being measured by money income. (2) This assumes that money income is the sole income which a man enjoys. Granting this assumption for the moment, we saw that even then no system of taxation could express justice because of the varying utilities of money to different people, and because there must therefore be inequalities of sacrifice as a result of any uniform system of taxation. (3) Next we took up the point that money income is not the sole wealth of a man ; what he enjoys under the protection of the State embraces many non-quantitative elements which can never be assessed, but which would have to be assessed if justice in taxation were to be attained. (4) Finally, on the other side, we have seen that neither are taxes the only contributions of a man to the community. He does other things for its benefit.

So far, therefore, our conclusion is that if according to accepted doctrine justice is to be attained by taxing individuals according to their ability to pay, then justice in taxation is unattainable.

The question that remains is whether after all this is the true ideal of taxation.



It may be of interest first to note that in actual practice our Chancellors have departed far from the Smithian maxim, and seem to be expressing some new ideal of taxation which has not yet received definition. Can we grip it and put it into words? The following are a few illustrations of the fact that there exist items in our Budgets which do not fall under the equal-sacrifice principle.

A. From the orthodox view it necessarily follows that taxation should be raised for revenue only. If it is imposed for any other purpose—to penalise a man, for instance, for making his income in a particular way, to effect an alteration in the distribution of wealth, to improve taste, to benefit health, or to elevate morals—then it is introducing an ulterior motive, and is not taxation according to ability. Taxation on the orthodox view must not be so imposed as to cause one man to sacrifice more than another. It should be a money levy, based on ability to pay, and therefore it should be for revenue only. But, while granting this, our Chancellors have introduced into their Budgets various items which are not based on the ability criterion. Such, for example, is the differential treatment of earned and unearned income.<sup>1</sup> Smith's maxim comes down to us from a time when it was conceived that the individual was hedged about with rights and that the Government should not inquire into the sources of a man's wealth. It was all one whether a man made his money breaking stones, inventing engines, writing books, or receiving rents. The amount of the income was the sole question with which the State had any concern; its source, or the manner in which it was made, it had nothing to do with. On this view, and on the ability criterion which followed from it, the heavier taxation of unearned income is unjustifiable; and we must either return to our ability theory and attempt to bring

<sup>1</sup> I am aware that the differential treatment of unearned and earned income has been held to be only an extension of the ability principle, on the ground that the former is secure and the latter insecure. But any change in economic conditions which affects earned also reacts on unearned income.

about equal sacrifice on the part of all, or we must subsume our differential treatment under a new principle.

B. A second illustration of the introduction of an ulterior motive is to be found in the new Land Value Duties imposed under the Finance Act 1909-10, with the various exemptions allowed according to the uses to which the land is put. This is clearly a departure from the simple ideal of taxation on the basis of income.

C. The foregoing items, and possibly some others,<sup>1</sup> are recent variations. It is perhaps even more striking to reflect that while the ability theory was in the heyday of its favour there existed simultaneously in our system of taxation two distinct measures, namely, the measure of direct and that of indirect taxation. The direct method avowedly aimed at the application of the principle of the equality of sacrifice. The indirect method, a levy on certain common articles of consumption, expenditure on which is proportionately larger in the budget of the poor man than in that of the rich, must have prevented the ability principle from working out in practice. No matter how nearly the direct system came to embodying the criterion of justice, there always remain the indirect taxes to disturb our carefully made calculations. It would be absurd, of course, to pretend that the two systems, direct and indirect, are so arranged as to result in equality of sacrifice on the whole.

In such ways our legislators have in practice consciously departed from the criterion of taxation according to ability. They raise the question whether we are to adhere theoretically to our old criterion, or to advance to a new principle which will embrace and explain the new practice. At any rate, we see that our taxation systems have drifted from the old ideal. The principle of justice as expressed in taxation by ability on a money income basis is given up; or rather, it is

<sup>1</sup> The taxes on the liquor traffic might be cited as cases in point, as intended to discourage an industry which is socially injurious. But it is possible to argue that in such taxes the liquor trade is simply paying an equivalent to the State for the monopoly privileges which it enjoys.



only used as a rough guide and as one principle among a number of others. Further, we have seen reason to believe that the Smithian maxim of ability would not, even if perfectly embodied, yield the desired result. Is there any reason to hope that the new practice is more or less consciously following a better ideal?

### III.

First, I think we must grant that the attainment of perfect justice *in* taxation is impossible. Taxation implies measurement; justice implies the maintenance somehow of certain spiritual relations between individuals, single and in groups. Hence there are two stumbling-blocks to the expression of justice in taxation. (1) We cannot be assured that any contribution of wealth to the State by any individual accurately measures the services of the State to the individual. (2) We cannot be assured that the payments of different individuals to the State involve equality of sacrifice on the part of those individuals.

On the other hand, the ability and equal sacrifice ideas are the best tests which have emerged, and the only ones which give anything like an approximation to justice in taxation. Their failure, therefore, suggests that we have been on a wrong scent. And, indeed, justice as between individuals and State is to be found only in the sum-total of their relations, and not in this or that group of relations or activities. Among such activities, taxation is only one, and to seek to embody complete justice in it on a basis of the present distribution of wealth is a waste of energy. But this still leaves open the question of the ideal of taxation. What is the end, apart from the financial one, which the State ought to aim at in taking compulsory contributions from individuals? We have seen reason to believe that equality of sacrifice cannot be attained. What is our test?

Our past theories of the place of taxation in the State have all been based on a static ideal. We have said, "We, as a

State, pursue certain activities and perform certain services for the members of the State; the wealth of the State is distributed in such and such a way among individuals. Those individuals ought, on the basis of the actual distribution, to pay for the State's services by such contributions as will cause each to sacrifice as much as every other, no more and no less." We have accepted things as they are, and on this basis have tried to make taxation just, and, so far, have left off the quest for justice. We have forgotten that justice cannot be curbed within the bonds of a system of cash relations. Unlike Socrates and his friends, we have looked for it only among our feet and have forgotten that it also lies around us.

The new elements of taxation which I have indicated as forming an important part of recent Budgets, when taken together yield a new ideal of taxation—the ideal of taxation as a dynamic power, which may be used to further social justice in its wider sense. Taxation of unearned at a higher rate than earned income, however it may work out in detail (and that must be tested), is, at any rate, aimed at altering things. It gives up the simple ideal of equal sacrifice on the basis of existing incomes. It substitutes for it the dynamic idea of reducing certain incomes which come to their possessors in certain ways. The system of death duties, likewise, has departed from the old ideal, and aims at altering the degree of wealth of different people. Together these two items are aiming at a redistribution of wealth; they are being used as a dynamic to bring about a greater expression of social justice.

Similarly, the revaluation of the land of the country with the purpose of imposing taxes on the basis of the new valuation has in view an economic result. It is, probably, an attempt at forcing land into more productive uses. Again, the particular method of obtaining the result is open to criticism. But the idea of using taxation as a means of changing economic conditions is obviously in the mind of our Chancellors. It would seem, therefore, that we have substituted a dynamic for a static ideal of taxation. We are



giving up the attempt to express an abstract justice within a system of taxation based on a distribution of wealth conceived to be fixed and eternal. We are substituting for it the attempt to use taxation as one instrument among others for furthering social justice. It were well that the change should be generally recognised, that we should not simply slide into the new system unaware of the tremendous change of principle which it involves. Are we prepared to throw up our old theory? Are we prepared to say that taxation is a proper instrument to use for the purpose of changing social relations, even in order to bring about a greater realisation of justice in society?

If we accept the new ideal we shall have many difficulties to face. There are first certain political and personal difficulties. If we are to use taxation for this purpose, it will be necessary to state quite frankly what it is proposed to do; to confess that it is being used for "confiscation," or in order to "rob the rich." And the rich will have to be induced to accept the position. Perhaps, after all, that is not an insuperable difficulty. There is at the present time probably a larger amount of real social sympathy than at any other time in our history; many a rich man of to-day needs only to be convinced that a new measure is of real social value to bring himself into line. And the attitude of the *Times* to the latest Budget is significant.

But there are two somewhat graver troubles. One is, that the new ideal would add greatly to the responsibilities of the Government, or perhaps of the Chancellor of the Exchequer himself—for there is a great difference between the task of measuring incomes and proportioning taxation on the basis of an accepted ideal, and that of formulating a continuously progressive ideal and attempting to work it out.

And this raises the problem of continuity. If the two strongest parties in the State are to stand, the one for social change, the other for conservatism in social affairs, then we should have the exhibition of successive Chancellors opposing each other, each nullifying the work of his predecessor. But

recent signs seem to point to the fact that even the traditionally conservative party is alive to the need for social reform ; and the utterances of the present leader of the Opposition seem to indicate that even on such a measure as the Insurance Act the Opposition would think twice before attempting a complete reversal of the Government's policy.

But the greatest difficulty would be that of defining the limit. If taxation can be used to alter the distribution of wealth and to effect other social changes, where is the line to be drawn ? Several controlling forces will have to be carefully watched. I mention only one. It would have to be remembered that the instrument of taxation used as a dynamic must look not only to the redistribution of existing wealth, but must consider also the inflowing stream of wealth, which is the source of all income. Hence, if it were to be found from a study of incidence that any particular tax resulted in a limitation of the supply of capital for industrial work, there would be a case for reconsidering that tax. We must not kill the goose that lays the golden egg. Of course, such an accusation as this is more frequently made than substantiated. It is connected with the curious assumption that Government expenditure is waste. But the point is of importance, and would have to be kept in mind.

Such difficulties, therefore, would arise, but they are not insoluble. And, in any case, we must face the situation ; we must realise that the new system has actually begun, and that the change would be not from an old and tried ideal to a new and risky one, but from a haphazard system without any recognised guiding principle to the conscious acceptance and deliberate working out of an ideal which that system already implies.

JAMES CUNNISON.

WOODBROOKE, BIRMINGHAM.



## SCHWEITZER AS MISSIONARY.

THE REV. W. MONTGOMERY, M.A., B.D.

DR ALBERT SCHWEITZER is well known to readers of the HIBBERT JOURNAL as the author of *The Quest of the Historical Jesus*, which a few years ago fluttered the theological dovescotes and forced upon us once for all the importance of eschatology. Abroad, he is perhaps even more widely known as a musical critic of distinction who has written a large book on Bach and several smaller studies, has been organist to the Paris Bach Society, and has given recitals in most of the capitals of Europe.

He now claims our interest in a new character: as a missionary in Equatorial Africa—and, moreover, a medical missionary. It is characteristic of the man that, having decided to go abroad, he set to work patiently to make himself thoroughly efficient, taking his M.D. at the University of Strasburg and going through a post-graduate course in tropical medicine in Paris.

He has now been working for about a year at Lambaréné on the Ogowé river, in the Ogooué-Gabun district of the region formerly known as the French Congo, but now, I believe, officially designated French Equatorial Africa. His position is entirely undenominational—to use his own phrase, inter-confessional; but, realising the immense waste involved in purely individualistic effort, cut adrift from all organisation, he has made, and is fortunate in having been able to make, a most practical arrangement. The Mission Évangélique of

Paris—readers of Miss Kingsley's *West African Travels* will recall her somewhat exceptional praise of this mission—gives him the use of premises (dwelling-house and hospital building) in return for medical services to their staff, both European and native. He receives no financial subvention from the Society, and his general work among the natives as medical missionary is entirely under his own control. As this is a point which will interest the readers of this Journal, I quote his own words: "The means for the support of the undertaking are entirely derived from funds provided by contributors of various nationalities and Confessions. I thank them from my heart, not only for giving, but for uniting their efforts in spite of these divisive barriers, and so making it possible that a work which in its essential conception is purely humanitarian, international, and inter-confessional, and therefore 'religious' in the widest and deepest sense of the word, should also be carried out upon those lines."

Since going abroad Dr Schweitzer has sent home for the benefit of those interested two descriptive letters. They are written with his accustomed literary verve, and give the vivid impressions of a keen intellect in touch with new conditions. But before I begin to quote from them, some readers may like to have a glimpse of "the man behind the document." Imagine, then, a tall, handsome, powerfully built man of about forty, with an easy, natural manner. He studied in Berlin and Paris as well as Strasburg, and his various interests have brought him in contact with all sorts and classes of people, and led to his travelling over most of the Continent, so that, in the favourable acceptance of the term, he is a man of the world. An Alsatian by birth, and resident for long periods in Paris, he speaks French as readily as German. It need hardly be said that he is an interesting talker, but beyond that he is one of those men whose personality tells directly. The impression which one receives from him, first, last, and all the time, is one of immense but well-disciplined energy. In any company he would "count," and in any circumstances would



not be negligible. Some of those who have read his books with interest have expressed to me their regret that a man of his abilities, in taking up missionary work, should not have gone to one of the older civilisations, where his intellectual powers would have had more scope. Having met him, I do not feel this. Brilliant as he undoubtedly is, his intellectual powers are less exceptional than his vigour, his power of self-projection. And it is among a primitive population that this particular quality tells most. "The natives," as my wife remarked after first meeting him, "won't have a chance with Herr Schweitzer; they'll just have to be converted!" Allowing for the fact that a compulsory conversion of a particular type does not enter into Schweitzer's ideals, that remark sums up one's impression admirably. His influence is bound to be immense.

But it is time that Dr Schweitzer should speak for himself. I must not linger over his *impressions de voyage*, but one or two of them may be quoted for their literary quality, or as throwing further light on his personality.

"At two o'clock on the quiet Saturday in Easter week we took our places in the train for Paris. When the cathedral [of Strasburg] disappeared from view it seemed to me as if I were already in a strange land. And yet I had so often looked back at it from this point on the line, to accustom myself to the thought that I should one day look my last on it for a long time."

Some such touch of *Heimweh* is known to every normally constituted man, but there is a hint of self-revelation in the fact that it had been discounted beforehand in imagination.

On board the steamer, Schweitzer and his wife found themselves the only "new chums" among a company of old colonials. It was like being a new boy at school. But one gathers that Schweitzer was soon sized up as the right stuff when one finds that an army staff-surgeon gave him two hours every morning, going over the whole field of tropical medicine and detailing his experiments and experiences—Schweitzer notebook in hand and profiting by his opportunities.

A hint of humour often adds its touch of contrast effect to picturesque descriptions. (When the steamer was getting under weigh at Teneriffe :) "I stood in the bows and watched the anchor slowly drag itself loose and come up through the transparent water. Just then, I noticed a bluish bird which hovered gracefully over the waves ahead of us. A sailor told me that it was a flying-fish. Thus I had my first sight of this fabulous creature upon the first of April."

The following is from the last stage of the journey, on the Ogowé river-steamer :

"Water and primeval forest! Who could properly describe his impressions? We feel as if we were dreaming. Landscapes from the antediluvian world, such as one has seen somewhere in imaginary drawings, here become living reality. . . . A heron flaps lazily up-stream, and alights upon a dead tree; small white-and-blue birds hover over the water; high above circle a pair of fish-eagles. There! I cannot be mistaken. From a palm tree there depend, there swing, two monkeys' tails. And now their owners come into view. This, beyond question, is authentic Africa!"

There is a lively and pleasing little description of his first meeting with his fellow-missionaries, which, though I have quoted it elsewhere, must not be omitted :

"Suddenly I saw a long canoe, paddled by a crew of boys who were singing lustily, shoot round the steamer's bow—so quickly, indeed, that the white man in the stern had barely time to duck his head and clear the mooring-rope. This is Herr Christol with the junior division of the boys' school; behind comes a boat with Herr Ellenberger, rowed by the senior division. The boys had raced with one another and the juniors had won, having received the handicap of the lighter boat. So they had the honour of rowing home the doctor and his wife. The others brought the baggage. What bright young faces!"

Arrived at his destination, Dr Schweitzer was not long in getting to work—at first in a disused hen-house by way of



dispensary! Plans had been made for a temporary hospital, but a little experience convinced Schweitzer that the site chosen was unsuitable. There was no one on the spot who had authority to alter the arrangement, and it was in fact a matter of some delicacy, since Schweitzer is, as has been explained above, in a sense the guest of the Mission. Fortunately, the meeting of a conference of missionaries at a station some seventy kilometres up-stream gave an opportunity to get the requisite authority.

I shall quote the description of the journey to this conference, as it is both interesting in itself and brings in several points characteristic of the conditions of life and travel. "On a misty morning, two hours before daylight, the big canoe which was to take Ellenberger, Christol, Ottmann, and myself to Samkita pushed off from the landing-stage. In the forward part of the canoe we four sat one behind the other, in deck chairs. Amidships were stowed our tin boxes, folded camp-beds, sleeping-mats, and the crew's provision of bananas. In the after part stood the paddlers, six in a row. They sang as they paddled, a song which described where we were going to, and who was on board, interweaving with this information complaints at being roused so early, and having such a hard day's work before them! We had been perhaps an hour under way, the chant of the rowers and the movement had just lulled me to sleep, when suddenly the boat brought up with a bump upon a tree trunk lying beneath the surface of the water. It was held about the centre by a stout branch, and swung round upon it in a circle. After a while the natives of the nearest village came off through the darkness to help us. They took us off, one after another, into their boat in order to lighten ours. As I was sitting furthest forward, I was the last to move. Scarcely was I out of the boat when the bow tilted up, and we were able to back her off. 'This was the father of the load,' cried the natives; 'we ought to have begun with him!'

"As we came out of the backwater into the main stream,

day was breaking. Along the edge of the great sandbank, some three hundred yards ahead of us, I saw some black lines moving in the water. At once the chant of the rowers ceased as if at a word of command. What we saw were hippopotami taking their morning bath. The natives dread them greatly, and will make a wide detour to avoid them, since they are uncertain-tempered brutes, and will often attack and destroy a canoe.

“I spent a good deal of the time in writing letters, somewhat irked by the necessity of making sure every moment that my sun-umbrella and helmet were protecting my head and neck properly, since the rays of the sun were scorching.

“With the sun the tse-tse fly had come out. Compared to it the worst mosquitoes are innocent creatures. The tse-tse is half as big again as our common house-fly, which it resembles in appearance, except that the wings do not lie parallel to one another but are exactly superimposed when folded, and come to a point one above the other. It will pierce the thickest cloth to get at blood. At the same time it is extremely wary and dodges a blow from the hand with great agility. The moment it feels that the body on which it has alighted is making the slightest movement it darts off at once and hides itself on the side of the boat. The flight is noiseless. A small whisk is the only thing with which one can protect oneself to some extent. The fly is so cautious that it avoids settling on a light background on which it would be easily seen. For this reason white clothes are the best protection from it. This observation I found fully confirmed on the present voyage. Two of us were wearing white, the other two yellow. The former scarcely had a tse-tse light upon them, the others were constantly persecuted. The negroes suffered most. As is well known, the *glossina palpalis*, the disseminator of sleeping-sickness, is a species of tse-tse.”

With the heavily laden boat the journey took longer than was expected. “Instead of being at Samkita, as we had hoped, about six, we were overtaken by darkness, lost our way among



the sandbanks, and only gained clear water again after round-about wanderings. At last, about nine o'clock, a light appeared moving along the shore. We called out, and learned that we were already abreast of the river-front of Samkita. During the last two hours of this night-journey I had been uneasy. I could not help thinking constantly of our poor weary rowers. Every time the leader shouted to urge them on it seemed to me like a blow falling on an overdriven horse. As I make a practice of paddling myself on shorter journeys, I can form an idea of what such a long day's work means."

Several points just touched on in this narrative receive fuller illustration elsewhere in the letter. For instance, there is the chant of the rowers. This is not merely a device to aid the rhythm; it is a regular means of spreading news among the river-side natives. Schweitzer tells how when he needed leaf-mats for the roofing of his hospital he advertised his need by telling his patients when on their homeward way to be sure and chant loudly the Doctor's requirements as they passed alongside of villages. Sometimes the natives interweave in these chants remarks on the character of the various white men who live along the river. On one occasion the mission made a most successful appointment of a plantation-manager whose virtues had become known to the missionaries in this way.

Submerged trees such as the one which so nearly caused a serious accident in this case form one of the commonest dangers of navigation. When a tree is felled by the river-side and the thickest portion of the trunk is sawn off for timber, the upper part with its spreading branches is often carelessly allowed to float off, and, becoming fixed in a nearly upright position, forms a most dangerous snag.

A still more dreaded though less constant danger is caused by the hippopotami. "A missionary formerly stationed at Lambaréné used to laugh at the fears of his boatmen and urge them to go nearer to the beasts. But once, just as he was chaffing them, the boat was suddenly heaved into the air

by a hippopotamus which rose beneath it ; and the missionary and his crew escaped with the utmost difficulty. Part of the bottom of the boat, with the hole which the beast made in the thick planking, was afterwards sawn out and kept as a memento."

Schweitzer himself on one occasion came to rather closer quarters with the beasts than he could have wished.

Returning late from a river journey, he determined to save a two hours' detour by going through a narrow channel which was usually avoided on account of the strong current and of its being a favourite haunt of the hippopotami. "Scarcely had we reached the entrance to the narrows when two hippopotami rose some thirty yards from us. The rowers urged the boat along the further side of the stream, where, however, we had to face the full strength of the current. The hippos moved parallel to us, swimming along the opposite bank. We could only make headway by inches. The whole scene had something wonderfully fine and exciting about it. In the middle of the current several palm trees which had run aground rose out of the water, swaying to and fro like rushes. Along the bank the primeval forest stood up like a black wall. From above poured down the brilliant moonlight. The rowers panted with their efforts and encouraged one another with low cries ; the hippos raised their monstrous heads out of the water and eyed us angrily. The narrow channel was only some fifty yards in length, but it was a quarter of an hour before we struggled clear of it. A parting roar from the hippos urged us on our way. I vowed that I would never again boggle at a detour of a couple of hours to avoid these interesting beasts. But I should not like to have missed the weird beauty of those exciting moments."

The fierce power of the tropical sun, and the danger of even momentary exposure to it, is illustrated by many examples, but perhaps the following curious psychological observation of Schweitzer's brings home the impression to us most vividly : "I used formerly to have only two bad



dreams, which alternated with one another. One was, that I was on the eve of an examination; the other, that I had come on parade in civilian dress. Now I have a third—that I am out in the sun without my helmet. I have now reached the stage of being horrified when I see in the illustrated papers pictures of people standing bare-headed in the open air, and it always takes me a moment to realise that in Europe white men can take such liberties with impunity.”

There was a passing reference in connection with the tse-tse fly to sleeping-sickness. This is one of the most dreaded scourges of these regions. It attacks chiefly natives who have been felling timber in the swamps, but it can be spread by infection. Though sleeping-sickness is known to Europeans as, from its hopelessness, a name of dread, it is probably not so generally known that in its second stage it causes intense pain. A strongly-built man told Schweitzer that for months he had cried every night. As yet, science can only offer palliatives; but these often give sufficient relief to evoke much gratitude. Schweitzer finds the disease to be on the increase.

More widespread, and only less dreaded, is leprosy. At the first appearance of the reddish patch which usually announces its presence, the natives will undertake long journeys to seek the doctor's aid. It will, I believe, be a surprise to many non-medical readers to learn to what an extent leprosy, though of course, in the strict sense, incurable, responds to treatment. As, owing to its Biblical and literary associations, its mysterious character, and its comparative rarity but occasional occurrence in Europe, this disease has a kind of sinister fascination for most of us, I shall give Dr Schweitzer's notes in full: “Leprosy is by no means a uniform disease. There are rapid forms, and others in which the development is slow. Here I have generally to do with the latter. In these very marked improvement can be effected. The disease is not difficult to diagnose when one has seen two or three cases. The reddish, sharply-edged patches on the skin are often so

characteristic that they cannot be confused with any other discolorations which are of frequent occurrence in negroes. A very characteristic feature is the insensibility in the middle of the patches and in the extremities of the body. While I am asking some unimportant questions to distract the attention of the patient, I prick with a needle the arms, legs, and patches. If it is a case of leprosy, the patient does not cry out, but goes on talking as if nothing had happened. Of course, in using this means of diagnosis, all nervous diseases which cause insensibility must first be excluded. The needle must afterwards be most carefully sterilised. In advanced cases sores are present. These are surrounded by chapped skin. A typical position for a sore is under the great toe. In doubtful cases the microscope decides. In treatment the drug principally used is Indian chaulmoogra oil mixed in the proportion of seven per cent. with ordinary oil and taken in teaspoonfuls, the dose being increased at intervals of a week. Unfortunately, it has a horrible taste and often causes stomachic and intestinal derangements, so that its use has to be intermitted. The sores and patches are dressed with soaps and unguents containing chaulmoogra oil and bound up. As a tonic I give iron and arsenic. A permanent cure is not obtainable. From time to time the taking of chaulmoogra oil must be resumed. Weakening of the general health, and especially indulgence in alcohol, may cause serious relapses. But a patient who takes good care of himself may in most cases be certain of being little more troubled by his disease. There is no possibility here at present of isolating the sufferers in leper-villages. I impress upon my patients and their families that they must observe the necessary precautions, house the sufferers in a separate hut, use no object they have touched, and not only wash but boil thoroughly every stitch of clothing. If these directions are followed, that is no small gain.

“So far as my experience goes, lepers are the most grateful of patients. The story of the ten lepers does not apply to



the Ogowé. Here they all come back . . . and gratefully press my hand. Sometimes they even make me a present of a fowl, and that means a great deal."

Among the two thousand different patients treated in the first nine months of his work, Schweitzer found practically all European diseases represented — even including whooping-cough! Heart and lung troubles are extremely frequent, and pneumonia supervening upon malaria is often fatal. Ulcers of all kinds, often of a malignancy unusual in Europe, are very common, and the eggs of the sand-flea (jigger) laid under the skin of the foot give rise to painful abscesses which, in the absence of proper treatment, often set up mortification.

In operation cases the mission doctor has of course often to face problems that at home would be relegated to a specialist. "Lately I had a rare case to operate upon which many a famous surgeon might envy. An elderly man living between N'Gomo and Lambaréné suddenly felt a swelling as big as your fist rising under his lowest rib, rather towards the back, accompanied by sudden pain in the body. 'That is a rupture,' he said to his friends; 'take me quickly to the doctor, or I'm lost.'

"They rowed the whole night, and got to me about ten o'clock in the morning. I could only confirm his impression, and made up my mind to perform the rarely attempted and still more rarely successful operation that same afternoon. How willingly would I have left it to an experienced surgeon! It was with trepidation that I went to work. The case exhibited all possible complications. When evening came I had not finished. For the last sutures Joseph had to hold the lamp. The next day I hardly dared to go into the dormitory. I expected nothing else than to find the patient dead or dying. With hesitating steps I approached the mosquito-netting. But immediately there was poked out from it a woolly head and cheerfully grinning countenance. 'Doctor, no more stomach-ache, no more stomach-ache!' At the end of a fortnight he was able to return to his village."

In his surgical work Dr Schweitzer is ably seconded by his

wife, who has had a thorough hospital training. "The completion of the temporary hospital at last permits the 'Frau Doktor' to exercise her office freely. In the hen-house which hitherto had to serve there was scarcely room for Joseph and myself at the same time. The 'Frau Doktor' has the whole of the instruments and linens under her charge; she prepares for operations and performs the duties of anæsthetist. She appears punctually at ten o'clock, stays till twelve, and is very strict about orderly arrangement. If the bandages are not washed at the proper time or a forceps has not been properly vaselined, there is a scolding for somebody. Usually it's Joseph; but sometimes the Doctor gets a share."

"Joseph awaits the stroke of ten with some anxiety. He looks upon me, since we are both being trained into orderly habits, as to some extent a companion in misfortune. Lately, when I was about to move a box of bandaging materials from one corner of the room to another, he said earnestly, 'Doctor, let the thing stay where it is or else we shall get into trouble.'"

Some of the saddest cases, owing to the impossibility of proper care in their own homes, are those of insanity. The following description makes a vivid impression:

"My meeting with one of these unfortunates took place at night. I was roused and led out to a palm tree, to which an elderly woman had been bound. In front of her, seated round the fire, was the whole family. Behind rose the dark wall of the primeval forest. It was a wonderful African night, with the stars shining brilliantly. I ordered the bystanders to loose the woman's hands. They did so hesitatingly and in fear. Scarcely was she freed when she sprang at me, trying to snatch my lantern and throw it to the ground. The natives fled, yelling, in every direction; and did not dare to approach even when the woman, whose hand I had grasped, sat quietly down at my bidding, held out her arm for me to make an injection, and afterwards followed me into one of the huts, where, before long, she fell quietly asleep."

Some of the worst cases of mania are attributed by the



natives to poisoning, and in some instances Dr Schweitzer has got confirmation of this. The fear of being poisoned plays an astonishingly large part in native life. "I had lately to treat two young women who could neither eat nor sleep and were almost in a state of collapse. They had fallen out with their kinsfolk, and were constantly expecting to be poisoned. This, though they were not living in their own villages. They feared they might be poisoned at a distance, without any 'medicine' being actually mixed with their food. I was able to quiet their fears; but their countenances, distorted by weeks of dread, haunted me for long enough."

"It is indeed impossible for Europeans to understand how cruel life is for the miserable beings who pass their days in fear of being destroyed by fetishes and sorcerers. Only one who has seen this close at hand can realise that it is a duty laid upon us by the merest humanity to give them a different outlook upon life, and deliver them from these delusions. On this score the greatest sceptics, were they once face to face with the facts, would become supporters of missions." But Dr Schweitzer realises that even under mission influence it will take two or three generations for the old beliefs to lose their hold.

An interesting example is given of the persistence of these beliefs. The natives of a village near the mission station, who are for the most part Christianised, make a practice of going every year at a certain season to camp on an island in the river in order to fish. It is a kind of tribal festival. Schweitzer's native hospital assistant, Joseph, belongs to this village, and he is very fond of fishing; Schweitzer offered him, as a great treat, a day's holiday on the opening day of the festival. To his surprise, Joseph showed no enthusiasm. On being questioned, he explained that on the opening day libations of brandy and offerings of tobacco were cast into the water to propitiate the river demons. One year, when this was omitted, a woman got entangled in the nets and was drowned. So the practice was resumed, and anyone who opposed or laughed

at it was liable to be poisoned by the witch-doctors, who still secretly exercise their profession. So Joseph's fishing expedition was postponed to another day.

Some further examples of native beliefs suggest that as time goes on Schweitzer will be able to make a valuable collection of anthropological material.

The native theory of disease is of a beautiful simplicity. Every malady which is not due to an evil spirit is caused by a "worm." (Does this indicate a transition from a purely mythological to a pseudo-scientific stage of belief?)

"If they are asked to describe their condition they relate the history of the worm—how it was first in the legs, then went into the head, from there migrated to the heart, proceeded thence to the lungs, and has finally settled in the stomach. All medicines are understood to be directed against the worm. If colic has been eased with tincture of opium, the patient comes next day with a beaming countenance to announce that the worm has now been driven out of his body but has taken up a position in his head and is gnawing his brain; and I am now to give him the specific for 'worm in the head'!

"The conviction is still widely prevalent that it is possible to acquire possession of superhuman powers. He who has the right fetish can do anything. One of the most important of these fetishes is the skull of a man killed for the purpose, more especially the parietal bones. In the case of a murder committed recently within two hours of the mission station, it was held to be established that this had been the motive. I myself am the proud possessor of a fetish of this kind. The main part of it consists of two long oval-shaped pieces cut out of a human skull and dyed with some red colouring matter. The former owner and his wife had both been in ill-health for several months, suffering tortures from sleeplessness. The man several times heard a voice in a dream which revealed to him that he would never be cured until he took the fetish, which he had inherited from his father,



to Mr Haug, the missionary at N'Gomo, and followed his directions. In the end he did as he was commanded. Mr Haug sent him on to me, and made me a present of the fetish. The man and his wife were under treatment for several months, and went away considerably improved in health."

The finding in prehistoric burial-grounds of skulls from which such portions have been removed has been supposed, Schweitzer recalls, to indicate that the operation of trepanning was practised in those far-off days. Is it not more probable that the portions of bone were removed after death for use as fetishes? <sup>1</sup>

But Schweitzer's own claims as a magician rest on more solid grounds than the possession of a fetish. The wonders of modern surgery leave magic limping in the rear. The thing which impresses the natives most is the use of anæsthetics. The girls in the mission school write letters to those in a school in Europe. In one of these letters you may read: "Since the Doctor came here, wonderful things are happening. First he kills the sick people; then he cures them; then he raises them to life again." What larger reputation could a wonder-worker desire?

There are many more passages that invite quotation, but enough has been said to show how great, in such circumstances, are the opportunities of a man of unconquerable energy with the gift of healing and the will to serve.

W. MONTGOMERY.

CAMBRIDGE.

<sup>1</sup> This, however, is a moot point. Dr Rivers, the well-known anthropologist, informs the present writer that some of the South Sea Islanders have been found to practise the operation on the living subject for curative purposes—in a community which fights with clubs the occasion frequently arises. This fact goes some little way to confirm the prehistoric operation theory.

# THE SIGNIFICANCE OF DEATH.

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THE question is so vast that time would fail me, even if competence did not, to bring this matter with all its bearings into the full light of reason, and we shall have to be content with the twilight or the dawn.

At the outset we have to own that in the literature of the subject, despite its eloquence, its pathos, and its wisdom, there is found but little to further our enterprise, for in that immense literature reason has played an obscure and subordinate rôle. Now and then, in the long course of time, and more or less distinctly, her voice has indeed been heard, as in the beautiful words of Plato, in the brave words of Lucretius, in the consoling words of Paul; but, in the main, the literature of death is a literature of grief and dread, of morbid fancies, of wayward speculation; and, sadly enough, in the feeling and imagination of a great majority of our fellow men and women, death still remains in the primeval tangle of mystery and fear and demons and dreams. After the long lapse of ages, it still is true that,

“Imagination’s fool, and error’s wretch,  
Man makes a death which nature never made :  
Then on the point of his own fancy falls,  
And feels a thousand deaths, in fearing one.”

In trying to approach the subject in a rational frame of mind I am sustained by no faith in the omnipotence of reason, I am sustained by no belief that reason is competent or



destined to extend the dominion of its light throughout the whole sphere of our experience and psychic life. Of this sphere it is clear enough that the field of what is rational, the great domain of reason, is not indeed the whole, but is only a grand division ; for in the domain of reason are found many phenomena that seem to intimate more than dimly the existence of zones above and beyond its borders. Within its own sphere, however, the aim, the sacred obligation, the high and holy office of reason is to see things as they are. Therein is the hope that sustains our present meditation. For reason there is no way of conquest except the way of illumination, and over death it seeks no victory save that which may come through understanding. Hope of other victory there is none. And so we ask : In the light of reason, what is the spiritual significance of death ?

Unless I am mistaken, the answer to the great question will ultimately be found where, strangely enough, it has least been sought : namely, in the relations of our life to the familiar fact of its termination. It may be, as millions of souls have fondly hoped, that death is the portal of an eternal life. We do not know. It may be, as other millions have dared to believe, that death is a station of transfer in a long and winding course of transmigration destined to issue at length in a blest state of everlasting extinction. We do not know. We do know that death is not the penalty or the effect of an ancient disobedience. We know that it is not a monster to be feared, or a god to be placated, or an eternal and dreamless sleep, for sleep is a state and a function of life. What death is, if we may trust its plainest aspect, is very simple : it is the end of life ; a death is the end of a life. By life I do not mean a thing of conceptual fabrication. I do not mean here a static abstraction composed of a few beatitudes detached by thought from reality, formed into a kind of strand and then drawn out to stretch, colourless and cold and thin as an ether thread, throughout the eons of endless time-to-come. Neither do I mean a life form or principle that

may transcend all temporal vicissitudes including births and deaths. I narrow the problem. I mean this present life, which no sceptic denies or doubts. I mean the great concrete and throbbing life that we know by living it here in the body upon the earth. How immense it is! How immeasurable and manifold and inexhaustible its riches!

There are moments when it seems but a little thing. There are moments when our sense of reality is dim, when recollection has relaxed its hold, and our vision of life, the spell of its morning and the glory of its noontime gone, contracts and fades in the gloaming of its eventide. In such a mood we love to liken life to

“A Moment's Halt—a momentary taste  
Of Being from the Well amid the Waste.”

In such a mood we like to fancy that we are such stuff as dreams are made on, and it is soothing to say our little life is rounded with a sleep. In these melancholy moments it is sweet to hear it said that “life is only an episode between two eternities of death”; that man, born of woman, is of few days and full of trouble, that he fleeth as a shadow and continueth not; that “Life is a narrow vale between the cold and barren peaks of two eternities”; that it is only “a short, shadowy, and winding road on which we travel for a little while, from the cradle, with its lullaby of love, to the quiet wayside inn where all at last must sleep.” There are moments, I admit, when our hearts cry out, Vanity of vanities, all is vanity. For, like a great spirit, like a great man, life is great enough to be capable, when it will, of seeing itself as small. The selective instinct of the poet is in us all. We know how to confine our attention to some minor chord or melody amid the rolling billows of an orchestral harmony, or to note only some lurid flash among the manifold wonders of a raging storm. Yet the artistry by which one aspect, singled out from an infinite variety, is made to fill the eye, does not really deceive us. We know that our mournful moods are but



momentary, as fleeting shadows, or the "flowing purple" of a sea. We know that the melancholy sentiments engendered in them are only the poignant elements of a life which no poetic formulation, no single generalisation however sublime, can contain. No, the life we have is not a little thing. It is great, ineffably great, defying definition, immeasurable in its magnitude, countless in its dimensions, in wonders abounding everywhere; all that perception can sense, all that emotion can feel, all that memory can hold of the past or prophecy foretell, all that imagination can create or reason understand, all that is without or within: the "great, wide, beautiful wonderful world," the glory of day, the mystery of night, the spangled heavens, the cycle of the seasons, hope and yearning and sorrow and love, the splendours of art, the voices of literature and song, the meditations of philosophy, the achievements of knowledge, visions of the infinite, dreams of immortality. Such is the Life of which the End is called Death.

Our question is: What is the significance of the End? To be significant at all is, of course, to be significant for life, for, if there were no life, there could be no significance. It is, then, plain that the meaning and worth of mortality must be sought in the nature and properties of life: it is evident that to discern and to estimate the spiritual significance of death we must ponder the relations of life to the simple fact of its termination: we must ask what life would be if death were not. We are not practised in such reflection. In our everyday experience, processes that continue for a time and then come to an end are so common and so familiar that the abstract principle of termination, though the world of reality is riven by it, is, for the generality of men, not impressive. Nevertheless, in connection with our present inquiry, the familiar fact that our lives are things that, sooner or later, cease to be, demands the most attentive consideration. For it means that life, notwithstanding the greatness of it, notwithstanding it is truly illimitable in many regards, is yet, in

one important respect, a *finite* thing. This finiteness of life, its temporal finitude, is, for our quest, a fact of supreme importance. For, owing to a radical insight of modern science, we know at length that the distinction of finite and infinite is very profound, deep as the nature of being, cleaving the world: we know that the difference between the peculiar properties of what is finite and the peculiar properties of what is infinite is a radical difference, not to be obliterated or annulled, and fatal for thought to disregard. Unfortunately, this scientific doctrine, although it reaches the very marrow of our theme, is too abstract and difficult for further development here. I have mentioned it in order to signalise its bearing as at once suggesting and supporting the thesis which I wish now to submit briefly for consideration. The thesis, which is simple, is neither remote nor difficult to grasp. It is that the values of life are values characteristic of *mortal* life: it is that the temporal finitude of life is essential to its worth: it is that, were it not for death, if life did not end, if it were a process of infinite duration, it would be devoid of the precious things that make us yearn for its everlasting perpetuation.

To be immortal, a life must be eternal—it must be a life that never was born. Birth, it is true, was often allowed in the olden time to the gods of poesy and myth, but these were not immortal. The born divinities have passed away. “Isis no longer wandering weeps searching for the dead Osiris”; Woden and Thor are now only names of days; and the summit of Olympus is but a barren mountain-top. Even if immortal lives could spring from birth, we should not be obliged to credit or assume a destined extinction of the sun in order to make it clear that Earth could not be the home of an ever-increasing race of immortal beings, for the resources of Earth are limited, and birth would have to cease. Death, then, is essential to birth.

But in saying that

“Our birth is nothing but our death begun,”



the poet was profoundly mistaken. Doubtless our birth is death begun, but it is infinitely more: it is, with death, the condition and source of holy and beatific things that characterise the life that intervenes. Our human speech, if it were without the tender and sacred words it has from death, would ill befit a life-loving race of mortals. The precious associations that cluster about the words friendship, love, husband, wife, father, mother, parent, child, brother and sister, youth and age, flourish and bloom only in the heart of a life that begins and ends. But it is not only in these common goods of life, not only in the humbler joys that bless us all from day to day, that the spiritual significance of mortality may be discerned. More subtly, indeed, but not less certainly is it manifest also in the austere felicities of the higher reason: visions of the infinite, the swift march of time, the irrevocableness of the past, the eternality of truth, the inexorableness of cosmic law, the imperturbability of nature's gaze upon the struggles and strifes of men, the unbroken silence of destiny—all these solemn beatitudes of reason and meditation derive their poignance from the transitoriness of the life that contemplates them. Nay, whatsoever is dearest in the sphere of *outer* sense—the beautiful garment of the external world, the wondrous drama of the revolving year, alternation of day and night, of morning and eventide, ocean's voice, and “the rhythmic sighing of the wind”; whatsoever is highest and holiest in the sphere of *inner* sense—the tenderness and piety of art, the mellowness of wisdom, the serenity and peace of renunciation, charity, mercy, and service; all the sacred values that constitute life a priceless boon are subtly bred in the all-pervasive sense of its temporal finitude. Death is not the tragedy of life; it is a limitation of life, essential to its beatitudes; the tragedy is that, if it were not for death, life would be void of worth.

Just because tragedy is thus throned in the nature of things, just because it has its seat in the very citadel of contradiction between what we would and what we may, there is

possible for reasoning beings a discipline of spirit releasing from the rule of Destiny and the reign of Fate. On the one hand, no life at all; on the other, mortal life so good as to make us crave for its everlasting perpetuation; of these two options, perhaps, sole alternatives of azoic time, man may win a vision of the better and ratify in gratitude and gladness the life-creating choice of precreative Will. To the level of such approval ascends the mount of moral discipline. The summit attained, we have such freedom as the nature of reality allows.

“Not all is clear, but this we see :  
 The living die that Life may be,  
 Life, the bloom of Being ;  
 Beneath the high and stern Decree  
 Abideth still deep mystery,  
 Deeper than mortal seeing.

Amidst the dark a golden gleam,  
 A truth austere, profound, supreme ;  
 A life not under Death's decree  
 Were void of human dignity.”

Death, a law of life, must indeed be fulfilled. We may fulfil it “like a quarry slave at night, scourged to his dungeon,” or “like one who wraps the drapery of his couch about him” in conscious willingness to fulfil the law and enter the darkness so that the world of being may continue to own and bless the light of life. To none but mortals is it given thus to die, willingly surrendering all to perpetuate the dignity of a world.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> An Address delivered at the Annual Commemoration of the Dead in Columbia University. The Address concluded with a remarkable poem by the author.—ED.



## DISCUSSIONS

N.B.—The contributions under this heading refer to matters previously treated in the "Hibbert Journal." Reviews of books are not open to discussion. Criticism of any article will, as a rule, be limited to a single issue of the Journal. The discussion ends with a reply from the original writer.—*Ed.*

### "CHANGING RELIGION."

(*Hibbert Journal*, January 1914.)

MR J. ARTHUR HILL and I have been fellow-members of the Society for Psychical Research since its very earliest days over thirty years ago, and it is therefore not surprising that I read with deep interest and approval much of his striking article on this subject in your current issue. The fact, however, that we have been guided in our religious ideas by the same influences for so long seems to impel me to express my inability to agree with his final conclusions. I will follow his classification in the evaluation of Mysticism :

*Firstly*, that an analogy may be found between the exaltation produced by alcohol and other drugs, and that produced by religious experience.

*Secondly*, that Mysticism does not stand the pragmatic test, inasmuch as it does not produce the more solid and reliable types of character.

(1) We should anticipate, *a priori*, that there must be some fallacy here ; at any rate, those who knew Hannah Whitall Smith, whose experience is taken as typical, feel a little shocked in hearing her experience compared with drunkenness. I was not, unfortunately, one of her intimates, but I belong to circles which touched hers, and I know her life in outline and in detail extremely well. For brightness, sweetness, strength of character, courage and patience in trouble, intellectual vivacity, and all that we associate with happiness, well-being, and blessing to mankind, she was, to old age, a signal example. There must be something wrong in the analogy between her emotions and those of the victim to opium or drink, and I think I can explain that error.

The great mystical religious leaders, from Buddha to George Fox, were men in whom met two entirely distinct streams of faculty, namely, that of communion with God and that which we call psychic, showing

itself in visions or "mediumistic" phenomena. It is the separateness of these two kinds of faculty upon which I insist. The religious sense, communion, a life-giving experience of prayer, a consciousness of the Divine presence, a realisation of man as the vehicle of God and of common life as aureoled with a rainbow glory behind—these are Mysticism. Isaac Penington, one of the founders of Quakerism, possessed these things, or rather they possessed him, but he never had a vision. On the other hand, psychic susceptibilities seem to be, as Mr Hill will agree from our Society's experience, wholly unconnected with morality, or elevation of character, or intellectual ability, or anything whatever that we can put our fingers upon. They are unaccountable and unrelated to other qualities. But when, as in the case of George Fox, they are found in a man also of strong religious gifts, we have the religious leader. It is these cases of the double gift which fill William James's striking work on the *Varieties of Religious Experience*, on which Mr Hill relies so much. His cases are all those where the psychic and the mystic are combined. Some of them are not high ethically, some are almost pathological, all are abnormal. His book might more fitly have been entitled *The Psychic Mystics of the World*. So that I feel bound to protest against religious people being identified with the visionary nun who could not be of any use in the kitchen, and with all such characters.

We can now, perhaps, more clearly approach the parallelism between the saint and the drunkard. Mr Hill will remember the illustration of our common friend and master, F. W. H. Myers, in an early volume of the *Proceedings*, where he attempted to plead on behalf of multiple personality that it need not necessarily be morbid or insane. He pointed out that slates will split in exactly the same lines of cleavage whether they are done deftly by the quarryman's chisel, or whether they are done blindly by the blasting explosion; so it would appear to me that a sense of exaltation and well-being, which is common to the saint and to the sinner, may arise from such different causes that one does not discredit the other. A villain is happy because he has committed a murder, a good man is happy because he has saved a life. Is their common happiness any argument to prove that destroying a life is much the same thing as saving it?

(2) With regard to the pragmatic test of moral consequences, one is bound to agree with Mr Hill that the fruits of revivals and the professors of religion cannot be proved to be more possessed of the strenuous virtues than those outside the borders of churches. At any rate, there would be wide difference of opinion on the point, and experiences would greatly differ. If we took a large enough basis for our induction I am inclined to think that, after all, the churches and chapels would win, but I do not press that opinion. What I am concerned to say is that the emotional revivalistic type of chapel-goer selected by Mr Hill by no means covers those whom we are discussing. Professor James's contrast between the once-born and the twice-born appears to me to be a distinction superficial rather than



profound. I incline to the view that the once-born and the twice-born reach much the same goal in the end, but that one class approaches it gradually and the other catastrophically. It is, therefore, not a matter for surprise that the gradually evolved souls are more stable in temperament. It would, I think, have been fairer if Mr Hill had asked whether the co-religionists of Hannah Whitall Smith were reliable in keeping their engagements and paying their debts; for the Society of Friends, after all, represents the one attempt at permanently organised Mysticism which has had any long history in Western Europe. If he had done so I should not have feared his reply. On the whole, mystics are the most practical of mankind, from William Penn to Florence Nightingale.

Lastly, I must plead that intellectual development cannot be taken as the modern equivalent of religious experience; religious emotion cannot "appear as intellectual energy." To the recital of the victories of science there is an ancient reply: "Knowledge grows, love is." That is, it is in the nature of the intellect to classify and to understand more and more; it is in the nature of fellowship with God to be always essentially the same. After all, eating and drinking have remained essentially the same always, and that was our Lord's analogy: "He that eateth me, even he shall live by me." It is doubtless very striking to say, "Religion in the mystical sense is bankrupt, for in the twenty-six centuries between Gotama and Hannah Smith it has no progress to show." It would be equally striking, doubtless, to ask whether the average modern Don is wiser than Socrates. But, seriously, does anyone doubt that religion has immensely progressed in purity and in wisdom since the days when it was identified with cruelty, ignorance, and persecution, with idolatry and barbaric ritual, and when the priest was the greatest enemy of mankind?

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### "SELF-SACRIFICE."

(*Hibbert Journal*, January 1914, p. 260.)

PROFESSOR BAILLIE'S otherwise very masterly and exhaustive essay on "Self-sacrifice" is open, in my opinion, to some serious criticisms. It seems to leave behind an impression in the reader's mind that on the lower levels of life altruistic springs of action are wholly alien to the self, and that there is an absolute chasm here between the individual moral good and the social good which can be bridged over only by an external "conception of collective life," and that love is a phenomenon to be found only on the exalted plane of the religious life.

He says that an individual "cannot sacrifice his highest good" (p. 262, par. 2), and again that self-sacrifice "clearly means the real loss of a personal good" (p. 264, last par.). Only one inference is possible from

these statements : viz. that the loss of a real moral good is consistent with the attainment of one's highest moral good. Is not this a contradiction in terms? This highly paradoxical position can be justified only on one assumption—and this the writer seems to ignore—namely, that our moral perspective is variable: what is a real good in one set of circumstances is not so in another. To the mother who sacrifices her health in attending a sick child, the health of the child is a more real good than her own health, though her own health is a good which she fully values in other circumstances; the care for personal health, a worthy spring of action to her in ordinary circumstances, is sacrificed at the altar of parental affection with which in particular she identifies herself now. This is the only way out of the difficulty. That for which the sacrifice is made and that which is sacrificed cannot be both real goods to the person at the same time and in the same sense.

Professor Baillie seems to use the terms "good" and "evil" in their absolute and not relative senses. He says that "what is abandoned is not evil" (p. 265). But the truth is that what is given up is not always and under all circumstances an evil, though certainly it is so as compared with the object of sacrifice. Otherwise the act could not be morally justified.

Professor Baillie himself sees the paradox, but the solution which he offers is far from satisfactory. "The conception of collective life," with its corollary "that the welfare of the whole is prior in value to the good of the individual" (p. 270), is, according to him, "a moral explanation" of self-sacrifice. But, stated as it is, this view is no other than "the attitude of the dramatist or the historian or the religious mind" which he apparently repudiates, and it is not the view of the moral agent himself which alone ought to count here. From the standpoint of the moral agent himself, the welfare of the whole cannot be prior to his own good, unless the former is shown to be identical with his own highest good, and the latter means simply a comparatively lesser good to himself—nay, a positive evil when an actual conflict arises. For, according to Professor Baillie's own statement referred to above, his highest good cannot be sacrificed. The truly moral antithesis in self-sacrifice is not that between the good of the individual and that of the society, but that between his own greater and lesser good. The other view would logically lead to what with Dr Sidgwick is a hopeless and irreconcilable "dualism of practical reason."

Love, again, is not, as he seems to think, an exclusive possession of the religious mind, but present in all grades of moral life in varying degrees in its different forms of parental affection, filial love, compassion, reverence, patriotism, and love of humanity. And whichever of these might prompt us to the deed, an act of self-sacrifice to be morally justified must be an act of "self-completion."

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## "THE TWENTIETH-CENTURY CHRIST."

(Hibbert Journal, April 1914, p. 583.)

MAY I be allowed a few remarks with reference to Professor Warfield's article on "The Twentieth-Century Christ" in the *Hibbert Journal* for April, especially as he attributes to me a view of the Incarnation which I do not hold—a view, of which he thinks it might be said that "only one who has himself suffered a kenosis of his understanding" can possibly welcome it? One cannot willingly lie under the imputation of such a calamity, even though those holding the view are at the same time described as "men of brilliant parts." Although I do not hold that view myself, I cannot help saying that Professor Warfield is scarcely fair in his description of it. So far as I have read, no recent maintainer of a kenosis believes that "the Son of God in becoming man abandoned His Deity, extinguished it, so to speak, by immersing it in the stream of human life"; but only that He laid aside whatever was incommensurate with the human condition. In the representation quoted we have only Professor Warfield's interpretation of their view.

As I have said, however, I do not myself share the belief in a *temporal* kenosis, but have repeatedly criticised and rejected it, chiefly on ethical grounds. But it seems to me impossible that God can appear as a man—be born into the world as a little child, etc.—without presupposing, not a temporal, but an *eternal* kenosis of the absolute Divine. Creation, or Evolution, itself involves, I think, such a Divine kenosis. God as He becomes immanent for the Creation cannot be the same as God in His transcendency. I therefore hold that, while a kenosis at a definite point of time is to be rejected, an *eternal* kenosis must be maintained for Creation itself, and that the appearance of God in Christ in time is the result of the progressive Divine self-realisation in the Divinely intended human form. It is the outcome of a *process* of natural and spiritual evolution or development, not of the laying aside of Divine attributes at some moment of time. The gradual realisation of the ideal of an organism seems the best analogy. The doctrine of Evolution enables us to understand in a way that was impossible to the earlier theologians how God could become manifest in Christ. St John's Gospel declares that the Logos was *in* the world, the principle of its life, prior to His appearance in the flesh. This view gives us, not "the mere man" of whom Professor Warfield speaks (who has really no actual existence anywhere), but God in Christ in the only way in which God can appear as human. If I may venture an illustration, let us take a flower, say a beautiful rose; let that in its full bloom represent *God* to us. If that rose is to perpetuate and multiply itself, it must pass out of that form of its existence into that of the *seed*—very unlike that of the beautiful rose. But when the evolution of that seed has been completed we behold the rose again in all its beauty and fragrance. Some blooms may be less perfect than others,

which is just what we see in the history of religions: the perfect bloom, the full manifestation of God in humanity, is what we behold in Christ; it is truly *God* we have in Him under the limitations of humanity. As St Paul teaches, all things were created "in Christ" as the ideal; so that when the Creation reaches its highest point, as it did in Jesus, that ideal, which was eternal in God, becomes expressed. We have in Him the Eternal Divine Life in human form.

Of course, the process was not a merely mechanical one, and its culmination was the result of Divine spiritual influences. In the personal life of Christ, crowned by the complete self-sacrifice of the Cross, there was such a unison with the spirit and will of the transcendent Father as made God and man *one* in Him. We can see here the immanent coming into union with the transcendent.

No question of "two natures" arises here. Professor Warfield says that "the alternative of the two natures is, of course, one nature; and this one nature must be conceived, naturally, either as Divine or human." But surely there is another alternative, viz. that the "two natures" were *one* in Christ, in so far as the Divine can be expressed in a human form. Christianity holds that God is essentially an *ethical* Being, that His "nature" is not something semi-physical, as some of the old theologians seem to have imagined it; God is Love; and if He be, even ideally, the Father of men, human nature cannot be ethically and essentially different from or opposed to the Divine nature, but the Divine must be the ideal of the human, as Jesus plainly taught. Although under bodily limitations all the Divine attributes cannot find expression, the essentially Divine—the infinite Love that God *is*—can be and was manifested in Christ.

Professor Warfield holds by what he calls the Chalcedonian "settlement." But that was far from being a "settlement" even for the time. As Mosheim remarks, "the remedy proved really worse than the disease," and there "arose deplorable discords and civil wars, whose fury and barbarity were carried to the most excessive and incredible lengths." If the Christian Church has accepted the decision of an early Council—packed as these Councils often were and dominated by imperial authority—as a "settlement" of one of the highest Christian questions, one can only say that it is a pity.

The twentieth century needs a Christ in whom both God and man can be seen in their truth. But what puzzles men, and often turns them away from the whole subject, is, how Jesus Christ, who was certainly truly *man*, could be at once the man who prayed to and obeyed God and at the same time the God to whom He prayed and whom He obeyed. If they open the New Testament they find Jesus always distinguishing between Himself and "God." In the Fourth Gospel He says, "The Father is greater than I." To confound Christ with "the Father" would be a lapse into an old, exploded heresy.

Professor Warfield speaks of the "two natures" in the Person of Christ as "a mystery." It is more than a mystery: it is an impossible concep-



tion, if the real manhood of Christ is to be held intact. It is the true source of the "humanitarianism" which he deplotes. But if we see God as He became immanent, gradually, in the course of man's spiritual development, realising or finding expression for the Divine Life in human form, we can understand how the man in whom He thus appears must look outside Himself to the transcendent Father, and yet be the manifestation of that God and Father in His ethical truth in human form. To have God ethically manifested is to have Him essentially—ontologically—manifested, as far as the human form can be a manifestation of God.

The doctrine of the "two natures" tends to hide from men—*has* hidden from many, we may truly say—that which most of all needs to be seen in Christ. Our greatest requirement is to see not only God, but *man*, in the ethical truth of his life in union with God revealed in Christ. Man's true nature could only be known when its Divine ideal was realised. What is most needed is to see that what was manifested in the life of Christ—unique though it was—is something which can in its essence be realised in all men. It is in the possession of human hearts by the spirit and life of Christ that the hope of the world lies. The theology which makes Christ "a mystery" blinds men's eyes to the real, practical significance of Christ, to that which the New Testament declares to be the purpose of the Divine manifestation in Him, that Christ should be "the first-born among many brethren," He to whom all are to be "conformed." Such would not be possible, unless the union of Christ with God were in its essential character of a type that can be realised in all men, through the indwelling Spirit that proceeds from God through Jesus Christ.

W. L. WALKER.

GLASGOW.

# SURVEY OF RECENT PHILOSOPHICAL AND THEOLOGICAL LITERATURE.

## PHILOSOPHY.

PROFESSOR G. DAWES HICKS.

READERS of Dr Bosanquet's Gifford Lectures will remember the frequency of his references to the work of Professor Varisco, entitled *I Massimi Problemi*. An English translation of this book by Mr R. C. Lodge has now appeared, and is published in the well-known Library of Philosophy, edited by Professor Muirhead, under the title of *The Great Problems* (London: G. Allen, 1914). The form of idealism which in broad outlines is presented in the volume has been developed by the author in various special fields of inquiry in a series of treatises beginning with that named *Scienza e opinioni*, issued in 1901. Professor Varisco's metaphysical theory resembles in many respects modes of thought with which we in this country have long been familiar. By somewhat hasty and dubious steps he reaches the conclusion that the same "something" is implicit in everything as an essential constituent, and that, since this "something" is absolutely simple, the whole of it is in everything, whilst conversely everything is implicit in it. This "something" is what the writer calls Being—the element or characteristic common to everything. Being, however, pure and simple, means the absolutely indeterminate. But apart from its determinations, the indeterminate has no existence. Determinations, therefore, are essential to Being, and the variation of the universe has its root in an intrinsic requirement of Being. Being gives rise spontaneously to centres of spontaneity or monads; and the monads, as determinations of the one Being, are included in it. Corporeal bodies are groups of monads, bound together by laws other than the unity of consciousness—that is to say, by causal laws which have their ground in the unity of Being. A monad is raised to the status of a conscious subject through the formation of a body so constituted as to permit one of its monads assuming a central and controlling position in regard to the rest, and in order that this subject should develop into a rational personality a still finer bodily organisation and a suitable environment are requisite. Life and conscious-



ness are not the products of mechanism, but they are evolved in the womb of mechanism, and they continue to be dependent upon it. The universe has always included, and will always include, sentient and thinking subjects, but it is not itself capable of being regarded as a higher organism which continuously develops in time. Purposiveness is certainly implicit in Being, yet the universe in its totality is not ordered with reference to an end. To speak of end in such a context would be to give to the word "end" a meaning altogether unlike the meaning it bears when used in regard to the practical conduct of individual agents. The existence of the universe may be said to be a perpetual varying of parts which leaves the whole fundamentally unchanged. And what is asserted of end may be asserted also of value. Value presupposes distinct spontaneity; the conscious subject, having a value of its own, lives, and therefore brings into being a value of physical reality with respect to itself. Value will or will not be permanent according as a divine personality does or does not exist. Upon theoretical grounds alone the existence of a personal God is declared to be an unlikely hypothesis. But, notwithstanding, the writer concludes by expressing his own belief in the permanence of values, and consequently is, I suppose, prepared to maintain that what the theoretical reason cannot do, reason in its aspect as practical may accomplish. To me, however, I confess, the task of reconciling the conception of a personal God with the metaphysical theory here expounded seems no light one. The earlier portion of the work is devoted to an interesting and often suggestive discussion of epistemological problems. In dealing with sense-perception, the author insists upon the necessity of distinguishing between (a) the act or process of perceiving, (b) the percept or content of the act, and (c) the real object, or what he calls the perceivable. So far I am convinced he is on the right lines. But I find it difficult to obtain a clear idea of the way in which he conceives the percept to be related on the one hand to the act of perceiving and on the other hand to the perceivable. Another volume of Benedetto Croce's has been translated, the translator in this instance being Mr C. M. Meredith. The volume is called *Historical Materialism and the Economics of Karl Marx*, and it contains an interesting introduction by Mr A. D. Lindsay (London: Latimer, 1914). The work is, in fact, a collection of essays, written at different times, but all bearing upon one central theme. Croce, who in various of his writings has emphasised uniqueness and individuality as the essential factors of historical development, argues here that historical materialism, if it is to express what will stand the test of criticism, can be neither a new *a priori* notion of the philosophy of history, nor yet a new method of historical thought, but must rather be a canon of historical interpretation, directing that attention be paid to the so-called economic basis of society, so that the forms and mutations of the latter may be the better understood. Science, as contrasted with history, is, it is urged, invariably concerned with abstractions, and historical materialism can only justify itself scientifically as an

attempt to treat, in isolation and abstraction, one factor of historical process—the economic factor, namely. Croce, then, maintains that the capitalist society studied by Marx is not any society that ever has existed or does exist, because no actual society is, or could be, completely capitalist, but a hypothetical society which, for the purposes of a scientific investigation, he was justified in conceptually constructing. And in contradistinction to *that* hypothetical capitalist society, which, although abstract, is partially actualised in modern civilisation, Marx pictured another and a *wholly* hypothetical economic society—a society of unfettered competition which he thought would only be realisable in a collectivist state. In such a community the value of commodities would represent the value of the labour put into them, and that value might be expressed as so many units of socially necessary labour time. But this unit would still be an abstraction, because, since the hour of one man's labour might be of much greater value to the community than two hours of another man's, the hour of one man might contain two or more of such units. So long, then, as there are differences of ability, there must, as Mr Lindsay points out in his Introduction, still be monopoly, and the influence of the relation of supply and demand upon the determination of value cannot be eliminated. With regard to the distinction between the method of science and the method of history, attention may be drawn to an able article by Hugo Bergmann in *Logos* (vol. i., 1914) on "Der Begriff der Verursachung und das Problem der individueller Kausalität." The author maintains that by the historian as by the scientist the world of *objects* is throughout conceived as causally determined. Yet the matter is otherwise when causality is spoken of as appertaining to conscious *subjects*. Causality implies reference to a universal law. But since conscious subjectivity can only be *erlebt* and not conceptually apprehended, conscious subjects cannot legitimately be treated as objects falling under a general rule. No doubt psychical processes may be thought of as forming a causal series, but this causal series does not constitute the conscious subject—rather does it consist of elements abstracted from the conscious subject, and determined conceptually. Napoleon as viewed by the psychologist is a totally different individual from Napoleon as viewed by the historian. Splinters and bits of a personality may enter into the chain of psychical events, but the historian is concerned with a personality in its entirety. This is perhaps the place also to welcome the translation, by Mr Fred. Rothwell, of Professor Emile Boutroux's *De l'idée de loi naturelle*, under the title of *Natural Law in Science and Philosophy* (London: David Nutt, 1914). The thesis upheld by Professor Boutroux is that there is no absolute correspondence between the laws of nature as science assumes them to be and the laws of nature as they really are. The former are comparable to laws enacted by a legislator, and are imposed *a priori* upon reality. The latter are uniformities towards which we find the activities of different entities actually tend. The former are abstract relations, the elements of which are themselves relations; the latter are concrete relations, the terms of which are real subjects, factual



existences. Intelligibility is not, Boutroux argues, confined to the sphere which has mathematics for its ideal; there fall likewise within its range the relations which subsist between individuals themselves, concrete realities as such, and which are incapable of reduction to mathematical terms. Boutroux criticises with some severity the application of quantitative methods to the psychological treatment of mental states. Psychic units, susceptible of addition or subtraction like mathematical units, will, he argues, be sought for in vain.

From Boutroux one may naturally pass to Bergson. In an article on "James, Bergson, and Traditional Metaphysics," by Horace M. Kallen (*Mind*, April 1914), an attempt is made to show how far James was influenced in his philosophical thinking by the writings of Bergson. It is pointed out that the doctrine of radical empiricism differs, in truth, fundamentally from the doctrine of creative evolution. According to James, there is no block of oneness that can be called life, and no hegemony of bare homogeneous manyness that can be called space. On the contrary, there is a real combination of manyness and oneness in which the relations that bind, and whose binding makes the oneness, are as immediate data of sense-perception as the terms that are bound; and the relations that distinguish have as legitimate a metaphysical status as the terms which they differentiate. What James gained from Bergson was, on the one hand, freedom to accept experience at its face-value, and, on the other hand, confirmation that this face-value is not illusory. Writing on "Intuition" (*Intern. J. of Eth.*, April 1914), Mr A. Barratt Brown compares the ideal of knowledge suggested by Plato, Aristotle, Spinoza, and Hegel with that which is portrayed by Bergson, and draws the conclusion that intuition is not really a break with our ordinary thought and account of experience, not an inversion of rational procedure, but an expansion and completion of the labour of the intellect, a grasp or comprehension of the *συνοπτικός*, who sees things as a whole, whose experience is what Bergson calls "integral experience." In the course of an able article on "Time and the Experience of Time" (*Phil. R.*, March 1914), Professor E. B. McGilvary criticises Bergson's refusal to recognise the existence of instants in time and the mutual externality of such instants. Whilst admitting that the successive moments penetrate each other and overlap, the author contends that there is a partial mutual externality in that the part of a preceding moment which is not part of a succeeding moment is external to the latter. Such externality is, however, compatible with continuity; it does not mean an *externality between* mutual externals. So, too, there is order in succession, else there were no dates, and dates Bergson himself must and does recognise. In time everything comes in its own turn. The mutual interpenetration is no confused jumbling. In fine, Bergson's attempt to differentiate time and space as one a non-externalising continuum and the other a non-continuous externality fails. A continuum when partitioned becomes a medium of externality; the parts must be external to one another or there would be no partition. But partition does not

mean separation by an impassable gulf. Dr H. Wildon Carr (*Phil. R.*, May 1914) answers the question, "Why the Mind seems to be and yet cannot be produced by the Brain." Two reasons, he insists, are conclusive against the assumption that it is the function of the brain to produce mind. One is that it is impossible to explain anything as an effect unless we can regard it as strictly commensurate with the cause, and mind is not commensurate with cerebral process. The awareness forms a connected series, but it is not, like the cerebral process, a series of movements, and it does not intervene in that series which is complete in itself. The author admits, however, that, so far as this difficulty is concerned, the conception of the mind as an epiphenomenon of the brain is a possible conception. So that his answer rests mainly upon the second reason he has to give, which is that consciousness which arises concomitantly with cerebral process is not consciousness of cerebral process, but consciousness of what is outside the brain altogether. The consideration thus emphasised is undoubtedly of first-rate importance in many connections, but I cannot discover its relevance in this particular connection. Suppose consciousness were consciousness of cerebral process, would its production by cerebral process be any the more intelligible? "We wish," says Dr Carr, "to derive a reality that is unconfined in space and unlimited in time from a reality that is limited to a definite portion of space and to a moment of time." But consciousness as a mental event certainly is limited to a definite moment of time (some would say also to a definite portion of space); it is what consciousness is aware of that is not so limited. If it were assumed that what consciousness is aware of is produced along with it, the argument would certainly have weight, but obviously that is an assumption which the view Dr Carr is arguing against does not, and could not, imply.

Most English students of philosophy have been engaged lately in considering Professor S. Alexander's very interesting paper, entitled *The Basis of Realism*, which was read before the British Academy on 28th January last, and is now separately published as a reprint from vol. vi. of the *Proceedings* (London: Milford, 1914). The paper was occasioned by Dr Bosanquet's recent criticism of realism in the Adamson Lecture for 1913. The starting-point of realism is declared by Professor Alexander to be the analysis of an act of cognition into (a) an act of mind, (b) its independent object, and (c) their compresence. This is to be understood as the distinction of an enjoying subject from a contemplated object, separate from it,—a distinction which, when further examined, turns out to be a particular case of the compresence of interrelated reals cohering within a universe. Two consequences are deduced from this analysis. The first is that mind is a continuum of mental functions which are also brain functions, of a certain degree of development, with the mental quality. Mind or consciousness is a new empirical quality which emerges at a particular stage, and is thus located in the brain. The second consequence is that the alleged distinction of "contents" of sense from "objects" of thought disappears. The difference is one of part and whole. In each case there is an object, and not



a "content." (The argument here is chiefly directed against Professor Stout, who, however, does not usually speak of "content" at all, but rather of "presentation." Professor Alexander recognises, at the same time, that the term has been used in another sense, and when he himself distinguishes what he calls the partial "object" from the complete "thing," he seems to me to be only using the terms "object" and "thing" for what others would name "content" and "object." And, although one would be quite willing to drop the word "content" if a better could be found, the latter pair of terms is, I think, preferable to the former, because the former seems to suggest that it is not the "thing" which is being apprehended but the "object" as distinguished from it. Surely what is compresent with the mind, and is rightly called its object, is the complete thing. The constituents of the "part" are, I agree, not manufactured by the mind, but the particular *conjunction* of features of which this "part" consists has no subsistence apart from the selective activity of the mind directed on the complete thing.) Dr Bosanquet's objection that mind is always a world and its objects are always fragments is then dealt with, and it is urged in opposition that mind and its objects are both alike and in the same sense worlds or fragments. Both are metaphorically a world in themselves, and each of them stands in relation with more than itself and in the end with the whole world. But each of them is finite and more properly a fragment than a world. Dr Bosanquet's further objection that the analysis fails to account for the riches of mind, or for tertiary qualities like beauty, is then examined, and it is contended (*a*) that the riches of mind are unaffected, for they are but a complex of processes and tendencies, always compresent with their objects; and (*b*) that the co-operation of mind and object in the æsthetic thing is what gives to beauty at once its character of fiction and of value. Finally, the objection that things already imply mind and are continuous in kind with mind confuses the specific characters of minds with the categorical or fundamental characters which are common to minds with things.

The little volume on *The Problem of Individuality*, by Professor Hans Driesch (London: Macmillan, 1914), containing the four lectures delivered by the author before the University of London in October 1913, will find a large number of readers. The first two of the lectures restate in a brief form the well-known argument of Professor Driesch's Gifford Lectures, and present proofs for the doctrine of vitalism. The "Logic of Vitalism," as developed in the third lecture, is part of the author's general theory of Becoming, which is expounded in his *Ordnungslehre*. It is laid down as an essential principle that the degree of manifoldness of a natural system cannot increase from itself. The most important case of an increase of manifoldness occurs when an arrangement that is a mere sum is transferred into an arrangement of the character of unity or totality of some kind. Such unifying causality, as the author calls it, is the type of becoming which is met with in the organic world. The logical justification of the concept of wholeness and in particular of the theory of unifying

causality furnishes a basis for vitalism and gives to it a philosophical significance. The signs of wholeness evinced in biological evolution, in history, and especially in the growth of the moral consciousness in man, point, it is maintained, to the existence of a supra-personal unity. In the fourth lecture, the problem of Monism is discussed. If, it is urged, we allow the Absolute to consist of innumerable qualities which are not spatially symbolised and are therefore unknowable, then the world of experience proper can only give us a fragmentary knowledge of ultimate reality, and from our piecemeal experience we can never say whether there be not a monism of order in the Absolute. But personally the writer tells us he feels himself bound, in spite of all logical postulates, to accept the dualistic doctrine. And he sums up such dualism in the form:—There is the material world as the world of chance, but there is also a world of form or order that manifests itself in certain areas of the material world, namely, in the biological individual, and probably, in another way, in phylogeny and history also; and there may even be formlike combinations in what we call the inorganic world.

Although Mr A. F. Shand's great work, the fruit of years of patient and conscientious labour, on *The Foundations of Character* (London: Macmillan, 1914), will be reviewed by another pen, I cannot refrain from expressing here my deep sense of the scientific value of what he has accomplished. No more important contribution to psychological literature has been made within recent years. Mr Shand has taken up a study which occupied in no small measure the attention of a Descartes and a Spinoza, and he has taken it up in fact almost at the point where they left it. It is, he conceives, through an examination of the primary emotions and of the instincts connected with them that the foundations of character will be disclosed. His work, then, is a sustained and determined attempt to deal with the emotions by a method which is in the main, as he puts it, the hypothetical method of the sciences, and to frame as he goes along working hypotheses which may stimulate further inquiry and research. His mode of procedure in this particular province is, however, largely new, although he modestly disclaims novelty for it. Recognising the excessive difficulty of psychologically analysing emotions into their constituent elements, he directs his efforts rather in the first place to the discovery and analysis of the tendencies of the emotions, to determining what biological value they have at the outset, and what value they have for the higher ends of character afterwards. The problem is conceived to be essentially dynamical; the emotions are taken to be forces, and are handled as such. With elaborate care and thoroughness the tendencies of each of the primary emotions are traced in Book II., and the laws of these tendencies are tentatively formulated. Especially noteworthy, I think, is the masterly treatment of the emotion of sorrow, an adequate interpretation of which would, as Mr Shand says, tax the powers of the greatest minds. All through the volume, Mr Shand draws most of his material from literature—from our own great poets and from the



great French prose writers—and it has turned out to be a veritable mine for psychological investigation. The further volume we are promised on the sentiments will be awaited with much eagerness.

An article upon the question, "What is Religious Knowledge?" by Mr C. Delisle Burns (*Intern. J. of Eth.*, April 1914), is deserving of notice. Mr Burns attempts to show that religious knowledge is not different in kind from scientific knowledge, but that it is scientific or philosophical knowledge systematised and poetically expressed. Whilst there is much in Mr Burns' article with which one feels oneself in accord, yet I confess that as a whole his argument seems to me unconvincing on account of the persistent way in which he identifies religion and theology, which appear to me to be as different from one another as the process of digestion is different from the physiology of that process. In a thoughtful little work, *Towards Religion*, by Mr R. Brimley Johnson (London: The Lindsay Press, 1913), a careful effort is made to distinguish theology and religion. The first obvious function of theology must be, he urges, to define, however tentatively, those beliefs on which religion is founded, and then to investigate them scientifically. But religious faith depends upon no such investigation. It must first be there before there can be any theological treatment of it.

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## THEOLOGY.

THE REV. PROFESSOR JAMES MOFFATT, D.LITT.

DR SANDAY'S pamphlet on *Bishop Gore's Challenge to Criticism* (Longmans, Green & Co.) is entitled, *A Reply to the Bishop of Oxford's Open Letter on the Basis of Anglican Fellowship*, but its main significance lies not so much in the effectiveness of its opening paragraphs as in the positive definition of his own attitude towards the miracles of the New Testament which Dr Sanday lays before the world. He has now modified his views. He refuses to believe that the rejection of the nature-miracles in the Gospel narrative invalidates the Christian Creed, or that the Ascension, in the sense of a physical elevation of the Lord's body, was an objective occurrence, or that it is possible "to draw any clear line of demarcation between the New Testament and the Old" upon the subject of the growth of miraculous stories. The courage and courtesy of the distinguished author of this pamphlet lend weight to his brief statement. Its conclusions are not new. They have been held for years by younger members of his own Church, for example. What is new is their adoption, in principle, by Dr Sanday. It may be predicted that his reply to the Bishop will lead to a fresh discussion of the relations between faith and history, in the Christian religion; it may be hoped that Dr Sanday him-

self will be able to contribute a fuller statement of his position for the benefit of those whom he has influenced and will influence upon so vital a question.

Meantime some other aspects of faith have been emphasised in four articles<sup>1</sup> contributed to the March number of the *Constructive Quarterly*. Professor Curtis of Aberdeen writes vigorously upon the place of faith and the common elements of faith in Roman and Protestant views of Christianity, and concludes by deprecating the ordinary idea that one or other of these views is sufficient to itself or to the needs of the world. "Have Greeks and Romans a real monopoly of Catholicity? Have they undergone no reformation? Have they no internal divisions, no clashing interests and rival parties? Have Protestants no 'charcoal-burner's' faith, as Luther called it, unreasoning assent to 'whatever Mother Church believes'? Have the Reformed Churches nothing left to reform?" Canon Green's exposition of the Anglican view is followed by Professor Maher's argument that faith is essentially obedience or assent to the doctrinal deposit of revealed faith, while Archbishop Platon, of the Russian Church, distinguishes the Orthodox view from the Protestant and the Roman Catholic; the Archbishop is not much of a theologian, but his spirit is admirable. A timely corrective to Professor Maher's hypothesis is furnished by Professor Morgan's study of "Religion and Philosophy" in the *Expositor* for May (pp. 440-453), which points out curtly that such a notion of revelation is antiquated, and that the real problem for the modern mind is to see that the philosophical instinct differs from the religious, and that the latter does not depend on the former. "A moral order in human life is a fact, and a moral end cherished in the breasts of earth's noblest sons and inspiring their highest efforts. Justice and mercy are facts. The purity, the love, and the sacrifice of Jesus are facts. Such facts we gather up under the term Revelation. They form the material with which faith deals, the objective reality by which faith is evoked. Faith affirms their absolute worth and their ontological significance." Herr Bornhausen of Marburg notes the recent recognition of this distinction between religion and philosophy, in a study of Liberal Theology in modern Germany (*American Journal of Theology*, April, pp. 191 f.). After estimating the recent essays of Troeltsch, Otto, and Wobbermin, he admits they need elaboration. But this, he holds, is a promising defect. "By contrast, philosophy appears to be too hasty in its discussion of the religious problem, and to underestimate its real value and depth. The stimulus which Eucken's theology gave to theology too quickly shifts to the suggestion that philosophy itself is in a position to solve religious problems. And the pupils of Eucken have hastily advanced to claim the religious realm for themselves and for their bold emphatic assertions. This circumstance gives to current liberal theology the feeling that too close an alliance with philosophy has inevitably been harmful.

<sup>1</sup> Lobstein's essay on "Dogmatisme et Symbolisme" in *Revue de Théologie et de Philosophie* (1914, 102 f.) is a pendant to these.



The philosophers constantly incline to the settled conviction that they are masters of all problems, and that theology must await from them suggestions for the solution of its problems."

Canon J. G. Simpson's volume in "The Layman's Library" (Longmans) is entitled *What is the Gospel?* It is a forcibly written popular attempt to do "primarily for Churchmen" the same sort of service which Professor Denney has done from the inside of New Testament criticism, and for a wider circle, in his *Jesus and the Gospel*—an attempt to show the continuity between the teaching of Jesus and the redemptive theology of Paul. The nexus is found in the fact that Jesus himself claimed to fulfil not only the ideal of the Suffering Servant of Isaiah liii., but the "conception of the transcendent, heavenly Messiah which meets us in the pages of the Apocalyptic literature." There is a problem here, as Dr Simpson recognises. It is not so clearly recognised by Professor Jean Rivi re, who has followed up his historical study of the dogma of the Atonement with a comprehensive and learned theological study, *Le Dogme de la R demption* (Paris: J. Gabalda). The book is meant for Roman Catholics, but it shows more consciousness of work done outside the Roman Church than ordinary volumes of its class, and Professor Rivi re can certainly lay out a complex problem with considerable lucidity. From the dogmatic point of view, his treatise has little or nothing fresh for those who already know scholastic theology and modern speculation; it runs off into pious edification at a number of crucial points, just when the reader wishes more than appeals to the "mysteries" of revelation; and when we find that the entire New Testament basis occupies about twenty pages out of a total of over five hundred, we realise that there is still room for the next Bampton lecturer. The last word has not been spoken yet.

The author of *Pro Christo et Ecclesia*, in his latest volume, on *The Practice of Christianity* (Macmillan), develops the thesis that the practice of vital Christianity must involve reaction against customs that have begun to corrupt society, and revision of conventional ideas, in the light and strength of Christ's revelation. This revelation is defined to be that of God's love—love with the purpose of bringing about a renovated earth, purged from material as well as spiritual evils. This renovation was to be realised, according to Jesus, "by the internal creative power of human benevolence and faith linked up to God." By this standard the writer proceeds, not unlike Tolstoy, to criticise the modern penal system of dealing with criminals, militarism, and thrift. All these make up the City of Destruction, and the new pilgrim's progress is not to seek one's personal salvation by flight, but to foster corporate goodness and deal collectively with such abuses and evils as individually we cannot right. The indebtedness of the author to Professor Royce is obvious, and acknowledged. The book is written with the same persuasiveness as its predecessors, and its temper, if not all its argument, can be welcomed by thoughtful Christians; its ethics are stronger than its economics or its biblical criticism. It is supplemented, on the theological side, by

Mr J. K. Mozley's *Christian Belief* (Cambridge: Heffer & Sons), a short series of addresses upon the Christian view of God and the world. Father Tyrrell once neatly replied to Matthew Arnold's epigram, that "conduct is not three-quarters, but the whole of life; for there is a conduct of the mind and a conduct of the feelings." Mr Mozley's argument is similar. Christianity must be practised, but Christian behaviour and belief are, or ought to be, a unity; hence he repeats the theological postulates of the Creed as essential to a Christian view which will result in Christian practice. Another Cambridge book, *Personality and Revelation* (Heffer & Sons), takes the same line, though with more ability. Its author, Mr F. W. Butler, has not much new to say about either personality or revelation. Who has, outside a small circle of original men? But there are a number of true things to be said about these problems by one who will use modern methods, and Mr Butler has done this conscientiously. He too insists that the experience of liberation and grace which underlies the Christian faith must express itself in doctrines of some sort. A useful little book. Though it is doubtful if much is gained by statements like this, that "the ultimate philosophy must be a philosophy of life. . . . Its general expression is that reality is the living God, transcending, and yet immanent in, dependent and liberated spirits."

The popular introduction to the study of primitive religion<sup>1</sup> which M. Roger Bornand has begun in the *Revue Chrétienne* (May 1914, pp. 21 f., "Les Débuts de la Religion") has an English counterpart in Mr D. C. Owen's book on *The Infancy of Religion* (Oxford University Press), a study of primitive man in relation to the supernatural which seeks to prove that the religious instincts are deeply rooted in human nature. The facts and illustrations are chosen from the best modern authorities, and the argument is presented without recourse to unduly technical language or to precarious hypotheses. Readers of this book might have been none the worse for some words upon the vexed question of the relation between magic and religion, in view of Dr J. G. Frazer's theories, but what Mr Owen has included is apt and readable.

On the special theology of St Paul we have to chronicle, first of all, M. Loisy's study of "the gospel of Paul" in *Revue d'Histoire et de Littérature Religieuses* (1914, pp. 138-174). It starts from the point of view that Paul, at his conversion, forsook Judaism for "une religion de mystère," and that one of the most interesting features of his theology is the restatement of his earlier beliefs in the light of the new revelation. Thus, "quand Paul emploie le mot de 'justification' pour signifier le salut et qu'il l'entend d'une absolution résolue devant Dieu, il suit le courant juif de sa pensée: quand il implique dans cette justification la participation de l'esprit, une régénération du chrétien sur le type du Christ, il suit un courant de pensée mystique dont la source n'est point proprement juive ni

<sup>1</sup> A useful "Bibliografica Introduzione alla Scienza della Religione" is now issued in Signor Salvatorelli's *Collezione di Scienza delle Religioni* (Rome, 1914).



évangélique." The last two words are based upon M. Loisy's interpretation of the teaching of Jesus in the synoptic tradition. What differentiates Paulinism from the latter as well as from Judaism is expressed in the words, "It is no longer I that live, but Christ who lives in me." M. Loisy works this out on familiar lines, and closes with an application of it to Paul's doctrine of the Church. "L'idée d'Église vient de la tradition biblique; le sens de l'Église vient du judaïsme. A ces deux éléments Paul ajoute son idée du Seigneur et son idée du Christ esprit, principe de toute vie, qui viennent plutôt du paganisme et des mystères païens." Two studies of Pauline epistles have appeared. One, by Dr C. H. Watkins, on *St Paul's Fight for Galatia* (London: James Clarke), is the English edition of a German monograph which has already attracted attention by its thoroughness and freshness of scholarship; the other, *A Letter to Asia* (London: Macmillan), by Dr F. B. Westcott, is a running unconventional commentary on the text of Colossians, intended for people "who still have time and energy for quiet Bible reading." Dr H. L. MacNeill, a Canadian scholar, has also published at the Chicago University Press a monograph on *The Christology of the Epistle to the Hebrews* which is of singular importance; it recognises the primitive element in the theology of this epistle, and presents a clear picture of how and why the unknown writer fused this with his inheritance from Alexandrian Judaism. It is a long while since any study of the Christology of *Hebrews* has appeared which shows such penetration and grasp as Dr MacNeill's, though the eschatological factor has perhaps more weight than he seems inclined to admit. Mr Alban Blakiston's *The Bible of To-day* (Cambridge University Press) has a more general range of appeal. It opens with a chapter on biblical study and inspiration, then discusses the text, canon, and literature of the Old and the New Testament respectively, and closes with a historical sketch of the religious affinities between Judaism and Christianity. A book of this kind requires both scholarship and literary skill, as well as a knowledge of the popular mind. Mr Blakiston seems to possess these qualifications, and his volume is an excellent handbook of introduction to the subject. It is well balanced and has useful bibliographies. The attitude adopted towards the New Testament is not quite so frank as to the Old, however. Unlike Dr Sanday, Mr Blakiston tends to draw a line of demarcation between the two.

We must also call attention to a scholarly study by Miss E. C. Tucker of *The Later Version of the Wycliffite Epistle to the Romans* ("Yale Studies in English," xlix.). The monograph has a double interest. It appeals, on the philological side, to the student of Middle English in the fourteenth century, and furnishes a fresh proof of the ability with which scholars of Yale University in particular have addressed themselves to this as well as to other problems of our language. On another side, it caters for the wider class who are interested not only in the Wycliffite movement, but in its contributions to biblical interpretation. The latter are occasionally recognised. Thus Westcott prints Wyclif's version at the

end of his commentary on Ephesians, side by side with Tyndale's. But it is not sufficiently realised how valuable are the materials to be drawn from such versions. Romans, for example, is here printed in the Purvey revision of the earlier and cruder version, side by side with the Latin text which presumably formed the original. Equipped with Miss Tucker's concise, relevant notes, it serves to justify Bishop Coverdale's assertion: "Sure I am, that there commeth more knowledge and vnderstandinge of the Scripture by theyr sondrie translacyons, then by all the gloses of oure sophisticall doctours." This is hard upon editors, if they are included among the sophistical doctors; but it is not more than generous to translators. A different though not remote phase of religious life in England is sketched by Professor W. P. M. Kennedy in a new volume of the Catholic Library (London: G. Herder) entitled *Parish Life under Queen Elizabeth*, which is not a flattering picture of the Elizabethan clergy, as seen through the glasses of a Roman Catholic historian.

Finally, we have hardly more space than to chronicle Mr D. C. Simpson's lucid and temperate volume on the principles of *Pentateuchal Criticism* (London: Hodder & Stoughton), with a preface by the Dean of Westminster—a book <sup>1</sup> which ought to prevent the ordinary man from being misled by recent American and German vagaries; Professor Morris Jastrow's monograph on *Babylonian-Assyrian Birth-Omens and their Cultural Significance* (Giessen); an attempt by M. R. Dussand (*Revue de l'Histoire des Religions*, 1914, pp. 70 f.) to show a connection between the religious rites of the Carthaginians and Leviticus; and a popular illustrated study of *Herod's Temple* (London: C. Kelly) by Mr W. Shaw Caldecott, which closes with a translation of the Mishna tractate "Middoth." An edition of the latter tractate, with translation and notes, has been issued recently by Professor Oscar Holtzmann in the edition of the Mishna which he and Professor Beer of Heidelberg are publishing (Giessen: Töpelmann).

JAMES MOFFATT.

<sup>1</sup> The last chapter, on "The Divine Purpose in Hebrew Religion" (pp. 150 f.), is a particularly fine statement of the relation between the Old Testament and Christianity, as interpreted by the critical hypothesis.



## A SOCIAL SURVEY.<sup>1</sup>

### SOCIAL THEORY.

THE change in public sentiment with regard to questions of work and wages is strikingly shown by the following resolution, which received the unanimous assent of the Upper House of the Convocation of York on 7th May last: "Holding as Christians that the individual life of every person is sacred, and that we are, therefore, bound not to tolerate any department of our industry being permanently carried on under conditions which involve the misery and want of the labourer, we believe it to be the fundamental Christian principle of wages that the first charge upon any industry should be the proper maintenance of the labourer; and we therefore declare our adhesion to this principle, which has been called the principle of the living wage, and pledge ourselves to co-operate in promoting its extended application in whatever way we can, both by our prayers and our private and public actions." Nonconformity also, as represented by the English Presbyterian Synod, has declared in the same sense. The Student Christian Movement has issued in book form (*Social Problems in Wales*: London, 93 and 94 Chancery Lane, 1s.) the lectures given at the third annual session of the Welsh School of Social Service. Though containing papers on the social question in its general aspect, the most valuable part of the book deals with the problem of rural Wales. Housing accommodation provided for agricultural workers and the rural community generally is a disgrace to civilisation, with the result that agricultural workers in the principality are fast becoming a decaying section of the community. Mr Reginald Lennard, in *Economic Notes on English Agricultural Wages* (Macmillan, 5s. net), has contributed a most impartial inquiry into the question whether it is possible to raise agricultural wages in England. His conclusion is that a rise is possible, and that experiments with a view to obtaining this end should be made either by Wages Boards established for each county or by the determination of some central authority after careful inquiry into local conditions. *The Way to Industrial Peace and the Problem of Unemployment*, by Seebohm Rowntree (Fisher Unwin, 2s. 6d. net), traces industrial discontent (1) to

<sup>1</sup> The Social Survey in the next issue of the *Hibbert Journal* will be chiefly devoted to a description of Social Work in Switzerland.

the change of mind brought about by the spread of education, and (2) to the fact that recently real wages have not made a normal advance. The remedies in Mr Rowntree's view are a minimum wage, a shortening of the hours of labour, the regularisation of employment by a more extended use of the machinery provided by Labour Exchanges, and the provision of alternative occupations.

The interest in civics continues to increase, and there is a growing demand for text-books in which a reasoned view of social development is expounded. *The Modern British State*, by H. J. Mackinder, M.P. (G. Philip & Son, Ltd., 1s. 6d. net), is a clear and concise introduction to the study of civics as illustrated in the social organism known as the United Kingdom. What is perhaps the most interesting civic development in the world is described from an original point of view in a most stimulating and suggestive volume by Sir Laurence Gomme (*London*: Williams & Norgate, 7s. 6d. net). "There is no city in Europe," he maintains, "which has preserved its historical continuity so faithfully as London has preserved hers. The essential difference between London and other cities beginning in the Roman Empire lies in the fact that London has acted the part of city-state throughout the modern as in ancient days."

*National Guilds*, edited by A. R. Orage (Bell & Sons, 5s. net), is the long-awaited reprint of the series of articles on Guild Socialism which appeared in *The New Age* during the years 1912-13. The only emancipation, say Mr Orage and his collaborators, is from the wage system, which must be abolished, as it is the root-cause of human exploitation. Labour must no longer be regarded as something for which a price must be paid as a mere commodity. Every worker must be organised in a national guild which will have absolute control of the particular industry for which it is organised. The whole represents a kind of fusion of Syndicalism and State Socialism, expounded with much vigour, cleverness, and originality.

Dr Georg Kerschensteiner's *Grundfragen der Schulorganisation* has appeared in an authorised translation, admirably executed, by Mr C. K. Ogden, with an introduction by Viscount Haldane ("The Schools and the Nation," Macmillan, 6s. net). As everybody knows, Dr Kerschensteiner is opposed to the notion—and the magnificently organised technical schools at Munich, where he is Director of Education, have proved the justice of his contention—that trade education cannot be so adapted as to provide general culture. The aim of the Munich schools is to turn out not merely efficient hand-workers, though they do that, but good men and useful citizens. *The Hamptonsire Experiment in Education*, by C. R. Ashbee (*London*: G. Allen, 3s. net), sketches rural reform as applied to the school. Elementary, secondary, and higher education must be linked up and must cater for the æsthetic and humanistic cravings of the rural worker.

That eminently sane and practical body, the Women's Co-operative Guild, has recently had considerable prominence given in *The Times* and



other leading journals to its proposals for a Ministry of Health, the aim of which should be to link up the State with the home and the municipality. Such a Ministry would co-ordinate existing agencies and prevent overlapping—in England, for instance, it would take over the duties and powers of the Health Insurance Commission and of the Public Health side of the Local Government Board. In addition, there should be a special department to deal with maternity and infant life, with a woman at the head, staffed by women, and served by a number of qualified women inspectors. *Expectant Motherhood*, by J. W. Ballantyne (Cassell & Co., 6s. net), partially draws aside the veil of conventionalism in the best interests of expectant mothers and their infants, and in the belief that the time is ripe for the making of a great world-wide attempt to check the squandering of antenatal life and the depreciation of antenatal health. It is a sane and plainspoken book by an expert of wide information and experience. *Women Workers in Seven Professions: A Survey of their Economic Conditions and Prospects*, edited by Prof. Edith Morley (London: Routledge; New York: E. P. Dutton, 6s. net), discusses from the women's point of view the economic position of women in the professions of teaching, nursing, medicine, the Civil Service, etc. The able and sincere collaborators in this volume, while differing on many points, agree that women need economic independence and political emancipation, and that women should be paid at equal rates with men for equal work, no less in the interests of men than of women. *Sex*, by Profs. Patrick Geddes and J. Arthur Thomson (Williams & Norgate, 1s. net), is a most persuasive and lucid presentation of the case for sex instruction, entirely free from dogmatism or overstatement, and with a keen sense of the practical difficulties in the way of acquainting young people with the essential facts concerning the continuance of life. If the sane and wise precepts of the authors of this admirable text-book were followed, probably it would be unnecessary to write such a volume as *Prostitution in Europe*, by Abraham Flexner (London: Grant Richards, 7s. 6d. net), the second in the series issued by the American Bureau of Social Hygiene. It is a summary of the results obtained by detailed investigation in many centres of Europe, with a description of various methods of "regulation." The emphatic conclusion reached on the evidence is that from every point of view, moral and physiological, "regulation" has been a hopeless failure. *A History of Penal Methods (Criminals, Witches, Lunatics)*, by George Ives (London: Stanley Paul, 10s. 6d. net), is a most interesting study, crystallising the results of years of research, of the evolution of the idea of punishment. More valuable still is the exposition of principles which must guide us in the future—"the scientific sorting out of society's failures, and their individual treatment according to their various and widely differing needs, will prove to be the greatest measure yet undertaken to ensure the ultimate but certain elimination of crime." The removal of the grosser forms of destitution by carefully devised schemes of insurance will do much to remove disease, crime, vice, and other evils—such is the view most ably

expounded in *Social Insurance*, by J. M. Rubinow (Williams & Norgate), formerly statistical expert to the United States Bureau of Labour, and now lecturer on social insurance to the New York School of Philanthropy. This volume, which deals both with Europe and the United States, is not only a clear and exhaustive summary of information with regard to existing schemes of insurance against accident, sickness, old age, invalidity, unemployment, but an exposition of the social theories underlying the idea of insurance and a statement of the problems that have arisen in connection with such a public policy. By far the ablest criticism of the British Insurance Act which has yet appeared is the special supplement to *The New Statesman* for 14th March 1914. A sympathetic account of recent tendencies in English social legislation is *Die neuere englische Sozialpolitik*, by Dr H. Walter, with an introduction by the Rt. Hon. D. Lloyd George (Munich and Berlin: Oldenbourg, 4 M.). This appears in a series, edited by Professor E. Sieper of Munich, and entitled "Die Kultur des modernen England," and is of importance not so much for its subject, though that is ably dealt with, as because it is another piece of evidence of the determination of the best elements in German life to understand England and to make it understood among other Germans. Another example is *Toynbee Hall and the English Settlement Movement*, by Dr Werner Picht, a translation by Miss Lilian Cowell of the revised edition of a work first issued in German a few months ago (London: G. Bell & Sons, 3s. 6d. net). It contains details of each settlement in the United Kingdom, a history of the University Extension Movement, and an account of the Workers' Educational Association.

### SOCIAL EXPERIMENTS.

The *Sixth Annual Report of the Public Trustee*, the most remarkable social experiment in England of recent years, shows that business of over 110 millions sterling is now being transacted, and that "this departure in State enterprise has been a success, and now rests upon an established, satisfied, and growing connection." *Social Work in London, 1869-1912: A History of the Charity Organisation Society*, by Mrs Helen Bosanquet (John Murray, 8s. net), describes in detail the work of the Society which more than any other has stood for voluntarism and has steadfastly maintained its principles in face of frequent criticism and sometimes of misrepresentation. Though written from the point of view of a believer in and worker for the Society, the volume is a perfectly candid statement which the future social historian, whatever his opinions, will have to keep constantly before him. Particularly interesting are the accounts of the Society's early history and of the reforms which it advocated.

*The Report of the University of London Joint Committee for the Promotion of the Higher Education of Working People* (prepared for the Committee by Mr J. B. Knowlton Preedy; 6d.), on the work of the Tutorial Classes, 1909-1913, describes a movement which has had remarkable results, and, in the opinion of the most competent critics, has



entirely succeeded in its primary object of training up a body of students "educated to recognise what really matters in the broader aspects of life, and having the ability to pursue their aims with the wisdom born of real and accurate knowledge." It is sad, however, to have to add that in the wealthiest city in the world a movement which has been so sanely conceived cannot, through lack of an additional income of £1000 per annum, a paltry sum considering London's vast resources, meet the needs of earnest and able students who wish for higher education, but whose means are insufficient to enable them to pay for it at the rates exacted from the average middle-class university student.

The Ratan Tata Foundation of the University of London has published another volume embodying the results of its investigations. *The Feeding of School Children*, by Miss M. E. Bulkley (Bell & Sons, 3s. 6d. net), is an exhaustive and up-to-date account of the policy of feeding necessitous school-children, which, in the author's opinion, has produced in the scholars an immense improvement in physique, mental capacity, and manners. *The Medical Inspection of Girls in Secondary Schools*, by Dr Catherine Chisholm (Longmans, 3s. 6d. net), written from the standpoint of practical experience, shows that medical inspection is necessary for the children not only of the poor, but of those more comfortably circumstanced, and supplies full details of methods at present in successful operation. A book full of extraordinary insight and practical skill is *The Training of a Working Boy*, by Rev. H. S. Pelham (Macmillan, 3s. 6d. net), who as Head Missioner of the Birmingham Street Children's Union has shown a real genius for dealing with city lads.

Various applications of the minimum wage have been made and must be tested by their results. *Minimum Rates in the Chain-Making Industry*, by R. H. Tawney (Bell & Sons for the Ratan Tata Foundation, 1s. 6d. net), maintains that "it is possible to fix and enforce minimum rates of payment for a highly technical industry, and to do so with the approval of the public opinion of all the main classes of persons concerned in the trade," and that on the whole, so far as experience shows up to the present, the results are excellent. It is interesting also to learn from the *First Annual Report of the Minimum Wage Commission of Massachusetts* (Public Document, 102; Boston: Wright & Potter) that the principle in various forms has been applied to the cases of women and minors in Massachusetts, California, Colorado, Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon, Washington, and Wisconsin. In the British Islands the Co-operative Wholesale Society has put into operation in all its factories a minimum of 17s. per week for women aged twenty and over.

The principle of co-operation appears to be steadily winning its way and even to have taken root in quite unfavourable soil. Some recent numbers of the *Monthly Bulletin of the International Institute of Agriculture* have dealt with interesting developments of agricultural co-operation in Italy, where collective farms seem to have had great success.

Three types are distinguished: those established on the colony system (most frequent in Lombardy), those on large estates (in Sicily), and those founded by associations of labourers (chiefly in Emilia). In Yorkshire, the Wharfedale Farmers' Trading Association, founded for the co-operative purchase of feeding stuffs, manures, seeds, implements, and other farming requisites, has successfully met the objections of the doubters, has pulled down its barns and built greater, and has had a comfortable balance left over. What is perhaps most remarkable of all, the Oxford University Co-operative Society has been founded by Oxford men for Oxford men in order to demonstrate the merits of the co-operative supply system, and the superiority of cash over credit payments, an experiment the results of which will be watched with great interest.

Attempts have been made from time to time, as is pointed out in the May number of the *Charity Organisation Review*, to bring about a regulation of wages by other means than a Trade Board, and especially by inducing consumers to deal only with firms known to have humane conditions of work and to pay a living wage. Such movements in America have been called "Consumers' Leagues," and in France "Ligue Sociale d'Acheteurs." The latter started in 1902 as the Ligue Sociale de Paris, but speedily became the Ligue Sociale de France, with a federation of twenty-nine provincial sections and the central metropolitan branch. The Ligue has had considerable influence, not only directly by influencing consumers, but indirectly by affecting legislation and even arbitrating in trade disputes.

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## REVIEWS

*Sādhanā: The Realisation of Life.*—By Rabindranath Tagore, author of *Gitanjali*.—London: Macmillan & Co. Ltd., 1914.

THE Indian poet whose literary touch has already enabled him to reveal so much of the spirit of his race to the mind of the West now addresses us in a small volume of lectures on *The Realisation of Life*, giving apparently what defence he cares to give of the standpoint from which he has been taught to look at the world. We venture to think his attitude sufficiently significant to deserve unusually serious consideration—this, chiefly, in view of what we take to be a certain preparation going on amongst us (still accompanied, it is true, by a vast unpreparedness) for burdens which our own life is like to call upon us to bear.

Not that in any reconstruction of life which may be needful for us, this Oriental poet's thought or his poetry or his religion could be taken as furnishing concrete ideals; any more than the civilisation from which it springs could ever become our model civilisation. The "light from the East," about which we hear sometimes, is emphatically light only; the medium, that is, through which we may hope to see our own things better, not new things for us to see. For the latter we must look elsewhere—to our own civilisation, namely, finding from its tortuous course as best we can the concrete ends towards which it may seem to have been dimly pointing all along. What we could take from the Eastern mind with advantage is not its ideals, but in the strict sense its light, and its length of vision. We lack this. Living in a world as large as that of the Orientals—much larger—we do not see our horizons; and our step is unsteady and our directions uncertain in consequence.

There are not wanting indications that we are beginning to seek this greater length and width of vision, though it is doubtful if we realise either the extent of our need of it or its nature at all adequately as yet. Amongst these indications we reckon the reception given by the English-speaking public to the writings now before us. And perhaps the most important thing about these works is just the reflex light which they cast upon our own newer mental attitudes—upon the spirit in our own midst which has welcomed them, and apparently found some satisfaction in them.

Mr Tagore is before all things a poet; and to speak of finding a

message in his writings is at once to lay oneself open to the charge of finding his work didactic, or in some sense or other not true poetry. But at all risks we feel bound to use the term, though it is very nearly impossible to give the said message a name and not leave it shorn of its power—so much is it a religious, so little a philosophical one. But such a thing there undoubtedly is. There is in him, to put it otherwise, that to which people listen out of need, and not out of curiosity only.

Doubtless this is hardly the immediately obvious view. The spectacle of an Indian poet translating his works into English prose, finding an enthusiastic public for them, and having his success crowned with a ready market and a Nobel prize, suggests at first no more than the arrival of a new literary rarity amongst us or a society "rage." If so, we may say in passing, we can hardly conceive anyone whose work has more completely miscarried than the poet's, or fostered more precisely the spirit his poems disparage. If there is any sincerity in his work at all, he is out for something else than to pamper a jaded literary appetite with another latest novelty. The taste for this kind of thing no doubt explains part of his popularity, as of every popular man's. But the secret of the hold he has taken upon his Western readers lies, we are convinced, in something deeper and much more like the sense to which he meant to appeal.

He can at least claim some amongst his admirers whose appreciation of him is not thus superficial. No discerning person could associate anything shallow or ephemeral with the language of Mr W. B. Yeats, for instance, in his introduction to the volume of poems entitled *Gitanjali*, published last year. Mr Yeats tells there of the reverence for Tagore among his Indian fellow-countrymen: of how "natural" it appeared to some of them to be told that these poems "had stirred his blood as nothing had for years"; and of how they said that among themselves these songs were sung "from the west of India into Burma, wherever Bengali was spoken." "I have carried the manuscript of these translations about with me for days," he goes on, "reading it in railway trains, or on the top of omnibuses and in restaurants, and I have often had to close it lest some stranger would see how much it moved me. These lyrics . . . display in their thought a world I have dreamed of all my life long." Such words do not suggest the passing fancy of a day. They are clearly the voice of a genuine hunger of the spirit resting at length satisfied with the object of a long quest; and they are eloquent of the fact that to one type of mind, at least, there *is* a message in this writer's work, whatever its purport may be. And we cannot believe that that mind is confined to Mr Yeats or to a few select souls; or that it is quite unknown to the thousands of ordinary readers of English books who are buying and reading these works.

Which fact, if it be a fact, lends unique interest to the question what these works really offer. One peculiarity of them is that they face two audiences. They are the product, apparently, of a species of renaissance spreading over an Eastern civilisation, and thus have a double appeal—being sufficiently inspired by renaissance daring to seem to beckon the East



to a higher life and greater freedom ; while yet remaining true enough to Eastern tradition to constitute a potent, though implicit, criticism of all that extravagance of liberty which has appeared to some to threaten a miscarriage of life in the West. They are not philosophical works ; not even the lectures which immediately concern us are primarily philosophical. They are religious, and at the same time high poetry. But though, as we have just said, they have a Western touch, they are Eastern in fundamental character. In their moral teaching they have the note of Oriental universalism and more than a touch of Oriental quietism. They are essentially an Indian melody, as Mr Ernest Rhys has said, though sung with some change of key. And their value for us, whatever they may be for India, lies in the revelation they give of *the astonishing universality which must characterise that in which genuine human satisfaction is to be found*. This is the central burden of the lectures. And it constitutes their value, because in touching this they touch the thing we are at once in peculiar need of remembering and most tempted to forget.

All the lectures centre round this theme. The first note struck in the discourses is a picture of how the Aryan races by their natural conditions in India were laid peculiarly open to the impression of the vastness of the universe. And all through the subsequent discussions given—of the soul, of evil and selfishness, of love, action, and beauty, and of the Infinite—the same picture is repeated ; the picture, rather than the logical exposition, of the universal as containing the true aim, fruition, and destiny of all individual life. It is not a systematic treatise—the author expressly disclaims all pretension to philosophical or scholarly specialism in his preface. It has almost no controversial interest, and in the way of logical justification of the main doctrine little is given with which the student of Western idealism since Kant is not familiar. What is fresh, as we said, is not so much what he sees as the clearness and the imagination with which he sees it. And for his message—for the real inwardness of his convictions about the universe and man as well as for their incidence upon our own life—we must look rather to the poetry itself than to the lectures which give the rationale of the standpoint of the poetry. We turn for a moment, then, to the poetry.

To say that Tagore's writing is poetry at all is to say that in one way or another it contrives so to present the universe to us, that the latter becomes a fair or satisfying thing to see. But two points are noticeable in his presentation. It is a satisfaction attained by the minimum of artifice ; and it is a religious satisfaction.

As to the first point : the poet casts his pictures upon a very broad canvas ; and his creative touch is a singularly unobtrusive touch. The experience which he chooses to light up by his poetry is the widest spread of common experience. There is nothing rare or unusual about the images and associations which we meet with in his pages except their poetic character. He revels in the sun and the grass, the streams, the life of the

highway, the swish of the July rain. And the familiar becomes poetry, not by being decked or exaggerated, but by being allowed to stand in its simplicity.

"The morning sea of silence broke into ripples of bird-songs; and the flowers were all merry by the roadside; and the wealth of gold was scattered through the rift of the clouds, while we busily went our way and paid no heed.

"We sang no glad songs nor played; we went not to the village for barter; we spoke not a word nor smiled; we lingered not on the way. We quickened our pace more and more as the time sped by.

"The sun rose to mid-sky and the doves cooed in the shade. Withered leaves danced and whirled in the hot air of noon. The shepherd boy drowsed and dreamed in the shadow of the banyan tree, and I laid myself down by the water and stretched my tired limbs on the grass.

"My companions laughed at me in scorn; . . . they never looked back nor rested; . . . they crossed many meadows and hills. . . . All honour to you, heroic host of the interminable path! Mockery and reproach pricked me to rise, but found no response in me. I gave myself up for lost in the depth of a glad humiliation—in the shadow of a dim delight."<sup>1</sup>

The objects of nature here appear before us, not dead any more but alive; they have sprung into poetry; but surely not because they have been changed or artificialised or even touched, but simply because we have learnt in the poet's company not to brush past them; to stay our haste, rather, and look at them.

But, in the second place, there is the religious note. This is the ecstasy and the crowning wonder. Nature thus not interfered with, but simply seen—widely and steadily and as she is,—begins to speak to us with a human voice. Listen to the ending of the same song.

"The repose of the sun-embroidered green gloom slowly spread over my heart. I forgot for what I had travelled, and I surrendered my mind without struggle to the maze of shadows and songs. At last when I woke from my slumber and opened my eyes, I saw *thee* standing by me, flooding my sleep with thy smile. How I had feared that the path was long and wearisome, and the struggle to reach thee was hard!"

Not, of course, that the author would ever indulge in italics in such a place as this. I have italicised the word simply to bring out the point. Now this teaching, that the seemingly unrelieved and barren universal, in other words, life in its utter entirety and integrity to which we can only give ourselves up by cessation of all feverish forward-struggling and pursuit of narrow ends—that this universal is really intensely human, that it is near us and ready to commune with us as Father, Lover and Friend—is the repeated refrain of all the poems.

"You came down from your throne and stood at my cottage door.

"I was singing all alone in a corner, and the melody caught your ear. You came down and stood at my cottage door.

"Masters are many in your hall, and songs are sung there at all hours. But the simple carol of this novice struck at your love. One plaintive little strain mingled with the great music of the world, and with a flower for a prize you came down and stopped at my cottage door."

<sup>1</sup> *Gitanjali*, pp. 39-41.



It comes to this, that both the poet's message and his charm lie in the non-egoistic character of his song—his humility, his contentment even not to sing, if so he can soothe us into the power to hear the music which the universe itself is singing. Or, to change the metaphor, it lies in the breadth of the ocean on which he launches us, and the unassuming grace with which he does it. Everywhere it is the universality of that which is to be satisfying—the need for including all things, the inability to spare any, in a universe where we are to find settled joy. We find ourselves in the presence either of objects the most familiar we know, or objects whose familiarity to the Indian mind we can at once feel. And they all meet us, nod to us, greet us; and we greet them. Above all, they do it, not because they have been artificialised or because we have forced our minds into a peculiar mood, but simply because the nature and life in which we rejoice are untampered with, and because we are supremely restrained and sane.

Now this humility, this non-egoism, this inability to outrage any least part of the whole universe of God in our search for satisfaction, is what makes us think the spirit of these poems so adapted to certain growing social needs, and so important a spirit for us to get into. One of the strong points of the lectures is that this moral aspect of the whole standpoint becomes clearer after reading them—we see how little the standpoint can permit of any vulgarity, any licence, any kind of egoistic irrelevance, nay, how even the touch of these things at once oversets the delicate poise of the thought, and transforms the whole vision in a flash into the mere wreck of commonplace.

“One day I was out in a boat on the Ganges. It was a beautiful evening in autumn. The sun had just set; the silence of the sky was full to the brim with ineffable peace and beauty. The vast expanse of water was without a ripple, mirroring all the changing shades of the sunset glow. Miles and miles of a desolate sandbank lay like a huge amphibious reptile of some antediluvian age, with its scales glistening in shining colours. As our boat was silently gliding by the precipitous river-bank, riddled with the nest-holes of a colony of birds, suddenly a big fish leapt up to the surface of the water and then disappeared, displaying on its vanishing figure all the colours of the evening sky. It drew aside for a moment the many-coloured screen behind which there was a silent world full of the joy of life. It came up from the depths of its mysterious dwelling with a beautiful dancing motion and added its own music to the silent symphony of the dying day. I felt as if I had had a friendly greeting from an alien world in its own language, and it touched my heart with a flash of gladness. Then suddenly the man at the helm exclaimed with a distinct note of regret, ‘What a big fish!’ It at once brought before his vision the picture of the fish caught and made ready for his supper. He could only look at the fish through his desire, and thus missed the whole truth of its existence.”<sup>1</sup>

The entire significance we wished to point out in Tagore might be taken from this passage. He is one who reveals to us a very wide universe, teaches us not to touch it, but to treat it with utter reverence, on pain of spoiling it all, and helps us to feel that only this will ever really satisfy.

<sup>1</sup> *Sādhana*, p. 110.

We need this teaching. It is not, indeed, a world of Indian river and forest, which we are called upon to rein ourselves up and try to look at, and to love, entire. The object in our case is a different one. But the attitude we are called upon to take up is the same. Our object is not, or at least is not primarily, nature at all, but the fair structure built and borne by rational human energy—the social world, our civilisation. But there is no thing we need more, in our haste (even in our well-meant haste to better it), than to stand back awhile and try to see this human world, and feel it, whole. It is no commonplace to say we need to learn the universality of what is to satisfy. The problem really takes us back to our own Renaissance. Ever since then we have been, with whatever variations or back-turnings, following that great time's trumpet-call to man "to be free, to enjoy, and to understand"; and we are beginning now to realise what it really means. The vanguard of that "host of the interminable path," to whom, as such, Tagore accords "all honour," have reached as far as they could hope to reach. Some of us are about as "free" as human nature by the very law of its structure can possibly be. And we are waiting now for the rear to close up with us, and enter with us into the enjoyment of our new attained life—a life which is worthier shared, but the sharing of which is apt to feel like disillusion. This sharing, which means the universalising, of human good is the problem in the midst of which we are actually now labouring. And what is needed is not any return to the East; but it is certainly an infusion of what has some claim to be called Eastern light: the light in which we are able to see good and yet not "desire" it; the spirit in man which can rejoice in the mere consciousness that such good is, and be untormented by the lust of possession; the spirit which Ruskin called "admiration."

The difficulty is that experience has not specially fitted us for the task. The mere advance of the masses towards free life in the Western communities is not as such fitted to develop the qualities needed when the advance is accomplished. The winning of the battles for freedom does not of itself qualify us for the tasks which remain when the battles are won. Every step in the advance has been conceived in discontent—a discontent afterwards named divine. Men saw a good, saw they had the power to take it, and heroically took it. And very often the leader of such advance is but the first seer of the new good, who lets other men see. Thus Ruskin, in *Fors Clavigera*: "I never stand up to rest myself [in the theatre] and look round the house without renewal of wonder how the crowd in the pit and shilling gallery allow us of the boxes and stalls to keep our places! Think of it—those fellows behind there have housed us and fed us . . . have bought us the best places . . . brought us through the cold to them," etc., etc. The solution of the puzzle was precisely that they of the pit and the gallery had not really seen this denied good—this good not theirs—and seen it as one man. They have begun to see it since, and the process of taking it too has begun. Moreover, we are seeing more clearly goods not ours, and whole classes are seeing them more as one man, every day.



Whatever progress or retrogression has been registered in the changes through which social life has passed, there has at least been advance in self-consciousness. The world of labour knows, now, that it labours. The rich know that they are rich. An awakened and refined self-consciousness is the deepest social fact with which we have to deal. Which means that within certain limits we have no need of light. Within the boundaries of the field of our desires we see with a clearness which grows almost fierce. What we need, really, is the ability to see and not to desire. For we shall hope in vain for any, however distant, dream of a social perfection, which will not involve differences of status and responsibility and privilege, and in which there will not be for most of its members "places" which are good and are not theirs.

What we need is to see and not to desire. And if this were all, there would be no particular point in commending Tagore to our specially serious consideration, any more than any preacher of an ascetic morality. But asceticism—denial for denial's sake—is just what will not carry us any appreciable way towards the social spirit we have in view. The only way is through the light which reveals the distant as well as the near—so that we may see the good immediately beyond us, but not that good only.

The one way of keeping stable a structure which rests on human wills lies in the will for its stability—the full-blooded concrete enlightened will. The only hope lies in two things, and they are characteristic of the spirit in which these poems are written—nay, taken together, they almost constitute the atmosphere in which Tagore's thought lives and moves. On the one hand, a genuine and immediate interest in the life of the whole which makes a wound to that a personal disaster; and, on the other hand, a perception of the delicate connection between individual conduct and that larger life, a perception of how small a lapse from individual integrity can deal that life a blow.

It is true we must enrich the poet's vision of the universal ends, with a Western articulation of life into definite achievement and practice. But the fundamental thing is that we should see the larger end—in other words, that the controlling interest in the whole be genuine, and felt. When that is felt, if it ever is, it will be with precisely the feeling which ranges through all this poetry. A *mystical* devotion to the universal it accurately is not. It is at most a mysticism which sees not by any special "illumination," but by the clear light of the understanding; and interest in the end is felt powerfully because it and its connection with conduct is so seen. But though not mysticism proper, there no doubt lies in mysticism a certain consciousness of the transcendence of the infinite end of life and its absolute authority over all the finite means; and so there is in it a certain preparation for the attitude we have tried to indicate—a preparation for the shock of discovering how innocent or how time-honoured certain lines of conduct may be, which, for instance, natural history might condemn as incompatible with the ultimate good of the entire social structure. It implies an interest in what is very far beyond the scope of our ordinary

finite interests. This is why we venture to see an incipient preparation for the shouldering of greater social burdens, in the spread of that mystic spirit among us, which has welcomed the mystically-touched beauty of Mr Tagore's writings and so much else besides. It is really the mystic note given to some of the highest thoughts in Mr Tagore's writings, which places them so near the central developing point of our culture—despite the fact that a stable life would seem necessarily to rest on something beyond mysticism.

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*The Autobiography of Maharshi Devendranath Tagore.*—With Portraits.—Calcutta: S. K. Lahiri & Co., 1909.

To have been the father of Rabindranath Tagore is one of the various distinctions of the subject of this biography. The preface to *Sādhanā* contains a filial tribute of gratitude which may with advantage be quoted here. First, we are told that he “lived his long life in the closest communion with God, while not neglecting his duties to the world, or allowing his keen interest in all human affairs to suffer any abatement.” Secondly, that he had daily family worship at which texts of the Upanishads were recited. To the father, then, is owing the obvious interest in the life of to-day which characterises the son, and to the habit of reading the old Indian Scriptures in a devotional spirit is due the alertness and originality which constitute the charm of *Sādhanā*. “To me the verses of the Upanishads and the teachings of Buddha have ever been things of the spirit.”

The reference to Buddha is illuminative. Tagore the father does not seem to have venerated that wonderful man, but both Keshab Chandra Sen and Vivekananda were his devotees. Thus the harm that was done by the abolition of Indian Buddhism was happily undone. It was not yet the time, however, for anything to be said or done which might seem to impair the doctrinal purity and spirituality of the Indian Reformation. Hence Devendranath Tagore not only rejected Buddha but also the whole of the Indian monistic philosophy and the widely spread theories of Maya, of incarnations, and of images. It was, in fact, his mission, not only to organise the association (the Brahma Samaj) which Rammohan Roy had founded in 1828, but also to beautify its too coldly intellectual aspect by the flowers of prayer and praise.

He began his career as a reformer in 1839, when he established a society called the Tatwabadhini Sabha, which held weekly meetings at his house in Calcutta, where sometimes religious discourses were delivered and sometimes prayers were offered to the one and only God, known in India as Brahma. The step was doubtless unavoidable because of the lack of organ-



isation in Rammohan Roy's institution. But equally of course the time soon came when practical men became aware that what was required was not a new association but a tightening of the bands of the old. This was effected by Devendranath Tagore, who "devoted himself with zeal and energy to its reorganisation, introduced a regular form of worship, including prayers for spiritual light and strength, and drew up a covenant for promoting consistency of conduct among the brotherhood." The importance of this can hardly be overrated. Consistency in a country like India was almost impossible, and yet the attempt had to be made; the support of church membership was therefore of inestimable advantage. This was in 1843. In 1848 a further step in advance was taken. Recognising the want of a "sacred book," based not only on natural but on revealed religion, Devendranath Tagore—as he thought himself, by special inspiration—dictated passages from the Upanishads, which formed Part I. of the so-called Brahma-Dharma. It became, however, only too evident that even the Upanishads, which had been so invaluable to Devendranath Tagore in his earlier years, needed a good deal of sifting; they might indeed contain the word of God, but they were not the word of God itself. This led to a further extension of the eclectic principle in Part II., which contained, besides, passages from the Laws of Manu and from the Mahabharata, and also a beautiful prayer (interspersed with quotations from the Upanishads) of Fénelon. Of Fénelon's Bible, however, no use was made. This may seem strange, but the truth is that Fénelon's prayer had been already annexed to Indian literature by being translated. Devendranath Tagore was thoroughly Indian in his tastes.

We may contrast him, therefore, as a leader of conservative instincts with a younger leader, cosmopolitan in spirit and athirst for radical reforms, Keshab Chandra Sen. They were close friends, and for a time in the same society, but how different! Permanent co-operation was seen to be impossible, and in February 1865 Keshab and the radical party seceded from the original Brahma Samaj, assuming the title "Brahma Samaj of India," while Devendranath Tagore, as leader of the more conservative section, gave his society the title of Adi Brahma Samaj, "The Original Society of Brahma (God)." The details of this critical period would repay an impartial investigation, but this would divert us too much from our main subject. Suffice it to mention here that Keshab's unfortunate marriage of his daughter to the Maharajah of Kuch-behar led to the formation of a third society called the Sadharan (*i.e.* Universal) Brahma Samaj. In several respects this was the most advanced of the Samajs; to idolatry and to caste it was entirely opposed, and any change in the rules had to be passed by the votes of a majority of the members. But to Devendranath Tagore the colour of the institution must have seemed hardly Indian enough. Certainly he was, on the whole, more in sympathy with his friend Keshab (to whom he gave the beautiful name Brahmananda, "Brahma's bliss"). This clearly appears from the letters exchanged by the two friends in the last year of Keshab's life.

There are many specimens of a truly spiritual religion both in the Autobiography itself and in the appendix. The former is disappointingly fragmentary, but it reveals to us a noble searcher after God, who was willing to make any sacrifice for truth and righteousness' sake. In the spirit of the ancient sages, he retired from the world before it was too late to enjoy the change. A portion of his leisure he spent in his family house at Calcutta, and a portion in meditation and prayer in a house and garden which he owned called Santi-nikatan, or the Abode of Peace. He also, his son relates, travelled about proclaiming the religion.

He died 11th January 1903, universally regretted, and honoured with the title Maharshi, "the Saint." To one of his sons we owe the excellent translation of the Autobiography and its various supplements. Another son is the now well-known poet and teacher. Both these sons are distinctly progressive men, who value the religious tradition of the Mother-land.

I may add that there are many illustrations, and that the book is of historical interest to those who realise that Indian religion has a future and a hope.

T. K. CHEYNE.

OXFORD.

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*The Foundations of Character.*—By Alexander F. Shand.—  
London: Macmillan, 1914.

IN chapter seventeen of the second part of this work Mr Shand gives an account of the emotion of wonder which will make many a reader pause and say to himself, "That is exactly the kind of interest in the mind that this book has aroused in me." Wonder, we are told, is an interplay of joy, curiosity, and astonishment. Now the essence of joy is its tendency to sustain the circumstances which have given rise to it. The essence of curiosity, which is not accompanied by very much or very strong feeling, is to examine the object by which it has been excited and carry the attention beyond the present situation. Consequently there is a strange antagonism between the tendencies that are at work in wonder which produces two varieties of the emotion. The one, which results in superstition, is childish and sensational; the other, which results in science, is highly intellectual and reverential: for in the former the joy predominates, and in the latter the curiosity. But in any case "wonder is the Phoenix which, through its own destruction, comes to life again." It is ever renewed by a world in which the mystic finds "every common bush afire with God," and the man of science is constantly being challenged to answer the questions that Nature puts to him in endless succession.

Of such problems, which are at once baffling and alluring, Mr Shand has propounded hundreds; and it is one of the outstanding merits of the book that he has not answered them dogmatically. He has aimed at



showing his readers a good method of study rather than at proving himself to be the complete psychologist. Thus they will not idly assimilate his theories, but will use them as a stimulus to making discoveries in psychology, and correcting the laws of the science which have so far been enunciated in the light of broadening experience and increasing knowledge.

To the unlearned in psychology the book will bring an awakening similar to that which a child feels when he first learns that the snowflakes which, erstwhile, were mere objects of admiration to him, are crystals of exquisite form; or the flowers which he has regarded only as decorations are organisms every part of which has a definite function to perform in the economy of the whole. The mind is a universe as vast and complex as the sky and the earth; and as well planned and ordered. Instincts, impulses, and emotions are all organised into sentiments as the planets are disposed in the solar system. A man who is idling on a railway station, a child who is tired of his toys, a sedentary worker who goes out for a walk, will instinctively seek some ulterior object to systematise their activities. The organising process begins at one's birth and goes on until sentiments are formed—such as friendship, conscience, the love of business, parental affection, and self-love—that wax and wane like all living things, and that utilise and control numbers of instincts, appetites, and emotions, in the service of the ends for which they have grown up. All of them, as need arises, employ anger, fear, joy, and sorrow; but of repugnance, hope, disgust, and other emotions they do not all make use. The emotions are themselves organisations, microcosms or selves indeed, which together constitute the compound self or ego; which comprise a cognitive, a conative, and a feeling attitude; and which, when character degenerates, or before it is determined, sometimes become independent personalities, insomuch that the dotard, the child, and the hysteric fall a prey to their passions and impulses. As for the instincts—that of grasping, for instances of pursuing or of hiding—they, in the human race, bring about only fragmentary actions which the child has to find out how to combine for some serviceable purpose by means of imitation and experiment. Desire is a developed impulse which holds in train the six prospective emotions of disappointment, anxiety, hope, despondency, despair, and confidence; and will and intellect are not independent existences, but merely instruments for realising the ends of some sentiment or emotion. The writer proceeds to explain how, in the course of their evolution, the sentiments construct ideals of their action which form their “relative ethics”; how the “tempers” relax and quicken the emotions; how the character acquires the qualities of conduct; and how so many other mental processes achieve themselves that the student's wonder, both at the volume and the subject, is amply justified.

The multitude of details which the book records may confuse many people; and perhaps, after all, the majority derive more knowledge of character from the artists—poets, novelists, and essayists—who make a few

broad outlines tell the whole story of it, than from the psychologist who neatly enumerates its elements and ranges them under laws. For example,

"She would do joy no curious despite,  
She made no wonder how the wonder was;  
Only concern'd to take her full delight,"

contains more information about joy and its inclination to maintain its object without change than the author's analysis of that emotion, which is elaborate and extremely careful. To give precision to such literary utterances, and to ancient saws and maxims, has been one of his chief aims in writing the book; and it has lent a primness to his pages that occasionally becomes almost ludicrous. But to complain of a man of science because he is not an artist is hardly fair criticism. Well schemed and modestly written, Mr Shand's book is the fruit of long study that should secure much attention for it, from dreamer and thinker alike, for many a year to come.

M. E. ROBINSON.

LONDON.

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*Introduction to the History of Religions.*—By Crawford Howell Toy.—  
Ginn & Co., London, 1914.—Pp. xix + 639.

THIS volume is the fourth of a series of "Handbooks on the History of Religions," under the editorship of Professor Morris Jastrow, jun., former volumes dealing with India (by E. W. Hopkins), Babylonia and Assyria (Jastrow), and the Teutons (Chantepie de la Saussaye). The author—a Professor of Hebrew since 1869—is a biblical scholar best known for his book *Judaism and Christianity*, and for his excellent commentaries on Ezekiel and Proverbs. In this volume he has performed a service which places all students of religion under his debt. He has classified, summarised, and discussed the principal beliefs, ideas, legends, myths, practices, and customs in "public religion" from the lowest forms upwards. Although it has not been his aim to deal at length with the higher religions, with personal religion on the higher levels (*e.g.* as exemplified in mysticism), or with the quasi- and semi-religious features of philosophy, art, poetry, etc., he has nevertheless introduced numerous references "for the purpose of illustrating lines of progress." He has extended his survey from savagery and totemism to modern philosophising and theosophising tendencies, and he has ranged from the meanest of cults to the problem of a universal religion. In fact, the veteran Harvard scholar has given the student a convenient bird's-eye view of the entire field, and an "up-to-date" and concise summary of all the important material. A careful scrutiny may reveal lacunæ—"the details are selected from a large mass of material which is increasing in bulk year by year"; but the classification is so clear and the references so complete that the book will be an indispensable handbook to all who wish to pursue the subject and "pigeon-hole" new



evidence as it comes. A very brief introductory chapter is followed by one on the soul (pp. 10-47); next is an account of various early religious ceremonies, with a chapter on early cults (99-175). Totemism and taboo are handled with commendable fullness (176-264), and a chapter on gods leads up to one on myths (359-391). A discussion of magic and divination completes this part of the book. There are careful discussions, especially interesting to the ordinary reader, of "the higher theistic development" (440-480), and of the "social development of religion" (481-572), and a few concluding pages on "scientific and ethical elements in religious systems." The select bibliography is very elaborate (pp. 585-623); the index, though acceptable, is all too short considering the quantity of material; on the other hand, the book is conveniently divided into 1173 sections, and there is a useful analytical table of contents. Altogether, the work is a fine achievement and an invaluable contribution to the subject.

Whatever advance be made in the study in the future will doubtless be due less to the discovery of novel data than to better methods of treating the old. The material is already unwieldy, and, although new data may prove or disprove some hypotheses and suggest others, the unprejudiced observer of to-day can hardly fail to notice with perplexity the varying attitudes and positions which are due, not so much to the data *per se*, as to the individual factor, the inevitable presuppositions of the inquirer. Professor Toy's main conclusions, however, should win assent: (a) the similarity among religions is a result of the psychological unity of the human race (§ 943); (b) every religion is the product of a community, and represents its view of human life in its relation to the supernatural (§ 1148); and (c) human life has always been unitary, no one part can be severed from the others, and religion is simply one line of social growth existing along with science, philosophy, etc. (§ 1015). While, on the one hand, he recognises certain features that are common to practically all religions (§ 1149), he naturally accepts, on the other, the fact of a religious development of some sort from the earliest times (§ 12). It is here that one or two criticisms suggest themselves. When we read that "the clearest example of the orderly advance of a deity to pre-eminence is afforded by the Hebrew Yahweh, Jehovah" (§ 765), it is obvious that we deal not with tangible living individuals of flesh and blood, but with a long series of characteristic ideas and convictions focussed by them upon Yahweh. And so, when, instead of a single area, we survey religious development from Central Australia to its highest forms (*viz. our own ideals*), the abstract and involved nature of the process is still more obvious. None the less, for the purpose of handling the facts, the evolutionary method is entirely helpful so far as it goes. But there is a logic of evolution. When we consider any series of successive stages A, B, C, etc., there will be features peculiar to some or all of them (to AB, BC, ABC, or CDE, etc.), and there will be the characteristic differences which alone allow us to sever the stages. What is applicable to one or

two stages may not be so to others, and what becomes distinctive and recognisable (say *c* at stage C) must have necessary antecedents in B, even though we cannot recognise anything like *c*. So it is that if we can regard thought as developing, and if we agree that religion first appears at a certain stage, there will be a prior stage where, however, we may not descry religion *as we define it*; and if religion develops, we may, from *our* definition of God, find the earliest stage where the idea first appears, but there will be a necessary antecedent stage, even though we cannot recognise a belief in God resembling our beliefs. Indeed, a great deal of trouble has arisen in dealing with the lower religions because of our definitions and concepts: we do not find certain features in a recognisable form, or we find features that can be expressed only in terms that properly refer to some higher stage; our intuitive feeling of the course of evolution culminates in the present stage reached by us in our own evolution; and, finally, there is considerable difference of opinion among ourselves touching the content of sundry concepts and the value of sundry definitions.

Professor Toy very reasonably finds "germinal" conceptions of natural law (§ 7), the infinite (§ 9), public spirit (§ 131), and public opinion (§ 435). But it is quite another thing when he speaks of religion and science as coeval (§ 1). He even talks of "savage science" (§ 26), "early biological science" (§ 35), and of ideas of the deity, soul, and conscience as "products of scientific thought" (§ 15). In a Nandi folk-story wonder is expressed at the fact that man can turn over when asleep without first getting up (§ 642). This is on the road to psychology—and *rudimentary* psychology at the *pre-scientific* stage; but it is confusing to identify the explicit with the implicit, the "science" with the *pre-scientific* antecedents. We must insist on severing astrology from astronomy, and alchemy from chemistry, nor must hepatoscopy be equated with anatomy! Instead of running the stages together, it is more important to realise the existence and to look for the indications of the antecedent stages in the growth of science, theology, and philosophy, and the various aspects or departments of them. The fact that *logically* there must be antecedent stages in the history of ideas of God, Redemption, Sacrifice, and so forth, is of positive value in research.

Professor Toy inclines to differentiate within the area at stages where there was not yet differentiation. Thus: "The belief that the newborn child is the reincarnation of an ancestor is scientific rather than religious" (§ 186); *mana* is "a scientific biological conception, but it necessarily enters into alliance with religion" (§ 235); economic taboos are "prudential rules to which a supernatural sanction has been attached" (§ 622); "taboo is in essence religious, not moral" (§ 632). This scarcely views the evidence in its own light, but gives our point of view. So also, when he says "a house . . . represents the life of the family, and is therefore a thing to be revered" (§ 236), must one not protest? On the theory of the psychological unity of the race, may not some savages have their "Home, sweet Home," co-ordinating and intensifying what with us is often an undifferentiated fusion of feelings, memories, and ideas? Again, while



the outside observer can say: "innumerable are the taboos that have passed into oblivion" (§ 633), the more psychological method finds everywhere taboos of *some* kind, either isolated or in some organic connection of current beliefs and practices. Professor Toy also writes: "Taboo, being a religious conception, has been adopted and fostered by all popular systems of religion" (*ib.*); but the evidence, regarded more psychologically, shows that the ordinary religious individual invariably tends to recognise within himself certain profound differences of absolute validity.

The gulf between the sacred and the non-sacred is felt subjectively and is absolutely valid; but to the external observer the gulf has no objective existence. When, further, Professor Toy proceeds to associate the decay of a taboo with the influences that have tended to rationalise religion, we see that although the detached intellectualistic mind may not feel the force of some taboo, and may object, say, to the blasphemy laws, the average type of mind is such as to account entirely both for their rise and for their persistence. The intellectual type sees the data from its own point of view. If "the hold of magic on the minds of men is shown by the fact that it has persisted up to the present day" (§ 903), the theory of "survival" does not explain the psychological aspects. The individuals, who are our evidence, have not, as it were, inherited certain ideas and beliefs, rather do they manifest a supernaturalism, closely related to religion, but expressed in external forms which religion cannot tolerate. The whole significance of the modern study of religion lies not so much in the gap which appears to sever the highest thought from the lower, but in the discovery (*a*) of the imperfections of our tools of thought, (*b*) of the delicate character of "civilisation," and (*c*) of the world-wide distribution of a supernaturalism, of a subjectively valid nature, which makes and unmakes peoples. The purely classificatory and descriptive stage in the scientific study of religion has passed into one more psychological, where, as it seems, theories of logic and of philosophy are inextricably entangled with it. The old problems have taken a new form. In conclusion, Professor Toy's admirable and indispensable volume will materially relieve the initial labours of future students; and in expressing sincerest thanks to the veteran scholar for his work, it must be freely acknowledged that criticisms have only been possible because the material has already been collected and presented to us by the zeal and scholarship of such as he.

STANLEY A. COOK.

CAMBRIDGE.

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*Roman Ideas of Deity.*—By W. Warde Fowler.—London :  
Macmillan & Co., 1914.

THIS is a most interesting and suggestive piece of work on a particular branch of a study to which a great deal has been contributed by scholars in late years, no small part by Dr Fowler himself. The revived interest

in the ways of life and thought of the ancient world has led to an eager search for all new evidence that may be forthcoming and a minute re-examination of the old, in the hope that fresh light may be thrown on what may be termed the combined study of anthropology and the classics. In this study, in popular appreciation at any rate, Greek institutions have proved far more inspiring than those of Rome. And if generally "the glory that was Greece" has had a larger appeal than "the grandeur that was Rome," certainly in the sphere of religious belief, particularly in the period with which Dr Fowler is specially concerned, that of the last century before the Christian era, we do not even find that grandeur. Our first impression—and to some extent Dr Fowler supports the view—is that of a faith that was dead or dying, of vague abstractions converted into lifeless deities, and of gods adopted from the Greeks, and so misused in the adoption as to lose all their nobility. When we turn to the evidence of Roman literature, we get the same impression of lifelessness. Cicero's philosophical writings show, indeed, a serious spirit, a genuine wish to believe; but, as Dr Fowler justly observes, they have never really roused mankind. If, as he says, the religion of Rome and Italy had been at this time a genuine product full of life, this theology might have been of real and permanent interest. But it was not so. And if Cicero is not greatly inspiring, neither was he greatly inspired. Just as the Romans adopted the Greek gods in the period of their decline, so did they take on Greek philosophy when its great days were over. The writers whom Cicero followed had, as Dr Fowler points out, the great defect that their thinking was not rooted in the life of the world around them. For the most part Cicero's attitude to religion is that of the man of the world, and we feel much the same about Horace, while of Ovid we should be inclined to say that his is the religion of the man about town. "It is expedient that gods should exist, and, as it is expedient, let us believe that they do," remains as a delightful summary of Ovid's religious convictions.

But we get a very imperfect and unfair view of the Roman character if we only give attention to what they borrowed from others and never fully realised for themselves, to what became weak and debasing, and do not consider the far more important elements of strength and power. Many years ago Henry Nettleship in some admirable essays entered a vigorous plea for a proper appreciation of those great qualities which raised Rome to her position of eminence and made her a ruling power, which the Greeks never became. It is a great attraction of Dr Fowler's learned work that he gives us the impression of holding the same point of view. To quote some lines of the conclusion, he writes: "I asked myself what the old Roman religion could contribute to the idea of deity, and found some little contribution in the spirituality of the domestic worships, especially of *genius*, and in the tendency towards monotheism in the cult of Jupiter the heaven-god. I went on to remark on the sense of cosmic powers as divine forces. . . . Then I passed to the most important of the religious tendencies of the age, the tendency to think of Man as capable of becoming



god, and the exemplification of this tendency in the cult of the Cæsars, which reconstituted the old connection between religion and the State."

We feel very forcibly, on reading this book, the strength and endurance of this connection. The typical Roman does not strike us as religious in any intensity of spiritual communion with his own soul. But he is religious in his regard for the home, the family, and the State. Hence comes the importance attached to the Penates, to Vesta, and to Jupiter, who, in a sense, is a deity who embraces and transcends all. The Roman *pietas* was a very real virtue, and even more so, perhaps, was the *sanctitas*, scrupulousness, which kept men in the right path. We feel, from much evidence which Dr Fowler discusses, how apt the Roman genius was for preserving and developing whatever made for the life and permanence of the community and its institutions; and, further, how dextrous a use authority was continually making of what could serve this purpose. The Roman spirit was rather confirmed than exalted by the Roman religion and its observances, and the most exalted of the Romans, Lucretius and Virgil, are in a way foreigners among their fellow-countrymen. Yet they were only partly so. Dr Fowler makes some interesting comments on Lucretius, and indicates how, in spite of the purpose of the *De rerum natura* and the theory it expounds, Lucretius represents the ideas of deity which inform the Roman religion. Virgil's mysticism appeals to us as looking to the future rather than to the present or the past. Yet he too had much in common with the feeling of his age.

Dr Fowler discusses at some length the subject of the cult of the Cæsars. We are probably most of us startled by Horace's picture of Augustus as drinking, or destined to drink, nectar among the Immortals, with purple-stained mouth. But Dr Fowler makes us understand how, apart from the exaggerated language of courtly poets and the exceptional forms it sometimes assumed, this cult may be regarded without a feeling either of amazement or offence, as a natural development of Roman belief and certainly a most useful institution for the community. Perhaps we might wish to say that it is the tendency to think of man as capable of becoming "a god" rather than "god." But at any rate it is a belief that again impresses us with the *savoir faire* if not with the exaltation of the Roman mind.

This book consists of lectures delivered in Oxford for the Common University Fund, and so is primarily addressed to students of the subject; but it should appeal to a wider public. If any fault may be found with it, it is that, dealing as it does with much that is matter of recent investigation, occasionally we feel that too much importance is attached to what is new—to what time must put in its proper place in the general body of evidence. Not unnaturally perhaps in such inquiry, *omne repertum pro magnifico*, if we may alter the famous saying of Tacitus. But it is difficult to repress a smile when we read Dr Fowler's statement, "When I was preparing these lectures, I learnt from an article in the *Archiv für Religionswissenschaft* that an Italian scholar, Dr Pettazoni, claims to have

discovered a supreme deity in the island of Sardinia." But perhaps Dr Fowler smiled as he wrote it.

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*The Principle of Authority in Relation to Certainty, Sanctity, and Society.*

—An Essay in the Philosophy of Experimental Religion. Lectures by P. T. Forsyth, M.A., D.D., Principal of Hackney College, Hampstead.—London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1913.

DR FORSYTH is a leading exponent of that evangelical Liberalism which no one who understands it in the least can mistake for a position of compromise between free progressive thinking and traditional prejudices. To disparage in this way all who believe that intellectual continuity under modern conditions can be reached without a vast disturbance of the centre of gravity, is really inexcusable in dealing with Dr Forsyth. And this not merely because of the vigour and independence of his thought, not merely because the critic could be challenged to show what place his system gives to scholastic methods, naïve assumptions, dependence on exploded narratives, undigested lumps of tradition: but for a further reason. A theology of this sort is virtually a challenge, on ground principles, to the Liberalism that thus disparages it; and therefore, if the writer is to be taken seriously at all, such disparagement only begs the question. This theology is an attempt, at least, to make the idea of Redemption determinative; and if the attempt is successful, historical belief must necessarily win a new significance, and therefore, in its main features, new credentials. The task of finding intellectual continuity, in view of modern thought and of abiding human needs, is not the exclusive privilege of a levelling Liberalism: the Liberalism that seeks not a level but a focus is a rival on the same ground. This latter may mediate between its rival and the old theology, but it is not a compromise; it works on principles of its own.

The writer, starting from the idea of authority, in all departments of life, seeks to establish it upon a soteriological basis. Salvation is the approach of God, not merely as love but as holiness. His self-revelation is received rather volitionally than intellectually by the soul that it subdues. "The unapproachable approaches, enters, tarries, lives, dies, conquers among us and in us, knows us into our only knowledge of itself, subdues all things to its sanctuary, and establishes its good and blessed self in us and on us all" (p. 7).

The key to the understanding of the general position is to be found in the Theory of the Knowledge of God which it contains, not because this is the basis of the reasoning so much as because it is the crucial point to which the lines converge. We shall deal with that point rather closely, yet not at all from a desire to press home a too nice criticism; for it is just



because we feel so strongly the truth and value of the main thesis that we would fain bring its weaker elements to the surface and try to show that they are best corrected from a standpoint close to the writer's own.

The book, we should add, is written in Dr Forsyth's well-known brilliant and incisive style, full of telling epigrams and unusual turns of expression, which at first give a sense of being strained after; but we believe they are rather due to his method of thought, and that the strain is not after style but after the elusive implications of his thought. This is in itself antithetical in ground and substance, and lives upon antithesis. But for this characteristic, the treatise might seem rather spun out. It turns upon a few great and closely connected ideas, trenchantly enforced, and is in fact a noble contribution, not so much perhaps to the elucidation of the "principle of authority" as such, but certainly to redemptional theology.

But to proceed. The author finds the ultimate ground of authority in the submission of the soul to the holy God who approaches it redemptively in Jesus Christ. This approach is essentially authoritative: it is a claim, a taking possession, an act of self-vindicating Holiness no less than of saving Grace. Dualism and discontinuity are emphasised at this central point. "He (St Paul) never speaks of the success of the Gospel as lying in its appeal to his better self, or its consummation of his prior self, or its transfiguration of his natural self, or its corroboration of his rational self. . . . The supreme authority, in so far as it is effective for my obedience, is the supreme miracle, which remakes me and my will, rather than the supreme reason which extends me and my domain" (p. 65). How effectively this is maintained must be seen by reading the book. That there is a certain one-sidedness here, at least in emphasis, will be submitted presently, but one may admit this without softening the terms in which this discontinuity is expressed. It is not the bold grasping of the nettle, the incisive affirmation of interacting realities at the heart of things, which gives just offence to the modern mind. Intellectual continuity—the organic unification of our ideas—does not require us to postulate a universe with no real freedom in it, no eternal issues. A Dualism clarified and focussed is no less true to the genuine requirements of Liberalism as such than any Monism—not to say far truer to experience and life.

Dr Forsyth's attitude towards Monism should be noted, for it has a point of attachment with other of his positions which will afford occasion for comment. He says of the moral (and religious) consciousness that it "is not, like the philosophic, single, simple, and harmonious, but double, divided, and even rent. . . . It must begin with the experienced and certain fact of the divided conscience, a standing state of collision, war, and sin" (p. 5). While agreeing most fully with this, we yet may pause when the conclusion is drawn that "when we are dealing with the holy, we are in a region which thought cannot handle or even reach" (p. 7). The general tendency of the passage is to do, as we think, imperfect justice to Philosophy, and therefore to the intellectual claims of religious

experience itself. Our substantial agreement with Dr Forsyth here is qualified at this point: that whereas he seems to concede the monistic ideal to Philosophy, and on that ground asserts the independence of the religious consciousness, which is essentially dualistic, we should rather dispute the philosophic soundness of Monism because it is not true to the most basal experience. We should not therefore concede the coherence, within their scope, of the monistic systems. We should challenge any theory, expressed or implied, of the relation between experience and pure thought, which would not allow religious experience to decide this question for Philosophy.

We now pass on to our consideration of the epistemological side of the discussion. Its three main terms should be carefully borne in mind. The argument turns upon the mutual relations of Experience, Idea, and the content or object of both. We shall best show how much the writer has helped towards a true adjustment of these three terms by showing where, in the opinion of the present reviewer, his adjustment fails, or at least falters. The tenor of our criticism will be to give the Idea, or rational side of Religion, a somewhat more dominant place.

"When we are dealing with the holy we . . . are beyond both experience and thought, and we are dependent on revelation for the conviction of the reality of the ideal which moral experience demands but cannot ensure" (p. 7). Experience "leaves me surer of the content than of the experience itself" (p. 29). But, on the other hand, experience is nearer to the Object than the idea is. "Our theological capital is not ideas we arrive at, but experience we go through" (p. 103). Yet "we do not believe things *because* of an experience, but we do *in* an experience" (p. 30). It is difficult to convey in a few fragmentary quotations the substance of a large portion of a large volume, but these few sentences fairly indicate the drift. Spiritual knowledge, Dr Forsyth declares in effect—and we emphatically agree with him—is correlative with a divine self-presentative revelation, and, in this respect, is super-intellectual. The actual contact with the operative divine Object, if it be but a fact, takes us, obviously, beyond mere conceptions and mere feeling alike. But here comes in the *crux*. What is the nature of that experience "in" which we believe in an Object that transcends it? Clearly we cannot be always worshipping. And even though the spirit of worship becomes the main current of our lives, yet still, if we are to justify our faith to our intellect, we must be able in some sense to view the experience from without. To shun this would be a confession that we are dominated by feeling. The author is far from failing to recognise this. He emphasises the claims of the intellect. But he is not, we think, quite satisfactory, or at least clear, in the assignment of its subject-matter. He is too much inclined (as in the passage already referred to, pp. 103-4) to assign to it the experience as such in too narrow a sense, rather than the ideas which express the content of the experience. He does not make it clear that the former is not even comprehensible without the latter. By the experience he means, not the mere subjective happening (though he leaves a loop-hole for this



error), but in its correlation with an objective content, which is, not an idea about God, but God Himself. Now here there is something wanting, and that is the clear recognition that cognitive experience possesses an *ideal* content. It is not enough to say that it has an *actual* content (though this paradox is true in the mysticism of Religion), or an immediate object. All cognition is implicitly *knowledge about* as well as acquaintance, even though the implication can never fully be made explicit. Such certainly is the knowledge of God. If we forget this we drive a wedge between the subject and the object—however close their reciprocity—which would involve scepticism. When discursive thought has its turn, there is nothing for it to handle but subjective phenomena from which it may draw inferences as to their cause: for to assume the object as real would be to beg the question. And thus there will be just that sharp division between experience and rational knowledge which is not only contrary to fact, but throws us back ultimately upon ecstasy for our apprehension of God. Dr Forsyth should surely have explicitly admitted, and indeed affirmed strongly, that we experience ideas as well as facts and entities: that the idea of God, however it may suffer from the mediation of reflective analysis, is as truly the content of experience as is the living presence of God. His system absolutely requires not merely a God responded to but a Truth intuited.

In ordinary matters we draw a distinction between object and idea which we must not allow to mislead us when we are dealing with the basis of religious cognition. What we desiderate in the author's reasoning is not that he should spoil the immediacy of apprehension by the interposition of the Idea (this, indeed, is what he seems to fear), but the fusion of Idea and Object at the apex of knowledge. When the object is God, is not the distinction between the actual and the ideal transcended at the central point of contact between the knower and the known?

Does the idea of God really *express*, in any degree, the content of the God-consciousness, or is it only a causal explanation of that consciousness, a hypothesis that the phenomenon has suggested and justifies? If the former, then surely a moment of understanding, or acceptance of an idea or ideas, is no less present in the immediacy of spiritual communion than the living reality of God Himself. That the latter cannot be left for an instant out of account is, we hold, a vital truth, and is enforced with great power throughout this volume: but we must secure this truth by showing that the experience not merely invites but initiates the intellectual process.

Closely connected with this question is that of self-consciousness; and here we seem to find, in Dr Forsyth's fine construction, a crack continuous with that which we have already traced. He takes his stand upon a proposition of the deepest truth and significance, that we know ourselves as known of God. "Our knowledge of ourselves rests on God's knowledge of us. . . . The root certainly is not, 'I think,' it is 'I am thought'; not 'I know,' but 'I am known'" (p. 111; see also, *e.g.*, pp. 71 f.). The

real ground of our certitude is "the nature of the thing of which we are sure" (p. 58). But this is still only part of the truth. There is a pervading tendency to underrate the fact of a redeemed *self*-consciousness, corresponding to the consciousness of God. The word "reflection" covers both sides of that main idea that has eluded the firm grasp so admirable in the treatment of the main theme. That is to say, the subjectivity of the individual soul, in respect both of its mental processes (already discussed) and of its existence as an eternal entity, is too much subordinated. The whole process is exhibited too exclusively in terms of an outward movement, or series of movements, towards God, just as God is conceived essentially in His redemptive approach to us. If we are to do justice to the redeemed consciousness as a position of the soul tending at least to stability, and as an atmosphere pervading thought and life, we must work into the theory an abiding and conscious, or subconscious, immanence of the soul in God, and that as a matter not merely of grace *per se*, but of nature restored and reinstated by grace. This higher self-consciousness is necessary not only directly to that basis of assurance without which a redemptional theology is stultified, but to a full grasp of the rationality of our faith. That is to say, we must incorporate self into our vision, both as an individual unit of redemption and also as the seat of subjective Reason, which may either deceive or discredit our naïve faith unless admitted, so far as may be, into its confidence. If it were utterly left out of account, it would remain as a background of uncertainty to all our brightest hopes. We could have no doctrine of assurance and no assurance of such doctrine as we had. Mere self-transcendence stultifies at both ends the security which it seems at first to win. With this we may assume that Dr Forsyth would unreservedly agree. But if we are right, it is important to inquire whether the place he has assigned to self-consciousness in Christian experience is quite clear and adequate. Is it *enough* to say that we know ourselves as known of God? Do we not know God as known by ourselves? In other words, have we not, ideally, such a consciousness of God that the fact of its complete and inevitable relativity to ourselves casts no shadow upon its objective and transcendental reality? If so, there must be a more radical correlation between self and God in Christian experience and in any adequate intellectual expression of it. It is not quite enough to see self mirrored in the heart of God. The immanence is mutual. The doctrine of God in us, widely as it has been abused—starved in its own sanctuary by isolation from the ideas that are its necessary complement—is a truth that, in the very interests of transcendental Theism, we cannot afford to forget.

Dr Forsyth, as we have said, is disposed to view personal religion too exclusively in terms of outgoing movement, both on the side of God and on the side of man. And this, as we have partly indicated, has consequences in more than one direction. The tendency of his reasoning is to reduce, as we think, too much the significance of the *præparatio evangelica*, both in the individual and at large. For instance, there is something distinctly lacking in his treatment of verification—the relation of the old



to the new (pp. 375-378 ; cf. pp. 175, 176): "The Gospel can be handled by no experience but that which it really creates." Now this, to begin with, is not easy to reconcile with the strong volitional element fundamental to his teaching ; for in proportion as we emphasise the act of free personal self-surrender, so far we must allow to the "natural man" the possession of moral and spiritual instincts of which the Christian state is *in one aspect* the efflorescence. Freedom is the formula not only of transition and discontinuity, but of continuity also. The object that evokes the self-surrender must find as well as bring. Until we fully recognise this we are in a position that requires on one side, while it excludes on the other, a theory of Irresistible Grace. This freedom of the natural man is surely a self-expression as well as a transformation. *Within the actual experience*, of course, he does not contribute or co-operate. "Nothing in my hand I bring, simply to Thy Cross I cling." But that is because *here* the antithesis is not primarily between self as it has been and self as it seeks to become, but between God and self *qua* separate from God. When I hail the Gospel as the response to old needs and the interpretation of old problems, I am not worshipping. I am dwelling upon a different antithesis from that which expresses itself in worship. But for all that I may still be thinking and living within the comprehensive life-experience of the Christian. And as worship is not the whole of life, so it is not the whole of experience, though central to both.

Now apply this to the pre-Christian religious influences that the Gospel presupposes. Surely they are more than a mere raw material. There is, in technical language, a "moment" of continuity. The antithesis of Nature and Grace, though focussed in history, is in a certain sense super-historical. The Gospel did not entirely create the sense of that need that it supplied, unless we regard it ideally as the principle of all Divine approach, which finds its full expression in the logic and the fact of the Cross. But this is just what Dr Forsyth seems shy of doing. It would require no modification of his central theme : for, indeed, the more the Christ of our philosophy gathers up the past the more truly can He become transcendent, masterful, and creative. It is not quite enough to say that He is seen to be all this when once accepted. The continuity is not only *ex parte post*.

We have noted many other passages for comment, but it may be well not to prolong this review. Enough has been said to indicate the main point where the system, as we think, needs fortifying. Almost everything else that we might say in criticism is connected with that. Even his Theory of Knowledge in general (ch. v.) must be passed over. After all, it is—and quite rightly, in our opinion—rather a corollary than a basis to his treatment of central Christian experience. As to the outstanding excellences of the book, these would indeed form a long *catena* ; but rather let them be studied in the book itself.

A. R. WHATELY.

*Studies in Modernism.*—By the Rev. Alfred Fawkes, M.A.—London :  
Smith, Elder & Co., 1913.—Pp. xii + 468.

THE “Modernism” of these remarkably thoughtful and well-written essays covers the whole movement of contemporary thought. Hence the inclusion of such studies as those of Anatole France and Zola. The latter writer has been connected with religious questions by his three works, *Lourdes*, *Rome*, and *Paris*, and also by his dramatic action in the Dreyfus case, which revealed, as by a flash, his ruling principle, the love of truth and justice. Whether he did the best service for truth by the character of his writings is another question. Mr Fawkes quotes with approval the saying of Anatole France that he was “a perverted idealist.”

The nature of thought makes abstraction inevitable, but no doubt Zola made a deliberate selection which illustrated the worst side of humanity. But if he did for French what the author of *The Jungle* and *The Metropolis* did for American society, it does not differ from the method of satirists in every age.

Man is compounded of brute and angel, devil and God. If most writers have laid the stress on the flattering side of the picture, Zola sought to counterpoise this tendency by painting the shadows deeper than they are, without any of those fine gradations between virtue and vice which exist in real life. But who among those who have worked in the slums of our large towns, or have looked behind the decorous and hypocritical veil that hides certain aspects of the life of our public schools, army, professional, and respectable classes, can deny the presence of moral ulcers that are eating deeply into our civilisation? Why should we believe Juvenal and not Zola, because Paganism was more open and shameless in its vice? Is our civilisation, on the whole, better than the Pagan, with its deeper and more widely spread contrast of luxury and squalor, with all its inevitable and degrading consequences?

Mr Fawkes answers that we have progressed intellectually, and, though in some respects individual morality has not, social morality has advanced. There is some truth in this, but, taking it on the whole, the social qualities which make for the commercial success of the present day, and call forth the most strenuous activities, are opposed to the old-fashioned virtues of regard for the things of others, self-sacrifice, and inward self-discipline.

But, he urges, an age must be judged by its ideals and its efforts to realise them, not by failures which are due to new problems springing from new conditions. And we must forecast the future by the past: we must use “the large map” (p. 205).

One of the notes he strikes most frequently, and which might be called the philosophical *leitmotif* running throughout the volume, is that of the “One and Many.”

“The One remains, the Many change and pass.”

Without taking wide views we cannot see the unity underlying the diversity, the jar and clash of differences and antagonisms. Without wide



views we shall not appreciate the fact that when one historical synthesis is destroyed, another gradually forms out of its fragments, and that this is a kind of recurring law of history. We live in a time of greater diversity than unity, but the philosopher thinks he can see the commencement of a higher and wider synthesis. Doubtless there is truth in the author's contention. It is only by including in our purview the whole of history, and even many ages before its dawn, that we can venture on any forecast, however general, of the future of humanity. It is only thus that we can appreciate the fact that the movement of the race has been progressive. But it does not follow from this that progress will continue indefinitely, or, if it continues, that it will be on its present lines. If we learn anything from the long past, it is the disappearance of the special type. In the short history of man alone, whole nations, whole civilisations have decayed and been swept away. Progress is only general. Change is unceasing and inevitable: we are changing now, but whether it be the change of progress or decay the future alone will show. We can only conjecture. Ultimately "the large map" may not include our ideals at all. Perhaps Mr Schiller, the Dean of St Paul's, and other "pessimists" will be right, and the white races will so diminish and degenerate that the yellow will become the rulers of the world.

The same formula of the "One and Many" stands for a wholeness of general outlook. To our author the ordinary hard-and-fast distinctions between good and evil, Church and World, and the like, are merely relative: there is a *communicatio idiomatum*: "there is a soul of goodness in things evil" (p. 263). This, within limits, is good philosophy, but it is the view of the thinker rather than the man of action. "It is possible" (p. 343) "to see too many sides of the question to take up any one with decision: it is the fanatics, the men of one idea, who act." But, besides this, it must be remembered that this formula is no more than a category of space and spatialised time: it cannot touch the ultimate nature of spirit, for which such qualities as good and evil must stand in absolute opposition. The world-picture is composed of light and darkness: they shade off one into the other; yet nothing can bridge the gulf between their natures.

The controversy between Harnack and Loisy, to which our author turns in his essay on "Development," is one of enduring significance. He shows very clearly that, while Loisy is right historically, Harnack's principle is true from the point of view of religion and philosophy. But here a distinction must be drawn between the general principle and its application. Though the nature of mind is such that a purely positive view is impossible, however necessary it may be to approximate thereto for scientific purposes (p. 436); though mind cannot but assign special values and distinguish between the permanent and the passing; yet it must not be forgotten that such distinctions cannot be exempted from the relativity which attaches to all thought. The notion of permanency is an abstraction and cannot be otherwise. Loisy was right in pointing out that Harnack's "essence" represented no more than his individual faith, and that consequently he

was wrong in treating it as the final metaphysical residuum of a scientific analysis. In point of fact, it is open to everyone who reflects to find his own "essence of Christianity," which need not be that of Harnack. And this is what has actually taken place. Some have found their absolute in the life and character, some in the doctrine, some in the death, and others in the resurrection of Jesus. The latter seems to have been the ruling idea of the Apostles, to judge by their preaching as recorded in the Acts, and also of the sub-Apostolic Church; with all the belief implied, the superior reality of the unseen life, the nearness of that life to the veil of phenomena, and the Presence in the Eucharist as at Emmaus.

If a part of the doctrine of Jesus, as recorded in the Gospels, be regarded as the permanent element, great care must be taken to put the emphasis in the right place. Was Harnack right in laying it "on the Fatherhood of God and brotherhood of man," or are there other elements which are relatively more permanent? Mr Fawkes agrees with Harnack in this matter, but it is not everyone who will do so. Even if the idea of "Sonship" were, as our author asserts, absolutely incompatible with that of "mediation," which it is not, this would not compel us to believe that Jesus used it with an anti-legal bias. Even if he had intended this, the Jews would not so have understood it. The symbol was a familiar one in their ancient Scriptures, and they found no more difficulty in reconciling it with the sacrifices of the Law than did Christians afterwards with the mediatorship of Christ. There is absolutely no warrant in the text of the Gospels for this assumption as to the attitude of Jesus towards the ceremonial Law. It would have been an extraordinary and unnatural phenomenon, had one brought up amidst his surroundings posed as an anti-legal revolutionary. And there is no evidence of anything of the kind. On the contrary, whatever evidence exists points to no such sudden breach with the past, but to the fact that in this, as in other respects, he accepted and utilised, or at least conformed to, the current religious ideas and worship. He denounced the scribes and Pharisees, but not the priests or the ceremonial Law. The Fourth Gospel, from which our author quotes the well-known text about spiritual worship, represents him as a frequenter of the temple. He proposed to spiritualise the Law, not to overthrow it, to cleanse it from Rabbinical accretions and perversions, to purge his "Father's house." Had his attitude been otherwise, had he taught his Apostles differently, no special revelation to St Peter would have been needed that the door might be opened to the Gentiles, and still less would the question have subsequently arisen as to the necessity of Gentile observance. To read such a notion into the doctrine of Jesus is an anachronism, due to the desire to make the ideas of Sonship and Fatherhood more prominent. In his own spirit he was free, because he was free from sin. His own sense of Sonship was perfect and unclouded, because the lower elements of his nature were in perfect harmony with the higher. But no mortal has shared that perfect freedom with him. It is this perfection of character, this realisation of the ideal



in the actual, which is his unique glory, as it is that which constitutes his "Divinity." But he came to a world of sinners, to reconcile them to God. He would therefore have recognised that, for those who had not taken even the first steps in the narrow, upward path to interior freedom, the Law was still in force. The symbols of the old Law, by which man was put in mind of his need of inward purification before he could approach the Divine, were, it is true, soon to pass away and to be replaced by others having a like, but deeper, significance. And though Christ had compassion on the sinner, he was uncompromising in his attitude towards sin. He was most insistent on its awful nature and consequences. The keynote of his early preaching was repentance; his parabolic teaching to a great extent reflected the mixture of good and evil in the phenomenal world, together with the absolute gulf between their natures and ultimate results. To minimise this element in his teaching, or to take the parable of the fond, indulgent old father as representing its entire essence, is, then, radically to misrepresent it. Luther's "justification by faith only" was derived from the laxest and most decadent side of Catholic doctrine, in which the need of penance and purification was, at least, formally recognised, however ineffectual that recognition had become. His famous formula was, in fact, a plenary indulgence on a larger scale than had ever yet been offered, and that "without money and without price." In the Church, Jansenism; among Protestants, Puritanism, were the inevitable and wholesome, though extreme, reactions against such lax doctrine. No doubt, it is pleasing to "the natural man," and this factor at least partially accounts for the swift success of the Reformation in Germany. The "natural man," as Mr Fawkes says, loves easy ways of evading the Law, and Luther's was the easiest ever offered. He prefers to treat it, as did Luther, as something hostile and external, rather than to make it his own so that he can truly say, "Thy Law is within my heart." But it is not only because all men are sinners, not only because it is a pale and one-sided abstraction of Christ's teaching, that universal sonship cannot be made its sole essence. Besides theological and moral, there are other reasons as well.

The idea of God which it conveys is not only partial, but is founded on a misconception of the universe. Like some other elements in Christ's teaching, the idea of the Heavenly Father was not new. There was no difficulty for a man of that age in imagining an omnipotent and all-seeing Benevolence, who clothed the lilies, and did not overlook the fallen sparrow. But to the men of the present day such a conception is quite contrary to what they know of nature, with its hard, inexorable laws, its creation and elimination of myriads of the "unfit"; "a nature in which everything eats the other," and in which man is the most destructive of carnivora; in which vice, though often punished "unto the third and fourth generation," yet often goes scot-free in the present, while virtue, so far from being always rewarded, is often punished too. It certainly requires "great faith" to discern the relationship of father and son between such a creative principle and its creatures. The war-God of the Kaiser or of Mr Kipling's

"Recessional" is more in harmony with such a creation than is the "Bon-Dieu" theory. No doubt "all things work together for good," in the long run, for those who survive. The underlying principle, so far as it resembles a principle of human action, is the doing of evil that good may come. Evil and good, love and hatred, are inextricably interwoven in the web of life. Science has abolished the devil (pp. 401-2), only to make God more incomprehensible. And, though there may still be some who believe that they "see his hand" in their own lives, yet such an impression can only be subjective. The belief in special providences, even in matters of public concern, is disappearing; and, in private, even religious people are beginning to recognise that to suppose the course of events to be deflected and arranged with a view to their particular advantage is a piece of extraordinary vanity. The creative and sustaining principle of this universe deals with us, not as a father with a son, which implies caprice as well as love; but, fortunately for us, by orderly, definite laws, which we must ascertain and endeavour to obey. But, though we are surrounded with the hard-and-fast laws of the universe, though we are subject to the categories of time and space, we have that within us which escapes them. We have that within us which tells us we can be free from them. For there is a Law of the spirit, which is different from, and in some respects directly opposed to, the Law of nature, and it is only by seeking to obey this Law that we can realise ourselves and accomplish our inward enfranchisement. It is a law of spiritual causation and progress which is totally different from the mechanical. Thoughts and deeds create character and so bring their own retribution: "As a man soweth, so shall he reap." It is to the eternal glory of Christ that he, like the Buddha, pointed the way. He showed that the Law was no mere external incumbrance, as St Paul made it for the sake of his argument against the Jews and as Luther's doctrine made it absolutely, but that it should be made inward and spiritual (St Matt. v.). He fulfilled the moral ideal which is latent in every man, and awoke us to the consciousness of it. But the only way to win that freedom is not through "faith only," coupled with "*pecca fortiter*," but through the long, unpopular, and tedious process of self-discipline.

HENRY C. CORRANCE.

PARHAM HALL, SUFFOLK.

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*Encyclopædia of the Philosophical Sciences.* Volume I., *Logic*.—By Arnold Ruge, Wilhelm Windelband, Josiah Royce, Louis Couturat, Benedetto Croce, Federico Enriques, and Nicolaj Losskij.—Translated by Ethel Meyer.—London: Macmillan & Co., 1913.—Pp. x+269.

PUBLIC interest in philosophy is not yet such as to encourage publishers to indulge frequently in the issue of philosophical works of reference. The appearance of a new *Encyclopædia of the Philosophical Sciences* is consequently an event of no little importance in the philosophic world. The



fact that the editorship of the *Encyclopædia* is in the able hands of Professor Windelband and Dr Ruge, and that Sir Henry Jones is acting as the editor of the English edition, is a sufficient guarantee of the scholarly soundness of the new enterprise, which assuredly has the best wishes of all students of philosophy.

The form of the new *Encyclopædia* is to be very different from the form usually associated with encyclopædias. It will not simply colligate the different views on all philosophical problems, and present them in alphabetical order, after the usual manner of encyclopædias. On the one hand, it is going to be rather less exhaustive; on the other hand, it is rather more ambitious. Each main department of philosophy (Logic, Ethics, *Æsthetics*, etc.) will have a separate volume devoted to it; the articles will consist, not of bare summaries of already familiar views, but of original, comprehensive discussions of the fundamental aspects of each of the principal subjects; and the contributors will include some of the most eminent philosophers in Europe and America. The policy of the editors is an extremely liberal one—as becomes philosophers. We are assured that “any one who is to-day recognised as a philosopher may unfold the principles of his philosophising in this *Encyclopædia* of the Philosophical Sciences,” so that the work, when completed, may “exhibit the ground-plan of the philosophy of the present age.” The marked differences in the views of the philosophers of the present (as of every other) age may seem to discourage such a policy of the “open door,” lest their co-presentation make confusion worse confounded. But the editors have great faith in the convergence and unity of all the apparently different philosophic tendencies. And they feel confident that even without any undue intervention on their part in order to eliminate, select, and co-ordinate the views of contributors, the *Encyclopædia* will still have a certain unity, not the less real because unpremeditated.

The first volume issued is the volume on Logic, because every system of philosophy must begin with a theory of the forms of thought, that is, with Logic, in the more comprehensive sense of the term. The volume contains six important essays on Logic; also a general introduction to the *Encyclopædia* by Dr Ruge, and a benedictory preface by Sir Henry Jones. From the point of view of the general reader it may be somewhat unfortunate that his first introduction to the new *Encyclopædia* should be by way of the part on Logic. For to the general reader Logic is no doubt the most forbidding, or, at all events, the least attractive, of the philosophical studies. It is to be hoped that this order of publication may not prejudice likely patrons, or deter them in any way from giving full support to so worthy an enterprise.

Of the six essays contained in the present volume, the first three are devoted to a consideration of “The Principles of Logic.” The writers severally responsible for these are Professor Windelband of Heidelberg, Professor Royce of Cambridge, U.S.A., and Professor Couturat of Paris. The fourth essay is by Professor Croce of Naples, who writes on “The

Task of Logic." Professor Enriques of Bologna is the author of the fifth essay, on "The Problems of Logic." And Professor Losskij of St Petersburg concludes the first instalment of the Encyclopædia with an essay on "The Transformation of the Concept of Consciousness in Modern Epistemology and its bearing on Logic." The appearance of a Russian writer in a work of this kind is an event sufficiently uncommon to prompt a special word of welcome to Professor Losskij.

The first general impression produced by the perusal of these essays is that Logic is here conceived as a vast field of inquiry. Between them the essays cover not only the problems usually discussed in Deductive Logic, Inductive Logic, and Symbolic Logic, but also a certain amount of the Psychology of Knowledge, and a good deal of what is commonly termed Epistemology (or philosophical Theory of Knowledge). The inclusion of the last two groups of problems in Logic is a matter on which there is a difference of opinion among logicians, but the difference is not really a serious one, especially if we have regard to the way in which these additional problems are handled in the present volume.

Professor Windelband's account of the Phenomenology of Logic shows clearly enough that he does *not* think that it is the logician's business to make himself responsible for the psychological data from which he starts, and that, if empirical Psychology were only sufficiently advanced, the logician would be perfectly justified in accepting from it his psychological data in the same unquestioning way as he accepts the concepts of Mathematics and Physics; and even in the interim, though the logician must begin by defining as clearly as possible the fundamental psychological concepts which he requires, Logic is not concerned with the *origin*, but with the *validity* of ideas. In actual teaching, I should like to add, it may be advisable (as I think it is) to give a general descriptive account of the thinking processes before taking up the properly logical problems. But this does not make Logic an integral part of Psychology, nor Psychology an integral part of Logic, any more than the mere fact that physicists and engineers must know something of the calculus, etc., makes Mathematics an integral part of Physics or of Engineering. Certainly there is nothing in the present volume to suggest or to confirm the view recently urged with great emphasis by the principal exponent of Humanism, that Logic is most intimately dependent upon Psychology.

The case of Epistemology is rather different. Like Mill, Venn, and other English logicians, I am inclined to think that it is best to keep Logic as distinct as possible from Epistemology. But I readily admit that the two between them constitute one comprehensive Theory of Knowledge. My reason for preferring the separate treatment of the two studies is chiefly a practical one. The fusion of the two generally tends to encourage a prematurely philosophical treatment of Logic. The result often is that the young student of Logic does not profit as much as he should from the close study of the general conditions of proof and probability; he may even be muddled by such early philosophising, if (as mostly happens



nowadays) he does not go on to a more detailed study of philosophy. Logic itself is also apt to suffer through an over-emphasis of the value of epistemological problems. The fact that some of the most important of scientific methods are usually omitted from the ordinary text-books on Logic may perhaps be best accounted for by the supposition that the teachers of Logic (who are nearly always teachers of philosophy) are much more interested in the philosophical problems (*i.e.* epistemological problems) to which the properly logical problems lead up than in Logic itself. Yet from the standpoint of educational requirement—that is to say, as a preparation of the average student to take an intelligent interest in social and scientific problems of general importance—a fuller knowledge of scientific methods is more valuable than such little Epistemology as he can be taught when first introduced to the study of Logic. Of course, this objection does not apply to the combination of Logic and Epistemology in an encyclopædic work like the one now under review. Much might, no doubt, be said in favour of such a combination in an advanced work of this kind. Nevertheless I feel that, on the whole, it was a mistake to combine them even in this case. I think that both Logic and Epistemology have suffered through it—though, in the present instance, Epistemology has suffered more than Logic has. It is a regrettable fact that very little space is devoted to Epistemology in the present volume. It would have been much better to have devoted that little space to the further discussion of some strictly logical problem, and to have devoted a separate volume to Epistemology alone. In fact, in the interest both of philosophy and of the Encyclopædia, the editors would be well advised to adopt even now the latter suggestion, and arrange for a special volume on Theory of Knowledge. One other suggestion I should like to make, though not at all in a captious spirit. Considering the very prominent part taken by English thinkers in the building up of modern Logic, it is passing strange and highly regrettable that this encyclopædic volume on Logic should contain nothing to represent England, although so many other countries are represented in it. It is quite right that a work of this kind should be international, cosmopolitan; but it is a grave omission to pass by a country which has done more for Logic than most other countries. I hope that the omission may be remedied in the suggested volume on Epistemology.

The six essays are naturally of different degrees of interest, although they are all valuable. Professor Couturat and Professor Enriques discuss some of the most technical, quasi-mathematical problems of Logic, and it is no fault of theirs if the general reader can work up no special enthusiasm for these discussions. Professor Croce seems purposely to avoid special logical problems, but his treatment of his subject, the Task of Logic, may appear somewhat nebulous. The most interesting essays are those of Professor Windelband, Professor Royce, and Professor Losskij. Professor Windelband and Professor Royce cover the whole ground of Logic, which according to the former includes also Epistemology, and according to the

latter is only one department of a more comprehensive Science of Order. Professor Losskij confines himself almost entirely to Epistemology. This is not the place for a technical discussion of details. In any case, there is not much ground for complaint. A fuller treatment would no doubt have been desirable. One feels this especially in the case of Professor Losskij, and in Professor Royce's interesting account of the Comparative and Statistical Methods.

A word of praise is also due to the translator, Miss B. E. Meyer, who has acquitted herself of her difficult task quite satisfactorily. We may well believe her confession that she found herself "confronted with difficulties which would at times have been overwhelming but for the unfailing help and encouragement of the English editor." I have not noticed any really serious mistranslation. The real difficulties have been surmounted with praiseworthy success. It is curious that Miss Meyer should occasionally come to grief over comparatively easy passages. For instance, Dr Ruge is made to speak of "the proud overlordship of rational knowledge, which turned a blind eye to the limits of the irrational" (p. 4). There is obviously something wrong here, for the pride of rationalism would show itself by turning a blind eye to the limits of the *rational* rather than to the limits of the *irrational*. That is really what the German means, only Miss Meyer mistranslated *Grenzen* here by "limits" instead of by "borders," "frontiers," or "boundaries." The "borders of the irrational" mark, of course, the limits of the rational. Again, why is *unwillkürlich* translated by "capricious" instead of by "involuntary"? On the same page (p. 18, middle) Professor Windelband is made to say the very opposite of what he meant, because Miss Meyer translates *nichts weniger* by "nothing less" instead of "anything but." However, these blemishes are not very serious, as they fortunately do not affect any vital part of the book. No doubt more care will be taken with the remaining volumes, which will certainly be awaited with the greatest interest.

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*The Present Relations of Science and Religion.*—By Rev. T. G. Bonney, Sc.D., F.R.S.—Library of Historic Theology.—London: Robert Scott.

THE framework and scope of Professor Bonney's book are shown by the headings of his chapters. His list of contents runs:—Recent Advances in Physical Science, The Position of Biology, The Ideas of Religion and their Development, The Probabilities of a Revelation, The Possibility and Place of Miracles, The Credibility of Christianity, Representatives of Christianity and Workers in Science.

The first two chapters contain a brief but on the whole adequate sketch of the present position of physical and biological science. It is true that here and there in the chapter on physics a looseness of statement appears,



while in one place there is the definite misstatement that Lodge's experiments prove that the "ether" is not carried along by the earth. Still, taken generally, Professor Bonney's account of physics and biology is successful.

The chapter on The Ideas of Religion and their Development is, in proportion, much slighter, and might have been amplified. It gives, in the barest outline, an account of modern knowledge of primitive religions, and the development of more advanced forms of faith.

Again, the early part of the chapter on The Credibility of Christianity gives a good, though necessarily brief, account of present views of the relative ages and authority of the books of the New Testament.

On the whole, then, the descriptive part of Professor Bonney's work may be said to be well done. It is when we pass to the main theme of the book that it appears to us less adequate. If we have to analyse the feeling of disappointment which grew as we read, we should say that we felt that while Professor Bonney's account of science and of religious origins had been brought up to date, his views of their relations are very little changed from those which would have been appropriate thirty or forty years ago.

It seems to us useless nowadays to found an apologetic on the unlimited growth of crystals (p. 81), on the small number of species which are definite failures in the various forms of life preserved by the geological record (p. 86), on the phenomena of parthenogenesis in the echinodermata (p. 162).

Professor Bonney appears to regard psychical research as a hopeless mode of attack on the unknown, so that avenue of approach to supernatural phenomena is closed to him. He rejects "modernism" and all its ways, so that Christianity is with him literalism or nothing.

But we think the real inadequacy of Professor Bonney's treatment of the subject depends on his want of appreciation of any metaphysical standpoint. In consequence, he takes a naïvely realistic view of the concepts both of science and of religion, and in reading his pages we feel that we are being led over conflicting currents on the surface of things, and that we hardly touch the depths below, where a true blending of the waters is to be sought.

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CAMBRIDGE.

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*Lollardy and the Reformation in England*, Vol. IV.—By James Gairdner.—  
 Edited by William Hunt.—London: Macmillan, 1913.

THIS fourth volume—which must now be the last—had not the advantage of revision by the author himself. We are grateful to Dr Hunt for sparing time to edit it, yet he has not saved it from some of the ills that ordinarily beset a posthumous work. The index, though bulky, is most inadequate; even in a subject of primary importance such as "Royal Supremacy" we find the omissions almost as frequent as the entries; and,

since the indexer thought it worth while to enter the word "heretic" at all, he would have done better to perform his task thoroughly, even though the total references might have filled a full column of small print. Under two other headings—"Protestants," and "Churches, Outrages in"—we have found striking omissions. Dr Hunt's memoir, moreover, scarcely attempts to do justice to one side of Dr Gairdner's character which is even rarer, if not more valuable, than his immense industry. Few historical scholars have been so ready as he to confess a mistake, or to give the same publicity to the retraction which they had unwittingly given to the misstatement.

All that honesty and immense industry could do, at the end of a laborious career and under the gradual failure of physical powers, is to be found in this volume. But we are bound to confess that it presents less a history in the ordinary sense, than materials for a history. To the student it is invaluable; for the general reader it is too full, too dependent upon mere chronological arrangement, and—we say it deliberately, in spite of our admiration for Dr Gairdner's honesty—too one-sided. This book will indeed make it easy for later historians to chronicle the first half of Mary's reign in a spirit wholesomely corrective of Froude's bias; but this is partly because Dr Gairdner's counter-bias was almost as strong as Froude's. He was an admirable example of Goethe's aphorism: "I can promise to be sincere, but not to be impartial." His own progress had been from Presbyterianism—almost, perhaps, from inward indifferentism—to the high Anglican position; and this cause he champions with all the enthusiasm of a convert. The innovators in religion—or, as they themselves claimed with some real justice, the would-be restorers of primitive Christianity—are to him, as to Mary Tudor, simply "heretics." "The New Learning" is to him not so much the learning of Erasmus and Colet and More, as that derisive phrase applied by the old school to the reformers in religion. He loses no opportunity of pointing out the inconsistencies, errors, or illegalities of the reformers, but seldom pauses to consider how far these were really chargeable to the agent or to the cause which he championed, and how far they were almost inevitable under the then conditions of Western Christianity. This is most conspicuous, perhaps, in the chapter entitled "Heretics, painted mostly by Themselves," and in his dealings with Mary's different proclamations of tolerance, which he seems to take at their face-value. Yet in all this he is perfectly honest; he gives us an array of facts which we should seek in vain elsewhere, except in the vast mass of original documents; and to a great extent his undisguised leaning to the conservative side supplies its own corrective. Therefore, although we feel, in this fourth volume, almost as strongly as in the first, that Dr Gairdner had not thoroughly understood either the Lollards or the Reformers, yet we welcome this posthumous work as a most valuable storehouse of trustworthy facts, and as certain to stimulate thought even along those lines which the author himself was apparently too preoccupied to follow.

G. G. COULTON.



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